/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/100131.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
Sunday, January 31, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 30
Headlines
ABACUS 2005-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes to 'D'
ACA CDS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to 'CC'
AES EASTERN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Certificates to 'BB+'
ANTHRACITE CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-HY3 Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2007-3 Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2005-2 Securities
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Expects to Assign 'BB+' Rating on Class D
CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2005-4 Certs.
CITY OF BOSTON INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Caa3'
CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Upgrades Rating on $10MM Notes to 'BB+'
DUTCH HILL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
DYNASTY II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Credit Default Swaps
FEP RECEIVABLES: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
FIRSTPLUS HOME: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 35 Classes to 'C'
FORD AUTO: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class D Subordinate Notes
FORT POINT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-RR1 Certs.
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-LDP5 Securities
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2005-LDP3 Certs. to 'D'
JPMORGAN-CIBC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-RR1 Securities
KENMARE 2005-I: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2005-I Notes to 'D'
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-LC1 Securities
MISSOURI HEALTH: Fitch Puts 'BB' Rating on $5.1 Mil. 2002A Bonds
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2006-1 Securities
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 2007-XLC1 Notes
N-STAR REL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
ORANGE REGIONAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Series 2008 Bonds
PALISADES MEDICAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Two Revenue Bonds
PIONEER VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
PROSPECT FUNDING: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Tranches
RFMSII HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Ten Tranches
SAPPHIRE VALLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
SCANDINAVIAN TRUST: S&P Publicizes 'BB' Rating on Secured Bonds
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on 2002-B Notes
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Ratings on Senior Notes
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Ratings on Two Notes
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Ratings on Two Series
STRUCTURED ENHANCED: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Series 1998-1 to 'C'
TIERS BEACH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Six 2006-11 Certificates
US CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
VALLEJO CITY: S&P Raises Rating on $21.2 Mil. Certs. From 'BB+'
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 121 Classes From Eight RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 30 Classes From Five Hybrid CDO ABS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 33 Certs. From 10 Separate CMBS to 'D'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Tranches From 13 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 39 Classes From Three Prime Jumbo RMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 49 Classes From 16 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 56 Classes From 18 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 87 Tranches From 16 CLO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 645 Classes From 536 RMBS Transactions
*********
ABACUS 2005-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-1 and A-2 notes issued by ABACUS 2005-1 CB1 Ltd. to 'D'
from 'CCC-'.
The downgrades follow a number of recent credit events within the
reference portfolio. Specifically, write-downs in the
transaction's underlying reference portfolio have caused the class
A-1 note to incur a partial principal loss, and the class A-2 note
to incur a full principal loss.
ACA CDS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to 'CC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on ACA CDS
2006-1B Tranche C and Tribune Ltd.'s series 33 and 40 notes to
'CC' from 'CCC-'.
The downgrades follow a number of credit events within the
transactions' underlying corporate reference entities. S&P
received final valuations on the credit events in the underlying
portfolios, which indicated that losses in the portfolios had
caused the notes to incur partial principal losses.
Rating Actions
ACA CDS 2006-1B Tranche C
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Tranche CC CCC-
Tribune Ltd.
Series 33
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Tranche CC CCC-
Tribune Ltd.
Series 40
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Tranche CC CCC-
AES EASTERN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Certificates to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades AES Eastern Energy, L.P.'s pass-through
trust certificates series 1999-A and 1999-B to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';
the Rating Outlook has been revised to Negative.
The downgrade reflects lower power price assumptions for the
remaining tenor of the debt and higher forecast environmental
allowances for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a
Memorandum of Understanding between ten Northeastern U.S. states
including New York that became effective Jan. 1, 2009. As a
result, forecasted fixed charge coverage ratios are near break-
even for three years out of the next 10-year plant overhaul cycle,
a material change from above 2.0 times coverage historically and
are not consistent with an investment grade rating. Coverage is
expected to be most pressured during years of a major overhaul or
increasing capital expenditures; however, the structure provides
added protection by strengthening internal liquidity through an
equity lock-up in times of stress, thereby reducing the dependence
on structured reserves. The Negative Outlook reflects the
uncertainty regarding the timing and magnitude of expected
increases in merchant energy prices and the possibility that RGGI
costs could be greater than currently forecast by AEE. Fitch did
not give credit to potential increases in power prices due to
increased RGGI costs, which could have a moderating effect on cash
flows.
Fitch's rating acknowledges a strong FCCR distribution requirement
of 1.7x or greater, a cash trap for non-distributed cash that can
be applied to future debt amortization, and a Rent Reserve plus an
Additional Liquidity Reserve that together provide the equivalent
of 12-months' debt service. AEE's proven abilities at operational
and cash management are also a positive rating factor.
Historical capacity factors have been strong at 90% in 2008, 92%
in 2007, and 88% in 2006, while in 2009 the economic downturn that
depressed pricing and demand, as well as an extended outage at
Somerset, lowered capacity factors to near 54% for the year. Low
gas prices in 2009 displaced AEE's plants in the dispatch curve
behind lower-cost gas-fired plants and lowered overall capacity
factors in 2009. Fitch believes this situation is temporary, and
expects capacity factors to approach historical levels as gas
prices increase and demand improves in line with the broader
economy. AEE usually targets 70%-80% price hedging, but reduced
its hedging portfolio in 2009 when the market became illiquid.
The company is 55% hedged for 2010 and expects to add hedges as
prices rise, further stabilizing debt service. While AEE retired
its two smallest units (together just under 100 megawatts [MW])
due to lack of environmental compliance on Dec. 31, 2009, the
retirements will not have a material effect on future capacity
factors or cash flows. The remaining coal-fired units, except for
Cayuga 2, have all the currently required emissions control
equipment.
AES Eastern Energy LP is a special purpose entity that is
indirectly wholly owned by AES Corporation (Rated 'B+' by Fitch).
AES Eastern Energy leases and operates four coal-fired electricity
generating facilities (five units total) with a gross capacity of
1,169 MW located in western New York state. AES Eastern Energy
sells its predominantly base load electricity into the spot market
at prevailing New York Independent System Operator wholesale
market prices.
ANTHRACITE CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-HY3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes from Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd., a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transaction. S&P removed
two of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative, and the
other five remain on CreditWatch negative. At the same time, S&P
affirmed two ratings at 'CCC-' and removed them from CreditWatch
negative. One additional rating also remains on CreditWatch
negative.
The lowered ratings reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following its downgrades of 41 commercial mortgage-backed
securities certificates that serve as underlying collateral for
Anthracite 2006-HY3. The downgraded certificates have a total
balance of $261.6 million (45.8% of the pool balance) and are from
10 CMBS transactions. Six ratings from Anthracite 2006-HY3 remain
on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's exposure to CMBS
collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative ($29.7 million,
5.2%).
According to the Jan. 19, 2010, trustee report, CMBS certificates
($424.8 million, 74.3%) from 15 distinct transactions issued
between 2004 and 2006 collateralized Anthracite 2006-HY3. The
current assets also included six commercial real estate loans
($146.9 million, 25.7%), which are all either subordinate B-notes
or mezzanine loans.
Anthracite 2006-HY3 has significant exposure to these CMBS
certificates that Standard & Poor has downgraded:
* GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2005-C4 (classes K through
O; $48 million, 8.4%);
* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 (classes J
through P; $47.8 million, 8.4%);
* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C7 (classes K through S;
$44.4 million, 7.8%); and
* ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 (classes H through P;
$39.8 million, 7%).
S&P expects to update or resolve its CreditWatch negative
placements on Anthracite 2006-HY3's certificates in conjunction
with its CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.
Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B-FL B+/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
B-FX B+/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
C-FL CCC+/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
C-FX CCC+/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
D CCC/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
E-FL CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
E-FX CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
F CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
G CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3 Ltd.
Class Rating
----- ------
A BB+/Watch Neg
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2007-3 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes and
downgraded 16 classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-3. The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged watchlisted loans.
The downgrades include Classes A-4, A-5 and A-1A, which have the
longest weighted average life among the super senior Aaa classes
with 30% initial credit support. Depending on the magnitude,
severity, and timing of losses from specially serviced loans and
the balance of the pool, along with any loan payoffs, sequential
paydowns may not reach these classes. Losses are likely to erode
the credit enhancement cushion for the super senior classes
creating a potential differential in expected loss between those
super senior classes benefiting first from paydowns and those
classes receiving paydowns last. Although Moody's believe that it
is unlikely that Classes A-4, A-5 and A-1A will actually
experience losses, the expected level of credit enhancement and
their priority in the cash flow waterfall no longer provide an
adequate cushion to maintain Aaa ratings.
The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, stressed debt service coverage ratio
and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.
On November 4, 2009, Moody's placed 16 classes of this transaction
on review for possible downgrade due to potential losses from
specially serviced and other poorly performing loans.
This action concludes Moody's review of this transaction. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 11, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$3.507 billion from $3.515 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 151 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 52% of the pool.
At securitization the 1001-1007 Third Ave Loan ($15.0 million --
0.4% of the pool) had an investment grade underlying rating.
However, the performance of the property securing this loan has
declined and the loan is now analyzed as part of the conduit
because of increased leverage.
Twenty-three loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
The pool has not experienced any losses to date. Currently,
twenty-four loans, representing 27% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Renaissance
Mayflower Hotel Loan ($200.0 million -- 5.7% of the pool), which
is secured by a 657-room full service hotel located in Washington,
D.C. The loan was transferred to special servicing in December
2009 due to imminent default. Performance has declined since last
review due to a drop in tourist and business travel and increased
operating expenses. The borrower has not been successful in
achieving the increased rental revenue originally projected at
securitization. Occupancy and RevPAR for year-to-date ending June
2009 were 76% and $183, respectively compared to 75% and $185 for
the same period ending June 2008.
The second largest specially serviced loan is the One Park Avenue
Loan ($187.5 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $375 million first mortgage ($406 PSF) that is
spread among two CMBS deals. The property is also encumbered by a
$108 million ($116 PSF) mezzanine loan. The loan is secured by a
924,501 square foot (SF) office and retail building located on
Park Avenue between 32nd and 33rd St in the Murray Hill area of
Manhattan in New York City. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in August 2009 due to imminent default. The borrower
has not been successful in achieving the increased rental revenue
originally projected at securitization due to the downturn in the
New York City office market. Additionally, the second largest
tenant, The Segal Co., which leased 17% of the net rentable area
vacated the property at its December 2009 lease expiration. While
the property was 97% leased as of November 2009, the loss of The
Segal Co. would increase vacancy to more than 20% and negatively
impact the borrower's ability to make debt service payments. The
loan sponsor is an affiliate of Cerberus Capital.
The third largest specially serviced loan is the Rockwood Ross
Multifamily Portfolio Loan ($175.0 million -- 5.0% of the pool),
which represents a pari passu interest in a $275 million first
mortgage that is spread among two CMBS deals. The property is
also encumbered by a $71 million mezzanine loan. The loan is
secured by seven multifamily properties (2,508 units) located in
and around the suburban Washington, D.C. area. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in August 2009 due to imminent
default. Two of the properties were negatively affected by a
failed condo conversion. All of the properties are currently
undergoing renovations. The portfolio was 90% occupied as of June
2009. The loan sponsor is Rockwood VI REIT.
The fourth largest specially serviced loan is the Second & Seneca
Loan ($175.0 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a
22 story Class A and a four story Class B office property located
in the downtown Seattle, Washington. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2009 due to imminent default due to the
loss of Washington Mutual, which leased 16% of the NRA. As of
October 2009 the property was 72% leased compared to 96% at
securitization. The loan sponsor is Tishman Speyer.
The remaining 14 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, office, retail and self storage properties. Moody's
estimates an aggregate $388.4 million loss for all specially
serviced loans (37% loss severity on average). The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $75.1 million appraisal reduction for six
of the specially serviced loans.
In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on five loans which
represent 6% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate loss of
$34.4 million (17% loss severity on average) from these troubled
loans. Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty
around the timing and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.
Moody's was provided with partial 2009 or full-year 2008 operating
results for 96% of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV ratio,
excluding the specially serviced and troubled loans, is 127%
compared to 160% at Moody's prior review in February 2009. The
previous review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep of 2006-2008 vintage CMBS transactions.
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR are 1.34X and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 1.05X and 0.78X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of the Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29, essentially the same as at last review.
The three largest performing loans represent 19% of the
outstanding pool balance. The largest loan is the Presidential
Towers Loan ($325.0 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which is secured
by four connected 50-story apartment buildings (2,346 units)
located in the West Loop area of downtown Chicago, Illinois. As
of June 2009 the property was 96% leased compared to 90% at year
end 2008. The property is performing slightly below Moody's
original projections due to unrealized rental revenue growth and
increased expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 133% and
0.65X, respectively, compared to 163% and 0.55X at last review.
The second largest performing loan is the Pacific Shores Building
9 & 10 Loan ($183.8 million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured
by two Class A office buildings (447,747 SF) located in Redwood
City, California. The property was 100% leased as of June 2009,
the same as at securitization. The property is leased to Openwave
Systems (63% of the NRA; lease expiration April 2013) and PDL
Biopharma (37% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2021). While
Moody's is concerned that the subject is 100% occupied by two non-
investment grade rated tenants, this risk was somewhat mitigated
by the posting of two letter of credits at securitization totaling
$19.5 million. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 160% and 0.65X,
respectively, compared to 190% and 0.54X at last review.
The third largest performing loan is the Hilton Anatole Loan
($175.0 million -- 5% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $350 million first mortgage that is spread among two
CMBS deals. The property is also encumbered by a $20 million
mezzanine loan. The loan is secured by a 1,606 full service hotel
located in Dallas, Texas. Occupancy and RevPAR for the year to
date September 2009 were 63% and $76, respectively, compared to
67% and $100 for the same period ending June 2008. The subject
has performed below Moody's original projections because of
declines in tourist and business travel due to the economic
recession. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 139% and 0.85X,
respectively, compared to 169% and 0.70X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $43,453,076, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 8/23/2007
-- Class XW, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
on 8/23/2007
-- Class A-2, $334,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 8/23/2007
-- Class A-2FL, $150,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 8/23/2007
-- Class A-3, $133,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 8/23/2007
-- Class A-AB, $78,944,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 8/23/2007
-- Class A-4, $1,017,000,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class A-5, $50,000,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class A-1A, $646,840,210, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class A-M, $116,565,000, downgraded to Baa1 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class A-MF, $100,000,000, downgraded to Baa1 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class A-MFL, $135,000,000, downgraded to Baa1 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class A-J, $241,701,000, downgraded to B3 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
11/4/2009
-- Class B, $35,157,000, downgraded to Caa2 from A3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class C, $48,340,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa1 previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class D, $26,368,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class E, $26,367,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class F, $35,157,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class G, $30,762,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class H, $48,340,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class J, $35,156,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
-- Class K, $43,946,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 11/4/2009
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 12 2005-2 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 12
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-2 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from the same
transaction and removed three of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions. S&P's analysis included a review of
the credit characteristics of all of the assets in the pool.
Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.61x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 102.4%. S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.94x and an LTV
of 134.3%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 82.4% and 33.0%, respectively. These calculations
exclude one defeased loan ($9.5 million, 0.7%).
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XP
and XC interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.
S&P published a request for comment proposing changes to the IO
criteria on June 1, 2009. After S&P finalizes its criteria
review, S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
had an aggregate trust balance of $1.29 billion, down from
$1.64 billion at issuance. The pool includes 80 assets, down from
86 at issuance. The master servicer, Bank of America N.A.,
provided full-year 2008 or interim-2009 financial information for
all of the nondefeased assets in the pool. S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.66x for the pool based on the reported
figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.61x and 102.4%,
respectively. The master servicer reported a watchlist of 16
loans ($178.8 million, 13.8%). Twelve assets ($155.3 million,
12.0%) in the pool have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and six
assets ($99.4 million, 7.7%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.00x.
The American Express Building-Salt Lake City and American Express
Building?Ontario are the two largest loans on the master
servicer's watchlist. The former ($30.1 million, 2.3%) is secured
by an office property in Taylorsville, Utah, while the latter
($25.4 million, 2.0%) is secured by an office property in Markham,
Ontario. Both loans are 100% occupied by American
Express Co. The loans appear on the master servicer's watchlist
due to pending loan maturities. The loans have anticipated
repayment dates within the next three months. If the loans are
not paid off by their ARDs, their payment schedules will convert
from interest-only to hyper-amortization.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 loan exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$622.6 million (48.2%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.74x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.64x and
101.0%, respectively. None of the top 10 loans appear on the
master servicer's watchlist.
Specially Serviced Loans
As of the January 2010 remittance report, two loans
($54.2 million, 4.2%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc.
The Grand Rivage at Brandon Lakes loan is the largest loan with
the special servicer. The loan has a total exposure of
$27.9 million (2.2%), and is secured by a 390-unit multifamily
property in Brandon, Fla. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer in October 2008 and is classified as current in its
payment status. The reported DSC was 0.71x as of September 2009,
down from 1.21x at issuance. According to comments in the January
2010 remittance report, the borrower defaulted under the senior
and mezzanine loans, an event which prompted the mezzanine lender
to foreclose on the borrower's equity interest. The property was
subsequently sold. The new borrower has spent nearly $2 million
renovating the property. Midland has indicated that the loan will
be returned to the master servicer. There is an appraisal
reduction amount of $407,667 in effect against the loan.
The Captain's Portfolio loan, which has a total exposure of
$26.3 million (2.0%), is the other loan with the special servicer.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in May 2009, and
its payment status is classified as current. The reported DSC was
0.64x as of December 2008. The loan is secured by a portfolio of
four multifamily properties in Texas. A portion of the collateral
was damaged during Hurricane Ike in 2008, and the settlement of an
insurance claim filed by the borrower is being completed.
