/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/241223.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, December 23, 2024, Vol. 25, No. 256
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
GAUCHO GROUP: 3i LP, 2 Others Hold 9.9% Stake as of Sept. 30
PROVINCE OF NEUQUEN: S&P Affirms 'CCC' LT ICRs, Outlook Stable
B R A Z I L
ITAU UNIBANCO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Signs Agreement to Strengthen Export Promotion
J A M A I C A
JAMAICA: Cocoa Production Hampered by Several Issues, Leckie Says
P A N A M A
PANAMA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Foreign-Currency IDR, Outlook Stable
P U E R T O R I C O
PUERTO RICO: Dechert LLP Updates List of PREPA Bondholders
X X X X X X X X
LATAM: ECLAC Forecasts Regional Growth of 2% This Year
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week from Dec. 16 to 20, 2024
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A R G E N T I N A
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GAUCHO GROUP: 3i LP, 2 Others Hold 9.9% Stake as of Sept. 30
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3i, LP disclosed in a Schedule 13G filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission that as of September 30, 2024, the firm,
3i Management LLC, and Maier J. Tarlow beneficially owned 97,482
shares of Gaucho Group Holdings, Inc.'s common stock, representing
9.9% of the shares outstanding.
The ownership percentages are based on:
(i) 889,263 shares of Common Stock outstanding of August 14,
2024, as disclosed in the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
for the fiscal period ended June 30, 2024, filed by the Company
with the SEC on August 14, 2024, and
(ii) 97,482 shares of Common Stock issuable, in an combination,
to 3i upon the (x) the full exercise of Common Stock purchase
warrants held by 3i, which are exercisable for up to an aggregate
of 35,054 shares of Common Stock, which are subject to a 4.99%
beneficial ownership limitation provision, and (y) full conversion
of senior secured convertible notes held by 3i in the principal
aggregate amount of approximately $1.6 million, which conversions
are subject to a 9.99% beneficial ownership limitation provision.
3i holds the Warrants exercisable for up to an aggregate of 35,054
shares of Common Stock and the Notes convertible into a number of
shares of Common Stock pursuant to, and in accordance with, the
conversion price and terms of the Notes, subject to the Blocker.
Due to the interaction between the Blocker and the 4.99% beneficial
ownership limitation, 3i is prohibited from exercising the Warrants
and/or converting the Notes into shares of Common Stock if, as a
result of such exercise or conversion, respectively, 3i, together
with its affiliates and any persons acting as a group together with
3i or any such affiliates, would beneficially own more than 4.99%
or 9.99% of the total number of shares of Common Stock then issued
and outstanding immediately after giving effect to such exercise or
conversion, as applicable.
Consequently, 3i is the beneficial owner of 97,482 shares of Common
Stock. 3i has the power to dispose of and the power to vote the
Shares beneficially owned by it, which power may be exercised by 3i
Management, the manager and general partner of 3i. Mr. Tarlow, as
the manager of 3i Management, has shared power to vote and/or
dispose of the Shares beneficially owned by each of 3i and 3i
Management. Mr. Tarlow does not directly own the Shares. By reason
of the provisions of Rule 13d-3 of the Act, Mr. Tarlow may be
deemed to beneficially own the Shares beneficially owned by 3i and
3i Management, and 3i Management may be deemed to beneficially own
the Shares beneficially owned by 3i.
A full-text copy of 3i's SEC Report is available at:
https://tinyurl.com/yynt4jv9
About Gaucho Group Holdings
Gaucho Group Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware holding company
headquartered in Miami, Fla., which owns certain subsidiaries
including operating companies that own a winery, boutique hotel and
real property in Argentina.
Gaucho filed Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No.
24-21852) on November 12, 2024, with $10 million to $50 million in
both assets and liabilities.
Nathan G. Mancuso, Esq., at Mancuso Law, P.A. is the Debtor's legal
counsel.
PROVINCE OF NEUQUEN: S&P Affirms 'CCC' LT ICRs, Outlook Stable
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On Dec. 18, 2024, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC' foreign and
local currency long-term issuer credit ratings on the Province of
Neuquen. The outlook remains stable.
Outlook
The stable outlook balances S&P's expectations that Neuquen will
generate balanced results after capital expenditures (capex) and
that international debt service will remain manageable in the next
12 months against the risks stemming from Argentina's substantial
economic vulnerabilities and the ongoing challenges in tackling
them. While President Milei's administration has undertaken
comprehensive reforms designed to stabilize the economy,
Argentina's economic fundamentals remain fragile.
Downside scenario
S&P said, "We could lower our long-term ratings on Neuquen in the
next 12 months if we revise down our T&C assessment on Argentina
because of tighter foreign currency restrictions, which would
likely weaken the capacity of Argentine provinces to service debt.
"We could also lower our ratings on Neuquen if unexpected fiscal
deterioration or reduced liquidity increases the risk of a default
or the likelihood of a distressed debt exchange in the next 12
months."
Upside scenario
S&P could raise the long-term ratings on Neuquen in the next 12
months if it revise up its T&C assessment or its rating on the
sovereign. Currently, the Argentina rating depends on successful
policy execution to stabilize the economy and reduce macroeconomic
and fiscal imbalances. This would entail additional deficit
reduction, lower inflation, higher economic growth, and increased
international reserves that could facilitate access to global
capital markets.
Rationale
The 'b-' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on Neuquen reflects the
provincial government's recent ability to build up Neuquen's fiscal
and liquidity buffers amid stressed macroeconomic conditions.
Neuquen's individual credit characteristics point to an SACP that
is two notches above the 'CCC' rating, comparable with other
provinces that have built some buffers amid very stressed
conditions.
The royalties coming from the oil and gas sector have allowed the
administration in Neuquen to accumulate liquidity and reduce
financing needs. This partially insulates the province's fiscal
accounts from exchange swings and the reduction in transfers from
the national government.
S&P said, "Despite our upward revision of the SACP, our ratings on
the Province of Neuquen are capped by our T&C assessment on
Argentina, which reflects the uncertainty over access to foreign
currency for paying international debt, given the stressed level of
the international reserves." None of the rated Argentine local
governments can pass the severe stress test for being assigned a
rating higher than the sovereign rating or the sovereign T&C
assessment under our methodology.
