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          Monday, September 29, 2025, Vol. 26, No. 194

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Poverty Fell to 31.6% in 1st Half of 2025, INDEC Says
ARGENTINA: U.S. Treasury Chief Hints at Argentina Financial Rescue


B A H A M A S

FTX GROUP: FTX Trust Seeks $1B From Crypto Miner Genesis Digital


B E R M U D A

GOLAR LNG: Moody's Assigns First Time 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
GOLAR LNG: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Ups CFR to Ba2, Outlook Positive


B R A Z I L

AEGEA SANEAMENTO: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating
BANCO DO BRASIL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings
GOL LINHAS: Abra Pulls Plug on Deal, Ending Talks on Merger


C O L O M B I A

BANCO AGRARIO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Negative
BANCOLDEX: Fitch Affirms BB+ LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Negative
FINANCIERA DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDRs, Outlook Neg.
FINDETER: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Currency LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Neg.


C O S T A   R I C A

COSTA RICA: Moody's Hikes Issuer Ratings to 'Ba2', Outlook Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Faces Challenges in Growing AI Capabilities


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: S&P Raises LongTerm Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'BB'
JAMAICA: Trade Deficit Hit US$2.4 Billion for January to May 2025


P A N A M A

BANCO LATINOAMERICANO: Fitch Rates USD200MM 7.5% Sub. Notes 'BB-'


P U E R T O   R I C O

CARMEN FRATICELLI: Court Upholds Dismissal of Bankruptcy Case


U R U G U A Y

PROVINCIA CASA: S&P Assigns 'B-' Global Scale Rating

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Poverty Fell to 31.6% in 1st Half of 2025, INDEC Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Times reports that Argentina's poverty rate fell to
31.6 percent in the first of the year, according to the INDEC
national statistics bureau – a drop of 6.5 points from the second
half of 2024.

Extrapolated out to the wider population, the data means that more
than 14 million Argentines – almost a third of the population –
are now considered poor, according to Buenos Aires Times.

The proportion of households living below the poverty line stood at
24.1 percent, added the bureau, a drop of 4.5 points from the same
period, the report notes.

Within this group, 5.6 percent of households were classified as
living in extreme poverty, encompassing 6.9 percent of the
population – declines of 0.8 points and 1.3 points respectively,
the report relays.

The downward trend was observed across all regions of the country,
according to INDEC's report, Buenos Aires notes.

The news was greeted jubilantly by officials in President Javier
Milei's government, which hailed the improvement as a sign that the
administration's austerity measures are bearing fruit, the report
says.

"Poverty continues to decline. Freedom advances or Argentina
retreats.  Long live freedom, damn it!!!" wrote Milei in a post on
social media, the report discloses.

Presidential Spokesperson Manuel Adorni echoed the sentiment: "It
wasn't by issuing currency, it wasn't by harassing the private
sector, it wasn't by isolating ourselves from the world. Populism
impoverishes, always," he wrote on his X account, the report says.

"Poverty continues to decline," celebrated the Human Capital
Ministry in a post on social media, noting the "strong interannual
decline" in extreme poverty, the report notes.

Experts said the drop was mostly down to a fierce fall in
inflation, the report relays.  The Milei government managed to slow
price hikes to almost 118 percent in 2024 and has maintained the
downward trend in 2025, the report recalls.  Prices increased 19.5
percent in the first eight months of this year, the report
discloses.

INDEC's report, based on 31 urban centres nationwide, provides a
window into the inequality amongst Argentina's population, the
report says.

The bureau measures poverty and extreme poverty by a household's
ability to afford the basic food basket (CBA) and the overall basic
basket (CBT), the report notes.

The downward trend in indicators is directly linked to changes in
the purchasing power of household incomes relative to the cost of
the reference baskets, the report relays.  While the CBA increased
by 13.2 percent and the CBT by 12.3 percent, household incomes rose
by an average of 26.3 percent, the report says.

This discrepancy allowed both poverty and extreme poverty rates to
decline relative to the previous measurement, the report notes.

However, the gap between the income of poor households and the cost
of purchasing the CBT remains unchanged. On average, these
households earned around 671,492 pesos, while the cost of the CBT
for that same group stood at 1,065,691 pesos, the report
discloses.

Drilling down into the data by age, the data shows the worrying
penetration of poverty among children and adolescents: 45.4 percent
of those under the age of 14 live in households below the poverty
line, the report says.

Among young people aged 15 to 29, the rate was 37 percent, while
among adults aged 30 to 64 it reached 27.7 percent, the report
relays.  For those aged 65 and over, the incidence dropped to 10.8
percent, the report notes.

Geographically, the NEA (Northeast) and Cuyo regions recorded the
highest poverty rates, 39 percent and 33.8 percent respectively. In
contrast, Patagonia and the Pampas registered the lowest levels,
with 27 percent and 30.5 percent, the report discloses.

When President Milei took office in December 2023, poverty affected
41.7 percent of the population, the report relays.  The indicator
soared to 52.9 percent in the first half of 2024 following a steep
devaluation of the currency and has fallen since then, the report
notes.

Extreme poverty has followed the same trajectory, affecting 11.9
percent in the second half of 2023 and rising to 18.1 percent in
early 2024, the report relays.  In the second half of the same
year, 8.2 percent of Argentines were considered destitute, the
report adds.

                   Methodology Questioned

Following the publication of the new data, some experts warned that
methodological limitations could be responsible for some of the
improved numbers, the report relays.

Sociologist Daniel Schteingart, from the Fundar research centre,
said that the decline in poverty should be interpreted with
caution, stating it is based on a survey in which people declare
their income in an unreliable manner and because it measures the
previous month's income in comparison with the current month's food
basket, the report discloses.

‘When you have high monthly inflation, as was the case in 2023
and early 2024, that one-month gap between income and the basket
adds many poor people. When you have low monthly inflation like
now, that effect practically disappears,' he explained, the report
says.

"It's not that INDEC is lying," he continued. "It's that the
methodology itself has potential weaknesses that came together in
the last year."

The Catholic University of Argentina (UCA), argued in a statement
that the decline in poverty had been "overrepresented" since it is
still based on baskets constructed using consumption patterns from
a decade ago, the report relays.

For example, last year, the government eliminated subsidies for
utilities such as water, gas and electricity, causing an
astronomical increase in prices that is not reflected in inflation
or poverty figures, it stressed, the report adds.

                       About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota) -- with an approved immediate
disbursement of an equivalent of US$9.65 billion.  Argentina's
IMF-supported program sought to improve public finances and start
to reduce persistent high inflation through a multi-pronged
strategy.

On April 11, 2025, the IMF further approved a 48-month Extended
Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Argentina totaling US$20
billion (or 479 percent of quota), with an immediate disbursement
of US$12 billion, and a first review planned for June
2025 with an associated disbursement of about US$2 billion.  The
program is expected to help catalyze additional official
multilateral and bilateral support, and a timely re-access to
international capital markets.

Fitch Ratings, on May 12, 2025, upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency and Local-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CCC+' from 'CCC'.  The upgrade reflects the launch of a new IMF
program, among other things.  S&P Global Ratings, in February 2025
lowered its local currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to
'SD/SD' from 'CCC/C' and its national scale rating to 'SD' from
'raB+'.  Moody's Ratings, in January 2025, raised Argentina's local
currency ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling
to Caa1 from Caa3.  DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC in
November 2024.


ARGENTINA: U.S. Treasury Chief Hints at Argentina Financial Rescue
------------------------------------------------------------------
globalinsolvency.com, citing the Wall Street Journal, reports that
the Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent disclosed the Trump
administration is looking at options to provide Argentina a
financial lifeline as the country struggles to overhaul its
economy.  

Bessent in a series of posts on X laid out the options
administration officials are reviewing to backstop Argentina if the
country under President Javier Milei's leadership can't overcome
its financial woes, according to globalinsolvency.com.

"These options may include, but are not limited to, swap lines,
direct currency purchases, and purchases of U.S," the report adds.

                       About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America. Its capital is Buenos Aires. Javier Milei is the current
president of Argentina after winning the November 19, 2023 general
election. He succeeded Alberto Angel Fernandez in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019, according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

In March 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a
30-month arrangement under an Extended Fund Facility for Argentina
in the amount of SDR 31.914 billion (equivalent to US$44 billion,
or 1000 percent of quota) -- with an approved immediate
disbursement of an equivalent of US$9.65 billion.  Argentina's
IMF-supported program sought to improve public finances and start
to reduce persistent high inflation through a multi-pronged
strategy.

On April 11, 2025, the IMF further approved a 48-month Extended
Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Argentina totaling US$20
billion (or 479 percent of quota), with an immediate disbursement
of US$12 billion, and a first review planned for June
2025 with an associated disbursement of about US$2 billion.  The
program is expected to help catalyze additional official
multilateral and bilateral support, and a timely re-access to
international capital markets.

Fitch Ratings, on May 12, 2025, upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency and Local-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'CCC+' from 'CCC'.  The upgrade reflects the launch of a new IMF
program, among other things.  S&P Global Ratings, in February 2025
lowered its local currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to
'SD/SD' from 'CCC/C' and its national scale rating to 'SD' from
'raB+'.  Moody's Ratings, in January 2025, raised Argentina's local
currency ceiling to B3 from Caa1 and the foreign currency ceiling
to Caa1 from Caa3.  DBRS, Inc. upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Ratings to B (low) from CCC in
November 2024.




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B A H A M A S
=============

FTX GROUP: FTX Trust Seeks $1B From Crypto Miner Genesis Digital
----------------------------------------------------------------
Clara Geoghegan at law360.com reports that the recovery trust
created under FTX's Chapter 11 plan has filed a lawsuit in Delaware
bankruptcy court that aims to claw back more than $1 billion that
FTX's founder invested in Genesis Digital Assets Ltd., accusing the
bitcoin mining firm of overinflating its value and projections to
secure the funds.

                       About FTX Group

FTX is the world's second-largest cryptocurrency firm.  FTX is a
cryptocurrency exchange built by traders, for traders.  FTX offers
innovative products including industry-first derivatives, options,
volatility products and leveraged tokens.

Then CEO and co-founder Sam Bankman-Fried said Nov. 10, 2022, that
FTX paused customer withdrawals after it was hit with roughly $5
billion worth of withdrawal requests.

Faced with liquidity issues, FTX on Nov. 9, 2022, struck a deal to
sell itself to its giant rival Binance, but Binance walked away
from the deal amid reports on FTX regarding mishandled customer
funds and alleged US agency investigations.  SBF agreed to step
aside, and restructuring vet John J. Ray III was quickly named new
CEO.

FTX Trading Ltd (d/b/a FTX.com), West Realm Shires Services Inc.
(d/b/a FTX US), Alameda Research Ltd. and certain affiliated
companies then commenced Chapter 11 proceedings (Bankr. D. Del.
Lead Case No. 22-11068) on an emergency basis on Nov. 11, 2022.
Additional entities sought Chapter 11 protection on Nov. 14, 2022.

FTX Trading and its affiliates each listed $10 billion to $50
billion in assets and liabilities, making FTX the biggest
bankruptcy filer in the US this year.  

According to Reuters, SBF shared a document with investors on Nov.
10, 2022, showing FTX had $13.86 billion in liabilities and $14.6
billion in assets. However, only $900 million of those assets were
liquid, leading to the cash crunch that ended with the company
filing for bankruptcy.

The Hon. John T. Dorsey is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP as bankruptcy counsel;
Landis Rath & Cobb, LLP as local counsel; and Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC as financial advisor. Kroll is the claims
agent, maintaining the page
https://cases.ra.kroll.com/FTX/Home-Index

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Paul Hastings
as counsel, FTI Consulting, Inc., as financial advisor, and
Jefferies LLC as the investment banker. Young Conaway Stargatt &
Taylor LLP is the Committee's Delaware and conflicts counsel.

Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads LLP, led by partners Gregory
T. Donilon, Edward L. Schnitzer, and David M. Banker, is
representing Sam Bankman-Fried in the Chapter 11 cases.

White-collar crime specialist Mark S. Cohen has reportedly been
hired to represent SBF in litigation. Lawyers at Paul Weiss
previously represented SBF but later renounced representing the
entrepreneur due to a conflict of interest.




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B E R M U D A
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GOLAR LNG: Moody's Assigns First Time 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings has assigned a first time B2 long-term Corporate
Family Rating and B2-PD Probability of Default Rating to Golar LNG
Limited (the company, Golar LNG). Concurrently, Moody's have
assigned a B3 instrument rating to the $500 million senior
unsecured notes issued by Golar LNG. The outlook is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect Golar LNG's focus on large, floating liquefied
natural gas (FLNG) assets, essentially floating liquefaction
plants, with good underlying market fundamentals, its highly
contracted nature with approximately $17 billion of earnings
backlog under tolling- and lease-like contracts that provide fixed
minimum payments, before commodity-linked tariff upside and
inflationary adjustments, thereby mitigating price and volume risks
while also providing some upside. Various contractual mechanisms
also mitigate other risks to a significant degree, including
country and counterparty risks, while its customer mix include some
highly-rated counterparties such as BP p.l.c. (A1 stable). Golar
LNG's FLNG assets are large scale and typically represent important
local infrastructure in the region they operate in, enabling the
export of otherwise potentially stranded gas resources.

