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/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/241007.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, October 7, 2024, Vol. 25, No. 201 Headlines A R G E N T I N A ARGENTINA: Milei Wants Argentines to Dollarize Economy for Him B A H A M A S FTX GROUP: CEO Avoids Depo Before Ch. 11 Confirmation Hearing FTX GROUP: Landis Rath, Et Al. to Defend Chap. 11 Plan B R A Z I L BRAZIL: Moody's Ups Issuer & Senior Unsecured Bond Ratings to Ba1 PRIO SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' ICR & Alters Outlook to Positive P U E R T O R I C O PUERTO RICO: Court OKs $188.4-MM Settlement With Cobra Acquisition PUERTO RICO: PREPA Creditors Seek OK For Bond Claims Suit X X X X X X X X [*] BOND PRICING: For the Week September 30 to October 4, 2024 - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= ARGENTINA: Milei Wants Argentines to Dollarize Economy for Him -------------------------------------------------------------- Buenos Aires Times reports Javier Milei seems to have abandoned his vision of a sudden, official dollarization of Argentina's economy. The politician, who suggested blowing up the Central Bank's peso-printing machines during last year's presidential campaign, no longer talks about that, according to Buenos Aires Times. Instead, he wants his countrymen to do the job for him. Dollar by dollar, peso by peso, the report notes. The current approach - dubbed "endogenous dollarization" - entails curtailing the supply of pesos, forcing Argentines to use their dollars to pay for everyday expenses, the report says. Over time, that's supposed to increase the amount of dollars in circulation and reduce reliance on the peso, which has lost 62 percent of its value since Milei took office, the report discloses. "We aim to re-monetise the economy, both in pesos and dollars," Economy Minister Luis Caputo said in a September 20 speech. "We want people to use their dollars because that reactivates the economy, generates more revenue and allows us to lower taxes," Minister Caputo added. Supermarkets, manufacturers and even bars have started accepting dollar payments, while banks and financial technology firms are developing payment methods using the US currency. "Dollarization is already underway," says Emiliano Merenda, an executive at brokerage Win Securities, the report relays. "The government is dollarising the economy without most people realising it. Every step it takes is aimed at getting dollars into the formal economy," the report notes. Dollarization Without Dollars A key reason the government is doing what it's doing is it doesn't have access to dollars, Buenos Aires Times notes. Argentina has precious few foreign reserves to spend, and its country risk stands at 1,284 basis points as measured by JPMorgan's EMBIG Argentina Sovereign Index, the report discloses. That's a far cry from other countries in the region, such as Brazil at 211 basis points, or Colombia, at 317 basis points, the report says. Ten months into office, Milei is maintaining foreign exchange restrictions known in Spanish as the 'cepo.' They prohibit the purchase of foreign currencies by individuals and force exporters to sell their dollars to the Central Bank, which then hands them over to importers, the report relays. Milei doesn't plan on lifting those restrictions any time soon, the report notes. Instead, he is betting on a tax amnesty, the report discloses. The initiative, which industry insiders estimate has generated US$10 billion of inflows so far, nudges Argentines to return as much as US$100,000 per person to the formal economy by October 31 to avoid penalties, the report says. Companies Join In Companies are already taking steps to dollarise, according to Buenos Aires Times. Fintech firms are also joining in, the report adds. As a result, the amount of dollars is starting to grow. Dollar savings held in Argentine bank accounts - at US$28.8 billion - have gone up 82 percent so far this year, growing at a rate of more than US$1 billion a day, according to government data, the report discloses. Still, they only amount to about 31.5 percent of the total, up from 25 percent at the end of last year, the report relays. Dollar loans have doubled in volume, but continue to account for just 15 percent of the total, the report says. Banks Argentines owned a whopping US$277 billion in untaxed funds during the first quarter, roughly 10 times more than the pesos in circulation, according to official statistics, the report notes. Some of that money is moving to banks, the report relays. Banks have opened around 200,000 dollar-denominated accounts in recent months, according to people with direct knowledge, the report says. But, strict regulation prohibits banks from lending dollars to people who don't have income in foreign currencies, the report discloses. Banks are forced to keep dollar reserves, leading them to hold on to two out of every three dollars in their deposits, the report says. Despite the recent progress, some businesses remain doubtful that Argentina will fully dollarise, the report relays. About Argentina Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position. Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year 2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution and in the recent decades, increasing poverty. In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new 30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion, or 1000 percent of quota). The IMF Executive Board's decision allowed the authories an immediate disbursement of an equivalent of US$9.65 billion in March 2022. Argentina's IMF-supported program seeks to improve public finances and start to reduce persistent high inflation through a multi-pronged strategy, involving a gradual elimination of monetary financing of the fiscal deficit and enhancements in the monetary policy framework. In June 2024, the IMF Board completed an eighth review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Argentina. The IMF Board's decision enabled a disbursement of around US$800 million to support the authorities' efforts to entrench the disinflation process, rebuild fiscal and external buffers, and underpin the recovery. S&P, in March 2024, raised its local currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC/C' from 'SD/SD' and its national scale rating to 'raB+' from 'SD'. S&P also raised its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC' from 'CCC-' and affirmed its 'C' short-term foreign currency rating. The S&P ratings have been affirmed as of August 2024. S&P said the stable outlook on the long-term ratings balances the risks posed by pronounced economic imbalances and other uncertainties with recent progress in making fiscal adjustments, reducing inflation, and undertaking structural reforms to address long-standing microeconomic weaknesses that have contributed to poor economic performance for many years that it would likely consider to be distressed. In June 2023, Fitch ratings also upgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from 'C'and affirmed the Long-Term Local Currency (LC) IDR at 'CCC-'. The upgrade of the FC IDR reflects that Fitch no longer deems a default-like process to have begun, as the authorities have not signaled a clear intention to follow through with an intra-public debt swap announced in March 2023. The new 'CC' rating signals a default event of some sort appears probable in the coming years. The affirmation of the LC IDR at 'CCC-' follows the peso debt swap in June that Fitch did not deem to be a "distressed debt exchange" (DDE). Moody's Investors Service, in September 2022, affirmed Argentina's Ca foreign-currency and local-currency long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings. The outlook remains stable. The decision to affirm the Ca ratings balances Argentina's limited market access, weak governance, and history of recurrent debt restructurings with recent efforts to marshal fiscal and monetary measures to start addressing underlying macroeconomic imbalances in the context of the IMF program that was approved in 2022, according to Moody's. DBRS, Inc. confirmed Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Rating at CCC and downgraded its Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Rating to CCC from CCC (high) on March 3, 2023. ============= B A H A M A S ============= FTX GROUP: CEO Avoids Depo Before Ch. 11 Confirmation Hearing ------------------------------------------------------------- Ben Zigterman at law360.com reports that FTX CEO John J. Ray III does not have to sit for a deposition requested by Virgin Islands-based LayerZero Labs Ltd. to answer questions about why it was not included in a Chapter 11 settlement with the debtor, a Delaware bankruptcy judge said, as FTX pursues confirmation of its bankruptcy plan. About FTX FTX is the world's second-largest cryptocurrency firm. FTX is a cryptocurrency exchange built by traders, for traders. FTX offers innovative products including industry-first derivatives, options, volatility products and leveraged tokens. Then CEO and co-founder Sam Bankman-Fried said Nov. 10, 2022, that FTX paused customer withdrawals after it was hit with roughly $5 billion worth of withdrawal requests. Faced with liquidity issues, FTX on Nov. 9, 2022, struck a deal to sell itself to its giant rival Binance, but Binance walked away from the deal amid reports on FTX regarding mishandled customer funds and alleged US agency investigations. SBF agreed to step aside, and restructuring vet John J. Ray III was quickly named new CEO. FTX Trading Ltd (d/b/a FTX.com), West Realm Shires Services Inc. (d/b/a FTX US), Alameda Research Ltd. and certain affiliated companies then commenced Chapter 11 proceedings (Bankr. D. Del. Lead Case No. 22-11068) on an emergency basis on Nov. 11, 2022. Additional entities sought Chapter 11 protection on Nov. 14, 2022. FTX Trading and its affiliates each listed $10 billion to $50 billion in assets and liabilities, making FTX the biggest bankruptcy filer in the US this year. According to Reuters, SBF shared a document with investors on Nov. 10, 2022, showing FTX had $13.86 billion in liabilities and $14.6 billion in assets. However, only $900 million of those assets were liquid, leading to the cash crunch that ended with the company filing for bankruptcy. The Hon. John T. Dorsey is the case judge. The Debtors tapped Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP as bankruptcy counsel; Landis Rath & Cobb, LLP as local counsel; and Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC as financial advisor. Kroll is the claims agent, maintaining the page https://cases.ra.kroll.com/FTX/Home-Index The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Paul Hastings as counsel, FTI Consulting, Inc., as financial advisor, and Jefferies LLC as the investment banker. Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP is the Committee's Delaware and conflicts counsel. Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads LLP, led by partners Gregory T. Donilon, Edward L. Schnitzer, and David M. Banker, is representing Sam Bankman-Fried in the Chapter 11 cases. White-collar crime specialist Mark S. Cohen has reportedly been hired to represent SBF in litigation. Lawyers at Paul Weiss previously represented SBF but later renounced representing the entrepreneur due to a conflict of interest. FTX GROUP: Landis Rath, Et Al. to Defend Chap. 11 Plan ------------------------------------------------------ Emlyn Cameron at law360.com reports that beleaguered crypto exchange FTX Trading Ltd. will seek a Delaware bankruptcy judge's approval for the debtor's Chapter 11 plan after a bankruptcy process that has seen its counsel questioned, the legitimacy of its plan challenged and a bevy of disputes settled. At the hearing it will rely on the expertise of a legal team uniting lawyers from Landis Rath & Cobb LLP and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, according to law360.com. About FTX FTX is the world's second-largest cryptocurrency firm. FTX is a cryptocurrency exchange built by traders, for traders. FTX offers innovative products including industry-first derivatives, options, volatility products and leveraged tokens. Then CEO and co-founder Sam Bankman-Fried said Nov. 10, 2022, that FTX paused customer withdrawals after it was hit with roughly $5 billion worth of withdrawal requests. Faced with liquidity issues, FTX on Nov. 9, 2022, struck a deal to sell itself to its giant rival Binance, but Binance walked away from the deal amid reports on FTX regarding mishandled customer funds and alleged US agency investigations. SBF agreed to step aside, and restructuring vet John J. Ray III was quickly named new CEO. FTX Trading Ltd (d/b/a FTX.com), West Realm Shires Services Inc. (d/b/a FTX US), Alameda Research Ltd. and certain affiliated companies then commenced Chapter 11 proceedings (Bankr. D. Del. Lead Case No. 22-11068) on an emergency basis on Nov. 11, 2022. Additional entities sought Chapter 11 protection on Nov. 14, 2022. FTX Trading and its affiliates each listed $10 billion to $50 billion in assets and liabilities, making FTX the biggest bankruptcy filer in the US this year. According to Reuters, SBF shared a document with investors on Nov. 10, 2022, showing FTX had $13.86 billion in liabilities and $14.6 billion in assets. However, only $900 million of those assets were liquid, leading to the cash crunch that ended with the company filing for bankruptcy. The Hon. John T. Dorsey is the case judge. The Debtors tapped Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP as bankruptcy counsel; Landis Rath & Cobb, LLP as local counsel; and Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC as financial advisor. Kroll is the claims agent, maintaining the page https://cases.ra.kroll.com/FTX/Home-Index The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Paul Hastings as counsel, FTI Consulting, Inc., as financial advisor, and Jefferies LLC as the investment banker. Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP is the Committee's Delaware and conflicts counsel. Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads LLP, led by partners Gregory T. Donilon, Edward L. Schnitzer, and David M. Banker, is representing Sam Bankman-Fried in the Chapter 11 cases. White-collar crime specialist Mark S. Cohen has reportedly been hired to represent SBF in litigation. Lawyers at Paul Weiss previously represented SBF but later renounced representing the entrepreneur due to a conflict of interest. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BRAZIL: Moody's Ups Issuer & Senior Unsecured Bond Ratings to Ba1 ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Ratings has upgraded the Government of Brazil's long-term issuer and senior unsecured bond ratings to Ba1 from Ba2, the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba1 from (P)Ba2; and maintained the positive outlook. The upgrade reflects material credit improvements which Moody's expect to continue, including a more robust growth performance than previously assessed and a growing track record of economic and fiscal reforms that lend resilience to the credit profile, although the credibility of Brazil's fiscal framework is still moderate, as reflected in a relatively high cost of debt. In turn, more robust growth and fiscal policy consistently adhering to the fiscal framework will allow the debt burden to stabilize in the medium term, albeit at relatively high levels. The positive outlook reflects the possibility that steady growth and compliance with the fiscal framework will help enhance institutional credibility and reduce borrowing costs more markedly than Moody's currently assume. In turn, a lower cost of debt would have a positive impact on Brazil's government debt path, especially if combined with more robust growth than Moody's currently expect, allowing a decrease in the debt burden over the medium term. Brazil's country ceilings were changed. The local-currency country ceiling is positioned four notches above the sovereign rating at A3 from Baa1, reflecting external stability, moderate political risk, against the government's relatively large footprint in the economy. The foreign-currency country ceiling is upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2, one-notch below the local-currency country ceiling reflects large foreign exchange reserves, which reduces the risk of restrictions on transfer and convertibility in times of stress, and open capital account, balanced against exchange-rate volatility and some restrictions on short-term capital flows. RATINGS RATIONALE RATIONALE FOR THE RATINGS UPGRADE MORE ROBUST GROWTH OUTLOOK AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS SUPPORT CREDIT RESILIENCE Moody's revised Moody's real GDP growth to 2.5% in 2024 and over the medium term, a much more solid growth performance compared to pre-pandemic years, partly the result of structural reforms implemented over successive administrations related to a range of policy areas. Brazil's economic performance surprised to the upside in 2022-24 reflecting in part cyclical factors and the impact of structural reforms. This year, stronger growth expanded to both industry and services sectors and was supported by higher investment, reinforcing Moody's expectations that more robust growth will persist. In the next few years, Moody's anticipate growth will remain broad-based with domestic demand propelled by a relatively strong labor market – compared to Brazil's past - and higher real wages. Despite a polarized political environment, successive governments have advanced difficult reforms in key areas related to monetary policy implementation and strengthened central bank independence, improved governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and measures to improve the