/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/240812.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, August 12, 2024, Vol. 25, No. 161
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Global Scale SCRs, Outlook Stable
ARGENTINA: Soy-Crush Workers Extend Strike Over Pay to Third Day
ARGENTINA: Transport Subsidies Cause Rift Between Milei and Macri
B R A Z I L
3R PETROLEUM: Fitch Hikes LongTerm IDR to 'BB-'
3R PETROLEUM: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT ICR After Merger w/ Enauta
OI S.A.: S&P Raises ICR to 'CCC' on Debt Exchange, Outlook Neg.
P U E R T O R I C O
EL VERDE: Hires Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna as Attorney
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Economist Says Country is Largest Forex Loser
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Farrell Says Dukharan's Analysis 'Incorrect'
X X X X X X X X
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week Aug. 5 to Aug. 9, 2024
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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Global Scale SCRs, Outlook Stable
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On Aug. 8, 2024, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC/C' foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina. S&P also
affirmed its 'raB+' national scale rating on the country. The
outlook on the long-term ratings remains stable. S&P's 'CCC'
transfer and convertibility assessment for Argentina remains
unchanged.
Outlook
The stable outlook on the long-term ratings balances the risks
posed by pronounced economic imbalances and other uncertainties
with recent progress in making fiscal adjustments, reducing
inflation, and undertaking structural reforms to address
long-standing microeconomic weaknesses that have contributed to
poor economic performance for many years.
Upside scenario
S&P could raise the ratings in the next 12 months if it sees
successful execution of policies that reduce Argentina's major
macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities, setting the stage for
sustainable fiscal outcomes, lower inflation, and continued
economic recovery. In such a scenario, the government would have
better access to voluntary capital market funding.
Downside scenario
S&P could lower the ratings in the coming 12 months if negative
developments undermine Argentina's already limited access to
financing. Failure to carefully advance difficult exchange rate,
fiscal, monetary, and other reforms could result in instability
that could raise the risk of default, which could lead to a
downgrade.
Rationale
S&P's ratings reflect Argentina's high external vulnerabilities,
weak public finances, lack of access to global capital markets,
high inflation, and weak monetary flexibility.
The government's strategy for stabilizing the economy depends on
sustained fiscal primary surpluses that anchor investor
expectations and limit exchange rate volatility, among other
measures. It also depends on skillful management of inflation and
the exchange rate to create conditions for renewed economic growth
and better access to external liquidity.
A 'CCC' rating indicates that the obligor might not meet its
financial commitments in the event of adverse business, financial,
or economic conditions.
Institutional and economic profile: The election of President Milei
has led to ambitious reforms designed to address deep-seated
weaknesses in the economy
-- A history of macroeconomic instability and sharp changes in
economic policy underpin the low credibility and predictability of
Argentina's governing institutions.
-- The Milei administration has been able to secure Congressional
approval for important fiscal and economic laws despite his party's
weak position in Congress.
-- Successful development of Argentina's nonconventional energy
resources will likely improve GDP growth and balance-of-payments
dynamics in the next few years.
S&P's ratings on Argentina are based on its weak institutions and
history of major swings in economic policy following shifts in
political leadership. Prolonged political polarization has hindered
the government's ability to implement its economic agenda.
Volatility and lack of policy predictability have led to swings in
exchange rate regimes and approaches to monetary policy, all
contributing to low GDP growth. This has also impaired sovereign
debt payment capacity and undermined the debt payment culture.
Libertarian President Milei, from La Libertad Avanza (LLA) party,
won the presidency in October 2023 with 55.7% of the votes. The
LLA, which has very few representatives of its own in Congress,
relies on support from Propuesta Republicana (PRO), a centrist
party led by former President Mauricio Macri.
After difficult negotiations with legislators, provincial
governors, and interest groups, the Milei administration persuaded
Congress this June to narrowly approve an omnibus bill and a fiscal
package, its first legislation passed since the president took
office in December. The new laws change--among other things--income
taxes and labor markets and provide incentives for large
investments (through tax breaks and easier access to foreign
exchange markets).
The laws also delegate powers to the president to pursue reforms
such as privatization. Milei created a new Ministry of Deregulation
and State Transformation to promote structural reforms to
deregulate the economy and strengthen long-term economic
performance.
The administration has made progress in lowering inflation,
improving fiscal outcomes (targeting an improvement of 5% of GDP in
2024), liberalizing prices, giving incentives for large
private-sector investments, and restructuring the central bank to
give it scope to make effective policy. Milei's ability to advance
with his policies depends largely on his popular support, given his
weak position in Congress. As a result, unexpected setbacks or
policy errors could derail these reforms (and delay economic
recovery), undermining his political standing.
S&P said, "We think GDP is likely to shrink 3.5% in 2024 overall,
although it will likely start recovering in the second half of the
year. GDP could grow 3.5% in 2025-2026, depending on the success of
the reform measures, but our projections are subject to high
uncertainty. Reaching a new agreement with the IMF could help
Argentina gain more access to external liquidity and sustain
growth.
"Raising medium-term trend GDP growth has been a challenge for many
Argentine governments. Growth remains below that of other countries
with similar levels of wealth. We expect GDP per capita will be
around US$11,800 in 2024 (at the official exchange rate), compared
with about US$14,600 in 2017 (the expected decline is due to a
combination of economic contraction and currency depreciation). We
calculate a 10-year real per capita GDP contraction of 0.2% as of
2024 (based on a combination of past and forecast growth)."
Prolonged fiscal deficits led governments (until this year) to rely
on central bank financing, which contributed to inflation,
Argentine peso depreciation, and economic instability. Increased
spending by all levels of government over the past two decades has
led to high and more distortionary taxes, hampering private
investment and encouraging tax evasion. The increase in the size of
the public sector has not translated into better public services or
more public investment. Poor policies such as price controls, a
rigid labor code, and regulatory barriers to entry and competition
have constrained growth.
Nevertheless, Argentina's educated workforce (compared with
regional peers) could buoy the export sector. Moreover, successful
development of nonconventional energy resources (including Vaca
Muerta, the second-largest gas reserve and the fourth-largest
petroleum reserve in the world) could improve GDP growth and
balance-of-payments dynamics in the next couple of years.
Flexibility and performance profile: High debt, vulnerable external
profile, no access to external capital markets, and poor monetary
flexibility
-- A sustained fiscal adjustment program, combined with tight
monetary policy, is the anchor of the government's economic
stabilization strategy.
-- Argentina has a vulnerable external profile, with high debt and
substantial upcoming financing needs, as well as poor access to
external capital markets.
-- Inflation is likely to decline but remain high in 2024, around
200%.
S&P said, "We think a trade surplus is likely to support current
account surpluses in 2024 and in the next two to three years,
contrasting with deficits in recent years. The surpluses reflect
favorable commodity prices and subdued demand for imports. The
energy trade balance will be in surplus in 2024, and we project it
to grow rapidly in upcoming years, thanks to expanding oil and
natural gas production.
