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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, March 4, 2024, Vol. 25, No. 46

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Banks Warn Against Inflation Bonds as Price Hikes Cool
ARGENTINA: Bullrich Divides PRO as She Backs Milei
ARGENTINA: Milei Detonates Relationship with Governors
GAUCHO GROUP: Receives Default Notice From Convertible Noteholder


B O L I V I A

BCP BOLIVIA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Negative


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pepper & Garlic Lead Increases in Prices
[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Applies for Membership in Caricom


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm Foreign Currency IDR


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Calls in Oil Debt it Once Traded Away for Literal Beans


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Feb. 26 to March 1, 2024

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Banks Warn Against Inflation Bonds as Price Hikes Cool
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ignacio Olivera Doll at Bloomberg News reports that banks and funds
in Argentina are telling clients to ease off short-term bonds with
interest payments linked to inflation as early signs fuel market
optimism about President Javier Milei's pledge to crush runaway
price increases.

Recession forecasts and a shrinking amount of money in circulation,
as well as a narrowing gap between Argentina's exchange rates and
cooling inflation expectations, are driving investors to ease off
inflation bonds that until recently became a popular investment to
shield peso portfolios from triple-digit price hikes, according to
Bloomberg News.

"The inflation decline is much faster than we expected and this
forces a portfolio rebalancing," said Mariano Calviello, head
portfolio manager at Fima, the investment wing of Banco Galicia,
which is the main holder of inflation-linked bonds, according to
data compiled by Bloomberg. "The inflation-linked bonds have to
readjust to this new reality."

Argentina has been reporting lower-than-expected inflation for two
months now, albeit still at crisis levels. Cumulative price
increases in Milei's first two months were 51.3 percent versus the
57.3 percent forecast in a Bloomberg survey.  The new president
anticipates data could surprise again in February, with gains of
around 15 percent monthly, against market expectations of 18
percent, Bloomberg News notes.

"The short end of the inflation-linked curve has lost
attractiveness," Juan Carlos Barboza, chief economist at Buenos
Aires-based Banco Mariva, said in a note to clients, referring to
the inflation-adjusted bond coefficient, Bloomberg News relays.
"Inflation data has been surprisingly downward and bond prices
continue to remain strong," he added.

Besides Galicia and Mariva, AdCap Securities and local broker Neix
have also told clients in Argentina to sell or take profits of
CPI-linked bonds, Bloomberg News discloses.

To be sure, Milei's economic plan faces steep challenges on
inflation and history has repeatedly shown that early investor
hopes in Argentina later get dashed by the crisis-prone country,
Bloomberg News relays.  For example, market optimism imploded in
2019 after former president Mauricio Macri lost a primary election,
ending his business-friendly agenda after Argentina's inflation
rate doubled in his final two years, Bloomberg News notes.  A
litany of factors - labour unions, utility bills, transport costs,
education -could push inflation higher again in the coming months,
Bloomberg News relays.  

And not all investors are shifting strategy.  Brokers Balanz
Capital and TPCG Valores also see inflation cooling, but are not
advising clients against inflation-linked notes because short term
fixed rates and FX-linked bonds still provide worse returns,
Bloomberg News says.

Until recently, investors were comfortable positioning themselves
in inflation-linked bonds with annual price gains topping 250
percent,  Bloomberg News discloses. Demand for this hedge was so
high that the bonds offered a negative real interest rate,
Bloomberg News relays.  But economists surveyed by Argentina's
central bank last month expect monthly inflation to gradually cool
from 21 percent last month to eight percent in June, Bloomberg News
notes.

"We recommend taking some profits in CPI-linked bonds and
dollarising part of the portfolio with more conservative bonds,"
such as dual bonds, said Javier Casabal, a strategist at AdCap,
another major investor of inflation-linked securities.  "There is a
flood of news showing an enormous conviction that everything is
going in the same direction of lowering inflation, in whatever
way," he added.

High-frequency inflation data shows monthly price hikes cooling,
while the peso's parallel exchange rate strengthened about 11
percent in the last 30 days to 1,100 per US dollar, diminishing the
need for another sharp move, Bloomberg News discloses.  Consumer
spending plummeted in December after Milei devalued the official
peso rate 54 percent overnight and lifted years of price controls,
cementing recession forecasts for 2024, Bloomberg News adds.

"Recession, adjustment of relative prices and zero deficit is what
is needed for inflation to come down in Argentina. Milei is playing
right into that," said Alberto Bernal, chief strategist at XP
Investments in Miami, Bloomberg News adds.

                     About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
0its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook on the long-term ratings is based on
the risks surrounding pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'.
Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a
rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.


ARGENTINA: Bullrich Divides PRO as She Backs Milei
--------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that row over funding pitting President
Javier Milei's government against a number of provincial leaders is
bleeding into a leadership battle for the PRO party founded by
former president Mauricio Macri.

From the distance of Washington DC, Security Minister Patricia
Bullrich intervened forcefully in the spat that had previously
erupted between Milei and Chubut PRO Governor Ignacio Torres,
according to Buenos Aires Times.

Bullrich firmly backed her new political boss while accusing her
supposed party ally of "blackmail," the report notes.

The report discloses that drafting a statement entitled "a call to
sanity," the PRO chair - currently on leave while serving as a
minister in Milei's government (and up for replacement next month)
- started collecting signatures of party members.

There was a conspicuous silence from Macri, the frontrunner to be
the next party chairman, the report says.

Against Bullrich's firm stance, governors nationwide (including all
belonging to the Juntos por el Cambio coalition) backed their
Chubut colleague, who threatened to cut off oil and gas supplies in
his confrontation with the Casa Rosada over the deduction of
federal revenue-sharing funds, the report relays.

The report discloses that Torres says his region is owed 13.8
billion pesos to pay off debts incurred by the previous Peronist
provincial government.

Worried by the ramifications of the conflict and the erosion of
support for Milei within PRO ranks (including even Buenos Aires
City Mayor Jorge Macri), Bullrich made her move ahead of returning
home from Washington, where she had attended the Conservative
Political Action Conference (CPAC) aimed at returning Donald Trump
to the White House, the report says.

While Mauricio Macri reportedly backs Torres and the other Juntos
por el Cambio governors on the quiet, Bullrich has placed herself
at the head of the pro-government wing of the PRO party, the report
relays.  She even met Torres on February 23 in a bid to dissuade
him from his defiant gesture, the report notes.

                      'Obscene' Threats

Claiming to represent a PRO majority against Macri, Bullrich
defined her stance as follows on her X account: "No member of PRO
can be in agreement with a threat to confiscate private property,
the report relays.  Not only are such threats obscene but they are
affirmations which scare off investments, job creation and the
progress of our country, the report notes.  The dilemma is simple -
either everything stays the same or we embrace liberty and change,"
the report relays.

"We the undersigned, leaders and militants of PRO, share in various
ways the experience of the 2015-2019 government.  The public
statements of our main leaders confirm a diagnosis - the advance
was too slow and with exaggerated prudence, for which we paid with
a crisis preventing the continuity of change.  Should we return to
government, greater courage and decision would be necessary," read
a joint statement of the PRO leadership drafted by Bullrich, the
report relays.

"The parliamentary defeat of the Ley de Bases was a heavy blow to
our aspirations, rapidly showing the difficulties which must be
faced by any reform plan and depriving the national government of
the necessary tools to confront the disastrous situation inherited.
Our caucus remained compact, voting in favour of all articles
while at the same time suggesting amendments.  That is why we are
consternated by the resistance of many governors to sharing the
fiscal effort necessary to prevent a hyperinflation whose main
victim would not be the government but the Argentines in every
province."

