/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/231016.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, October 16, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 207

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Bank Likely to Hold Rate Despite Inflation Spike
ARGENTINA: IMF's US$43-Billion Problem is About to Get Worse


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

GLOBAL AIRCRAFT: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable


C H I L E

CHILE: Minister Downplays Inflation Risks From Currency Slump
INVERSIONES LATIN: Moody's Cuts Rating on $404MM Sec. Notes to Ca


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Unemployment is 4.7 Percent, Lowest in Years


J A M A I C A

MYSTIC MOUNTAIN: Trustee in Bankruptcy Matter Resigns


P U E R T O   R I C O

CHALLENGER BRASS: Court OKs Deal on Cash Collateral Access


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Oct. 9 to Oct. 13, 2023

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Bank Likely to Hold Rate Despite Inflation Spike
-----------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that Argentina's Central Bank board
plans to keep its benchmark interest rate unchanged despite
inflation data hovering around a three-decade high, two officials
with direct knowledge of the matter said.

The bank's monetary policy committee will likely keep the Leliq
rate at 118 percent at its weekly meeting because officials believe
price pressures are showing signs of cooling in the past weeks,
according to the people, who asked not to be named to discuss
upcoming policy decisions, according to Buenos Aires Times.

A spokesperson for the BCRA, as the Central Bank is known, didn't
immediately reply to a request for comment.

Argentina's monthly inflation averaged 12 percent over the past two
months, the Central Bank said in a report published, before the
official release from the INDEC national statistics bureau, the
report notes.  That's slightly above the 11.3 percent monthly
inflation expected for September by an average of six economists
surveyed by Bloomberg, which puts annual price gains at 135
percent, the highest since the country was exiting hyperinflation
in early 1990s, the report discloses.

BCRA has refrained from boosting borrowing costs further after
lifting them by 21 percentage points in mid-August, when the
government ordered a sharp devaluation of the official exchange
rate, the report discloses.  Heightened volatility linked to
Argentina's upcoming presidential election on October 22, coupled
with a historic drought that cost the economy US$20 billion of
exports, has sent prices soaring and activity down as a recession
looms, the report says.

Outsider candidate Javier Milei, who's the frontrunner in the
election after winning a primary in August, is openly pushing
Argentines to get rid of their pesos as he advocates to dollarise
the economy if elected, the report notes.

Despite the Central Bank tightening monetary policy, the pressure
on the Argentine currency continues as the black market exchange
rate weakened to a record low of 945 pesos per dollar Monday and
the gap between the official rate and informal rates reached 170
percent, the report relays.  Many private economists see another
currency devaluation on the official rate, which the government
controls, sometime after the election as all but inevitable as the
exchange rate gap balloons, the report adds.

                         About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook on the long-term ratings is based on
the risks surrounding pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from 'C'
and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'. Fitch
typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a rating of
'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.


ARGENTINA: IMF's US$43-Billion Problem is About to Get Worse
------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Martin, Manuela Tobias & Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News
report that economics says it's way past time for the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to pull the plug on Argentina.  Geopolitics
helps explain why it hasn't - yet.
       
Over the past five years, the Fund has lent US$43 billion in
repeated bailouts for the Latin American nation - multiples more
cash than anyone else has gotten - with dismal results, according
to Bloomberg News.
       
On the eve of a pivotal presidential vote, Argentina has 124
percent inflation and its economy is in deep recession again.  The
latest IMF program, like so many predecessors, has essentially
collapsed, the report relays.
       
But the country is still getting IMF money - and the escalating
cold war between the United States and China, with Latin America a
key arena of competition, is one reason why, the report adds.
       
                  'Argentina is a Battleground'
       
In the Fund's fraught relationship with Argentina, according to
conversations with insiders at both ends, strategic considerations
sometimes outweigh purely financial ones, the report discloses.
And Argentina's growing ties with Beijing have sent rumblings
through Washington, where the Fund is headquartered, the report
relays.
       
"Those who increasingly see Latin America through the prism of a
great-power competition are very much aware that Argentina is a
battleground," says Benjamin Gedan, director of the Wilson Center's
Latin America Program, the report says.
       
A good example came in June when Economy Minister Sergio Massa,
who's one of three candidates in the October 22 election, used
money borrowed from China to pay off a chunk of Argentina's debt to
the IMF, the report discloses.  That had never happened before in
the Fund's eight-decade history, the report relays.
       
The cash came out of an US$18-billion swap line with the Chinese
central bank, the report relays.  While IMF chiefs and members are
meeting in Morocco, Argentina's outgoing President Alberto
Fernandez (who's not seeking re-election) is due in Beijing - to
plead for more of that credit to be made available, the report
discloses.  Argentina also has an invite to join China and Russia
in the BRICS group of emerging nations, seen as a rival to US-led
alliances, the report says.
       
It was against this backdrop that the IMF doled out another
US$7.5-billion installment in August, even though Argentina hadn't
met any of the economic targets that were supposed to be conditions
for payment, the report notes.
       
One telling indicator that power politics weighed on the decision:
In the tense weeks beforehand, the White House's National Security
Council was actively involved in discussions with the IMF to help
reach a deal to allow the latest disbursement for Argentina,
according to people with direct knowledge, the report relays.
       
                        Losing Patience
       
The report relays that the next IMF review isn't due till after the
election, though the timetable is complicated by the possibility of
a November run-off if no candidate manages a clear first-round win.
The outcome could push geopolitics onto the back burner, the
report notes.
       