"We project narrow net external debt to average about 200% of
current account receipts (CARs) in 2024-2025, assuming some
increase only in official debt. We estimate gross external
financing needs to usable reserves and CARs to average about
160%-170% over the same period. Our forecast assumes international
reserves rise with net disbursements from the IMF and other
official lenders and current account surpluses in 2024 and 2025.
The central bank has boosted its reserves by about US$17 billion
during the course of 2024.
"Regaining access to global capital markets would be an important
step to support refinancing and is key to better creditworthiness,
in our view."
The government plans to unify the exchange rate, scrap controls on
foreign exchange, and eliminate an import tax ("impuesto pais").
Abolishing exchange controls carries risk because foreign exchange
reserves remain low (gross reserves, including a swap line from
China, are around US$27 billion). In December 2023, the central
bank devalued the peso to narrow the gap between the official and
parallel exchange rates. However, the currency continues to
appreciate in real terms (because monthly inflation exceeds the
current 2% monthly rate of peso depreciation).
The government faces large debt service payments on commercial debt
in early and in mid-2025, highlighting the need to boost its
external liquidity. Delays in abolishing exchange controls would
make it harder to recover from recession.
S&P said, "We expect net general government debt (that excludes
estimated holdings of central government debt by ANSES, the pension
system, and includes estimated provincial debt) to be about 85% of
GDP in 2024. The general government is likely to run a small fiscal
deficit (on an accrual basis) in 2024 and 2025, down from 3.5% in
2023. We think the primary fiscal outcome (which excludes interest
payments) is likely to be a small surplus. We estimate the change
in net general government debt will average 30% of GDP during
2024-2025, largely reflecting the composition of the debt (exposure
to foreign currency and indexation to inflation).
"Interest to revenue could remain below 10% in 2024-2025, but we
think there's considerable uncertainty about the trajectory of the
debt burden." The high share of foreign-currency debt (nearly 70%)
renders the debt burden vulnerable to swings in the currency, and
more than half of the peso-denominated debt is linked to inflation.
Over 30% of total central government debt is held by creditors in
the public sector (such as the central bank and pension system,
ANSES), which mitigates domestic rollover risk.
The government is complementing fiscal adjustment with monetary
adjustment. The central bank has transferred its remunerated
liabilities to the government and stopped issuing new debt.
Recently, the government began to issue new Treasury bills (Letras
Fiscal de Liquidez, or LeFi) to replace central bank short-term
bills (Pases) which it had used for liquidity management
(repurchase agreements). These measures should facilitate more
effective monetary policy as the government lifts exchange
controls.
High inflation and exchange rate volatility underpin low monetary
flexibility. Inflation rose to 211% (year over year) in 2023,
peaking at a monthly rate of nearly 26% in December. The monthly
rate has fallen to 4%-5% in mid-2024, thanks to less money
creation. S&P expects yearly inflation to be above 200% in 2024 but
the monthly rate to decelerate. However, inflation could rise
temporarily due to further increases in tariffs for public
services, as well as sharp movements in the exchange rate.
S&P said, " view contingent liabilities, including those posed by
the banking system, as limited. We classify the banking sector of
Argentina in group '9' according to our Banking Industry Country
Risk Assessment (BICRA), with '1' being the lowest risk category
and '10' the highest. Argentina has a small financial system, with
domestic credit to the private sector at less than 10% of GDP
(among the lowest in Latin America).
"In accordance with our relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable." At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed
that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the
primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was
sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.
The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.
Ratings List
RATINGS AFFIRMED
ARGENTINA
Sovereign Credit Rating CCC/Stable/C
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment
Local Currency CCC
ARGENTINA
Senior Unsecured CCC
ARGENTINA: Soy-Crush Workers Extend Strike Over Pay to Third Day
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Jonathan Gilbert at Bloomberg News reports that workers at
oilseed-processing plants in Argentina extended their strike for a
third consecutive day last August 8 as wage talks with trading
houses hit an impasse, crippling activity in the world's biggest
exporter of soy meal and soy oil.
Representatives of the two main unions, SOEA and the Federation of
Oilseed Industry Workers, confirmed the continuation of the strike
to Bloomberg News. Unions are unhappy with wage increases offered
by trading houses, saying they aren't enough to prevent an erosion
of purchasing power amid Argentina's chronic inflation running at
some 270 percent a year, according to Bloomberg News.
The strike is impacting a slew of ports, according to shipping
agency Nabsa, including those of Argentina's biggest crushers such
as Viterra Inc, Cargill Inc and Louis Dreyfus Co, Bloomberg News
relays.
Gustavo Idigoras, head of crusher association CIARA that's leading
negotiations with workers, said the delay to shipments is costing
Argentina some US$50 million a day as well as staining the
country's reputation as a reliable global supplier, Bloomberg News
discloses.
With the talks in deadlock, no immediate end to the strike is in
sight. "As things are going right now, we'll decide on a
day-to-day basis," said Martin Morales, an official for SOEA,
Bloomberg News relays.
SOEA represents workers in San Lorenzo, a Parana river port
district accounting for about 70 percent of Argentine soy
shipments, Bloomberg News. The oilseed industry federation groups
workers at plants elsewhere on the Parana and on the Atlantic
coast, Bloomberg News adds.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.
S&P Global Ratings, on March 15, 2024, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raB+' from 'SD'. S&P also raised its
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC' from
'CCC-' and affirmed its 'C' short-term foreign currency rating. The
outlook on the long-term ratings is stable. In addition, S&P
revised its transfer and convertibility assessment to 'CCC' from
'CCC-'.
S&P said the stable outlook on the long-term ratings balances the
risks posed by pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties with the favorable change in near-term debt service
obligations. S&P also expect no further debt exchanges that it
would likely consider to be distressed.
Fitch Ratings upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'.
Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a
rating of 'CCC+' or below.
The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).
Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings. The outlook remains stable. The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.
DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.
ARGENTINA: Transport Subsidies Cause Rift Between Milei and Macri
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Buenos Aires Times reports that the same day of the meeting between
Luis Caputo and Jorge Macri to move forward with an agreement on
the distribution of federal revenue sharing funds, the Transport
secretariat sent a leter to the City announcing its intention to no
longer subsidise 40 percent of the subsidies for all 31 Buenos
Aires City bus lines. On that day, the Mayor left happy thinking
he would be paid from 1.4 to 2.95 percent starting on August 1,
according to Buenos Aires Times.
However, the government did not send a cent and now added a fresh
conflict front with the City by going ahead and removing subsidies,
which amount to some 6.5 billion pesos, the report relays. This
would be effective in September.
