/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/250127.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, January 27, 2025, Vol. 26, No. 19
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Gov't Touts Kept Promises After Producing Budget Surplus
ARGENTINA: IMF Discussed Post-Eval of Access on 2022 Fund Facility
B R A Z I L
BRAZIL: Foreign Investors Flee in December, Echoing Pandemic Panic
C H I L E
WOM SA: Seeks to Extend Plan Exclusivity to March 21
G R E N A D A
GRENADA: China to Provide Country With Millions in Financial Aid
P A N A M A
ELEKTRA NORETE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
P E R U
GRUPO EMBOTELLADOR: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'BB' LongTerm IDRs
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
BPTT: Too Soon to Assess Impact of BP's Plan to Cut Jobs Globally
X X X X X X X X
[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week from Jan. 20 to Jan. 24, 2025
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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Gov't Touts Kept Promises After Producing Budget Surplus
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that Argentina's government said it had
produced the country's first budget surplus in more than a decade
in 2024, after a year of drastic austerity by libertarian President
Javier Milei, whose term has also seen inflation fall.
Economy Minister Luis Caputo said the budget surplus, which
amounted to 0.3 percent of GDP, was the first since 2010, according
to Buenos Aires Times.
"The promises have been kept. The 'zero deficit' is a reality. Long
live freedom, goddammit," Milei wrote on Instagram, the report
notes.
On the campaign trail in 2023, the self-described
"anarcho-capitalist" economist brandished a chainsaw as a symbol of
his plans to slash public spending and tame inflation after years
of eye-watering price increases, the report says.
Caputo said the 2024 surplus was the fruit of a reform programme
"that surprised the whole world," the report relays.
Milei has applied shock therapy to try to stabilize South America's
long-struggling second-biggest economy, the report notes.
He devalued the national currency by 52 percent, laid off more than
33,000 public sector workers, slashed state subsidies on transport,
fuel and energy and led a massive deregulation drive, the report
discloses.
His reforms nearly halved annual inflation, which fell 94 points to
117.8 percent last year but still remains amongst the highest in
the world, the report says.
But his policies also plunged Argentina into recession and tipped
an additional five million people into poverty in the first half of
2024, bringing tens of thousands of people onto the streets in
protests, the report relays.
The 54-year-old has swatted away criticism, declaring that what he
presents as short-term pain will restore the prosperity Argentina
enjoyed in the early 20th century, the report notes.
His government has forecast an economic rebound in 2025, with GDP
growth of five percent, the report discloses.
The IMF's current 30-month loan agreement with Argentina expires on
December 31, and is worth around US$44 billion, making it the
largest programme it has, the report adds.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota). The IMF Executive Board's decision
allowed the authorities an immediate disbursement of an equivalent
of US$9.65 billion in March 2022.
Argentina's IMF-supported program seeks to improve public finances
and start to reduce persistent high inflation through a
multi-pronged strategy, involving a gradual elimination of monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and enhancements in the monetary
policy framework.
In June 2024, the IMF Board completed an eighth review of the
Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for
Argentina. The IMF Board's decision enabled a disbursement of
around US$800 million to support the authorities' efforts to
entrench the disinflation process, rebuild fiscal and external
buffers, and underpin the recovery.
On Jan. 8, 2025, Moody's Ratings raised Argentina's local currency
ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling to Caa1
from Caa3. Moody's said the decision to raise the local and
foreign currency ceilings reflects the increased predictability and
the greater consistency in economic policy that has led to a rapid
reduction in monetary and fiscal imbalances that were stoking very
high inflation.
On Nov. 15, 2024, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'CC',
and its Long-Term Local-Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'.
Argentina's upgrade to 'CCC' from 'CC' reflects developments that
have improved Fitch's confidence in the authorities' ability to
make upcoming foreign-currency bond payments without seeking relief
of some sort.
S&P, in March 2024, raised its local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Argentina to 'CCC/C' from 'SD/SD' and its national scale
rating to 'raB+' from 'SD'. S&P also raised its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC' from 'CCC-' and affirmed
its 'C' short-term foreign currency rating. The S&P ratings have
been affirmed as of August 2024. S&P said the stable outlook on
the long-term ratings balances the risks posed by pronounced
economic imbalances and other uncertainties with recent progress in
making fiscal adjustments, reducing inflation, and undertaking
structural reforms to address long-standing microeconomic
weaknesses that have contributed to poor economic performance for
many years that it would likely consider to be distressed.
DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC on November 25, 2024.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.
ARGENTINA: IMF Discussed Post-Eval of Access on 2022 Fund Facility
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The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) met on
January 10, 2025 to discuss the Ex-Post Evaluation (EPE) of
Argentina's exceptional access under the 2022 extended arrangement
under the Extended Fund Facility (2022 EFF), which expired at the
end of 2024.
As required in all cases of exceptional access (EA) to Fund
financing, this EPE assesses whether the macroeconomic strategy,
program design, and financing under the 30-month EFF arrangement
approved by the Executive Board in March 2022 (Press release No.
22/89) were appropriate and in line with Fund policies. The report
also includes an appendix with the authorities' reactions and views
on the 2022 EFF.
The 2022 EFF came about in extremely difficult circumstances.
Argentina was unable to regain external viability under the 2018
Stand-By Arrangement and faced large and concentrated repurchase
obligations to the Fund totaling about US$ 35 billion in 2022-23.
In addition, the country was grappling with high inflation, a
significant budget deficit, low international reserves, and
elevated public debt. The inability to meet obligations falling due
to the Fund could have led to severe and protracted consequences
for Argentina, significant reputational implications to the Fund,
and financial costs for the Fund and its members.
The EPE report concludes that, reflecting this difficult context,
as well as the challenging post-COVID conjuncture and the need to
secure ownership by a reluctant government, the design of the 2022
EFF did not provide for an adjustment commensurate with the scale
of Argentina's fiscal and balance of payments (BoP) problems. The
combination of a gradualist reform strategy in a country with
severely limited access to financial markets, large adverse shocks,
and progressively weaker policy implementation resulted in outcomes
in 2022-23 that fell well short of what was envisaged at the time
of program approval.
A major course correction subsequently undertaken by the Milei
government—notably a sharp fiscal consolidation, an upfront
devaluation, and an end to monetary financing of the budget helped
Argentina avert a full-blown crisis and make important strides
toward macroeconomic stabilization.