business environment, such as financial digitalization and labor reform, supporting Moody's assessment of institutional strength and policy predictability. The upcoming overhaul of the tax regime, while taking effect over a long period, also marks a notable structural reform that will improve the business environment and allocation of resources, adding to long-term growth potential. Since the beginning of the year, real GDP growth proved stronger and more resilient to high interest rates and the severe flooding that hit Brazil earlier this year. In addition, fiscal performance and the government budget presented for next year have remained consistent with fiscal targets. That said, a limiting factor on Brazil's policy effectiveness is the persistent risks to achieving fiscal targets due to structural spending rigidities and rise in mandatory spending, such as social security, social assistance programs, and health and education spending. These limitations weigh on fiscal policy credibility and complicate ongoing efforts to comply with fiscal targets, which undermines policy effectiveness and contributes to relatively high-risk premia. GRADUAL FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN LINE WITH TARGETS WILL CONTAIN INCREASE IN DEBT AND BUILD FISCAL POLICY CREDIBILITY In an environment of steady growth and given the government's efforts to raise revenues and incipient measures to cut spending, Moody's expect primary fiscal results will improve gradually in line with the government targets over the next 2-3 years. The persistent increase in mandatory spending limits the government's ability to achieve faster fiscal consolidation. Moreover, the overall fiscal deficit will remain elevated on account of high interest payments. In the absence of large shocks, compliance with the fiscal framework will lead Brazil's government debt to stabilize in the medium term, around 82% of GDP. Interest payment will remain elevated around 15% of revenues. So, while Brazil's debt burden and debt affordability will remain weaker than Ba1- and Baa3-rated sovereigns on average, the likelihood that its debt metrics stabilize has improved. Despite relatively high debt burden, Brazil's fiscal strength benefits from a large domestic market that allows the government to issue mainly in domestic currency, and sizeable liquid assets worth around 15% of GDP. RATIONALE FOR THE POSITIVE OUTLOOK The positive outlook reflects the possibility that sustained solid growth, and the implementation of spending measures will support compliance with the fiscal framework and will help reduce uncertainty around Brazil's debt trajectory. This would enhance the credibility of fiscal policy and support overall institutional strength. Improved credibility would contribute to lower borrowing costs and could improve debt dynamics more than Moody's currently expect. Lower cost of debt, combined with solid growth performance would have a positive impact on Brazil's debt trajectory, allowing a decrease in the debt burden over the medium term. On the fiscal side, maintaining commitment to fiscal targets and introducing spending measures to contain the increase in mandatory spending would ensure compliance with the fiscal framework and help build the credibility of fiscal policy and anchor market expectations. In turn, this would reduce uncertainty around Brazil's fiscal trajectory and support a reduction in risk premia, leading to lower borrowing costs for the government, accelerating debt stabilization. Meanwhile, as regards growth prospects, the government's energy transition agenda, which aims to attract private investment into clean energy projects with incentives and a favorable regulatory framework, adds upside to medium- to-longer-term growth potential if it enhances the attractiveness of Brazil as a production location and improves its competitiveness. In addition, advancing Brazil's energy transition efforts would reduce future vulnerability to climate shocks. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS Brazil's Credit Impact Score (CIS-3) reflects exposure to environmental and social risks, and moderately strong institutions. Social and environmental risks are driven by high income inequality and exposure to carbon transition risk. Brazil's exposure to environmental risks (E-3 issuer profile score) reflects carbon-transition risk, impacting its oil sector, and risks related to waste and pollution, water management and the depletion of natural capital. However, those risks are mitigated by Brazil's significant endowment of natural capital and its continental landmass, where any given climate shock impacts only part of the country. Environmental risks are also mitigated by the government's emphasis on supporting investment in green energy through a host of policy initiatives and efforts to meet the national climate resilience targets. Exposure to social risks (S-3 issuer profile score) reflects high income inequality and some deficiency in the provision of basic services, notwithstanding a large social safety net. Future social pressure may arise if employment and wage growth were to persistently weaken, leading to deterioration in living standards. The influence of governance on Brazil's credit profile (G-2 issuer profile score) reflects the effectiveness of economic, political, and judicial institutions in enacting difficult reforms across multiple administrations and strong monetary policy framework set against Moody's assessment of the impact of relatively weak governance indicators related to corruption and rule of law. GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 20,001 (2023) (also known as Per Capita Income) Real GDP growth (% change): 2.9% (2023) (also known as GDP Growth) Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 4.6% (2023) Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -7.9% (2023) (also known as Fiscal Balance) Current Account Balance/GDP: -1% (2023) (also known as External Balance) External debt/GDP: 33.7% (2023) Economic resiliency: baa1 Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans) has been recorded since 1983. On September 26, 2024, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the Brazil, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its economic strength, have materially increased. The issuer's institutions and governance strength, have not materially changed. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has not materially changed. The issuer's susceptibility to event risks has not materially changed. FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS Brazil's sovereign rating would be upgraded if the government was able to address underlying spending rigidities and introduce structural fiscal measures to contain the increase in mandatory spending on a sustainable basis. This would facilitate the decline in debt burden when the economic environment is favorable and limit its increase when the economic cycle turns. It would also indicate higher policy effectiveness, supporting Moody's assessment of institutional strength and resiliency to shocks. In turn, higher policy effectiveness and generally more credible institutions would likely be reflected in lower risk premia and a lower cost of debt, contributing to more favorable debt dynamics. The positive outlook indicates that a downgrade is unlikely in the near term. The outlook could return to stable if commitment or capacity to implement fiscal consolidation weakens, leading to a likely deterioration or absence of improvement in the primary and overall fiscal balances. This would also suggest weaker fiscal policy effectiveness which would weigh further on investor confidence, investment, and growth. Continued increase in government funding costs would also weaken the sovereign's creditworthiness. A return of persistently low GDP growth would represent a credit-negative development that would adversely affect Brazil's credit profile. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereigns published in November 2022. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable. PRIO SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' ICR & Alters Outlook to Positive ----------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Prio S.A. to positive from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' and 'brAA+' global scale and national scale long-term issuer credit ratings and its 'brA-1+' national scale short-term issuer rating on the company, its 'BB' issue-level rating on its senior secured notes, and our 'brAA+' issue-level rating on its senior unsecured debentures. The positive outlook indicates that S&P could raise the ratings in the next 12 months if the company increases production while maintaining controlled leverage. Sinochem has a 40% stake at Peregrino field, which will boost Prio's proved oil reserves (1P) by about 20% (106.8 million barrels of oil) and production by about 32% (around 40,000 barrels per day in 2025). Considering the asset acquisition, higher production at Albacora Leste with revitalization and drilling campaigns, and the expected start of production at Wahoo field next year, S&P now forecasts Prio's production to reach close to 160,000 barrels per day in 2025, compared with about 90,000 barrels per day in 2024. S&P now forecasts Prio's lifting cost per barrel of oil equivalent of about $7.7 in 2025, and $6 in the following years. Also, the current price discount to Brent from Peregrino's field is about $10.5-$12 because of logistics and the lower quality of the oil, compared with average $2.5-$3 discounts on Prio's current assets. The company has plans to reduce the price discount from Peregrino, but we aren't yet considering that in our base case. S&P forecasts that the company's leverage will return to 1.0x-1.5x in 2025, after a peak of close to 2.0x at the end of 2024. This considers the debt for the acquisition but not the pro forma EBITDA generation of the acquired company. The improvement in credit metrics in 2025 also considers the additional production from the acquired asset and higher production from current assets. The company is still waiting for environmental permits before it can proceed with drilling campaigns and the start of production at Wahoo field. Workers at Brazil's environmental protection agency, Ibama, were on strike from Jan. 1, 2024 until August 2024. As a result, S&P now expects the company to receive its permits this year and start producing in first half 2025 (versus its previous expectation that production would start in the second half of 2024). Also, lower production at Albacora Leste in 2024 owed to additional stabilization for the company's floating production storage and offloading vehicles and licenses needed for drilling activity. ===================== P U E R T O R I C O ===================== PUERTO RICO: Court OKs $188.4-MM Settlement With Cobra Acquisition ------------------------------------------------------------------ Cobra Acquisitions LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Mammoth Energy Services, Inc., on Sept. 19, 2024, announced that the previously disclosed Settlement Agreement with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority was approved by the Title III Court at the omnibus hearing held on September 18, 2024. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, which was approved by Judge Laura Taylor Swain, Cobra will receive total settlement proceeds of $188.4 million. Additionally, PREPA is required to pay Cobra $150 million within ten business days of the September 18(th) hearing. The remaining $38.4 million, of which $18.4 million relates to funds PREPA has received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency but are currently withholding, are to be paid out according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Arty Straehla, Chief Executive Officer, commented, "We are pleased with the results of the omnibus hearing and are happy to have received approval of the Settlement Agreement. We look forward to receiving the money owed to us for work completed over five years ago. The initial $150 million payment is expected to arrive within ten business days, and the remaining $38.4 million will follow. These proceeds will allow us to pay off all outstanding amounts under our term credit facility, together with accrued and unpaid interest, and terminate the facility. We expect that the remaining proceeds from the Settlement Agreement will result in cash on our balance sheet, which we believe will have a transformative impact on our business going forward." Settlement Agreement Terms The proceeds of the Settlement Agreement will be paid to Cobra through three installments: (i) $150 million on the later of (A) ten business days following approval of the Settlement Agreement by the Title III Court and (B) August 31, 2024; (ii) $20 million within seven days following the effective date of PREPA's plan of adjustment; and (iii) $18.4 million in the Withheld FEMA Funds within either (A) ten business days after the deadline for appealing the entry of the settlement order by the Title III Court under the applicable bankruptcy rules of procedure if no such appeal is filed, or (B) if the provisions of the settlement order allowing PREPA to release the Withheld FEMA Funds to Cobra without retaining any liability to the Specified Municipalities are appealed by the Specified Municipalities, within ten business days of the filing of the notice of such appeal. About Mammoth Energy Services, Inc. Mammoth is an integrated, growth-oriented energy services company focused on the providing products and services to enable the exploration and development of North American onshore unconventional oil and natural gas reserves as well as the construction and repair of the electric grid for private utilities, public investor-owned utilities and co-operative utilities through its infrastructure services businesses. Mammoth's suite of services and products include: well completion services, infrastructure services, natural sand and proppant services, drilling services and other energy services. For more information, please visit www.mammothenergy.com. About Puerto Rico Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with the United States. The chief of state is the President of the United States of America. The head of government is an elected Governor. There are two legislative chambers: the House of Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats. In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the government, which expired May 1, 2017. The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii) Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J. Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and (vii) David A. Skeel Jr. On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). The case is pending in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578. A copy of Puerto Rico's PROMESA petition is available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf On May 5, 2017, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) commenced a case under Title III of PROMESA (D.P.R. Case No. 17-01599). Joint administration has been sought for the Title III cases. On May 21, 2017, two more agencies -- Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Case Nos. 17-01685 and 17-01686) -- commenced Title III cases. U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts named U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain to preside over the Title III cases. The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor. Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M. Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys. Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk maintains the case Website https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders. Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General Obligation Bondholders. PUERTO RICO: PREPA Creditors Seek OK For Bond Claims Suit --------------------------------------------------------- Rick Archer at law360.com reports that representatives of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's unsecured creditors are asking a New York federal judge to allow them to contest what they say is the wrongful lumping of $8.4 billion in bondholder claims with their own claims against the utility. About Puerto Rico Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with the United States. The chief of state is the President of the United States of America. The head of government is an elected Governor. There are two legislative chambers: the House of Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats. In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the government, which expired May 1, 2017. The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii) Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J. Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and (vii) David A. Skeel Jr. On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). The case is pending in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578. A copy of Puerto Rico's PROMESA petition is available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf On May 5, 2017, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) commenced a case under Title III of PROMESA (D.P.R. Case No. 17-01599). Joint administration has been sought for the Title III cases. On May 21, 2017, two more agencies -- Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Case Nos. 17-01685 and 17-01686) -- commenced Title III cases. U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts named U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain to preside over the Title III cases. The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor. Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M. Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys. Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk maintains the case Website https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders. Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General Obligation Bondholders. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== [*] BOND PRICING: For the Week September 30 to October 4, 2024 -------------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Cntry Curr ---------- --- ----- -------- ----- ---- AMTD IDEA Group 4.5 55.3 KY SGD Argentina Bonar Bonds 1.0 43.7 7/9/2029 AR USD Argentina Treasury Dual 3.3 45.8 4/30/2024 AR USD Argentine Bonos del Tesoro 15.5 40.3 10/17/2026 AR ARS Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond 1.0 47.5 7/9/2029 AR USD Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond 0.5 41.9 7/9/2029 AR EUR Argentine Gov't Int'l Bond 0.1 42.5 7/9/2030 AR EUR Ascent Finance 1.2 61.0 7/12/2047 KY EUR Ascent Finance 3.4 66.6 2/6/2043 KY AUD Ascent Finance 3.8 67.9 6/28/2047 KY AUD Astra Cumulative 2019 1.5 62.1 11/1/2029 KY USD At Home Cayman 11.5 69.3 5/12/2028 KY USD At Home Cayman 11.5 70.6 5/12/2028 KY USD AYC Finance 3.9 63.2 KY USD Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 65.8 CO USD Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 70.3 CO USD Banco de Chile 2.7 75.1 3/9/2035 CL AUD Banco del Estado de Chile 3.1 71.2 2/21/2040 CL AUD Banco del Estado de Chile 2.8 67.7 3/13/2040 CL AUD Banco Nacional de Panama 2.5 75.4 8/11/2030 PA USD Banco Nacional de Panama 2.5 75.2 8/11/2030 PA USD Banco Santander Chile 3.1 71.2 2/28/2039 CL AUD Banco Santander Chile 1.3 73.9 11/29/2034 CL EUR Banda de Couro Energetica 8.0 55.1 1/15/2027 BR BRL Baraunas II Energetica S/A 8.0 12.5 1/15/2027 BR BRL Bishopsgate Asset Finance 4.8 66.9 8/14/2044 KY GBP Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 58.3 3/20/2028 BO USD Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.5 59.4 3/2/2030 BO USD Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 58.5 3/20/2028 BO USD Bolivian Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.5 59.5 3/2/2030 BO USD Bonos Para La Reconstruccion 5.0 63.6 10/31/2027 AR USD Bonos Para La Reconstruccion 3.0 60.5 5/31/2026 AR USD Bonos Para La Reconstruccion 5.0 51.9 10/31/2027 AR USD Brazilian Gov't Int'l Bond 4.8 74.1 1/14/2050 BR USD BRF SA 5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD BRF SA 5.8 78.1 9/21/2050 BR USD Caja de Compensacion 2.4 49.6 4/5/2025 CL CLP Camposol SA 6.0 72.3 2/3/2027 PE USD Camposol SA 6.0 72.6 2/3/2027 PE USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.8 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.9 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.5 1/31/2031 KY USD CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.5 72.7 1/25/2050 CL USD Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.1 73.6 5/7/2041 CL USD Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.1 62.8 1/22/2061 CL USD Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.5 72.3 4/15/2053 CL USD Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 1.3 67.4 1/29/2040 CL EUR Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 1.3 54.0 1/22/2051 CL EUR Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.3 62.9 9/21/2071 CL USD Chile Gov'tInt'l Bond 1.3 74.4 7/26/2036 CL EUR China Yuhua Education Corp 0.9 65.1 12/27/2024 KY HKD CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II 3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD CK HutchisonInt'l 19 II 3.4 74.4 9/6/2049 KY USD CK HutchisonInt'l 20 3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD CK HutchisonInt'l 20 3.4 74.1 5/8/2050 KY USD Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 4.1 61.2 5/15/2051 CO USD Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 3.9 57.2 2/15/2061 CO USD Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 5.2 72.4 5/15/2049 CO USD Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 4.1 66.7 2/22/2042 CO USD Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 7.3 71.1 10/26/2050 CO COP Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 5.0 71.6 6/15/2045 CO USD Colombia Gov't Int'l Bond 6.3 73.3 7/9/2036 CO COP Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD Colombia Telecomunicaciones 5.0 67.5 7/17/2030 CO USD Colombian TES 7.3 70.9 10/26/2050 CO COP Colombian TES 6.3 73.1 7/9/2036 CO COP Coopeucha 4.6 38.3 6/1/2029 CL CLP CODELCO 3.7 67.4 1/30/2050 CL USD CODELCO 3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD CODELCO 3.7 67.3 1/30/2050 CL USD CODELCO 3.2 61.0 1/15/2051 CL USD CODELCO 3.6 74.7 7/22/2039 CL AUD Earls Eight 0.1 64.5 12/20/2031 KY AUD Earls Eight 1.7 72.4 6/20/2032 KY AUD Ecopetrol SA 5.9 73.6 5/28/2045 CO USD Ecopetrol SA 5.9 70.5 11/2/2051 CO USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.3 1/20/2050 SV USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.0 9/21/2034 SV USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.8 2/1/2041 SV USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 5.9 65.1 1/30/2025 SV USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.6 9/21/2034 SV USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.1 68.4 1/20/2050 SV USD El Salvador Gov'tInt'l Bond 7.6 72.9 2/1/2041 SV USD Embotelladora Andina SA 6.5 23.2 6/1/2026 CL CLP EFE 3.8 65.7 9/14/2061 CL USD EFE 3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD EFE 3.1 59.8 8/18/2050 CL USD EFE 3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD EFE 6.5 11.1 1/1/2026 CL CLP ETESA 5.1 71.5 5/2/2049 PA USD ETESA 5.1 72.2 5/2/2049 PA USD Metro SA 3.7 65.1 9/13/2061 CL USD Metro SA 3.7 65.0 9/13/2061 CL USD Metro SA 5.5 50.1 7/15/2027 CL CLP Metro SA 5.0 63.8 5/11/2025 AR USD ENAP 4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD ENAP 4.5 73.2 9/14/2047 CL USD ENA Master Trust 4.0 70.5 5/19/2048 PA USD ENA Master Trust 4.0 70.9 5/19/2048 PA USD Enel Generacion Chile SA 6.2 29.2 10/15/2028 CL CLP Equatorial Energia 10.9 1.1 10/15/2029 BR BRL Equatorial