Today, all 31 bus lines are subsidised by 51 percent by the Buenos
Aires City Hall, 40 percent by the government and the remaining 9
percent by the fare, the report discloses. However, the body with
the power to regulate the concession, routes and fare policy is the
national Transport secretariat, the report says.
According to an agreement signed in 2019 between the federal
government and City Hall, subsidies would be removed "depending on
budgetary possibilities," the report discloses. Thus, at Buenos
Aires City Hall, in addition to state of alarm, they are working on
replying that they cannot handle the funds this removal entails,
the report notes.
Could all 31 bus lines move to Buenos Aires City's jurisdiction?
The letter sent by the government does not mention that, but the
costs, the report relays.
In this vein, while he was Economy minister two years ago, Sergio
Massa wished to do likewise and a worktable was confirmed, the
report discloses. Those who wished to curb the issue were bus
companies and unions who were more comfortable with the federal
government then, the report relays.
In this context, sources from the City's Transport portfolio
anticipated to PERFIL that the issue put the Mayor and his
collaborators on alert, the report notes. And they said that
today's transfer would be a serious complication for the City's
coffers, the report discloses.
The hostility between the libertarians and PRO has gone from bad to
worse: after the disputes between Mauricio Macri and Santiago
Caputo, the President's preferred advisor, now this comes in
addition to noncompliance not only with the Supreme Court's ruling
in September 2022 which ordered an increase of federal funds from
1.4 to 2.95 percent, but the Economy minister's word on compliance
starting in August, the report discloses.
What the Economy Ministry offered were discretionary transfers, but
not actually enforcing the ruling with a daily transfer of funds,
the report relays.
Thus, the City should now be filing a complaint before the Supreme
Court once again and leave open the possibility of attaching Banco
Nacion accounts otherwise, the report adds.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
The IMF's executive board completed on August 23, 2023, the fifth
and six reviews of Argentina's 30-month Extended Fund Facility
(EFF), and approved a US$7.5-billion disbursement to Argentina as
part of the larger program, which refinances payments Argentina
owes the institution from a previous bailout that failed to
stabilize the economy in 2018. Argentina would receive another IMF
disbursement in November of about US$2.75 billion pending another
staff-level agreement and board approval.
S&P Global Ratings, on March 15, 2024, raised its local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC/C' from 'SD/SD' and
its national scale rating to 'raB+' from 'SD'. S&P also raised its
long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC' from
'CCC-' and affirmed its 'C' short-term foreign currency rating. The
outlook on the long-term ratings is stable. In addition, S&P
revised its transfer and convertibility assessment to 'CCC' from
'CCC-'.
S&P said the stable outlook on the long-term ratings balances the
risks posed by pronounced economic imbalances and policy
uncertainties with the favorable change in near-term debt service
obligations. S&P also expect no further debt exchanges that it
would likely consider to be distressed.
Fitch Ratings upgraded on June 13, 2023, Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'.
Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a
rating of 'CCC+' or below.
The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a
default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not
signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public
debt swap announced in March. The new 'CC' rating signals a default
event of some sort appears probable in the coming years, regardless
of the outcome of upcoming elections. The affirmation of the LC IDR
at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not
deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE).
Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's
Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior
unsecured ratings. The outlook remains stable. The decision to
affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access,
weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with
recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start
addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of
the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's.
DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer
Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer
Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023.
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B R A Z I L
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3R PETROLEUM: Fitch Hikes LongTerm IDR to 'BB-'
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Fitch Ratings has removed from Rating Watch Positive and upgraded
3R Petroleum Oleo e Gas S.A.'s (3R) Long-term Local and Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB-' from 'B+' and its
long-term National Scale Rating to 'AA-(bra)' from 'A(bra)'. Fitch
has also removed the Rating Watch Positive and upgraded the rating
of 3R Lux S.à.r.l's (3R Lux) USD500 million notes due 2031 to
'BB-' from 'B+'/'RR4'.
The upgrade follows the closing of 3R's merger with Enauta
Participacoes S.A. (Enauta) and Maha Energy Brasil Ltda. The
all-stock transaction not only strengthens 3R's scale and operating
efficiency, but also materially reduces its financial leverage, in
addition to broadening its already diversified asset base. Fitch
believes the merger will bring tangible synergies in the offshore
operations and better position 3R to develop growth opportunities.
The ratings should continue to benefit from 3R's low exploration
risk and capex flexibility that are reflective of its comfortable
reserve life.
Key Rating Drivers
Higher Scale, Better Efficiency: The merger increases 3R's scale to
levels compatible with the 'BB' category and broadens its asset
base, further diluting operating risks that are typically high in
the sector. 3R's proven reserves (1P) and production should
increase to 511 million boe and 90 kboe/d, proforma for 2024, and
110 kboe/d in 2025. The larger scale and potential operating
synergies should contribute to capex and opex optimization in the
offshore business. Fitch believes 3R will be able to contract
services and equipment at better terms and use shared workover and
drilling rigs, as well as logistical support. It should also be
able to improve on the pricing of exports, with Papa Terra field's
greater storage capacity and the low-Sulphur, better-quality oil
from Atlanta field.
Robust Reserves: 3R should maintain a comfortable reserve life,
which provides capex flexibility during downward market cycles.
This is especially positive now that most of the production will
come from offshore fields, where opex and capex are less flexible.
Fitch estimates 12 years of 1P reserves through 2026, assuming no
reserve replacement. Offshore revenues should increase to around
55% of total revenues on average for 2024-2026, from 32% before the
merger. Undeveloped reserves now represent 60% of the proved
reserve base, from 40%, reflecting higher growth prospects with
lower capex predictability.
Strong Growth: Fitch estimates 3R's production to increase 11% per
year on 2024-2028, on average (proforma for 2024), driven by
facilities improvements in Potiguar cluster and the gradual
increase in Papa Terra's efficiency, after heavy maintenance works.
The startup of the new FPSO in Atlanta, expected for 3Q24 should
also bring significant growth.
Atlanta's heavy oil production faces above-average depletion rate,
but capex included in the base-case scenario includes new drillings
that should significantly increase production by 2028. Fitch
expects the relevant environmental licenses to be issued in 2024.
The merger better positions 3R for further consolidation and
enhances organic growth prospects with Enauta's contingent,
adjacent resources and exploratory fields.
Improving Cost Profile: Production ramp-up and operational
synergies should contribute to diluting high fixed costs, despite
the upcoming challenges on asset integration. Fitch estimates 3R's
lifting cost around USD20/boe in 2024, still in line with 2023,
reflecting the consolidation of Enauta's currently higher costs,
and around USD17/boe in 2025, with a downward trend going forward.
Most of the reduction should come from Papa Terra and Atlanta,
following the production increase. Half-cycle costs (operating
costs plus interest payments) should reach around USD30/boe in
2024-2025 on average, which compare unfavorably with 'BB-' onshore
peers in the Permian basin.