"It is necessary to discuss a new framework for
federal-revenue-sharing, as established by our Constitution and
never put into effect. Meanwhile we must all combine our efforts so
that this country can move past this critical cycle.  Aware of our
responsibility to support the change demanded by our voters and a
majority of Argentines, we appeal to the sanity of all who share
our vision of a federal country in which each province generates
its own funding and where banknotes are no longer printed to
finance privilege at the expense of the welfare of Argentines and
in which continuity and respect for the Constitution and the laws,
not blackmail, would be the starting-point for the resolution of
disputes," he added.

                          Divide and Rule ?

Meanwhile, Milei escalated his indiscriminate critique of the
provincial governors lined up against him on social media, eroding
his agreement with PRO, the report discloses.

Torres was singled out for criticism with a stream of insults while
Argentina's youngest governor was supported by all five of his
Patagonian colleagues, all nine Juntos por el Cambio governors (who
wrote a separate text) and indeed every governor except for the
Peronist Osvaldo Jaldo of Tucuman, the report says.

Interior Minister Guillermo Francos called the talk of paralysing
oil and gas "illicit" and "a threat worthy of [late Venezuelan
strongman Hugo] Chavez" while Bullrich, strongly aligned with the
libertarians, fulminated against "an oil rebellion," the report
notes.

While both Bullrich and Macri are keen to team up with the new
government, the minister - who seems more worried by the
protagonism of Macri than of Milei - is seeking a fusion, the
report says.  Macri's aim is not to dilute the PRO identity within
government and boost its foundational characteristics, an aim
shared by the PRO governors Rogelio Frigerio (Entre Rios Province)
and Torres, the report notes.

While the libertarian administration insists on the excellent
relationship between Macri and Milei, the former's advice is
consistently rejected by the latter, according to the
ex-president's entourage, the report relays.

Although the libertarians value the wealth of Macri's experience,
they insist that all actions are decided by Milei and his inner
circle (Santiago Caputo and Karina Milei).

                         Debt Documents

A new chapter to the conflict between Torres and the national
government was added when Chubut provincial Economy Minister
Facundo Ball hit back against Francos for making public
documentation of the Patagonian province's debt to the national
government, the report relays.

This involved the leaking of a WhatsApp conversation in which a
government official admits to "a direct order" from Milei to hold
back the FFDP (Fondo Fiduciario para el Desarrollo Provincial) for
political motives, the report discloses.  "It seems they were
annoyed by what your governor said.  They sent me this from the
Economy Ministry so I guess you'll know all about it," concludes
the captured chat, the report relays.

Via X (ex-Twitter), Ball stated: "Mr minister, I want to add to
your emails to expose the lies and bad faith of your government in
these messages I have in my telephone.  And deny it if you can if
what is communicated here is not exactly the same as the governor
telling me that this is political and a personal decision of
Milei," the report notes.

These statements come after Francos revealed by the same channel
that on February 22 the Chubut Economy minister had requested a new
debt rollover by issuing a bond to cancel the debt owed by the
province to the FFDP, the report discloses.

"Contrary to what the lieutenant-governor said, we replied with an
email on February 23 asking for the documentation necessary to
advance with the requested bond in conformity with the valid norms.
We are awaiting the response," chipped in the Interior minister,
after the warning of Torres about holding back the oil and gas if
the national government did not release the funds, the report
relays.

Along the same lines of accusing the governor of not having replied
to the government request, presidential spokesman Manuel Adorni,
ironically commented on the social networks: "A good start to the
week, everybody, and read your emails because they do not get read
by themselves," the report adds.

Speaking on television, Milei added a new insult: "Nachito is a
poor kid who cannot read a contract. What a precarious intellect!"

                      About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
0its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook on the long-term ratings is based on
the risks surrounding pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'.
Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a
rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.


ARGENTINA: Milei Detonates Relationship with Governors
------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that decided on maximising austerity as
much as possible, President Javier Milei has ordered a review of
provincial debts to the national government.  On this basis, he is
seeking to collect as soon as possible or to start cutting back on
the outlay of federal revenue-sharing funds, thus leading to a
point of no return where each governor has to look for a solution
individually, according to Buenos Aires Times.

The national government's strategy is clear although the results
still remain to be seen, the report relays.

In the course of the conflict which seemed limited to Chubut has
escalated to other jurisdictions, the report discloses.  Milei's
advance against the province governed by PRO's Ignacio Torres has
stirred things up among the governors - now they consider that in
this confrontation there are no longer enemies or allies among
them, the report says.

"We're all left dizzy by decisions which could bankrupt many. If
from one day to the next they slash 15 billion (pesos) like they
did to Chubut or 40 billion as they did to Buenos Aires Province,
we've no idea whose turn it might be tomorrow," analysed a northern
Peronist governor in dialogue with Perfil, adding: "We're at the
mercy of a decree whether or not we can pay salaries, the report
relays."

                10 Provinces with Biggest Debts

According to the edition of La Nacion newspaper, the government is
taking aim at 10 other provinces with similar debts totalling
392.104 billion pesos, the report relays.  Of that total, Chubut
owes 119 billion, Tucumán 72 billion, Chaco 63 billion and Salta
55 billion, the report says.

The provinces of Santa Cruz, Formosa, Entre Ríos and Catamarca,
governed by different parties, follow on that list with debts of
11-22 billion pesos while Tierra del Fuego, Misiones and Jujuy have
11-digit liabilities, the report notes.

Buenos Aires Province Governor Axel Kicillof gave a press
conference to explain his legal strategy to halt the cuts ordered
by the DNU emergency decree signed by Economy Minister Luis Caputo,
among others, the report discloses.  Tierra del Fuego Governor
Gustavo Melella anticipated that he would interrupt oil production
"for a day," the report relays.

"We'll be paralysing oil production for a day.  What we're asking
of the national government is to sit down urgently with the
governor of Chubut to try and resolve the situation," explained
Melella to the Telam state news agency, the report adds.

                  Dispute Moves to Congress

In the midst of this tussle the southern governors went to the
Senate in search of opposition support for "revenge" since the
emergency decrees published by the national government may be
halted in Congress, the report relays.

"A week ago I would have told you what was going to happen but now,
I cannot.  Ask me again," was the response of a key Radical
senator, the report notes.

On February 23, the Bicameral Commission for Processing Legislation
was formed to deal with this issue. Senate head Victoria Villarruel
was requested to call the session by legislators as far removed
from Kirchnerism as Carlos Mauricio Espinola (Corrientes), Edgardo
Kueider (Entre Rios), Carlos Arce (Misiones), Sonia Rojas Decut
(Misiones), Monica Silva (Rio Negro), Jose Maria Carambia (Santa
Cruz), Natalia Gadano (Santa Cruz), Daniel Blanco (Tierra del
Fuego) and Alejandra Vigo (Córdoba), the report relays.

"We are not going to negotiate with those responsible for the
imbalances. Everybody wants ordered accounts but nobody wants to
pay the cost. Now they'll have to show their faces," summed up a
Casa Rosada official who is aware of the collapse of negotiations,
the report adds.

                             About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.

S&P Global Ratings, on June 13, 2023, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from 'SD/SD' and
0its national scale rating to 'raCCC+' from 'SD'. S&P also affirmed
its 'CCC-/C' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Argentina. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. S&P's
'CCC-' transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged. None of
its rated bond issues are affected.