Neuquen's management will focus on sustaining economic growth, but
with fiscal discipline and economic diversification.
Since entering office, the new administration in Neuquen has
articulated a commitment to improving the province's fiscal
profile. Provincial financial planning in Argentina tends to be
short term in times of pronounced macroeconomic volatility. But the
administration in Neuquen aims to focus on diversifying the
province's economy beyond oil and gas to bolster long-term
growth--with an eye toward maintaining solid fiscal performance.
Neuquen's investment plan emphasizes enhancing provincial
connectivity, to diversify industry beyond the hydrocarbon sector
as well as to facilitate tourism. To that end, it launched its own
Investment Regime (known as RIGI) aimed at aligning the investment
incentives of small and medium-size enterprises with the province's
diversification plans, while also adhering to the national RIGI
under Milei.
The province has taken concrete steps to reduce fiscal pressure. In
the short term, it closed its pension system deficit, which was
2.7% of operating revenue in 2023, by increasing contribution
rates. The government has acknowledged that structural imbalances
remain, but this short-term solution will ease pressure on the
province's fiscal accounts in 2024 and 2025. It will also allow the
province to devote those resources to servicing international
debt.
Oil and gas production, from the Vaca Muerta basin, has partially
insulated Neuquen's economy from the complex, volatile
macroeconomic conditions at the national level. Notwithstanding
management's efforts to diversify the province's economic
structure, S&P assumes that oil and gas will continue to underpin
the province's economic growth, since more pronounced development
of other sectors will take time to materialize.
S&P said, "We expect the province to continue to operate under
volatile macroeconomic conditions despite benefits from oil and
gas. Our estimate sees national GDP contracting 3.5% in 2024 and
growing 3.8% in 2025 and 3.5% in 2026.
"Still, we project that Neuquen's GDP per capita will reach
US$22,940 in 2024, much higher than the national average of
US$13,000. Even though the oil and gas sector boosts provincial
growth vis-a-vis its peers, it represents important concentration
in the local economy and adds volatility to its economic and fiscal
performance."
The institutional framework for Argentine local and regional
governments--a framework that we consider to be very volatile and
underfunded--limits Neuquen's capacity for fiscal planning and
exposes it to the potential transfer of fiscal stress from higher
tiers of government.
S&P expects fiscal results to be balanced despite increases in
capex and pressure from higher operating expenditures.
In S&P's base case, it expects that the province's fiscal surplus
will be roughly 9.8% of operating revenue, on average, in
2024-2027. Nontax revenue should continue to support provincial
revenue, since royalties represent 35% of total revenue. The Vaca
Muerta basin is expected to keep growing in coming years.
In 2024, the administration in Neuquen managed to contain pressing
operating spending through lagging payroll, favored by the
inflation dynamic. Nevertheless, S&P expects that the
administration will have less room to maneuver going forward amid
lower inflation and increasing royalties (which would improve the
union's bargaining capacity).
S&P said, "Our forecast incorporates a fiscal result after capex
remaining near balanced--slightly positive at 1% of operating
revenue in 2025-2027. Like other provinces, Neuquen cut capital
investment this year to limit fiscal slippage. Capex dropped to a
historically low level of 3.8% of total expenditures in September
2024, down from 8% in 2019-2023. We expect investment to bounce
back to about 8% of total expenditures by 2027, since the province
has an established track record with respect to its execution of
investment projects."
Oil and gas royalties, which are linked to the exchange rate, and
the containment of spending resulted in an accumulation of cash.
This, in turn, reduced Neuquen's borrowing needs. Liquidity also
improved because of higher collections from the provincial
countercyclical and development fund (known as FEDEN) and because
of U.S. hard currency holdings coming from proceeds of the bill
issued back in September 2023.
Given Neuquen's stronger budgetary out-turn and lower funding
needs, S&P expects that it will reduce its debt stock so that it
approaches 25% of operating revenue by 2027. Dollar-linked
royalties serve as a natural hedge, partially mitigating the risks
of accessing hard currency to service international debt.
Amortization of that international debt will tick up to US$300
million in 2025 before falling to US$260 million in 2026 and US$206
million in 2027.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.
The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed
Neuquen (Province of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC/Stable/--
Neuquen (Province of)
Senior Unsecured CCC
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B R A Z I L
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ITAU UNIBANCO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. (IUH)
and its operating subsidiary Itau Unibanco S.A. (Itau Unibanco) at
'BB+' and Long-Term National Rating at 'AAA(bra)'. The Rating
Outlooks are Stable. Fitch has also affirmed IUH and Itau
Unibanco's Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb+'.
Key Rating Drivers
Group VR: Fitch rates IUH and its main bank subsidiary, Itau
Unibanco S.A., at the same level in the consolidated group
reflecting its view that the entities have the same failure risk.
This is because the Central Bank of Brazil regulates the group as a
consolidated entity. Capital and liquidity are highly fungible
among the entities, as well as operational integration.
Business, Financial Profile Key Strengths: The IDRs and National
Ratings are driven by the entities' standalone creditworthiness, as
expressed by their 'bb+' VR. IUH's ratings continue to reflect the
strength of its business profile and well-managed risk profile that
results in resilient earnings generation capacity.
This is underlined by the group's leading banking position
domestically and moderate and consistent exposures in stronger
economies than its home Brazilian market, such as Chile, Uruguay
and Colombia, among other Latin American markets. The ratings are
also underpinned by the bank's sound funding profile, as well as
higher liquidity and capital buffers than similarly rated regional
banks. Fitch expects the bank's disciplined risk appetite to
continue to mitigate asset-quality pressures in an economic
downturn and that it will maintain capital ratios commensurate with
its risk profile.
Ratings One Notch above Brazil: The VRs are one notch above
Brazil's (BB/Stable) sovereign rating, reflecting the group's very
strong standalone credit profile and Fitch's view that these
entities would likely retain the capacity to service their
obligations in the case of a sovereign default, without any
restrictions from the sovereign. The uplift on the ratings is
limited to one notch due to the group's high exposure to the
sovereign, primarily through its holdings of government securities,
and as the majority of its operations are concentrated in Brazil.