Quick Deleverage: The merger accelerates 3R's deleverage trend.
Fitch estimates EBITDA net leverage to reduce to 1.6x in 2024 and
0.6x in 2025, from 2.8x in June 2024, and debt/1P reserves to
decrease to around USD4.1/boe in 2024-2025, on average, from USD
5.2/boe in June 2024. These ratios incorporate into debt M&A
payables due to Petrobras (BRL1.8 billion in June 2024) and
derivatives (asset balance of BRL2.8 billion).
Fitch's projections do not consider financial synergies related to
maximization of regional fiscal benefits, monetization of tax
credits or goodwill amortization, but considers a lower funding
cost leading to higher EBITDA Interest Coverage at around 7.0x in
2024-2025.
Substantial Capex Limits FCFs: Absent potential synergies arising
from the merger, Fitch projects 3R`s consolidated EBITDA increasing
to BRL5.1 billion in 2024 and BRL7.7 billion in 2025, from BRL2.4
billion in the last twelve months (LTM) March 2024. Around 70% of
EBITDA should convert into cash flow from operations (CFFO) as of
2025, but investments should consume around 90% of the total CFFO
to be generated through 2027.
Capex projections average BRL3.7 billion in 2024-2026, including
half the investments expected for developing unproved reserves,
based on reserves certificates. FCF should turn positive in 2025,
after negative BRL1.2 billion in 2024. Projections also include
dividends of BRL93 million in 2024 and close to BRL900 million in
2025-2026, on annual average, equivalent to 25% of net income.
Derivation Summary
3R's diversified asset base is a key differentiation factor in
comparison with North American E&P, oil-weighted producers in the
onshore Permian basin (Texas/New Mexico), such as CrownRock, L.P.
(CrownRock; IDR BB-/Watch Positive), Matador Resources Company
(Matador; IDR BB-/Outlook Positive) and SM Energy Company, L.P.
(SM; IDR BB-/Watch Positive).
3R stands out for its long 1P reserve life of 12 years, compared to
the four year to nine years range for the others, but these
companies are larger and more efficient than 3R, with production
size between 150 kboe/d and 190 kboe/d, based on Fitch's
projections, and production costs between USD10/boe and USD13/boe,
below the USD28/boe level that Fitch estimates for 3R. These
factors compensate the credit risk of the Permian producers for the
lower diversification of their asset base, although the
concentration favors efficiency.
All these companies operate in regulatory friendly hydrocarbon
environments, even for unconventional production in the Permian
basin, and should present low financial leverage in the coming
years, with net debt/EBITDA below or close to 1.5x, especially
CrownRock (close to 0.5x) and 3R (close to 0.5x as of 2025).
Among Latin America peers, Prio S.A. (IDR BB/Stable) benefits from
larger scale, significantly higher operating efficiency and lower
financial leverage, while SierraCol Energy Limited and Geopark
Limited, both rated 'B+'/Stable, are smaller and must deal with the
pressure from a shorter reserve life, below seven years. Geopark
and SierraCol's production costs are currently more efficient, but
3R is well positioned to close the gap in the coming years and
generate more operating cash per boe than the Colombian peers,
after accounting for royalties, taxes and interest costs.
Fitch estimates similar leverage ratios for these companies, with
net debt/EBITDA averaging between 0.8x and 1.2x in 2024-2026,
although 3R's debt/1P reserves ratio (USD3/boe) should be much
lower than the peers' (close to USD9/boe).
Key Assumptions
- Average Brent prices from 2024 to 2027 (USD/bbl): 80; 70; 65;
60;
- Atlanta's first oil in 3Q24;
- Acquisition of 23% stake in Parque da Conchas closing in 3Q24 for
USD140 million (subject to regulatory approval);
- Farm-out of 20% stake in Atlanta/Oliva closing in 3Q24 for USD302
million (subject to regulatory approval);
- Average daily production from 2024 to 2027 (kboe/d): 69; 111;
112; 121;
- Oil sales consider discount to Brent of USD5/bbl in 2024 and
around USD4/bbl in 2025;
- No payment related to the arbitration process in Papa Terra;
- Lifting cost from 2024 to 2027 (USD/boe): 20; 17; 16; 15;
- Annual capex averaging BRL3.7 billion through 2026, with no
significant investments in or divestments from mid & downstream;
- Effective tax rate around 26%, benefitted by regional tax
incentives (base-case does not consider tax efficiencies arising
from the merger);
- Dividend payout ratio of 25%.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
- Increasing production to more than 125 kboe/d, while maintaining
1P reserve life of at least seven years;
- Reducing half-cycle costs to below USD20/boe on a sustained
basis.
Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
- Debt/EBITDA and net debt/EBITDA ratios above 3.5x and 2.5x,
respectively;
- Weakening of the liquidity profile;
- Major operational disruptions at key assets, resulting in a
significant reduction in production.
Liquidity and Debt Structure
Comfortable Liquidity: Fitch expects the merger to strengthen 3R's
ability to access local and foreign capital markets, reducing its
cost of funding. Post-merger liquidity is comfortable, with
combined cash balance at June 2024 (BRL6.6 billion, excluding
Enauta's equity investments) covering all debt maturing through
2026.
Fitch's projections consider that the company will prepay a
significant amount of debt in the short-term, given the strong cash
balance at hand. In case of liquidity pressure, Fitch considers
that 3R would be able to securitize FPSO Atlanta's long-term
receivables or sell and leaseback Papa Terra's FPSO. Combined with
Enauta, total debt at June 2024 was BRL15.9 billion, comprised of
debentures (60% of the total amount after derivatives), secured
notes due 2031 (18%), payables due to Petrobras (11%) and loans
from local banks (11%).
Issuer Profile
3R is a small, partially integrated, well-diversified O&G producer,
focused on revitalizing mature fields in Brazil, onshore and
offshore. It is a corporation with no controlling shareholder and
its capital is listed on B3 - Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão.
Summary of Financial Adjustments
Acquisition payables were incorporated into debt; debt-related
restricted cash was incorporated into cash; debt-related
derivatives were excluded from debt.
ESG Considerations
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
3R Lux S.a.r.l.
senior secured LT BB- Upgrade B+
3R Petroleum Oleo
e Gas S.A. LT IDR BB- Upgrade B+
LC LT IDR BB- Upgrade B+
Natl LT AA-(bra)Upgrade A(bra)
3R PETROLEUM: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT ICR After Merger w/ Enauta
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed the 'B+' long-term issuer credit rating
on 3R Petroleum Oleo e Gas S.A. and the 'BB-' issue rating on its
senior secured notes.
S&P raised the national scale issuer credit rating and the national
scale issue rating on the senior unsecured debentures to 'brAA-'
from 'brA+'.