Energia 10.8 1.0 5/15/2028 BR BRL Esval SA 3.5 13.1 2/15/2026 CL CLP Farfetch 3.8 4.3 5/1/2027 KY USD Fospar S/A 6.5 1.4 5/15/2026 BR BRL GDM Argentina SA 2.5 0.0 9/8/2024 AR USD GDS Holdings 4.5 67.7 1/31/2030 KY USD Generacion Mediterranea SA 4.6 0.0 11/12/2024 AR ARS General Shopping Finance 10.0 66.2 KY USD General Shopping Finance 10.0 65.0 KY USD Genneia SA 2.0 56.9 7/14/2028 AR USD Greenland Hong Kong 10.2 13.4 KY USD Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 70.5 4/30/2025 CL USD Guacolda Energia SA 10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 71.8 4/30/2025 CL USD Guacolda Energia SA 10.0 70.1 12/30/2030 CL USD Hector A Bertone SA 1.9 0.0 4/7/2024 AR USD Hilong Holding 9.8 68.7 11/18/2024 KY USD Hilong Holding 9.8 69.7 11/18/2024 KY USD Hilong Holding 9.8 69.4 11/18/2024 KY USD Multiplo SA 3.3 59.5 BR USD Itau Unibanco SA/Nassau 5.8 20.2 5/20/2027 BR BRL Jamaica Gov't Bond 6.3 67.8 7/11/2048 JM JMD Jamaica Gov't Bond 8.5 73.0 12/21/2061 JM JMD Lani Finance 1.7 63.5 3/14/2049 KY EUR Lani Finance 1.9 66.9 10/19/2048 KY EUR Lani Finance 3.1 66.1 10/19/2048 KY AUD Lani Finance 1.9 65.8 9/20/2048 KY EUR Link Finance Cayman 2009 2.2 70.0 10/27/2038 KY HKD LIPSA Srl 1.0 0.0 8/23/2024 AR USD Logan Group Co 7.0 5.1 KY USD Longfor Group Holdings 4.0 43.3 9/16/2029 KY USD Longfor Group Holdings 3.4 56.1 4/13/2027 KY USD Longfor Group Holdings 3.9 38.4 1/13/2032 KY USD Longfor Group Holdings 4.5 53.1 1/16/2028 KY USD Luminis III 2.3 41.8 9/22/2048 KY USD Luminis III 2.4 55.3 9/22/2048 KY AUD Luminis IV 3.2 70.4 1/22/2042 KY AUD Luminis 2.3 54.8 9/22/2048 KY AUD Lunar Funding I 1.7 8/11/2056 KY GBP MTR Corp CI 2.8 73.3 9/6/2047 KY HKD MTR Corp CI 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD MTR Corp CI 3.0 75.4 4/26/2047 KY HKD MTR Corp CI 3.2 73.7 2/5/2055 KY HKD MTR Corp CI 3.0 73.1 3/11/2051 KY HKD NIO Inc 4.6 73.1 10/15/2030 KY USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 63.1 4/1/2056 PA USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 2.3 70.2 9/29/2032 PA USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.9 55.8 7/23/2060 PA USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 64.9 4/16/2050 PA USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 62.0 1/19/2063 PA USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.5 66.6 5/15/2047 PA USD Panama Gov'tInt'l Bond 4.3 62.6 4/29/2053 PA USD Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 71.8 3/10/2051 PE USD Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 2.8 57.3 12/1/2060 PE USD Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.2 57.3 7/28/2121 PE USD Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.6 65.7 1/15/2072 PE USD Peruvian Gov'tInt'l Bond 3.3 74.3 3/11/2041 PE USD Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 68.3 6/19/2047 PE USD Powerlong Real Estate 6.3 10.3 8/10/2024 KY USD Provincia de Cordoba 7.1 39.6 10/27/2026 AR USD Provincia de la Rioja 7.5 45.9 7/20/2032 AR USD Provincia de la Rioja 4.5 51.8 1/20/2027 AR USD Chaco Argentina 4.0 0.0 12/4/2026 AR USD QNB Finance 13.5 63.1 10/6/2025 KY TRY QNB Finance 11.5 71.7 1/30/2025 KY TRY QNB Finance 2.9 74.2 9/16/2035 KY AUD QNB Finance 2.9 72.9 12/4/2035 KY AUD QNB Finance 3.0 75.4 2/14/2035 KY AUD QNB Finance 3.4 72.0 10/21/2039 KY AUD Radiance Holdings Group 7.8 49.6 3/20/2024 KY USD Rio Alto Energias Renovaveis 7.0 29.1 7/15/2027 BR BRL Santander Consumer Chile SA 2.9 72.7 11/27/2034 CL AUD Seazen Group 6.0 75.2 8/12/2024 KY USD Seazen Group 4.5 34.1 7/13/2025 KY USD Shui On Development Holding 5.5 61.2 6/29/2026 KY USD Shui On Development Holding 5.5 73.0 3/3/2025 KY USD Silk Road Investments 2.9 66.8 1/23/2042 KY AUD Skylark 1.8 59.0 4/4/2039 KY GBP Autopista Central 5.3 37.2 12/15/2026 CL CLP Autopista Central 5.3 50.6 12/15/2028 CL CLP SQM 3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD SQM 3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD Southern Water Service 3.0 70.8 5/28/2037 KY GBP SPE Saneamento RIO 1 7.2 10.8 1/15/2042 BR BRL SPE Saneamento RIO 1 SA 6.9 10.5 1/15/2034 BR BRL SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA 7.2 10.2 1/15/2042 BR BRL SPE Saneamento Rio 4 SA 6.9 10.2 1/15/2034 BR BRL Spica 2.0 74.9 3/24/2033 KY AUD Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 72.2 9/20/2025 KY USD Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 73.0 9/20/2025 KY USD Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 70.3 9/20/2025 KY USD Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8.0 72.5 9/20/2025 KY USD Sylph 2.7 68.5 3/25/2036 KY USD Sylph 3.1 74.7 9/25/2035 KY USD Sylph 2.4 64.2 9/25/2036 KY USD Sylph 2.9 74.5 6/24/2036 KY AUD Telecom Argentina SA 1.0 74.0 3/9/2027 AR USD Telecom Argentina SA 1.0 66.1 2/10/2028 AR USD Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD Telefonica Moviles Chile SA 3.5 74.4 11/18/2031 CL USD Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.9 6/3/2050 KY USD Tencent Holdings 3.3 64.0 6/3/2060 KY USD Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD Tencent Holdings 3.8 75.4 4/22/2051 KY USD Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.6 6/3/2050 KY USD Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.9 4/22/2061 KY USD Tencent Holdings 3.3 64.1 6/3/2060 KY USD Three Gorges Finance 3.2 71.6 10/16/2049 KY USD Grupo Travessia 9.0 1.6 1/20/2032 BR BRL Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 62.2 2/11/2026 PE USD Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 62.0 2/11/2026 PE USD VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 61.6 1/15/2028 CL USD VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 60.8 4/15/2029 CL USD VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 61.9 1/15/2028 CL USD VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 60.6 4/15/2029 CL USD YPF SA 7.0 72.6 12/15/2047 AR USD YPF SA 1.0 66.8 4/25/2027 AR USD ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. 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