However, the ratings also reflect Golar LNG's asset concentration
and degree of construction risk with two operational vessels (FLNG
Hilli and FLNG Gimi) and one under development (MKII) due in the
fourth quarter of 2027. Despite significant contractual
mitigations, Golar LNG's vessels nevertheless operate and are
expected to continue to operate in the waters of lower-rated
countries such as Cameroon (Caa1 stable) and Argentina (Caa1
stable), and it has concentration among counterparties including
low-rated local companies, which increases counterparty risks. The
company will also have large, contracted cash outflows over the
next years for the construction of the MKII vessel and cash flow
generation will temporarily dip in the second half of 2026
following completion of FLNG Hilli's existing contract and before
commencement of its new 20-year contract expected in 2027.

These developments are reflected in weak credit metrics over the
construction period of the MKII, including negative cash flows,
high upfront Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA of above 10x in 2025 to
2027 (excluding FLNG GIMI pre-COD cashflows in 2025 expected
EBITDA) and Moody's-adjusted EBITDA/Interest below 2.0x. Moody's
expects the company to refinance the asset-level funding on the
FLNG Gimi in the fourth quarter of 2025 now that the commercial
operations date (COD) has been achieved, which will together with
the proceeds from the new senior unsecured notes add substantially
to cash balances. As a result, Moody's-adjusted net debt/EBITDA
would still be high but somewhat lower in the 7.0-10.0x range over
the 2025-2027 period. From 2028, assuming no further newbuild
activity, metrics should substantially improve, although the
company may commission the next conversion to take advantage of
market demand.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Golar LNG is exposed to environmental and social risks, including
physical climate risks given its asset concentration and the need
to operate its assets safely and responsibly. Given its focus on
hydrocarbons it is exposed to the energy transition, although
partly limited by its focus exclusively on converting third-party
gas to LNG. Governance considerations include the company's
financial policies including the meaningful use of debt to fund its
assets and substantial ongoing dividend payments, as well as its
transparency and disclosure as listed business.

RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that the company
will maintain its steady operating track record, execute the
construction of the MKII as planned within budget and time
including securing appropriate funding in a timely and cost
competitive manner, and execute as planned regarding the transition
of the FLNG Hilli to Argentina in 2027.

LIQUIDITY

The liquidity profile is good. The company had an unrestricted cash
balance of $783 million as of June 2025, which will rise following
the notes issuance and an expected refinancing of the FLNG Gimi
asset-level funding. Moody's expects Golar LNG to remain
significantly cash flow negative over the coming years due to the
growth investments related to the MKII and relocation of the FLNG
Hilli. Considering the minimum contractual counterparty payments,
continuation of shareholder returns at current levels, expected
notes and FLNG Gimi asset-level funding, Moody's expects Golar LNG
to have sufficient funds through the investment peak of the MKII
conversion.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The senior unsecured notes are rated one notch below the CFR. They
are unsecured and unguaranteed by the operating subsidiaries and
rank behind the secured funding at FLNG Gimi and FLNG Hilli. They
rank in line with the other unsecured bonds and convertible bond.
Moody's expects Golar LNG to continue to pursue asset-level
financing. However, any future capital structure changes beyond the
anticipated refinancing of the FLNG Gimi asset-level funding may
have implications for the instrument rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The ratings could come under positive pressure if the company
successfully executes on the FLNG Hilli contract start-up in
Argentina in 2027 and MKII peak construction phase so that
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA falls sustainably towards 6.0x and
Moody's-adjusted EBITDA/Interest rises above 2.0x. A prerequisite
would also be an at least adequate liquidity profile and Moody's
would also consider the operating environment in its main countries
for any positive pressure to develop. Conversely, negative pressure
on the rating could arise if any operating or counterparty issues
occur, the company's financial policy becomes more aggressive for
example through rising shareholder returns, rising leverage beyond
Moody's expectations or weakening credit metrics. More
specifically, debt/EBITDA remaining above 7.0x beyond 2027 or
EBITDA/Interest falling below 1.25x would result in negative
pressure. Weakening liquidity or an inability to secure any
additional funding needs at cost competitive levels and in a timely
manner would also pressure the rating and so would any rising
concerns that the environment in the countries it operates, most
notably Argentina, may have an adverse impact on Golar LNG.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Midstream
Energy published in February 2022.

The net effect of any adjustments applied to rating factor scores
or scorecard outputs under the primary methodology(ies), if any,
was not material to the ratings addressed in this announcement.

COMPANY PROFILE

Golar LNG is a US-listed business, specializing in owning and
operating FLNG vessels. It has two operating vessels, the FLNG
Hilli and FLNG Gimi, with a third, the MKII under construction and
due in late 2027.


GOLAR LNG: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned our 'B' preliminary issuer credit
rating to Bermuda-Based Golar LNG and its 'B-' preliminary issue
rating to its proposed notes.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Golar will
deliver stable operating and financial performances in line with
S&P's base case.

Golar LNG, a Bermuda-registered operator of two floating LNG (FLNG)
vessels, is looking to issue notes to partly refinance existing
debt and for general corporate purposes.

The company provides tolling services on a take-or-pay basis via
long-term contracts and has little exposure to commodity prices or
volume risk, which results in highly predictable cash flows.

Still, it operates in high and very high risk countries and S&P
forecasts its leverage (gross debt to EBITDA) will materially
exceed 5x during the next few years.

Golar's current and future exposures to high and very high risk
countries, increasingly to Argentina, are key rating constraints.  
Despite being registered in Bermuda and having management in
Europe, Golar's two FLNGs (FLNG Gimi--owned, FLNG Hilli—leased
under a financing arrangement with mandatory purchase obligation at
the end of the financing period) operate in regions that S&P views
as high risk. FLNG Gimi started its 20-year contract offshore from
Mauritania and Senegal in June 2025, while FLNG Hilli is in the
final year of its contract in Cameroon. In 2026, Hilli will
relocate to Argentina, where Golar has just concluded a 20-year
tolling contract. Moreover, Golar's new vessel MKII, to be built
and enter operations by 2028, will operate in Argentina, increasing
Golar's exposure to the country to about 80% of EBITDA.

S&P said, "We view Golar's increasing exposure to Argentina as a
central weakness in the company's credit profile.  Our long-term
foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Argentina is ' CCC' and
on Feb. 17, 2025, we lowered the long- and short-term local
currency sovereign credit ratings to 'SD/SD' (selective default)."
Still, the government has recently had some success in addressing
key challenges, such as high inflation, but the country's
macroeconomic situation remains fluid and difficult to predict.
Argentina has a track record of frequent changes in political and
economic policies, which have significantly affected international
and local businesses. It has also defaulted several times, and the
government has imposed currency restrictions on occasions. The
current administration has taken steps to attract foreign investors
and granted Golar a special RIGI regime (Regimen de Incentivo para
Grandes Inversiones). RIGI protection brings a stable regulatory,
tax and monetary regime, but whether this would survive a change in
the country's leadership remains untested.

Golar's contractual and structural protections should mitigate some
risks, but it is exposed to the financial systems of the countries
it operates in.   Golar aims to protect itself from high-risk
jurisdictions by maintaining offshore bank accounts and having
offtakers pay into those in U.S. dollar under all contracts. These
measures will allow it to accumulate liquidity in low-risk
jurisdictions and service its debt from those if there are
disruptions to transborder payments or any other operational
interruption. S&P said, "We also recognize that FLNG's are
self-propelling vessels, located offshore, which mitigates certain
physical risks. They can also be relocated if a contract is lost or
other obstacles arise. These mitigants lead us to rate the company
above the 'CCC' foreign currency sovereign rating on Argentina and
above our 'B-' T&C assessment, as well as above our 'B-' foreign
currency sovereign ratings on Cameroon and Senegal."

S&P said, "Still, the risks are not fully mitigated, in our view.
In Cameroon and Argentina payments to Golar are ultimately made by
local companies. In Cameroon it is Perenco Cameroon (unrated) from
a local bank account. In Argentina the payment will be made by
Southern Energy SA, which is incorporated in Argentina, from its
Argentinian bank account. The documentation also assumes guarantees
from Southern Energy's parent companies in case of its inability to
pay or if a contract is terminated. However, three out of four (YPF
[B-/Stable/--]), Pampa Energia [B-/Stable/--], Pan American Energy
[not rated], and Harbour Energy [BBB-/Stable/--]) are Argentinian
companies, which are bound by the same potential credit constraints
as the sovereign. The contracts also incorporate insurance against
the risk of expropriation but the timing of payments under
potential claims might not help prevent a default, according to our
definition, given the number of jurisdictions involved.

"We forecast high leverage over the next few years for Golar, with
gross debt to EBITDA above 5x, reflecting operational expansion
costs and Hilli's relocation.   With the new contract starting in
Mauritania/Senegal, Golar's EBITDA will grow toward $370 million
this year, from $252.2 million in 2024. However, in 2026 it will
relocate Hilli to Argentina to start a new contract. In that year,
Hilli will only generate revenues for about six months, which will
impact Golar's annual results. Golar has also begun work on MKII,
which will cost about $1.8 billion in 2025-2028 and materially
increase its debt (we note that Golar has a track record of
building FLNG Hilli and FLNG Gimi within costs and schedule). This
leads us to forecast Golar's gross debt to EBITDA increasing toward
14x-15x in 2026 on a S&P Global Ratings-adjusted basis, from 4.9x
in 2024 and 8.5x in 2025 (noting that we fully consolidate the cash
flows and debt related to Gimi, which is 70% owned by Golar). We
also do not net Golar's sizable cash balances to calculate our
financial ratios.

"Leverage could start to reduce meaningfully in 2028, when MKII
starts to generate cash flows, with EBITDA exceeding $600 million,
and capital expenditure (capex) decreases.   However, the pace of
deleveraging would depend on whether the company decides to build
another vessel, which we see as a possibility. Golar will also
likely continue paying dividends regularly despite the high
leverage it will have in the coming years. We anticipate it paying
about $100 million of dividends annually over the forecast period,
in addition to distributions to minority shareholders of Gimi, at
about $160 million this year and $20 million-$30 million annually
from 2026, which will further limit its deleveraging capacity."

Absent sovereign-related risks, the company's tolling business
provides it with stable and predictable cash flows.   Golar LNG
occupies a leading position in terms of capacity and the number of
assets in the global FLNG market, which is a sector with high
technological, financial and operational barriers to entry. FLNG
also benefits from the growing demand for LNG and the increased
willingness to diversify energy sources, particularly in Europe. As
a provider of tolling services, Golar does not procure, own, or
sell the commodity (natural gas, LNG). Also, it does not provide
100% of the theoretical availability of an FLNG vessel; nor does it
commit the vessel to be available 100% of the time, which gives it
sufficient headroom for maintenance and/or additional works. As
soon as Golar provides contractual availability, it receives a base
tolling fee that is not exposed to the availability of feedstock
(natural gas) or price fluctuations for either feedstock or product
(LNG). The feedstock and product are owned and sold by its
customers. Golar's contracts include a commodity-linked component,
under which it receives extra payments if the LNG price exceeds a
certain minimum. S&P said, "In our base case, this commodity-linked
component never exceeds 15% of EBITDA under our current gas price
assumptions, which we believe results in stable and highly visible
cash flows and EBITDA. Contract cash flows depend on counterparties
that we do not view as having strong credit quality. The exception
is BP (A-/Stable), which is one of the counterparties in the
Mauritania/Senegal contract."

S&P said, "We rate the proposed notes preliminary 'B-', one notch
below our issuer credit rating on Golar, because they will be
structurally subordinated to the debt of subsidiaries.   We
calculate that there will be more than 50% of debt in the capital
structure that will have structural or contractual priority to the
proposed notes. We also expect the company to keep using
asset-backed financing in the future. The proposed senior unsecured
notes will have no upstream guarantees from the operating
subsidiaries, where most of Golar's debt will sit, mostly secured.
We used our structural subordination analysis to derive the rating
on the notes, rather than our recovery analysis, given the
countries of Golar's operations. We do not do recovery analysis in
Bermuda (the country of its registration), the Marshall Islands
(FLNG registration), or Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal, and
Argentina (countries of operations). In certain cases, we do
recovery analysis for shipping companies with vessels registered in
the Marshall Islands, when we assess diversification as high due to
the large number of vessels dispersed across the globe, which
mitigates certain country-related risks. However, in the case of
Golar, both vessels will be stationed in one location for a long
time. We also note that Golar owns only one FLNG, Gimi--while Hilli
is leased under a financing arrangement, the company having a
mandatory purchase obligation at the end of the financing period
and purchase options at specific dates.