That's because Massa's two rivals - Javier Milei, a libertarian
outsider who wants to scrap Argentina's peso and make US dollars
the national currency, and Patricia Bullrich of the pro-business
Juntos por el Cambio coalition - have both come out against BRICS
membership, the report discloses.  Milei, who's been the
frontrunner since his surprise win in August's primary vote, has
gone as far as saying he'd cut diplomatic ties with China, the
report says.
       
If either wins, the focus would likely shift back toward economics,
the report relays.  During a volatile election campaign, the IMF
was reluctant to trigger a blow-up and get blamed for influencing
the outcome, the report notes.  Without that shield, any new
government will be held to a tougher standard, the report relays.
       
Both opposition candidates are promising the type of pro-market
reforms the Fund has insisted on for decades, the report relays.
Milei says he'll take a "chainsaw" to public spending, which along
with money-printing by the Central Bank is viewed by many
economists as the root of Argentina's woes, the report discloses.
       
But inside and outside the Fund, there's a sense among officials
that patience has worn thin, and that cutting Argentina's IMF
lifeline could become more than an empty threat, the report
relays.
       
There'll need to be a reset after elections, says Mark Sobel, a
Treasury official responsible for ties with the IMF from 2000 to
2015, and then the US representative at the Fund until 2018, the
report recalls.  The US would be willing to let Argentina default,
he added.
       
An IMF spokesperson said in response to questions that they're
assessing the government's recent actions, and offsetting measures
that could help steady the economy, the report relays.  It's in the
interests of the Fund and its members to keep working with
Argentina on policies that promote prosperity and protect the
vulnerable, the spokesperson said, the report discloses.
       
The country's current debt pile to the IMF isn't primarily a
consequence of the Fund deciding to lend lots of money to the
left-of-centre government of Fernández and Massa, the report
relays.  It's a hangover from the US$56-billion credit line - still
the biggest in IMF history - handed to then-president Mauricio
Macri in 2018 and 2019, the report notes.

                       New beginning, Old Story
       
The market-friendly Macri was seen as offering a new beginning,
after Argentina had been run by the statist Peronist movement for a
decade and a half, the report relays.  He was friends with Donald
Trump, who'd done business with his father.  The US Treasury and
the IMF itself wanted to see Macri succeed, according to people
with direct knowledge.  So did investors, who poured billions into
Argentina, the report discloses.
       
But Macri's stewardship of the economy proved disastrous.  His
agenda of fiscal belt-tightening stalled in congress, markets began
to panic over rising inflation and a widening budget gap, and the
IMF rescue effort couldn't turn things around, the report notes.
Voters booted him out of office in 2019, the report recalls.  
       
Since then, while inflation has more than doubled under Fernández
and growth was hit by the pandemic and a severe drought,
Argentina's IMF programs have basically consisted of rolling over
debt without implementing much in the way of reform, the report
notes.
       
Before receiving the August payment, Massa did agree to devalue the
peso by 18 percent - which has pushed inflation even higher, the
report notes.  But within days of getting the money, the economy
chief turned his back on austerity commitments and went on a
spending spree to win votes.  He increased welfare payments and
public salaries, and slashed income taxes, triggering a rare public
criticism from the IMF, the report says.
       
Argentines are betting that another devaluation isn't far off once
the election's over, the report relays.  They've been rushing to
the parallel market to buy dollars - pushing the peso's unofficial
exchange rate to a record 900 per dollar as of Thursday, a slide of
almost 13 percent in just four days, the report notes.
       
If Massa loses, it'll mean another political zig-zag for Argentina
- which in the past decade alone has gone from populism to a
pro-market stance and then back again - and maybe an even sharper
one if the dollarisation advocate Milei wins, the report
discloses.
       
These 180-degree turns reinforce a sense that Argentine society
doesn't know which policy framework it's willing to stick with, the
report notes.  The problem stretches deeper into the past, notably
including the 2001 crisis when a collapsed IMF program triggered
deep recession and social unrest - turning the Fund into a toxic
presence for many Argentines, the report adds.
       
                             'A Failed Bet'
       
Any post-election IMF programme would be the country's 23rd, taking
it out of a tie with Ecuador and into outright first place as the
most frequent borrower the Fund has ever had, the report says.  And
it would hinge on the next government taking ownership of tough
austerity measures, the report relays.
       
Milei and Bullrich both say they'll do so.  The IMF will lack
leverage to hold them to their promises, after letting the current
administration get away with lax policies, according to Alejandro
Werner, who was head of the Western Hemisphere Department at the
IMF until 2021, the report relays.

"Argentina will say, 'Hey, the programme you just approved for
Massa in August is much weaker than mine, so there's nothing to
negotiate," he said, the report relays.
       
Extending more credit to Argentina could worsen the reputational
blow that the Fund has already taken - by apportioning such a big
chunk of its loan book to a mid-income country, stirring resentment
among poorer ones, and with little to show for it all, the report
discloses.
       
Geopolitics helped keep the credit flowing.  Even so, at some point
the lender - and its biggest shareholder, the United States - might
call time, the report relays.
       
Dollarization could change the calculus, but under the current
economic regime "it's going to be very difficult to provide any
substantial resources to Argentina going forward," says Mark Rosen,
the US official on the IMF board from 2019 to 2021, the report
says.  As things stand, he says, "Argentina was a failed bet," the
report adds.

                             About Argentina
       
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.
       
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
       
The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.
       
S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None of
its rated bond issues are affected.
       
S&P said the negative outlook on the long-term ratings is based on
the risks surrounding pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.
       
Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from 'C'
and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'. Fitch
typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a rating of
'CCC+' or below.
       
The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).
       
Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.
       
DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.