Discussions between the borrower and Midland are ongoing, and
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor this loan.
Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
U.S. conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M AA+ AAA/Watch Neg 25.42
A-J A AAA/Watch Neg 17.00
B BBB+ AA/Watch Neg 13.66
C BBB AA-/Watch Neg 12.39
D BBB- A/Watch Neg 10.17
E BB+ A-/Watch Neg 8.90
F BB BBB+/Watch Neg 7.31
G BB- BBB/Watch Neg 5.88
H B+ BBB-/Watch Neg 4.45
J B+ BB+/Watch Neg 3.81
K B BB/Watch Neg 3.34
L B BB-/Watch Neg 2.86
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
M B B/Watch Neg 2.54
N B- B-/Watch Neg 2.38
O CCC+ CCC+/Watch Neg 1.59
Ratings Affirmed
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-2
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-3 AAA 38.13
A-4 AAA 38.13
A-AB AAA 38.13
A-5 AAA 38.13
XP AAA N/A
XC AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Expects to Assign 'BB+' Rating on Class D
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign these ratings to Cabela's Credit
Card Master Note Trust's asset-backed notes, series 2010-I:
-- $255,000,000 class A floating-rate 'AAA';
-- $24,000,000 class B fixed-rate 'A+';
-- $12,750,000 class C fixed-rate 'BBB+';
-- $8,250,000 class D fixed-rate 'BB+'.
The class A notes will be publicly offered and will be eligible
collateral for a loan under the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Fitch's expected ratings are based on the underlying receivables
pool, available credit enhancement, World's Foremost Bank's
underwriting and servicing capabilities, and the transaction's
legal and cash flow structures, which employ early redemption
triggers.
The transaction structure is similar to series 2009-I, with credit
enhancement totaling 15% for class A, credit enhancement of 7% for
the class B, credit enhancement of 2.75% plus an amount from a
spread account for the class C, and credit enhancement of an
amount from a spread account for the class D notes only.
CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
ratings of these notes issued by Chatham Light CLO, Limited:
-- US$28,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2017,
Confirmed at A2; previously on April 16, 2009 A2 Placed Under
Review for Possible Downgrade;
-- US$27,000,000 Class B Fixed Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinate Notes Due 2017, Confirmed at B3; previously on
June 15, 2009 Downgraded to B3 and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade.
According to Moody's, the rating actions are a result of the
confirmation by Moody's of the insurance financial strength rating
of Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (formerly Financial Security
Assurance Inc.), which acts as guarantor under the Investment
Agreement in the transaction. On November 12, 2009, Moody's
confirmed the financial strength rating of Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp. at Aa3 with a negative outlook. On June 15, 2009,
Moody's downgraded the Class B Notes, the Class C-1 Notes and the
Class C-2 Notes as a result of the application of revised and
updated key modeling assumptions as well as the credit
deterioration of the underlying portfolio. The Class A-2 and
Class B Notes remained on review for possible downgrade because
Moody's placed the insurance financial strength rating of
Financial Security Assurance Inc. on review for possible downgrade
on May 20, 2009.
Moody's also notes that the deal has demonstrated relatively
stable credit performance since the last rating actions taken on
June 15, 2009. In particular, the weighted average rating factor
has improved slightly and is currently 3115 as of the last trustee
report, dated December 10, 2009, versus 3338 as of the May 8, 2009
trustee report. Additionally, securities rated B3 and below make
up approximately 16.5% of the underlying portfolio in December as
compared to 22.8% in May.
Chatham Light CLO, Limited, issued in December 2004, is a
synthetic collateralized loan obligation referencing a portfolio
of primarily senior secured loans.
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2005-4 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of residential mortgage-backed certificates issued by
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.'s series 2005-4. S&P also
affirmed its rating on one other class from the same transaction.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses in light of
increased delinquencies and higher loss severities.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. For prime
jumbo transactions, in order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class,
S&P assess whether, in its view, the class could absorb the base-
case loss assumptions S&P used in its analysis. In order to
maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P assess whether the class
could withstand losses exceeding its base-case loss assumptions at
a percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for an
'AAA' rating. For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 127% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 154% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in its view, withstand
approximately 235% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover the losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transaction. The underlying pool of loans backing the transaction
consists of adjustable-rate U.S. prime mortgage loans that are
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.
Ratings Lowered
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2005-4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 17307GWE4 A AAA
B-1 17307GWF1 B- B+
B-3 17307GWH7 CC CCC
Rating Affirmed
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2005-4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-2 17307GWG9 CCC
CITY OF BOSTON INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the rating on the City of Boston Industrial
Development Financing Authority's $33.8 million Senior Revenue
Bonds Series 2002 to Caa3 from Caa1. The outlook is negative.
The financial and operating performance of the hotel continues to
decline and the Project is expected to draw on reserves again in
order to pay its debt service. The bonds are secured by a pledge
of net revenues that are generated primarily from the operation of
the hotel and the parking garage, as well as debt service reserves
and various other reserves.
On September 2, 2009, BCC withdrew $121,624 from the senior debt
service reserve and $369,461 from the subordinate debt service
reserve fund in order to make debt service payments. Per the
Mortgage and Trust Agreement, BCC had 30 days to replenish those
amounts withdrawn. On November 5, 2009, the Trustee informed BCC
that if the amount was not replenished within 7 days, BCC would be
in default. BCC did not make the deposits and entered into an
event of technical default. BCC eventually replenished the amount
from operating cash flow, but the Project continues to be in
default because it has not been making the required monthly
deposits into the debt service payment fund since November 2009.
The next debt service payment will be on March 1, 2010, and BCC is
expected to draw on the debt service reserves in order to make the
payment. During a continuing event of default, Note holders can
instruct the Trustee to accelerate the payment of senior bonds
outstanding. Wells Fargo replaced US Bank as the trustee on
November 4, 2009.
Because the project has not had sufficient funds to meet debt
service requirements from current year's net revenues, the
replacement reserve fund is now depleted. Without regular
deposits to this account, the project would lack the resources
needed for reinvestment in furniture, fixtures and equipment that
is needed to maintain a competitive position and critical to the
hotel's long-term financial and operating success. The project
opened for business in July 2004, and thus far room rentals and
revenues have been consistently significantly lower than original
forecasts. Hotel room demand never reached original expectations
due to the continued expansion of the Boston hotel supply and the
economic slowdown.
The bonds were issued in 2002 to finance a portion of the costs of
constructing a 175-room Hampton Inn and Suites limited service
hotel and a 650-space garage located directly off, and visible
from, the Southeast Expressway at Massachusetts Avenue and near a
large medical community in the City of Boston. The hotel benefits
from its proximity to the Boston Medical Center, which generates
demand from patients and families, visiting doctors and visiting
sales people. Area attractions include Symphony Hall, the Back
Bay area, and Northeastern University. It is approximately one
mile from the City's convention center and approximately ten
minutes from Logan Airport. The hotel is located in the Boston
Empowerment Zone on land leased from the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA) for a term of 65 years. The project has limited
financial sponsorship by the City of Boston, thereby providing
limited incentive to intervene if the hotel's financial
performance continues to deteriorate
Crosstown Center Project Series 2002 bond rating was assigned by
evaluating factors believed to be relevant to the credit profile
of the Crosstown Center Project such as i) the business risk and
competitive position of the issuer versus others within its
industry or sector, ii) the capital structure and financial risk
of the issuer, iii) the projected performance of the issuer over
the near to intermediate term, and iv) the issuer's history of
achieving consistent operating performance and meeting budget or
financial plan goals. These attributes were compared against
other issuers both within and outside of the Crosstown Center
Project's core peer group and the Series 2002 bond ratings are
believed to be comparable to ratings assigned to other issuers of
similar credit risk.
The last rating action was on October 9, 2009, when the ratings of
the Series 2002 bonds were downgraded to Caa1 with a negative
outlook from B3.
CLOVERIE PLC: Fitch Upgrades Rating on $10MM Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the notes issued by Cloverie Plc Series
2007-52 following the upgrade of the reference entity.
The rating action reflects Vale S.A.'s Issuer Default Rating of
'BBB' with a Stable Outlook. The rating also considers the credit
quality of the Citigroup Funding Inc. senior unsecured notes as
the eligible investments issued by Citigroup Inc. (rated 'A+';
Outlook Stable by Fitch), and Citigroup Inc. as guarantor to
Citigroup Global Markets Limited, the swap counterparty to the
transaction.
The rating addresses the likelihood that investors will receive
full and timely payments of interest, as per the transaction's
governing documents, as well as the stated balance of principal by
the legal final maturity date. Payments of interest and principal
will be made in US dollars adjusted according to the prevailing
value of the Unidad de Fomento and the Chilean Peso (CLP)/US$
exchange rate.
Cloverie 2007-52 is designed to provide credit protection on the
reference entity, Vale S.A., with a reference amount of
US$10 million. The credit protection is arranged through a credit
default swap between the issuer and the swap counterparty, CGML.
The CDS is collateralized by the Citigroup Funding Inc. senior
unsecured notes as the eligible investments issued by Citigroup
Inc.
Fitch has taken this rating action:
-- $10,000,000 credit-linked notes upgraded to 'BB+', Outlook
Stable from 'BB', Outlook Positive.
The revised outlook to the notes is based on the Stable Outlook of
Vale S.A.'s rating.
DUTCH HILL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed three classes of
notes issued by Dutch Hill II, Ltd./Corp., as a result of
continued credit deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's last
rating action in February 2009 and the resulting
undercollateralization of the notes.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The Structured
Finance Portfolio Credit Model and Fitch's cash flow model were
not used in this review due to the degree of
undercollateralization in the transaction.
Since last review, the portfolio manager has sold $134.6 million
in par of defaulted assets realizing an average recovery of 9%.
The sales proceeds were utilized to redeem the class A-2 notes and
a portion of the class B notes. The par balance of the remaining
securities in the portfolio as of the Dec. 15, 2009 trustee report
stood at $33.2 million. The entire portfolio has a below
investment grade Fitch derived rating. In addition, there are
four remaining synthetic short positions whose notional amounts
total $13.5 million. Principal and portion of interest proceeds
have been used to redeem the class B notes since the more senior
classes were paid in full. Still, with the current outstanding
balance of $54.3 million, Fitch does not expect class B to be paid
in full.
The class C notes continue to receive interest distributions as
per the transaction's priority of payments. However, they are not
expected to receive any principal repayment by maturity.
The class D-1, D-2 and D-3 notes are not expected to receive any
proceeds going forward.
Dutch Hill II is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on May 2, 2007 and is managed by TCW
Investment Management Company. The portfolio is composed
primarily of commercial mortgage-backed securities (87.8%) and
corporate CDOs (12%).
Fitch has downgraded and affirmed these ratings as indicated:
-- $54,267,758 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- $32,348,015 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
-- $18,131,979 class D-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
-- $14,895,089 class D-2 notes affirmed at 'C';
-- $15,755,619 class D-3 notes affirmed at 'C'.
DYNASTY II: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Credit Default Swaps
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings on two credit default swaps entered with Dynasty II
Synthetic CLO, collateralized debt obligation transactions
referencing a static portfolio of corporate entities.
The rating actions are:
Issuer: Dynasty II Synthetic CLO
-- US$48,040,000 Original Swap Notional Amount Credit Default
Swap with Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc. (Ref. NGZY0),
Downgraded to A1; previously on Feb 27, 2009 Downgraded to
Aa2;
-- US$9,608,000 Original Swap Notional Amount Credit Default
Swap with Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc. (Ref. NF8VQ),
Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 27, 2009 Downgraded to
Caa1.
Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio. The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the
portfolio, not adjusted with forward looking measures, has
deteriorated from 3356 from the last rating action to 4002,
equivalent to an average rating of the current portfolio of B3.
Since the last rating action on the transaction, the subordination
of the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on
Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Idearc, Inc., Bowater Incorporated,
General Growth Properties, Inc., Mark IV Industries Inc., Georgia
Gulf Corp, Crescent Resources, LLC, Freedom Communications, Inc.,
FairPoint Communications, Inc. These credit events led to a
decrease of approximately 3.5% of the subordination of the
tranches. The portfolio has its highest industry concentrations
in Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals (9.2%), Banking (8.3%), Hotel,
Gaming & Leisure (8.3%), and Retail (7.3%).
FEP RECEIVABLES: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn the ratings of four
classes of notes issued by FEP Receivables Trust 2001-1.
FEP 2001-1 is collateralized by receivables of certain fees
charged to the class B shareholders of a select pool of mutual
funds. Namely, FEP 2001-1 receives, from a predetermined set of
shareholders in the mutual funds, the asset-based sales charges
(12b-1 fees), contingent deferred sales charges (CDSC fees), and
shareholder servicing fees which are charged to these
shareholders. The primary factors in determining cash flows in
this transaction are the net asset values of the underlying funds,
share redemption rates, and the expiration of the transaction's
entitlements to fees from each underlying fund.
The underlying funds in FEP 2001-1 experienced significant NAV
declines soon after the inception of the transaction in January
2001. The poor performance led to insufficient cash flows
supporting the notes, and therefore a slow rate of principal
redemption of the notes. Performance has continued to
deteriorate, as many of the initial underlying funds are no longer
generating fees that may be passed through to FEP 2001-1. This
occurs as shares of the underlying funds are no longer subject to
the aforementioned fees once a certain time period has elapsed.
These pre-defined timeframes will continue to expire for the
remaining fee-producing funds throughout the remaining life of the
transaction, further reducing the amount of proceeds available for
distribution to the notes.
The floating-rate notes (classes A-3L and BL) receive 75% of all
proceeds, while the fixed-rate notes (classes A and B) receive 25%
of the proceeds. Within these groups, interest is paid
sequentially, followed by principal. Currently, class A-3L and
class A are not receiving their full required interest payments,
causing class BL and class B, respectively, to receive no proceeds
at all. Fitch expects classes A-3L and A to continue to receive
only partial interest distributions at future monthly payment
dates, while the classes BL and B notes are not expected to
receive any future distributions. No further principal payments
are expected on any of the notes.
Also, given the apparent lack of investor interest, Fitch has
withdrawn its ratings.
Fitch has affirmed and withdrawn these ratings:
-- $20,212,341 class A-3L floating-rate notes at 'C/RR6';
withdrawn;
-- $5,000,000 class BL floating-rate notes at 'C/RR6';
withdrawn;
-- $12,624,642 class A fixed-rate notes at 'C/RR6'; withdrawn;
-- $5,000,000 class B fixed-rate notes at 'C/RR6'; withdrawn.
FIRSTPLUS HOME: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 35 Classes to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded to 'C' all 35 classes in eight
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust residential mortgage backed
security transactions listed below. The affected classes have an
aggregate balance of approximately $34 million.
The downgrades are a result of the ongoing suspension of interest
and principal to bondholders by US Bank National Association (the
Trustee). Amounts otherwise payable to bondholders are being
retained in the trust pending further developments resulting from
litigation involving the transactions. The revised ratings
reflect both the increased likelihood of both permanent interest
shortfalls and principal writedowns. Since bond loss amounts
cannot be estimated at this time, Recovery Ratings have not been
assigned to the bonds.
Over the past several years, there has been litigation involving
the FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trusts based on consumer protection
statutes in various states. Most of these class action lawsuits
have been settled. However, on Aug. 7, 2009, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a district court's decision and thus
significantly increased the amount of potential liability to the
trusts in four Missouri class actions. The Trustee petitioned for
a rehearing in these cases but was subsequently denied.
In separate Arkansas litigation, the Greene County District Court
most recently ruled in December 2009 in favor of the plaintiffs
stating that the interest paid on the mortgage notes was
exorbitant and that the class members are entitled to recovery
from the Trusts.
As a result of the ongoing litigation and the possibility that the
Trust and the Trustee could be held liable for the alleged actions
of the originators, the Trustee decided to suspend all
distributions to holders in October 2009 pending further
developments. This status continued in effect as of the January
2010 remittance date.
At this time, it is undetermined when or if these transactions
will receive distributions of interest and principal. In
addition, all funds that are retained will first be distributed as
a payment of fees and costs incurred by the Trustee in performing
its duties. The fees and costs due to the Trustee will increase
the likelihood that the bonds will incur non-recoverable interest
shortfalls and/or principal writedowns resulting in a default.
Fitch will continue to monitor these transactions for ongoing
developments and their potential impact on the bonds' outstanding
ratings.
The various bonds affected by the actions are:
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1997-2
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1997-3
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1997-4
-- Class A8 downgraded to 'C' from 'AAA';
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-1
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-2
-- Class A8 downgraded to 'C' from 'AAA';
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-3
-- Class A8 downgraded to 'C' from 'AAA';
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4
-- Class A8 downgraded to 'C' from 'AAA';
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-5
-- Class A9 downgraded to 'C' from 'AAA';
-- Class M1 downgraded to 'C' from 'AA';
-- Class M2 downgraded to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B1 downgraded to 'C' from 'BBB';
-- Class B2 downgraded to 'C' from 'BB'.
FORD AUTO: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class D Subordinate Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Ford
Auto Securitization Trust's C$556.191 million asset-backed notes
series 2010-R1.
The ratings reflect S&P's opinion of:
* The availability of approximately 13.9%, 11.1%, 9.2%, and 7.4%
credit support to the class A, B, C, and D notes, respectively,
based on stressed break-even cash flow scenarios. These credit
support levels provide coverage of more than 5x, 4x, 3x, and 2x
S&P's expected net loss range of 2.05%-2.25%;
* The transaction's ability to withstand more than 1.5x S&P's
expected net loss level in its "what-if" scenario analysis
before becoming vulnerable to a negative CreditWatch action
and/or a potential downgrade;
* The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the assigned rating
categories;
* The characteristics of the pool being securitized; and
* The transaction's payment and legal structures.