"The final rating will depend on our receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation.   Accordingly, the
preliminary rating should not be construed as evidence of a final
rating. If we do not receive the final documentation within a
reasonable time frame or if the final documentation departs from
the materials reviewed, we reserve the right to withdraw or revise
our preliminary rating. Potential changes include the utilization
of the bond proceeds, maturity, size, and conditions of the notes,
financial and other covenants, security, and ranking.

"The stable outlook on Golar reflects our expectation that the
company will continue to deliver a stable operating performance
with the successful startup of its contract in Mauritania and
Senegal. We also expect that it will complete its Cameroon contract
and relocate FLNG Hilli to Argentina in 2026.

"Our base case assumes leverage increasing toward 13x-15x in
2026-2027, from 4.6x in 2024, as a result of elevated capex to
build a third vessel, MKII, as well as lower revenues from the FLNG
Hilli due to its relocation. We expect Golar will maintain adequate
liquidity and reasonable cash balances at its offshore bank
accounts.

"The stable outlook also assumes stable political, economic, and
financial environments in Golar's countries of operations, allowing
it to continue doing business without disruptions and receive
payments for its services, into offshore accounts, to service its
debt.

"We could lower the rating on Golar if it suffered a major
operational disruption leading to a material decline in cash flow
generation, causing higher leverage and liquidity pressures."

More aggressive financial policies, including large acquisitions,
higher capex and shareholder distributions, or other material cash
outflows could lead to a downgrade.

Material deteriorations in the political, economic, and financial
environments in its countries of operations, which undermined
Golar's operations or its ability to receive payments into its
offshore accounts, could also lead to a downgrade.

S&P said, "If we were to revise upward our view of country risk in
Argentina, where Golar's operations will be heavily concentrated in
the future, we could consider an upgrade. Also, additional credit
enhancements, such as reducing its exposure to Argentina, might
also support rating upside. Over the longer term we could consider
a positive rating action if Golar's leverage declines, improving
its EBITDA interest coverage ratios towards 2x."


WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Ups CFR to Ba2, Outlook Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings upgraded the ratings of Weatherford International
Ltd. (Bermuda) (Weatherford), including its Corporate Family Rating
to Ba2 from Ba3, Probability of Default Rating to Ba2-PD from
Ba3-PD, and the rating on the backed senior unsecured notes to Ba3
from B1. The SGL-1 Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating (SGL) remains
unchanged. A Ba3 rating was assigned to its proposed senior
unsecured notes due 2033. Moody's have also withdrawn the Baa3 bank
credit facility ratings. The outlook remains positive.

Weatherford will apply the net proceeds from the notes offering and
$100 million of existing cash towards a partial repayment of the
notes due 2030.

Moody's have concurrently withdrawn Baa3 ratings on the senior
secured bank facility due to no amounts outstanding. The company
put in place a new senior secured bank facility (unrated) to
support its corporate short-term funding requirements.

"The upgrade of Weatherford's ratings reflects its conservative
financial policies and improving credit profile," stated James
Wilkins, Moody's Ratings Vice President – Senior Analyst. "The
company continues to generate positive free cash flow and reduce
debt, which is lowering its leverage and strengthened its balance
sheet."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Weatherford's CFR to Ba2 reflects its conservative
financial policies, declining debt, and Moody's expectations the
company will continue to generate positive free cash flow and
improve its credit metrics. Despite a slowdown in certain of its
oilfield service markets, Weatherford has continued to generate
positive free cash flow and apply excess cash flow to debt
reduction, even while also repurchasing shares. In 2024, the
company implemented a capital allocation framework that includes a
dividend ($1 per share p.a., paid quarterly) starting in the third
quarter 2024 and a $500 million share repurchase program. The
company's business transformation and focus on efficiencies
improved its profit margins while oilfield services demand
rebounded from the lows experienced in 2020, allowing Weatherford
to continue to generate positive free cash flow in 2025, even as
revenue declined (down -13% YoY in the first half 2025). The
company benefits from sourcing ~80% of revenue outside of the US.
International and offshore markets for oilfield services have
experienced more favorable demand compared to the US market, where
the rig count has declined meaningfully in 2023-2025.

Weatherford is targeting gross leverage below 1x. Therefore,
Moody's expects the company's credit metrics to continue to improve
as it further reduces debt. The issuance of notes due 2033 and
repayment of notes due 2030 with the net proceeds and $100 million
of existing cash, reduces the company's gross leverage and improves
its debt maturity profile by reducing the principal amount of notes
due 2030 to a more manageable principal amount and extending the
maturity of a portion of the notes. As of June 30, 2025, leverage
was 1.7x, including Moody's analytical adjustments, which is low
compared to 'Ba' rated peers.

Weatherford benefits from its large scale (comparable to the
biggest oilfield services companies), a broad product range, and
significant geographic and customer diversification, with a
substantial portion of revenue coming from more stable
international markets. The company's numerous patented products and
technologies are well-known and widely used in the oilfield
services industry, providing competitive advantages and leading
market positions in several product categories.

Weatherford's SGL-1 rating reflects excellent liquidity through
2026, supported by its revolving credit facility, unrestricted cash
balance ($943 million as of June 30, 2025) and expected positive
free cash flow generation. Weatherford entered into a new five
year credit agreement in September 2025 that matures in September
2030 and provides for a $1 billion revolving credit facility and
letters of credit. (There were no borrowings under the prior credit
facility in place at the end of the second quarter 2025 and the
company had $412 million of letters of credit outstanding as of the
end of the second quarter 2025, including $259 million issued under
the old credit agreement and $153 million of additional letters of
credit under various bilateral agreements, some of which were
collateralized with restricted cash.) The credit agreement has
financial covenants that require the company to maintain at least
$250 million of liquidity (cash plus availability under the credit
facility), a minimum interest coverage ratio of 2.5x, a maximum
consolidated net leverage ratio (debt/EBITDA) of 3.5x and a maximum
consolidated net secured leverage ratio of 1.5x. Moody's expects
the company to maintain ample headroom for future compliance with
these covenants through the end of 2026. The next notes maturity is
the unsecured notes due in 2030.

The proposed notes are senior unsecured obligations of Weatherford
and will rank pari passu with the company's existing senior
unsecured notes due 2030 (also rated Ba3). The company's debt
capital structure includes obligations under the secured credit
agreement and the two issues of unsecured notes, which are all
obligations of Weatherford International Ltd. (Bermuda) as well as
other entities as borrowers (in the case of the revolving credit
facility) or a co-issuer (in the case of the notes). The
obligations under the credit facilities and have a secured claim to
substantially all of the personal property of Weatherford
International plc and the guarantors. The notes are rated Ba3, one
notch below the Ba2 CFR, because of the more senior priority-claim
secured credit facility debt in Weatherford's capital structure.

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Weatherford
will continue to execute on its financial policy, prioritizing debt
reduction and a strong balance sheet, and will generate positive
free cash flow and excellent liquidity, supported by significant
cash balances.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The CFR could be upgraded if Weatherford continues to successfully
achieve it business objectives (e.g., reducing costs and expanding
profit margins), generates positive free cash flow, and continued
to reduce debt (improving its credit metrics), and maintains
conservative financial policies supportive of a higher rating, with
debt/EBITDA leverage at or below 1. 5x. The CFR could be downgraded
if the company engages in debt-funded acquisitions, adopts more
aggressive financial policies or debt/EBITDA leverage rising above
3x, or a significant reduction in cash balances without the
corresponding reduction in leverage.

Weatherford International Ltd. (Bermuda) is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Weatherford International plc, which is incorporated
in Ireland, and is a diversified international provider of a wide
range of services and equipment to the global oil and gas
industry.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Oilfield
Services published in January 2023.

The net effect of any adjustments applied to rating factor scores
or scorecard outputs under the primary methodology(ies), if any,
was not material to the ratings addressed in this announcement.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

AEGEA SANEAMENTO: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 23, 2025, assigned its 'BB-' issuer
credit rating to Aegea Saneamento e Participacoes S.A. (Aegea), its
'BB-' issue rating and '3' recovery rating to Aegea Finance's
proposed notes.

The negative outlook reflects the company's pressured credit
metrics particularly in 2025, given its aggressive growth and
Brazil's high interest rates.

Aegea is Brazil's largest private sanitation company, with over 39
million clients, operating concessions and public-private
partnerships (PPPs) in 15 states. Through acquisitions, the company
has increased its scale, but also its leverage.

The company is proposing to issue 10-year senior unsecured blue
notes through its financing vehicle Aegea Finance S.a. r.l. (not
rated). The notes will be unconditionally and irrevocable
guaranteed by Aegea. Part of the proceeds will used to finance a
partial tender offer for its existing notes due 2029, and the
remainder to finance eligible investments under the notes'
framework.

Appetite for growth amid high-interest rates hinders free operating
cash flow (FOCF) and increases leverage.

Aegea has increased its debt to sustain growth and investments. In
2024, the company expanded its portfolio through new concessions
and secured full financing to address Águas do Rio's financial
obligations and fund its capital expenditure (capex) in the next
few years. Aguas do Rio's acquisition was completed in November
2021, and was Aegea's largest acquisition in the past few years,
with R$15.4 billion in concession fees and required investment of
about R$24 billion throughout the concession's term. The company
also won the auction to operate a sewage PPP in the state of
Paraná and the water and sewage concession in the state of Piauí
for R$1 billion. In 2025, Aegea started operating several
previously awarded concessions, won the concession to operate water
and sewage in the state of Para for R$1.8 billion in concession
fees, and announced the acquisition of the solid waste operations
of Ciclus Rio for R$1.1 billion. To support expansions and
operating improvements, S&P projects investment of approximately
R$24 billion between 2025 and 2027, leading to FOCF shortfall of
almost R$5 billion in 2025 and more than R$3 billion in 2026.

To support this robust growth, the company issued approximately
R$9.5 billion in debt in the first half of 2025. S&P said, "As a
result, we expect pressured credit metrics this year, with funds
from operations (FFO) to debt of 5%-10% and debt to EBITDA around
4.5x, considering Brazil's basic interest rates at 15%. We expect
these metrics to be 10%-15% and 4.0x, respectively, starting in
2026, given increasing cash flow and improving operating
performance of its concessions, especially Corsan, Aguas do Rio,
and Manaus, which are ramping up and should represent close to 80%
of the company's EBITDA in 2025."

The negative outlook on the rating reflects the company's
increasing leverage and large interest burden, combined with an
appetite for growth, stemming from a large number of auctions in
the coming quarters and increasing investment for the operating
improvement of the recently won concessions. S&P may downgrade
Aegea if it maintains an aggressive acquisitive strategy with no
rise in cash flow due to the delayed ramp-up of assets, preventing
deleveraging.

Aegea's portfolio has expanded at a remarkable pace and improved
its operating efficiency. Considering all recent acquisitions,
Aegea's portfolio has an average concession life of more than 30
years. The sanitation sector in Brazil benefits from stable cash
generation, resilient billed volumes, inflation-adjusted rates, and
the favorable regulatory framework. The latter, amended five years
ago, has been predictable, while no interventions have occurred
under it, thereby fostering investments in the sector.

Aegea's significant investment is helping margins to rise. For
instance, Corsan reported EBITDA margin of 66% in the first half of
2025, up from 49% in the same period of 2024, mainly driven by the
expansion of the sewage network and lower expenses, following the
floods in Rio Grande do Sul last year. However, the company still
faces operating and commercial challenges in blocks 1 and 4 of
Águas do Rio, particularly regarding high water loss rates.

In parallel to the proposed notes, Aegea has launched an optional
tender offer for its existing notes. Part of the proceeds of Aegea
Finance's senior unsecured notes will be used to repurchase up to
$250 million of its 6.75% notes due 2029 to extend its debt
maturity profile, as the proposed notes mature in January 2036. The
remaining proceeds will be used to fund eligible investments under
the notes' framework, labeled as blue. Aegea will fully and
unconditionally guarantee the notes. Therefore, the rating on the
proposed notes reflects the parent's credit quality and S&P views
that unsecured creditors would benefit from a significant recovery
under a hypothetical default scenario, with recovery rounded to
65%. This is part of the company's broader liability management
efforts to reduce debt cost and debt concentration particularly
between 2028 and 2030. In addition, Aegea is in the process of
issuing its 23rd local debentures for R$3.2 billion due 2032, which
will be used to finance the voluntary tender offer for the three
debentures maturing between 2028 and 2029.

S&P said, "We analyze Aegea on a consolidated basis. We incorporate
the figures for Águas do Rio 1 SPE S.A. and Águas do Rio 4 SPE
S.A. (collectively, Águas do Rio) and concessions acquired by
Aegea in April 2021, because of an integrated financial and
operational management of those assets, in Aegea's financial
figures. Additionally, we adjust our credit metrics to include
Parsan's debt, which was used to finance the acquisition of Corsan.
We view the Equity Support Agreement between Aegea and Parsan as
having characteristics of corporate guarantees. Moreover, as Aegea
consolidates Corsan's numbers, we incorporate both its debt and
financial performance into our adjusted metrics. As a result, we
start our analysis from reported gross debt of about R$48 billion
as of June 30, 2025. As debt adjustments, we consider the company's
lease agreements of about R$2.3 billion, R$1.5 billion in fees
related to older acquisitions, and about R$6 billion of preferred
stocks provided by minority shareholders. We also deduct its cash
position, as we believe it is available to pay down debt, reaching
the net debt of about R$56 billion by the end of 2025. The recent
restatement of Aegea's financial statements, due to revised
accounting treatment for unrealized profits on related party
transactions, does not impact our metrics as these adjustments
pertain to non-cash items.