The Stable Outlook on the Long-Term IDRs mirrors Brazil's Outlook.
Revised Operating Environment: Fitch has revised its assessment of
IUH's operating environment score to 'bb+' from 'bb' based in a
blended approach given IUH's international footprint has
continuously increasing and over the past four years has maintained
around 18% of expanded credit risk, mostly in Chile (A-/Stable).
This, combined with the bank's risk selective risk stance
domestically, underpins the resilience of the group's asset quality
in periods of stress and helps to reduce its risk sensitive to the
domestic economy in light of the concentration of activities within
Brazil and significant sovereign exposure.
Strong Domestic Franchise, Revenue Diversification: Fitch revises
IUH's business profile score to 'bbb+' from 'bbb' underpinned by
the group's strong and diversified business model, with significant
contributions from fee income, which have supported a steady
earnings generation over the years. IUH's four-year average total
operating income is USD22.3 billion, which is the largest among
private sector direct peers in the region.
Disciplined and Diversified Risk Profile: Fitch views IUH's risk
profile as moderate, supported by a diversified portfolio and
strong risk management. The bank effectively optimizes
risk-adjusted returns across retail, corporate, and international
segments, limiting credit and market risks volatility through the
cycles. Proactively tightened underwriting standards in retail and
improved client and sector diversification in corporate and SME
segments have maintained credit quality. Market risks, primarily
interest rate and foreign exchange, are well-managed through
hedging strategies.
Improved Asset-Quality: IUH's impaired loan (D-H loans as per
resolution 2682) to gross loan ratio has gradually improved in
recent years to 5.3% as of end-September 2024. Fitch expects the
impaired loans ratio to remain broadly stable in 2025. The impact
of aligning with the new definition of default as banks transition
to IFRS9 domestically in 2025 will be offset by the bank's
proactive impaired loan definition and management of expected loss
buffers.
Sound Structural Profitability: IUH's operating profitability is a
rating strength and has improved further over the past three years.
Business diversification and strategic enhancements in both retail
and corporate banking continues to yield resilient risk adjusted
revenue streams.
Operating profit/risk-weighted assets (RWAs) reached 3.7% in 9M24
(four-year average 2.5%), due to de-risked portfolios and reduced
credit costs in retail, and disciplined capital allocation and
increased fee-generating services in corporate banking. Fitch
expects IUH's disciplined credit underwriting, market risk
management, and strong cost-to-income culture to support an
earnings ratio above 3.0% of RWAs in 2025.
Adequate Capitalization: Fitch believes the group is
well-capitalized relative to its risk profile, with the common
equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio improving to 13.7% in 3Q24 from 13.1%
the previous year. This is above the bank's target of 12.0%. IUH's
proven access to equity markets, strong internal capital
generation, and additional capital strength from additional Tier 1
(AT1) instruments (1.6% of RWAs) and subordinated debt (2.1%)
enhance loss absorption. IUH's total capitalization ratio was
17.2%, well above the regulatory minimum limits.
Excess Liquidity and Stable Funding: Fitch revises IUH's funding
and liquidity score to 'bbb-' from 'bb+'. IUH's funding benefits
from a stable and large deposit base and good pricing power. At
9M24, the loan to deposit ratio was 94.8% (96.4% for the average
2020 to 2023). Funding and liquidity management also benefits from
deep global capital market access at the group level. Its approach
requires foreign subsidiaries to be locally funded. Its liquidity
coverage ratio remains one of the highest among the largest
regional banks.
Rating Sensitivities
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
The entities' VRs and Long-Term IDRs would come under pressure if
its CET1 ratio declines sustainably below 10% without a credible
plan to rebuild it in the short term, including as a result of
greater than expected asset quality deterioration or unexpected
events.
A meaningful erosion of the bank's earnings resilience, i.e.
operating profit/RWAs below 2% on a sustained basis, would also
likely result in a negative rating action.
The ratings remain sensitive to a downgrade of Brazil or to the
group's current Operating Environment score of 'bb', the latter
being particularly sensitive to the economic and banking prospects
of domestic and international markets.
The national scale ratings are sensitive to weakening
creditworthiness, relative to other Brazilian issuers.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
An upgrade would be contingent on an upgrade of Brazil's rating,
resulting in a better assessment of the group's operating
environment. In the medium term, an upgrade would require a CET1 to
RWA ratio consistently above 12% and an impaired loan ratio
structurally below 6%, while preserving the group's earnings
resilience.
OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS
GSR
IUH's GSR of 'bb-' reflects the moderate probability of support
from the Brazilian authorities, if required. Despite contagion
risks stemming from IUH's position as a domestic systemically
important bank with dominant market shares, the government's
moderate financial flexibility and capacity to provide support as
indicated by its sovereign rating, highly influence its GSR.
Senior Unsecured Debt
IUH's senior unsecured debt is rated in line with the IDRs as the
likelihood of default on these obligations reflects the likelihood
of default of the entity.
Subordinated and Junior Subordinated Debt
The subordinated debt is rated two notches below IUH's VR of 'bb+'.
The notching is driven by the subordinated status and the expected
high loss severity of the notes. No notching for nonperformance is
applied, as there is no coupon flexibility, i.e., coupons must be
paid as they are not deferrable and the write-off trigger is close
to the point of nonviability. As a result, Fitch believes the
incremental nonperformance risk is not material from a rating
perspective.
IUH's AT1 notes are four notches below the VR of 'bb+' in
accordance with Fitch's criteria for assessing and rating bank
subordinated and hybrid securities. The notching reflects the
notes' higher expected loss severity relative to senior unsecured
creditors (two notches) and higher nonperformance risk (two
notches).
OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES
OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES
SENIOR DEBT
IUH's senior debt ratings are primarily sensitive to changes in
IUH's IDRs, from which they are equalized.
SUBORDINATED AND JUNIOR SUBORDINATED DEBT
IUH's hybrid ratings (for its Tier II subordinated debt and AT1)
rating are sensitive to a change in its anchor VR.