Ratings Assigned
Ford Auto Securitization Trust - Series 2010-R1
Interest Amount
Class Rating Type rate (mil. C$)
----- ------ ---- -------- ---------
A-1 AAA Senior Fixed 272.471
A-2 AAA Senior Fixed 124.208
A-3 AAA Senior Fixed 121.342
B AA Subordinate Fixed 16.359
C A Subordinate Fixed 10.905
D BB+ Subordinate Fixed 10.906
FORT POINT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three and affirmed two classes of
notes issued by Fort Point CDO II, Ltd./Inc.
As of the December 2009 trustee report, the balance of the
portfolio was $299 million, including $128 million in par of
assets deemed defaulted as per the transaction's governing
documents. Approximately 68.6% of the portfolio has been
downgraded since Fitch's last rating action in September 2008,
resulting in 63.6% of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 55.6% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or below, as compared to 41.7% and 23.6%, respectively,
at last review.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
Due to the significant collateral deterioration, credit
enhancement levels available to all classes of notes are exceeded
by the 'CCC' rating loss rate, the lowest rating level loss
projected by SF PCM. Given this, Fitch believes that the
likelihood of default for all classes of notes in this transaction
can be assessed without performing cash flow model analysis under
the framework described in the 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow
Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.
Fitch compared the respective credit enhancement levels for each
rated class of notes with the amount of underlying assets
considered distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower). These assets have
a high probability of default and low expected recoveries upon
default. The class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes have the credit
enhancement levels of 17.6%, -1.9% and -14.5%, respectively.
While these classes are still receiving interest distributions,
given the amount of distressed assets in the portfolio, Fitch
believes that default is inevitable for these classes at or prior
to maturity.
The class B and C notes are no longer receiving interest
distributions and are not expected to receive any proceeds going
forward. Therefore, the class B and C notes have been affirmed at
'C' to indicate Fitch's belief that default is inevitable at or
prior to maturity.
Fort Point II is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation, which
closed on Oct. 16, 2003, and has a portfolio that was initially
selected by State Street Research and is now managed by BlackRock
Financial Management. The transaction's revolving period ended in
November 2007. Presently 67% of the portfolio is composed of
residential mortgage-backed securities, 14.9% consists of
commercial mortgage-backed securities, 6.9% of corporate CDOs, and
6.4% of various consumer and commercial asset-backed securities.
The remaining 4.8% consists of structured finance CDOs, commercial
real estate CDOs, and senior unsecured debt issued by real estate
investment trusts.
Fitch has downgraded or affirmed these ratings as indicated:
-- $253,220,175 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'BB';
-- $60,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- $38,750,000 class A-3 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
-- $13,595,984 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
-- $13,898,998 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-RR1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust
2006-RR1, a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transaction. These ratings, as well as four additional ratings on
the same transaction, remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
S&P's downgrades of 13 CMBS certificates that serve as underlying
collateral for GCCMT 2006-RR1. The downgraded certificates have a
total balance of $139 million (21% of the pool balance) and are
from 11 distinct CMBS transactions. Eleven ratings on GCCMT 2006-
RR1 remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's
exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative
($30.1 million, 4.7%).
According to the Jan. 21, 2010, trustee report, 74 CMBS
certificates ($660.9 million, 100%) from 34 distinct transactions
issued between 1998 and 2006 collateralize GCCMT 2006-RR1. GCCMT
2006-RR1 has significant exposure to these CMBS certificates that
Standard & Poor's has downgraded:
* COMM 2006-C7 (classes E, F, G, and H; $48 million, 7.3%);
* Morgan Stanley Capital Trust 2006-HQ9 (classes H, J, and K;
$44 million, 6.7%); and
* ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-2 (classes F and G;
$19.9 million, 3.0%).
S&P expects to update or resolve its CreditWatch negative
placements on GCCMT 2006-RR1's certificates in conjunction with
its CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.
Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-RR1
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A1 BBB-/Watch Neg A-/Watch Neg
A2 B/Watch Neg BB-/Watch Neg
B CCC+/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
C CCC+/Watch Neg B/Watch Neg
D CCC/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
E CCC-/Watch Neg CCC+/Watch Neg
F CCC-/Watch Neg CCC/Watch Neg
Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
Greenwich Capital Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-RR1
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
Class Rating
----- ------
G CCC-/Watch Neg
H CCC-/Watch Neg
J CCC-/Watch Neg
K CCC-/Watch Neg
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-LDP5 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-LDP5 and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications. In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from the
same transaction.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions on the senior classes. The
downgrades of the subordinate classes also reflect credit support
erosion S&P anticipate will occur upon the eventual resolution of
several specially serviced loans. S&P's analysis included a
review of the credit characteristics of all of the loans in the
pool. Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P
calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.58x and a loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio of 94.9%. S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 1.00x and an LTV ratio of 123.7%. The implied defaults and
loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 72.5% and 29.7%,
respectively. S&P's weighted average DSC and LTV calculations
exclude four ($24.6 million, 0.6%) of the eight specially serviced
assets. S&P separately estimated losses for these four specially
serviced loans, which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied
default and loss figures.
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
1 and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria. S&P published a request for comment proposing changes
to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009. After S&P finalizes its
criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
As of the January 2010 remittance report, eight assets
($329.7 million, 7.8%) in the pool were with the special
servicers, Pacific Life and CWCapital Asset Management LLC. A
breakdown of the specially serviced assets by payment status is:
one is current (1.0%), four are 90-plus-days delinquent (2.6%),
one is in foreclosure (0.1%), and two are in bankruptcy
proceedings (4.2%). Five of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $10.7 million.
The fifth-largest loan in the pool, the Jordan Creek loan
($164.6 million, 3.9%), is specially serviced by Pacific Life.
The loan is secured by a first mortgage encumbering 939,085 sq.
ft. of a 1,508,398-sq.-ft. super-regional mall in West Des Moines,
Iowa. This loan was transferred to the special servicer on
April 2, 2009, due to a maturity default. The borrower, General
Growth Properties, filed for bankruptcy on April 16, 2009. On
Dec. 15, 2009, the bankruptcy court confirmed a modification plan
for 85 GGP loans, including the Jordan Creek loan. The special
servicer for this loan, PacLife, has confirmed that the maturity
date of this loan was extended 60 months, until March 1, 2014. As
of year-end 2008, the reported DSC was 1.80x and occupancy was
95%, compared with 1.71x and 85.9% at issuance.
The Hanover Mall loan ($87.2 million 2.1%), is the second-largest
loan with the special servicer, CWCapital. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 16, 2009, for imminent
default and is now more than 90 days delinquent. The loan is
secured by a 706,005-sq.-ft. anchored retail property in Hanover,
Mass. Numerous tenants have filed for bankruptcy, which resulted
in a loss of revenue at the property. The reported DSC as of
year-end 2008 was 1.41x, up from 1.14x at issuance. The borrower
has requested a loan modification.
The third-largest loan with the special servicer, CWCapital, is
the Hospitality Ventures Portfolio loan ($41.0 million, 1.0%).
This loan was transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 9,
2009, and is current. The loan is secured by a portfolio of five
full-service hotels in New Jersey, Tennessee, Maine, and Alabama
with a total of 655 rooms. The hotels were built between 1983 and
1991 and renovated between 2001 and 2006. The borrower and lender
have engaged in loan modification discussions.
The five remaining specially serviced loans ($37.0 million, 0.9%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.4% of the
total pool balance. S&P estimated losses for four of these five
loans resulting in weighted average loss severities ranging from
44.3% to 65.3%. S&P expects the remaining loan to be returned to
the master servicer.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had
an aggregate trust balance of $4.11 billion, which is
approximately 95.0% of the balance at issuance. The pool consists
of 181 assets, the same as at issuance. The master servicers for
the transaction are Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC and Midland
Loan Services Inc. The master servicers provided financial
information for 98.2% of the pool; 97.3% of the financial
information was full-year 2008 data or interim-2009 data. S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.68x for the pool based on
the servicer-reported figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.58x and 94.9%, respectively. These figures exclude four of the
eight specially serviced assets ($24.6 million, 0.6%). Thirty-
five loans ($561.8 million, 13.3%) are on the master servicers'
watchlists. Twenty-seven loans ($447.9 million, 10.6%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 14 of these loans
($278.7 million, 6.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x. The
transaction has not experienced any losses to date.
Summary Of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.9 billion (47.2%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.93x for the top 10 loans.
One of the top 10 loans appears on the master servicers'
watchlists and is discussed below. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for
the top 10 loans are 1.75x and 89.2%, respectively.
The NEC America Corporate Center loan ($99.1 million, 2.3%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan on the master
servicers' watchlists. The loan is secured by a 526,245?sq.-ft.
class A office building built in 2001 in Irving, Texas; a single-
tenant, NEC America, 100% occupies the building. The loan appears
on the watchlist due to a technical default resulting from an
underfunded reserve. The reported DSC for year-end 2008 was
1.49x, up from 1.33x at issuance.
The DRA-CRT Portfolio II loan ($138.1 million, 3.3%) is the
seventh-largest loan in the pool and has a near-term maturity of
Oct. 1, 2010. The loan is secured by a 1,401,560-sq.-ft.
portfolio of 30 office buildings built between 1966 and 2001 in
Jacksonville, Fla., Memphis, Tenn., and Orlando, Fla. Standard &
Poor's will continue to monitor this loan to maturity.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels are consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP5
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M AA AAA/Watch Neg 20.42
A-J A AAA/Watch Neg 13.15
B A- AA+/Watch Neg 12.51
C BBB+ AA/Watch Neg 10.72
D BBB AA-/Watch Neg 9.70
E BBB- A+/Watch Neg 9.19
F BB+ A/Watch Neg 7.91
G BB A-/Watch Neg 7.02
H BB- BBB+/Watch Neg 5.74
J B+ BBB/Watch Neg 4.72
K B+ BBB-/Watch Neg 3.19
L B+ BB+/Watch Neg 2.55
M B BB/Watch Neg 2.17
N B BB-/Watch Neg 1.79
O B- B+/Watch Neg 1.66
P B- B/Watch Neg 1.53
Q CCC+ B-/Watch Neg 1.28
Ratings Affirmed
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP5
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-1 AAA 30.63
A-2FL AAA 30.63
A-2 AAA 30.63
A-3 AAA 30.63
A-4 AAA 30.63
A-SB AAA 30.63
A-1A AAA 30.63
X-1 AAA N/A
X-2 AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
JPMORGAN CHASE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2005-LDP3 Certs. to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class N and O commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2005-
LDP3 to 'D' from 'CCC-'.
The downgrades reflect principal losses sustained by the classes
as reported on the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report. The class N
certificate sustained a $201,856 loss and has a remaining
principal balance of $7,384,143. The class O certificate
experienced a $5,056,000 principal loss that reduced the current
outstanding principal balance of the class to zero.
The principal losses resulted from the liquidation of two assets
that were with the special servicer, CWCapital Investments.
Details of the two liquidated assets are:
The Qwest Building had a total exposure of $27.7 million. The
asset consisted of a 324,645-sq.-ft. office property in Denver,
Colorado. The asset was transferred to the special servicer on
March 31, 2009, due to imminent default. The reported occupancy
at the property was 8% after Qwest vacated the building when its
lease expired in January 2009. A receiver was appointed on
June 1, 2009, and the property was liquidated through a note sale
on Jan. 14, 2010. The trust incurred a $9.0 million realized
loss, which was reflected in the most recent remittance report.
The Weston Village Apartments had a total exposure of $2.1 million
and comprises a 60-unit multifamily property in Greenfield, Ind.
The asset was transferred to CWCapital on Jan. 7, 2009, due to
monetary default, and a receiver was appointed on Feb. 9, 2009.
The receiver executed a purchase and sale agreement, and the trust
incurred a $1.2 million realized loss when the asset was
liquidated on Jan. 14, 2010, which was reflected in the most
recent remittance report.
Ratings Lowered
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
N D CCC-
O D CCC-
JPMORGAN-CIBC: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2006-RR1 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securities Trust 2006-RR1, a U.S. resecuritized real estate
mortgage investment conduit transaction. The three ratings that
S&P lowered to 'D' were previously on CreditWatch negative. Eight
of the lowered ratings and one additional rating remain on
CreditWatch negative.
The lowered ratings reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following the downgrades of 12 CMBS certificates that serve as
underlying collateral for JPM-CIBC 2006-RR1. The downgraded
certificates have a total balance of $72.8 million (13.9% of the
pool balance) and are from six CMBS transactions. The downgrades
to 'D' of classes J, K, and L reflect interest shortfalls to the
classes that S&P expects to continue for the foreseeable future.
Nine ratings from JPM-CIBC 2006-RR1 remain on CreditWatch negative
due to the transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral with ratings
on CreditWatch negative ($198.3 million, 37.8%).
According to the Jan. 21, 2010, trustee report, 83 CMBS
certificates ($523.9 million, 100%) from 53 distinct transactions
issued between 2002 and 2006 collateralized JPM-CIBC 2006-RR1.
JPMCIBC 2006-RR1 has significant exposure to these CMBS
certificates that Standard & Poor has recently downgraded:
* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C1 (classes
D and H;
* $19 million, 3.6%);
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP6
(classes G and H; $16.6 million, 3.2%); and
* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 (classes G, H,
and J; $15.6 million, 3%).
S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
JPM-CIBC 2006-RR1's certificate ratings in conjunction with its
CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.
Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A2 BBB-/Watch Neg BBB+/Watch Neg
B BB+/Watch Neg BBB-/Watch Neg
C BB-/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
D B/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
E B-/Watch Neg BB-/Watch Neg
F CCC+/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
G CCC-/Watch Neg B/Watch Neg
H CCC-/Watch Neg CCC+/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
J D CCC-/Watch Neg
K D CCC-/Watch Neg
L D CCC-/Watch Neg
Rating Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1
Class Rating
----- ------
A1 AA/Watch Neg
KENMARE 2005-I: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2005-I Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the notes
issued by Kenmare 2005-I Ltd., a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction backed by a reference portfolio of
mezzanine structured finance bonds, to 'D' from 'CCC-'.
S&P lowered its rating after a number of underlying securities
experienced write-downs that caused the notes to incur a principal
loss.
Rating Lowered
Kenmare 2005-I Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Notes D CCC-
MERRILL LYNCH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2005-LC1 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust's series 2005-LC1 and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on nine additional classes from the same transaction,
and removed one of them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of its rating actions. The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect credit support erosion S&P anticipates will
occur upon the eventual resolution of seven specially serviced
assets. S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.53x and a loan-to-value ratio of 93.5%. S&P
further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to
yield a weighted average DSC of 1.02x and an LTV of 119.8%. The
implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were
66.1% and 29.7%, respectively. The DSC and LTV calculations S&P
noted above exclude two defeased loans ($14.6 million, 1.0%) and
seven ($38.0 million, 2.6%) specially serviced assets. S&P
separately estimated losses for these seven assets and included
them in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificate reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificates based on S&P's current criteria. S&P
published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009. After S&P finalizes its criteria
review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the rating on the IO certificate
that S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
As of the January 2010 remittance report, eight assets
($97.0 million, 6.7%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
LNR Partners Inc. The payment status of the specially serviced
assets is: three are real estate owned ($20.7 million, 1.4%), two
are in foreclosure ($3.1 million, 0.2%), two are 90?plus-days
delinquent ($14.1 million, 1.0%), and one is current
($59.1 million, 4.1%).
The Four Forest Plaza and Lakeside Square loan ($59.1 million,
4.1%) is the third-largest loan in the pool and the largest loan
with the special servicer. The loan is secured by two office
buildings totaling 792,177 sq. ft. in Dallas, Texas. The loan is
current and is in the process of a modification. Upon completion,
S&P expects the loan to be returned to the master servicer.
The East Empire Industrial Portfolio is the second-largest asset
with the special servicer and has a total exposure of
$12.3 million (0.8%). The portfolio consists of 153,240 sq. ft.
of industrial space in Bend, Ore. The asset was transferred to
the special servicer on Oct. 8, 2007, and became REO on Sept. 25,
2009. There is an appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
$3.8 million in effect against this asset. Standard & Poor's
expects a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.
The six remaining specially serviced loans have balances that
individually represent less than 0.8% of the total pool balance.
S&P estimated losses for all seven assets, resulting in loss
severities ranging from 10% to 55%.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $1.457 billion, which is 94.2% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 138 loans, down from 142 at issuance.
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the master servicer,
Berkadia Commercial Mortgage, provided financial information for
97.8% of the pool; 97.0% of the servicer-provided information was
full-year 2008 or interim 2009 data. S&P calculated a weighted
average DSC of 1.55x for the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.53x and 93.5%, respectively,
which exclude two defeased loans ($14.6 million, 1.0%) and seven
specially serviced loans ($38.0 million, 2.6%). S&P estimated
losses separately for these seven loans. Twenty-nine loans
($431.0 million, 29.6%) are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including four of the top 10 loans. Eighteen loans
($100.9 million, 6.9%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x, and 13 of
these loans ($57.2 million, 3.9%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.0x.
Summary Of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$562.3 million (38.6%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.59x for the top 10 loans.
Four of the top 10 loans ($302.4 million, 20.8%) appear on the
master servicer's watchlist, which S&P discuss in detail below.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.52x and
93.2%, respectively.
The Colonial Mall Bel Air loan ($120.7 million, 8.3%) is the
largest loan in the pool and on the watchlist. The loan is
secured by a 999,799-sq.-ft. retail mall in Mobile, Ala. The loan
appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to JCPenney's
recent lease expiration. However, JCPenney recently exercised a
five-year renewal option.