Overall, the 2022 EFF did not achieve its original macroeconomic
objectives, but it was successful in easing the burden of
Argentina's financial obligations to the Fund by rescheduling
repayments over 2026-34, and may have helped Argentina avoid even
worse outcomes in 2022-23.
The EPE report concludes that the experience with the 2022 EFF
affirms many lessons from previous Argentina EPEs and warrants
further reflection in several areas, including the suitability of
the Fund's lending policy framework to deal with high and
concentrated exposure cases as well as when resolution of a deeply
entrenched BoP problem may not be feasible through a single Fund
arrangement; the need for clearer commitments on specific
contingency plans when implementation risks are high; and the role
that assessments of countries' capacity to repay should play in
guiding the design of program safeguards, among others.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors welcomed the comprehensive ex post evaluation
(EPE) of Argentina's exceptional access (EA) to Fund financing
under the 2022 Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility (2022 EFF).
Directors regretted that the 2022 EFF did not achieve its
objectives. While recognizing that the program reflected difficult
trade-offs in a highly complex setting - and that the rescheduling
of Argentina's repayment obligations to the Fund likely helped
avoid potentially worse outcomes - they agreed that program design
did not provide for an adjustment commensurate to the scale of the
problem and risks of the situation. Furthermore, the combination of
a gradualist reform strategy, large adverse shocks, and
progressively weaker implementation resulted in outcomes
substantially worse than in the baseline by end‑2023. Directors
however welcomed the course correction and significant shift in
ownership and toward macroeconomic stabilization achieved since
December 2023.
With respect to the consistency of the 2022 EFF with Fund policies
and procedures, Directors expressed concern that the approval of
the program request and subsequent reviews relied on the
technicality of assessments of individual elements
(capacity-to-repay descriptors, the exceptional access criteria,
and strength of program design) as having been satisfied rather
than a holistic view of how the Fund's resources were safeguarded.
Directors also acknowledged that while policies regarding
enterprise risk management (ERM) were evolving during the period,
these risks could have been assessed and managed earlier, allowing
for broader and deeper Board discussions on mitigation options.
Directors underscored the continued relevance of the lessons drawn
by previous EPEs, including the importance of ensuring robustness
of the program to shocks, balancing ownership with the quality and
appropriateness of program policies, and a sharper and more
holistic application of the EA framework—where they also
highlighted the findings of the December 2024 IEO evaluation.
Directors broadly agreed that the experience of the 2022 EFF
demonstrates that the Fund's current lending policy framework may
not be perfectly suited to deal with cases of large and
concentrated Fund exposures, although a number of Directors
expressed reservations about some alternative policy options, such
as postponement of obligations to the Fund. Directors also
supported the need for early and comprehensive enterprise risk
discussions with the Board in such cases. While they generally
agreed with the need to explore alternative approaches in
circumstances where resolution of a deeply entrenched balance of
payments problem may not be feasible through a single arrangement,
a few Directors expressed reservations.
Directors supported further reflection in several other areas,
including: the role that the capacity-to-repay assessments should
play in the Fund's lending decisions; the provision of technical
assistance to facilitate debt restructuring outside of a
Fund-supported program; the practice of repeatedly approving
program reviews on the basis of "temporary” FX control measures;
the importance of clearer commitments to specific contingency plans
when program implementation risks are high; and how the Fund and
its shareholders deal with political pressure. A number of
Directors also emphasized the importance of effective external
communications.
Directors urged that the findings from this and previous EPEs
inform the ongoing discussions on a potential follow-up program
with Argentina.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota). The IMF Executive Board's decision
allowed the authorities an immediate disbursement of an equivalent
of US$9.65 billion in March 2022.
Argentina's IMF-supported program seeks to improve public finances
and start to reduce persistent high inflation through a
multi-pronged strategy, involving a gradual elimination of monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and enhancements in the monetary
policy framework.
In June 2024, the IMF Board completed an eighth review of the
Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for
Argentina. The IMF Board's decision enabled a disbursement of
around US$800 million to support the authorities' efforts to
entrench the disinflation process, rebuild fiscal and external
buffers, and underpin the recovery.
On Jan. 8, 2025, Moody's Ratings raised Argentina's local currency
ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling to Caa1
from Caa3. Moody's said the decision to raise the local and
foreign currency ceilings reflects the increased predictability and
the greater consistency in economic policy that has led to a rapid
reduction in monetary and fiscal imbalances that were stoking very
high inflation.
On Nov. 15, 2024, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'CC',
and its Long-Term Local-Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'.
Argentina's upgrade to 'CCC' from 'CC' reflects developments that
have improved Fitch's confidence in the authorities' ability to
make upcoming foreign-currency bond payments without seeking relief
of some sort.
S&P, in March 2024, raised its local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Argentina to 'CCC/C' from 'SD/SD' and its national scale
rating to 'raB+' from 'SD'. S&P also raised its long-term foreign
currency sovereign credit rating to 'CCC' from 'CCC-' and affirmed
its 'C' short-term foreign currency rating. The S&P ratings have
been affirmed as of August 2024. S&P said the stable outlook on
the long-term ratings balances the risks posed by pronounced
economic imbalances and other uncertainties with recent progress in
making fiscal adjustments, reducing inflation, and undertaking
structural reforms to address long-standing microeconomic
weaknesses that have contributed to poor economic performance for
many years that it would likely consider to be distressed.
DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC on November 25, 2024.
The trend on all ratings is Stable.
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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Foreign Investors Flee in December, Echoing Pandemic Panic
------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Mann at Rio Times Online reports that Brazil witnessed a
massive exodus of foreign capital in December 2023. The Central
Bank reported an outflow of $14.291 billion, reminiscent of the
early pandemic panic, according to Rio Times Online. This sudden
departure of foreign investors caught many by surprise, the report
notes.
The December outflow contrasts sharply with previous trends. In
December 2022, Brazil enjoyed a $5.861 billion inflow, the report
relays. The reversal raises questions about investor confidence in
the Brazilian market, the report notes.
Contrary to initial assumptions, profit and dividend remittances
did not drive this outflow, the report discloses. These
remittances actually decreased compared to previous years, the
report says. The real culprit was short-term investments, the
report relates.
Portfolio investments took the biggest hit. Stocks and investment
funds lost $8.071 billion, while fixed income declined by $4.546
billion, the report notes. This suggests a shift in investor risk
appetite, the report discloses.
