/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/230904.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, September 4, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 177
Headlines
B R A Z I L
BRAZIL: In July, Government Continued to Incur Debt
BRAZIL: To Send Business Leaders to Cuba in Push to Rebuild Ties
STATE OF MARANHAO: Fitch Lowers LongTerm IDR to 'B', Outlook Stable
C H I L E
CHILE: IMF Says Economy Remains Exposed to Elevated External Risks
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Storm Franklin Affects Food Supply
E C U A D O R
FIDEICOMISO MERCANTIL 5: Fitch Cuts Rating to CCC+sf on 3 Tranches
P E R U
PERU: Slashes Growth Outlook Amid Falling Copper Investment
P U E R T O R I C O
GRUPO HIMA: Seeks Approval to Hire Lugo Mender Group as Attorney
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Looming Shortages Threaten Cocoa Industry
X X X X X X X X
[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Aug. 28 to Sept. 1, 2023
- - - - -
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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: In July, Government Continued to Incur Debt
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Richard Mann at Rio Times Online reports that in July, the
Brazilian government continued to incur debt. Lula's government
dues increased to 74.1% of its GDP, up 0.5% from June.
This means the liabilities increased from BRL7.6 trillion (US$1.57
trillion) to BRL7.7 trillion (US$1.59 trillion), according to Rio
Times Online.
The Central Bank shared this information on August 31, 2023. This
debt includes money owed by federal, INSS, state, and municipal
governments, the report notes.
Jair Bolsonaro, the president before Lula, finished his term with
the smallest public debt in over five years, the report adds.
About Brazil
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva won the 2022
Brazilian general election. He was sworn in on January 1, 2023, as
the 39th president of Brazil, succeeding Jair Bolsonaro.
Fitch Ratings upgraded on July 26, 2023, Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB', from 'BB-',
with a Stable Outlook. The upgrade reflects better-than-expected
macroeconomic and fiscal performance amid successive shocks in
recent years, proactive policies and reforms that have supported
this, and Fitch's expectation that the new government will work
toward further improvements.
In mid-June 2023, S&P Global Ratings, revised the outlook on its
long-term global scale ratings on Brazil to positive from stable.
S&P affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on Brazil. S&P also affirmed its
'brAAA' national scale rating, and the outlook remains stable. The
transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'BB+'. The positive
outlook reflects signs of greater certainty about stable fiscal and
monetary policy that could benefit Brazil's still-low GDP growth
prospects. Continued GDP growth plus the emerging framework for
fiscal policy could result in a smaller government debt burden than
expected, which could support monetary flexibility and sustain the
country's net external position.
Moody's credit rating for Brazil was last set at Ba2 in 2018 with
stable outlook. Moody's affirmed the Ba2 issuer ratings and
senior unsecured bond ratings in April 2022.
DBRS Inc., on August 15, 2023, upgraded Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer Ratings to BB from BB (low).
At the same time, DBRS Morningstar confirmed Brazil's
Short-term Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer Ratings at R-4.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.(March 2018).
BRAZIL: To Send Business Leaders to Cuba in Push to Rebuild Ties
----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Carvalho at Bloomberg News reports that a delegation of at
least 30 Brazilian business leaders will travel to Havana in search
of opportunities to boost trade with Cuba, the latest step in
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's push to repair relations
between the two nations.
The four-day mission will take place ahead of Lula's own trip to
the Caribbean island, where he will meet with Cuba leader Miguel
Diaz-Canel and take part in the Group of 77 meetings, a United
Nations economic summit of developing countries, according to
Bloomberg News.
Brazil's ties with Cuba deteriorated under right-wing former
president Jair Bolsonaro, although they were never fully severed.
Since taking office in January, Lula has sought to rebuild
relations with both Havana and Venezuela, and met with Diaz-Canel
on the sidelines of a global finance summit in Paris earlier this
year, Bloomberg News discloses.
That has created an opening for industry leaders eager to bolster
trade relationships, according to Jorge Viana, the head of the
Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, or Apex, which is
leading the trip, Bloomberg News says.
"That's an opportunity to to resume our trade relations, after the
previous Brazilian government left Cuba aside," Viana said in a
statement, Bloomberg News notes. "It makes no sense for Brazil to
turn its back on Central America and the Caribbean countries,
including Cuba, as we have done for the past four years,"
Bloomberg News discloses.
Brazil is the fourth-largest supplier of goods to Cuba, behind only
Spain, China and the United States, according to Apex. But the
volume of its exports in 2022 was little more than half of what it
sent to the island 10 years earlier, Bloomberg News relays.
The trip will include business leaders from the air transportation,
agriculture, energy and health industries, Bloomberg News says.
The names of those joining the delegation were not disclosed,
Bloomberg News notes.
Food, industrial machinery, transportation equipment and chemicals
are the areas with the largest export opportunities in Cuba,
according to Apex, Bloomberg News relays. The agency also expects
the creation of a commercial airline route connecting Sao Paulo and
Havana, it said in the statement obtained by Bloomberg News.
Lula will also travel to New York for the United Nations General
Assembly this month, Bloomberg News notes. He is planning to meet
there with US President Joe Biden, whose efforts to reorient
Washington's policy toward its longtime adversaries in Havana have
been largely overshadowed by other global priorities, Bloomberg
News adds.
About Brazil
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva won the 2022
Brazilian general election. He was sworn in on January 1, 2023, as
the 39th president of Brazil, succeeding Jair Bolsonaro.