GSR
An upward revision of the GSR would be contingent on a positive
change in the sovereign's propensity to support the bank. In
Fitch's view, this is highly unlikely, although not impossible.
VR ADJUSTMENTS
The Asset Quality score of 'bb' was assigned above the 'b and
below' category implied score because of the following adjustment:
collateral and reserves (positive).
The Funding & Liquidity score of 'bbb-' was assigned above the 'bb
and below' category implied score because of the following
adjustment: Deposit Structure (positive).
ESG Considerations
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
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Itau Unibanco
Holding S.A. LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Natl LT AAA(bra)Affirmed AAA(bra)
Natl ST F1+(bra)Affirmed F1+(bra)
Viability bb+ Affirmed bb+
Government Support bb- Affirmed bb-
senior
unsecured LT BB+ Affirmed BB+
subordinated LT BB- Affirmed BB-
subordinated LT B Affirmed B
Itau Unibanco
S.A. LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
ST IDR B Affirmed B
LC LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
LC ST IDR B Affirmed B
Natl LT AAA(bra)Affirmed AAA(bra)
Natl ST F1+(bra)Affirmed F1+(bra)
Viability bb+ Affirmed bb+
Government Support bb- Affirmed bb-
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D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Signs Agreement to Strengthen Export Promotion
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Dominican Today reports that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Mirex) and the Dominican Association of Exporters (Adoexpo) have
signed an agreement to promote and enhance the country's exports by
leveraging its advantages. The agreement, signed by Foreign
Minister Roberto Alvarez and Adoexpo President Karel Castillo,
highlights the Dominican Republic's capacity to strengthen
international ties, particularly through integration and
cooperation efforts in line with the National Development Strategy,
according to Dominican Today.
The agreement also establishes a joint working group, led by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coordinated by the Vice-Ministry
for Economic Affairs and International Cooperation, the report
notes. Foreign Minister Alvarez emphasized the government's
commitment to fostering investment and trade, enhancing
international relations, and supporting the growth of the national
productive sector, the report relays. He noted that the country's
political stability, legal security, and economic resilience have
been crucial in consolidating the Dominican Republic's presence in
global markets, contributing to record export figures of over
$12,000 million in 2023, the report notes.
The agreement outlines an action plan aimed at improving
communication, enhancing diplomatic support for Dominican exports,
exploring market opportunities, conducting research, and
establishing open communication channels between both
organizations, the report discloses. Reports show that, from
January to November 2024, Dominican exports reached $11,900
million, with the U.S. being the largest trading partner, the
report says. Key export products include gold, medical
instruments, and cigars, demonstrating the competitiveness and
quality of Dominican exports, which are integral to the nation's
economic growth, the report adds.
About Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the
island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis
Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.
Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic was raised
to 'BB' in December 2022 with stable outlook. Moody's credit
rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 in August 2023
with the outlook changed to positive. Fitch, in December 2023,
affirmed the Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the outlook to positive.
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J A M A I C A
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JAMAICA: Cocoa Production Hampered by Several Issues, Leckie Says
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RJR News reports that immediate past president of the Small
Business Association of Jamaica (SBAJ), Michael Leckie, said
although Jamaica is recognized worldwide as a producer of fine
flavored cocoa, there are issues hampering cocoa production.
The price for lower grade cocoa recently skyrocketed to almost
US$12,000 per metric tonne but Mr. Leckie says issues such as the
frosty pod rot disease and inadequate financing and marketing are
contributing to a fall in local cocoa production, according to RJR
News.
He notes that local cocoa production has fallen from a high of
3,000 metric tonnes to less than 1,000 metric tonnes, the report
relays.
About Jamaica
Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea. Jamaica
is an upper-middle income country with an economy heavily dependent
on tourism. Other major sectors of the Jamaican economy include
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, petroleum refining, financial
and insurance services.
In October 2023, Moody's upgraded the Government of Jamaica's
long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings to B1 from B2, and
senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)B1 from (P)B2. The outlook has
been changed to positive from stable.
In September 2023, S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica to 'BB-'
from 'B+', and affirmed its short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings at 'B', with a stable outlook. In
September 2024, S&P affirmed 'BB-/B' sovereign ratings on Jamaica
and revised outlook to positive.
In March 2022, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. The Rating Outlook
is Stable.
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P A N A M A
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PANAMA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Foreign-Currency IDR, Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed Panama's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' with a Stable Rating Outlook.
Key Rating Drivers
Ratings Affirmed: Panama's ratings are supported by high per-capita
GDP, low inflation and macro-financial stability anchored by
dollarization, and robust medium-term growth prospects, centered
around logistics activities and the strategic asset of the Panama
Canal. This is counterbalanced by weaknesses in governance and
public finances, including a narrow and eroding government revenue
base, high and rising government debt and interest burdens, and a
heavy reliance on external markets for funding.
New Administration Inherits Challenges: The administration of
President Jose Raul Mulino took office on July 1, inheriting a
number of pressing challenges including a rising social security
deficit, weak public finances, and fallout from closure of a large
copper mine in 2023. Addressing these challenges will depend on
negotiation with other political parties, as the president's
Realizando Meta's (RM) party lacks a simple majority, and within
its party, as some of its members are not assured of supporting
aspects of his agenda. Advancing legislation may thus entail
difficult negotiations and concessions, as evidenced by the 2025
budget process and an ongoing reform of the social security system
(CSS).
Mine Uncertainty: The government intends to address the matter of
the copper mine in 2025, following social security reform. Possible
proposals include an "open-to-close" approach, involving
temporarily reopening the mine to finance its responsible closure,
however it remains a sensitive social issue. Arbitration
proceedings against the government due to the closure remain a
large contingent liability (USD20 billion, or 23% of 2024 GDP),
with the first ICC arbitration deadline approaching in September
2025.