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C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================

GLOBAL AIRCRAFT: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Global Aircraft Leasing Co., Ltd. (GALC)
a 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and 'BB-(EXP)'
expected rating to the proposed $1.95 billion issuance of Senior
Secured Payment-in-Kind (PIK) Toggle Notes due 2028 co-issued by
GALC and Global Sea Containers Two Limited (GSCL II), collectively
the co-issuers. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

GALC is a Cayman Islands-exempted company, and holder of 70% of the
outstanding ordinary shares of Avolon Holdings Limited (rated
'BBB-'/Positive), a leading global aircraft leasing company. GSCL
II is a Bermuda-exempted company and parent company of Global Sea
Containers Limited (GSCL; not rated), a leading marine container
leasing company, and parent of Seaco SRL (Seaco), and Cronos
Limited (Cronos), both of which are engaged in the leasing and sale
of maritime and intermodal containers.

The notes benefit from a joint and several guarantee from GALC and
GSCL II, as well as a first-priority lien on the equity interests
in GSCL and in GALC, owned by Global Aviation Leasing Co., Ltd.
(Global Aviation), GALC's parent company. The interest rate and
maturity date will be determined at the time of issuance.

Proceeds from the issuance will be used to repay outstanding
amounts under the existing $1.911 billion 6.50% cash interest/7.25%
PIK interest, Senior PIK Toggle Notes due 2024 issued by GALC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The expected rating assigned to the notes is anchored to GALC's
Long-Term IDR, which Fitch deems has the higher credit quality of
the two co-issuers. If the dividend payment capacity of the
lower-credit quality subsidiary (GSCL II) is diminished, Fitch
assumes the higher-rated subsidiary (GALC) would be responsible for
the fulfilling the obligations under the note indenture in full
given the joint and several guarantee.

GALC's Long-Term 'BB' IDR is two-notches below the Avolon's IDR,
reflecting higher default risk of the holding company relative to
the aircraft lessor operating subsidiary. This is due to high
double leverage of 151% as of June 30, 2023 and the significant
influence of minority shareholder, ORIX Corporation ('A-'/Stable),
which owns the remaining 30% outstanding ordinary shares of
Avolon.

Under the Shareholder Agreement, ORIX has minority veto rights on
shareholder reserved matters, which includes the ability to
upstream dividends to GALC from Avolon. ORIX also has approval
rights on the collateral enforcement of GALC's equity interests, in
the event of default under the notes. For more details on Avolon's
Key Rating Drivers, see "Fitch Affirms Avolon Holdings Limited at
'BBB-'; Outlook Revised to Positive," dated June 16, 2023.

Fitch does not publicly rate GSCL II, but views its standalone
credit profile as incrementally weaker than GALC's. This reflects
its secured, wholesale funding profile and monoline business model,
which is exposed to changes in steel prices and global trade
levels, and a fairly concentrated customer base compared to other
finance and leasing companies.

The 'BB-(EXP)' rating assigned to the proposed Senior PIK Toggle
Note due 2028 is one-notch below GALC's Long-Term IDR, reflecting
weaker-than-average recovery prospects. Since the notes are not
guaranteed by Avolon, Seaco, Cronos, or any of the respective
subsidiaries, they are therefore structurally subordinated to all
those entities' indebtedness.

The notes are the co-issuers' joint and several senior obligations,
secured by the equity interests in GSCL and in GALC, held by Global
Aviation. The notes rank equal in right of payment with all of the
co-issuers' future senior debt, senior in right of payment to all
future subordinated debt, and effectively subordinated to all of
the co-issuer's future secured obligations.

In connection with the note issuance, GALC and GSCL II entered into
an Allocation and Reimbursement Agreement, to which the co-issuers
will allocate between themselves their respective obligations under
the notes. The Allocation and Reimbursement Agreement also provides
that if one of the co-issuers pays more than their allocated
portion of the note, the other co-issuer will be responsible for
reimbursing such overpayment.

Initially, GALC and GSCL II will be allocated 100% and 0%,
respectively, of responsibility for payments under the note
Indenture and the Allocation and Reimbursement Agreement, although
the co-issuers may from time to time revise such percentages. Any
reimbursement borne by the co-issuers will be subordinated to any
obligations under the note Indenture.

The notes also include a number of covenants that restrict the
co-issuers' ability to incur additional debt, pay dividends, incur
liens and assets, merge with another company, or engage in a
different business activity. With the note's PIK toggle feature,
the co-issuers can elect to pay interest entirely in cash, entirely
through issuing additional notes, or a split of cash and additional
notes. The PIK feature adds risk when interest deferrals increase
the co-issuers' indebtedness.

Fitch expects that Avolon, Seaco and Cronos will generate
relatively consistent cash flows from lease income, which through
their dividend payments to GALC and GSCL II, should be sufficient
to cover cash interest payments on the notes at the given rating
level. To the extent that the PIK feature is activated, the ratings
of the co-issuers, and thus the notes, could be adversely impacted
given higher levels of indebtedness.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

GALC's IDR is sensitive to changes in Avolon's IDR, as the holding
company has no revenue-generating and independent operations. Thus,
in order to satisfy interest payments under the notes, GALC relies
on dividends provided by Avolon and its subsidiaries.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

GALC's IDR is sensitive to changes in Avolon's IDR, as the holding
company has no revenue-generating and independent operations. Thus,
in order to satisfy interest payments under the notes, GALC relies
on dividends provided by Avolon and its subsidiaries.