Fitch Ratings upgraded on July 26, 2023, Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB', from 'BB-',
with a Stable Outlook. The upgrade reflects better-than-expected
macroeconomic and fiscal performance amid successive shocks in
recent years, proactive policies and reforms that have supported
this, and Fitch's expectation that the new government will work
toward further improvements.
In mid-June 2023, S&P Global Ratings, revised the outlook on its
long-term global scale ratings on Brazil to positive from stable.
S&P affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on Brazil. S&P also affirmed its
'brAAA' national scale rating, and the outlook remains stable. The
transfer and convertibility assessment remains 'BB+'. The positive
outlook reflects signs of greater certainty about stable fiscal and
monetary policy that could benefit Brazil's still-low GDP growth
prospects. Continued GDP growth plus the emerging framework for
fiscal policy could result in a smaller government debt burden than
expected, which could support monetary flexibility and sustain the
country's net external position.
Moody's credit rating for Brazil was last set at Ba2 in 2018 with
stable outlook. Moody's affirmed the Ba2 issuer ratings and
senior unsecured bond ratings in April 2022.
DBRS Inc., on August 15, 2023, upgraded Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer Ratings to BB from BB (low).
At the same time, DBRS Morningstar confirmed Brazil's
Short-term Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer Ratings at R-4.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.(March 2018).
STATE OF MARANHAO: Fitch Lowers LongTerm IDR to 'B', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the State of Maranhao's (Maranhao)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
to 'B' from 'BB-'. The downgrades follow Maranhao's failure to pay
principal and interest on its external debt with Bank of America
(BofA) on July 24, 2023. The Rating Outlook is Stable.
Fitch has also affirmed Maranhao's Short-Term Foreign and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'. Fitch has downgraded Maranhao's Long-Term
National Scale Rating to 'BB+(bra) from 'AA-(bra)' with a Stable
Outlook and its Short-Term National Scale Rating to 'B(bra)' from
'F1+(bra)'. Fitch has lowered Maranhao's Standalone Credit Profile
(SCP) to 'ccc' from 'bb-'.
The downgrades are due to Maranhao's failure to pay the last
installment of its loan with BofA in the amount of USD56.2 million.
This failure resulted in activation of the sovereign guarantee on
the loan and a subsequent payment by the Brazilian sovereign
(BB/Stable). Maranhao's 'ccc' SCP reflects the state's low
willingness to pay its debt service in a constrained revenue growth
scenario. Maranhao's IDRs benefit from a three-notch uplift from
its SCP through ad hoc support because the federal government
guarantees approximately 75% of its debt.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Risk Profile: Weaker
The 'Weaker' assessment reflects Fitch's view that there is a high
risk of the issuer's ability to cover debt service with the
operating balance weakening unexpectedly over the scenario horizon
(2023-2027) due to lower revenue, higher expenditure, or an
unexpected rise in liabilities or debt-service requirements.
Maranhao's dependency towards federal transfers translates into a
'Weaker' assessment for revenue robustness. The national tax
framework with a limited ability to raise rates and a high
dependency on a small number of tax payers translates into a
'Weaker' assessment for revenue adjustability. Maranhao has
historically reported sound operating margins, with expenditure
growth under control, which translates into a 'Midrange' assessment
for expenditure sustainability. However, the extensive use of
earmarked revenues, high share of staff costs, salary rigidity, and
low capex lead to a 'Weaker' assessment for expenditure
adjustability. Liabilities & Liquidity robustness is assessed as
'Weaker' due to an underdeveloped credit market for subnational
governments in Brazil and the presence of off-balance sheet risks
related to pension payments and judicial liabilities
(precatórios). Stressed liquidity metrics, as attested by the
Capacidade de Pagamento (CAPAG ) liquidity indicator, translate
into a 'Weaker' assessment for liabilities and liquidity
flexibility.
As of December 2022, external debt totaled BRL1billion,
corresponding to 19% of direct debt. The state had a debt contract
with BofA that should be fully amortized by July 2023. The
amortizations in July 2022 and January 2023 due to BofA were
serviced through federal guarantees as compensation for the tax
loss associated to the ICMS (Tax on the Circulation of Goods and
Services) tax tariff ceiling on fuels and electricity. The
compensation was supported by a supreme court decision and was
valid until April 2023.
Maranhao failed to pay the last installment of its loan with BofA
in July 2023 in the amount of BRL266.42 million for principal plus
interests, converted from USD56.2 million. This was despite an
accumulated operating balance of BRL2.3 billion as of June 2023,
according to data from Siconfi (Sistema de Informações Contábeis
e Fiscais do Setor Público Brasileiro).
The missed payment was followed by the activation of the sovereign
guarantee and subsequent sovereign payment on July 27, 2023, within
the grace period. Since the compensation for the ICMS tax loss was
no longer valid, this event constitutes a failure of principal and
interest payments by Maranhao. The state also failed to pay
principal and interest on the BofA loan in July 2020, making this
the second time in three years it resorted to external support to
perform debt service.
Maranhao is currently rated 'C' under the CAPAG, which restricts it
from taking new loans with a sovereign guarantee. The 'C' score is
mainly due to the state's weak liquidity metrics.
Debt Sustainability is assessed at 'aa' and considers an override
to the primary metric. Fitch rating case forward looking scenario
indicates that the payback ratio (net direct risk to operating
balance) - the primary metric of the debt sustainability assessment
- will reach an average of 3.8x for the 2025-2027 period, which is
aligned with a 'aaa' assessment. The actual debt service coverage
ratio - the secondary metric - is projected at 1.5x for the average
of 2025-2027, aligned with an 'a' assessment. Fiscal debt burden is
projected at 15.3% for the same period. The final 'aa' debt
sustainability assessment reflects the two-notch difference between
the primary and secondary metrics.