Long-term investments, however, remained relatively stable, the
report says. Foreign direct investment showed a solid inflow of
$2.765 billion, the report relays. This indicates that some
investors still see long-term potential in Brazil, the report
notes.
The Central Bank's data contradicts earlier official statements,
the report says. Initially, authorities attributed the market
stress to profit remittances, the report relays. The figures
reveal a different story, highlighting the importance of accurate
data in understanding market dynamics, the report relates.
Recent weeks have seen a positive turn in foreign exchange flows.
This shift suggests the December outflow might be a temporary blip
rather than a long-term trend, the report discloses.
However, it underscores the need for careful monitoring of foreign
investment patterns, the report notes. This episode offers
valuable insights into investor sentiment and market volatility.
It serves as a reminder of how quickly capital can move in today's
interconnected global economy, the report discloses. For
policymakers and investors alike, understanding these flows is
crucial for navigating Brazil's economic landscape, the report
adds.
About Brazil
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and third largest
in the Americas. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva won the 2022 Brazilian
general election. He was sworn in on January 1, 2023, as the 39th
president of Brazil, succeeding Jair Bolsonaro.
In October 2024, Moody's Ratings upgraded the Government of
Brazil's long-term issuer and senior unsecured bond ratings to Ba1
from Ba2, the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba1 from (P)Ba2;
and maintained the positive outlook. S&P Global Ratings raised on
Dec. 19, 2023, its long-term global scale ratings on Brazil to 'BB'
from 'BB-'. Fitch Ratings affirmed on Dec. 15, 2023, Brazil's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB'
with a Stable Outlook. DBRS' credit rating for Brazil was last
reported at BB with stable outlook at July 2023.
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C H I L E
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WOM SA: Seeks to Extend Plan Exclusivity to March 21
----------------------------------------------------
WOM SA and its affiliates asked the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware to extend their exclusivity periods to file a
plan of reorganization and obtain acceptance thereof to March 21,
2025 and May 20, 2025, respectively.
The Debtors claim that the Company's business also involves a
variety of stakeholders including suppliers, customers, financial
creditors, and governmental regulators. The Debtors operate or
franchise over 200 stores throughout Chile and employ approximately
7,000 employees and independent contractors. These facts further
demonstrate the complexity and size of these Chapter 11 Cases, and
the Debtors must work through the myriad issues that a business of
this scale faces when rebuilding its operations through the chapter
11 process.
The Debtors believe that, in light of the progress made in these
Chapter 11 Cases, it is reasonable to request an additional
extension of the Exclusive Periods to allow the Debtors more time
to negotiate key documents with their stakeholders and solicit
votes on the Plan in order to ensure an efficient exit from chapter
11. Granting the requested extensions will facilitate the Debtors'
efforts by providing the Debtors with a full and fair opportunity
to continue these efforts without the distraction of competing
plans.
The Debtors explain that continued exclusivity will permit them to
maintain flexibility so competing plans do not derail the Debtors'
restructuring process. Dualtrack negotiations across multiple plans
could give rise to uncertainty and significantly increase
professional costs to the detriment of all stakeholders. The
Debtors' have been in continuous communication with major
creditors, including the Committee and the AHG, to resolve issues
that arise in these Chapter 11 Cases. Granting the requested
extension of the Exclusive Periods will therefore not prejudice or
pressure the Debtors' creditor constituencies or grant the Debtors
any unfair bargaining leverage.
The Debtors assert that they have obtained support for the Plan
from the AHG and the Committee pursuant to the PSA. An extension of
the Exclusivity Periods would provide the Debtors with more time to
prosecute the Plan, negotiate key Plan documents, and reach
consensus with other constituencies, which would advance the
prospect of a fully consensual Plan confirmation hearing.
The Debtors further assert that the extension is not sought for the
purpose of pressuring creditors. Rather, the Debtors will use any
extension granted by this Court to work to obtain consensus support
to solicit the Plan and draft key documents for the reorganization
transactions. Further, the Debtors consulted with and provided
certain key constituents, including the AHG and the Committee, with
an opportunity to review and comment on the Debtors' second request
for an extension of the Exclusivity Periods prior to filing this
Motion.
Co-Counsel to the Debtors:
John K. Cunningham, Esq.
Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.
WHITE & CASE LLP
Southeast Financial Center
200 South Biscayne Boulevard,
Suite 4900
Miami, Florida 33131
Tel: (305) 371-2700
Email: jcunningham@whitecase.com
rkebrdle@whitecase.com
- and -
Philip M. Abelson, Esq.
Andrew Zatz, Esq.
Samuel P. Hershey, Esq.
Andrea Amulic, Esq.
Lilian Marques, Esq.
Claire Tuffey, Esq.
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Phone: (212) 819-8200
Email: philip.abelson@whitecase.com
azatz@whitecase.com
sam.hershey@whitecase.com
andrea.amulic@whitecase.com
lilian.marques@whitecase.com
claire.tuffey@whitecase.com
Co-Counsel to the Debtors:
John H. Knight, Esq.
Amanda R. Steele, Esq.
Brendan J. Schlauch, Esq.
RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.
One Rodney Square
920 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Tel: (302) 651-7700
Email: knight@rlf.com
steele@rlf.com
schlauch@rlf.com
About WOM SA
WOM is a Chilean telecommunications provider, focused on offering
mobile voice, data, and broadband services, along with a rapidly
expanding "Fiber to the Home" broadband offering, to consumers and
businesses in Chile. Since the acquisition of Nextel Chile in 2015
through Novator Partners LLP's investment vehicle NC Telecom AS,
WOM has expanded from having virtually no market share to
establishing itself as the second-largest mobile network operator
in Chile.
WOM sought relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(Bankr. D. Del. Lead Case No. 24-10628) on April 1, 2024. In the
petition filed by Timothy O'Connoer, as independent director, the
Debtor reports estimated assets and liabilities between $1 billion
and $10 billion each.
The Honorable Bankruptcy Judge Karen B. Owens oversees the case.
The Debtors tapped White & Case, LLP as general bankruptcy counsel;
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. as local bankruptcy counsel;
Riveron Consulting, LLC as financial advisor; and Rothschild & Co
US Inc. as investment banker. Kroll Restructuring Administration,
LLC is the claims agent.