DEBT AND OTHER INSTRUMENT RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

The expected rating on the PIK toggle notes is primarily linked to
GALC's IDR and is expected to move in tandem. Therefore,
deterioration in GALC's Long-Term IDR could result in a ratings
downgrade of the notes. In addition, should Fitch consider the
interest-in-kind payments to be indicative of GALC's deteriorating
liquidity position or increasing refinancing risk, the ratings
could be negatively impacted or the notching of the PIK Toggle
Notes could widen relative to GALC's IDR.

DEBT AND OTHER INSTRUMENT RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

An improvement in GALC's or GSCL II's Long-Term IDRs could yield
positive ratings momentum.

Criteria Variation

Fitch has determined that a criteria variation is applicable,
because the "Non-Bank Financial Institutions Rating Criteria" does
not explicitly contemplate bonds issued by more than one issuer
with different non-performance risks, which is a characteristic of
this note. However, the presence of the joint and several guarantee
allows Fitch to effectively assess the note as a single-issuer
note, with credit linkage to the higher rated of the two
co-issuers.

   Entity/Debt             Rating           
   -----------             ------           
Global Aircraft
Leasing Co., Ltd.    LT IDR BB        New Rating

   senior secured    LT     BB-(EXP)  Expected Rating

Global Sea
Containers Two
Limited

   senior secured    LT     BB-(EXP)  Expected Rating




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C H I L E
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CHILE: Minister Downplays Inflation Risks From Currency Slump
-------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing Bloomberg News, reports that Chile's
finance minister played down the impact of one of the world's worst
currency routs on inflation, saying the short-term peso weakness is
unlikely to divert the central bank's plans to cut interest rates.


The currency slump stems from global economic factors such as the
appreciation of the dollar as the Federal Reserve turns more
hawkish, meaning any pressure on domestic prices will be relatively
small, Mario Marcel said in an interview from the International
Monetary Fund's annual meeting in Morocco, according to
globalinsolvency.com.

"The central bank manages monetary policy on the basis of a
medium-term horizon," said Marcel, who previously ran Chile's
central bank and the government's budget office.  Short-term
movements in domestic prices due to factors like the exchange rate
and oil prices "are not particularly relevant for decisions of
monetary policy," the report relays.

The peso hit a fresh year-to-date low after dropping nearly 14%
over the past three months, the biggest decline among expanded
major currencies after Argentina, the report discloses.

Some economists expect the depreciation to hit inflation in the
last part of the year through the cost of imports, potentially
slowing the pace of rate cuts, the report adds.


INVERSIONES LATIN: Moody's Cuts Rating on $404MM Sec. Notes to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ca from Caa3 the rating
assigned to the $404 million Senior Secured Notes issued by
Inversiones Latin America Power Limitada ("ILAP") maturing in 2033.
The rating's outlook remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of ILAP's secured notes to Ca is based on Moody's
estimates of lower recovery prospects for bondholders due to the
higher likelihood that ILAP's power purchase agreements (PPAs) with
distribution companies, that have prices above $100 per megawatt
hour, will be cancelled given that the project company has failed
to comply with the contractual provisions that required it to
maintain minimum credit quality standards. The negative outlook
reflects the execution risks on the proposed restructuring plan,
which is still pending signature from bondholders, and the very low
likelihood that the project would be able to make relevant cash
sweep payments or redeem bondholders if the project loses the
PPAs.

ILAP has been suffering from continuous subdued cash generation,
consequence of lower-than-expected energy generation, exposure to
volatile electricity spot prices and curtailments in Chile. In the
last quarter of 2022, ILAP drew $17.5 million on the LC Facilities
it holds with Citibank N.A. (Aa3 stable) significantly reducing its
external liquidity sources from reserve accounts. In the  first
quarter of 2023, ILAP reported a cash position of $5.6 million on
March 31st. Despite the issuer negotiations with its suppliers to
postpone energy and rental payments, the internal cash generation
during the second quarter was not enough to comply with the $14.1
million debt payment due in July. Unlike other power generators in
the system, ILAP was not yet able to monetize its PEC2 receivables
since it has defaulted, further aggravating its liquidity problems.
To face short-term liquidity pressures, share-holders provided
interim financing of $7 million backed by PEC1 receivables
(around$18 million) in August 2023.

In early July, ILAP announced a standstill period on its
obligations and a forbearance agreement with bondholders, initially
valid until August, but successively renewed until October. During
this period, the project company has worked with Lazard Frères &
Co. LLC on a debt restructuring plan, which draft was published on
in late September on the company's website. As part of the plan,
for each dollar of current senior secured notes, bond holders would
receive 62 cents of take-back senior secured notes, and 38 cents of
unsecured convertible notes. Under the proposed structure, interest
payments could be paid cash or in kind upon a higher interest rate,
and the debt schedule do not include any principal repayments, but
semi-annual cash sweeps will be possible starting in December 2024.
The project company would also raise a further $10 million, and new
lenders will be granted superpriority notes ("SPNs") that will be
senior to the existing senior notes. This restructuring plan has
still to be approved and signed by bondholders.

The new structure has been designed for the project company to be
able to retain cash for its operations while Latin America Power
S.A ("LAP"), the sponsor, search for a potential buyer. In case LAP
does not concretize any sale until the end of 2025, the unsecured
convertible notes will convert in equity and current bondholders
will hold around 86% of the project company. As such, the recovery
plan greatly relies on the successful sale of the project to
maximize the recovery to creditors.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

Ratings downgrade could result from the Moody's perception of a
lower recovery rate than 35% for debtholders.

A ratings upgrade is unlikely at this time given the negative
outlook and the ongoing restructuring process.