S&P said the negative outlook on the long-term ratings is based on
the risks surrounding pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties before and after the 2023 national elections.
Divisions within the government coalition, and infighting among the
opposition, constrain the sovereign's ability to implement timely
changes in economic policy.

Fitch Ratings also upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'.
Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a
rating of 'CCC+' or below.

The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).

Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings.  The outlook remains stable.  The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.

DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.


GAUCHO GROUP: Receives Default Notice From Convertible Noteholder
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gaucho Group Holdings, Inc. announced that the Company received an
Event of Default Redemption Notice from 3i, LP providing notice of
Events of Default arising under the Senior Secured Convertible Note
issued Feb. 21, 2023 by the Company to 3i, LP, the Securities
Purchase Agreement, Registration Rights Agreement, Security
Agreement, and Pledge Agreements between the Company and 3i, LP
dated as of the same date.  3i, LP demanded immediate payment of
the Event of Default Redemption Price equal to a minimum of
$3,437,645.74.

It is the Company's position that the Note Documents are illegal,
due to 3i, LP's failure to register as a dealer within the meaning
set forth in Section 3(a)(5)(A) the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Therefore, 3i, LP, violated Section 15(a) by engaging in
interstate securities transactions with the Company absent
effective dealer registration.  Because of these violations of
Section 15(a), the Company has filed a lawsuit against 3i in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware seeking
to have the Note Documents between it and 3i, LP declared void and
transactions effectuated thereunder rescinded pursuant to Section
29(b) of the Exchange Act.  The Company believes that the Notice of
Default is a retaliatory response to the Company's lawsuit against
3i.

The Company said dealer registration pursuant to Section 15(a) of
the Exchange Act has become a focus of regulatory enforcement and
private litigation in recent years.  Federal and state courts
across the country have been tasked to examine whether parties who
enter into various securities transactions with issuers, frequently
structured by a securities purchase agreement, convertible note
and/or warrant, are "engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities . . . for such person’s own account," and,
therefore, are dealers that must be registered with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and a recognized self-regulatory
organization, such as FINRA, before effecting, inducing or
attempting to induce an interstate securities transaction.
Numerous courts that have examined similar fact patterns have
almost unanimously reached the same conclusion: the unregistered
person acted in violation of Section 15(a)'s registration
requirement.  Upon demonstrating a violation of Section 15(a),
courts have imposed civil penalties, awarded disgorgement and/or
cancelled all outstanding transactions.

"Our focus continues to provide transparency and to protect the
long-term value for our Company and our stockholders.  We believe
that unregistered dealer litigation provides an opportunity to
protect our retail investment community from future unlawful
dilution," said Scott Mathis, CEO and Chairman of the Gaucho Board
of Directors.

                          About Gaucho Group

Headquartered in New York, NY, Gaucho Group Holdings, Inc.'s
mission has been to source and develop opportunities in Argentina's
undervalued luxury real estate and consumer marketplace.  The
Company has positioned itself to take advantage of the continued
and fast growth of global e-commerce across multiple market
sectors, with the goal of becoming a leader in diversified luxury
goods and experiences in sought after lifestyle industries and
retail landscapes.  With a concentration on fine wines
(algodonfinewines.com & algodonwines.com.ar), hospitality
(algodonhotels.com), and luxury real estate
(algodonwineestates.com) associated with its proprietary Algodon
brand, as well as the leather goods, ready-to-wear and accessories
of the fashion brand Gaucho - Buenos Aires (gaucho.com), these are
the luxury brands in which Argentina finds its contemporary
expression.

Gaucho reported a net loss of $21.83 million for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2022, compared to a net loss of $2.39 million for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2021. As of Sept. 30, 2023, the Company had $18.91
million in total assets, $11.02 million in total liabilities, and
$7.89 million in total stockholders' equity.

New York, NY-based Marcum LLP, the Company's auditor since 2013,
issued a "going concern" qualification in its report dated April
17, 2023, citing that the Company has a significant working capital
deficiency, has incurred significant losses and needs to raise
additional funds to meet its obligations and sustain its
operations.  These conditions raise substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company's operating needs include the planned costs to operate
its business, including amounts required to fund working capital
and capital expenditures.  Based upon projected revenues and
expenses, the Company believes that it may not have sufficient
funds to operate for the next twelve months from the date these
financial statements are made available.  Since inception, the
Company's operations have primarily been funded through proceeds
received from equity and debt financings.  The Company believes it
has access to capital resources and continues to evaluate
additional financing opportunities.  There is no assurance that the
Company will be able to obtain funds on commercially acceptable
terms, if at all.  There is also no assurance that the amount of
funds the Company might raise will enable the Company to complete
its development initiatives or attain profitable operations.  The
aforementioned factors raise substantial doubt about the Company's
ability to continue as a going concern for a period of one year
from the issuance of these financial statements, according to the
Company's Quarterly Report for the period ended Sept. 30, 2023.




=============
B O L I V I A
=============

BCP BOLIVIA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banco de Credito de Bolivia S.A.'s
(BCP Bolivia) Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from 'b-'. At the same
time, Fitch affirmed BCP Bolivia's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B-'. The Rating Outlook
remains Negative. Fitch has also affirmed BCP Bolivia's Short-Term
Foreign and Local Currency IDRs and Shareholder Support Rating
(SSR) at 'B' and 'b-', respectively.

The downgrade of BCP Bolivia's VR follows the recent downgrade of
Bolivia's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'B-', given
as per Fitch's criteria there is a high correlation between
sovereign and bank credit profiles.

BCP Bolivia's Local and Foreign Currency IDRs were affirmed above
the sovereign rating as it benefits from the support it would
receive from its higher-rated parent; however, IDRs are currently
capped by the country ceiling and sovereign rating with an uplift
up to two notches according to Fitch's bank criteria.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Support from Parent: BCP Bolivia's IDRs and SSR reflect expected
support the bank would receive from its parent, Credicorp Ltd.
(BBB/Negative), if required. Fitch views BCP Bolivia as a
strategically important subsidiary for Credicorp as it is an
integral part of the group since it contributes to the parent's
geographical diversification. Nevertheless, BCP Bolivia's Foreign
Currency IDR is capped by Bolivia's Country Ceiling of 'B-', which
captures transfer and convertibility risks and constrains Fitch's
assessment of the ability of the shareholder to support its
subsidiary. Fitch believes that the owner's commitment to its
subsidiary is likely to survive a sovereign default and government
restrictions are unlikely to be imposed, which would prevent the
bank from servicing its obligations.

The Negative Outlook on BCP Bolivia's support driven IDRs reflects
the Negative Outlook of the operating environment.

Challenging Operating Environment: The downgrade of BCP Bolivia's
VR reflects the increased downside risks from the operating
environment and liquidity risks associated with the significant
decline in usable international reserves to very low levels,
heightening risks to macroeconomic stability and debt service
capacity. This has resulted in foreign exchange (FX) rationing and
the emergence of parallel-market exchange rates in the context of a
stabilized currency regime. BCP Bolivia's VR is one notch below its
implied VR and constrained by Bolivia's sovereign rating as well as
the challenging and deteriorated operating environment within a
highly regulated and interventionist framework.

Good Franchise: Fitch's assessment of BCP Bolivia's business
profile balances its moderate franchise, the benefits of being 100%
owned by Credicorp Ltd., the largest financial group in Peru and
its business model concentrated in a higher-risk market. As of
3Q23, BCP Bolivia was the fifth largest bank in its market as
measured by total loans and deposits, with a market share of 9.1%
and 8.3% respectively. BCP Bolivia benefits significantly from the
reputation, synergies, technological developments and strategies of
its shareholder; however, this has yet to materialize in a stronger
franchise in Bolivia. Historically, the bank's branch expansion in
the country has not been aggressive.