"The negative outlook reflects Aegea's strained credit metrics in
2025, stemming from its aggressive growth trajectory in the form of
acquisitions and increasing investment in its recently acquired
concessions, amid Brazil's high interest rates, which consume cash
flows through higher debt servicing.

"We may downgrade Aegea in the next 18 months if its credit metrics
deviate from our base-case scenario, which assumes FFO to debt
above 10% and FFO cash interest coverage closer to 2.0x in 2026.
This could occur if the company acquires new concessions primarily
financed through debt, or if investment exceeds our projections,
while investment fails to bolster cash flow due to a delayed
ramp-up of assets and/or because of a more aggressive dividend
payout. In addition, persistently high interest rates could
increase refinancing costs or hinder the financing of Aegea's
substantial investment, potentially creating liquidity pressures.

"We could revise the outlook stable if the recent concessions
bolster the financial performance, resulting in cash flow exceeding
our base-case scenario, which the company would use to reduce debt.
This, coupled with declining interest rates, would also accelerate
the company's deleveraging, resulting in FFO to debt consistently
higher than 12% and FFO cash interest coverage above 2.0x."


BANCO DO BRASIL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings has affirmed Banco do Brasil S.A.'s (BB) long- and
short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings at Ba1 and
Not Prime, respectively, following the affirmation of the bank's
Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) and Adjusted BCA at ba1. Moody's
also affirmed the bank's long- and short-term local and foreign
currency Counterparty Risk Ratings at Baa3 and Prime-3,
respectively, and long- and short-term Counterparty Risk
Assessments (CRA) at Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr), respectively. The
outlook on the long-term bank deposit ratings remains stable.

In addition, Moody's also affirmed Banco do Brasil S.A. (Cayman)'s
(Cayman Branch) foreign currency senior unsecured debt and MTN
program ratings at Ba1 and (P)Ba1, respectively, foreign currency
preferred stock non-cumulative debt rating at B1 (hyb). Moody's
also affirmed the Cayman Branch's long- and short-term local and
foreign currency Counterparty Risk Ratings at Baa3 and Prime-3,
respectively, and long- and short-term Counterparty Risk
Assessments (CRA) at Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr), respectively. The
outlook on the senior unsecured rating remains stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In affirming BB's BCA of ba1, Moody's acknowledge its
well-established franchise as the second-largest bank by total
assets in the country in June 2025. This position is supported by a
diversified earnings structure, steady access to core retail
deposits, sound liquidity, and adequate capital buffer above
regulatory minimums over the past five years. The affirmation of
the BCA at ba1, however, also acknowledges recent challenges faced
by BB, particularly in its agribusiness loan portfolio, and
associated with the implementation of IFRS 9 accounting standards,
which Moody's sees as manageable by the bank.

About one-quarter of BB's loan book consists of low-risk exposures,
including loans to individuals through payroll loans and mortgage,
as well as loans to government-related entities supported by strong
receivables. These loan portfolios help mitigate challenges related
to the agribusiness portfolio and loans to small- and medium-sized
companies (SMEs) that accounted for 13.0% and 10.9% of gross loans,
respectively, in June 2025. While BB's granular loan book also
supports the generation of recurring earnings that enables the bank
to withstand periods of pressured profitability, revenues from
trading, service fees, and other products, including insurance and
investment banking, also contribute positively to bottom-line
results.

Amid the high interest rate cycle and strong volatility in
commodity prices over the past six months, BB's problem loan ratio,
measured as Stage 3 loans to gross loans, increased to 8.4% in June
2025, from 7.8% in March 2025, and the 90-day nonperforming loan
(NPL) ratio rose to 4.2%, from 3.9% in the same period. While this
deterioration in asset quality was primarily driven by the
agribusiness portfolio, it highlights BB's portfolio concentration
risk that exposes the bank to an increasing trend of judicial
recovery filings by producers, particularly in the soybean
industry. Accounting for more than one third of gross loans, the
agribusiness portfolio has also been affected by high interest
rates and the overleveraging of producers over the recent two
years. In addition, BB's problem loan volumes also rose among SME
borrowers facing financial strain from the country's elevated
interest rate environment, with 90-day NPL ratio reaching 10.6% of
total SME loans in June 2025. Despite these challenges, BB
maintained loan-loss reserves at 87.2% of Stage 3 loans and 7.2% of
gross loans, providing a cushion to absorb higher credit losses in
the coming quarters.

Despite estimates of strong demand for harvest financing in the
2025/26 season, BB's origination of new rural loans will likely be
more moderate as the bank reinforces its loan collection process
and enhances criteria for new credit disbursements as part of
ongoing efforts to restructure problematic loans. Moody's views
that a persistent scenario of weak asset quality could have
negative pressure on the bank's BCA in the next quarters.

The challenging asset risk environment has also hit BB's
profitability, with the net income to tangible assets ratio
declining to 0.9% in June 2025, from 1.7% in the previous year,
particularly as a result of a 59.4% increase in credit costs in the
12 months ended in June 2025. In the second half of 2025, BB's
profitability will likely remain constrained due to cautious loan
growth and persistently high funding and credit costs.

BB's capitalization, measured by Moody's ratio of tangible common
equity to risk-weighted assets, declined to 7.1% in June 2025 from
8.7% a year earlier, primarily due to loan growth of 8.9% during
the period. The recent decline in dividend payouts is expected to
help maintain capitalization at a stable level. Moody's also
expects BB's funding and liquidity profiles to remain solid over
the outlook horizon, supported by access to stable demand and
savings deposits through its nationwide branch network and its
status as a government-owned institution.

BB's Ba1 long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings, as
well as its foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating,
incorporate Moody's assessments of the highest degree of support
from the Government of Brazil (Ba1 stable), its main shareholder,
and the bank's systemic importance. However, this support does not
result in any rating uplift, as BB's BCA is already aligned with
Brazil's Ba1 sovereign rating. The senior unsecured ratings carry a
stable outlook, consistent with the outlook on the sovereign.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

An upgrade of BB's long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt
ratings is unlikely, as they are currently aligned with Brazil's
sovereign rating. This reflects the strong credit linkages between
the sovereign and the bank. BB's BCA could be upgraded if Brazil's
sovereign rating is raised and, simultaneously, the bank
demonstrates a material improvement in asset quality and
profitability, thereby continuing to support its loss-absorbing
capital buffers.

Conversely, downward pressure on BB's BCA could result from
sustained deterioration in asset quality and profitability metrics,
which would weaken the bank's capacity to absorb credit losses.
Given its status as a government-backed entity, BB's deposit and
debt ratings would also face downward pressure in the event of a
downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in November 2024.

BB's "Assigned BCA" score of ba1 is set two notches above the
"Financial Profile" initial score of ba3 to account for the
issuer's ample access to low-cost stable funding, strong position
of liquid assets and diversified loan book and earnings structure.

GOL LINHAS: Abra Pulls Plug on Deal, Ending Talks on Merger
-----------------------------------------------------------
Gabriel Araujo and Luciana Novaes Magalhaes at Reuters report that
airline group Abra has decided to terminate talks on a potential
merger between Brazilian carrier Gol, which it controls, and rival
Azul , a securities filing showed.

The move ends prospects for the creation of a dominant airline in
Latin America's largest economy, which would have held roughly 60%
of the domestic market, surpassing the local unit of Chile-based
LATAM Airlines (LTM.SN), opens new tab, according to Reuters.

Abra Group -- the majority investor in Gol and Colombia's Avianca
-- and Azul first signed a memorandum of understanding in January
aimed at combining the two carriers, following months of talks and
market speculation, the report relays.

However, Azul filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in May, a
move that analysts warned at the time would likely scupper the
potential merger with Gol, which in June emerged from its own
bankruptcy proceedings, the report discloses.

Azul's shares were up 18% in early afternoon trading in Sao Paulo,
while Gol's shares rose 5%, the report says.

                    Industry Struggles

"The parties have not meaningfully discussed or progressed a
possible business combination transaction for several months as a
result of Azul's focus on its Chapter 11 proceeding," Abra told
Azul in a letter, according to Gol's filing, the report discloses.

Both companies sought bankruptcy protection as the industry
grappled with debt burdens, a steep decline in traffic during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and aircraft delivery delays, the report says.

Abra noted that the January memorandum came "in another scenario
and at another moment for the companies," the report relays.

Gol and Azul also terminated their 2024 codeshare deal for
cross-selling tickets and integrating their loyalty programs, which
had been under intense scrutiny from antitrust watchdog CADE. Abra,
however, left the door open for future talks, the report notes.

"We continue to believe in the merits of a business combination of
Azul and Gol and, as such, Abra is ready, willing and available to
engage with the relevant stakeholders," it added.

In a separate filing, Azul confirmed the talks had ended and
reaffirmed its "commitment to strengthening its capital structure."
Azul expects to exit bankruptcy in early 2026, the report relays.

                       Competition Concerns

The potential merger had raised competition concerns and criticism
from LATAM, though some experts labeled it a "necessary evil" for a
financially healthy sector in Brazil, where costs are high and air
travel remains restricted, the report relays.

"We never considered a scenario in which such a merger would be
approved without mitigation measures. No country in the world would
do that," LATAM Brasil CEO Jerome Cadier told Reuters.

He added that the development did not change LATAM's expectations
for the local market, the report discloses.

Brazil's government, which initially supported the deal to prevent
either company from failing but later reversed its stance on
competition worries, welcomed the end of the talks, the report
says.

"The outcome is the result of the strengthening of the airlines and
the growth of aviation in Brazil," Ports and Airports Minister
Silvio Costa Filho wrote on X, the report relays.

                   About Gol Linhas

GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. provides scheduled and
non-scheduled air transportation services for passengers and cargo;
and maintenance services for aircraft and components in Brazil and
internationally.  The company offers Smiles, a frequent flyer
program to approximately 20.5 million members, allowing clients to
accumulate and redeem miles.  It operates a fleet of 146 Boeing
737
aircraft with 674 daily flights.  The company was founded in 2000
and is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. and its affiliates and its
subsidiaries voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 protection (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 24-10118) on Jan. 25, 2024.

GOL Linhas estimated $1 billion to $10 billion in assets as of the
bankruptcy filing.

The Debtors tapped Milbank LLP as counsel, Seabury Securities LLC
as restructuring advisor, financial advisor and investment banker,
Alixpartners, LLP, as financial advisor, and Hughes Hubbard & Reed
LLP as aviation related counsel.  Kroll Restructuring
Administration LLC is the Debtors' claims agent.

In August 2025, Moody's Ratings assigned a B3 corporate family
rating to Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. (Gol) in connection
with its post-bankruptcy exit financing. At the same time, Moody's
assigned a B3 rating to the $2.1 billion backed senior secured
first lien notes issued by Gol Finance (LuxCo) on June 6, 2025 and
due in 2030. The outlook for both entities is stable.




===============
C O L O M B I A
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BANCO AGRARIO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Agrario de Colombia S.A.'s
(Agrario) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+' and its Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb'. The
Rating Outlook for the IDR is Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

Support Driven IDRs: Banco Agrario de Colombia's IDRs are driven by
its 'bb+' Government Support Rating (GSR), which reflects Fitch's
assessment of the propensity and ability of support from the bank's
sole shareholder, the Colombian government (BB+/Negative), if
needed. The Negative Outlook on Agrario's IDRs mirrors the Outlook
on Colombia's IDRs. The bank's assigned Viability Rating (VR) is in
line with its implied VR based on its business, risk and financial
profile.

State Ownership: Fitch's support assessment considers with high
importance that Agrario is a policy bank fully owned by the state
through Grupo Bicentenario, a government holding of the Ministry of
Finance. Although the Colombian government does not explicitly
fully guarantee all of Agrario's liabilities, the entity has many
operational and financial synergies with the public administration
and is view by Fitch as a factor with high importance.

Important Policy Role: Agrario has a key policy role in the
development of the agricultural sector, small and medium
enterprises and the government plan of promoting the "Popular
Economy" resulting in an equalization of its GSR with the
sovereign's 'BB+' Long-Term IDR. The GSR also reflects Agrario's
role in Grupo Bicentenario, the holding that consolidates public
sector financial entities.

Pressured Asset Quality: Agrario's asset quality remains pressured,
reflecting weaker borrower repayment capacity since 2023 amid a
prolonged unfavorable operating environment and climate-related
shocks, which have had a greater impact given the bank's high
exposure to agricultural lending. However, by 1H25 asset quality
appears to have reached an inflection point: the 90+ days past due
loans (PDL) ratio declined to 6.8% from 7.3% in 2024, though it
remains above the four-year average of 6.0%.