ILAP is a subsidiary of Latin America Power S.A, owned by BTG
Pactual Brazil Infrastructure Fund II (45.85%), Patria
Infrastructure FIP (45.85%), and GMR Holding B.V. (8.30%). ILAP
owns 100% of the ownership interest in two wind power generation
assets in Chile, "San Juan" and "Totoral", which have achieved full
commercial operating date on March 2017 and January 2010,
respectively, and have a combined installed capacity of 239.2
megawatt ("MW") North of Santiago.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Power Generation
Projects published in June 2023.




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Unemployment is 4.7 Percent, Lowest in Years
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the President Luis Abinader stressed
that unemployment in the Dominican Republic is 4.7%, the lowest
figure in recent years.  And that in 2022, 34% of the new ones were
young people in their first job.

Abinader stated that the nominal minimum wage has increased 43%
after two wage hikes, and the absolute minimum wage, discounting
inflation, rose 21% from August 2020 to October 2023, according to
Dominican Today.  He said this has boosted the average salary of
the entire economy, the report notes.

The president offered these details while delivering the inaugural
speech at the 46th ILO-CINTERFOR Technical Commission (RCT) meeting
held in Punta Cana, the report discloses.  This event brings
together representatives of over 50 technical vocational training
institutions from 27 countries, the report says.

Abinader called for South-South collaboration among the members
participating in the meeting to strengthen training in the branches
of technology, as this is the key to increasing productivity and
generating more employment, the report notes.

Abinader highlighted that in 2020, the National Institute of
Technical Professional Training (Infotep) had only seven
facilities, and today, there are 38 throughout the country, which
he considered a revolution since more than two million workers are
trained in technical careers and courses, the report relays.  He
congratulated Infotep for hosting this ILO-CINTERFOR meeting
because it promoted technical and professional training, the report
notes.

At the event, the director general of the International Labor
Organization (ILO), Gilbert F. Houngbo, explained that developing
competencies and learning skills are fundamental for workers to
adapt to changes in technology and the requirements of companies,
the report discloses. These are essential to building resilience in
businesses, labor markets, and workers in the Americas. He
indicated that policies are needed for people to develop their
skills further, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCRLA reported in April 2019 that the Dominican Today related that
Juan Del Rosario of the UASD Economic Faculty cited a current
economic slowdown for the Dominican Republic and cautioned that if
the trend continues, growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del
Rosario said that if that happens, "we'll face difficulties in
meeting international commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Moody's Investors Service, on Aug. 10, 2023, changed the outlook on
the Government of Dominican Republic's ratings to positive from
stable and affirmed the local and foreign-currency long-term issuer
and senior unsecured ratings at Ba3.  Moody's said the key drivers
for the outlook change to positive are: (i) sustained high growth
rates have enhanced the scale and wealth levels of the economy; and
(ii) a material decline in the government debt burden coupled with
improved fiscal policy effectiveness will support medium-term debt
sustainability.  The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings balances the
Dominican Republic's strong economic growth dynamics and relatively
contained susceptibility to event risks, with a comparatively
weaker fiscal position, reflecting long-standing credit challenges
which include: (i) a shallow revenue base compared to peers, (ii)
weak debt affordability metrics, and (iii) high exposure to foreign
currency borrowing.

S&P Global Ratings, in December 2022, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican
Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the long-term ratings
is stable. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity
over the next 12-18 months that will likely stabilize the
government's debt burden.

In February 2023, S&P said its BB ratings reflect the country's
fast-growing and resilient economy.  It also incorporates the
country's historical political and social challenges in passing
structural reforms to contain fiscal deficits, despite recent
improvements in the electricity sector. The ratings are constrained
by relatively high debt, a hefty interest burden, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.

In September 2023, S&P assigned its 'BB' issue rating to the
Dominican Republic's 11.25% Dominican peso (DOP) linked bond for
DOP71 billion (equivalent to US$1.25 billion) maturing in 2035. The
rating on the bond is the same as the long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating on the Dominican Republic (BB/Stable/B).
The country used about 57% of the DOP-linked bond to roll over a
peso-denominated bond maturing in 2026, and will use the rest of
the proceeds for general budgetary purposes.

Fitch Ratings, in December 2022, affirmed the Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Rating Outlook.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

MYSTIC MOUNTAIN: Trustee in Bankruptcy Matter Resigns
-----------------------------------------------------
Javaughn Keyes at RJR News reports that attorney-at-Law Debbie-Ann
Gordon has resigned as trustee in the Mystic Mountain bankruptcy
matter.

Ms. Gordon tendered her resignation, according to RJR News.

She is the third trustee to be appoint in the matter, and her
decision comes weeks after the courts blocked an attempt to remove
her from the post, the report notes.

Ms. Gordon said since taking up the post in August last year, she
faced challenges in executing her duties, the report relays.

A trustee in bankruptcy presides over the administration of the
entity or person that has become bankrupt, the report discloses.

This includes analyzing the state of affairs, reviewing claims
against the estate and payout sums from the liquidation of assets,
the report says.

As it relates to Mystic Mountain, Ms. Gordon said she has been told
the sale of the company and its NorthJam has not made much headway,
the report notes.

In August, Radio Jamaica News was told the sale would be completed
in September.

Sky-High Holdings is the agent for the secured creditor JCSD
Trustee Services Limited which is owed $1.1 billion, the report
relays.

Northjam Island Tours was approved by the Supreme Court in August
as the purchaser of Mystic Mountain, the report notes.

The purchase price was US$13.4 million.

Mystic Mountain was opened in 2008.

In September 2018, it entered into a bond agreement for the value
of $1.1 billion to undertake expansion work, the report says.  But
the financial troubles for the company worsened in 2020 when the
attraction was forced to close because of the COVID-19 pandemic,
the report notes.