Growth Slows Less than Expected: Fitch expects real GDP growth to
slow to 2.8% in 2024 from 7.4% in 2023, reflecting a deceleration
after years of post-pandemic catch up, and the impact of the mine
closure. Growth has performed better than Fitch projected in its
March downgrade, as the impact of the mine closure has been less
than anticipated, while non-mining activity has grown in line with
prior expectations of 4.5%. Fitch expects growth to accelerate to
4.0% in 2025 and 4.5% in 2026, above the 'BB' median average of
3.6%, on a robust pipeline of public works projects. A weak labor
market, however, reflects challenges in Panama's growth model and
could weigh on potential growth, with lower labor force
participation, higher unemployment, and higher informality relative
to pre-pandemic levels.
Fiscal Slippage, Arrears: Fitch expects the non-financial-public
sector (NFPS) deficit to rise to 7.0% of GDP in 2024 from 3.0% in
2023. The deterioration largely reflects transitory factors,
including loss of one-off receipts, arrears settlement, and payback
from an accounting maneuver that helped the 2023 outturn. But it
also reflects underlying pressures, including longstanding tax
underperformance, inertial spending growth, and higher interest
costs. The 2024 deficit is subject to a wide margin of uncertainty
depending on how much of the large arrears stock the authorities
settle. The executive has identified USD877 million (1.0% of GDP)
in arrears it is working to settle by year-end, on top of USD650
million (0.8%) settled in May and recorded in the deficit.
Challenging Fiscal Outlook: The authorities relaxed the budget
deficit limits set in the fiscal responsibility law (LRSF) to allow
for a gradual consolidation in the coming years, from 4%-of-GDP
deficit in 2025 to 1.5% in 2030. They have pledged spending
restraint and revenue improvements to deliver it, but have yet to
unveil concrete plans. Fitch projects fiscal deficits will fall,
but remain somewhat above the new limits, at 4.3% of GDP in 2025
and 3.8% in 2026.
Spending cuts could face political pushback, as evidenced by the
2025 budget, which was significantly increased through the
legislative process. The authorities have discretion to enact
austerity measures in 2025 if needed, but they already announced
USD1.4 billion (1.6% of GDP) in spending cuts in July without
providing detail on these, making it difficult to assess how much
retrenchment can be achieved. They hope to significantly lift tax
collections, to 8.9% of GDP projected in the 2025 budget from 6.4%
in 2024, via efforts to combat evasion. Such a large improvement
will be difficult to achieve without changes in the tax code. The
authorities have ruled out tax reform, for now, but have signaled
openness to narrowing exemptions.
Rising Debt, Interest Burdens: Fitch projects gross government debt
to rise to 63.5% of GDP at end-2024 from 56.9% in 2023 and remain
on an upward path in following years. On a consolidated basis (i.e.
net of CSS holdings and IOUs issued to the sovereign wealth fund),
Fitch projects debt to rise to 58.3% of GDP in 2024 from 52.8% in
2023, surpassing the 'BB' median of 55.2%. Interest/revenue ratio
is projected to reach 19.1% in 2024, up sharply from 10.2% in 2019
given revenue underperformance and accumulation of new debt at
higher rates. The authorities have relied on bank loans to delay
the return to global bond markets, but have limited room for
greater borrowing in the small local market.
Pension Reform: The Mulino administration has submitted a social
security reform proposal, which would consolidate the current
subsystems into a single defined-benefit system (eliminating
individual accounts), increase the retirement age by three years
and employer contribution by 3pp, and initiate a large new
contribution from the government. The bill represents the first
serious attempt to tackle this issue after decades of inaction, but
would offer limited fiscal relief, as most of the burden would be
borne by the government via its higher contribution rather than the
private sector via parametric adjustments.
External Financing Reliance: Fitch expects the current account
deficit to widen to 6.2% in 2024 from 4.5% in 2023, driven by the
loss of exports from the mine closure, and that it will not be
covered by FDI inflows. Panama's external imbalance does not pose a
risk to macroeconomic stability, as economic agents maintain
external liquidity buffers to manage shocks in the absence of a
central bank.
However, it highlights the economy's reliance on external markets
to fund twin deficits, exposing the economy to potential adverse
shifts in global financing conditions. Net external debt is
projected to reach 52% of GDP at end-2024, one of the highest
levels in the 'BB' category.
Governance: Panama has an ESG Relevance Scores (RS) of '5' [+] for
Political Stability and Rights, and '5' for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption.
These scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign Rating
Model (SRM). Panama has a medium WBGI percentile score of 47.3,
reflecting a recent track record of peaceful political transitions,
a moderate level of rights for participation in the political
process, moderate institutional capacity and rule of law, and a
high level of corruption.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
- Public Finances: Failure to deliver on structural fiscal
consolidation that leads to a significant increase in the
government debt/GDP and interest/revenue burdens, or material
further erosion in market borrowing conditions;
- Macro: Reduced confidence in Panama's ability to sustain
relatively high economic growth rates;
- Structural: Further social instability or political gridlock that
adversely affect the economy and public finances.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
- Public Finances: Structural fiscal consolidation that puts
government debt/GDP and interest/revenues on a firm downward path;
- Structural: Evidence of improving governance, for example via
enhancements in fiscal policy credibility and predictability.
Sovereign Rating Model (SRM) and Qualitative Overlay (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Panama a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR scale.
Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR by
applying its Qualitative Overlay (QO), relative to SRM data and
output, as follows:
- Structural: -1 notch, to reflect shortcomings in governance that
are not fully captured in the Worldwide Governance Indicators that
feed into the SRM. These have been reflected by the mine closure,
recent social protests, and weaknesses in fiscal policy management
that is of greater relevance in the absence of independent monetary
policy.
- Macro: +1 notch, to offset the deterioration of GDP growth
volatility variable in the SRM due to the impact of the pandemic,
which Fitch expects will be temporary, and would otherwise add
excess volatility to the rating.
- Public Finances: +1 notch, to reflect that the SRM classifies
public debt as fully denominated in foreign currency due to
Panama's use of the U.S. dollar, but the well-entrenched
dollarization regime mitigates foreign exchange risk on the
sovereign balance sheet.
Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. Fitch's QO is a
forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting
factors within its criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or
not fully reflected in the SRM.