Pressured Asset Quality: BCP Bolivia's impaired loan ratio worsened
to 2.7% in 3Q23 from a 1.6% average in 2019-2022, driven by the end
of regulatory and compulsory relief measures for all the banking
system and modest loan portfolio growth of 5.9%, which include a
portion of loans transferred from former Fassil. The loan loss
allowance/impaired loan ratio declined to 99%. Fitch expects asset
quality metrics will remain pressured but still on a good level.

Pressured Profitability: The bank's profitability remained low in
the midst of a pressured operating environment. Net interest
margins slightly increased in 2023 due to higher loan growth and
yields, benefited by the transferred loans of former Fassil.
However, margin pressures remain due to interest rate ceilings of
loans placed on productive sectors and deferred loan instalments.
BCP Bolivia's operating profit to RWA ratio declined to 0.74% at
3Q23 from an average of 1.26% during 2019-2022. Fitch expects
additional profitability pressures from lower business volumes, an
increase in credit costs, and higher financial expenses related to
the lower liquidity in the system.

Improving but Still Limited Capitalization Levels: Capitalization
ratios improved at 3Q23 mainly due to higher retained earnings but
still remained weak. The Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio improved by
70 bps to 11.0%. BCP Bolivia's capitalization is higher than local
peers and the Bolivian banking system. The regulatory capital ratio
of 12.5% is above the FCC ratio due to subordinated bond issuances;
however, these are not considered loss absorbing capital under
Fitch's criteria. Fitch believes that current metrics and loss
absorption capacity will be tested given the expected asset quality
and profitability deterioration.

Funding Concentration and Access to FX Liquidity Uncertain: Fitch
assessment of the bank's Funding and Liquidity profile weighs its
good liquidity metrics but is constrained by the local market poor
foreign currency availability and depositor concentrations.
Although funding concentration is a systemic issue, Fitch believes
the bank's high funding concentration is one of its main
weaknesses, but this is partially offset by the bank's solid
liquidity, reflected in its loan to deposit ratio of 93.3%, and LCR
well above 100%. In addition, liquidity risks may arise from
reduced cash flows resulting from the ongoing liquidity restriction
in foreign and local currency.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- The IDRs and SSR will be downgraded if Fitch perceives a material
weakening of the parent's ability or willingness to support the
bank;

- The IDRs and VR are sensitive to changes in the sovereign rating,
or further deterioration in the local operating environment;

- BCP Bolivia's VR could be negatively affected if the bank's
operating profit to risk weighted assets is consistently negative
or its FCC ratio falls below 7%;

- A significant deterioration of its access to funding or sustained
pressure on the bank's liquidity profile would also be negative for
creditworthiness.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Rating actions on the bank's IDRs and SSR are sensitive of those
of the sovereign and country ceiling;

- BCP Bolivia's VR upside potential is limited given the
sovereign's current rating and negative operating environment. Over
the medium term, ratings could be upgraded due to an improvement in
the operating environment and if the bank sustains a stable
business and financial profile.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The Viability Rating has been assigned below the implied score due
to the following adjustment reason: Operating Environment/Sovereign
Rating Constraint (negative).

The Operating Environment score has been assigned below the implied
score due to the following adjustment reasons: Macroeconomic
Stability (negative) and Sovereign Rating (negative).

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Fitch revised its intangible asset calculation to factor in some
accounts that were classified as other assets and other accounts
receivable under Bolivian GAAP. The bank cannot rely on these
assets in case of a liquidation process to pay for financial
obligations. Therefore, Fitch classified prepaid and deferred
expenses as intangibles and deducted these from the Fitch Core
Capital calculation.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

BCP Bolivia's IDRs are support-driven from its ultimate parent,
Credicorp Ltd.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

BCP Bolivia's Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG)
Relevance Score for Management Strategy of '4' reflects a track
record of high government intervention in the Bolivian banking
sector. Government intervention in the country's banking regulatory
framework challenges BCP Bolivia's ability to define and execute
its own strategy. This has a negative impact on the rating.

BCP Bolivia's ESG Relevance Score for Governance Structure is '3',
aligned with the standard scoring for all banks globally.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                        Rating           Prior
   -----------                        ------           -----
Banco de Credito
de Bolivia S.A.    LT IDR              B-  Affirmed    B-
                   ST IDR              B   Affirmed    B
                   LC LT IDR           B-  Affirmed    B-
                   LC ST IDR           B   Affirmed    B
                   Viability           ccc Downgrade   b-
                   Shareholder Support b-  Affirmed    b-




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Pepper & Garlic Lead Increases in Prices
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that according to the Ministry of Economy,
Planning, and Development's Agricultural Product Price Index, the
Cubanela chili pepper experienced the highest price increase in
January.  Its price rose from RD$53.8 in December to RD$68.1 at the
beginning of this year, marking a significant 26.5% increase,
according to Dominican Today.

Following closely is garlic, with the price per pound climbing from
RD$209.4 last year to RD$221.7 in January, reflecting a 5.9%
increase, the report notes.  This translates to a RD$12.3 price
hike. Other items that witnessed price increases during this period
include Persian lemon (20.8%), bell pepper (8.1%), and MD2
pineapple (4.4%), the report relays.

Persian lemon saw a rise of RD$23.5, reaching RD$136.4, compared to
RD$112.9 in December, the report discloses.  Bell pepper registered
an increase of RD$6.2, climbing from RD$75.8 to RD$82, while
pineapple experienced a rise of RD$4.9, going from RD$111.2 to
RD$116.1, the report says.

Additional items that saw an uptick in value include Fresh Chop
(Pork), Leg (Pork), and Green Banana, reaching RD$70.4, RD$29.5,
and RD$26.8, respectively, the report relays.

The report also reveals discrepancies in the average prices of key
agricultural products in markets and supermarkets during January,
the report notes.  For instance, the price of green bananas in
supermarkets was RD$4.5 lower than the sales price in other retail
markets, the report discloses.

In contrast, the document highlights that potato granola, superior
rice, processed chicken, smoked pork chop, Creole avocado, pinto
beans, and garlic displayed higher prices in supermarkets compared
to other retail markets, the report says.  Notably, garlic and
pinto beans stood out with differences of RD$12.9 and RD$13.6 per
pound, respectively, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCR-LA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

On December 4, 2023, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings has
affirmed Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the Outlook to Positive
from Stable. Fitch says the Positive Outlook reflects a trend
improvement in governance, and robust growth prospects that should
lead to continued gains in per capita income.  According to Fitch,
growth has decelerated in 2023, but it expects Dominican Republic
to recover to high levels during 2024-2025. External liquidity
metrics have improved in recent years, and foreign currency share
of government debt is on a downward path.

In August 2023, Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on
the Government of Dominican Republic's ratings to positive from
stable and affirmed the local and foreign-currency long-term issuer
and senior unsecured ratings at Ba3.  Moody's said the key drivers
for the outlook change to positive  are: (i) sustained high growth
rates have enhanced the scale and wealth levels of the economy; and
(ii) a material decline in the government debt burden coupled with
improved fiscal policy effectiveness will support medium-term debt
sustainability.

The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings balances the Dominican
Republic's strong economic growth dynamics and relatively contained
susceptibility to event risks, with a comparatively weaker fiscal
position, reflecting long-standing credit challenges which include:
(i) a shallow revenue base compared to peers, (ii) weak debt
affordability metrics, and (iii) high exposure to foreign currency
borrowing.