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G R E N A D A
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GRENADA: China to Provide Country With Millions in Financial Aid
----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the government of China has agreed to provide
Grenada with gratuitous aid of 100 million yuan for mutually agreed
to projects.
This financial support was signed in an agreement for economic and
technical cooperation during the recent official visit to China by
Grenada's Prime Minister, two other ministers of government and
several supporting staff, according to RJR News.
Although the agreement was signed on January 13, it was disclosed
during a special news conference attended by China's Ambassador to
Grenada Wei Hongtian, the report relays.
Since resuming diplomatic relations, China has provided Grenada
with millions in grants for capital and social projects, the report
adds.
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P A N A M A
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ELEKTRA NORETE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Elektra Noreste S.A.'s (ENSA) Local- and
Foreign-Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and its
unsecured notes due 2036 at 'BB+'. Fitch has also affirmed ENSA's
Long- and Short-Term National Scale ratings at 'AAA(pan)' and
'F1+(pan)', respectively. The Rating Outlook is Stable.
ENSA is a regulated utility in Panama (BB+/Stable) with entirely
domestic cash flows. Its ratings reflect a strong financial
position and stable cash flows, driven by a regulated tariff
program with an adequate return on investment. The company has a
relatively low business risk profile, although Panama's operating
environment, which Fitch assesses at 'bb', influences its ratings.
Fitch rates ENSA on a standalone basis from its controlling parent
Empresas Publicas de Medellin E.S.P. (EPM; BB+/Rating Watch
Negative). ENSA is relatively financially and operationally
independent, and the Panamanian government holds a significant 49%
minority stake in it. Fitch equalizes the IDRs across the company
and both major shareholders.
Key Rating Drivers
Regulatory Risk: ENSA's ratings are strongly linked to the
sovereign rating due to its partial government ownership, the
regulatory framework, and government subsidies. As one of three
nationwide distribution providers, it holds a natural monopoly as a
permanent concessionaire of its exclusive service area, covering
half of the Panama City metro area and several nearby provinces.
VAD Tariff Ensures Stable Cash Flow: ENSA's gross margin is
influenced by regulated 'value added distribution' (VAD) charges to
a largely residential customer base. The tariff follows a price-cap
approach by the independent regulator Autoridad Nacional de los
Servicios Publicos (ASEP) covers operating expenses, capital
expenditures, cost of capital and a return on investment (ROI).
This leads to a legally binding maximum allowable income, or
ingreso máximo permitido (IMP) over four-year cycles.
The VAD updates every four years with interim inflationary
adjustments. It was last approved in October 2023, retroactive to
2022, and will remain in effect through June 2026. This period has
a total guaranteed IMP of USD844 million for this period, an 18.6%
increase over the prior tariff.
Temporary VAD Suspension: The latest tariff was temporarily
suspended in October 2024 by the Supreme Court of Justice stemming
from a third-party lawsuit and is pending further review by ASEP,
reverting user charges to prior 2018-2022 tariff levels. ASEP is
revising the tariff and aims to reinstate rates in April 2025, but
further delays could occur. Fitch expects tariffs will adjust
adequately to meet ENSA's guaranteed IMP, requiring standard phased
retroactive customer bill increases, as well as for the subsequent
2026-2030 IMP to be priced sufficiently to sustain the company's
ROI and requisite capex levels.
Leverage to Stabilize, Negative FCF: Fitch's base case assumes that
the VAD suspension will continue through 2025, resulting in EBITDA
of about USD138 million and increasing to USD170 million in 2026.
Leverage will weaken in 2025 to 3.4x but improve yoy to 3x in 2026,
with both falling below ENSA's 3.5x consolidated indebtedness
covenant. Ongoing EBITDA and cash flow from operations will remain
stable, averaging 19% and 12%, respectively. However, FCF will be
negative yoy starting in 2025 due to higher capex rates and
dividends, with dividends linked to 100% of the prior year's net
income.
Approaching Contract Review: ENSA has a permanent concession over
its service area, but its contract under ownership by the Panama
Distribution Group (PDG; EPM's 100%-owned subsidiary and ENSA's 51%
owner) is reviewed every 15 years and expires in October 2028. ENSA
will remain the concessionaire despite any potential PDG ownership
change upon the approaching expiration date.
Standalone Rating: Per its Parent and Subsidiary Linkage Criteria
there is sufficient control by the parent, EPM, to consider
linkage. However, when the rating of the parent and subsidiary are
the same, the entities are rated on a standalone basis. EPM has a
strong business profile due to its broad footprint in Latin
America, regional diversification, financial structure, proven
access to capital and the strategic and operational benefits it
provides to its subsidiaries. ENSA's legal ringfencing insulates it
from parent access due to limited dividend extraction and an
external treasury managed autonomously from EPM.
Derivation Summary
ENSA's closest rating peers are Energuate Trust (BB/Stable) and
Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig, BB/Stable). Energuate
Trust is also a distribution-only company that faces similar energy
loss dynamics and is partially subsidized by the government.
Cemig's ratings benefit from its asset diversification and
operation in different segments within the power sector, with
distribution contributing to 46% of EBITDA. Like ENSA, Cemig's
leverage ranges in the 2.0x-3.0x range, and its aggressive capex
plan, while manageable, may drive negative FCF and increased
leverage.
Additional peers include ENSA's parent company EPM and Grupo
Energia Bogota (GEB; BBB/Stable). Fitch projects leverage for both
of between 3x-4x on an ongoing basis, compared to ENSA's 2.5x-3.5x.
EPM provides generation, transmission, distribution and
commercialization of electricity. The Rating Watch Negative
reflects the tumultuous failure and closure of the right Auxiliary
Diversion System tunnel of the Ituango hydroelectric facility, one
component of the multi-unit, expansive and operational generation
project.
GEB's ratings reflect its reliance on dividends from its
financially solid subsidiaries to service debt, as well as its
ongoing growth strategy and aggressive dividend policy, which will
result in sustained higher leverage.
Both GEB and EPM benefit from a much larger scale of operations
than ENSA, with annual EBITDA many times higher. ENSA has a
comparatively more stable cash flow, which is also reflected in a
smoother leverage trajectory.