Sovereign Ad Hoc Support: Maranhao's 'B' IDRs benefit from a
three-notch uplift from its SCP through ad hoc support because the
federal government guarantees approximately 75% of its debt.
ESG Governance - Creditor Rights: Maranhao's recent use of
sovereign support to cover its external debt service reflects the
breach of legal documentation stating full debt service payments
and the state's very low willingness to pay.
DERIVATION SUMMARY
Maranhao's SCP of 'ccc' reflects substantial credit risk,
considering the state's low willingness to pay for its debt service
without resorting to external support in an environment of
constrained revenue growth. The state's Risk Profile is assessed at
'Weaker'. Maranhao's debt sustainability is assessed at 'aa' under
Fitch's rating case. A 'Weaker' Risk Profile coupled with a debt
sustainability score of 'aa' would typically lead to an SCP in the
'bb' category.
However, Fitch is also factoring in the recent failure of payment
as an issuer-specific key rating driver, as per the local and
regional governments (LRG) master criteria. Maranhao's IDR of 'B'
benefits from a three-notches uplift from its SCP through ad hoc
support, considering that the federal government guarantees
approximately 75% of its debt. Its national scale rating of
'BB+(bra)' is based on the national ratings correspondence table
and a national peer comparison.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:
- Maranhao's Long-Term IDRs could be upgraded if Fitch perception
of the state's willingness to service debt in a timely manner and
without federal support improves.
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:
- Maranhao's IDRs could be downgraded if Fitch's perception of
federal support to service guaranteed debt weakens;
- Maranhao's IDRs could be downgraded if the share of federal
guaranteed debt to total direct debt decreases substantially;
- Maranhao's SCP could be downgraded if Fitch's perception that the
state may fail to pay principal and interests without external
support in the following 12- to 24-month period deteriorates.
ISSUER PROFILE
Fitch classifies Maranhao as a Type B LRG, which is required to
cover debt service from cash flow on an annual basis. Maranhao is
home to roughly seven million people or 3% of Brazil's population.
The state's revenue sources are strongly influenced by transfers
from the national government. The main spending responsibilities
cover education, healthcare and law enforcement. According to
budgetary regulations, Maranhao has the right to borrow on the
domestic market and externally, subject to federal government
approval. Maranhao's per capita GDP is equivalent to 42% of
national per capita GDP.
ESG CONSIDERATIONS
Fitch raised Maranhao's ESG Score for Governance - Creditor Rights
to '5' from '3' due to the recent use of sovereign support to cover
its external debt service, which reflects the breach of legal
documentation stating full debt service payments and the very low
willingness to pay. This has a negative impact on the credit
profile and is highly relevant to the rating, resulting in an
implicitly lower rating.
Fitch raised Maranhao's ESG Score for Governance - Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption to '4'
from '3' because the government's effectiveness and institutional
and regulatory quality were not sufficient to prevent the state
from resorting to external financial support. This has a negative
impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the rating in
conjunction with other factors.
Maranhao has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Population
Demographics due to the negative weight the state's poverty rate
has on its revenue raising ability and the pressing demand for
expenditures in health, education and other social services. This
has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.
Maranhao has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Development,
Health and Education due to its Human Development Index (calculated
as a geometric average of health, education and income), which is
close to the bottom of the ranking among Brazilian states. This has
a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
Maranhao,
State of LT IDR B Downgrade BB-
ST ID B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR B Downgrade BB-
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Natl LT BB+(bra) Downgrade AA-(bra)
Natl ST B(bra) Downgrade F1+(bra)
=========
C H I L E
=========
CHILE: IMF Says Economy Remains Exposed to Elevated External Risks
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
completed on August 23, 2023, the mid-term review of Chile's
qualification under the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) arrangement. The
Executive Board reaffirmed Chile's continued qualification to
access FCL resources.
The current two-year FCL arrangement for Chile was approved by the
IMF's Executive Board on August 29, 2022 (see Press Release No.
22/294), in the amount of SDR 13.954 billion (800 percent of quota,
around US$18.5 billion[2]). The Chilean authorities reiterated
their intention to continue to treat the arrangement as
precautionary. The authorities intend to gradually exit the
arrangement conditional on external developments and risks.
Following the Executive Board's discussion on Chile, Ms. Antoinette
Sayeh, Deputy Managing Director, made the following statement:
"Following the macroeconomic imbalances that built up in 2021-22,
the Chilean economy is approaching the end of its adjustment cycle
towards more sustainable growth and lower inflation in a
challenging external environment. The authorities are implementing
very strong policies to preserve macroeconomic stability and
rebuild buffers. The government has reform ambitions to raise tax
revenues, reduce inequality, reform pensions and health care, as
well as foster a green economy.
"The Chilean economy remains exposed to elevated external risks
tied to a possible abrupt global slowdown and sharply tighter
global financial conditions, which could lead to lower and more
volatile commodity prices and a decline in capital inflows.
Domestic risks have largely subsided with the narrowing of
uncertainty around the constitutional reform process, while the
risk of social discontent over unmet demands and security
deterioration and uncertainty related to the health care sector
remain. However, Chile's very strong economic fundamentals and
institutional policy frameworks—anchored in the
inflation-targeting framework, the structural fiscal balance rule,
a flexible exchange rate, and effective financial regulation and
supervision—support Chile's resilience and capacity to respond to
shocks.