S&P Global Ratings, in December 2022, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican
Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the long-term ratings
is stable. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity
over the next 12-18 months that will likely stabilize the
government's debt burden.

In February 2023, S&P said its BB ratings reflect the country's
fast-growing and resilient economy.  It also incorporates the
country's historical political and social challenges in passing
structural reforms to contain fiscal deficits, despite recent
improvements in the electricity sector. The ratings are constrained
by relatively high debt, a hefty interest burden, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.


[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Applies for Membership in Caricom
---------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Guyanese President Irfaan Ali
announced that the Dominican Republic and Martinique have applied
for membership in the Caribbean Community (Caricom) during the
community's summit in Georgetown.

"The process for these countries to become associate members has
already begun," Ali said in his closing speech at the summit, which
was broadcast on his social media networks, according to Dominican
Today.

"The (Caricom) secretariat will work with both Martinique and the
Dominican Republic to comply with the procedural aspect of things,
so that by the time we reach July (the month of the next regular
meeting), the full mechanism will be in place and the
recommendations will come," the Guyanese leader said, the report
notes.

The last time talks were suspended was due to the large-scale
deportation of Haitians by the Dominican Republic, the report
relays.

Caricom members are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bahamas, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname
and Trinidad and Tobago, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCR-LA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

On December 4, 2023, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings has
affirmed Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the Outlook to Positive
from Stable. Fitch says the Positive Outlook reflects a trend
improvement in governance, and robust growth prospects that should
lead to continued gains in per capita income.  According to Fitch,
growth has decelerated in 2023, but it expects Dominican Republic
to recover to high levels during 2024-2025. External liquidity
metrics have improved in recent years, and foreign currency share
of government debt is on a downward path.

In August 2023, Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on
the Government of Dominican Republic's ratings to positive from
stable and affirmed the local and foreign-currency long-term issuer
and senior unsecured ratings at Ba3.  Moody's said the key drivers
for the outlook change to positive  are: (i) sustained high growth
rates have enhanced the scale and wealth levels of the economy; and
(ii) a material decline in the government debt burden coupled with
improved fiscal policy effectiveness will support medium-term debt
sustainability.

The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings balances the Dominican
Republic's strong economic growth dynamics and relatively contained
susceptibility to event risks, with a comparatively weaker fiscal
position, reflecting long-standing credit challenges which include:
(i) a shallow revenue base compared to peers, (ii) weak debt
affordability metrics, and (iii) high exposure to foreign currency
borrowing.

S&P Global Ratings, in December 2022, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican
Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook on the long-term ratings
is stable. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's
expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity
over the next 12-18 months that will likely stabilize the
government's debt burden.

In February 2023, S&P said its BB ratings reflect the country's
fast-growing and resilient economy.  It also incorporates the
country's historical political and social challenges in passing
structural reforms to contain fiscal deficits, despite recent
improvements in the electricity sector. The ratings are constrained
by relatively high debt, a hefty interest burden, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.




=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================

GUATEMALA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm Foreign Currency IDR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Guatemala's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Strengths and Weaknesses: Guatemala's 'BB' rating is
supported by a track record of macroeconomic stability,
conservative fiscal policies that have resulted in low government
borrowing, and robust external liquidity. These strengths are
balanced by a low revenue-to-GDP ratio that constrains fiscal
flexibility, governance and human development indicators that
compare unfavorably with 'BB' category peers, and political
gridlock that limits the sovereign's ability to address these
weaknesses.

Elections Highlight Governance Challenges: President Bernardo
Arevalo began his term on Jan. 15, 2024, following his victory in
the 2023 general elections, which were marred by tensions. Arevalo,
positioned himself as a center-left anti-graft candidate,
benefiting from public discontent amid high levels of perceived
corruption. Arevalo and his party face a challenging governability
outlook. His success in making progress on his legislative agenda
hinges on his ability to manage complex and fluid dynamics in
Congress. Arevalo may prioritize the executive route to deliver on
anti-graft campaign promises.

Deteriorating Governance Indicators: Governance scores fell from
the 31st percentile in 2010 to the 25th in 2023, well below the
peer median of 47th. Arevalo is focused on addressing these
weaknesses, but concrete progress could face challenges from vested
interests and congressional fragmentation. His government has
benefited from support from the U.S., via visa restrictions against
his detractors and actors implicated in corruption, though this
highlights some risks to domestic political dynamics from a
potential change in the U.S. administration following the 2024
presidential election.

Fiscal Policy Continuity: In 2023, the central government (CG)
fiscal deficit fell to 1.3% of Fitch-estimated GDP, from 1.7% in
2022. Fiscal revenues to GDP were stable at 12.6% despite lower
commodity prices that reduced import taxes, largely highlighting
consolidation of recent administrative improvement in collections.
Expenditures fell to 13.9% of GDP (14.4% in 2022) due to a
deceleration in goods and services and transfers after presidential
elections. In 2024, the government will be continue to operate
under the 2023 budget because the 2024 budget that was approved by
Congress was suspended due to procedural irregularities. The
authorities plan to propose a budget revision to make room for some
of its spending plans, but prospects for this are unclear. Given
the constraints of the current budget, Fitch projects a CG deficit
of 1.0% of GDP.

After 2024, Fitch projects CG fiscal deficits of 2.3% of GDP as
Arevalo delivers on of his priorities of higher social spending and
public investment, which are planned to be funded primarily via
administrative improvements in tax collections and only a small
rise in borrowing. The administration hopes to increase tax
revenues by 0.6pp to 12.4% by 2025, via further efforts to combat
evasion (e.g. stricter controls in customs, digital invoicing) that
have already yielded 1.1pp since 2018. Fitch projects stable tax to
GDP of 11.7% as it is difficult to determine how much further gains
these efforts can yield. Arevalo's plans will also likely be met
with strong fiscal conservatism by the political establishment.

External Debt Covers Financing Needs: In contrast to the past,
Guatemala relied heavily on external debt to meet its financing
needs in 2023 amid legislative gridlock that delayed multilateral
disbursements and rise in local-currency yields given domestic
monetary policy tightening. In 2024, Fitch expects the deficit to
be financed via domestic and multilateral debt and by Eurobond
issuances, but the mix could be sensitive to relative rates and
Congressional loan approvals. Fitch does not expect the courts to
lift their suspension of the 2024 budget, but should this occur it
could pose a financing challenge as it includes a provision
requiring the government to obtain Congressional approval to
rollover bonds.

By 2025, Fitch expects slowly rising fiscal deficits to bring
general government (GG) debt (consolidating the holdings of the
social security institute) to 26.4%, below the 'BB' peer average of
52.2%. However, GG interest/revenue of 9.0% is likely to be more in
line with the 'BB' average of 9.6%.

Economic Resilience: Guatemala's solid growth pace continued in
2023. Fitch estimates real GDP grew by 3.3% due to dynamism in
credit growth and remittances to the private sector. Mobilizations
and road blockades that lasted three weeks in the fall led to
larger disruptions than the past instances of social unrest, but
activity rebounded quickly. In 2024, Fitch expects GDP growth to
return to its potential of 3.5% as consumption continues to be
driven by robust remittances and credit growth. There could be some
upside to potential growth from ongoing urbanization, although
institutional and infrastructure bottlenecks could limit the upside
from the global nearshoring trend that is benefitting some
neighbors in the region.