This improvement reflects the bank's actions to contain PDLs,
including tightened underwriting standards, strengthened
collections and recoveries, and borrower support measures such as
loan modifications and restructurings. As a result, PDL's are not
expected to further deteriorate at YE 2025.

Recovery in Profitability: As Fitch expected, Agrario's
profitability is recovering as funding costs fall and asset quality
improves. By 1H25, operating profit to risk-weighted assets (RWA)
rose to 5.5% from 3.2% in YE 2024, though below the 6.5%.
four-years average. Agrario's profitability ratio exceeds the 2%
system average, supported by low RWA density. Fitch expects
profitability to stabilize around 4.5% for YE 2025, consistent with
the rating category.

Adequate Capitalization: Agrario's common equity Tier 1 (CET1)
ratio improved to 15.9% at 1H25 from 14.6% at YE 2024, mainly
reflecting the improvement in profitability, and a slight decrease
in RWA. Fitch does not anticipate significant pressure on
capitalization metrics in YE 2025 and believes capitalization will
remain adequate, under moderate asset growth and stable earnings.
Fitch believes Agrario's capital position is commensurate with its
rating level and risk exposure.

Sound Liquidity: Agrario's sound liquidity position is reflected in
its loans-to-deposit ratio of 99.5% at 1H25, which has improved as
deposits grew at a higher pace compared to loans. Historically,
customer deposits have covered almost two-thirds of the bank's
funding needs. Fitch expects liquidity to remain sound as the bank
benefits from an ample and stable deposit base and access to local
funds from other financial institutions. The loans to deposit ratio
is expected to be around 104% at YE 2025, considering higher growth
pace of loans over deposits.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Agrario's GSR and IDRs could be downgraded if the sovereign
rating is downgraded.

- Agrario's GSR and IDRs could be downgraded if Fitch perceives a
decrease in the bank's policy role for the government, but this
scenario is unlikely over the medium term.

- The VR could be downgraded if a significant deterioration of the
bank's asset quality and/or profitability ratios result in a
sustained decrease in the CET1 ratio below 12%.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Agrario's GSR and IDRs could be upgraded in the event of a
similar action in Colombia's sovereign ratings, absent any change
in Fitch's view of the government's propensity to provide support
to this bank.

- The VR could be upgraded by the confluence of improvements in the
operating environment and asset quality that results in an
operating profit to RWA ratio consistently above 4.75%.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

Fitch has assigned an Earnings and Profitability score of 'bb+'
that is below the 'bbb' category implied score due to the following
adjustment reason: Earnings stability (negative).

Public Ratings with Credit Linkage to other ratings

Banco Agrario's ratings are driven by Colombia's sovereign rating
(BB+/Negative).

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                      Rating           Prior
   -----------                      ------           -----
Banco Agrario de
Colombia S.A.      LT IDR             BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                   ST IDR             B   Affirmed   B
                   LC LT IDR          BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                   LC ST IDR          B   Affirmed   B
                   Viability          bb  Affirmed   bb
                   Government Support bb+ Affirmed   bb+


BANCOLDEX: Fitch Affirms BB+ LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de Comercio Exterior de Colombia
S.A.'s (Bancoldex) Foreign and Local Currency Long-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+'. The Rating Outlook is Negative.
Fitch has also affirmed Bancoldex's National ratings at 'AAA(col)'
and 'F1+(col)' and its subsidiary Fiduciaria Colombiana de Comercio
Exterior S.A.'s (Fiducoldex) National Scale ratings at 'AAA(col)'
and 'F1+(col)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

Government Support Drives Ratings: Bancoldex's IDRs are driven by
its Government Support Rating (GSR), which is equalized with
Colombia's Long-Term IDR (BB+ /Negative). The ratings reflect
Fitch's assessment of the Colombian government's high propensity
and ability to provide timely support to Bancoldex, if needed.
Fitch also believes Bancoldex plays a prominent policy role, as it
is an integral arm of the state in implementing economic
development policies.

State Ownership: Fitch's support assessment considers with high
importance that Bancoldex is a policy bank fully owned by the state
through Grupo Bicentenario, a government holding of the Ministry of
Finance. Although the Colombian government does not explicitly
fully guarantee all Bancoldex's liabilities, the entity has many
operational and financial synergies with the public administration,
which Fitch views as a 'high importance' factor.

Policy Bank Role: Bancoldex's ratings reflect its high strategic
importance in Colombia for promoting small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) and larger commercial and corporates, enhancing
competitiveness and fostering foreign trade. As a development bank,
it primarily provides wholesale funds and guarantees to commercial
banks and other non-bank financial institutions, and offers direct
credit lines to SMEs and corporates to promote economic growth.

Development Role Explains Financial Performance: Bancoldex's
financial profile has no direct implications for its ratings. Its
asset quality is aligned with its development bank model and recent
issuance of direct loans. Bancoldex's 30 days Past Due Loans (PDLs)
ratio rose modestly to 3.7% at June 25 (3.5% at December 24) due to
the SME loans. These carry higher risk compared to its development
loans, which remained relatively stable amid prepayments from
financial institutions. Its operating profit to RWA ratio declined
(2.9% at June 25 vs. 3.5% at December 24), reflecting weaker net
interest performance and higher cost-to-revenue, despite a solid
and increasing non-interest contribution and lower Loan Impairment
Charges (LICs).

Comfortable Capital Position and Diversified Funding: Capital
buffers remain a key strength. As of June 2025, Bancoldex' common
equity Tier 1 ratio (CET1) increased to 29.6% (2024: 28.8%).
Capital ratios improved further due to retained earnings and lower
risk-weighted assets. Bancoldex's funding mix shifted toward a more
deposit-centric profile while remaining diversified, reducing
reliance on bank borrowings and market debt. Liquidity is supported
by a sizable high-quality securities portfolio, predominantly
Colombian government bonds.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Bancoldex's GSR and IDRs could be downgraded if the sovereign
rating is downgraded;

- Although not a baseline scenario, Bancoldex's ratings could
change if Fitch perceives a decrease in the company's strategic
importance to the government's public policies, such as a shift in
its countercyclical role or supporting commercial companies either
directly or through wholesale loans.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Bancoldex's GSR and IDRs could be upgraded in the event of a
similar action on Colombia's sovereign ratings, absent any change
in Fitch's view of the government's propensity to provide support
to this bank;

- National ratings have no upside potential because they are at the
highest level in the national rating scale.

SUBSIDIARIES & AFFILIATES: KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fiducoldex's National Ratings reflect the support they would
receive from Bancoldex in case of need, mainly based on Fitch's
opinion of the entity's high strategic role for Bancoldex's
business model and the reputational and franchise implications from
a subsidiary default. Fiducoldex's synergies with its parent and
respective role in executing the group's long-term strategy as well
as alignment with central government are also important factors.

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Fiducoldex's ratings will reflect any negative rating action
taken on its main shareholder, Bancoldex, and any change in Fitch's
assessment on the propensity and/or ability of the parent to
provide support.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Fiducoldex's National Scale Ratings are at the highest level on
the national scale and therefore they cannot be upgraded.

Public Ratings with Credit Linkage to other ratings

Bancoldex's ratings are support driven from Colombian government.

Fiducoldex's ratings are support driven from Bancoldex.

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                       Rating           Prior
   -----------                       ------           -----
Banco de Comercio
Exterior de
Colombia S.A.       LT IDR             BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                    ST IDR             B   Affirmed   B
                    LC LT IDR          BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                    LC ST IDR          B   Affirmed   B
                    Natl LT       AAA(col) Affirmed   AAA(col)
                    Natl ST       F1+(col) Affirmed   F1+(col)
                    Government Support bb+ Affirmed   bb+

Fiduciaria
Colombiana de
Comercio Exterior
S.A. – Fiducoldex   Natl LT       AAA(col) Affirmed   AAA(col)
                    Natl ST       F1+(col) Affirmed   F1+(col)


FINANCIERA DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDRs, Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional,
S.A.'s (FDN) Long-Term (LT) Foreign (FC) and Local Currency (LC)
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+' and the bank's Government
Support Rating (GSR) at 'bb+'. The Rating Outlook for the LT IDRs
is Negative.

Fitch has also affirmed FDN's National LT and Short-Term Ratings at
'AAA(col)' and 'F1+(col)', respectively. The Outlook for the
National ratings is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

Government Support Drives Ratings: FDN's IDRs and national ratings
are based on the support it would receive from the Colombian
government, if required, as reflected in its GSR of 'bb+'. Fitch
considers the entity to have a high policy role as it is integral
to the state in implementing infrastructure development policies.

State Ownership: Fitch's support assessment considers with high
importance that the Colombian government is FDN's majority
shareholder through Grupo Bicentenario and that the company has
operational and financial synergies with the public administration.
However, the government does not extend an explicit guarantee on
all its debt.

Government Support Ability: The government's current ability to
support the bank is reflected in the sovereign's IDR of 'BB+' and
its Negative Outlook. The GSR indicates the minimum level to which
the entity's LT IDRs could fall if Fitch does not change its view
on potential sovereign support. FDN's national ratings are at the
highest level on the ratings scale and indicate relative rankings
of creditworthiness within Colombia. The national ratings are based
on potential sovereign support, if needed.

Policy Role: Fitch considers FDN's policy role with high importance
in the support assessment. The bank acts as the government's
financial arm to structure and finance public infrastructure
projects. The entity is heavily involved in the development of the
country's biggest road concession programs and some of the largest
infrastructure projects in a wide variety of sectors, which are
expected to grow in the short to medium term.

Financial Profile: FDN's ratings are based solely on Fitch's
assessment of expected government support. The bank's performance
has been relatively stable over the years, supported by solid
capital metrics and good loan performance, which in turn underpin
its adequate asset quality. As of June 2025, the 30-days PDL ratio
slightly increase to 0.14%.

Like other development banks, FDN's loan portfolio shows
concentration per debtor, but this is partially offset by good
payment behavior and adequate loan loss allowances. By 2Q25, FDN's
annualized operating profit to risk-weighted assets ratio improved
to 3.5% from 3.1% in 2024 but is still below the 2021-2024 average
(3.9%). This trend is explained by higher net interest margin due
to lower funding costs and relatively stable loan impairment
charges.

As of June 2025, FDN's common equity tier 1 to risk-weighted assets
ratio remains high at 17.2%, slightly below 18.1% at YE24.
Capitalization is considered robust and supports FDN's expected
high loan growth. Bilateral loans, local bond issuances, external
bank lines and term deposit certificates to institutional investors
support FDN's funding profile. As of June 2025, customers deposits
grew by 61.5% compared to December 2024. Fitch believes that FDN
will continue to maintain a solid financial profile, supported by
expected growth on loans and assets with strong capital.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- FDN's GSR and IDRs could be downgraded if the sovereign rating is
downgraded;

- FDN's GSR, IDRs and national ratings could be downgraded if Fitch
perceives a decrease in the entity's policy role for the national
government, but this scenario is unlikely over the medium term.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- FDN's GSR and IDRs could be upgraded in the event of a similar
action in Colombia's sovereign ratings, absent any change in
Fitch's view of the government's propensity to provide support to
FDN;

- The national ratings have no upside potential because they are at
the highest level on the national rating scale.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

Debt Ratings: Fitch rates FDN's local senior debt issuance at the
same level as its National LT rating because the notes' likelihood
of default matches the company's.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

FDN's senior notes' national ratings are sensitive to any changes
in FDN's national ratings.

Public Ratings with Credit Linkage to other ratings

FDN's ratings are support-driven by the Colombian government.

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                   Rating           Prior
   -----------                   ------           -----
Financiera de
Desarrollo
Nacional S.A.   LT IDR             BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                ST IDR             B   Affirmed   B
                LC LT IDR          BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                LC ST IDR          B   Affirmed   B
                Natl LT       AAA(col) Affirmed   AAA(col)
                Natl ST       F1+(col) Affirmed   F1+(col)
                Government Support bb+ Affirmed   bb+

   senior
   unsecured    Natl LT       AAA(col) Affirmed   AAA(col)


FINDETER: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Currency LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Financiera de Desarrollo Territorial
S.A.'s (Findeter) Long- and Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+' and 'B', respectively. The
Rating Outlook is Negative, in line with that of the Colombian
sovereign. Fitch has also affirmed Findeter´s National Long- and
Short-Term Rating at 'AAA(col)' and 'F1+' respectively, with a
Stable Outlook for the Long -Term Rating.

Key Rating Drivers

Government Support Drives Ratings: Findeter's IDRs are driven by
its Government Support Rating (GSR), which is equalized to
Colombia's Long-Term IDR (BB+/Negative). The ratings reflect
Fitch's assessment of the Colombian government's propensity and
ability to provide timely support to Findeter if needed. Colombia's
sovereign rating reflects its ability to support the development
bank, while its propensity to support is reflected in Findeter's
state ownership and policy bank role.