"In this context, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) will continue to
provide a valuable buffer against tail risks and boost market
confidence by reinforcing Chile's policy and institutional
strengths. The authorities remain committed to treat the FCL
arrangement as precautionary and gradually exit conditional on
external risk developments."
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Storm Franklin Affects Food Supply
------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that since not enough products are entering
the Mercado Nuevo de Villas Agricolas because of the effects of the
storm Franklin on transportation and production, the supply of
agricultural products for Greater Santo Domingo could be affected.
Although operations resumed at the Mercado Nuevo, the quantities of
products offered were minimal because little merchandise entered
the market, according to Dominican Today.
The products sold were those the market received, according to
vendors consulted, who also added that their goods were few due to
the two days with practically no market operation, the report
notes.
According to the president of the Federation of Traders of Mercado
Nuevo, Miguel Minaya, only 20 trucks with different products
entered the market when it is customary to receive about 300 on
Mondays and Thursdays, the report relays.
He foresees that the supply situation for the New Market would be
normalized in about two weeks after evaluating and establishing the
damages left by the storm, the report relays.
He indicated that the market would be selling the products that
arrive from the provinces where the rains of Franklin did not cause
damage and recalled that the market is also of agro-industrial
production, the report notes.
"There are areas such as Moca, where cassava and plantains come
from, that did not get as much rain and so the market will continue
to function," added Minaya, the report says.
The Minister of Agriculture, Limber Cruz, offered a preliminary
balance on the impacts of Tropical Storm Franklin on agriculture,
specifying that the province of Azua has been, according to
reports, the most affected in agricultural matters, the report
says. He said that they were informed that there were about three
thousand banana plantations affected, the report adds.
About Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.
TCRLA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."
An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.
On August 14, 2023, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Investors
Service has changed the outlook on the Government of Dominican
Republic's ratings to positive from stable and affirmed the
local and foreign-currency long-term issuer and senior unsecured
ratings at Ba3.
Moody's said the key drivers for the outlook change to positive
are: (i) sustained high growth rates have enhanced the scale and
wealthclevels of the economy; and (ii) a material decline in the
government debt burden coupled with improved fiscal policy
effectiveness will support medium-term debt sustainability
The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings balances the Dominican
Republic's strong economic growth dynamics and relatively
contained
susceptibility to event risks, with a comparatively weaker fiscal
position, reflecting long-standing credit challenges which
include:
(i) a shallow revenue base compared to peers, (ii) weak debt
affordability metrics, and (iii) high exposure to foreign currency
borrowing.
S&P Global Ratings, in December 2022, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican
Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the long-term ratings
is stable. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity
over the next 12-18
months that will likely stabilize the government's debt burden.
In February 2023, S&P said its BB ratings reflect the country's
fast-growing and resilient economy. It also incorporates the
country's historical political and social challenges in passing
structural reforms to contain fiscal deficits, despite recent
improvements in the electricity sector. The ratings are constrained
by relatively high debt, a hefty interest burden, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.
Fitch Ratings, in December 2022, affirmed the Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Rating Outlook.
=============
E C U A D O R
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FIDEICOMISO MERCANTIL 5: Fitch Cuts Rating to CCC+sf on 3 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings assigned to series A notes
issued by Fideicomiso Mercantil Titularizacion Hipotecaria de Banco
Pichincha 5 (FIMEPCH 5) to 'CCC+sf' from 'B-sf'.
The downgrade on the notes follows Fitch's downgrade of Banco
Pichincha C.A. y Subsidiarias' (Banco Pichincha) on Aug. 24, 2023.
The series A notes are capped at the rating of the Transaction
Account Bank provider Banco Pichincha and Ecuador's Country
Ceiling.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
Fideicomiso
Mercantil
Titularizacion
Hipotecaria de
Banco Pichincha 5
A2 LT CCC+sf Downgrade B-sf
A3 LT CCC+sf Downgrade B-sf
A4 LT CCC+sf Downgrade B-sf
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Downgrade of Transaction Account Bank Provider: The series A notes
are capped at the rating of the Transaction Account Bank provider
(currently Banco Pichincha). To be able to be rated at 'Bsf' rating
category the Transaction Account Bank must have at least the same
rating as the notes, according to Fitch's Structured Finance and
Covered Bonds Rating Criteria.
However, in this case, the eligible bank has been defined as an
entity with a rating equal to or maximum one notch below Ecuador's
sovereign rating (CCC+), which constrains the ratings. As Banco
Pichincha rating was downgraded to 'CCC+' from 'B-' on Aug. 24,
2023, the transaction's rating is also downgraded to that same
level.
Stable Pool Characteristics: The portfolio has finished the
replenishment phase and has been static since January 2022. Pool
characteristics remained similar since issuance, while the
portfolio has performed better than Fitch's initial expectations.
As of July 2023, the average original loan-to-value (OLTV) was 67%,
the assets original term averaging 18 years and the remaining term
averaging 13 years, being consistent to its characteristics since
its issuance, two years ago. As of July 23, just 14 loans (0.3%)
reached 180 dpd and only five loans (0.13%) have been
restructured.
Adequate Capital Structure Supports Ratings: The series A notes
benefit from a sequential pay structure, where their target
amortization payments are senior to interest and principal payments
on the series B notes. Series A also benefits from credit
enhancement (CE) of 14.2% as of July 2023 and an interest reserve
account equivalent to 3x their next interest payment. In addition,
although they benefit from excess spread, due to their Net weigted
average coupon feature, Fitch does not consider this variable.