Key Assumptions
Fitch's Key Assumptions Within the Rating Case for the Issuer
Include:
- The 2022-2026 tariff will resume in late 2025, with the IMP
fulfilled as guaranteed;
- Energy sales volumes grow at an average of 3.5% between 2025 and
2028, or between 3,950 to 4,400 GWh per year;
- 100% of previous year's net income paid in dividends, with
2025-2027 year-end cash averaging around USD13 million;
- All near-term maturing short- and long-term debt will be
refinanced prior to maturity;
- Government subsidies comprise around USD50 million, or 6% of
annual revenues;
- Average 83 days' accounts receivable and 76 days' accounts
payable,
- Maintenance capex of USD234 million between 2025 and 2027.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade
- Improvement of gross leverage to less than 2.5x on a sustained
basis;
- Upgrade of Panama's sovereign rating or greater disassociation
from the government.
Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade
- Weakening of gross leverage to above 3.5x on a sustained basis;
- Adverse government intervention in the sector that weakens the
regulatory framework or compromises the receipt of the company's
full Maximum Allowable Income (ingreso máximo permitido);
- Increased reliance on government subsidies coupled with a
downgrade of the sovereign.
Liquidity and Debt Structure
ENSA's relatively low minimum annual cash balance of around USD10
million per year is supplemented by access to USD292 million in
uncommitted credit lines from multiple financial institutions. At
any given time, the company utilizes only up to around 36% of its
available credit.
Long-term financial obligations include a USD80 million bond due
2027, a USD100 million bond due in 2036, and a USD200 million
variable rate loan with Panamanian bank Banco General due in July
2029. The loan was refinanced in late 2024, swapping a portion of
short-term debt for long-term debt.
Fitch expects the company's solid access to local banks will enable
it to successfully refinance all short- and long-term debt well
before maturity and based on optimal market conditions. ENSA pays
the majority of its net income in dividends.
Issuer Profile
Elektra Noreste S.A.'s (ENSA) is one of Panama's three electricity
distribution companies. Its concession area includes 39% of the
country, spanning parts of Panama City and the provinces north and
east of the capital.
MACROECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS AND SECTOR FORECASTS
Fitch's latest quarterly Global Corporates Macro and Sector
Forecasts data file which aggregates key data points used in its
credit analysis. Fitch's macroeconomic forecasts, commodity price
assumptions, default rate forecasts, sector key performance
indicators and sector-level forecasts are among the data items
included.
ESG Considerations
Elektra Noreste, S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Governance Structure due to its 49% government-owned corporate
structure, and the inherent governance risk that arises with a
material or dominant state shareholder, which has a negative impact
on the credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
Elektra Noreste, S.A. LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
LC LT IDR BB+ Affirmed BB+
Natl LT AAA(pan)Affirmed AAA(pan)
Natl ST F1+(pan)Affirmed F1+(pan)
senior unsecured LT BB+ Affirmed BB+
=======
P E R U
=======
GRUPO EMBOTELLADOR: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'BB' LongTerm IDRs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and subsequently withdrawn Grupo
Embotellador Atic, S.A.'s (Atic) Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook
is Stable.
Atic's ratings reflect its business position as a player in the
non-alcoholic beverage industry with geographic diversification in
Latin America, Indonesia and Thailand. The ratings also reflect the
company's diversified product portfolio in the 'B' brand segments,
solid financial position, and participation in the resilient
beverage industry.
The ratings are constrained by Atic's limited market position and
Fitch's view that the company's governance practices are weaker
than its peers.
The ratings have been withdrawn for commercial reasons. Fitch will
therefore no longer provide rating or analytical coverage on Atic.
Key Rating Drivers
Limited Market Share Position: Atic's ratings reflect its weaker
brand recognition compared to well-known non-alcoholic beverages
brands. The company faces strong competition from large
international bottlers and non-branded product producers in the 'B'
brand segment. In Fitch's view, Atic has a lower sales price point
and passes cost pressures to consumers more gradually than its
competitors. Additionally, Atic relies on more third-party
distributors in some countries than its peers, though it has
strengthened its distribution network in core markets, like Peru.
Geographic and Product Diversification: Atic's geographically
diversified operations mitigate its exposure to cash flow
generation from a single market. The company's operations are
primarily in Latin America, with a smaller presence in Asia. As of
year-end (YE) 2023, Atic's EUR1.4 billion in revenues came from
Peru (30%), Central America (25%), Mexico (16%), Ecuador (12%),
Colombia (11%), Thailand (6%) and Indonesia (0.4%).
Atic's product portfolio is balanced between carbonated soft drinks
(CSD) and non-carbonated beverages (NCB). As of YE 2023,
approximately 39% of revenues came from CSD, while 61% came from
NCB, including citrus, water, isotonic, energy drinks, tea and
nectar.
Low Leverage: Fitch expects Atic to maintain gross and net leverage
metrics below 1.0x over the next 18 to 24 months. EBITDA growth and
modest debt reduction will support these metrics. The company's
total reported debt declined EUR54 million in 2023 to EUR201.4
million (EUR174.2 million excluding financial leases), compared to
EUR255.7 million (EUR235.4 million excluding financial leases) at
YE 2022. Fitch believes Atic will focus on executing its organic
growth strategy and manage its gross leverage metrics profile below
2.0x, in case of mergers & acquisitions (M&A) activity.
Positive FCF: Atic's FCF is forecasted to be around EUR85 million
in 2024-2025, driven mainly by annual cash flow from operations
(CFO) of around EUR170 million, capex of EUR65 million and
dividends of EUR20 million. Over the last four years, the company
has generated a strong FCF margin. In 2023, strong EBITDA and CFO
generation, coupled with low capex needs, resulted in EUR95 million
in FCF. Fitch also incorporates that Atic may use a portion of its
FCF generation for other investing and financing activities.
Stable Profitability: Fitch's base case projections incorporate an
EBITDA margin of around 16% in 2024-2025. This trend will be
supported by a stable raw material cost environment, mid to high
single-digit revenue growth and commercial and operating
efficiencies. Atic's operating results in 2023 benefited from a
favorable raw material cost environment, cost reduction initiatives
and efficiencies, as well as better pricing across its markets.
Derivation Summary
Atic's geographical diversification in Latin America and its stable
position in the B brand segment support its business profile. The
company's 'BB' ratings are below or similar to other regional
beverage peers like The Central America Bottling Corporation (CBC,
BB/Stable), or Embotelladora Andina, S.A. (BBB+/Stable).