The GSR indicates the minimum level to which the entity's Long-Term
IDRs could fall if Fitch does not change its view on potential
sovereign support. Findeter's National Ratings are at the highest
level in the ratings scale, reflecting potential sovereign support
if needed. These ratings indicate relative creditworthiness within
Colombia.

State Ownership: Fitch's support assessment considers with high
importance that Findeter is fully owned by the state through Grupo
Bicentenario, a government holding of the Ministry of Finance.
Although the Colombian government does not explicitly guarantee all
of Findeter's liabilities, Fitch views its ownership as long term
and strategic.

Bank's Policy Role: Findeter's ratings reflect its policy role of
high importance. The entity is an integral arm of the state,
implementing the economic development policies of the National
Development Plan and financing regional and urban infrastructure.

As a development bank, Findeter primarily structures general
obligation loans to supervised financial institutions and, direct
lines generally backed by promissory notes from infrastructure
projects. Consistent with the National Development Plan for
2022-2026, Findeter grants direct loans to special-purpose vehicles
structured for investment projects in eligible sectors. This
further supports Fitch's view on Findeter's relevant policy role.

Development Role Explains Financial Performance: As of June 2025,
past due loans (PDLs) over 30 days totaled 2.5%, surpassing the
average of the last four years, reflecting the deterioration of a
direct exposure of an electricity sector borrower. By the same
date, the operating profit-to-risk-weighted assets (RWA) ratio fell
to -0.38%, from 1.8% in December 2024. Operating profit weakened
due to a 290% rise in loan impairment charges, largely explained to
that single-name exposure. Profitability was further pressured by a
sustained narrowing of the net interest margin amid monetary easing
and 2024-2025 rate cuts, alongside a negative net result from
trading and derivatives.

Strong Capital and Improved Loan-to-Deposit: As of June 2025, the
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio was 21.2%, above the result of
December 2024 (19,75%) and compares favorably with local and
international peers. The loans-to-customer deposits ratio improved
to 113,2%, below the four-year average of 147.2%, but still exceeds
the banking sector average. Following the maturity of two bonds in
2024, term deposit certificates now account for nearly 80% of total
funding, with multilaterals as the next largest source.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- Findeter's GSR and IDRs could be downgraded if the sovereign
rating is downgraded;

- Findeter's GSR, IDRs, and National Scale Ratings could also be
downgraded if Fitch perceives a decline in the bank's policy role
for the government, such as a shift in its role of transforming the
regions by financing different sectors of the economy. However,
this scenario is unlikely over the medium term.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- Findeter's GSR and IDRs could be upgraded in the event of a
similar action on Colombia's sovereign ratings, without any change
in Fitch's view of the government's propensity to provide support
to this bank;

- National Ratings have no upside potential because they are at the
highest level in the national rating scale.

Public Ratings with Credit Linkage to other ratings

The ratings are support-driven. This entity's ratings are linked to
those of the Colombian Sovereign.

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt                     Rating            Prior
   -----------                     ------            -----
Financiera de
Desarrollo
Territorial S.A.
– Findeter         LT IDR             BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                   ST IDR             B   Affirmed   B
                   LC LT IDR          BB+ Affirmed   BB+
                   LC ST IDR          B   Affirmed   B
                   Natl LT       AAA(col) Affirmed   AAA(col)
                   Natl ST       F1+(col) Affirmed   F1+(col)
                   Government Support bb+ Affirmed   bb+




===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================

COSTA RICA: Moody's Hikes Issuer Ratings to 'Ba2', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Ratings has upgraded the Government of Costa Rica's
long-term local and foreign currency issuer and foreign currency
senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba2 from Ba3. The outlook has been
changed to stable from positive.

The upgrade reflects Moody's views that prospects for the
sovereign's fiscal and debt metrics have improved meaningfully,
underpinned by continued progress on establishing a track record of
fiscal discipline alongside robust economic growth. The
government's adherence to expenditure ceilings and proactive policy
management have accelerated the decline in the debt burden, even as
the country approaches the February 2026 general election.
Moreover, debt affordability will steadily improve as government
interest payments have begun to decline even in nominal terms,
buffering the sovereign's fiscal strength.

The stable outlook reflects a balance of upside and downside risks
to Costa Rica's Ba2 rating. The sovereign is making progress to
improve institutions and governance strength backed by stronger
debt and liquidity management, and continued compliance with fiscal
rules embedded in the medium-term fiscal framework. Moody's expects
that robust, albeit slower, economic growth will continue to
support the decline in the government debt burden. However, Costa
Rica's still-low tax base has seen limited benefits from the
economy's robust growth, and as external growth drivers subside due
to the impact of global tariffs on external demand, economic
activity in Costa Rica will be subject to downside risks. Should
economic activity decelerate more than Moody's expects, this could
have a negative impact on government revenue growth, posing
challenges to the fiscal consolidation trajectory outlined in the
medium-term fiscal framework. In addition, failure by the
Legislative Assembly to approve external market financing, or the
continued approval of new tax exemptions, would further complicate
fiscal consolidation efforts and heighten financing risks.

Costa Rica's local and foreign currency country ceilings have been
raised to Baa1 from Baa2 and to Baa3 from Ba1, respectively. The
four-notch gap between the local currency ceiling and the sovereign
rating reflects limited government intervention in the economy,
high predictability and reliability of institutions, overall low
political risk and relatively contained external imbalances. The
Baa3 foreign-currency ceiling, two notches below the local currency
ceiling, reflects the economy's moderate level of external
indebtedness, open capital account and a low level of policy
effectiveness.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE UPGRADE TO Ba2

STRONG COMPLIANCE WITH EXPENDITURE CEILINGS WILL HELP ACCELERATE
THE DECLINE IN GOVERNMENT DEBT

Costa Rica's fiscal consolidation is anchored by a structural shift
to sustained primary surpluses and robust real GDP growth,
resulting in an eight percentage point decline in public debt from
its 67.6% of GDP peak in 2021 to 59.8% in 2024. The authorities
have raised the primary balance by over three percentage points of
GDP, compared to pre-pandemic levels, through significant spending
cuts and increased revenues from the 2018 tax reform.

Despite one-off effects that widened the fiscal deficit in 2024,
debt fell below 60% of GDP owing to robust economic growth. The
primary surplus narrowed in 2024 to 2.3% of GDP from 2.8% in 2023
at the general government level. Measures such as the public
employment law that restricts wage increases and ongoing tax
administration efforts are in place to support a widening of
primary surpluses, and 2025 fiscal results reflect substantial
expenditure restraint. Moody's forecasts the general government
primary surplus will widen to 2.6% of GDP in 2025 from 2.3% in
2024, implying a lower overall fiscal deficit of 2.2% of GDP in
2025 from 2.8% in 2024.

Medium term fiscal consolidation is mostly reliant on spending
decreases that are likely to come from a slow reduction in the wage
bill based on measures adopted in recent years and continued
compliance with expenditure ceilings under the fiscal rule. As a
result, Moody's forecasts that general government primary surpluses
are likely to reach 3% of GDP in 2026-27. Public debt will fall
below 55% of GDP by 2027, increasing the sovereign's ability to
respond to negative shocks.

DEBT AFFORDABILITY WILL STEADILY IMPROVE, BUFFERING THE SOVEREIGN'S
FISCAL STRENGTH

Costa Rica's borrowing costs have continued to decline and will
support favorable debt and interest cost dynamics. Debt management
reforms, including the unification of debt management functions and
centralization of cash holdings, have helped reduce domestic
borrowing costs. The new market makers program has increased
liquidity in the sovereign debt market. There has been a marked
downward shift in the sovereign's domestic yield curve that in 2024
allowed the sovereign to lengthen the average maturity of domestic
debt to 7.0 years from 6.3 in 2023 without a significant increase
in funding costs.

In 2025, the authorities have focused their liability management
efforts on decreasing the overall cost of debt without shortening
average maturities. The substantial decrease in domestic and
external yields is supporting higher debt affordability.
Consequently, interest payments on debt have begun declining this
year both in absolute and relative terms. In the first six months
of 2025, interest expenditure fell 4.2% in nominal terms compared
to the same period in 2024. Moody's forecasts the general
government interest-to-revenue ratio will decline to 17% in 2025
from 18.5% in 2024, and will ease further to 15.9% in 2026,
supporting an improvement in Costa Rica's fiscal strength.
Moreover, the approval of the constitutional reform enabling
greater access to external financing would further reduce the
sovereign's reliance on the domestic market, broaden the investor
base, and potentially lower the sovereign's cost of funding by
facilitating benchmark-sized issuances in international markets.
This structural improvement would reinforce the downward trajectory
of interest expenditures and support debt sustainability over the
medium term.

ROBUST GROWTH IS SET TO SLOW BUT WILL REMAIN AMONG THE STRONGEST IN
THE REGION, SUPPORTING BENIGN DEBT DYNAMICS

Real GDP grew 4.3% in 2024, driven by exports, inward FDI, and
strong private consumption. Costa Rica remains one of the
fastest-growing economies in Latin America and among 'Ba'-rated
sovereigns globally. Through 2025, growth will have averaged 5.1%
since 2021, outpacing regional and global peers even though Costa
Rica has comparatively higher income levels. Entrenched
macroeconomic stability, a well-educated and highly skilled labor
force, the country's proximity to the US, and a pro-business
regulatory framework that supports a benign business environment
with an absence of political polarization, continue to make Costa
Rica an attractive destination for FDI, and support the sovereign
credit profile.

Moody's forecasts real GDP growth will converge with potential,
slowing to 3.5% in 2025 and remain around that level in 2026–27.
The slowdown reflects the impact of the 15% tariff imposed by the
US and softer global demand that is likely to have a moderating
effect on activity in the country's export-oriented sectors. Half
of Costa Rica's exports of goods and services are bound to the US,
which is also the source of about two-thirds of Costa Rica's FDI.
Even so, economic growth will remain supportive of a gradual but
steady decline in debt ratios that is likely to accelerate as the
fiscal deficit narrows.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The risks around the baseline scenario that supports a Ba2 rating
are balanced.

On the upside, robust economic growth and the authorities'
continued commitment to expenditure restraint could lead to a
faster decline in the government debt burden, improving fiscal
strength more than Moody's currently envision. Stronger debt and
liquidity management and continued compliance with fiscal rules
embedded in the medium-term fiscal framework could support a more
rapid decrease in funding costs that enhances debt affordability.
Should political support grow for revenue-increasing tax reforms,
fiscal performance could strengthen more than Moody's forecasts.

On the downside, softer economic activity could result in revenue
decreases, jeopardizing the fiscal consolidation plan. Costa Rica's
still-low tax base has seen limited benefits from the economy's
robust growth and as external growth drivers subside due to the
impact of global tariffs on external demand, economic activity in
Costa Rica will be subject to downside risks. Since the pandemic in
2020, Costa Rica's growth has been led by stronger economic
activity in the free trade zones than in the broader economy. This
has led to a two-speed economy that has not resulted in a material
improvement in tax revenues, which at around 13.5% of GDP lag
behind the tax burden in countries with similar income levels.
Moreover, should economic activity decelerate more than Moody's
expects, this could have a detrimental impact on government revenue
growth, making the fiscal consolidation push more reliant on
expenditure cuts, rather than limiting expenditure growth as is
currently planned.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Costa Rica's ESG Credit Impact Score of CIS-3 reflects the
country's moderate exposure to environmental and social risk. Its
governance profile remains moderately weak due to its track record
of slow policymaking process that at times limits policy
effectiveness and reforms.

The E-3 issuer profile score on environmental risk is related to
physical climate risk. Lower crop yields because of weather events
can harm the agricultural export sector and tourism revenues may be
affected by wildfires, floods and increased storm severity.

The S-3 issuer profile score on social risk reflects labor and
income, housing, and health and safety risks. Social considerations
historically were not material to Costa Rica's credit profile given
a long history of stable governments and democratic institutions
but attempts to reduce fiscal deficits have encountered significant
social resistance in prior years. Popular demands to reduce
perceived inequalities and high rates of violence will continue to
constrain domestic policy choices.

The G-3 issuer profile score on governance risk is related to the
political inability of several administrations to address a fiscal
crisis that led to substantial debt accumulation. Although budget
management was weak, the authorities are slowly building a track
record of credibility as fiscal deficits narrow. Governance risks
are tempered by a very favorable institutional structure that
safeguards democratic processes and upholds the respect for
contracts.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 29,892 (2024) (also known as Per
Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 4.3% (2024) (also known as GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 0.8% (2024)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.6% (2024) (also known as Fiscal
Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.3% (2024) (also known as External
Balance)

External debt/GDP: 40.7% (2024)

Economic resiliency: baa2

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans)
has been recorded since 1983.

On September 22, 2025, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Costa Rica, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have not materially changed. The
issuer's institutions and governance strength, have not materially
changed. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its
debt profile, has materially increased. The issuer has become less
susceptible to event risks.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Policy continuity under a new administration that maintains the
current fiscal trajectory by preserving primary surpluses and
existing consolidation measures, as well as the current debt
management strategy to improve debt affordability, could lead to an
upgrade. Additionally, progress on reforms that enhance external
financing flexibility and complement establishing a track record of
low fiscal deficits could exert upward pressure on the ratings.