Operational Risk Mitigated: Pursuant to the servicer agreement,
Banco Pichincha will perform the role of primary servicer. Fitch
has reviewed Banco Pichincha's systems and procedures and is
satisfied with its servicing capabilities. Additionally,
Corporacion de Desarrollo de Mercado Secundario de Hipotecas CTH
S.A. (CTH) has been designated as master and back-up servicer,
mitigating the exposure to operational risk.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
The ratings are sensitive to the Ecuadorian sovereign's credit
quality, as well as Banco Pichincha's (acting as the transaction
account bank holder) credit quality. A downgrade of Ecuador's
Country Ceiling to levels below the transaction current rating or a
downgrade of Banco Pichincha would result in a downgrade of the
series A notes.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
The ratings assigned to the class A notes issued by FIMEPCH 5 are
sensitive to the credit quality of the Ecuadorian sovereign, as
well as to the credit quality of Banco Pichincha (acting as the
transaction account bank holder). An upgrade of Banco Pichincha, or
the replacement by another entity with a higher rating, could
result in an upgrade of the series A notes.
PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS
The credit quality of the Series A notes is currently capped at and
driven by the rating of the Transaction Account Bank, Banco
Pichincha, as measured by its Long-Term IDR.
ESG CONSIDERATIONS
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
=======
P E R U
=======
PERU: Slashes Growth Outlook Amid Falling Copper Investment
-----------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Peru lowered its economic growth forecasts for
2023 and 2024 amid poor weather, lower private investment in
mining, and anti-government protests earlier this year.
The South American country's economy is expected to grow 1.1% this
year, the economy ministry said in Peru's official gazette,
according to the report. That is down from a previous estimate of
2.5%, after data showed the economy shrank in the first half of
2023, the report notes.
That would mark the slowest annual growth since 2009, excluding
coronavirus-dampened 2020, the report relays. The Peruvian Fiscal
Council warned the forecast could still be too optimistic and could
see further adjustments, the report discloses.
Next year, Peru's economy is expected to grow 3.0%, the ministry
added, down from a previous estimate of 3.4%, the report notes.
The world's second-largest copper producer has taken a hit as
prices of the metal fell from an average of $400/lb last year to an
estimated $380/lb this year and $360/lb next year, the report
adds.
According to Reuters, though metals mining and production is
expected to grow 7% this year, private investment - largely in
mining - is expected to drop 4.5%, alongside a slowdown in Peru's
construction and manufacturing sectors.
Peru's fishing industry is also expected to be seriously hit by
warmer seas due to the El Nino climate phenomenon, the ministry
said, notes the report. This has devastated production of the
anchovy-based fertilizer fishmeal in which Peru leads globally.
The report relates that warmer seas are also expected to bring
heavy rains along the Pacific Ocean coastline, likely damaging
agriculture and key infrastructure such as roads. That makes El
Nino the largest immediate threat to Peru's economy, the government
said.
The ministry also pegged Peru's estimated fiscal deficit for this
year at 2.4% of gross domestic product (GDP), up from the 1.7% of
GDP recorded last year, the report relays.
Meanwhile, Peru's estimated current account deficit was lowered to
1.6% of GDP, down from the 2.1% of GDP previously expected,
according to Reuters.
Still, markets appeared largely unfazed, notes the report. Peruvian
stocks in dollars were up 1.16% in early afternoon trading last
Aug. 30.
Finance Minister Alex Contreras, in a press conference, vowed that
the government was working "intensely" to reverse the trend, and
that inflation was slowing, with the annual rate set to dip to 4%
by year's end, the report relays. He added that companies from
multiple countries including the U.S had shown interest in
developing petrochemicals in Peru.
The report further notes that government has repeatedly denied the
country entered a recession after the two consecutive quarterly
contractions this year, citing methodological nuances.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
GRUPO HIMA: Seeks Approval to Hire Lugo Mender Group as Attorney
----------------------------------------------------------------
Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc., and its debtor-affiliates seek approval
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto
Rico to hire Lugo Mender Group, LLC as their attorneys.
The firm will render these services:
a. advise the Debtors with respect to its duties, powers and
responsibilities in this Chapter 11 case under the laws of the
United States and Puerto Rico in which it conducts its operations,
does business, or is involved in litigation;
b. advise the Debtors in connection with its reorganization
endeavors, including assisting in the formulation of a plan of
reorganization to be prepared pursuant the provisions of 11 U.S.C.
Section 1123 and 1129;
c. advise and assist the Debtors in retaining all required
professionals;
d. assist the Debtors in developing reorganization strategies
to maximize the value of its assets and operations;
e. assist the Debtors with respect to negotiations with
creditors for the purpose of arranging a feasible plan of
reorganization;
f. prepare legal papers;
g. appear before the bankruptcy court or any other court in
which the Debtor asserts a claim or defense directly or indirectly
related to this bankruptcy case;
h. collaborate with other professionals which may be retained
within the bankruptcy case per Section 327 to prosecute the rights
of the the Debtor and achieve the reorganization goals delineated;
i. perform such other legal services for the Debtor as may be
required in these proceedings or in connection with the operation
of the business as the case may require.
The firm's hourly rates are as follows:
Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq. $325 per hour
Senior Associate Attorney $250 per hour
Junior Associate Attorney $175 per hour
Legal and Financial Assistants $125 per hour
Lugo Mender Group has been paid a retainer in the amount of
$100,000 for the legal services rendered in connection with the
case.
Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq., principal of Lugo Mender Group,
disclosed in a court filing that he is a "disinterested person" as
the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The firm can be reached at:
Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq.
Lugo Mender Group, LLC
100 Carr. 165 Suite 501
Guaynabo, PR 00968-8052
Tel: (787) 707-0404
Fax: (787) 707-0412
Email: wlugo@lugomender.com
About Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc.
Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc. serves as a diversified healthcare
services holding company pursuant to a corporate reorganization of
several businesses related by common ownership. Through its
subsidiaries and affiliates, the Company primarily owns and
operates hospital facilities and other healthcare related
businesses. As of August 2023, the HIMA GROUP operates four
hospitals, with over 1,200 licensed beds, including an Oncological
Hospital, a multi-specialty physician practice management company,
Home Care Service (including infusion therapies and wound care), a
free-standing Ambulatory Center and a 16-Ambulance Service
Company.
The Debtor sought protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 23-02510-EAG11) on August
15, 2023. In the petition signed by Armando J. Rodriguez-Benitez,
chief executive officer, the Debtor disclosed up to $1 billion in
assets and up to $500,000 in liabilities.
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan oversees the case.
Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq., at Lugo Mender Group, LLC, represents
the Debtor as legal counsel.
=====================================
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
=====================================
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Looming Shortages Threaten Cocoa Industry
------------------------------------------------------------
Vishanna Phagoo at Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that
Trinidad and Tobago's attempts of recent years to revitalize the
industry are flagging.
Prof Pathmanathan Umaharan, director of UWI's Cocoa Research
Centre, who is also advocating for the revitalizing of the cocoa
industry, has also discussed making chocolates locally for export -
but the remaining cocoa farmers need much more to make the industry
what it was over 100 years ago, according to Trinidad and Tobago
Newsday.
President of the Lopinot Cocoa Farmers Joseph Ronnie Garcia said
more awareness and encouragement is needed to get people on board
with making cocoa a source of foreign income and get them working
on the estates, the report notes.
"Cocoa is a very manual thing - a lot of manual labour is needed -
and then people were not going outside to do that. It was and is
still hard to get people to do it," the report quoted Mr. Garcia as
saying. "I do my own thing and go in the estate when I can, but a
lot of people grow the cocoa trees and cut it to get short crops,"
he said.
He added that the amount of cocoa a farmer would usually get before
2020 is no longer what it used to be, the report notes.
He said this is owing to unpredictable weather patterns and lack of
labor, the report relays.
Garcia added that payments to farmers from chocolate-makers were
also a problem, leading to many people leaving the industry or
hesitant to join, the report notes.
"It's only now the chocolatiers paying a little change, because
there is actually no cocoa. The chocolatiers only wanted to pay
farmers $20-$25 per kg and the farmers really had to work hard.
"Production is picking the cocoa, heaping it up in one area, crack
them, take the cocoa from the pods, clean it, put it in the sweat
box to sweat for six-seven days - which you have to turn every two
days - then it has to dry, which takes another week. So it takes
two weeks to get the get the cocoa to make products, but they only
want to give farmers $25 per kg."
This year, however, farmers got $40-$60 per kg because of the
shortage, he said, the report relays.
The report notes that Mr. Garcia added that this is one of the many
reasons people prefer to work small jobs instead of getting into
cocoa farming, but being a retired man, this is one of the ways he
keeps active.
His hopes for the upcoming cocoa season - November-July - is a
stable weather pattern suitable for boosting cocoa production, the
report discloses.
Arthur Cooper, cocoa farmer and owner of a cocoa estate in the Las
Lapas Heights, Lopinot, also shared his insights into the cocoa
shortage, saying it was because there were many abandoned and
inaccessible cocoa and coffee estates, the report says. When he
raised these concerns with a former agriculture minister, Cooper's
pleas fell on deaf ears, the report notes.
He echoed Garcia's comments on the lack of labor, reiterating that
it is a problem that reduces production, along with another problem
plaguing estates - animals, the report discloses. He said monkeys,
parrots, woodpeckers and squirrels are also affecting cocoa
production, the report relays.
Cooper's relative, who also owns a cocoa farm in Venezuela, is
faced with the same issue of cocoa shortage, the report relays.
Asked what he thinks is needed to bring back the industry, he said,
"There are plenty abandoned estates, but labor is the biggest
problem to solve," the report says.
As for machinery, Cooper said it would be hard to incorporate,
since the cocoa farms in the northern range are hilly, and the only
tool he sees helping in the harvesting process is a brush cutter,
the report discloses.
Cooper added that training is also vital as people may not know
which cocoa to pick and how to check the quality of the beans
before even cracking the pod open, the report notes.
"I was teaching, but some did not want to learn. Training is
important, especially when it comes to pruning the tree: people
have to know how to do that. If training had continued and the
government had put more money in the industry, it would have been
better than where it is now," he said, the report relays.
Asked if he believes the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and
Fisheries and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN's One
Country One Product will bring TT's global cocoa production scale
to 23 per cent from 20 per cent in 1920, he said no, the report
says.
He explained that from what he has seen recently, with people
backing out of the labor-intensive process, he doesn't see it
getting better in the years to come, the report discloses.
"The ministry will have to select some of the young people, who are
interested in it, and train them – training on the field is
necessary for that industry," the report relays.
While there are drawings and explanations to teach people the
process, learning first-hand in the field is much more effective,
Cooper explained, the report notes.