Atic's size and scale are relatively smaller, and it has weaker
brand recognition and lower market shares in key markets compared
to Coca-Cola or PepsiCo. Atic's exposure to low-rated countries
like Ecuador and mostly non-investment-grade countries in Central
America, except Panama, is similar to that of CBC.
Atic's financial profile in terms of profitability margins is
better than CBC (EBITDA margin 13%) but lower than Andina (EBITDA
margin 18%). Atic's projected net leverage of around 1.0x is
stronger than CBC's (3.0x) and Andina's (1.5x). However, Atic's
ratings are tempered by the company's corporate governance
practices.
Key Assumptions
- Mid-to high single digit revenue growth in 2024-2027;
- EBITDA margin around 16% in 2024-2027;
- Annual capex averaging around EUR58 million in 2024-2027
- Positive FCF generation in 2024-2027.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Rating sensitivities are not applicable as the ratings have been
withdrawn.
Liquidity and Debt Structure
Manageable Liquidity: As of Sept. 30, 2024, Atic had EUR117 million
of cash and cash equivalents and EUR212 million of total debt. The
total debt is mainly bank debt allocated at the subsidiary level,
notably in Central America and Peru. The primary source of
liquidity is the company's available cash and positive FCF.
Issuer Profile
Atic produces and markets soft drinks through its flagship brand
"BIG Cola." The company also makes juices, iced tea, energy drinks,
mineral water and others products. It targets middle-to-low-income
consumers by providing a lower price point than its competitors.
MACROECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS AND SECTOR FORECASTS
Fitch's latest quarterly Global Corporates Macro and Sector
Forecasts data file which aggregates key data points used in its
credit analysis. Fitch's macroeconomic forecasts, commodity price
assumptions, default rate forecasts, sector key performance
indicators and sector-level forecasts are among the data items
included.
ESG Considerations
Grupo Embotellador Atic, S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Group Structure due to the existence of related-party transactions,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.
Grupo Embotellador Atic, S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Financial Transparency due to timing and disclosure of financial
information, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and
is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.
Grupo Embotellador Atic, S.A. has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Governance Structure due to ownership concentration and strong
influence of Atic's owners upon its management, which has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.
The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.
Following the withdrawal of ratings for Grupo Embotellador Atic,
S.A. Fitch will no longer be providing the associated ESG Relevance
Scores.
Entity/Debt Rating Prior
----------- ------ -----
Grupo Embotellador
Atic, S.A. LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
LT IDR WD Withdrawn
LC LT IDR BB Affirmed BB
LC LT IDR WD Withdrawn
=====================================
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O
=====================================
BPTT: Too Soon to Assess Impact of BP's Plan to Cut Jobs Globally
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that BpTT said it is "too soon" to
determine exactly how the plan to cut 4,700 jobs globally will
impact its operations in Trinidad and Tobago.
BP, the U.K.-based energy giant, announced it would be cutting
4,700 jobs worldwide, along with an additional 3,000 contractor
roles, as part of a cost-saving initiative, according to Trinidad
Express.
In an email to staff, which was seen by The Associated Press, CEO
Murray Auchincloss stated that these job losses "account for much
of the anticipated reduction this year," the report notes.
As a result of the announcement, Express Business sent questions to
bpTT to understand the impact on local operations.
"The job cuts announced recently by bp are one part of a broader
transformation programme being undertaken by bp. It is too soon in
the process to comment on how these changes will impact the
Trinidad and Tobago business," it stated, the report relays.
Last October, BP said it had identified US$500 million of cost
savings to be delivered this year, a quarter of the US$2
billion-target set in April by the end of 2026, the report notes.
Auchincloss said that the company is "focusing resources on our
highest-value opportunities" and that it has stopped or paused 30
projects since June, the report discloses.
The reductions come as BP tries to bring more digital capabilities
into the business, with artificial intelligence increasingly
playing a role in engineering and marketing operations, the report
says.
Express Business had previously contacted BpTT to determine what
steps, if any, are being taken to reduce costs locally, the report
notes.
"bp is focused on making our business simpler, more focused and
higher value and reducing costs globally is one of the key enablers
of achieving this goal. In Trinidad, we continue to look for
opportunities to improve the efficiency of our existing operations,
that includes how we more efficiently deliver our activity and
lower our operating costs," bpTT stated, the report shares.
"We are making significant strides in delivering our strategy which
includes maximising production from the Columbus Basin off the east
coast while at the same time continuing to invest in developing gas
resources that enable growth. We are actively pursuing the
development of new acreage such as fields in the deep water and
cross border and are continuously investing to bring more gas to
the market," it stated, the report discloses.
'No Surprise'
Speaking to Express former Energy Minister Kevin Ramnarine said:
"The announcement that BP will cut staff levels by 5% globally
comes as no surprise given the performance of the company in recent
years compared to its peers, namely ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Shell.
Their strategy to invest in green energy has not delivered returns
comparable to its legacy oil and gas business. The Financial Times
has even reported that there are concerns about BP Lightsource. BP
Lightsource is building a solar farm in central Trinidad."
"In addition, when you look at how BP stacks up to ExxonMobil, it's
chalk and cheese. BP's share price has fallen by 7% in the last 12
months, while ExxonMobil's share price is up 8%. Exxon's market cap
is six times that of BP's market cap. That obviously concerns the
investment community and shareholders," he stated, the report
discloses.
Ramnarine said BP production in this country has been in decline in
recent years, the report says.
However, he said he does not think they will leave this country,
the report relays.
"They have a program of drilling for the rest of the decade and a
portfolio of projects to deliver. However, I don't expect them to
get back to where they were ten years ago when they were producing
2.0 billion cubic feet per day. Now they are doing around 1.1 to
1.2 per day. I expect that they will stick around Trinidad but will
change the way they do business here and seek out more Joint
Ventures. It's an opportunity for them to partner with some of the
smaller natural gas operators in the country," Ramnarine said, the
report adds.