Costa Rica's ratings could face downward pressure if liquidity and
financing constraints re-emerge, or if a reversal of fiscal policy
leads to wider fiscal deficits that deviate significantly from the
medium-term fiscal framework, resulting in an upward debt
trajectory. Given the country's history of political gridlock
hindering reforms and the prompt adoption of corrective fiscal
measures, downward pressure on the sovereign's credit profile could
also result from legislative deadlock, lack of timely approval of
external financing, or political inability to support measures that
have led to continued improvements in debt metrics.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereigns
published in November 2022.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology
used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

The net effect of any adjustments applied to rating factor scores
or scorecard outputs under the primary methodology(ies), if any,
was not material to the ratings addressed in this announcement.




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Faces Challenges in Growing AI Capabilities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that while the Dominican Republic is among
the countries lagging in investment in artificial intelligence,
other nations have assigned regulatory roles to this technology.

This is the case in Albania, which has just appointed AI "Diella"
as Minister of Public Procurement, to ensure that tenders are "100%
incorruptible" and expenditures are "100% legible" for the public,
according to Dominican Today.

Other countries have taken similar steps, creating ministerial or
Government positions dedicated to AI or digital technologies, the
report notes.  Still, without full ministerial authority, the
United Arab Emirates has a "Ministry of State for Artificial
Intelligence, Digital Economy and Remote Working" with Omar Al
Olama. At the same time, France appointed Clara Chappaz as
Secretary of State (or Minister Delegate) for Artificial
Intelligence and Digital Technologies, the report relays.

These steps show a trend: your governments are creating important
roles for AI, which can be revolutionary and make governments more
efficient, but it also increases risks: giving machines human
functions is inherently high risk, but these risks are greater when
we assign them public functions, the report notes.

The challenge this represents for the Dominican Republic is
significant because the problem is not only that this trend forces
the country to invest in technology to overcome its lag, but that
this must be accompanied by the talent required to manage this
technology and regulations that mitigate the risks, the report
discloses.

In particular, the country must prepare to prevent the
technological and governance gap from widening, the report says.

Failure to do what is necessary in these areas could lead the
country to become even more dependent on external standards imposed
by technological powers, the report relays.

Furthermore, we must ensure that, as AI begins to improve
efficiency in public and private management in other countries
(from tax administration to industrial policy), the competitiveness
gap does not widen to our detriment, the report notes.  This means
that, in trade, foreign investment, and talent attraction, the
country could lose appeal compared to countries that already use AI
to accelerate processes, reduce costs, and generate predictability,
the report relays.

As wisdom warns, the times give it the strength of the
unquestionable: "The country advances with weary steps in a race
where artificial intelligence is already a hurricane's wind, and it
fears that, by staying in its wake, it will not be able to reap the
rewards or avoid the storms," the report adds.

                 About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district. Luis Rodolfo
Abinader Corona is the current president of the nation.

TCR-LA reported in April 2019 that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic was raised
to 'BB' in December 2022 with stable outlook.  Moody's credit
rating for Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 in August 2023
with the outlook changed to positive.  Fitch, in December 2023,
affirmed the Dominican Republic's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' and revised the outlook to positive.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============

JAMAICA: S&P Raises LongTerm Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 25, 2025, raised its long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica to
'BB' from 'BB-', and its transfer and convertibility assessment to
'BB+' from 'BB'.  At the same time, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its
'B' short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings
on Jamaica.  The outlook is positive.

Outlook

The positive outlook reflects S&P Global Ratings' expectation that
continued primary fiscal surpluses will let the government meet its
fiscal responsibility law debt target, likely ahead of schedule.
This would demonstrate its decade-long commitment to effective and
predictable fiscal policymaking. At the same time, we expect the
government's debt burden will decrease.

Downside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable during the next six-18
months if we believed changing fiscal policy would lead to larger,
sustained deficits over the forecast horizon, and if no other
rating assessments improved; or if the economy fails to perform as
expected, weakening the country's external position.

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could raise the ratings over the next six-18 months
if Jamaica's debt burden improves as its interest-to-revenues ratio
decreases, and if we expect this improvement will be sustained
during the forecast horizon. We could also raise the ratings if the
economic growth rate improves and converges with that of peers at a
similar level of economic development."

Rationale

Institutional and economic profile: Institutions are stronger while
growth is expected to remain mild

The support across political parties and many economic sectors of
society for a fiscal policy focused on debt reduction that was
evident during the recent election suggests broad policy consensus
that has become embedded in Jamaica's political culture and in its
governing institutions over the past decade. S&P believes that the
re-elected government, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), will remain
committed to its legislatively enshrined debt-to-GDP ceiling (60%)
during its third consecutive term in office. This commitment
follows a track record of adherence to large government primary
surpluses and reducing government debt. Jamaica is the only one of
the 141 sovereigns rated by S&P Global Ratings that has achieved an
annual primary fiscal surplus above 3% of GDP for the past 10
years, notwithstanding significant external shocks like the
pandemic and major hurricanes.

S&P said, "Although the JLP's majority has shrunk, with 35 of 63
seats in the Parliamentary House of Representatives, we believe
that both the country's main political parties -- the JLP and the
opposition People's National Party -- share a similar outlook on
economic policy and commitment to fiscal consolidation. Jamaica has
a history of a stable democracy with smooth transitions of
government. We believe there is bipartisan consensus on
macroeconomic policies."

The government has improved its ability to respond to
weather-related shocks, as demonstrated in the aftermath of
Hurricane Beryl last year when it was able to quickly roll out
support measures to the population and return to normal operations.
Proactive preparation has improved the government's readiness for
such events. The government has also solidified the Bank of
Jamaica, giving it legal independence and an official
inflation-targeting mandate. Furthermore, recent indicators suggest
that violent crime, which has been a long-term problem with
negative economic and social impacts, has lessened in the past
year.

S&P said, "On the back of these improvements and the recovery from
the storms that affected Jamaica last year, we expect growth will
rebound in 2025, with real GDP expanding by 2%. Jamaica's economy
has suffered from anemic growth, on average, over the past several
decades. During the past five years, the economy has been affected
by successive negative external shocks. We expect that growth will
return to its long-term average of 1%-2% annually by 2026-2028. We
expect GDP per capita will be about US$8,500 in 2025." This level
is higher than anticipated, in part due to revised GDP data that
uses an updated industrial classification, a rebasing of economic
sectors, in alignment with international best practices.

The Jamaican economy is relatively well diversified, with tourism,
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, but it is vulnerable to
hurricanes, flooding, and droughts. Over the past decade, the
government has made numerous reforms that support diversification
and economic growth. Nevertheless, growth remains constrained by
high security costs; perceived corruption; low productivity; low
business competitiveness; and vulnerability to external shocks,
including weather-related ones. S&P expects the country's 10-year
weighted-average growth rate will be 1.3%, which, although higher
than before, remains below that of sovereigns in the same GDP
category.

Flexibility and performance profile: Jamaica's external debt
profile is improving as the government's debt burden falls.

The combination of consistent primary surpluses and higher GDP
levels will lead to net general government debt falling below 50%
this year, and continuing to fall during the forecast horizon. S&P
said, "We expect net general government debt will reach just below
48% this year, four percentage points lower than our 2025 forecast
made last year. At the same time, we expect the government interest
to revenues metric will fall, averaging just over 15% from
2025-2027. The government estimates its financing needs will be
J$158 billion in the current fiscal year, and we expect it will
meet them through a combination of domestic borrowing and
predominantly concessionary multilateral loans."

Jamaica's debt has significant exposure to exchange rate movements,
as approximately 59% of general government debt is denominated in
foreign currency. This exposure and the depreciation of the
Jamaican currency are significant factors in S&P's assessment of
the change in net general government debt, as currency depreciation
can offset debt reduction.

S&P said, "As part of our assessment of the government's contingent
liabilities, we consider the US$480 million in senior secured notes
issued by Kingston Airport Revenue Finance LLC in October 2024 and
the US$400 million in senior secured notes issued by Montego Bay
Airport Revenue Finance Ltd. in July 2025. However, given the size
of these transactions and credit profiles that indicate stronger
creditworthiness on a stand-alone basis than the sovereign, they do
not weaken our government debt assessment. At the same time, we
deduct the proceeds that the government has received from these
transactions from non-tax revenue, where it is counted by the
government, as we consider these funds to be finance-related, and
not part of ordinary budget revenues.

"We assess Jamaica's contingent liabilities from the financial
sector and nonfinancial public enterprises as limited, based on our
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment score of '8' (with '1'
being the lowest-risk category and '10' the highest) and the ratio
of banking sector assets to GDP of less than 100%.

"We expect the change in net general government debt to GDP will
average 0.9% from 2025-2028. We expect this metric will gradually
shrink over the forecast horizon as the effects of Hurricane Beryl
in 2024, as well as our deduction of securitization revenues from
non-tax revenue related to the airport securitizations, fall out of
the metric. These metrics also incorporate the negative effect of a
likely depreciating Jamaican dollar on the valuation of the
country's large foreign currency-denominated external debt. We
expect primary surpluses to remain below their average in the past
decade as the government will have met its long-term debt-to-GDP
target this year and GDP revisions indicate a larger economy.
Nevertheless, primary surpluses will likely remain above 3% of GDP,
on average, over the forecast horizon."

Following two consecutive years of current account surpluses
averaging 2.9% of GDP, fueled by strong tourism receipts and high
remittances, Jamaica is likely to maintain surpluses over the next
several years, dropping closer to historical levels. The surplus
may decline to 1.6% of GDP in 2025. Remittances continued to
bolster external balances, although they decreased slightly year
over year to just less than US$3.36 billion (about 15% of GDP) in
2024. S&P expects remittances will remain steady for the next two
years. Over the next four years, the current account may be on
average in a surplus of 0.6% of GDP.

Current account surpluses have supported central bank reserves.
This, together with stronger financial sector external assets and
steady external debt, has contributed to an improvement in our
external assessment of the country. External debt of the public,
private, and financial sectors, net of usable reserves and
financial sector external assets, reached 45% of current account
receipts in 2024, and we expect it will reach 42% this year. The
country's gross external financing needs will likely hover around
90% of current account receipts and usable reserves in the next
couple of years after falling gradually over the past several
years. Nevertheless, Jamaica's net external liability position is
substantially larger than its net external debt position, which
could expose the country to elevated risk of disruptions to
external funding.

To address vulnerabilities to weather-related events, the
government created a disaster risk policy framework to build
resiliency and respond faster in the aftermath of a disaster. This
has served Jamaica well during recent external shocks, such as
Hurricane Beryl and storm Raphael in 2024. The multilayered
approach to mitigating the fiscal risks caused by a disaster
includes a contingency fund, insurance, a disaster line of credit
with a multilateral institution, and the issuance of a catastrophe
bond. Although Jamaica has made progress on mitigating the fiscal
risks, its economy and infrastructure remain vulnerable to physical
risks.

Inflation has fallen sharply in recent months and was 1.2% in
August 2025, below the Bank of Jamaica's target of 4%-6%, largely
due to the effects of falling energy and agricultural prices.  In
2024, the Bank of Jamaica began reducing its policy rate, and it
was 5.75% as of August 2025. S&P believes the bank will maintain a
cautious monetary policy that, combined with tight fiscal policy,
will keep inflation at the lower end of its target band.

Although the central bank has a short track record under its
enhanced autonomy, S&P believes it will continue facilitating
orderly movements in the floating exchange rate, as shown by
two-way movement recorded against the U.S. dollar.  Dollarization
is still high in the financial system, but it has decreased over
the past several years. In June 2025, about 36% of resident
deposits in the financial system were denominated in foreign
currencies.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Rating Component Scores above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Upgraded    
                                  To              From
  Jamaica  

  Sovereign Credit Rating     BB/Positive/B   BB-/Positive/B

  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment  

  Local Currency                  BB+              BB

  Jamaica  

  Air Jamaica Ltd.  

  Senior Unsecured                BB               BB-


JAMAICA: Trade Deficit Hit US$2.4 Billion for January to May 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica's merchandise trade deficit jumped to
US$2.4 billion between January and May this year.

That's compared to US$2.2 billion during the similar period last
year, according to RJR News.

The increase was driven by a 3.6 per cent rise in imports to US$3.2
billion alongside a 7 per cent fall in exports to US$773 million,
the report notes.

The country's export earnings were not enough to cover key import
costs, including US$919 million of raw materials, US$865 million
for food and consumer goods and US$841 million for fuel during the
five month period, the report adds.

                        About Jamaica

Jamaica is an island country situated in the Caribbean Sea. Jamaica
is an upper-middle income country with an economy heavily dependent
on tourism.  Other major sectors of the Jamaican economy include
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, petroleum refining, financial
and insurance services.