S&P said, "Furthermore, we raised the national scale issuer credit
rating on Enauta to 'brAA-' from 'brBBB' and raised the national
scale issue rating on its senior secured debentures to 'brAA' from
'brBBB+'.
"We assigned our 'brAA-' issue rating to Enauta's new senior
unsecured debentures.
"The positive outlook on the issuer credit ratings reflects our
expectation of an upgrade once 3R starts operating the new FPSO
(Floating Production Storage and Offloading) Atlanta and once it
sees daily production approaching 100,000 boe, all while decreasing
leverage."
On Aug. 1, 2024, 3R Petroleum Oleo e Gas S.A. and Enauta
Participacoes S.A. merged operations. The new company will have
estimated daily production of roughly 85,000 barrels of oil
equivalent (boe) by fourth-quarter 2024. Daily production will
increase to over 100,000 boe in 2025 with the definitive production
system in the Atlanta field.
S&P said, "The combined company registered daily production of
67,000 boe in first-half 2024, and we expect daily production to
approach 85,000 boe in the fourth quarter and 100,000 boe in
first-quarter 2025. We think there will be an organic increase in
production from the Potiguar and Papa-terra fields (which are being
redeveloped) and, importantly, from the launch of the new FPSO
Atlanta. Subsea work is already complete, and the new floater is
awaiting final permits from Brazilian regulators."
3R now has solid 2P reserves (proved and probable reserves) of 734
million boe, and of that total, 514 million boeare 1P (proved)
reserves. Of the 2P reserves, 46% is onshore and 54% is offshore,
and 90% of it is oil.
S&P said, "We expect gains of scale from higher production levels
to result in a decrease in consolidated lifting costs, to about
US$16/boe in 2025. This should translate to a higher EBITDA margin
in the exploration and production segment next year, of about 65%.
Still, we forecast a consolidated EBITDA margin of about 50% since
the midstream and downstream segment has inherently lower margins;
we estimate 3%-4% margins in 2024-2025.
"Moreover, we believe 3R will absorb synergies of operational
efficiencies from offshore operations, commercial strategies, and
better terms with suppliers, as well as fiscal and capital
allocation.
"In light of the benefits of higher production levels and the
synergies 3R will absorb, we also expect an improved capital
structure to drive lower leverage in coming years. Our forecast
sees gross debt to EBITDA of 3.0x by the end of 2024 and close to
1.5x in 2025 (versus 5.0x in 2023, for 3R on a stand-alone basis).
"We believe an improved capital structure, by reducing the overall
cost of debt and maintaining 3R's extended debt profile, is an
important result of the merger. Recently, Enauta issued R$2.7
billion in debentures at the interest rate plus 2.5%--a notable
reduction in cost from the cost of the existing debentures
(interest rate plus 5%). We believe the new company will use the
proceeds to pay down the costly existing debt at 3R.
"We view Enauta as a core subsidiary to 3R, an indication of its
integral role to the future development of the group--notably with
the higher production from the Atlanta field. For this reason, we
now equalize the rating on Enauta with the rating on the parent. Of
the consolidated company's first-half 2024 production, Enauta
represented only about 30% because of maintenance stoppages at both
the Manati and Atlanta fields.
"In coming quarters, we expect Enauta to account for a higher share
of production with the launch of the new FPSO Atlanta, the
resumption of operations at the Manati field, and the consolidation
of Parque das Conchas."
OI S.A.: S&P Raises ICR to 'CCC' on Debt Exchange, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its issuer credit ratings on Brazilian
telecom operator Oi S.A. to 'CCC' from 'CCC-' on the global scale
and to 'brB' from 'brCCC+' on the Brazil national scale and removed
the ratings from CreditWatch positive.
S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned a 'CCC+' issue rating to
Oi's US$505 million priority notes due 2027 and raised the issue
rating on the US$11 million senior secured notes due 2026 to 'CCC+'
from 'D'. The recovery rating on the notes is '2', reflecting our
view that debtholders would have substantial recovery (rounded 85%)
in a new distress scenario.
"The negative outlook reflects our view that the company will
generate negative EBITDA during the next two years and is dependent
on favorable events, such as the asset sales, to improve its
repayment capacity."
On August 8, Brazilian telecom operator Oi S.A. completed the debt
exchange approved under its judicial reorganization (JR) plan,
resulting in lower gross debt. At the same time, we believe the
company still faces operational challenges that will result in
negative EBITDA in 2024 and 2025.
S&P estimates gross debt following the exchange of Brazilian real
(R$) 32.4 billion. If it was to include the option haircuts, total
gross debt would be about R$13 billion.
From the existing debt, US$12 million senior secured notes due
2026, the existing general offering due 2042 of about R$5.9
billion, and the R$16 million loan from Banco de Brasilia due 2026
will remain. Oi has the option to prepay this general offering with
a 85% haircut.
The remaining DIP financing of about US$500 million will be
converted into new priority notes due 2027. Additionally, V.Tal's
debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing of US$150 million due 2027,
which is new debt provided in the judicial recovery plan, was
disbursed on August 8.
The remaining R$29 billion debt will be exchanged in three
options:
First option: Available only to debtholders that provided new money
to the company. We estimate about R$12 billion will be converted
into R$6.75 billion roll-up notes due 2028, and the remaining value
converted into Oi's shares.
Second option: 8% converted in a new loan due 2044 and 92% into a
new loan due 2050. Oi would have the option to prepay the 2050 loan
with a 90% haircut.
Third option: New loan due 2052, to be repaid in five annual
installments. Oi would have the option to prepay this loan with a
85% haircut.
Oi plans to sell its fiber clients (ClientCo) by mid-2025 and its
shares of V.Tal by mid-2026. It will use the proceeds to repay the
V.Tal DIP financing and the priority notes, and the remainder to
prepay the roll-up notes. At the end of the transactions, the
remaining asset under Oi's operation will be mainly Oi Solutions,
which will include fixed-line, data, broadband, and IT services for
corporations.
On July 17, Oi announced it received only one offering for
ClientCo's auction from Ligga Telecomunicacoes S.A.
(brA-/Negative/--), which offered R$1.03 billion, 86% below Oi's
asked price of R$7.3 billion. The proposal was declined by Oi's
creditors and the company is working to open the second round of
auctions.
Based on the economic assessment made by Ernst & Young Assessoria
Empresarial Ltda (EY) for Oi's JR plan, the company should generate
negative EBITDA during 2024 and 2025 because the costs from its
legacy and Oi Fiber will hurt operations. Operations should improve
in 2025 as the legacy costs of about R$1.1 billion will be
discontinued and the ClientCo--that currently impacts negatively in
about R$600 million--will be sold.
Additionally, with the new JR approval, the company does not have
any significant debt maturity in the next 12 months and a
significant portion of its interest rates are payment-in-kind,
supporting the 'CCC' rating.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
EL VERDE: Hires Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna as Attorney
-------------------------------------------------------
El Verde Associates LDP seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire The Law Offices
of Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna, as its attorney.