===============
X X X X X X X X
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[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week from Jan. 20 to Jan. 24, 2025
------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Cntry Curr
----------- --- ----- -------- ----- ----
Argentine Bonos del Te 15.5 39.7 10/17/2026 AR ARS
Argentine Gov't Int'l 1 46.4 7/9/2029 AR USD
Argentine Gov't Int'l 0.5 41.4 7/9/2029 AR EUR
Argentine Gov't Int'l 0.1 42 7/9/2030 AR EUR
Ascent Finance 1.2 61.6 7/12/2047 KY EUR
Ascent Finance 3.8 67 6/28/2047 KY AUD
Ascent Finance 3.4 65.7 2/6/2043 KY AUD
Astra Cumulative 2019 1.5 62 11/1/2029 KY USD
At Home Cayman 11.5 69.3 5/12/2028 KY USD
At Home Cayman 11.5 70 5/12/2028 KY USD
AYC Finance 3.9 62.2 KY USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 64.1 CO USD
Banco Davivienda SA 6.7 70.3 CO USD
Banco de Chile 3.6 75.7 11/18/2039 CL AUD
Banco de Chile 3.5 75.4 9/5/2039 CL AUD
Banco de Chile 2.7 74.7 3/9/2035 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Ch 3.1 70.5 2/21/2040 CL AUD
Banco del Estado de Ch 2.8 67 3/13/2040 CL AUD
Banco Nacional de Pana 2.5 74.7 8/11/2030 PA USD
Banco Santander Chile 3.1 70.6 2/28/2039 CL AUD
Banco Santander Chile 1.3 73.5 11/29/2034 CL EUR
Banda de Couro Energe 8 54.4 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Baraunas II Energeti 8 12.4 1/15/2027 BR BRL
Bishopsgate Asset Fi 4.8 66.9 8/14/2044 KY GBP
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 4.5 55.6 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 7.5 57.2 3/2/2030 BO USD
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 4.5 55.8 3/20/2028 BO USD
Bolivian Gov't Int'l 7.5 57.2 3/2/2030 BO USD
BOPREAL 5 64.7 10/31/2027 AR USD
BOPREAL 3 60.9 5/31/2026 AR USD
Brazilian Gov't Int'l4.8 73.8 1/14/2050 BR USD
BRF SA 5.8 73.5 9/21/2050 BR USD
BRF SA 5.8 73.6 9/21/2050 BR USD
Camposol SA 6 72.1 2/3/2027 PE USD
Camposol SA 6 72.5 2/3/2027 PE USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.6 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.1 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.8 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 8.7 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 3.4 1/31/2031 KY USD
CFLD Cayman Investment 2.5 2.2 1/31/2031 KY USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.5 72.6 1/25/2050 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.1 73.4 5/7/2041 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.1 62.7 1/22/2061 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.5 72.1 4/15/2053 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 1.3 67.4 1/29/2040 CL EUR
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 1.3 54 1/22/2051 CL EUR
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 3.3 62.8 9/21/2071 CL USD
Chile Gov't Int'l Bond 1.3 74.2 7/26/2036 CL EUR
China Overseas Cayman 3.1 75.1 3/2/2035 KY USD
China Yuhua Education 0.9 65.8 12/27/2024 KY HKD
CK Hutchison Int'l 19 3.4 74 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK Hutchison Int'l 19 3.4 73.9 9/6/2049 KY USD
CK Hutchison Int'l 20 3.4 73.7 5/8/2050 KY USD
CK Hutchison Int'l 20 3.4 73.8 5/8/2050 KY USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 3.9 2/15/2061 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 4.1 61.6 5/15/2051 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 5.2 72.9 5/15/2049 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 4.1 67 2/22/2042 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 6.3 73.5 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l 7.3 71.7 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l 7.3 71.7 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombia Gov't Int'l 5 72 6/15/2045 CO USD
Colombia Gov't Int'l 6.3 73.5 7/9/2036 CO COP
Colombia Telecom 5 66.9 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombia Telecom 5 67 7/17/2030 CO USD
Colombian TES 7.3 71.6 10/26/2050 CO COP
Colombian TES 6.3 73.4 7/9/2036 CO COP
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.7 67.5 1/30/2050 CL USD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.2 61.2 1/15/2051 CL USD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.7 67.5 1/30/2050 CL USD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.6 74 7/22/2039 CL AUD
Corp Nacional de Chile 3.2 61.2 1/15/2051 CL USD
Dibens Leasing S/A 10.9 30.6 3/1/2035 BR BRL
Dibens Leasing S/A 10.9 34.6 3/1/2035 BR BRL
Dibens Leasing S/A 10.9 29.2 3/1/2035 BR BRL
Earls Eight 1.7 72 6/20/2032 KY AUD
Earls Eight 0.1 64.2 12/20/2031 KY AUD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 74.2 5/28/2045 CO USD
Ecopetrol SA 5.9 70.7 11/2/2051 CO USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.1 68.7 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 72.9 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 73.3 2/1/2041 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 5.9 65.1 1/30/2025 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 73.5 9/21/2034 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.1 68.7 1/20/2050 SV USD
El Salvador Gov't Int 7.6 73.5 2/1/2041 SV USD
Embotelladora Andina 6.5 23.3 6/1/2026 CL CLP
EFE 3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE 3.1 60 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE 3.1 59.9 8/18/2050 CL USD
EFE 3.8 65.8 9/14/2061 CL USD
EFE 6.5 11.2 1/1/2026 CL CLP
ETESA 5.1 71.8 5/2/2049 PA USD
Empresa de Transmision 5.1 72.2 5/2/2049 PA USD
Metro SA 3.7 65.2 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA 3.7 65.1 9/13/2061 CL USD
Metro SA 5.5 50.2 7/15/2027 CL CLP
Edsa SA 5 62.6 5/11/2025 AR USD
ENAP 4.5 73.3 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENAP 4.5 73.4 9/14/2047 CL USD
ENA Master Trust 4 70.8 5/19/2048 PA USD
ENA Master Trust 4 71.1 5/19/2048 PA USD
Enel Generacion Chile 6.2 29.4 10/15/2028 CL CLP
Equatorial Energia 11 1.1 10/15/2029 BR BRL
Equatorial Energia 10.8 1 5/15/2028 BR BRL
Esval SA 3.5 13.2 2/15/2026 CL CLP
Farfetch 3.8 4.3 5/1/2027 KY USD
Fospar S/A 6.5 1.4 5/15/2026 BR BRL
GDM Argentina SA 2.5 0 9/8/2024 AR USD
GDS Holdings 4.5 67.7 1/31/2030 KY USD
Generacion Mediterrane 4.6 0 11/12/2024 AR ARS
General Shopping Finan 10 66.2 KY USD