The Glendale Galleria loan ($117.5 million, 8.1%) is the second-
largest loan in the pool and on the watchlist. The loan is
secured by 660,671 sq. ft. of a 1,319,015-sq.-ft. regional mall in
Glendale, Calif. The reported year-end 2008 DSC was 2.02x and
occupancy was 95.0%. The loan appears on the master servicer's
watchlist due to the bankruptcy filing of the borrower, General
Growth Properties. On Dec 15, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court
confirmed a modification plan for 85 GGP loans, which did not
include this loan. Standard & Poor's will continue to review the
details of the GGP loan restructurings as they become available.
The Samaritan Medical Tower loan ($34.5 million, 2.4%) is the
seventh-largest loan in the pool and the third-largest loan on the
watchlist. The loan is secured by a 143,491-sq.-ft. office
building in Los Angeles, Calif., and appears on the watchlist due
to a drop in occupancy. The reported DSC and occupancy for the
six months ended June 30, 2009, were 1.34x and 75%, respectively.
The Green Acres loan ($29.7 million, 2.0%) is the ninth-largest
loan in the pool and the fourth-largest loan on the watchlist.
The loan is secured by a 595-pad mobile home park in
Breinigsville, Penn. The reported DSC for year-end 2008 was
1.07x, down from 1.21x at issuance. The decrease in DSC was
caused by the loan converting to principal and interest payments
from interest-only.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LC1
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-J A+ AAA/Watch Neg 14.64
B A AA/Watch Neg 12.38
C A- AA-/Watch Neg 11.32
D BBB+ A/Watch Neg 9.33
E BBB A-/Watch Neg 8.27
F BBB- BBB+/Watch Neg 6.55
G BB+ BBB/Watch Neg 5.22
H BB- BBB-/Watch Neg 3.76
J B+ BB+/Watch Neg 3.23
K B+ BB/Watch Neg 2.83
L B BB-/Watch Neg 2.43
M B- B/Watch Neg 2.04
N CCC+ B-/Watch Neg 1.64
P CCC CCC+/Watch Neg 1.37
Ratings Affirmed
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LC1
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-2 AAA 31.75
A-3 AAA 31.75
A-3FL AAA 31.75
A-1A AAA 31.75
A-SB AAA 31.75
A-4 AAA 31.75
A-4FC AAA 31.75
X AAA N/A
Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LC1
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-M AAA 21.14
N/A - Not applicable.
MISSOURI HEALTH: Fitch Puts 'BB' Rating on $5.1 Mil. 2002A Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'BB' rating on these series of
bonds issued by the Missouri Health and Educational Facilities
Authority on behalf of St. Louis Charter School:
-- $5.1 million revenue bonds, series 2002A.
The Rating Outlook is revised to Positive from Stable.
Rating Rationale:
-- The Positive Outlook is based on SLCS' recent financial
improvement, which is highlighted by a positive operating
margin in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
-- Extremely weak balance sheet liquidity and historically
negative operating performance underpins SLCS' 'BB' rating.
-- SLCS' recent financial improvement is supported by a track
record of stable headcount, bolstered by an actively managed
waiting list, and the academic success of enrolled students.
-- While SLCS is subject to industry standard charter renewal
risk, it successfully completed its third charter renewal in
2007.
What Could Trigger An Upgrade?
-- Sustained generation of operating margins at or above a
break-even level, coupled with gradual growth in unencumbered
balance sheet resources.
-- Continued enrollment stability and healthy student demand.
Security:
The series 2002A bonds are secured by a gross revenue pledge, a
leasehold mortgage over the school's facility, and a debt service
reserve fund.
Credit Summary:
Following a number of years of deficits, SLCS' operating profile
has begun to improve, with a positive 3.5% and 4.7% operating
margin reported in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, respectively. The
operating improvement is a result of the school's stable
enrollment, stable per pupil funding, and better expense
management. While PPF was reduced for the 2009-2010 school year
due to budgetary pressure at the state level, SLCS expects to
conclude fiscal 2010 with a surplus similar in size to the prior
fiscal year. For 2010-2011, the school anticipates PPF to remain
flat with 2009-2010 levels. SLCS' ability to sustain recent
operating margin improvement could have positive implications for
its rating.
Although balance sheet resources are typically limited for most
charter schools, SLCS' financial cushion is notably weak, even
when the financial characteristics of its sector are considered.
Given the improvement in operating performance over the past two
years, however, SLCS' level of liquidity has improved slightly.
At June 30, 2009, SLCS reported $2.7 million of total cash and
cash equivalents, including approximately $1.8 million of reserve
funds relating to the series 2002A bonds. While this level of
cash and investments represents an increase of 18.8% from June 30,
2008, coverage of operating expenditures (9.2%) and debt (15.4%),
excluding bond reserve funds, is extremely low. SLCS ability to
strengthen balance sheet resources and liquidity is contingent
upon its ability to sustain recent operating improvement. As SLCS
has no immediate debt plans, its moderate debt burden (7% in
fiscal 2009), should continue to decline.
Established in 2000, SLCS is a public charter school serving over
900 students in kindergarten through eighth grade. SLCS'
headcount is generally stable and approaches the maximum capacity
of 930 students in most fiscal years. Supporting this stability
is an actively managed waiting list, which, as of January 2010,
contained approximately 275 children, and high student
achievement. To date SLCS' charter has been renewed three times,
most recently in 2007 for a five year period expiring in 2012.
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2006-1 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from ML-CFC
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1, two of which S&P lowered to 'D',
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications. In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on nine other classes from the
same transaction.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of its rating actions. The downgrades of the mezzanine and
subordinate classes also reflect credit support erosion S&P
anticipates will occur on the eventual resolution of 10 specially
serviced assets, as well as its analysis of one asset that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired. S&P lowered its ratings on the
class N and P certificates to 'D' because S&P expects the interest
shortfalls affecting the classes to recur for an extended period
of time. The interest shortfalls are primarily due to appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions related to 10 specially
serviced assets.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all the loans in the pool. Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of
1.81x and a loan-to-value ratio of 91.4%. S&P further stressed
the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.12x and an LTV of 126.4%. The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 67.7% and
36.8%, respectively. The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude 10 ($105.3 million, 5.1%) of the 12 specially serviced
assets and one credit-impaired loan ($21.1 million, 1.0%). S&P
separately estimated losses for these 11 loans and included them
in S&P's 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria. S&P
published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009. After S&P finalizes its criteria
review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the rating on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
As of the January 2010 remittance report, 12 assets
($130.9 million, 6.3%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc. The payment status of the specially
serviced assets is: three are in foreclosure ($14.6 million,
0.7%), eight are 90-plus-days delinquent ($105.9 million, 5.1%),
and one is less than 30 days delinquent ($10.3 million, 0.5%).
Ten of the specially serviced assets have appraisal reduction
amounts in effect totaling $45.7 million.
The Inglewood Park loan ($39.9 million, 1.8%) is the largest loan
with the special servicer and the 10th-largest loan in the pool.
The loan is 90-plus-days delinquent and is secured by five
industrial/flex buildings and two office buildings totaling
536,197 sq. ft. in Largo, Md. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Oct. 6, 2009, for payment default. Current
occupancy is approximately 47%, and the reported DSC for year-end
2008 was 0.65x. In January 2010, the lender used $5.2 million in
reserves to pay down the outstanding principal balance. The
special servicer is currently trying to work out a loan
modification with the borrower; if the modification does not
occur, Standard & Poor's expects a moderate loss upon the
resolution of this loan.
The U-Store-It Self-Storage Portfolio loan ($22.1 million total
exposure, 1.0%) is the second-largest loan with the special
servicer. The loan is secured by four properties consisting of
194,241 sq. ft. of self-storage space and 56,455 sq. ft. of
commercial warehouse space in Chicago and Des Plaines, Ill.,
respectively. The single tenant vacated the warehouse space at
the expiration of its lease term on Dec. 31, 2008, and the loan
was transferred to the special servicer on June 3, 2009. The
self-storage portions of the properties are 66% leased, on
average. The special servicer is currently trying to work out a
loan modification with the borrower; if the modification does not
occur, Standard & Poor's expects a significant loss upon the
resolution of this loan.
The 10 remaining specially serviced loans ($73.2 million, 3.5%)
have balances that individually represent less than 0.9% of the
total pool balance. S&P estimated losses for eight of these 10
loans, resulting in a weighted average loss severity of 44.5%.
One of the two loans for which S&P did not estimate a loss is in
discussions for a possible loan modification, and the other is a
recent transfer.
In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined the
Colonial Mall Glynn Place loan ($21.1 million, 1.0%) to be credit-
impaired. The loan is in its grace period and is secured by a
282,182-sq.-ft. retail property in Brunswick, Ga. The property
has not been producing positive net cash flow for the past six
months. Steve & Barry's, an anchor tenant with approximately 31%
of gross leasable area (GLA), vacated the property in late 2008
after filing for bankruptcy. For the trailing six months ended
June 30, 2009, the reported DSC was 0.80x, and occupancy was 75%.
As a result, Standard & Poor's considers this loan to be at an
increased risk of loss.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $2.074 billion, which is 96.9% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 147 loans, down from 152 at issuance
due to five loan payoffs ($9.6 million, 0.5%). The master
servicer, Wachovia Bank N.A., provided financial information for
99.5% of the pool, and 98.1% of the servicer-provided information
was full-year 2008 or interim-2009 data. S&P calculated a
weighted average DSC of 1.81x for the pool based on the reported
figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV, which exclude 10 of the 12
specially serviced loans and one credit-impaired loan, were 1.81x
and 91.4%, respectively. Including these loans, S&P's adjusted
DSC is 1.76x. The transaction has not experienced any principal
losses to date. Forty-two loans ($358.8 million, 17.3%) are on
the master servicer's watchlist, including one of the top 10
loans. Twenty-nine loans ($283.9 million, 13.7%) have a reported
DSC below 1.10x, and 22 of these loans ($232.5 million, 11.2%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$957.9 million (46.2%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 2.29x for the top 10 loans.
One of the top 10 loans ($39.9 million total exposure, 1.8%) is
with the special servicer, which S&P discussed in detail above,
and another ($41.1 million, 2.0%) appears on the master servicer's
watchlist, which S&P discuss in detail below. Excluding the
specially serviced loan, S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10
loans are 2.27x and 80.5%, respectively.
The Prince Georges Center II loan is the ninth-largest loan in the
pool and the largest loan on the master servicer's watchlist. The
loan was current in its debt service payments as of the January
2010 remittance report and has a trust balance of $41.1 million
(2.0%). The loan is secured by a 394,578-sq.-ft. office property
in Hyattsville, Md. The reported trailing-nine-month DSC for the
period ended Sept. 30, 2009, was 0.79x, down from 0.94x as of
year-end 2008. Two tenants 100% occupy the property. The General
Services Administration (GSA) occupies 99.5% of the building under
a lease that expires in 2012. The U.S. Department of Treasury
occupies the GSA space. The decrease in DSC is due to an increase
in utilities expense. The master servicer does not expect an
increase in utility reimbursements until the GSA tenant signs a
new lease.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M AA- AAA/Watch Neg 20.65
A-J BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg 11.87
AN-FL BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg 11.87
B BBB AA/Watch Neg 9.42
C BB+ AA-/Watch Neg 8.39
D BB A/Watch Neg 6.97
E BB- A-/Watch Neg 6.19
F B+ BBB+/Watch Neg 5.03
G B BBB/Watch Neg 4.26
H CCC BBB-/Watch Neg 2.97
J CCC BB/Watch Neg 2.71
K CCC- BB-/Watch Neg 2.45
L CCC- B/Watch Neg 2.07
M CCC- B-/Watch Neg 1.94
N D CCC+/Watch Neg 1.55
P D CCC/Watch Neg 1.29
Ratings Affirmed
ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-1 AAA 30.97
A-2 AAA 30.97
A-3 AAA 30.97
A-3FL AAA 30.97
A-3B AAA 30.97
A-SB AAA 30.97
A-4 AAA 30.97
A-1A AAA 30.97
X AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 2007-XLC1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades all classes of Morgan Stanley 2007-XLC1,
Ltd./LLC, reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 30.2%.
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.
The transaction is primarily collateralized by subordinate
commercial real estate debt: 83.2% of total collateral is either
B-notes or mezzanine debt. Fitch expects considerable losses upon
default for these assets since they are generally highly leveraged
debt classes. Three loans (6.4%) are currently defaulted. Fitch
modeled significant to full losses on these loan interests.
MS 2007-XLC1 is a static $616.8 million CRE collateralized debt
obligation. As of the January 2010 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations, the CDO was substantially invested: whole
loans/A-notes (16.6%), B-notes (28.1%), CRE mezzanine loans
(55.1%), and cash/uninvested proceeds (0.2%). All
overcollateralization and interest coverage ratios are currently
in compliance.
The transaction is currently subject to sequential paydown.
However, at origination, the CDO was subject to a modified pro
rata paydown feature, which allowed principal proceeds to be
applied pro rata to pay down the class A-1 through class J notes
under certain conditions. The conditions were breached in
November 2008 resulting in sequential payment being triggered.
Going forward, Fitch does not expect the transaction to revert to
pro rata paydown based on the high modeled expected loss.
Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 50.6% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 12.3% from generally trailing 12 month (TTM)
2009 cash flows. Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
40.3%, due to the subordinate position of many of the assets.
The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
mezzanine loan (12.2%) secured by interests in a portfolio of six
full-service hotels. At closing, the borrower funded significant
capital for a property improvement plan. Rooms have been offline
and cash flow was negative in 2008. Economic conditions have also
negatively affected property performance. Fitch modeled this loan
with 100% probability of default resulting in a significant base
case loss after accounting for the $6 million reserve in place for
debt service and operating expenses.
The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (18.3%) secured by interests in a 770-room
hotel located in the Times Square area of Manhattan. The property
also contains approximately 240,000 square feet of office and
retail space, as well as parking and signage space. Renovations
of approximately $68 million were completed in the fourth quarter
of 2008 (4Q'08); however, market weakness has affected property
performance. Revenue per average room is significantly below the
original projection. Fitch modeled a substantial loss on this
over-leveraged position.
The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (15.1%) secured by interests in a portfolio of
48 office properties located in five major metropolitan areas.
While cash flow from the property has been supporting debt
service, Fitch modeled a maturity default due to the portfolio's
overall value decline.
This transaction was analyzed according to the 'U.S. CREL CDO
Surveillance Criteria', which applies stresses to property cash
flows and debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.
Based on this analysis, the class A-1 notes' breakeven rates are
generally consistent with the 'BBB' rating category; the class A-2
notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent with the 'BB'
rating category; and the class B notes' breakeven rates are
generally consistent with the 'B' rating category.
Ratings for classes C through G are generally based on a
deterministic analysis because the notes' breakeven rates fall
below the 'B' rating category default levels. The deterministic
analysis considers the current percentage of defaulted and
delinquent assets and any Fitch loans of concern, as well as the
likelihood for OC tests to fail and/or cure. Based on this
analysis, classes C through G are consistent with a 'CCC' rating,
meaning default is possible given the credit enhancement to each
class falls below Fitch's base case loss expectation of 30.2%.
This ratings review incorporated an analysis of a proposed
amendment to the MS 2007-XLC1 CRE Servicing Agreement that
institutes fees to be paid to the current special servicer, CT
Investment Management Co., LLC. The proposed amendment is
expected to have negligible impact to the cash flow of the
transaction; as such, the proposed amendment did not result in or
cause the rating actions taken.
Currently, CTIMCO, a subsidiary of Capital Trust, Inc., receives
no fees for its services in its capacity as special servicer. The
proposed sliding fee schedule to be paid to CTIMCO is similar to
the fee schedule currently detailed in the transaction documents
for a replacement special servicer. A potential risk of the
proposed amendment is that CTIMCO could be motivated to hold the
specially serviced assets due to the increasing and uncapped rates
of the fee schedule. However, increased assets in special
servicing can cause the OC test to fail, cutting off cash flow to
the preferred shares, of which, a CTIMCO affiliate owns a
percentage.
While this change would affect CDO cash flows because under
current transaction documents CTIMCO is not entitled to special
servicing fees, the alternative, presumably, would be to find a
replacement special servicer whose maximum fee schedule is
stipulated in the transaction documents. A replacement special
servicer in all likelihood would not be as familiar with the CDO
assets. Further, the addition of the fee does not significantly
affect the cash flow available to pay the notes based on Fitch's
current expectation of future specially serviced loans, and
therefore would not change Fitch's credit opinion of the rated
liabilities. Finally, Fitch assumed a third party fee in its
original analysis.
An amendment to the CRE Servicing Agreement does not require
noteholder consent. However, a Notice to Noteholders of the
proposed amendment was sent on Dec. 4, 2009. As of Jan. 25, 2010,
Capital Trust reported receiving no objections to the proposed
amendment. Interested parties should contact the trustee for
further details. It remains the exclusive responsibility of the
noteholders to perform their own risk analysis of any proposed
amendments. Fitch is not a party to the transaction and therefore
does not provide consent or approval, as that remains the sole
preserve of the transaction parties. Fitch expects to be notified
by the trustee when or if the amendment is executed.
The class A through B notes were each assigned a Negative Rating
Outlook reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral. These classes were also
assigned Loss Severity ratings ranging from 'LS3' to 'LS5'. The
LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress. LS ratings should
always be considered in conjunction with probability of default
indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.
Classes C through G were assigned recovery ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities. The recovery ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model, and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(50.6% and 40.3%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag to determine the present value
of all future proceeds to that class. All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class' tranche size to determine a recovery rating.
The assignment of 'RR3' to class C reflects modeled recoveries of
54.9% of its outstanding balance. The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:
-- Present value of expected principal recoveries
($12.8 million);
-- Present value of expected interest payments ($1.2 million);
-- Total present value of recoveries ($14 million);
-- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($22.4 million).