Country Ceiling
The Country Ceiling for Panama is 'A+', +6 notches above the
Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. This uplift reflects Fitch's view
that Panama's full dollarization is a longstanding and entrenched
part of its economic model, which has encouraged private-sector
entities to maintain strong liquidity buffers of their own in the
absence of a lender-of-last-resort, and reduces the sovereign's
incentives to impose transfer restrictions.
Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of
+2 notches above the IDR. Fitch's rating committee applied a
+4-notch qualitative adjustment to this, under the Long-Term
Institutional Characteristics, reflecting Panama's fully dollarized
economy.
ESG Considerations
Panama has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' [+] for Political
Stability and Rights as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key
rating driver with a high weight. As Panama has a percentile rank
above 50 for the respective Governance Indicator, this has a
positive impact on the credit profile.
Panama has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore
highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a
high weight. As Panama has a percentile rank below 50 for the
respective Governance Indicators, this has a negative impact on the
credit profile.
Panama has an ESG Relevance Score of '4 [+]' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
WBGI is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Panama has a
percentile rank above 50 for the respective Governance Indicator,
this has a positive impact on the credit profile.
Panama has an ESG Relevance Score of '4 [+]' for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver for Panama, as for all sovereigns. As Panama has
a track record of 20+ years without a restructuring of public debt
and captured in Fitch's SRM variable, this has a positive impact on
the credit profile.
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
Panama LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
ST IDR B Affirmed B
Country Ceiling A+ Affirmed A+
senior unsecured LT BB+ Affirmed BB+
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
PUERTO RICO: Dechert LLP Updates List of PREPA Bondholders
----------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Dechert LLP filed a fifth verified statement
pursuant to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
to disclose that in the Chapter 11 case of Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority ("PREPA"), the firm represents PREPA Ad Hoc Group.
Dechert notes that it does not represent the PREPA Ad Hoc Group as
a committee (as such term is used in the Bankruptcy Code and
Bankruptcy Rules) and does not undertake to, and does not,
represent the interest of, and is not a fiduciary for, any
creditor, party in interests, or entity other than the PREPA Ad Hoc
Group and Invesco.
Dechert has been advised by the Members of the PREPA Ad Hoc Group
that its Members either hold, or manage funds and/or accounts that
hold, collectively, approximately $2.3 billion in aggregate
principal amount of uninsured Bonds, in addition to approximately
$449 million in aggregate principal amount of insured Bonds.
The members of the PREPA Ad Hoc Group and their bond holdings in
PREPA are:
Member Uninsured Bonds Insured Bonds
------- --------------- -------------
AllianceBernstein L.P. $170,415,000 $56,305,000
1345 Avenue of
the Americas,
New York, NY 10105
Aristeia Capital, L.L.C. $41,710,000 $0
One Greenwich
Plaza, Suite 300,
Greenwich, CT
06830
BNY Mellon Funds Trust $14,500,000 $0
201 Washington
Street, 8th Floor,
Boston, MA 02108
Capital Research and Management Co. $216,695,000 $51,040,000
333 South Hope Street, 54th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90404
Columbia Management Investment
Advisers, LLC $61,475,000 $0
290 Congress Street,
Boston, MA 02210
Delaware Management Company
a series of Macquarie
Investment Management
Business
Trust $161,190,000 $0
610 Market Street,
Philadelphia PA
19106
Ellington Management Group, L.L.C. $33,595,000 $0
711 Third Avenue,
New York, NY 10017
Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP $313,457,000 $148,577,000
200 West Street,
New York, NY 10282
Invesco Advisers, Inc. $308,205,000 $125,790,000
225 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10281
MacKay Shields LLC $608,545,000 $26,045,000
1345 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10105
Massachusetts Financial
Services Company $145,060,000 $36,995,000
111 Huntington
Avenue, Boston, MA 02199
RUSSELL INVESTMENT COMPANY $26,465,000 $3,965,000
1301 Second Avenue, 18th Floor
Seattle, WA 98101
SIG Structured Products, LLC $4,635,000 $0
401 E. City Avenue, Suite 220
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
T. Rowe Price $151,120,000 $130,000
100 E. Pratt Street, BA 0754
Baltimore, MD 21202
Tower Bay Asset Management LP $20,535,000 $0
700 Canal Street, Ste 12E
Stamford, CT 06902
PREPA Ad Hoc Group is represented by:
MONSERRATE SIMONET & GIERBOLINI, LLC
Dora L. Monserrate-Peñagarícano, Esq.
Fernando J. Gierbolini-GonzAlez, Esq.
Richard J. Schell, Esq.
101 San Patricio Ave., Suite 1120
Guaynabo, PR 00968
Phone: (787) 620-5300
Facsimile: (787) 620-5305
Email: dmonserrate@msglawpr.com
fgierbolini@msglawpr.com
rschell@msglawpr.com
- and -
DECHERT LLP
G. Eric Brunstad Jr., Esq.
Stephen D. Zide, Esq.
David A. Herman, Esq.
1095 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Phone: (212) 698-3500
Facsimile: (212) 698-3599
Email: eric.brunstad@dechert.com
stephen.zide@dechert.com
david.herman@dechert.com
About Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States. The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America. The head of government is an elected
Governor. There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats. The
governor-elect is Ricardo Antonio "Ricky" Rossello Nevares, the son
of former governor Pedro Rossello.
In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.
The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and (vii)
David A. Skeel Jr.
On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"). The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578. A copy of Puerto Rico's
PROMESA petition is available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/17
01578-00001.pdf
On May 5, 2017, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) commenced a case under Title III of PROMESA (D.P.R. Case
No. 17-01599). Joint administration has been sought for the Title
III cases.
On May 21, 2017, two more agencies -- Employees Retirement System
of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto
Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Case Nos. 17-01685 and
17-01686) -- commenced Title III cases.
U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts named U.S. District Judge Laura
Taylor Swain to preside over the Title III cases.
The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.
Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.
Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains the case Web site
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico
Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.
Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
LATAM: ECLAC Forecasts Regional Growth of 2% This Year
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News report that the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean says growth rate in the region is projected to be two
per cent this year, increasing slightly to 2.4 per cent next year.