General Shopping Finan 10 65.1 KY USD
Genneia SA 2 56.4 7/14/2028 AR USD
Greenland Hong Kong 10.2 12.9 KY USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 70.4 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 10 70 12/30/2030 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 4.6 70.6 4/30/2025 CL USD
Guacolda Energia SA 10 70 12/30/2030 CL USD
Hector A Bertone SA 1.9 0 4/7/2024 AR USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 65.7 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 62.2 11/18/2024 KY USD
Hilong Holding 9.8 65.6 11/18/2024 KY USD
ICBC DO Brasil 3.3 59.5 BR USD
IMPSA 1 75 12/30/2031 AR USD
Itau Unibanco SA/Nassau 5.8 20.1 5/20/2027 BR BRL
Jamaica Gov't Bond 6.3 67.8 7/11/2048 JM JMD
Jamaica Gov't Bond 8.5 73 12/21/2061 JM JMD
Lani Finance 1.7 64.1 3/14/2049 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.9 66.5 9/20/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance 1.9 67.5 10/19/2048 KY EUR
Lani Finance 3.1 64.7 10/19/2048 KY AUD
Link Finance Cayman 2.2 69.8 10/27/2038 KY HKD
LIPSA Srl 1 0 8/23/2024 AR USD
Logan Group Co 7 5 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 4 45.2 9/16/2029 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 3.4 58 4/13/2027 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 3.9 40.2 1/13/2032 KY USD
Longfor Group Holdings 4.5 55.2 1/16/2028 KY USD
Luminis III 2.3 41.5 9/22/2048 KY USD
Luminis III 2.4 54 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Luminis IV 3.2 69.6 1/22/2042 KY AUD
Luminis 2.3 53.5 9/22/2048 KY AUD
Lunar Funding I 1.7 70.7 8/11/2056 KY GBP
MTR Corp CI 3 72.6 3/11/2051 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 2.8 72.7 9/6/2047 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3.2 73.1 2/5/2055 KY HKD
MTR Corp CI 3 72.5 3/11/2051 KY HKD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 64.1 4/1/2056 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 2.3 70.3 9/29/2032 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 3.9 56.6 7/23/2060 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 3.3 75.7 1/19/2033 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 65.7 4/16/2050 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 63 1/19/2063 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.5 67.3 5/15/2047 PA USD
Panama Gov't Int'l Bon 4.3 63.8 4/29/2053 PA USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 2.8 57.2 12/1/2060 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.2 57 7/28/2121 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.6 71.3 3/10/2051 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.6 65.4 1/15/2072 PE USD
Peruvian Gov't Int'l 3.3 74 3/11/2041 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 66.3 6/19/2047 PE USD
Petroleos del Peru SA 5.6 66.4 6/19/2047 PE USD
Powerlong Real Estate 6.3 10.3 8/10/2024 KY USD
Provincia de Cordoba 7.1 39.7 10/27/2026 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja 4.5 55.5 1/20/2027 AR USD
Provincia de la Rioja 7.5 51.1 7/20/2032 AR USD
Chaco Argentina 4 0 12/4/2026 AR USD
QNB Finance 13.5 65.4 10/6/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 11.5 73.2 1/30/2025 KY TRY
QNB Finance 2.9 73.4 9/16/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 2.9 72.1 12/4/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 3 74.6 2/14/2035 KY AUD
QNB Finance 3.4 70.7 10/21/2039 KY AUD
Radiance Holdings Grou 7.8 69.6 3/20/2024 KY USD
Rio Alto Energias Reno 7 28.7 7/15/2027 BR BRL
Santander Consumer Ch 2.9 72.5 11/27/2034 CL AUD
Seazen Group 6 70.3 8/12/2024 KY USD
Seazen Group 4.5 30.6 7/13/2025 KY USD
Shui On Dev't 5.5 73.2 3/3/2025 KY USD
Shui On Dev't 5.5 61.7 6/29/2026 KY USD
Silk Road Investments 2.9 66 1/23/2042 KY AUD
Skylark 1.8 59.1 4/4/2039 KY GBP
Autopista Central 5.3 37.3 12/15/2026 CL CLP
Vespucio Norte 5.3 50.7 12/15/2028 CL CLP
Minera de Chile SA 3.5 65.5 9/10/2051 CL USD
Minera de Chile SA 3.5 65.4 9/10/2051 CL USD
Southern Water Services 3 70.9 5/28/2037 KY GBP
SPE Saneamento RIO 1 7.2 10.7 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 2 6.9 10.3 1/15/2034 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 3 7.2 10.8 1/15/2042 BR BRL
SPE Saneamento RIO 4 6.9 10.3 1/15/2034 BR BRL
Spica 2 74.6 3/24/2033 KY AUD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 72.1 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 72.5 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 72 9/20/2025 KY USD
Spirit Loyalty Cayman 8 70.9 9/20/2025 KY USD
Sylph 2.7 68.3 3/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph 2.4 64.1 9/25/2036 KY USD
Sylph 3.1 74.6 9/25/2035 KY USD
Sylph 2.9 74.1 6/24/2036 KY AUD
SYN prop e tech SA 11.1 21.1 3/15/2024 BR BRL
Telecom Argentina SA 1 74.1 3/9/2027 AR USD
Telecom Argentina SA 1 66.2 2/10/2028 AR USD
Telefonica Moviles Chi 3.5 74.1 11/18/2031 CL USD
Telefonica Moviles Chi 3.5 74.2 11/18/2031 CL USD
Tencent Holdings 3.8 75.4 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.3 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 63.6 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.4 4/22/2061 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.8 74.8 4/22/2051 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.2 67.2 6/3/2050 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.3 63.8 6/3/2060 KY USD
Tencent Holdings 3.9 73.2 4/22/2061 KY USD
Three Gorges Finance 3.2 70.5 10/16/2049 KY USD
Grupo Travessia 9 1.6 1/20/2032 BR BRL
Vina Santa Rita SA 4.4 63.8 9/15/2030 CL CLP
Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 61.7 2/11/2026 PE USD
Volcan Cia Minera SAA 4.4 61.8 2/11/2026 PE USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 62.5 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 62.9 4/15/2029 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 5.1 63.1 1/15/2028 CL USD
VTR Comunicaciones SpA 4.4 63.1 4/15/2029 CL USD
YPF SA 7 72.5 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA 7 72.1 12/15/2047 AR USD
YPF SA 1 65.9 4/25/2027 AR USD
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S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2025. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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