Chairman of the North Ridge Cocoa and Coffee Co-operative Winston
Maraj added, "In my view, the resources of the State or what's
available at the Ministry of Agriculture should come directly to
the cocoa enterprises themselves - farmers, processors,
manufacturers. Instead of going to consultants, the money needs to
be at the level of the producer," the report notes.
To allow TT to rely on cocoa as a source of income through exports,
Maraj reiterated what Garcia and Cooper said: revitalise abandoned
cocoa farms and estates and make them more productive, the report
relays.
Maraj added that for the year so far, the company has harvested
less than 100 kgs compared to 2019 when he would get 300-400 kgs of
cocoa, the report says.
Asked what he thinks is needed for the industry to thrive again, he
said, "For the farmers, we need to change the idea of it being
called a cocoa estate or cocoa space, because there are other
streams of income needed, through rearing bees or even producing
other crops," the report says.
President of the Lopinot Tourism Association Donna Mora said the
shortage is affecting her business, as she is unable to offer the
wide variety of products - cocoa wine, cocoa balls, cocoa powder
and soaps - and the well-anticipated dancing the cocoa, which
allows air to flow through the beans so they dry evenly. People
come to the tours by the association to see and experience this
cocoa dance, the report discloses.
Mora said, "We hope this doesn't turn into a crisis, because if the
shortage continues, we will have to totally shut down the chocolate
factory section of our tours," the report says.
She said the chocolate factory alone generates 75 per cent of the
association's income through these tours, the report adds.
===============
X X X X X X X X
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[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Aug. 28 to Sept. 1, 2023
--------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr
------ --- ----- -------- ------- ----
Ecopetrol SA 4.6 75 11/02/2031 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 63.9 11/02/2051 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 65.5 05/28/2045 CO USD
Lani Finance 3.1 68.6 10/19/2048 KY AUD
Lani Finance 1.9 63.3 10/19/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.7 60 03/14/2049 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.9 62.3 09/20/2048 KY EUR
QNB Finance 3.4 75.4 10/21/2039 KY AUD
QNB Finance 13.5 55.7 10/06/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 2.9 75.3 12/04/2035 KY AUD
Ruta del Maipo 2.3 53.5 12/15/2024 CL CLP
Santander Consumer 2.9 73.1 11/27/2034 CL AUD
Seagate HDD Cayman 3.4 73.4 07/15/2031 KY USD
Seazen Group 4.5 63.6 07/13/2025 KY USD
Silk Road Investments 2.9 68.8 01/23/2042 KY AUD
Simpar Finance 10.8 73.8 02/12/2028 BR BRL
Simpar Finance 10.8 73.8 02/12/2028 BR BRL
Skylark 1.8 58.2 04/04/2039 KY GBP
Panama Bond 4.5 73.5 01/19/2063 PA USD
Panama Bond 4.3 74.8 04/29/2053 PA USD
Panama Bond 3.9 66.8 07/23/2060 PA USD
Earls Eight 0.1 63.8 12/20/2031 KY AUD
Earls Eight 2.3 75.2 05/20/2032 KY AUD
Tencent Holdings 3.8 74.1 04/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 72.3 04/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 66.2 06/03/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 66.5 06/03/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 63 06/03/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 63.5 06/03/2060 KY USD
Three Gorges Finance 3.2 74.2 10/16/2049 KY USD
Chile Bond 1.3 52 01/22/2051 CL EUR
Chile Bond 3.1 66.9 01/22/2061 CL USD
Chile Bond 1.3 65.4 01/29/2040 CL EUR
Chile Bond 1.3 71.2 07/26/2036 CL EUR
Chile Bond 3.3 66.6 09/21/2071 CL USD
KWG Group Holdings 7.4 15.8 01/13/2027 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 6 40.8 01/14/2024 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 5.9 22.2 11/10/2024 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 6.3 17.6 02/13/2026 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 7.4 26.5 03/05/2024 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 6 19.4 08/10/2025 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 6 16.8 08/14/2026 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 7.9 27.5 08/30/2024 KY USD
KWG Group Holdings 7.9 60.2 09/01/2023 KY USD
Telecom Argentina SA 1 56.5 02/10/2028 AR USD
Telecom Argentina SA 1 64.2 03/09/2027 AR USD
eHi Car Services 7 64.9 09/21/2026 KY USD
YPF SA 1 69.8 01/10/2026 AR USD
YPF SA 7 61.6 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA 7 61 12/15/2047 AR USD
UEP Penonome II SA 6.5 73.6 10/01/2038 PA USD
UEP Penonome II SA 6.5 74.1 10/01/2038 PA USD
Guaranteed 5.4 73.7 01/29/2038 KY USD
Guaranteed 5.3 71.9 03/23/2038 KY USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 66.5 CO USD
Banco de Chile 2.7 75.4 03/09/2035 CL AUD
Banco de Chile 1.7 69.5 04/26/2032 CL EUR
Banco del Estado 3.1 72.5 02/21/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de 1.7 70 03/01/2032 CL EUR
Banco del Estado 2.8 68.9 03/13/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado 1.7 69.2 07/05/2032 CL EUR
Banco GNB Sudameris 7.5 73.3 04/16/2031 CO USD
Banco GNB Sudameris 7.5 73.4 04/16/2031 CO USD
Banco Santander Chile 1.3 57.6 11/29/2034 CL EUR