Karibukai owns 100 per cent of Mystic Mountain Limited, which is in
turn majority owned by Rainforest Adventure Holdings Limited, the
report adds.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

CHALLENGER BRASS: Court OKs Deal on Cash Collateral Access
----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico
authorized Challenger Brass & Copper Co., Inc. to use cash
collateral on an interim basis in accordance with its agreement
with Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, through November 27, 2023.

As previously reported, BPPR consents to the Debtor's limited use
of the cash collateral to satisfy certain operating and other
expenses solely under and pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation
and the adequate protection provided therein.

After some negotiations, the Debtor and BPPR have agreed to enter
into the Stipulation, to allow the Debtor to use the cash
collateral, on an interim basis, so that the Parties can explore
the possibility of a potential consensual resolution during this
period and preserve the going concern value of the Debtor.

Prior to the Petition Date, the Debtor and BPPR entered into
several credit facilities. Specifically, on May 24, 2019, the
Debtor and BPPR entered into a Credit Agreement, pursuant to which
BPPR provided to the Debtor a revolving line of credit in the
aggregate principal amount of $2 million to finance the Debtor's
accounts receivable and to satisfy a previous line of credit.

The First Loan is evidenced by a Note dated May 24, 2019, executed
by the Debtor in favor of BPPR in the principal amount of $2
million.

On March 19, 2021, the Debtor and BPPR entered into a Credit
Agreement, pursuant to which BPPR made available to the Debtor a
non-revolving line of credit in the aggregated principal amount of
$600,000 to finance the acquisition of raw material.

The Second Loan is evidenced by a Note dated March 19, 2021,
executed by the Debtor and Guarantors in the principal amount of
$600,000.

To secure the payment and performance of the Debtor under the
Loans, the Debtor and the Guarantors granted to BPPR a first
priority lien and security interest on the real properties, as well
as personal guarantees of the Guarantors, pursuant to certain
agreements, instruments, and other documents.

As a result, in an attempt to consensually resolve such defaults,
on October 28, 2022, the Debtor, Guarantors, and BPPR executed a
Forbearance Agreement, pursuant to which the Debtor and Guarantors
agreed to certain actions to remedy the outstanding events of
default.

As part of the Forbearance Agreement, the Debtor and Guarantors
executed a Consent Judgment in favor of BPPR.

The Debtor and the Guarantors failed to comply with their
obligations under the Forbearance Agreement. As a result, on May 4,
2023, BPPR issued a notice of events of default to the Debtor and
the Guarantors.

Since the Debtor and Guarantor failed to remedy the outstanding
events of default, on June 14, 2023, BPPR filed the Consent
Judgment in the Puerto Rico Court, Bayamon Part, Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico v. Challenger Brass & Copper Co., Inc., et al, Civil
No. BY2023CV03279, and requested that the local court issue the
corresponding judgment allowing BPPR to foreclose over its
Collateral.

As part of the Collateral granted to BPPR, the Debtor pledged all
cash collateral to BPPR.

Specifically, on May 24, 2019, the Debtor executed a Security
Agreement, Pledge and Assignment with BPPR.

BPPR duly perfected its security interest over the First Cash
Collateral by filing a UCC Financing Statement on May 29, 2019,
covering all of the First Cash Collateral granted under the First
Security Agreement.

Similarly, on March 19, 2021, the Debtor executed a Security
Agreement, Pledge and Assignment with BPPR.

The Second Security Agreement provides that the Debtor is granting
and pledging to BPPR as collateral for the Second Loan, among other
assets, all of the Debtor's Accounts, Accounts Receivable, Contract
Collateral, Inventory, Deposit and Collection and Account
Collateral and all Proceeds.

BPPR duly perfected its security interest over the Debtor's Second
Cash Collateral by filing a UCC Financing Statement on March 26,
2021, covering all of the Second Cash Collateral granted under the
Second Security Agreement.

Further, as evidenced by the UCC search report, BPPR holds a first
priority lien over the cash collateral.

After the Petition Date, on June 28, 2023, BPPR sent a letter to
the Debtor stating that it did not consent to the use of its cash
collateral until and unless an agreement was reached regarding its
use, or the Bankruptcy Court ordered otherwise.

A copy of the order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=YICN31
from PacerMonitor.com.

            About Challenger Brass & Copper Co Inc.

Challenger Brass & Copper Co Inc. is engaged in the manufacturing
and commercialization of copper, brass, bronze, stainless steels,
and aluminum. The company is based in Toa Baja, P.R.

Challenger Brass & Copper filed its voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
23-01917) on June 23, 2023. The petition was signed by Abimael
Padilla Negron as authorized representative of the Debtor. At the
time of filing, the Debtor reported $1,031,500 in assets and
$2,540,722 in liabilities.

Judge Edward A. Godoy presides over the case.