Inflation Slows: Unlike most regional central banks, BanGuat only
gradually phased out accommodative policies by increasing the
inflation rate a neutral level of 5.0% by April 2023, where it
remains. This different posture reflects the high import component
of inflationary pressures, which have ebbed. After peaking at 9.9%
in February 2023, inflation returned to its target (4%+/-1pp) and
ended the year at 4.2% due to falls in fuel and food prices.

Robust External Liquidity: Fitch estimates the current account
surplus rose to 2.4% of GDP in 2023 from 1.4% in 2022, reflecting
strong remittances that offset a widening of the trade deficit due
lower U.S. demand and road blockades that affected exports. Fitch
expects foreign reserves to continue rising to high levels. In
2023, reserves rose by USD0.9 billion to USD21.3 billion due to
substantial sovereign external borrowing while BanGuat became a net
seller of FX for the first time in many years despite the current
account surplus. Reserve adequacy remains robust, representing an
estimated 36.2% of broad money and 6.8 months of current external
payments (CXP). The sovereign net foreign asset position (reserves
minus sovereign external debt) of 8.7% of GDP remains significantly
above the 'BB' median of -3.5% and is the best in Latin America.

Country Ceiling: The revision of Guatemala's Country Ceiling to
'BBB-' from 'BB+' reflects Fitch's view that risks of FX controls
are mitigated given strong central bank reserves and broader
external liquidity position, and trade integration under the
US-CAFTA agreement.

ESG - Governance: Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5'
for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption.
These scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI) have in its proprietary Sovereign Rating Model.
Guatemala has a low WBGI ranking at 25th percentile, reflecting
relatively weak rights for participation in the political process,
weak institutional capacity, uneven application of the rule of law
and a high level of corruption.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Structural: Social instability and/or political gridlock that
affect macroeconomic performance or government financing
flexibility, such as interruptions in financing;

- Public Finances: A widening of the fiscal deficit, particularly
should this be driven by erosion in the recent gains in tax
collection and/or a large increase in spending;

- Macro: Lower-than-expected growth performance or weaker
medium-term growth prospects caused, for example, by lower
remittances, social unrest, and/or governability challenges.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Public Finances: Continued improvement in tax collection that
leads to an improvement in fiscal flexibility, preserves low fiscal
deficits and keeps debt/GDP stable at low levels;

- Macro: Continued strong economic momentum, and sustained evidence
of increased investment and medium-term growth prospects;

- Structural: Improvements in governance and human development
indicators relative to peers, particularly on control of corruption
and rule of law.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Guatemala a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee did not adjust the output from
the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within its
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected
in the SRM.

COUNTRY CEILING

The Country Ceiling for Guatemala is 'BBB-', two notches above the
LT FC IDR. This reflects strong constraints and incentives,
relative to the IDR, against capital or exchange controls being
imposed that would prevent or significantly impede the private
sector from converting local currency into foreign currency and
transferring the proceeds to non-resident creditors to service debt
payments.

Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of
+2 notches above the IDR. Fitch's rating committee did not apply a
qualitative adjustment to the model result.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability
and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest
weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the
rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Guatemala has
a percentile rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicator,
this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key
rating driver with a high weight. As Guatemala has a percentile
rank below 50 for the respective Governance Indicators, this has a
negative impact on the credit profile.

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of '4'for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a
rating driver. As Guatemala has a percentile rank below 50 for the
respective Governance Indicator, this has a negative impact on the
credit profile.

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Creditor Rights
as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating
and is a rating driver for Guatemala, as for all sovereigns. As
Guatemala has track record of 20+ years without a restructuring of
public debt and captured in its SRM variable, this has a positive
impact on the credit profile.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                    Rating           Prior
   -----------                    ------           -----
Guatemala         LT IDR           BB   Affirmed   BB
                  ST IDR           B    Affirmed   B
                  LC LT IDR        BB   Affirmed   BB
                  LC ST IDR        B    Affirmed   B
                  Country Ceiling  BBB- Upgrade    BB+

   senior
   unsecured      LT               BB   Affirmed   BB




=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

VENEZUELA: Calls in Oil Debt it Once Traded Away for Literal Beans
------------------------------------------------------------------
Nicolle Yapur & Jim Wyss at Bloomberg News report that at the
height of Venezuela's oil go-go days, tankers fanned out across the
Caribbean, handing out 200,000 barrels a day to a constellation of
small, mostly poor, islands.

The fact that those countries racked up huge debts and paid part of
the bill with things like black beans and peanuts mattered little
to Hugo Chavez as he parlayed the bonanza into global fame as the
leader of what he called 21st-century socialism, according to
Bloomberg News.

Two decades later, impoverished and desperate for cash, Venezuela
is trying to collect old debts from the Petrocaribe program,
Bloomberg News relays.  Last month, it received a US$500-million
payment from Haiti - the poorest country in the hemisphere - to
cancel what had been a US$2.3-billion debt, according to documents
seen by Bloomberg and people familiar with the matter. It's working
on similar transactions with other nations, the people said,
Bloomberg News notes.

The deal with Haiti came together after the US Treasury granted the
country a licence to transfer the money from an escrow account
through the international banking system, Bloomberg News relays.
For Haiti, a chronically crisis-torn country, clearing the debt
helps it move forward with the International Monetary Fund on a
potential loan package, Bloomberg News discloses.

Representatives for Venezuela, Haiti and various agencies involved
in the deal didn't respond to messages seeking comment.  A
spokesperson for the US Treasury said the Office of Foreign Assets
Control doesn't comment on individual licences.

For Venezuela and its current leader, Nicolas Maduro - who took
over after Chavez died in 2013 - the agreement marks another step
in its effort to regain international recognition after years of
economic collapse and international isolation, Bloomberg News
relays.  The government and its state-owned oil company have
themselves been in default for years on global bonds and owe China
billions for bilateral loans, Bloomberg News adds.

                        'Arc of Energy'

During the boom years of runaway global prices for crude,
Petrocaribe formed part of the broader largesse that Chavez
leveraged to curry an international following, Bloomberg News says.
He handed out heating oil to poor residents in the Bronx, New
York, bankrolled cash-strapped Argentina and vowed to finance mines
and refineries for Niger and Mauritania, Bloomberg News relays.

"We want to make an arc of energy cooperation in the region,"
Chavez said at the summit to launch Petrocaribe 2005, which Cuba's
Fidel Castro and a dozen other heads of state attended, Bloomberg
News notes.

Under the agreement, Venezuela sold oil to 18 countries, allowing
them to finance most of the bill for as long as 25 years at an
interest rate of one percent to two percent, Bloomberg News
relays.

They were allowed to pay part of the bill in kind: Guyana sent
rice; Nicaragua shipped cattle; Jamaica contributed cement
materials; for Cuba it was doctors. Sometimes, it was peanuts or
beans, Bloomberg News.

In turn, Venezuela secured political support, enough, at times, to
block proposals against the government at the Organisation of
American States, said David Goldwyn, the chairman of the Atlantic
Council Global Energy Center's Energy Advisory Group, Bloomberg
News discloses.

"Venezuela did something for them that Western countries didn't:
They were actually helpful with financing at a time when countries
needed it," he added.

All that aid, though, helped fuel a historic economic collapse,
marked by hyperinflation and the worst humanitarian crisis in Latin
America's history, Bloomberg News relays.

Even as global prices for crude fell, Maduro kept shipping oil to
the Caribbean under generous terms.

"The cost for Venezuela was clear: when oil prices dropped in 2014,
the country had no way of tackling it," said Francisco Rodríguez,
an economics professor at the University of Denver, Bloomberg News
notes.