The assignment of 'RR6' to class D through G reflects that the
modeled recovery for these classes is less than 10% of its
principal balance.
Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings, RR ratings, and Rating
Outlooks to the remaining classes:
-- $264,794,496 class A-1 downgrade to 'BBB/LS3' from 'AAA';
Outlook Negative;
-- $91,677,034 class A-2 downgrade to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA';
Outlook Negative;
-- $58,613,508 class B downgrade to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $25,549,254 class C downgrade to 'CCC/RR3' from 'A-';
-- $12,022,836 class D downgrade to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB+';
-- $9,768,918 class E downgrade to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB+';
-- $20,288,900 class F downgrade to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
-- $14,277,482 class G downgrade to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B'.
Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.
N-STAR REL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades all classes of N-Star REL CDO VI,
Ltd./LLC, reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 45.7%.
Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate market value and cash flow
declines.
N-Star VI is collateralized by senior and subordinate commercial
real estate debt: 41.4% of total collateral is either whole loans
or A-notes and 41.3% is either B-notes or mezzanine loans. Fitch
expects significant losses upon default for the subordinate assets
since they are generally highly leveraged debt classes. Two loans
(1.4%) are currently defaulted. Fitch modeled full losses on
these loan interests. Another matured balloon default (5.6%) was
recently extended for one year.
Additionally, four other assets (18.3%) are considered Fitch Loans
of Concern. These loans include three mezzanine loans (15.6%),
which are all related to a sponsor reported to be under financial
strain, and one whole loan (2.7%) secured by a vacant
industrial/office property. Fitch modeled significant to full
losses on these loans.
N-Star VI was issued as a $450 million CRE collateralized debt
obligation managed by NS Advisors, LLC. The transaction has a
five-year reinvestment period during which principal proceeds may
be used to invest in substitute collateral. The reinvestment
period ends in June 2011. In November 2009, $8 million of notes
were surrendered to the trustee for cancellation, which has
resulted in slightly larger cushion to the overcollateralization
ratios. All OC and interest coverage ratios have remained above
their covenants, as of the December 2009 trustee report.
As of the December 2009 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations, the CDO was substantially invested: CRE whole
loan/A-notes (41.4%), mezzanine loans (28.2%), B-notes (13.1%),
CRE CDOs (8.7%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (8.5%), and
cash (0.1%).
Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 68.6% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 10.4% from the most recent available cash
flows (generally from third quarter 2009). Fitch estimates that
average recoveries will be relatively low at 33.3%, due to the
concentration of subordinate assets.
The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
mezzanine loan (7.2%) secured by interests in a 400-unit
multifamily property located in Ventura, California. Although
current occupancy is 95% and performance has been relatively
stable, the loan is highly leveraged. Further, the sponsor of the
loan is reported to be under financial strain. Fitch modeled a
term default with a full loss under its base case scenario.
The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (7.1%) secured by interests in a 647-room
hotel located in Las Vegas, Nevada as well as the developments on
an adjacent 12-acre parcel of land. The business plan was to
expand the hotel, casino, retail, and food and beverage components
at the property. While progress has been made on the development,
economic conditions have limited property performance and cash
flow is significantly below original projections. Fitch modeled a
term default with a full loss under its base case scenario.
The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (6.9%) secured by interests in a 1,020 unit
multifamily property located in Framingham, Massachusetts.
Although current occupancy is 91% and performance has been
relatively stable, the loan is highly leveraged. Further, the
sponsor of the loan is reported to be under financial strain.
Fitch modeled a term default with a full loss under its base case
scenario.
This transaction was analyzed according to the 'U.S. CREL CDO
Surveillance Criteria,' which applies stresses to property cash
flows and uses debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based
on this analysis, the breakeven rates for class A-1 and A-R are
generally consistent with the 'BB' rating category. The breakeven
rates for class A-2 are generally consistent with the 'B' rating
category.
The ratings for classes B through G are generally based on a
deterministic analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to each
class's credit enhancement. Based on this analysis, the rating
for classes B through G is consistent with the 'CCC' rating,
meaning default is a real possibility given the credit enhancement
to each class falls below Fitch's base case loss expectation of
45.7%.
Classes A-1, A-R, and A-2 were each assigned a Negative Rating
Outlook reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral. These classes were also
assigned Loss Severity ratings ranging from 'LS4' to 'LS5'
indicating each tranche's potential loss severity given default,
as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected loss for
the collateral under the 'B' stress. LS ratings should always be
considered in conjunction with probability of default indicated by
a class' long-term credit rating. Fitch does not assign Rating
Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or lower.
Classes B through G were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities. Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model, and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(68.6% and 33.3%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag. All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class's tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating.
The assignment of 'RR4' to class B reflects modeled recoveries of
33% of its outstanding balance. The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:
-- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($2 million);
-- Present value of expected interest payments ($5.3 million);
-- Total present value of recoveries ($7.3 million);
-- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($13.9 million).
Classes C through G are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class's principal balance.
Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks, LS and Recovery
ratings to these classes:
-- $174,800,000 class A-1 to 'BB/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $70,000,000 class A-R to 'BB/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $27,225,000 class A-2 to 'B/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $21,825,000 class B to 'CCC/RR4' from 'AA';
-- $11,775,000 class C to 'CCC/RR6' from 'A+';
-- $10,000,000 class D to 'CCC/RR6' from 'A-';
-- $10,125,000 class E to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB+';
-- $7,650,000 class F to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB';
-- $6,900,000 class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B'.
Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.
ORANGE REGIONAL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on Series 2008 Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 rating assigned to
Orange Regional Medical Center's Series 2008 bonds issued by the
Dormitory Authority of the State of New York. The rating outlook
remains stable. The affirmation affects $260 million of debt
outstanding.
Legal Security: The bonds are secured by a pledge of Gross
Receipts of the Orange Regional Medical Center and a pledge of
first mortgage on the new campus. While not obligated the Orange
Regional Medical Center Foundation covenants to turnover to ORMC
all pledged funds for the new hospital. A fully funded debt
service reserve fund and days cash on hand test (60 days).
Interest Rate Derivatives: None.
Strengths
* ORMC continues to maintain its market share lead capturing a
distinctly leading 62% market share of its primary market and a
37% share of its total service area consisting of most of Orange
County. The number two provider (St. Luke's-Cornwall) captures
a distant 23% market share of the greater market while the
number three Bon Secours Health System hospitals have increased
their share to a 14% capture.
* Increasing case mix index, from 1.18 in 2002 to 1.39 in 2009,
reflecting the strategy to pursue higher acuity clinical
services and generate a stronger draw of patients beyond its
primary market as a regional referral center
* Reasonably sound demographics of the service area including
population growth, regional development, and high income levels
and low unemployment relative to the State's averages
* Two consecutive years of measurably improved operations follows
substantial multi-year increases to rates under third party
contracts. Through eleven months of FY 2009 (November 30,),
ORMC recorded an operating gain of $12.9 million (4.4% operating
margin) and operating cash flow of $22.8 million (7.8% operating
cash flow margin). This performance betters audited FY 2008
when ORMC recorded an operating gain of $9.9 million (3.3%
operating margin) and operating cash flow of $20.7 million (6.9%
operating cash flow margin) and FY 2007 when ORMC recorded an
operating gain of $2.4 million (0.9% margin) and operating cash
flow of $15.9 million (5.7% margin). While still modest
relative to the leverage (debt to cashflow of 10.5 times), these
results show continuous improvement over the $557 thousand
operating gain (0.2% margin) and $15.5 million operating cash
flow (5.6% margin) recorded in FY 2006. ORMC has met projected
operating performance targets set for FY's 2008 and 2009 at the
time of the bond issuance for the facility replacement
* Receipt of New York State Healthcare Efficiency and
Affordability Law Grant monies totaling $48.6 million for both
the cost of construction and defeasance of prior debt
demonstrated strong state support for this provider's
consolidation efforts to better serve the broader region.
* Historic success in extending the term for Medicare
reclassification to the New York City MSA for wage index
reimbursement to September 30, 2010, yielding $11 million of
annual net revenue. By September 30, 2010, ORMC will have
benefited from twelve consecutive years of re-classification.
Management has applied for extension through September 2013.
* All fixed rate debt (good headroom to bond covenant of 30 days
cash); no derivative exposure; very conservative asset
allocation on investments (nearly 100% cash, CD's and government
securities). All cash is available within a month.
* The two legacy hospital campuses have been sold. Cash proceeds
were used as a source of funding for replacement projects.
Challenges
* Recent variability in volume trends, with inpatient admissions
exceeding 5% growth in FY 2006 followed by two years of decline
(4.3% and 1% in FY's 2007 and 2008) before rebounding in FY
2009. Cardiac service volumes appear to be solid with ORMC
reporting 436 catheterizations through November 30, 2009 (as
compared to 388 for the full FY 2008)
* Liquidity remains a credit weakness. As of November 30, 2009,
unrestricted cash of $61 million equates to an adequate 76 days
cash but a very thin 23% cash-to-debt. Balance sheet measures
are thinner then cash projections had shown, largely due to
pension funding and some unexpected issuance costs at bond
closing that had required greater use of cash then expected.
* Elevated leverage with a high (unfavorable) 10.5 times debt-to-
cashflow and a modest, but improving, 1.5 times peak debt
service coverage based on eleven months of FY 2009
* Replacement hospital project risk of construction and the
uncertainty of patient referral patterns to the new site remains
a concern, although management expects the new site to
strengthen referral patterns and inpatient volumes.
* Competition from a large physician group (approximately 130-
members) for outpatient services, notwithstanding recent
collaborative ventures with these physicians to restore
relations. Both outpatient surgeries and outpatient visits have
trended down since FYE 2006
Outlook
The stable rating outlook is supported by ORMC's fundamental
attributes highlighted by a commanding market share in a growth
area of upstate New York and Moody's belief that improved
operating results will be sustained.
What could change the rating - UP
Successful completion and start-up of new Medical Center and
material reduction in leverage or increase in liquidity; sustained
operating improvement.
What could change the rating - DOWN
Reversal of operating trajectory; issuance of additional debt or
decline in cash
Key Indicators
Assumptions & Adjustments:
-- Based on financial statements for Orange Regional Medical
Center
-- First number reflects Audit year ended December 31, 2007
-- Second number reflects projected year ended December 31, 2008
-- Investment returns smoothed at 6% unless otherwise noted
* Inpatient admissions: 18,003; 17,847
* Total operating revenues: $280.5 million; $299.5 million
* Moody's-adjusted net revenue available for debt service: $19.2
million; $23.5 million
* Total debt outstanding: $38.9 million; $266.2 million
* Maximum annual debt service (MADS): $6.7 million; $18.3 million
* MADS Coverage with reported investment income: 2.9 times; 1.3
times
* Moody's-adjusted MADS Coverage with normalized investment
income: 2.9 times; 1.3 times
* Debt-to-cash flow: 2.4 times; 11.9 times
* Days cash on hand: 73 days; 59 days
* Cash-to-debt: 138%; 17%
* Operating margin: 0.9%; 3.3%
* Operating cash flow margin: 5.7%; 6.9%
Rated Debt
* Series 2008 Bonds, fixed rate
The last rating action was on January 8, 2008, when the Ba1 rating
and stable outlook were assigned to the Series 2008 bonds
PALISADES MEDICAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Two Revenue Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes this action on Palisades Medical Center
Obligated Group as part of its continuous surveillance effort:
-- $15,760,000 New Jersey Health Care Facility Financing
Authority revenue bonds, Palisades Medical Center, Inc.
Presbyterian Healthcare System Obligated Group Issue, Series
2002, affirmed at 'BB+'.
-- $28,630,000 New Jersey Health Care Facility Financing
Authority revenue bonds, Palisades Medical Center, Inc.
Presbyterian Healthcare System Obligated Group Issue, Series
1999, affirmed at 'BB+'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable.
Rating Rationale:
-- Despite recent improvement, operating losses do persist and
along with large accrued pension liabilities, combine to
weaken the obligated group's capital related and liquidity
ratios; which are more characteristic of a non-investment
grade profile.
-- A weakened financial standing restricts the obligated group's
ability to fund capital improvements going forward.
-- Palisades' operating environment is challenging with flat
volume trends and a payor mix where 60% of the revenue base
stems from a combination of Medicare and Medicaid sources.
Key Rating Drivers:
-- The Stable Outlook contemplates the continuation of the
obligated group's improved operating trends of fiscal year
2008 and through the nine month interim period ending
September 2009.
-- An additional component supporting the Stable Outlook is
Palisades Medical Center's designation as a tier one
essential hospital which provides additional charity
reimbursement to support PMC's indigent population.
Security:
The obligated group consists of PMC and Palisades General Care,
Inc. Bonds are secured by the gross receipts pledge of the
obligated group, a first mortgage on both the medical center and
the long term care facility and the debt service reserve fund.
Credit Summary:
The affirmation reflects the obligated group's continued improved
operating trends at fiscal year end 2008 which continue into the
nine month interim period ending Sept. 30, 2009. Liquidity ratios
are stable compared to prior years, but both capital related
ratios and liquidity ratios are weak in comparison to the rating
category medians.
After several years of increasingly larger operating losses at
PMC, leading to a significantly weakened balance sheet, Palisades
sharply reduced its operating losses for 2008 fiscal year ending
Dec. 31 and produced a small operating gain for the nine month
period ending Sept. 30, 2009. For the period ending Dec. 31,
2008, Palisades lost $0.8 million from operations (negative 0.6%
operating margin), a major improvement from the obligated group's
$5.7 million operating loss (negative 3.9% operating margin) that
occurred in fiscal 2008. Operating EBITDA margin improved 142%
between fiscal year end 2008 and the nine month period ending
September 2009. While EBITDA coverage of maximum annual debt
service (MADS) was adequate for the fiscal year 2008 at 1.7 times
MADS, EBITDA coverage of MADS has improved to a solid 3.2x
coverage for the interim period ending Sept. 30, 2009 and is well
ahead of the median for the rating category of 1.6x.
Credit concerns persists, especially weak liquidity ratios that
limit Palisades' ability to invest in capital improvements. At
fiscal year end 2008, Palisades has 57.2 days of cash on hand),
declining to 53.4 DCOH for the interim period, slightly below
Fitch rating medians for the category of 60 DCOH. The system's
average age of plant is 15.4 years, above the median of 12 years.
Consistently poor operating results have limited the obligated
group's ability to fund capital investment. For the period ending
Dec. 31, 2008, capital expenditures as a percentage of
depreciation expense were 54.5%, down from 75.5% in fiscal year
2007. The median for the category is 83.2%.
The obligated group's financial condition is further stressed
because of an actuarial adjustment to Palisades' future pension
liabilities, increasing Palisades' accrued pension liability from
$22.2 million at FY07 to $38.9 million at FY08. While coverage
numbers are slowly improving, years of operating losses coupled
with investment declines and the projected pension liability have
left the system with a negative fund balance that increased from
$13.1 million at the end of FY07 to $36.7 million at the end of
FY08. For the nine month period ending Sept. 30, 2009, the
current fund balance is negative $32 million.
Palisades' service area in North Bergen, NJ continues to be
challenging. Admissions declined to 9,276 in 2008 from 9,873 in
2007, reflecting the shift in services from inpatient to
outpatient services, the growth in observation status in lieu of
admissions and growing tertiary presence of Hackensack University
Medical Center (general revenue bonds rated 'A-' by Fitch), but
for the nine month interim period ending Sept. 30, 2009,
admissions increased 2.3% from 8,114 to 8,300 admissions year over
year stemming from the hospital's efforts to introduce new
programs at the medical center, expansion of existing services and
physician recruitment.
The Stable Outlook reflects Palisades' on going initiatives to
improve operations at PMC coupled with the historically solid cash
flow generated by the Harborage. PMC also has the leading market
share in the service area, is designated a Tier One Essential
Hospital by NJ Dept of Health, and interim utilization statistics
indicate evidence of growth in the secondary market. Fitch
continues to believe that these positive trends are likely to
develop into further profitability improvements over the near to
medium term.
PMC is a 202-bed acute care hospital located in North Bergen, NJ.
PGC is a 249-bed skilled nursing and assisted living facility
adjacent to the hospital. In fiscal 2008, Palisades reported
total operating revenues of $144.9 million. Palisades covenants
to provide to the NRMSIRs annual audited financial statements and
quarterly disclosure consisting of a balance sheet, income
statement, utilization statistics, and management discussion and
analysis.
PIONEER VALLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of four classes of Notes issued by Pioneer Valley
Structured Credit CDO I Ltd. The rating actions taken are:
-- US$870,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
Downgraded to Ca; previously on 2/13/2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- US$0 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due 2045, Downgraded to
Ca; previously on 2/13/2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- US$46,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
Downgraded to C; previously on 2/13/2009 Downgraded to Ca
-- Class X Notes Due 2010 (with a Class X Fixed Notional Amount
of $23,478,000), Downgraded to Ca; previously on 8/24/2009
Downgraded to Ba1
Moody's explained that the rating actions reflect information
about the transaction that it has recently received from the
Trustee. In a notice to Moody's from the Trustee dated January 6,
2010, the Trustee indicated that, following the occurrence of an
Event of Default with respect to the Issuer, the Trustee conducted
a public auction at which it sold all of the Cash Assets held by
the Issuer. The Trustee also reported that it designated
January 11, 2010, as the date on which the Trustee would make a
distribution of all of the proceeds from the liquidation. The
Trustee also issued a final distribution report dated January 11,
2010, which sets forth the amount of liquidation proceeds that
were treated as principal payments with respect to the Notes.
Moody's rating actions thus reflect changes in severity of losses
attributable to the Notes taking into account the final
distribution by the Trustee of liquidation proceeds.
PROSPECT FUNDING: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, A-3, A-5A, A-5B, A-6, and A-7 tranches of Prospect Funding I
LLC, a market value collateralized debt obligation transaction.