ECLAC, in its Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin
America and the Caribbean, is proposing a series of policies for
the region to be able to escape the trap of low growth capacity in
which it is caught, according to RJR News.
It warned that this year and next, the region's economies will stay
mired in a trap of low capacity for growth, with growth rates that
will remain low and a growth dynamic that depends more on private
consumption, and less on investment, the report notes.
ECLAC said the average annual growth for the LAC region during the
2015-2024 decade has been one per cent, which implies stagnation of
gross domestic product per capita during that period, the report
relays.
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week from Dec. 16 to 20, 2024
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Cntry Curr
---------- --- ----- -------- ----- ----
Alfa Desarrollo SpA 4.6 74.6 9/27/2051 CL USD
Alibaba Group Holding 3.2 66 2/9/2051 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding 2.7 68.5 2/9/2041 KY USD
Alibaba Group Holding 3.3 63.4 2/9/2061 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group 1.5 7.5 KY USD
AMTD IDEA Group 4.5 55 KY SGD
Amwaj 6.4 69.7 KY USD
Amwaj 4.5 49.6 KY USD
Argentina Bonar Bonds 1 43.3 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentina Treasury Bond 3.3 45.8 4/30/2024 AR USD
Argentine Bonos del Te 15.5 39.7 10/17/2026 AR ARS
Argentine Gov't Int'l 1 46.4 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentine Gov't Int'l 0.5 41.4 7/9/2029 AR EUR
Argentine Gov't Int'l 0.1 42 7/9/2030 AR EUR
Ascent Finance 1.2 61.6 7/12/2047 KY EUR
Ascent Finance 3.8 67 6/28/2047 KY AUD
Ascent Finance 3.4 65.7 2/6/2043 KY AUD
Astra Cumulative 2019 1.5 62 11/1/2029 KY USD
At Home Cayman 11.5 69.3 5/12/2028 KY USD
At Home Cayman 11.5 70 5/12/2028 KY USD
AYC Finance 3.9 62.2 KY USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 64.1 CO USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 70.3 CO USD
Banco de Chile 3.6 75.7 11/18/2039 CL AUD
Banco de Chile 3.5 75.4 9/5/2039 CL AUD
Banco de Chile 2.7 74.7 3/9/2035 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Ch 3.1 70.5 2/21/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Ch 2.8 67 3/13/2040 CL AUD
Banco Nacional de Pana 2.5 74.7 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Santander Chile 3.1 70.6 2/28/2039 CL AUD
Banco Santander Chile 1.3 73.5 11/29/2034 CL EUR
Banda de Couro Energe 8 54.4 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Baraunas II Energeti 8 12.4 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Bishopsgate Asset Fi 4.8 66.9 8/14/2044 KY GBP
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 4.5 55.6 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 7.5 57.2 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 4.5 55.8 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 7.5 57.2 3/2/2030 BO USD
BOPREAL 5 64.7 10/31/2027 AR USD
BOPREAL 3 60.9 5/31/2026 AR USD
Brazilian Gov't Int'l4.8 73.8 1/14/2050 BR USD
BRF SA 5.8 73.5 9/21/2050 BR USD
BRF SA 5.8 73.6 9/21/2050 BR USD
Camposol SA 6 72.1 2/3/2027 PE USD
Camposol SA 6 72.5 2/3/2027 PE USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.6 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.1 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.8 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 8.7 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.5 72.6 1/25/2050 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.1 73.4 5/7/2041 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.1 62.7 1/22/2061 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.5 72.1 4/15/2053 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 1.3 67.4 1/29/2040 CL EUR
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 1.3 54 1/22/2051 CL EUR
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.3 62.8 9/21/2071 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 1.3 74.2 7/26/2036 CL EUR
China Overseas Cayman 3.1 75.1 3/2/2035 KY USD
China Yuhua Education 0.9 65.8 12/27/2024 KY HKD
CK Hutchison Int'l 19 3.4 74 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK Hutchison Int'l 19 3.4 73.9 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK Hutchison Int'l 20 3.4 73.7 5/8/2050 KY USD
CK Hutchison Int'l 20 3.4 73.8 5/8/2050 KY USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 3.9 2/15/2061 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 4.1 61.6 5/15/2051 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 5.2 72.9 5/15/2049 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 4.1 67 2/22/2042 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 6.3 73.5 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l 7.3 71.7 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l 7.3 71.7 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l 5 72 6/15/2045 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 6.3 73.5 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Telecom 5 66.9 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombia Telecom 5 67 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombian TES 7.3 71.6 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombian TES 6.3 73.4 7/9/2036 CO COP
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.7 67.5 1/30/2050 CL USD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.2 61.2 1/15/2051 CL USD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.7 67.5 1/30/2050 CL USD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.6 74 7/22/2039 CL AUD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.2 61.2 1/15/2051 CL USD
Dibens Leasing S/A 10.9 30.6 3/1/2035 BR BRL
Dibens Leasing S/A 10.9 34.6 3/1/2035 BR BRL
Dibens Leasing S/A 10.9 29.2 3/1/2035 BR BRL
Earls Eight 1.7 72 6/20/2032 KY AUD
Earls Eight 0.1 64.2 12/20/2031 KY AUD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 74.2 5/28/2045 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 70.7 11/2/2051 CO USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.1 68.7 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 72.9 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 73.3 2/1/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 5.9 65.1 1/30/2025 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 73.5 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.1 68.7 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 73.5 2/1/2041 SV USD
Embotelladora Andina 6.5 23.3 6/1/2026 CL CLP
EFE 3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE 3.1 60 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE 3.1 59.9 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE 3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE 6.5 11.2 1/1/2026 CL CLP
ETESA 5.1 71.8 5/2/2049 PA USD
Empresa de Transmision 5.1 72.2 5/2/2049 PA USD
Metro SA 3.7 65.2 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA 3.7 65.1 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA 5.5 50.2 7/15/2027 CL CLP
Edsa SA 5 62.6 5/11/2025 AR USD
ENAP 4.5 73.3 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENAP 4.5 73.4 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENA Master Trust 4 70.8 5/19/2048 PA USD