                         Abrupt Half

When the program came to an abrupt halt after the US sanctioned
Venezuela's oil industry in 2019, about US$6 billion in receivables
had accumulated from Petrocaribe and other bilateral debt
agreements, according to estimates from EMFI Securities, Bloomberg
News relays.  The calculations exclude Cuba, which has a separate
oil supply agreement, the terms of which are not made public,
Bloomberg News says.

Venezuela has only recently started to collect on those debts after
the US granted sanctions relief in exchange for Maduro's pledge to
work toward free and fair presidential elections, scheduled to take
place later this year, Bloomberg News notes.  Those relations
though have grown tense as the vote approaches, Bloomberg News
says.  Washington has threatened to put some of the sanctions back
in place if Maduro doesn't meet a series of political agreements,
Bloomberg News relays.

Venezuela, meanwhile, is pushing ahead with debt collection
efforts, Bloomberg News discloses.  This month, Vice-President
Delcy Rodriguez visited officials in Grenada, which has said it was
discussing a payment plan for its Petrocaribe debts, Bloomberg News
notes.  And officials are nearing a deal with Belize to cancel its
debt for between US$129 million and US$164 million, according to
people familiar with the negotiations, Bloomberg News relays.

Leaders of the Caribbean have urged Venezuela to relaunch the
programme and Maduro has said it's a goal. In late 2022, Venezuela
shipped 23,000 barrels of diesel to Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, a political ally, Bloomberg News says.

However, the country only produces about a fourth of what it used
to, with output of about 840,000 barrels per day, according to OPEC
data, Bloomberg News notes.  And a portion of that production is
earmarked to paying back the vast debts Venezuela itself racked up
while it was shipping oil to its neighbours, Bloomberg News adds.


                       About Venezuela

Venezuela, officially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, is a
country on the northern coast of South America, consisting of a
continental landmass and a large number of small islands and islets
in the Caribbean sea.  The capital is the city of Caracas.

Hugo Chavez was president to Venezuela from 1999 to 2013.  The
Chavez presidency was plagued with challenges, which included a
2002 coup d'etat, a 2002 national strike and a 2004 recall
referendum.  Nicolas Maduro was elected president in 2013 after the
death of Chavez.  Maduro won a second term at the May 2018
Venezuela elections, but this result has been challenged by
countries including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, France and the United States who deemed it fraudulent and
moved to recognize Juan Guaido as president.

The presidencies of Chavez and Maduro have challenged Venezuela
with a socioeconomic and political crisis.  It is marked by
hyperinflation, climbing hunger, poverty, disease, crime and death
rates, social unrest, corruption and emigration from the country.