At the same time, S&P left its ratings on the class B and C
tranches from BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC, another
market value CDO, on CreditWatch with negative implications.
Finally, S&P affirmed its ratings on seven additional tranches
from these two transactions.
The rating actions follow S&P's monthly review of market value CDO
performance. The raised ratings reflect several months of stable
or improving overcollateralization ratios for the upgraded classes
as a result of increased loan prices. S&P's ratings remaining on
CreditWatch negative reflect O/C ratios that continue to fail.
The affirmations reflect adequate O/C ratios.
S&P will continue to monitor these transactions as part of its
monthly review process. S&P will take negative rating actions
when appropriate if S&P see declines in the O/C levels, and S&P
will remove its ratings from CreditWatch negative, affirm, or
raise them if the tranches reestablish an appropriate cushion
above the minimum O/C requirement for several consecutive months.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
Prospect Funding I LLC A-2 BBB BB
Prospect Funding I LLC A-3 BBB BB
Prospect Funding I LLC A-5A BBB BB
Prospect Funding I LLC A-5B BBB BB
Prospect Funding I LLC A-6 BBB BB
Prospect Funding I LLC A-7 BBB BB
Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC B BB/Watch Neg
BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC C CCC-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC D CC
BlackRock Senior Income Series III PLC E CC
Prospect Funding I LLC B-2 CCC
Prospect Funding I LLC C-1 CCC-
Prospect Funding I LLC D-1 CC
Prospect Funding I LLC D-2 CC
Prospect Funding I LLC SecCredAgr CCC
RFMSII HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Ten Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of ten
tranches issued in five RFMSII Home Loan Trust transactions and
placed five of these tranches on review for possible further
downgrade, due to higher expected pool losses in relation to
available credit enhancement. The collateral backing these
securities consists primarily of high LTV closed-end second lien
residential mortgage loans to prime borrowers.
The primary drivers in the downgrades were significantly higher
than expected increases in the delinquent loans and cumulative
losses over the last year. Cumulative losses for these deals
roughly doubled over the past year from an average of 7.5% to
15.5%. At the same time, the average proportion of loans 30 or
more days delinquent for these deals has been sustained in the
area of 8% over the past year, indicating that the rate of new
delinquencies is not abating. Loans in these deals are high LTV
closed-end second loans to prime-quality borrowers. Significant
deterioration in the performance is consistent with the
deterioration observer in first-lien prime jumbo loans from the
2006-2007 vintages. Moody's expect performance to continue to
deteriorate for next 12 months.
The securities are guaranteed by the Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company. In light of the withdrawal of FGIC's insurance financial
strength ratings on March 25, 2009, Moody's ratings on structured
finance securities that are guaranteed or "wrapped" by FGIC are
based solely on the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security, regardless of
whether the underlying rating had been previously published or
not.
When analyzing underlying ratings for CES and HELOC transactions,
Moody's projects cumulative losses for each deal based on analysis
of the deal's Constant Prepayment Rate and Constant Default Rate.
CPR is based on the average of the last six months' 1-month CPR
with floors and caps. A base CDR is determined by two approaches.
The first approach reflects the rate of recent losses, by
calculating CDR based on pool losses from the previous twelve
months. The second approach is more forward-looking and reflects
pending losses, which are calculated based on the current pipeline
of delinquencies. In order to calculate pending losses, Moody's
assumes a 100% roll rate for loans 60 or more days delinquent and
a 25% roll rate for loans 30 days delinquent, and a 100% severity.
The base CDR for loss projection purposes is determined by
averaging the CDRs calculated in these approaches. For yearly CDR
projections, Moody's assumed that the CDR for these transactions
in the first year will be 50% higher than the base, will then
decline to the base level for year 2, decline to 75% of the base
level for year 3, and decline to 50% of the base level for year 4,
remaining constant thereafter.
Based on calculated CPR and CDR, Moody's calculates projected
deal-specific cumulative losses and the weighted average life of
the deal. Moody's expects cumulative losses to range from 40% to
50% for these deals (as a percentage of original balance).
The credit enhancement calculation can include credit for excess
spread, i.e. the aggregate, positive difference in the weighted
average loan coupon and the all-inclusive securities' interest and
deal fees, including servicing. Excess spread benefit was
calculated by multiplying the stressed annualized excess spread by
the weighted average life of the deal.
Aggregate credit enhancement which combines subordination benefit
(including over-collateralization and/or reserve accounts) and
excess spread benefit is compared with projected cumulative losses
for the deal to derive coverage multiples and associated ratings
by deal tranche. Moody's will analyze tranche coverage multiples
after consideration of timing of tranche repayment and allocation
of losses (if any).
Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI2
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A1 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to A1 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 7, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2008
Downgraded to B1
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17,
2008 Downgraded to B1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI3
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa2 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 7, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17, 2008
Downgraded to Ba3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca; previously on Dec 17,
2008 Downgraded to Ba3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI4
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 7, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 19, 2008
Downgraded to Caa1
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17,
2008 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2006-HI5
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 7, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 19, 2008
Downgraded to B2
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17,
2008 Downgraded to B2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2007-HI1
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aa3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 and Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 7, 2008 Upgraded to
Aa3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17, 2008
Downgraded to Ba2
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Dec 17,
2008 Downgraded to Ba2
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
SAPPHIRE VALLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A, B, C, D, and E notes issued by Sapphire Valley CDO I
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by
Babson Capital Management LLC. The ratings on the notes remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications. At the same time, S&P
affirmed its rating on the class X notes and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications.
The downgrades reflect the application of S&P's updated criteria,
which S&P published on Sept. 17, 2009, as well as deterioration in
the credit quality of the portfolio.
According to Standard & Poor's collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) performance database, as of the most recent available
report, 25.07% of the current portfolio for Sapphire Valley CDO I
Ltd. consisted of CDOs backed by corporate obligors. This
exposure to corporate CDOs negatively affected the ratings on the
transactions because of increases in the correlation levels S&P
assumes in S&P's updated criteria between corporate assets and
corporate CDOs, as well as among the corporate CDO notes.
The notes remain on CreditWatch negative due to the large
percentage of portfolio collateral with ratings currently on
CreditWatch negative.
The affirmation of the rating on class X reflects S&P's view that
the tranche has adequate credit support to maintain the current
rating according to its updated criteria.
Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.
Rating And Creditwatch Actions
Rating
------
Sapphire Valley CDO I Ltd To From
------------------------- -- ----
Class A A+/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
Class X AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Class B BBB/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Class C BB+/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
Class D BB-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Class E B+/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
SCANDINAVIAN TRUST: S&P Publicizes 'BB' Rating on Secured Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services made public its 'BB' rating on
the secured bonds from Scandinavian Trust S.A., a market-value
collateralized debt obligation transaction, at the issuer's
request.
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on 2002-B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB+' rating on
Stonehenge Capital Fund Colorado LLC's medium-term notes series
2002-B at Stonehenge Capital Fund's (the issuer's) request.
The rating was based solely on the full financial guarantee
insurance policy that MBIA Insurance Co. ('BB+') had provided,
which guaranteed the timely payment of interest and principal
according to the transaction's terms.
Rating Withdrawn
Stonehenge Capital Fund Colorado LLC
$22.058 mil sr struct med-term nts ser 2002-B due 03/01/2013
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
86183@AA4 NR BB+
NR - Not rated.
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Ratings on Senior Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB+' ratings on
Stonehenge Capital Fund New York LLC's senior structured notes
series 2000B, 2000B-2, and 2005-B, and medium-term notes series
2004-B at Stonehenge Capital Fund New York LLC's request.
The ratings were based solely on the full financial guarantee
insurance policies that MBIA Insurance Co. ('BB+') had provided,
which guaranteed the timely payment of interest and principal
according to each transaction's terms.
Ratings Withdrawn
Stonehenge Capital Fund New York LLC
$11.469 mil sr struct med-term nts ser 2005-B due 12/15/2016
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
861832A#0 NR BB+
$13.554 mil gtd med-term nts ser 2004-B due 12/15/2015
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
240471MA7 NR BB+
$52.867 mil sr struct med-term nts ser 2000B-2 due 12/15/2011
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
861832A*4 NR BB+
$6.81 mil sr struct med-term nts ser 2000B due 12/15/2010
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
861832AA1 NR BB+
NR - Not rated.
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Ratings on Two Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB+' ratings on
Stonehenge Capital Fund Texas L.P.'s medium-term notes series
2005B and Stonehenge Capital Fund Texas II L.P.'s MTNs series
2008-B at Stonehenge Capital Fund's (the issuer's) request.
The ratings were based solely on the full financial guarantee
insurance policies that MBIA Insurance Co. ('BB+') had provided,
which guaranteed the timely payment of interest and principal
according to each transaction's terms.
Ratings Withdrawn
Stonehenge Capital Fund Texas L.P.
$23.413 mil sr struct med-term nts ser 2005B due 08/01/2011
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
-- NR BB+
Stonehenge Capital Fund Texas II L.P.
US$27.377 mil Medium Term Notes med-term nts ser 2008-B
due 08/01/2015
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
-- NR BB+
NR - Not rated.
STONEHENGE CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Ratings on Two Series
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB+' ratings on
Stonehenge Capital Fund Alabama LLC's medium-term notes series
2004-B and Stonehenge Capital Fund Alabama II LLC's MTNs series
2008B and 2008-C at Stonehenge Capital Fund's (the issuer's)
request.
The ratings were based solely on the full financial guarantee
insurance policies that MBIA Insurance Co. ('BB+') had provided,
which guaranteed the timely payment of interest and principal
according to each transaction's terms.
Ratings Withdrawn
Stonehenge Capital Fund Alabama LLC
$19.493 mil gtd med-term nts ser 2004-B due 03/01/2014
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
86185#AA0 NR BB+
Stonehenge Capital Fund Alabama II LLC
$17.766 mil capco nts med-term nts ser 2008B due 03/01/2019
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
-- NR BB+
$1.564 mil capco medium term notes med-term nts ser 2008-C
due 03/01/2019
Rating
------
CUSIP To From
----- -- ----
-- NR BB+
NR - Not rated.
STRUCTURED ENHANCED: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Series 1998-1 to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the notes issued by Structured
Enhanced Return Vehicle Trust, series 1998-1 to 'C' from 'CCC'.
The SERVES 1998-1 portfolio is comprised of a pool of less than 30
senior secured loans, most of which are currently impaired
(approximately 37% are rated 'D' based on Fitch's derived rating).
Fitch analyzed the credit risk of the portfolio using the
Portfolio Credit Model as described in Fitch's Corporate CDO
criteria. Based on this analysis, the par subordination of the
notes (approximately 12%) was less than the 'CCC' rating loss rate
as derived from PCM. In addition, because of the negative market
value coverage of the notes and the percentage of impaired assets
in the portfolio, Fitch has downgraded the notes to 'C', as a
default appears inevitable.
SERVES 1998-1 closed on Dec. 18, 2001, and is managed by PPM
America, Inc. The transaction began as a total rate of return
CLO, defined by the presence of a market value based termination
trigger (the threshold value event) which, if breached, could lead
to portfolio liquidation. All of the loans in the portfolio were
synthetically referenced via a total return swap.
In June 2009, the swap was terminated and a $26.5 million class X
note was issued, which is pari-passu to the rated notes. Since
then, the transaction has been in wind down mode, and much of the
portfolio has been liquidated.
TIERS BEACH: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Six 2006-11 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded its
ratings on certificates and CDS transactions issued by TIERS Beach
Street 3 Synthetic CLO 2006-11, a collateralized debt obligation
transaction referencing a static portfolio of corporate entities.
It has also downgraded its ratings on the $25M Series 2006-11A
(Cayman) certificates.
The rating actions are:
-- US$25M Series 2006-11A (Cayman) Certificates, Downgraded to
Aa2; previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1 and Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- US$6M Series 2006-11C (U.S.) Certificates, Upgraded to A2;
previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
-- US$5.78M Class D1 Swap (Reference CA1112640), Upgraded to
Baa1; previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
-- US$1.97M Class D2 Swap (Reference CA1112641), Upgraded to
Baa1; previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
-- US$6.72M Class E1 Swap (Reference CA1112642), Upgraded to
Ba2; previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to B1
-- US$2.28M Class E2 Swap (Reference CA1112643), Upgraded to
Ba2; previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to B1
Moody's explained that the upgrade rating actions taken are the
result of an improvement of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio. Since the last rating action, the weighted average
rating factor of the portfolio, after adjustment for forward
looking measures, has improved from 2494 to 2374, equivalent to an
average rating of B1. The decrease in WARF is partly attributed
to an improvement of the forward looking measures such as outlook
and watch status for many credits in the portfolio. Moody's note
that the reference portfolio is well diversified with no single
industry representing more than 10% of the total portfolio.
Additionally, there is a fixed recovery rate of 70% for credit
events in this transaction.
Since the last rating action on the transaction, the subordination
of the rated tranches has been reduced due to credit events on
Mark IV Industries Inc. and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. However, the
impact on the tranche ratings of these credit events was limited
given the high fixed recovery rate and the low ratings of these
reference entities prior to default.
Furthermore, Moody's explained that the downgrade of the Series
2006-11A (Cayman) certificates reflects the negative action taken
by Moody's on Trinity Plus Funding Company, which acts as the GIC
provider for the certificates in this transaction. On March 26,
2009, Moody's downgraded the long-term counterparty rating of
Trinity Plus Funding Company, LLC from Aaa to Aa2.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the strength of the legal
framework as well as specific documentation features, and
selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.
US CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of notes from U.S.
Capital Funding IV, Ltd./Corp. following a payment default on
scheduled interest due, as well as additional portfolio credit
deterioration.
The downgrades to the class B-1 and B-2 (class B) notes
incorporate the transaction's non-payment of its periodic interest
due. On the Sept. 1, 2009 payment date, the senior
overcollateralization test failed at 119.3% relative to its
respective trigger of 125%. Available proceeds of $1.9 million
were used to cure the failing senior coverage test, resulting in a
payment shortfall to the class B notes. The class B notes
received none of their interest due. This non-payment to the
notes is considered a payment default.
An additional driver to the downgrades on the class A-1 and A-2
notes is continued underperformance of collateral due to negative
portfolio credit migration, and additional defaults and deferrals.
Since April 2009, the portfolio experienced $45.5 million (13.5%)
of new defaults and $20.2 million (6%) of new deferrals.
Currently defaulted securities represent $74 million (22%) and
deferring securities $43.9 million (13.1%) of the portfolio.
Fitch considered $117.9 million (35.1%) of default and deferrals
in its analysis up from $77.2 million in April 2009. This
additional deterioration makes default a real possibility for the
class A-1 notes while a default on the class A-2 notes appears
probable.
Due to the recent event of default, as well as the current
condition of the portfolio from continued deterioration, Fitch did
not perform cash flow modeling as part of this analysis. This
review was conducted under the framework described in the report
'Fitch Revises Criteria for Reviewing U.S. CDOs Backed by Bank &
Insurance TruPS' dated March 25, 2009 using updated bank scores
for projecting expected losses for the underlying portfolio. This
framework assumes 100% loss for defaulted securities, a default
rate of 50% for all deferring securities, and a 25% default rate
for banks with a Fitch bank score of 4.5 or 5.0.
Fitch has taken these actions:
-- $192,905,774 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BBB';
-- $14,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'BB';
-- $92,250,000 class B-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
-- $12,500,000 class B-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC'.
Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks to classes rated 'CCC' or
lower. The Rating Outlook for classes A-1 and A-2 was Negative
prior to the downgrades.
VALLEJO CITY: S&P Raises Rating on $21.2 Mil. Certs. From 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its underlying rating to
'BBB' from 'BBB-' on Vallejo City Unified School District,
California's $102 million general obligation GO bonds. In
addition, Standard & Poor's raised its SPUR to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
on the district's $21.2 million certificates of participation.
The outlook remains stable for both the GO bonds and the COPs.
"The upgrades reflect S&P's view of demonstrated state support,
including the State Office of Education's central role in
governing and administering the district; a record number of
budget cuts that have resulted in balanced operations; and the
remaining $10 million balance of state loan funds for unexpected
financial events," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Ian
Carroll.
The district's bonds are secured by an unlimited pledge of ad
valorem taxes in the case of the GO bonds. For the COPs, the
district covenants to budget and appropriate lease payments for
the use of the facilities and improvements; the district may abate
lease payments in the event of damage or destruction, a risk S&P
believes is mitigated by the district's covenant to maintain
rental interruption insurance that will cover total rental
payments for at least 24 months. Vallejo Unified School District
is located in the San Francisco Bay Area, east of San Francisco in
Solano County. The district has a residential population of about
120,000, and has a declining enrollment trend of about 500
students per year.
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 121 Classes From Eight RMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 121
classes from eight U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo, subprime, and
Alternative-A residential mortgage loan collateral issued from
2003 through 2007. Concurrently, S&P removed 34 of them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P also downgraded five
of these classes to 'D'. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
16 classes from seven of the downgraded transactions.
Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for all rated
prime jumbo, subprime, and Alt-A transactions issued in 2005,
2006, and 2007. S&P's lifetime projected losses have changed for
these transactions:
Orig. bal. Lifetime
Transaction (mil. $) exp. loss (%)
----------- ---------- -------------
Citigroup Loan Trust 2007-10 (Ln Grp 1) 207 2.25
Citigroup Loan Trust 2007-10 (Ln Grp 10) 640 12.29
Citigroup Loan Trust 2007-10 (Ln Grp 12) 295 27.20
Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-2 345 10.36
Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-2, which closed in February 2008,
contained fixed Alt-A mortgage loan collateral with weighted
average seasoning at transaction closing of approximately five
months. As a result, S&P accounted for this seasoning when S&P
applied S&P's loss severity and default assumptions for fixed
Alt-A mortgage loan collateral.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given its current projected losses due to increased
delinquencies. The downgrades to 'D' reflect its assessment of
principal write-downs on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.