The firm will render the following services:
a. prepare bankruptcy schedules, pleadings, applications and
conduct examinations incidental to any related proceedings or to
the administration of the bankruptcy case;
b. develop the relationship of the status of the Debtor to
the
claims of creditors in the bankruptcy case;
c. advise the Debtor of its rights, duties and obligations as
Debtor operating under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code;
d. take any and all other necessary action incident to the
proper preservation and administration of the Chapter 11 case; and
e. advise and assist the Debtor in the formation and
preservation of a plan pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the disclosure statement, and any and all matter related
thereto.
Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna will be paid at the hourly rate of
$165. The Debtor paid the Firm a retainer in the amount of $4,000.
It will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
incurred.
Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna, partner of The Law Offices of Hector
Eduardo Pedrosa Luna, assured the Court that the firm is a
"disinterested person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14)
of
the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to
the Debtor and its estates.
Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna can be reached at:
Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna, Esq.
THE LAW OFFICES OF HECTOR EDUARDO PEDROSA LUNA
P.O. Box 9023963
San Juan, PR 00902-3963
Tel: (787) 920-7983
Fax: (787) 754-1109
Email: hectorpedrosa@gmail.com
About El Verde Associates LDP
El Verde Associates LDP filed its voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
24-03107) on July 27, 2024, listing $1,000,001 to $10 million in
both assets and liabilities.
Judge Mildred Caban Flores presides over the case.
Hector Eduardo Pedrosa Luna, Esq. at the Law Offices of Hector
Eduardo Pedrosa Luna serves as the Debtor's counsel.
=====================================
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
=====================================
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Economist Says Country is Largest Forex Loser
----------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that over the past 12 years, more than
US$25 billion has "gone missing" from this country, making us the
"world's largest loser of foreign exchange", economist Marla
Dukharan has said.
"When next you hear the authorities say Trinbagonians demand too
much foreign exchange, we import too much 'luxury' items, we shop
online too much, we use foreign credit cards too much, we travel
too much, and we get blamed for all the foreign exchange problems
in T&T, stop and think about this -- for the past 12 years
(2011-2023), over US$25 billion has gone missing from our country,"
Dukharan stated in her latest Caribbean Monthly Economic Report,
according to Trinidad Express.
"On average, over US$2 billion each year just disappears, and
nobody has been able to account for it, ever. But have you ever
seen this in the news?" she stated, the report notes.
Using the International Monetary Fund's global database for
2011-2022, Dukharan noted that the Errors and Omissions (E&O) item
-- meant to account for statistical errors in the balance of
payments for T&T -- shows a net outflow of US$23 billion that
cannot be accounted for, the report discloses.
"This is about 77% the size of our economy (2022, IMF) and over
US$16,000 per person. On a per capita basis, we are the world's
largest losers of foreign currency. Only 20 countries globally have
lost more in absolute US dollars than we have from 2011-22, and
only three countries—Djibouti, Liberia and the Marshall
Islands—have lost more relative to GDP (Gross Domestic Product),"
she stated, the report relays.
The report notes that Dukharan stated that T&T's national debt
level is lower than 77% of GDP, "so we lose more US currency than
the Government has borrowed."
She added that T&T's forex reserve is the only one that
consistently trends downwards in comparison to the forex reserves
of the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname, the report
relays.
Dukharan said that T&T's reserves declined by 48% from a US$11.5
billion peak in 2014 to US$5.98 billion in June 2024, the report
says.
"In the absence of Government borrowing and withdrawals from the
HSF (Heritage and Stabilisation Fund), T&T's forex reserves would
be only US$157 million in March 2024, which is roughly one week of
import cover," Dukharan stated, the report notes.
Regarding the Error and Omission "haemorrhaging", Dukharan
suggested it could be due to less accurate data, the report
discloses.
"But if statistical weakness was the biggest explanatory factor,
one would expect the E&O item to be a fairly random number --
positives and negatives, large and small. But T&T's E&O item has
been consistently negative every year since 2011 (the earliest data
available), meaning we have an undocumented net outflow of US
dollars each year that we can't account for. Furthermore, apart
from 2012 and then 2020-21 (COVID?) the E&O item has consistently
exceeded US$1 billon each year, the highest being US$4.8 billion in
2013. And this pattern in the data suggests that something else,
apart from statistical weakness, is at play," she said, the report
relays.
Dukharan also noted that the T&T dollar is "overvalued" compared to
the black market forex rate, which ranges from $7.50 to $10 per US
dollar, the report notes.
With the Government maintaining the $6.76 per US dollar exchange
rate, the US dollar is being effectively subsidised, she added.
She said this creates an artificial level of speculative demand for
the US dollar that would otherwise not exist at $10 per US dollar,
the report relays.
"Furthermore, the unavailability of US dollar currency creates a
level of precautionary demand for US dollars that does not exist
elsewhere in the Caribbean, for example. All of this drives a lack
of confidence in the TT dollar and a preference for US dollars, and
capital flight," Dukharan said, the report says.
"The Government has created a massive incentive for us to find,
earn, buy, hold and take overseas as much US dollars as we can. And
this perverse incentive, combined with our weak institutions and
poor crime detection, is flammable, bleeding into the (regional,
gang-related) crime associated with the northward movement of
narcotics, and the safe return (and laundering) of US dollars back
to the producers—primarily in Latin America," she said, the
report notes.
According to Dukharan, the best way for US currency to leave the
country undocumented is via cash and portable valuable goods such
as jewelry, the report relays.
"But I am certain that it is purely coincidental that our E&O
losses took off just when the previous Government introduced direct
flights to Panama and London (reputed to be money laundering
hotspots), and that our E&O losses were lowest during Covid-19
lockdowns when borders were closed. As with traffic jams and crime,
we lose immeasurable precious time, effort, talent and perhaps even
lives, navigating our nation's US dollar shortage, created not by
any error or omission but by successive governments' deliberate and
harmful policy choices," said Dukharan, the report adds.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Farrell Says Dukharan's Analysis 'Incorrect'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that economist and former deputy governor
of the Central Bank Dr Terrence Farrell has said that Marla
Dukharan's analysis on billions of US dollars "missing" from the
country is incorrect.
Farrell made the comment in response to a 5:37-minute video posted
by Dukharan on LinkedIn, where she further explained her asssertion
that over the past 12 years, more than US$25 billion had "gone
missing" from Trinidad and Tobago, making this country the "world's
largest loser of foreign exchange," according to Trinidad Express.
"Unfortunately, Marla's analysis and explanation is not correct.
Balance of Payments accounting is complicated. The more recent
methodologies which attempt to account for financial flows are even
more so. It records not only flows that go through the banking
system but other 'accounting' transactions which may not be
reflected in flows through the banks," Farrell stated, the report
notes.