Banco Santander Chile 3.1 72.3 02/28/2039 CL AUD
China Maple Leaf 2.3 75 01/27/2026 KY USD
China SCE Group 6 29 02/04/2026 KY USD
China SCE Group 7.4 56.2 04/09/2024 KY USD
China SCE Group 7 35.2 05/02/2025 KY USD
China SCE Group 6 42.9 09/29/2024 KY USD
Colombia Bond 7.3 71.3 10/18/2034 CO COP
Colombia Bond 7.3 71.3 10/18/2034 CO COP
Colombia Bond 7.3 61.5 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Bond 7.3 61.5 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Bond 3.9 54.8 02/15/2061 CO USD
Colombia Bond 4.1 61.9 02/22/2042 CO USD
Colombia Bond 5.6 72.7 02/26/2044 CO USD
Colombia Bond 3.1 74 04/15/2031 CO USD
Colombia Bond 3.3 72.1 04/22/2032 CO USD
Colombia Bond 5.2 67.3 05/15/2049 CO USD
Colombia Bond 4.1 58.8 05/15/2051 CO USD
Colombia Bond 5 66.9 06/15/2045 CO USD
Colombia Bond 6.3 63 07/09/2036 CO COP
Colombia Bond 6.3 63 07/09/2036 CO COP
Earls Eight 1.7 71.4 06/20/2032 KY AUD
Helenbergh China 8 32.9 11/07/2024 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings 6.1 41 10/13/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings 5.5 45 04/21/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings 5.5 39.2 05/17/2026 KY USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA 4.6 72.1 09/27/2051 CL USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA 4.6 72.1 09/27/2051 CL USD
Alibaba Group 2.7 67.4 02/09/2041 KY USD
Alibaba Group 3.2 65.2 02/09/2051 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings 5.8 50.2 01/02/2025 KY USD
QNB Finance 11.5 62.1 1/30/2025 KY TRY
SYN prop e tech SA 13.6 20.3 3/15/2024 BR BRL
Yango Cayman 12 3.9 09/15/2023 KY USD
MSU Energy SA 6.9 70.8 02/01/2025 AR USD
MSU Energy SA 6.9 71.2 02/01/2025 AR USD
Itau Unibanco SA 5.8 19.4 05/20/2027 BR BRL
Jamaica Government 8.5 68.9 12/21/2061 JM JMD
Jamaica Government 6.3 72.7 07/11/2048 JM JMD
Kaisa Group Holdings 10.9 9.1 KY USD
Fospar S/A 6.5 1.3 05/15/2026 BR BRL
Frigorifico 7.7 71.1 07/21/2028 PY USD
Frigorifico 7.7 71.4 07/21/2028 PY USD
Galaxy Digital 3 62.5 12/15/2026 KY USD
Generacion 9.9 73.1 12/01/2027 AR USD
Generacion 12.5 0 02/16/2024 AR USD
Gol Finance Inc 8.8 40.5 KY USD
Gol Finance Inc 8.8 42 KY USD
Goldman Sachs 2.3 75.9 06/30/2040 KY EUR
Greenland Hong Kong 10.2 45.9 KY USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 40.8 04/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 40.8 04/30/2025 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones 5.1 55.3 01/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones 5.1 53.6 01/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones 4.4 54.4 04/15/2029 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones 4.4 54.5 04/15/2029 CL USD
Vista Energy 1 73 03/03/2028 AR USD
Voyager II 3.3 74.3 03/23/2034 KY AUD
Transocean Inc 6.8 67.6 03/15/2038 KY USD
Inversiones Latin 5.1 44.6 06/15/2033 CL USD
Inversiones Latin 5.1 44.8 06/15/2033 CL USD
El Salvador Bond 6.4 62.3 01/18/2027 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 6.4 62 01/18/2027 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.1 48.5 01/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.1 48.6 01/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 5.9 46 01/30/2025 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.6 49.4 02/01/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.6 49.4 02/01/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 8.6 58.1 02/28/2029 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 8.6 57.9 02/28/2029 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 8.3 56.4 04/10/2032 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 8.3 56.3 04/10/2032 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.7 50 06/15/2035 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.7 50 06/15/2035 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 9.5 54.6 07/15/2052 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 9.5 54.5 07/15/2052 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.6 49.9 09/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Bond 7.6 50 09/21/2034 SV USD
Banda de Couro 8 69.1 01/15/2027 BR BRL
Alibaba Group 3.3 63 02/09/2061 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group 4.5 52.5 KY SGD
AAC Technologies 3.8 68.6 06/02/2031 KY USD
ACEN Finance 4 70.9 KY USD
AES Tiete 6.8 0.7 04/15/2024 BR BRL
Agile Group Holdings 13.5 40.7 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings 8.4 38.1 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings 7.9 31 KY USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1 19.8 7/09/2029 AR USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1 27.5 08/05/2023 AR USD
Argentina Treasury 2.5 25.3 11/30/2031 AR ARS
Argentine Bond 0.5 19.5 07/09/2029 AR EUR
Argentine Bond 1 23.7 07/09/2029 AR USD
Argentine Bond 0.1 21.5 07/09/2030 AR EUR
Argentine Bonos 16 72.6 10/17/2023 AR ARS
Argentine Bonos 15.5 22.2 10/17/2026 AR ARS
Ascent Finance 3.4 58.4 02/06/2043 KY AUD
Ascent Finance 3.8 59.8 06/28/2047 KY AUD
Ascent Finance 1.2 61.4 07/12/2047 KY EUR
Astra Cumulative 1.5 60.6 11/01/2029 KY USD
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2023. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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* * * End of Transmission * * *