ENA Master Trust 4 71.1 5/19/2048 PA USD
Enel Generacion Chile 6.2 29.4 10/15/2028 CL CLP
Equatorial Energia 11 1.1 10/15/2029 BR BRL
Equatorial Energia 10.8 1 5/15/2028 BR BRL
Esval SA 3.5 13.2 2/15/2026 CL CLP
Farfetch 3.8 4.3 5/1/2027 KY USD
Fospar S/A 6.5 1.4 5/15/2026 BR BRL
GDM Argentina SA 2.5 0 9/8/2024 AR USD
GDS Holdings 4.5 67.7 1/31/2030 KY USD
Generacion Mediterrane 4.6 0 11/12/2024 AR ARS
General Shopping Finan 10 66.2 KY USD
General Shopping Finan 10 65.1 KY USD
Genneia SA 2 56.4 7/14/2028 AR USD
Greenland Hong Kong 10.2 12.9 KY USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 70.4 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 10 70 12/30/2030 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 70.6 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 10 70 12/30/2030 CL USD
Hector A Bertone SA 1.9 0 4/7/2024 AR USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 65.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 62.2 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 65.6 11/18/2024 KY USD
ICBC DO Brasil 3.3 59.5 BR USD
IMPSA 1 75 12/30/2031 AR USD
Itau Unibanco SA/Nassau 5.8 20.1 5/20/2027 BR BRL
Jamaica Gov't Bond 6.3 67.8 7/11/2048 JM JMD
Jamaica Gov't Bond 8.5 73 12/21/2061 JM JMD
Lani Finance 1.7 64.1 3/14/2049 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.9 66.5 9/20/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.9 67.5 10/19/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance 3.1 64.7 10/19/2048 KY AUD
Link Finance Cayman 2.2 69.8 10/27/2038 KY HKD
LIPSA Srl 1 0 8/23/2024 AR USD
Logan Group Co 7 5 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 4 45.2 9/16/2029 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 3.4 58 4/13/2027 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 3.9 40.2 1/13/2032 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 4.5 55.2 1/16/2028 KY USD
Luminis III 2.3 41.5 9/22/2048 KY USD
Luminis III 2.4 54 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Luminis IV 3.2 69.6 1/22/2042 KY AUD
Luminis 2.3 53.5 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Lunar Funding I 1.7 70.7 8/11/2056 KY GBP
MTR Corp CI 3 72.6 3/11/2051 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 2.8 72.7 9/6/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3.2 73.1 2/5/2055 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3 72.5 3/11/2051 KY HKD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 64.1 4/1/2056 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 2.3 70.3 9/29/2032 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 3.9 56.6 7/23/2060 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 3.3 75.7 1/19/2033 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 65.7 4/16/2050 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 63 1/19/2063 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 67.3 5/15/2047 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.3 63.8 4/29/2053 PA USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 2.8 57.2 12/1/2060 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.2 57 7/28/2121 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.6 71.3 3/10/2051 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.6 65.4 1/15/2072 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.3 74 3/11/2041 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 66.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 66.4 6/19/2047 PE USD
Powerlong Real Estate 6.3 10.3 8/10/2024 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba 7.1 39.7 10/27/2026 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja 4.5 55.5 1/20/2027 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja 7.5 51.1 7/20/2032 AR USD
Chaco Argentina 4 0 12/4/2026 AR USD
QNB Finance 13.5 65.4 10/6/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 11.5 73.2 1/30/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 2.9 73.4 9/16/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 2.9 72.1 12/4/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 3 74.6 2/14/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 3.4 70.7 10/21/2039 KY AUD
Radiance Holdings Grou 7.8 69.6 3/20/2024 KY USD
Rio Alto Energias Reno 7 28.7 7/15/2027 BR BRL
Santander Consumer Ch 2.9 72.5 11/27/2034 CL AUD
Seazen Group 6 70.3 8/12/2024 KY USD
Seazen Group 4.5 30.6 7/13/2025 KY USD
Shui On Dev't 5.5 73.2 3/3/2025 KY USD
Shui On Dev't 5.5 61.7 6/29/2026 KY USD
Silk Road Investments 2.9 66 1/23/2042 KY AUD
Skylark 1.8 59.1 4/4/2039 KY GBP
Autopista Central 5.3 37.3 12/15/2026 CL CLP
Vespucio Norte 5.3 50.7 12/15/2028 CL CLP
Minera de Chile SA 3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
Minera de Chile SA 3.5 65.4 9/10/2051 CL USD
Southern Water Services 3 70.9 5/28/2037 KY GBP
SPE Saneamento RIO 1 7.2 10.7 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 2 6.9 10.3 1/15/2034 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 3 7.2 10.8 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 4 6.9 10.3 1/15/2034 BR BRL
Spica 2 74.6 3/24/2033 KY AUD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 72.1 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 72.5 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 72 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 70.9 9/20/2025 KY USD
Sylph 2.7 68.3 3/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph 2.4 64.1 9/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph 3.1 74.6 9/25/2035 KY USD
Sylph 2.9 74.1 6/24/2036 KY AUD
SYN prop e tech SA 11.1 21.1 3/15/2024 BR BRL
Telecom Argentina SA 1 74.1 3/9/2027 AR USD
Telecom Argentina SA 1 66.2 2/10/2028 AR USD
Telefonica Moviles Chi 3.5 74.1 11/18/2031 CL USD
Telefonica Moviles Chi 3.5 74.2 11/18/2031 CL USD
Tencent Holdings 3.8 75.4 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.3 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 63.6 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.4 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.8 74.8 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.2 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 63.8 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.2 4/22/2061 KY USD
Three Gorges Finance 3.2 70.5 10/16/2049 KY USD
Grupo Travessia 9 1.6 1/20/2032 BR BRL
Vina Santa Rita SA 4.4 63.8 9/15/2030 CL CLP
Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 61.7 2/11/2026 PE USD
Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 61.8 2/11/2026 PE USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 62.5 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 62.9 4/15/2029 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 63.1 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 63.1 4/15/2029 CL USD
YPF SA 7 72.5 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA 7 72.1 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA 1 65.9 4/25/2027 AR USD
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S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2024. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.
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