Jesus Enrique Batista Sanchez, Esq. at The Batista Law Group, PSC
represents the Debtor as counsel.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Oct. 9 to Oct. 13, 2023
-------------------------------------------------------------
        Issuer               Cpn    Price      Maturity   Country  
Curr
        ------               ---    -----      --------   -------  
----
       Panama  Bond          4.5     73.5      01/19/2063   PA     
  USD
       Panama  Bond          4.3     74.8      04/29/2053   PA     
  USD
       Panama  Bond          3.9     66.8      07/23/2060   PA     
  USD
       Earls Eight           0.1     63.8      12/20/2031   KY     
  AUD
       Chile  Bond           1.3     52        01/22/2051   CL     
  EUR
       Chile  Bond           3.1     66.9      01/22/2061   CL     
  USD
       Chile  Bond           1.3     65.4      01/29/2040   CL     
  EUR
       Chile  Bond           1.3     71.2      07/26/2036   CL     
  EUR
       Chile  Bond           3.3     66.6      09/21/2071   CL     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    7.4     15.8      01/13/2027   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    6       40.8      01/14/2024   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    5.9     22.2      11/10/2024   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    6.3     17.6      02/13/2026   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    7.4     26.5      03/05/2024   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    6       19.4      08/10/2025   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    6       16.8      08/14/2026   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    7.9     27.5      08/30/2024   KY     
  USD
       KWG Group Holdings    7.9     60.2      09/01/2023   KY     
  USD
       Earls Eight           2.3     75.2      05/20/2032   KY     
  AUD
       Banco Davivienda SA   6.7     66.5                   CO     
  USD
       Banco de Chile        2.7     75.4      03/09/2035   CL     
  AUD
       Banco de Chile        1.7     69.5      04/26/2032   CL     
  EUR
       Banco del Estado      3.1     72.5      02/21/2040   CL     
  AUD
       Banco del Estado de   1.7     70        03/01/2032   CL     
  EUR
       Banco del Estado      2.8     68.9      03/13/2040   CL     
  AUD
       Banco del Estado      1.7     69.2      07/05/2032   CL     
  EUR
       Banco GNB Sudameris   7.5     73.3      04/16/2031   CO     
  USD
       Banco GNB Sudameris   7.5     73.4      04/16/2031   CO     
  USD
       Banco Santander Chile 1.3     57.6      11/29/2034   CL     
  EUR
       Banco Santander Chile 3.1     72.3      02/28/2039   CL     
  AUD
       Kaisa Group Holdings 10.9      9.1                   KY     
  USD
       MSU Energy SA         6.9     71.2      02/01/2025   AR     
  USD
       Jamaica Government    8.5     68.9      12/21/2061   JM     
  JMD
       Jamaica Government    6.3     72.7      07/11/2048   JM     
  JMD
       China Maple Leaf      2.3     75        01/27/2026   KY     
  USD
       China SCE Group       6       29        02/04/2026   KY     
  USD
       China SCE Group       7.4     56.2      04/09/2024   KY     
  USD
       China SCE Group       7       35.2      05/02/2025   KY     
  USD
       China SCE Group       6       42.9      09/29/2024   KY     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         7.3     71.3      10/18/2034   CO     
  COP
       Colombia Bond         7.3     71.3      10/18/2034   CO     
  COP
       Colombia Bond         7.3     61.5      10/26/2050   CO     
  COP
       Colombia Bond         7.3     61.5      10/26/2050   CO     
  COP
       Colombia Bond         3.9     54.8      02/15/2061   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         4.1     61.9      02/22/2042   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         5.6     72.7      02/26/2044   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         3.1     74        04/15/2031   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         3.3     72.1      04/22/2032   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         5.2     67.3      05/15/2049   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         4.1     58.8      05/15/2051   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         5       66.9      06/15/2045   CO     
  USD
       Colombia Bond         6.3     63        07/09/2036   CO     
  COP
       Colombia Bond         6.3     63        07/09/2036   CO     
  COP
       Itau Unibanco SA      5.8     19.4      05/20/2027   BR     
  BRL
       VTR Comunicaciones    5.1     55.3      01/15/2028   CL     
  USD
       VTR Comunicaciones    5.1     53.6      01/15/2028   CL     
  USD
       VTR Comunicaciones    4.4     54.4      04/15/2029   CL     
  USD
       VTR Comunicaciones    4.4     54.5      04/15/2029   CL     
  USD
       Vista Energy          1       73        03/03/2028   AR     
  USD
       Voyager II            3.3     74.3      03/23/2034   KY     
  AUD
       Transocean Inc        6.8     67.6      03/15/2038   KY     
  USD
       Inversiones Latin     5.1     44.6      06/15/2033   CL     
  USD
       Inversiones Latin     5.1     44.8      06/15/2033   CL     
  USD
       Fospar S/A            6.5      1.3      05/15/2026   BR     
  BRL
       Frigorifico           7.7     71.1      07/21/2028   PY     
  USD
       Frigorifico           7.7     71.4      07/21/2028   PY     
  USD
       Galaxy Digital        3       62.5      12/15/2026   KY     
  USD
       Generacion            9.9     73.1      12/01/2027   AR     
  USD
       Generacion           12.5      0        02/16/2024   AR     
  USD
       Gol Finance Inc       8.8     40.5                   KY     
  USD
       Gol Finance Inc       8.8     42                     KY     
  USD
       Goldman Sachs         2.3     75.9      06/30/2040   KY     
  EUR
       Greenland Hong Kong  10.2     45.9                   KY     
  USD
       Guacolda Energia SA   4.6     40.8      04/30/2025   CL     
  USD
       Guacolda Energia SA   4.6     40.8      04/30/2025   CL     
  USD
       Earls Eight           1.7     71.4      06/20/2032   KY     
  AUD
       Ecopetrol SA          4.6     75        11/02/2031   CO     
  USD
       Ecopetrol SA          5.9     63.9      11/02/2051   CO     
  USD
       Ecopetrol SA          5.9     65.5      05/28/2045   CO     