Moody's has withdrawn 'C' local currency and foreign currency
ceilings for Venezuela in September 2022.  Standard & Poors has
also withdrawn its 'SD/D' foreign currency sovereign credit ratings
and 'CCC-/C' local currency ratings on Venezuela in September 2021
due to lack of sufficient information.  Fitch withdrew its own
'RD/C' Issuer Default Ratings on Venezuela in June 2019 due to the
imposition of U.S. sanctions on the country's government.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING COLUMN: For the Week Feb. 26 to March 1, 2024
--------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name                   Cpn      Price   Maturity      
Cntry    Curr
----------                    ---      -----   --------      
-----    ----
2W Ecobank SA                10.5     28.4 11/24/2029 BR BRL
ACEN Finance                4.0 64.0          KY USD
Aeropuerto de Tocumen        5.1 69.7 8/11/2061 PA USD
Aeropuerto de Tocumen        4.0 70.9 8/11/2041 PA USD
Aeropuerto de Tocumen        5.1 69.7 8/11/2061 PA USD
Aeropuerto de Tocumen        4.0 70.3 8/11/2041 PA USD
AES Tiete Energia SA        6.8 0.7 4/15/2024 BR BRL
Agile Group Holdings        5.8 16.3 1/2/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        6.1 13.4 10/13/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        5.5 13.0 5/17/2026 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        7.9 3.3          KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        5.5 15.0 4/21/2025 KY USD
Agile Group Holdings        7.8 3.3          KY USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA        4.6 74.5 9/27/2051 CL USD
Alfa Desarrollo SpA        4.6 74.7 9/27/2051 CL USD
Alibaba Group Holding        3.2 65.4 2/9/2051 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding        2.7 68.6 2/9/2041 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding        3.3 62.9 2/9/2061 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group                1.5 7.5          KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group                4.5 55.3          KY SGD
Amwaj                        6.4 71.6          KY USD
Amwaj                        4.5 50.9          KY USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds        1.0 43.7 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentina Treasury Dual        3.3 45.8 4/30/2024 AR USD
Argentine Bonos del Tesoro     15.5 40.3 10/17/2026 AR ARS
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond     1.0 47.5 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond     0.5 41.9 7/9/2029 AR EUR
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond     0.1 42.5 7/9/2030 AR EUR
Ascent Finance                1.2 61.0 7/12/2047 KY EUR
Ascent Finance                3.4 66.6 2/6/2043 KY AUD
Ascent Finance                3.8 67.9 6/28/2047 KY AUD
Astra Cumulative  2019        1.5 62.1 11/1/2029 KY USD
At Home Cayman                11.5 69.3 5/12/2028 KY USD
At Home Cayman                11.5 70.6 5/12/2028 KY USD
AYC Finance                3.9 63.2          KY USD
Banco Davivienda SA        6.7 65.8          CO USD
Banco Davivienda SA        6.7 70.3          CO USD
Banco de Chile                2.7 75.1 3/9/2035 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Chile      3.1 71.2 2/21/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Chile      2.8 67.7 3/13/2040 CL AUD
Banco Nacional de Panama       2.5 75.4 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Nacional de Panama       2.5 75.2 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Santander Chile        3.1 71.2 2/28/2039 CL AUD
Banco Santander Chile        1.3 73.9 11/29/2034 CL EUR
Banda de Couro Energetica      8.0 55.1 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Baraunas II Energetica S/A     8.0 12.5 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Bishopsgate Asset Finance      4.8 66.9 8/14/2044 KY GBP
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       4.5 58.3 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       7.5 59.4 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       4.5 58.5 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond       7.5 59.5 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion   5.0 63.6 10/31/2027 AR USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion   3.0 60.5 5/31/2026 AR USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion   5.0 51.9 10/31/2027 AR USD
Brazilian Gov't Int'l Bond     4.8 74.1 1/14/2050 BR USD
BRF SA                        5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD
BRF SA                        5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD
Caja de Compensacion        2.4 49.6 4/5/2025 CL CLP
Camposol SA                6.0 72.3 2/3/2027 PE USD
Camposol SA                6.0 72.6 2/3/2027 PE USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.8 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment        2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.5 72.7 1/25/2050 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.1 73.6 5/7/2041 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.1 62.8 1/22/2061 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.5 72.3 4/15/2053 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        1.3 67.4 1/29/2040 CL EUR
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        1.3 54.0 1/22/2051 CL EUR
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        3.3 62.9 9/21/2071 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond        1.3 74.4 7/26/2036 CL EUR
China Yuhua Education Corp     0.9 65.1 12/27/2024 KY HKD
CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II        3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II        3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 20        3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 20        3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      4.1 61.2 5/15/2051 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      3.9 57.2 2/15/2061 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      5.2 72.4 5/15/2049 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      4.1 66.7 2/22/2042 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond      7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 5.0 71.6 6/15/2045 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombian TES                 7.3 70.9 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombian TES                 6.3 73.1 7/9/2036 CO COP
Coopeucha                 4.6 38.3 6/1/2029 CL CLP
CODELCO                         3.7 67.4 1/30/2050 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.7 67.3 1/30/2050 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD
CODELCO                         3.6 74.7 7/22/2039 CL AUD
Earls Eight                 0.1 64.5 12/20/2031 KY AUD
Earls Eight                 1.7 72.4 6/20/2032 KY AUD
Ecopetrol SA                 5.9 73.6 5/28/2045 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA                 5.9 70.5 11/2/2051 CO USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.3 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.0 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.8 2/1/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 5.9 65.1 1/30/2025 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.6 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.4 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.9 2/1/2041 SV USD
Embotelladora Andina SA         6.5 23.2 6/1/2026 CL CLP
EFE                         3.8 65.7 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE                         3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE                         3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE                         3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE                         6.5 11.1 1/1/2026 CL CLP
ETESA                         5.1 71.5 5/2/2049 PA USD
ETESA                         5.1 72.2 5/2/2049 PA USD
Metro SA                 3.7 65.1 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA                 3.7 65.0 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA                 5.5 50.1 7/15/2027 CL CLP
Metro SA                 5.0 63.8 5/11/2025 AR USD
ENAP                         4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENAP                         4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENA Master Trust         4.0 70.5 5/19/2048 PA USD
ENA Master Trust         4.0 70.9 5/19/2048 PA USD
Enel Generacion Chile SA 6.2 29.2 10/15/2028 CL CLP
Equatorial Energia         10.9 1.1 10/15/2029 BR BRL
Equatorial Energia         10.8 1.0 5/15/2028 BR BRL
Esval SA                 3.5 13.1 2/15/2026 CL CLP
Farfetch                 3.8 4.3 5/1/2027 KY USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5 1.4 5/15/2026 BR BRL
GDM Argentina SA         2.5 0.0 9/8/2024 AR USD
GDS Holdings                 4.5 67.7 1/31/2030 KY USD
Generacion Mediterranea SA 4.6 0.0 11/12/2024 AR ARS
General Shopping Finance 10.0 66.2          KY USD
General Shopping Finance 10.0 65.0          KY USD
Genneia SA                 2.0 56.9 7/14/2028 AR USD
Greenland Hong Kong         10.2 13.4          KY USD
Guacolda Energia SA         4.6 70.5 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA         10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA         4.6 71.8 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA         10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD
Hector A Bertone SA         1.9 0.0 4/7/2024 AR USD
Hilong Holding                 9.8  68.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding                 9.8 69.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding                 9.8 69.4 11/18/2024 KY USD
Multiplo SA                 3.3 59.5          BR USD
Itau Unibanco SA/Nassau         5.8 20.2 5/20/2027 BR BRL
Jamaica Gov't Bond         6.3 67.8 7/11/2048 JM JMD
Jamaica Gov't Bond         8.5 73.0 12/21/2061 JM JMD
Lani Finance                 1.7 63.5 3/14/2049 KY EUR
Lani Finance                 1.9 66.9 10/19/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance                 3.1 66.1 10/19/2048 KY AUD
Lani Finance                 1.9 65.8 9/20/2048 KY EUR
Link Finance Cayman 2009 2.2 70.0 10/27/2038 KY HKD
LIPSA Srl                 1.0 0.0 8/23/2024 AR USD
Logan Group Co                 7.0 5.1          KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         4.0 43.3 9/16/2029 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         3.4 56.1 4/13/2027 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         3.9 38.4 1/13/2032 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings         4.5 53.1 1/16/2028 KY USD
Luminis III                 2.3 41.8 9/22/2048 KY USD
Luminis III                 2.4 55.3 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Luminis IV                 3.2 70.4 1/22/2042 KY AUD
Luminis                         2.3 54.8 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Lunar Funding I                 1.7  8/11/2056 KY GBP
MTR Corp CI                 2.8 73.3 9/6/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.0 75.4 4/26/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.2 73.7 2/5/2055 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI                 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD
NIO Inc                         4.6 73.1 10/15/2030 KY USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 63.1 4/1/2056 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         2.3 70.2 9/29/2032 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         3.9 55.8 7/23/2060 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 64.9 4/16/2050 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 62.0 1/19/2063 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.5 66.6 5/15/2047 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond         4.3 62.6 4/29/2053 PA USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 71.8 3/10/2051 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 2.8 57.3 12/1/2060 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.2 57.3 7/28/2121 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 65.7 1/15/2072 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.3 74.3 3/11/2041 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA         5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA         5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Powerlong Real Estate         6.3 10.3 8/10/2024 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba         7.1 39.6 10/27/2026 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja         7.5 45.9 7/20/2032 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja         4.5 51.8 1/20/2027 AR USD
Chaco Argentina                 4.0 0.0 12/4/2026 AR USD
QNB Finance                 13.5 63.1 10/6/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance                 11.5 71.7 1/30/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance                 2.9 74.2 9/16/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance                 2.9 72.9 12/4/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance                 3.0 75.4 2/14/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance                 3.4 72.0 10/21/2039 KY AUD
Radiance Holdings Group         7.8 49.6 3/20/2024 KY USD
Rio Alto Energias Renovaveis 7.0 29.1 7/15/2027 BR BRL
Santander Consumer Chile SA 2.9 72.7 11/27/2034 CL AUD
Seazen Group                 6.0 75.2 8/12/2024 KY USD
Seazen Group                 4.5 34.1 7/13/2025 KY USD
Shui On Development Holding 5.5 61.2 6/29/2026 KY USD
Shui On Development Holding 5.5 73.0 3/3/2025 KY USD
Silk Road Investments         2.9 66.8 1/23/2042 KY AUD
Skylark                         1.8 59.0 4/4/2039 KY GBP
Autopista Central         5.3 37.2 12/15/2026 CL CLP
Autopista Central         5.3 50.6 12/15/2028 CL CLP
SQM                         3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
SQM                         3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
Southern Water Service         3.0 70.8 5/28/2037 KY GBP
SPE Saneamento RIO 1         7.2 10.8 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 1 SA         6.9 10.5 1/15/2034 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA         7.2 10.2 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA         6.9 10.2 1/15/2034 BR BRL
Spica                         2.0 74.9 3/24/2033 KY AUD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 72.2 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 73.0 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 70.3 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman          8.0 72.5 9/20/2025 KY USD
Sylph                         2.7 68.5 3/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph                         3.1 74.7 9/25/2035 KY USD
Sylph                         2.4 64.2 9/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph                         2.9 74.5 6/24/2036 KY AUD
Telecom Argentina SA         1.0 74.0 3/9/2027 AR USD
Telecom Argentina SA         1.0 66.1 2/10/2028 AR USD
Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD
Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD
Tencent Holdings         3.2 67.9 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.3 64.0 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.8 75.4 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.2 67.6 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings         3.3 64.1 6/3/2060 KY USD
Three Gorges Finance         3.2 71.6 10/16/2049 KY USD
Grupo Travessia                 9.0 1.6 1/20/2032 BR BRL
Volcan Cia Minera SAA         4.4 62.2 2/11/2026 PE USD
Volcan Cia Minera SAA         4.4 62.0 2/11/2026 PE USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         5.1 61.6 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         4.4 60.8 4/15/2029 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         5.1 61.9 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA         4.4 60.6 4/15/2029 CL USD
YPF SA                         7.0 72.6 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA                         1.0 66.8 4/25/2027 AR USD
YPF SA                         7.0 72.3 12/15/2047 AR USD



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2024.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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