On Feb. 21, 2025, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-', with a
positive rating outlook.  In October 2023, Moody's upgraded the
Government of Jamaica's long-term issuer and senior unsecured
ratings to B1 from B2, and senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)B1
from (P)B2.  The outlook has been changed to positive from stable.
In September 2024, S&P affirmed 'BB-/B' longterm foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica and revised outlook to
positive.  




===========
P A N A M A
===========

BANCO LATINOAMERICANO: Fitch Rates USD200MM 7.5% Sub. Notes 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a final 'BB-' rating to Banco
Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior, S.A.'s (Bladex) U.S.
dollar-denominated perpetual non-cumulative fixed-to-fixed
subordinated notes for USD200 million at 7.5%. The notes will
constitute additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital for the bank in
accordance with Panamanian banking laws. The notes also are
intended to strengthen the bank's primary capital, with proceeds
from the issuance to be used for general corporate purposes.

The final rating follows a review of final terms and conditions
according to information Fitch received when it assigned Bladex an
expected rating on Sept. 5, 2025. For more details see "Fitch
Assigns Bladex's Perpetual Subordinated Notes 'BB-(EXP)' Rating,".

Key Rating Drivers

The new notes issuance rating is four notches below Bladex's 'bbb'
Viability Rating (VR), reflecting two notches for high loss
severity due to the bank's deep subordination and two notches for
incremental non-performance risk, given its fully discretionary,
non-cumulative coupon cancellation feature, according to Fitch's
criteria. The agency has used the bank's VR as the anchor rating
because it believes it better reflects nonperformance risk.

The notes are perpetual, with no fixed maturity or fixed redemption
date, with semiannual interest payments, which also will be
noncumulative. The bank will have the option to redeem the notes,
subject to the prior approval of Panamanian banks regulator, in
whole or in part after the seventh anniversary of the issue date or
on any interest payment date thereafter.

The notes will rank junior in right of payment to all the bank's
senior debt and pari passu with each other and with any other
unsecured AT1 capital subordinated indebtedness. They will rank
senior to Bladex's common and preferred shares and to any other
instruments that rank junior in right of payment to the notes in a
liquidation event.

Interest on the notes will not be due or payable on a payment date,
and will not accrue, in certain cases, including when the issuer,
at its sole discretion, elects to suspend payment and accrual. Such
suspension will not constitute an event of default. In addition,
under Panamanian law, if the Superintendency of Banks of Panama
takes administrative control of the issuer and initiates
reorganization, the notes may be used to absorb losses. The notes
will be permanently written off if any of the following occur: the
issuer enters reorganization, the regulator orders a write-off the
notes, or the bank's Tier 1 capital ratio falls below 5.125% (a
non-viability event).

Bladex's VR reflects extensive geographic diversification; notable
business and funding profiles anchored by a widely recognized
regional franchise and strong position in the market it serves; and
a robust risk framework that has supported resilient financial
performance. As of June 2025, its CET1-to-risk-weighted-assets
ratio was 15.0% and its regulatory capital adequacy ratio was
13.9%.

For further information about the rating drivers and rating
sensitivities for Bladex, please see "Fitch Affirms Bladex's IDR at
'BBB'; Outlook Stable" dated May 15, 2025.

Rating Sensitivities

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

- The rating of the notes is sensitive to movements in the bank's
VR in any direction, and the baseline scenario is that the notching
will likely remain -4 relative to the bank's VR.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

- The rating of the notes is sensitive to movements in the bank's
VR in any direction, and the baseline scenario is that the notching
will likely remain -4 relative to the bank's VR.

Date of Relevant Committee

02-Sep-2025

ESG Considerations

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt             Rating            Prior
   -----------             ------            -----
Banco Latinoamericano
de Comercio Exterior,
S.A.

   Subordinated         LT BB-  New Rating   BB-(EXP)




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

CARMEN FRATICELLI: Court Upholds Dismissal of Bankruptcy Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez of the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied Carmen Maria Mercado
Fraticelli's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of her
bankruptcy case.

On May 31, 2024, Carmen Maria Mercado Fraticelli filed the petition
for relief under Chapter 11, Subchapter V of the Bankruptcy Code.

On Aug. 5, 2024, creditor Blue View Capital LLC filed proof of
claim number 1 in the amount of $283,593.07, secured by Debtor's
residential property located in Ponce, Puerto Rico. On Sept. 17,
2024, Blue View filed a motion to dismiss the case with a four-year
bar to re-file. On Sept. 26, 2024, Debtor opposed Blue View's
dismissal request. On Oct. 30, 2024, the court entered an opinion
and order denying Blue View's request for dismissal of the case
with a four-year bar to refile and allowed Debtor to proceed to
confirmation.

On Nov. 23, 2024, Blue View moved for the reconsideration of the
order denying the dismissal and the bar to refile. Following
Debtor's request for valuation and protracted motion litigation
with Blue View, on Dec. 5, 2025, the court conducted an evidentiary
hearing to determine, for purposes of 11 U.S.C. Section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i), 11 U.S.C. Section 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012, the value of Debtor's residential property. On April 14,
2025, the court determined in an opinion and order that the value
of said property was $135,000 and granted Debtor thirty days to
file an amended Subchapter V plan consistent with the valuation
ruling.

On May 19, 2025, Debtor filed her Subchapter V amended plan, which
the court set for a confirmation hearing on July 10, 2025.

On July 7, 2025, Blue View filed an objection to the confirmation
of Debtor's amended plan. Blue View questioned the plan's
feasibility by analyzing the monthly operating reports filed to
date, which it argued had multiple deficiencies and
inconsistencies. Blue View also pointed out that the operating
reports for April and May were outstanding. Further, it argued that
the plan did not meet the criteria for cram down confirmation under
11 U.S.C. Sec. 1191(b) and that the plan improperly proposed a
bifurcation of its claim, a claim that Debtor never objected to.

The court granted Blue View's objection to confirmation and denied
confirmation of Debtor's plan. The court also granted Blue View's
request for reconsideration and dismissed the case.

Now pending before the court is Debtor's motion filed on July 21,
2025, seeking reconsideration of the dismissal. On the same day,
Debtor also filed an amended subchapter V plan, amended schedules I
and J, an objection to Blue View's claim, amended monthly operating
reports for January, February, and March 2025, and monthly
operating reports for April, May, and June 2025.

In her motion for reconsideration, Debtor argues that at the
confirmation hearing, she did not admit that her plan was
unfeasible. Instead, she contends that the court could not assess
feasibility due to the incomplete monthly operating reports filed
up to that date. She states that now she has amended these reports
and attached evidence of her income to demonstrate the source of
the funds. Further, she asserts that at the 341 meeting of
creditors and in "other hearings and motions," she had testified
that her plan would also be funded with her husband's income. She
further states that, if necessary, her son and daughter would
contribute to fund her plan and submits as exhibits two unsworn
statements under penalty of perjury to that effect. She also
attributes her previous omission of her husband's income and bank
statements to an error made by her prior accountant, who has now
been replaced. She claims that she is now in full compliance with
the confirmation requirements.

Debtor also emphasizes her active participation in the valuation
hearing, which resulted in the court determining that the value of
the property is $135,000. She contends that she had no obligation
to file an objection to Blue View's claim, and that the court's
valuation effectively bifurcated the claim. Moreover, Debtor argues
that she does not need Blue View's vote for plan confirmation
because she can confirm her plan under the cram-down provisions of
11 U.S.C. Sec. 1191(b). She asserts that her plan is fair and
equitable because it proposes to pay within a reasonable timeframe
and with interest, providing more than what unsecured creditors
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation scenario. Lastly, she
requests that the court exercise its equitable powers under 11
U.S.C. Sec. 105(a) to reconsider the dismissal of her case and
allow her to preserve her only property, which serves as her
residence and place of business.

Blue View opposes Debtor's reconsideration request. It asserts that
the court did not err in dismissing the case and that Debtor's
motion fails to meet the standard for  reconsideration, as there is
no showing of newly discovered evidence or manifest error.

Moreover, Blue View contends that there were multiple valid grounds
for dismissal, which the record clearly supported, including
ongoing noncompliance despite multiple opportunities to cure
deficiencies, continuing substantial diminution to the estate, lack
of feasibility, and an unreasonable likelihood of reorganization.

Regarding the statements attached to her motion claiming that her
son and daughter might contribute to fund the plan, Blue View
argues that these individuals could have appeared at the
confirmation hearing but chose not to and that their statements
fail to identify specific amounts that could render them relevant
for a feasibility determination. The court agrees with Blue View.

Debtor has neither argued how this court committed manifest error
nor presented any compelling grounds for the court to reconsider
its dismissal order. On the contrary, the record shows, and Debtor
admits, that: she failed to comply with the reporting requirements
for debtors in Subchapter V; she appeared unprepared to prosecute
the confirmation of her plan at the confirmation hearing; she
waited until the day before the hearing to seek a continuance and
to request additional time to amend her plan and operating reports;
and the lack of complete and accurate financial information
resulting from incomplete or missing operating reports prevented
the court from properly assessing the plan's feasibility at the
confirmation hearing.

Furthermore, aside from stating that the omission was due to errors
made by the prior accountant, Debtor has failed to explain why
possible contributions by family members to fund the plan were not
included in prior plans and reports filed with the court. The court
concurs with Blue View that this information has been readily
available to Debtor and therefore does not constitute newly
discovered evidence warranting reconsideration of the case's
dismissal.

The Court concludes absent a showing of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason that justifies the
reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, Debtor's motion for
reconsideration is denied.

A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated September 15, 2025,
is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=87uFyw from
PacerMonitor.com

Carmen Maria Mercado Fraticelli filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 24-02341) on May 31, 2024,
listing under $1 million in both assets and liabilities. The Debtor
is represented by Juan Carlos Bigas Valedon, Esq.




=============
U R U G U A Y
=============

PROVINCIA CASA: S&P Assigns 'B-' Global Scale Rating
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' global scale and 'uyBBB-'
national scale long-term issuer credit ratings to Provincia Casa
Financiera (PCF). The outlook is stable.

S&P bases the rating on PCF's status as a branch of Argentina-based
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. As a result, it caps PCF's
creditworthiness by Argentina's transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment.

The stable outlook on Provincia Casa Financiera (PCF) mirrors that
on Argentina, which balances persistent economic vulnerabilities in
that country against improved fiscal outcomes, falling inflation,
and renewed GDP growth.

S&P's rating on Provincia Casa Financiera (PCF) is based on its
status as a branch of the Argentina-based bank Banco de la
Provincia de Buenos Aires (BAPRO; raA-/Stable/raA-2). The Uruguayan
branch plays an important role in BAPRO's operations in the
commercial segment, as it primarily focuses on credit services for
foreign trade between Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil; money orders
and transfers; investments; and securities custody.

PCF is a small franchise in Uruguay, with a market share of 0.01%
of loans and 0.07% of deposits as of July 2025. However, in the
last two years its commercial loan portfolio has doubled in size
without damaging its asset quality, while it has maintained strong
capitalization. As of July 2025, the branch continues to have no
nonperforming assets and net charge-offs. Its regulatory capital
ratio is 70.3%, well above the minimum requirement and the
industry's average.

S&P considers BAPRO to be well positioned in the market. It plays a
relevant role in Buenos Aires as the financial agent that collects
revenue and pays obligations for both the public administration and
decentralized public agencies. BAPRO is also the receiving agent
for all the province's official and judicial deposits, providing it
with low-cost funding.

Also, BAPRO has a large distribution network, and its portfolio
covers several economic sectors, while it also focuses on
developing primary industries in the regional economy. As of May
2025, BAPRO was the fifth-largest financial institution by deposits
and the sixth in terms of loans, with a market share of 7.3% and
7.6%, respectively.

S&P said, However, our view of BAPRO's creditworthiness reflects
Argentina's T&C assessment, and this carries across to PCF. The cap
on our rating on PCF reflects the risk that Argentina could impose
restrictions that prevent the bank from paying its foreign currency
liabilities, which could constrain PCF's obligations not
denominated in Argentine pesos."

The stable outlook on PCF mirrors that on the sovereign rating on
Argentina, given that the rating on PCF reflects S&P's view of the
parent's credit profile, which reflects Argentina's T&C assessment.
The outlook balances persistent economic vulnerabilities in
Argentina against improved fiscal outcomes, falling inflation, and
renewed GDP growth. Any change in our view of BAPRO's or
Argentina's creditworthiness would lead to a similar action on the
Uruguayan subsidiary.

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings in the next six to 12 months
if negative developments undermine the Argentinian sovereign's
already limited access to financing. Failure to stabilize
macroeconomic variables or advance reforms could lead to
instability and interfere with the ability of domestic banks in
that country to access, convert, and transfer money abroad.

"We could take a positive rating action on PCF if we were to raise
the sovereign rating and T&C assessment on Argentina and BAPRO is
able to pass our sovereign stress test. This could happen if
external liquidity improves and economic vulnerabilities decline,
setting the stage for continued economic recovery in the country."



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