  USD
       Lani Finance          3.1     68.6      10/19/2048   KY     
  AUD
       Lani Finance          1.9     63.3      10/19/2048   KY     
  EUR
       Lani Finance          1.7     60        03/14/2049   KY     
  EUR
       Lani Finance          1.9     62.3      09/20/2048   KY     
  EUR
       QNB Finance           3.4     75.4      10/21/2039   KY     
  AUD
       QNB Finance          13.5     55.7      10/06/2025   KY     
  TRY
       QNB Finance           2.9     75.3      12/04/2035   KY     
  AUD
       Ruta del Maipo        2.3     53.5      12/15/2024   CL     
  CLP
       Santander Consumer    2.9     73.1      11/27/2034   CL     
  AUD
       Seagate HDD Cayman    3.4     73.4      07/15/2031   KY     
  USD
       Seazen Group          4.5     63.6      07/13/2025   KY     
  USD
       Silk Road Investments 2.9     68.8      01/23/2042   KY     
  AUD
       Simpar Finance       10.8     73.8      02/12/2028   BR     
  BRL
       Simpar Finance       10.8     73.8      02/12/2028   BR     
  BRL
       Skylark               1.8     58.2      04/04/2039   KY     
  GBP
       Tencent Holdings      3.8     74.1      04/22/2051   KY     
  USD
       Tencent Holdings      3.9     72.3      04/22/2061   KY     
  USD
       Tencent Holdings      3.2     66.2      06/03/2050   KY     
  USD
       Tencent Holdings      3.2     66.5      06/03/2050   KY     
  USD
       Tencent Holdings      3.3     63        06/03/2060   KY     
  USD
       Tencent Holdings      3.3     63.5      06/03/2060   KY     
  USD
       Three Gorges Finance  3.2     74.2      10/16/2049   KY     
  USD
       Telecom Argentina SA  1       56.5      02/10/2028   AR     
  USD
       Telecom Argentina SA  1       64.2      03/09/2027   AR     
  USD
       eHi Car Services      7       64.9      09/21/2026   KY     
  USD
       YPF SA                1       69.8      01/10/2026   AR     
  USD
       YPF SA                7       61.6      12/15/2047   AR     
  USD
       YPF SA                7       61        12/15/2047   AR     
  USD
       UEP Penonome II SA    6.5     73.6      10/01/2038   PA     
  USD
       UEP Penonome II SA    6.5     74.1      10/01/2038   PA     
  USD
       Guaranteed            5.4     73.7      01/29/2038   KY     
  USD
       Guaranteed            5.3     71.9      03/23/2038   KY     
  USD
       Helenbergh China      8       32.9      11/07/2024   KY     
  USD               
       Agile Group Holdings  6.1     41        10/13/2025   KY     
  USD
       Agile Group Holdings  5.5     45        04/21/2025   KY     
  USD
       Agile Group Holdings  5.5     39.2      05/17/2026   KY     
  USD
       Alfa Desarrollo SpA   4.6     72.1      09/27/2051   CL     
  USD
       Alfa Desarrollo SpA   4.6     72.1      09/27/2051   CL     
  USD
       Alibaba Group         2.7     67.4      02/09/2041   KY     
  USD
       Alibaba Group         3.2     65.2      02/09/2051   KY     
  USD
       Agile Group Holdings  5.8     50.2      01/02/2025   KY     
  USD
       QNB Finance          11.5     62.1      1/30/2025    KY     
  TRY
       SYN prop e tech SA   13.6     20.3      3/15/2024    BR     
  BRL
       Yango Cayman          12      3.9       09/15/2023   KY     
  USD
       MSU Energy SA         6.9     70.8      02/01/2025   AR     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      6.4     62.3      01/18/2027   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      6.4     62        01/18/2027   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.1     48.5      01/20/2050   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.1     48.6      01/20/2050   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      5.9     46        01/30/2025   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.4      02/01/2041   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.4      02/01/2041   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      8.6     58.1      02/28/2029   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      8.6     57.9      02/28/2029   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      8.3     56.4      04/10/2032   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      8.3     56.3      04/10/2032   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.7     50        06/15/2035   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.7     50        06/15/2035   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      9.5     54.6      07/15/2052   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      9.5     54.5      07/15/2052   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.6     49.9      09/21/2034   SV     
  USD
       El Salvador Bond      7.6     50        09/21/2034   SV     
  USD
       Banda de Couro        8       69.1      01/15/2027   BR     
  BRL
       Alibaba Group         3.3     63        02/09/2061   KY     
  USD
       AMTD IDEA Group       4.5     52.5                   KY     
  SGD
       AAC Technologies      3.8     68.6      06/02/2031   KY     
  USD
       ACEN Finance          4       70.9                   KY     
  USD
       AES Tiete             6.8      0.7      04/15/2024   BR     
  BRL
       Agile Group Holdings 13.5      40.7                  KY     
  USD
       Agile Group Holdings  8.4      38.1                  KY     
  USD
       Agile Group Holdings  7.9      31                    KY     
  USD
       Argentina Bonar Bonds 1        19.8      7/09/2029   AR     
  USD
       Argentina Bonar Bonds 1        27.5      08/05/2023  AR     
  USD
       Argentina Treasury    2.5      25.3      11/30/2031  AR     
  ARS
       Argentine  Bond       0.5      19.5      07/09/2029  AR     
  EUR
       Argentine  Bond       1        23.7      07/09/2029  AR     
  USD
       Argentine  Bond       0.1      21.5      07/09/2030  AR     
  EUR
       Argentine Bonos      16        72.6      10/17/2023  AR     
  ARS
       Argentine Bonos      15.5      22.2      10/17/2026  AR     
  ARS
       Ascent Finance        3.4      58.4      02/06/2043  KY     
  AUD
       Ascent Finance        3.8      59.8      06/28/2047  KY     
  AUD
       Ascent Finance        1.2      61.4      07/12/2047  KY     
  EUR
       Astra Cumulative      1.5      60.6      11/01/2029  KY     
  USD



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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