"It is for example not correct that our export earnings from oil
and gas are remitted through the local banking system. Most are
not! Our Net Errors and Omissions are indeed very large, but I
suspect most of the discrepancy is the non-classification of
Current Account transactions especially on the Services Account. To
the best of my knowledge, banks do not classify credit card
payments in accordance with the BoP classification and report those
to the Central Bank. It would be helpful if the staff at the
Central Bank intervene and correct the record. But I do not agree
with Marla's analysis," he stated, the report relays.
In response, Dukharan thanked Farrell for weighing in and conceded
that there may be a significant amount of misclassification, the
report discloses.
"But even so, my concern is that inflows are inflows and outflows
are outflows, however classified, and clearly, there is a large and
consistent outflow averaging over US$2 billion each year that is
not being recorded. This means that we are not aware of the
mechanism of the outflow or the reason(s). I think we really need
to resolve this massive unknown; otherwise how do we shape the
policy response? How do we address the fact that in the absence of
borrowing and HSF withdrawals we would only have about a week of
import cover?" Dukharan stated, the report relays.
The Central Bank issued a release explaining that the "Net Errors
and Omissions" category in the Balance of Payments statement, which
Dukharan referenced, serves as catch-all for discrepancies caused
by inaccurate and incomplete data, the report notes.
And the Central Bank identified two key issues contributing to this
incomplete coverage: the inaccurate measurement of travel expenses
and the fact that only about half of companies respond to surveys,
the report says.
The report relays that According to the Central Bank two particular
issues in the sphere of incomplete coverage for Trinidad and Tobago
are: (i) measurement of travel expenses-for example: on the credit
side, the Central Bank relies on historical averages of spending by
visitors/tourists in building the estimates of travel income to
Trinidad and Tobago but this pattern may have changed over the
years; while on the debit side, there are no complete sources of
information on how much residents spend on travel abroad. (ii) the
response rate of companies to the Central Bank's surveys for
balance of payments purposes is just around 50%, posing a
difficulty in getting broader coverage of firms' financial
transactions with the rest of the world.
The release, titled "Net Errors and Omissions in the Balance of
Payments of Trinidad and Tobago", is the first instalment of a new
public education series which was launched by the Central Bank, the
report notes.
It did not specially mention the concerns raised by Dukharan, the
report discloses.
The Central Bank stated that the total net errors and omissions for
Trinidad and Tobago over the past five years amounted to US$5.77
billion, the report relays.
"For Trinidad and Tobago, over the past five years, the net errors
and omissions were recorded as, 2019: -US$1,101.9 million; 2020:
-US$132.6 million; 2021: -US$90.5 million; 2022: -US$2,075.2
million; and 2023: -US$2,365.8 million," it stated, the report
discloses.
Speaking during the Diego Martin West 51st constituency conference,
Rowley took umbrage with Dukharan's claims and used some choice
words to make his feelings known, the report relays.
"Somehow US$25 billion is missing from this country, and every year
we lose US$2 billion. Well, I didn't have the time to read the rest
of the story. I just read the headline and the first paragraph. I
don't have to read the rest of the story to ask what kind of
jackassness is that," Rowley added .
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week Aug. 5 to Aug. 9, 2024
-----------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Cntry
Curr
---------- --- ----- --------
----- ----
Alfa Desarrollo SpA 4.6 74.7 9/27/2051 CL USD
Alibaba Group Holding 3.2 65.4 2/9/2051 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding 2.7 68.6 2/9/2041 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding 3.3 62.9 2/9/2061 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group 1.5 7.5 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group 4.5 55.3 KY SGD
Amwaj 6.4 71.6 KY USD
Amwaj 4.5 50.9 KY USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1.0 43.7 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentina Treasury Dual 3.3 45.8 4/30/2024 AR USD
Argentine Bonos del Tesoro 15.5 40.3 10/17/2026 AR ARS
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond 1.0 47.5 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond 0.5 41.9 7/9/2029 AR EUR
Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond 0.1 42.5 7/9/2030 AR EUR
Ascent Finance 1.2 61.0 7/12/2047 KY EUR
Ascent Finance 3.4 66.6 2/6/2043 KY AUD
Ascent Finance 3.8 67.9 6/28/2047 KY AUD
Astra Cumulative 2019 1.5 62.1 11/1/2029 KY USD
At Home Cayman 11.5 69.3 5/12/2028 KY USD
At Home Cayman 11.5 70.6 5/12/2028 KY USD
AYC Finance 3.9 63.2 KY USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 65.8 CO USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 70.3 CO USD
Banco de Chile 2.7 75.1 3/9/2035 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Chile 3.1 71.2 2/21/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Chile 2.8 67.7 3/13/2040 CL AUD
Banco Nacional de Panama 2.5 75.4 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Nacional de Panama 2.5 75.2 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Santander Chile 3.1 71.2 2/28/2039 CL AUD
Banco Santander Chile 1.3 73.9 11/29/2034 CL EUR
Banda de Couro Energetica 8.0 55.1 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Baraunas II Energetica S/A 8.0 12.5 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Bishopsgate Asset Finance 4.8 66.9 8/14/2044 KY GBP
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 58.3 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.5 59.4 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 58.5 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.5 59.5 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion 5.0 63.6 10/31/2027 AR USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion 3.0 60.5 5/31/2026 AR USD
Bonos Para La Reconstruccion 5.0 51.9 10/31/2027 AR USD
Brazilian Gov't Int'l Bond 4.8 74.1 1/14/2050 BR USD
BRF SA 5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD
BRF SA 5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD
Caja de Compensacion 2.4 49.6 4/5/2025 CL CLP
Camposol SA 6.0 72.3 2/3/2027 PE USD
Camposol SA 6.0 72.6 2/3/2027 PE USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.8 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.5 72.7 1/25/2050 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.1 73.6 5/7/2041 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.1 62.8 1/22/2061 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.5 72.3 4/15/2053 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 1.3 67.4 1/29/2040 CL EUR
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 1.3 54.0 1/22/2051 CL EUR
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.3 62.9 9/21/2071 CL USD
Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 1.3 74.4 7/26/2036 CL EUR
China Yuhua Education Corp 0.9 65.1 12/27/2024 KY HKD
CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II 3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II 3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 20 3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD
CK HutchisonInt'l 20 3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 4.1 61.2 5/15/2051 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 3.9 57.2 2/15/2061 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 5.2 72.4 5/15/2049 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 4.1 66.7 2/22/2042 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 5.0 71.6 6/15/2045 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombian TES 7.3 70.9 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombian TES 6.3 73.1 7/9/2036 CO COP