In the case of prime jumbo collateral, in order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for an
'AAA' rating. For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 127% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 154% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 235% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
In the case of subprime and Alt-A collateral, in order to maintain
a rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 150% for an
'AAA' rating. For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 110% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 120% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios. These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.
The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups. Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s). Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur if a group collateral balance is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.
Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
undercollateralized groups to mitigate this issue. However, if
the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate that is lower
than the pass-through rate of the undercollateralized group,
available interest may not be sufficient to satisfy the
undercollateralized group's interest requirement. Therefore, the
principal portion of available funds may be used to satisfy
interest obligations based on the interest-principal payment
priority within the structure.
In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this risk because structures may pay principal pro rata
with senior support classes. Although the senior class was not
exposed to a write-down in any of the prior periods, the senior
class could be susceptible to a write-down in the final period due
to the aforementioned issues.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo, subprime, and Alt-
A mortgage loans that are secured by first and second liens on
one- to four-family residential properties.
Rating Actions
2003-CB6 Trust
Series 2003-CB6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 12489WHF4 BB- BBB
M-3 12489WHG2 B- BB
M-4 12489WHH0 CCC B-
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-9
Series 2005-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 07387AEG6 BBB AA
A-2 07387AEH4 B BB
X 07387AEJ0 BBB AA
B-2 07387AEL5 CC CCC
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust Series 2007-7
Series 2007-7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
IA-1 173104AA8 BBB- AAA
IA-2 173104AB6 B BBB
IA-IO 173104AC4 BBB- AAA
IIIA-1 173104AF7 AA+ AAA
IIIA-IO 173104AG5 AA+ AAA
A-PO 173104AH3 B BBB
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10
Series 2007-10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A1B 17313QAB4 B AAA
1B1 17313QAC2 CCC AA
1B2 17313QAD0 CC A
1B3 17313QAE8 CC BBB
1B4 17313QAF5 CC BB
1B5 17313QAG3 CC B
2A1A 17313QAK4 CCC AAA
22AA 17313QAL2 CCC AAA
2A2A 17313QAM0 CCC AAA
2A2IO 17313QAQ1 CCC AAA
2A2B 17313QAN8 CCC AAA
212B 17313QAP3 CC AAA
2A3A 17313QAR9 CCC AAA
2A3B 17313QAS7 CC AAA
2A3IO 17313QAT5 CCC AAA
2A4A 17313QAU2 CCC AAA
2A4B 17313QAV0 CC AAA
2A5A 17313QAW8 B AAA
2A5B 17313QAX6 CC AAA
2B1 17313QAY4 CC AA
2B2 17313QAZ1 D A
2B3 17313QBA5 D BBB
31AA 17313QBF4 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
3A1A 17313QBG2 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
3A1B 17313QBH0 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
3A1C 17313QBJ6 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
31AB 17313QBK3 CC AAA/Watch Neg
3A1IO 17313QBL1 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
3A2A 17313QBM9 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
3A2B 17313QBN7 CC AAA/Watch Neg
3A3A 17313QBP2 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
3A3B 17313QBQ0 CC AAA/Watch Neg
3B1 17313QBR8 CC AA/Watch Neg
3B2 17313QBS6 D A/Watch Neg
3B3 17313QBT4 D BBB/Watch Neg
3B4 17313QBU1 D BB/Watch Neg
Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-2
Series 2008-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 52522UAA1 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2 52522UAB9 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3 52522UAC7 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A4 52522UAD5 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A5 52522UAE3 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A6 52522UAF0 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A7 52522UAG8 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A8 52522UAH6 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A9 52522UAJ2 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
1-A10 52522UAK9 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A11 52522UAL7 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A12 52522UAM5 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A13 52522UAN3 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A14 52522UAP8 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A15 52522UAQ6 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A16 52522UAR4 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
1-A17 52522UAS2 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
AP 52522UAT0 CCC AAA/Watch Neg
B1 52522UAU7 CC AA/Watch Neg
B2 52522UAV5 CC A/Watch Neg
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR5 Trust
Series 2005-AR5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-4 92922FL89 BBB- AAA
A-5 92922FL97 BB+ AAA
A-6 92922FM21 BB+ AAA
B-1 92922FM39 CCC BB
B-2 92922FM47 CC CCC
B-3 92922FM54 CC CCC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-14 Trust
Series 2005-14
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-2 949832AB5 BBB A+
I-A-7 949832AG4 BBB A+
I-A-8 949832AH2 BBB A+
I-A-9 949832AJ8 BBB A+
I-A-10 949832AK5 BBB A+
I-A-11 949832AL3 BBB A+
I-A-PO 949832AM1 BBB A+
II-A-2 949832AQ2 BBB- AA-
II-A-PO 949832AS8 BBB- AA-
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-9 Trust
Series 2006-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 94980SAA3 B+ BBB-
I-A-2 94980SAB1 B+ BBB-
I-A-3 94980SAC9 B+ BBB-
I-A-4 94980SAD7 AA- AAA
I-A-5 94980SAE5 B+ BBB-
I-A-6 94980SAF2 B+ BBB-
I-A-7 94980SAG0 B+ BBB-
I-A-8 94980SAH8 BB- BBB-
I-A-9 94980SAJ4 A- AA+
I-A-10 94980SAK1 B+ BBB-
I-A-11 94980SAL9 B+ BBB-
I-A-12 94980SAM7 A- AA+
I-A-13 94980SAN5 A- AA+
I-A-14 94980SAP0 B+ BBB-
I-A-15 94980SAQ8 B+ BBB-
I-A-16 94980SAR6 B+ BBB-
I-A-17 94980SAS4 A- AA+
I-A-18 94980SAT2 B+ BBB-
I-A-19 94980SAU9 B+ BBB-
I-A-20 94980SAV7 B+ BBB-
I-A-21 94980SAW5 B+ BBB-
I-A-22 94980SAX3 B+ BBB-
I-A-24 94980SAZ8 B+ BBB-
I-A-25 94980SBA2 B+ BBB-
I-A-26 94980SBB0 BB- BBB-
I-A-27 94980SBC8 B+ BBB-
I-A-28 94980SBD6 B+ BBB-
I-A-29 94980SBE4 B+ BBB-
I-A-30 94980SBF1 B+ BBB-
I-A-31 94980SBG9 A- AAA
I-A-32 94980SBH7 B+ BBB-
I-A-33 94980SBJ3 A- AA+
I-A-34 94980SBK0 B+ BBB-
I-A-35 94980SBL8 B+ BBB-
II-A-1 94980SBN4 B+ BBB-
II-A-2 94980SBP9 B+ BBB-
A-PO 94980SBQ7 B+ BBB-
Ratings Affirmed
2003-CB6 Trust
Series 2003-CB6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-5 12489WHC1 AAA
AF-6 12489WHD9 AAA
M-1 12489WHE7 AA+
M-5 12489WHJ6 CCC
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-9
Series 2005-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 07387AEK7 CCC
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Trust Series 2007-7
Series 2007-7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IIA-1 173104AD2 AAA
IIA-IO 173104AE0 AAA
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10
Series 2007-10
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1A1A 17313QAA6 AAA
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR5 Trust
Series 2005-AR5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-3 92922FL71 AAA
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-14 Trust
Series 2005-14
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 949832AA7 AAA
I-A-3 949832AC3 AAA
I-A-4 949832AD1 AAA
I-A-5 949832AE9 AAA
I-A-6 949832AF6 AAA
II-A-1 949832AP4 AAA
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-9 Trust
Series 2006-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 94980SBR5 CCC
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 30 Classes From Five Hybrid CDO ABS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 30
classes of notes from five cash flow and one hybrid collateralized
debt obligation of asset-backed securities transactions. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'CC' rating on one of the tranches.
Five of the lowered ratings were previously on CreditWatch
negative. Concurrently, one of the lowered ratings will remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.
These rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an EOD and may
be subject to acceleration or liquidation.
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd. triggered an event of default on June 29,
2009, after which, the controlling noteholders voted to accelerate
the maturity of the notes.
For all the other deals, S&P has received notices from the
trustees stating that the liquidation of the portfolio assets is
complete and that the available proceeds were insufficient to pay
the noteholders in full.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Deal Name Class To From
--------- ----- -- ----
Madaket Funding I Ltd A1M D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd A1Q D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd A2 D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd A3 D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd A4 D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd B D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd C D CC
Madaket Funding I Ltd D D CC
Tricadia CDO 2004-2 Ltd A D CCC/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2004-2 Ltd B D CC
Tricadia CDO 2004-2 Ltd C D CC
Cairn Mezz ABS CDO IV Ltd A1S D CC
Cairn Mezz ABS CDO IV Ltd A1J D CC
Cairn Mezz ABS CDO IV Ltd A2 D CC
Cairn Mezz ABS CDO IV Ltd A3 D CC
Cairn Mezz ABS CDO IV Ltd B1 D CC
Cairn Mezz ABS CDO IV Ltd B2 D CC
Pioneer Valley StCr I Ltd X D BB/Watch Neg
Pioneer Valley StCr I Ltd A-1A D CCC-/WatchNeg
Pioneer Valley StCr I Ltd A-2 D CC
Pioneer Valley StCr I Ltd B D CC
Pioneer Valley StCr I Ltd C D CC
Pioneer Valley StCr I Ltd D D CC
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd A-1 D CCC-
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd A-2 D CC
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd A-3 D CC
Saturn Ventures II, Ltd B D CC
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd X BB+/Watch Neg AAA/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd A-2L D CCC/Watch Neg
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd A-3L CC CCC/Watch Neg
Rating Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd B-1L CC
Other Outstanding Rating
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Tricadia CDO 2005-3 Ltd A-1L BB/Watch Neg
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 33 Certs. From 10 Separate CMBS to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 33
classes of certificates from 10 separate commercial mortgage-
backed securities transactions to 'D' because of recurring
interest shortfalls that S&P expects to continue for the
foreseeable future.
Twenty-eight of the downgraded classes have experienced interest
shortfalls for six or more months. The recurring interest
shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily due to
one or more of these:
* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for
specially serviced assets;
* Nonrecoverable advance declarations by the transactions'
respective master servicers;
* Recovery of advances previously made by the transactions'
respective master servicers;
* Trust expenses that may include but are not limited to property
operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments and legal
expenses;
* and Special servicing fees.
Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs that are
based on recent MAI (Member of the Appraisal Institute) appraisals
as well as the nonrecoverable advances, recovery of advances,
trust expenses, and special servicing fees that S&P believes are
likely to continue. The appraisal reduction amounts, however, are
subject to revision pending the receipt of updated appraisals by
the special servicer.
ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms. Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due and an
appraisal or other valuation is not available within a specified
timeframe. To decide which classes from the affected transactions
to downgrade to 'D', S&P primarily considered ASERs that were
based on ARAs calculated from appraisals. S&P used this approach
because ARAs based on principal balance are subject to revision,
and possible reversal, once valuations are obtained by the special
servicer.
Details of the 33 downgraded classes from the 10 CMBS deals are
provided below.
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C5
S&P lowered its ratings on the class L, M, N, and O certificates
in the Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2007-C5
(CSCMT 2007-C5) transaction due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to 15 assets that are
currently with the special servicer, Centerline Servicing Inc.
(Centerline). As of the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, ARAs
totaling $84.4 million are in effect for these 15 assets. The
resulting reported ASER amount was $463,361 and the reported
cumulative ASER amount was $2,454,694. Standard & Poor's
considered 12 ASERs ($379,700), which are based on recent MAI
appraisals, and current special servicing fees to determine its
ratings actions for this transaction. The transaction is
experiencing additional ASER related shortfalls on three assets.
Reported interest shortfalls total $662,294 and reached the class
J certificates. Classes L, M, N, and O have experienced interest
shortfalls for the past six months and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the CSCMT 2007-C5 transaction consists of
194 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.71 billion. As of
the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, 27 assets ($485.7 million;
17.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including two
top 10 assets. The payment status of the delinquent assets is:
two ($17.6 million; 0.6%) are real estate owned; 12
($303.1 million, 11.2%) are in foreclosure; nine ($81.5 million,
3.0%) are 90-plus days delinquent; one ($8.7 million, 0.3%) is
60-plus days delinquent; and four ($33.6 million, 1.3%) are 30-
plus days delinquent.
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C3
S&P lowered its ratings on the class M, N, O, P, Q, and S
certificates in the Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust series
2007-C3 transaction due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily
resulting from ASERs related to 16 assets that are currently with
the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. As of the Jan. 15, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $86.2 million are in effect for
these 16 assets. The resulting reported ASER amount was $417,923
and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $2,352,950. Standard
& Poor's considered six ASERs ($232,367), which are based on
recent MAI appraisals, and current special servicing fees to
determine its ratings actions. The transaction is experiencing
additional ASER related shortfalls on nine assets. An ASER is not
in effect for one asset with an ARA. Reported interest shortfalls
total $554,405 and have reached the class J certificates. Classes
M and N have experienced interest shortfalls for the past six
months, classes O, P, and Q have experienced interest shortfalls
for the past eight months, and class S has experienced interest
shortfalls for the past 10 months. S&P expects these shortfalls
to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the CSCMT 2007-C3 transaction consists of
236 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.67 billion. As of
the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, 25 assets ($315.5 million;
11.8%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including one
top 10 asset. The payment status of the delinquent assets is:
four assets ($70.0 million; 2.6%) are REO; eight ($61.2 million,
2.3%) are in foreclosure; four ($35.6 million, 1.3%) are 90-plus
days delinquent; one ($4.8 million, 0.2) is 60-plus days
delinquent; and two ($59.4 million, 2.2%) are 30-plus days
delinquent.
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2
S&P lowered its ratings on the class P and Q certificates in the
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C2 transaction to 'D' due to
recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs
related to 14 assets that are currently with the special servicer,
LNR. As of the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$163.6 million are in effect for 15 assets. An ASR is not in
effect for one asset with an ARA. The total reported ASER amount
was $405,152 and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$2,858,887. Standard & Poor's considered nine ASERs ($354,351),
which are based on recent MAI appraisals, and current special
servicing fees to determine its ratings actions. The transaction
is experiencing additional ASER-related shortfalls on four assets.
Reported interest shortfalls totaled $492,794 and have reached the
class K certificates. Class P has experienced interest shortfalls
for the past five months, class Q has experienced interest
shortfalls for the past eight months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the LBUBS 2007-C2 transaction consists of
170 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.54 billion. As of
the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, 17 assets ($397.3 million;
11.2%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including one
top 10 asset. The payment status of the delinquent assets is:
four assets ($74.1 million; 2.1%) are REO; five ($85.3 million,
2.4%) are in foreclosure; and six ($28.0 million, 0.8%) are 90-
plus days delinquent.
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-5
S&P lowered its ratings on the class L, M, N, and O certificates
in the Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-5 (BACM
2006-5) transaction to 'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to nine assets that are
currently with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.
As of the Jan. 11, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$37.5 million are in effect for these nine assets. The resulting
reported ASER amount was $200,356 and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $1.41 million. Standard & Poor's considered five ASERs
($115,623), which are based on recent MAI appraisals, and current
special servicing fees to determine its ratings actions. The
transaction is experiencing additional ASER-related shortfalls on
four assets. Reported interest shortfalls totaled $297,225 and
have reached the class H certificates. Classes L, M, and N have
experienced interest shortfalls for the last five months, class O
has experienced interest shortfalls for the last eight months, and
S&P expects these shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the BACM 2006-5 transaction consists of
183 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.21 billion. As of
the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, 20 assets ($473.6 million;
21.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including two
of the top 10 assets. The payment status of these assets is: 11
($121.8 million; 5.5%) are 90-plus days delinquent; one
($130.0 million, 5.9%) is 30 days delinquent; one ($30.5 million,
1.4%) is less than 30 days delinquent; four ($31.4 million, 1.4%)
are in their grace period; and three ($159.9 million, 7.2%) are
current.
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5
S&P lowered its ratings on the class M, N, and O certificates in
the Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C5 (CSMC
2006-C5) transaction to 'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to 12 assets that are
currently with the special servicer, LNR. As of the Jan. 15,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $40.8 million are in effect
for these 12 assets. The resulting reported ASER amount was
$213,443 and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $1,100,709.
Standard & Poor's considered five ASERs ($58,419), which are based
on recent MAI appraisals, and current special servicing fees to
determine its ratings actions. The transaction is experiencing
additional ASER-related shortfalls on seven assets. Reported
interest shortfalls totaled $433,236 and have reached the class J
certificates. Class M has experienced interest shortfalls for the
past five months, classes N and O have experienced interest
shortfalls for the past six months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the CSMC 2006-C5 transaction consists of
303 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.39 billion. To
date, no loans have defeased. As of the Jan. 15, 2010, remittance
report, 24 assets ($506.2 million; 14.9%) in the pool were with
the special servicer, including two top 10 assets. The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: one asset ($3.2 million; 0.1%)
is REO; seven ($110.4 million, 3.3%) are in foreclosure; seven
($34.0 million, 1.0%) are 90-plus days delinquent; three
($7.6 million, 0.2%) are 60-plus days delinquent; and three
($28.8 million, 0.9%) are 30-plus days delinquent.
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC14
S&P lowered its ratings on the class J, K, L, M, N, and P
certificates in the JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2006-CIBC14 (JPMCC 2006-CIBC14) transaction to 'D' due to
recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
nonrecoverable advance declarations by the transaction's master
servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, and ASERs related to
18 assets that are currently with the special servicer, Midland.