Coopeucha 4.6 38.3 6/1/2029 CL CLP
CODELCO 3.7 67.4 1/30/2050 CL USD
CODELCO 3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD
CODELCO 3.7 67.3 1/30/2050 CL USD
CODELCO 3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD
CODELCO 3.6 74.7 7/22/2039 CL AUD
Earls Eight 0.1 64.5 12/20/2031 KY AUD
Earls Eight 1.7 72.4 6/20/2032 KY AUD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 73.6 5/28/2045 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 70.5 11/2/2051 CO USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.3 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.0 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.8 2/1/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 5.9 65.1 1/30/2025 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.6 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.4 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.9 2/1/2041 SV USD
Embotelladora Andina SA 6.5 23.2 6/1/2026 CL CLP
EFE 3.8 65.7 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE 3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE 3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE 3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE 6.5 11.1 1/1/2026 CL CLP
ETESA 5.1 71.5 5/2/2049 PA USD
ETESA 5.1 72.2 5/2/2049 PA USD
Metro SA 3.7 65.1 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA 3.7 65.0 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA 5.5 50.1 7/15/2027 CL CLP
Metro SA 5.0 63.8 5/11/2025 AR USD
ENAP 4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENAP 4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENA Master Trust 4.0 70.5 5/19/2048 PA USD
ENA Master Trust 4.0 70.9 5/19/2048 PA USD
Enel Generacion Chile SA 6.2 29.2 10/15/2028 CL CLP
Equatorial Energia 10.9 1.1 10/15/2029 BR BRL
Equatorial Energia 10.8 1.0 5/15/2028 BR BRL
Esval SA 3.5 13.1 2/15/2026 CL CLP
Farfetch 3.8 4.3 5/1/2027 KY USD
Fospar S/A 6.5 1.4 5/15/2026 BR BRL
GDM Argentina SA 2.5 0.0 9/8/2024 AR USD
GDS Holdings 4.5 67.7 1/31/2030 KY USD
Generacion Mediterranea SA 4.6 0.0 11/12/2024 AR ARS
General Shopping Finance 10.0 66.2 KY USD
General Shopping Finance 10.0 65.0 KY USD
Genneia SA 2.0 56.9 7/14/2028 AR USD
Greenland Hong Kong 10.2 13.4 KY USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 70.5 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 71.8 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD
Hector A Bertone SA 1.9 0.0 4/7/2024 AR USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 68.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 69.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 69.4 11/18/2024 KY USD
Multiplo SA 3.3 59.5 BR USD
Itau Unibanco SA/Nassau 5.8 20.2 5/20/2027 BR BRL
Jamaica Gov't Bond 6.3 67.8 7/11/2048 JM JMD
Jamaica Gov't Bond 8.5 73.0 12/21/2061 JM JMD
Lani Finance 1.7 63.5 3/14/2049 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.9 66.9 10/19/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance 3.1 66.1 10/19/2048 KY AUD
Lani Finance 1.9 65.8 9/20/2048 KY EUR
Link Finance Cayman 2009 2.2 70.0 10/27/2038 KY HKD
LIPSA Srl 1.0 0.0 8/23/2024 AR USD
Logan Group Co 7.0 5.1 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 4.0 43.3 9/16/2029 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 3.4 56.1 4/13/2027 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 3.9 38.4 1/13/2032 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 4.5 53.1 1/16/2028 KY USD
Luminis III 2.3 41.8 9/22/2048 KY USD
Luminis III 2.4 55.3 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Luminis IV 3.2 70.4 1/22/2042 KY AUD
Luminis 2.3 54.8 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Lunar Funding I 1.7 8/11/2056 KY GBP
MTR Corp CI 2.8 73.3 9/6/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3.0 75.4 4/26/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3.2 73.7 2/5/2055 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD
NIO Inc 4.6 73.1 10/15/2030 KY USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 63.1 4/1/2056 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 2.3 70.2 9/29/2032 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.9 55.8 7/23/2060 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 64.9 4/16/2050 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 62.0 1/19/2063 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 66.6 5/15/2047 PA USD
Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.3 62.6 4/29/2053 PA USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 71.8 3/10/2051 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 2.8 57.3 12/1/2060 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.2 57.3 7/28/2121 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 65.7 1/15/2072 PE USD
Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.3 74.3 3/11/2041 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Powerlong Real Estate 6.3 10.3 8/10/2024 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba 7.1 39.6 10/27/2026 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja 7.5 45.9 7/20/2032 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja 4.5 51.8 1/20/2027 AR USD
Chaco Argentina 4.0 0.0 12/4/2026 AR USD
QNB Finance 13.5 63.1 10/6/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 11.5 71.7 1/30/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 2.9 74.2 9/16/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 2.9 72.9 12/4/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 3.0 75.4 2/14/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 3.4 72.0 10/21/2039 KY AUD
Radiance Holdings Group 7.8 49.6 3/20/2024 KY USD
Rio Alto Energias Renovaveis 7.0 29.1 7/15/2027 BR BRL
Santander Consumer Chile SA 2.9 72.7 11/27/2034 CL AUD
Seazen Group 6.0 75.2 8/12/2024 KY USD
Seazen Group 4.5 34.1 7/13/2025 KY USD
Shui On Development Holding 5.5 61.2 6/29/2026 KY USD
Shui On Development Holding 5.5 73.0 3/3/2025 KY USD
Silk Road Investments 2.9 66.8 1/23/2042 KY AUD
Skylark 1.8 59.0 4/4/2039 KY GBP
Autopista Central 5.3 37.2 12/15/2026 CL CLP
Autopista Central 5.3 50.6 12/15/2028 CL CLP
SQM 3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
SQM 3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
Southern Water Service 3.0 70.8 5/28/2037 KY GBP
SPE Saneamento RIO 1 7.2 10.8 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 1 SA 6.9 10.5 1/15/2034 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA 7.2 10.2 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA 6.9 10.2 1/15/2034 BR BRL
Spica 2.0 74.9 3/24/2033 KY AUD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 72.2 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 73.0 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 70.3 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 72.5 9/20/2025 KY USD
Sylph 2.7 68.5 3/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph 3.1 74.7 9/25/2035 KY USD
Sylph 2.4 64.2 9/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph 2.9 74.5 6/24/2036 KY AUD
Telecom Argentina SA 1.0 74.0 3/9/2027 AR USD
Telecom Argentina SA 1.0 66.1 2/10/2028 AR USD
Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD
Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.9 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 64.0 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.8 75.4 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.6 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 64.1 6/3/2060 KY USD
Three Gorges Finance 3.2 71.6 10/16/2049 KY USD
Grupo Travessia 9.0 1.6 1/20/2032 BR BRL
Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 62.2 2/11/2026 PE USD
Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 62.0 2/11/2026 PE USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 61.6 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 60.8 4/15/2029 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 61.9 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 60.6 4/15/2029 CL USD
YPF SA 7.0 72.6 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA 1.0 66.8 4/25/2027 AR USD
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
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