As of the Jan. 12, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$73.7 million are in effect for these 18 assets. The resulting
reported ASER amount was $349,394 and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $2,427,445. Standard & Poor's considered eight ASERs
($277,121), which are based on recent MAI appraisals, and current
special servicing fees to determine its ratings actions. In
addition, S&P considered Berkadia's determination that future
servicing advances totaling $220,072 for six loans will be
nonrecoverable. The transaction is experiencing additional ASER-
related shortfalls on 10 assets. Reported interest shortfalls
totaled $684,892 and have reached the class G certificates.
Classes J, K, L, M, N, and P have experienced interest shortfalls
for the past seven months or more, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the JPMCC 2006-CIBC14 transaction consists
of 198 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.68 billion.
As of the Jan. 12, 2010, remittance report, 26 assets
($251.5 million; 9.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
including one top 10 asset. The payment status of the delinquent
assets is: Two loans ($22.2 million, 0.8%) are in foreclosure; 17
($171.0 million, 6.4%) are 90-plus days delinquent; two
($24.0 million, 0.1%) are 60-plus days delinquent; and five
($26.7 million, 1.0%) are 30-plus days delinquent.
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2
S&P lowered its ratings on the class N and P certificates in the
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2006-C2 (MLMT 2006-C2) transaction to
'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
ASERs related to eight assets that are currently with the special
servicer, J.E. Robert Co. Inc. As of the Jan. 12, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $27.9 million are in effect for
these eight assets. The resulting reported ASER amount was
$145.2 million and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$1,016,050. Standard & Poor's considered five ASERs ($125,107),
which are based on recent MAI appraisals, and current special
servicing fees to determine its ratings actions. The transaction
is experiencing additional ASER-related shortfalls on three
assets. Reported interest shortfalls totaled $178,355 and have
reached the class J certificates. Class N has experienced
interest shortfalls for the past seven months, class P has
experienced interest shortfalls for the past eight months, and S&P
expects these shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the MLMT 2006-C2 transaction consists of
124 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.33 billion. As of
the Jan. 12, 2010, remittance report, 10 assets ($150.4 million;
11.3%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including two
top 10 assets. The payment status of the delinquent assets is:
two assets ($12.6 million, 1.0%) are in foreclosure; six
($50.2 million, 3.8%) are 90-plus days delinquent; and one
($4.8 million, 0.4%) is 60-plus days delinquent.
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.-Apos's
Series 2001-CK6
S&P lowered its ratings on the class O and P certificates in the
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2001-
CK6 transaction to 'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to seven assets that are
currently with the special servicer, Midland. As of the Jan. 15,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $9.7 million are in effect
for these seven assets. The resulting reported ASER amount was
$54,937 and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $336,553.
Standard & Poor's considered three ASERs ($29,550), which are
based on recent MAI appraisals, and current special servicing fees
to determine its ratings actions. The transaction is experiencing
additional ASER-related shortfalls on four assets. Reported
interest shortfalls totaled $81,309 and have reached the class O
certificates. Classes O and P have experienced interest
shortfalls for the past nine months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the CSFB 2001-CK6 transaction consists of
113 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $778.5 million. To
date, 24 loans (224.2 million, 28.7%) have defeased. As of the
Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, nine assets ($31.9 million;
4.1%) in the pool were with the special servicer. The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: one loan ($359,462, 0.1%) is
in foreclosure; five ($23.5 million, 3.0%) are 90-plus days
delinquent; and one ($7.3 million, 0.9%) is 60-plus days
delinquent.
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2000-WF2
S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, and M certificates in
the Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2000-
WF2 transaction to 'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to two assets that are
currently with the special servicer, Berkadia. As of the Jan. 15,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $6.8 million are in effect
for these two assets. The resulting reported ASER amount was
$59,942 and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $757,718.
Standard & Poor's considered both ASERs, which are based on recent
MAI appraisals, and current special servicing fees to determine
its ratings actions. The transaction is not experiencing
additional ASER-related shortfalls. Reported interest shortfalls
total $68,292 and have reached the class K certificates. Classes
K and L have experienced interest shortfalls for the past seven
months, class M has experienced interest shortfalls for the past
11 months, and S&P expects the shortfalls to recur for the
foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the BSCMS 2000-WF2 transaction consists of
125 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $547.2 million. To
date, 31 ($162.2 million) loans have been defeased. As of the
Jan. 15, 2010, remittance report, four assets ($24.0 million;
4.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer. The payment
status of these assets is: one ($8.0 million; 1.5%) is REO; two
($12.5 million, 2.3%) are in foreclosure; and one ($3.5 million,
0.6%) is 60-plus days delinquent.
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2000-C1
S&P lowered its ratings on the class L certificates in the Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2000-C1 (CSFB
2000-C1) transaction to 'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to five assets that are
currently with the special servicer, Berkadia. As of the Jan. 15,
2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $6.7 million are in effect
for these five assets. The resulting reported ASER amount,
excluding the Holiday Inn liquidation, was $40,797 and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $281,918. Standard & Poor's
considered three ASERs ($27,998), which are based on recent MAI
appraisals, and current special servicing fees to determine its
ratings actions. The transaction is experiencing additional ASER-
related shortfalls on two assets. Reported interest shortfalls,
excluding the Holiday Inn liquidation, total $48,989 and have
reached the class K certificates. Class L has experienced
interest shortfalls for the past nine months and has an
accumulated interest shortfall totaling $100,619 that S&P expects
to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
The collateral pool for the CSFB 2000-C1 transaction consists of
72 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $327.5 million. To
date, 22 ($194.0 million) loans have defeased. As of the Jan. 15,
2010, remittance report, eight assets ($27.8 million; 6.9%) in the
pool were with the special servicer. The payment status of the
delinquent assets is: two assets ($7.2 million, 1.8%) are REO and
five ($18.2 million, 4.5%) are in foreclosure.
Ratings Lowered
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C5
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
L D CCC- 3.14 41,297 239,696
M D CCC- 2.76 41,297 247,780
N D CCC- 2.38 41,297 247,780
O D CCC- 1.76 68,828 412,966
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C3
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
M D CCC- 2.42 31,256 187,533
N D CCC- 2.04 46,883 281,300
O D CCC- 1.79 31,256 232,155
P D CCC- 1.53 31,256 250,044
Q D CCC- 1.16 46,883 375,066
S D CCC- 0.91 31,256 292,103
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-C2
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
P D CCC- 1.51 37,869 192,470
Q D CCC- 1.38 18,934 151,477
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-5
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
L D CCC+ 1.90 23,946 112,683
M D CCC+ 1.78 11,973 59,865
N D CCC 1.52 23,950 131,700
O D CCC- 1.14 35,919 271,241
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-5
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
M D CCC- 1.75 54,353 278,412
N D CCC- 1.50 36,232 217,394
O D CCC- 1.37 18,116 108,697
JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC14
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
J D CCC+ 2.44 58,909 404,894
K D CCC 1.93 58,908 431,262
L D CCC- 1.67 29,452 235,618
M D CCC- 1.54 14,726 117,809
N D CCC- 1.29 29,456 235,652
P D CCC- 1.03 29,452 235,618
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C2
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
N D CCC- 1.58 17,430 128,342
P D CCC- 1.29 17,430 145,502
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CK6
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
O D B- 2.83 23,540 211,858
P D CCC 2.23 23,540 211,858
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF2
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
K D CCC+ 2.09 11,594 48,197
L D CCC- 1.32 23,132 164,633
M D CCC- 0.94 11,593 125,188
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C1
Reported
Rating Interest shortfalls
------ -------------------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%) current accumulated
----- -- ---- ---------------------- ------- -----------
L D CCC+ 1.75 0 100,619
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Tranches From 13 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 38
tranches from 13 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions. At the same time, S&P removed seven of
the lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, S&P placed 15 of the lowered ratings on CreditWatch
negative. S&P's ratings on 10 downgraded tranches remain on
CreditWatch negative, indicating a significant likelihood of
further downgrades. S&P also placed the rating on one additional
tranche on CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed its
ratings on 26 tranches. Lastly, S&P withdrew its rating on one
tranche from MKP CBO III Ltd. following its complete paydown.
The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on U.S. subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities. The CreditWatch
placements primarily affect transactions for which a significant
portion of the collateral assets currently have ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications or have significant
exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.
The 38 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $4.201 billion. Twelve of the 13 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities. The other transaction
is a high-grade SF CDO of ABS that was collateralized at
origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated tranches of RMBS
and other SF securities.
The affirmations reflect current credit support levels, which S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I A-1A A-/Watch Neg AAA
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I A-1B A-/Watch Neg AAA
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I A-1C A-/Watch Neg AAA
C-BASS CBO IX Ltd. A-1 A/Watch Neg AAA
C-BASS CBO IX Ltd. A-2 BB+/Watch Neg AAA
C-BASS CBO IX Ltd. B B/Watch Neg AA+
C-BASS CBO IX Ltd. C CC AA
C-BASS CBO IX Ltd. D CC A-
Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd A-1NV B+/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd A-1VA B+/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd A-1VB B+/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd A-2 CC B/Watch Neg
E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd. A-2 A AAA
Gemstone CDO Ltd A-1 A/Watch Neg AAA
Gemstone CDO Ltd A-2 AA/Watch Neg AAA
Gemstone CDO Ltd A-3 A/Watch Neg AAA
Gemstone CDO Ltd B BB+/Watch Neg AA
Gemstone CDO Ltd C CCC/Watch Neg BBB-/Watch Neg
Gemstone CDO Ltd D-1 CC CCC
Gemstone CDO Ltd D-2 CC CCC
MKP CBO III Ltd A-2 A/Watch Neg AAA
MKP CBO III Ltd B D BBB/Watch Neg
MKP CBO III Ltd A Combo NR AAA
MKP CBO III Ltd B/C Combo CCC-/Watch Neg CCC+/Watch Neg
Northlake CDO I, Limited I-MM B-/Watch Neg A-/Watch Neg
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd. A-1 AA/Watch Neg AAA
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd. A-2 B+/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd. C CC CCC/Watch Neg
Porter Square CDO II, Ltd. A-2 CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Porter Square CDO II, Ltd. B CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Revelstoke CDO I Ltd A-1 CCC-/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
Saturn Ventures I, Ltd A-1 AA/Watch Neg AAA
Saturn Ventures I, Ltd A-2 BB+/Watch Neg AA
Saturn Ventures I, Ltd A-3 CC BB+
Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd A-1 AAA/Watch Neg AAA
Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd A-2 CCC-/Watch Neg BB-/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding IV, Ltd A-1 AA/Watch Neg AAA
South Coast Funding IV, Ltd A-2 BB+/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding IV, Ltd B CC BB+/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding IV, Ltd C CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I B CC
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I C CC
Capital Guardian ABS CDO I Pfd Shares CC
Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd B CC
Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd C CC
E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd. B CC
E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd. C-1 CC
E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd. C-2 CC
E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd. Compo Secs CC
E*Trade ABS CDO I, Ltd. Pref Shrs CC
Gemstone CDO Ltd E CC
MKP CBO III Ltd C CC
Northlake CDO I, Limited I-A CC
Northlake CDO I, Limited II CC
Northlake CDO I, Limited III CC
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd. Pre Shares CC
Porter Square CDO II, Ltd. C CC
Porter Square CDO II, Ltd. D CC
Revelstoke CDO I Ltd A-2 CC
Revelstoke CDO I Ltd A-3 CC
Revelstoke CDO I Ltd B CC
Saturn Ventures I, Ltd B CC
Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd B CC
Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd C-1 CC
Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd C-2 CC
South Coast Funding IV, Ltd. Pre Shares CC
Other Outstanding Rating
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Pacific Bay CDO. Ltd. B D
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 39 Classes From Three Prime Jumbo RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 39
classes from three U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions issued in 2005. Additionally, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 19 classes from the same transactions.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses in light of
increased delinquencies.
For information on how S&P derives its loss assumptions, its use
of loss curve forecasting methodology, and how S&P incorporates
each transaction's current delinquency (including 60- and 90-day
delinquencies), default, and loss trends into its analysis, please
see the articles list in the Related Research section below.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. For prime
jumbo transactions, in order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class,
S&P assessed whether, in its view, a class could absorb the base-
case loss assumptions S&P used in its analysis. In order to
maintain a rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class
could withstand losses exceeding its base-case loss assumptions at
a percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for an
'AAA' rating. For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 127% of S&P's base-case
loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 154% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 235% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to cover
losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transaction. The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime
mortgage loans that are secured by first liens on one- to four-
family residential properties.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency pipeline performance to assess whether, in its view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deems
appropriate.
Ratings Lowered
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-9
Series 2005-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 05949CJF4 B- AAA
1-A-2 05949CJG2 B- AAA
1-A-3 05949CJH0 B- AAA
1-A-4 05949CJJ6 B- AAA
1-A-5 05949CJK3 B- AAA
1-A-6 05949CJL1 B- AAA
1-A-7 05949CJM9 B- AAA
1-A-8 05949CJN7 B- AAA
1-A-9 05949CJP2 B- AAA
1-A-10 05949CJQ0 B- AAA
1-A-11 05949CJR8 B- AAA
1-A-12 05949CJS6 B- AAA
30-IO 05949CJU1 B- AAA
30-PO 05949CJV9 B- AAA
B-1 05949CKB1 CCC B+
B-3 05949CKD7 CC CCC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR1 Trust
Series 2005-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-2 949781AB4 A AAA
II-A-1 949781AC2 A- AAA
II-A-IO A- AAA
I-B-1 949781AG3 B- A
II-B-1 949781AK4 B- A
I-B-2 949781AH1 CCC B
II-B-2 949781AL2 CCC B
I-B-3 949781AJ7 CC CCC
II-B-3 949781AM0 CC CCC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR16 Trust
Series 2005-AR16
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-2 94981QAB4 BBB+ A
II-A-1 94981QAD0 A- A
III-A-1 94981QAE8 A- A
III-A-3 94981QAG3 BBB+ A
IV-A-2 94981QAJ7 BBB+ AAA
IV-A-3 94981QAK4 BBB+ A
IV-A-7 94981QAP3 A- A
IV-A-8 94981QAQ1 BBB+ A
VI-A-1 94981QAS7 BBB+ AAA
VI-A-2 94981QAT5 BBB+ A
VI-A-3 94981QAU2 BBB+ AAA
VI-A-4 94981QBJ6 BBB+ A
Cr-B-2 94981QAX6 CC CCC
Cr-B-3 94981QAY4 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2005-9
Series 2005-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A-1 05949CJW7 AAA
3-A-1 05949CJX5 AAA
3-A-2 05949CKH8 AAA
3-A-3 05949CKJ4 AAA
4-A-1 05949CJY3 AAA
4-A-2 05949CKK1 AAA
4-A-3 05949CKL9 AAA
15-IO 05949CJZ0 AAA
15-PO 05949CKA3 AAA
B-2 05949CKC9 CCC
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR1 Trust
Series 2005-AR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 949781AA6 AAA
I-A-IO 949781AF5 AAA
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR16 Trust
Series 2005-AR16
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 94981QAA6 AAA
III-A-2 94981QAF5 AAA
IV-A-1 94981QAH1 A
IV-A-5 94981QAM0 A
IV-A-6 94981QAN8 AAA
V-A-1 94981QAR9 A
Cr-B-1 94981QAW8 CCC
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 49 Classes From 16 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 49
classes from 16 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. closed-end second-lien and second-lien
high-combined-loan-to-value mortgage loan collateral issued from
1999 to 2007, and removed four of the lowered ratings from
CreditWatch negative. S&P downgraded 15 classes to 'D' due to
realized losses on the certificate balances of those classes. In
addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 168 classes from 77
transactions and removed 63 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis. In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
its base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization provide credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consist of fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage loans
that are secured by second liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.
Rating Actions
CWABS, Inc.
Series 2002-S3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-5 126671RV0 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
A-IO 126671RW8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 126671RX6 CC AA/Watch Neg
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S1
Series 2006-S1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 126685CZ7 CC CCC
A-3 126685DA1 CC CCC
A-4 126685DB9 CC CCC
A-5 126685DC7 CC CCC
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S2
Series 2006-S2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 126685DW3 D BBB
A-3 126685DX1 D BBB
A-4 126685DY9 D BBB
A-5 126685DZ6 D BBB
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S3
Series 2006-S3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 23242MAA9 D BBB
A-2 23242MAB7 D BBB
A-3 23242MAC5 D BBB
A-4 23242MAD3 D BBB
A-5 23242MAE1 D BBB
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S4
Series 2006-S4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 23243NAD0 CC CCC
A-2 23243NAE8 CC CCC
A-3 23243NAF5 CC CCC
A-4 23243NAG3 CC CCC
A-5 23243NAH1 CC CCC
A-6 23243NAJ7 CC CCC
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S5
Series 2006-S5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 126683AA9 D BB
A-2 126683AB7 D BB
A-3 126683AC5 D BB
A-4 126683AD3 D BB
A-5 126683AE1 D BB
A-6 126683AF8 D BB
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S6
Series 2006-S6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 126684AA7 CC CCC
A-2 126684AB5 CC CCC
A-3 126684AC3 CC CCC
A-4 126684AD1 CC CCC
A-5 126684AE9 CC CCC
A-6 126684AF6 CC CCC
FFMLT 2007-FFB-SS
Series 2007-FFB-SS
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 30248EAB4 CC CCC
First Horizon ABS Trust 2004-HE4
Series 2004-HE4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-3 32051GDR3 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-4 32051GDS1 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-5 32051GDT9 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-HE4
Series 2002-HE4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 361856CF2 BBB- BBB-/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE2
Series 2003-HE2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-4 361856CP0 BBB- BBB-/Watch Neg
A-5 361856CQ8 BBB- BBB-/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV1
Series 2001-HLTV1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 36185HCY7 AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV2
Series 2001-HLTV2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I 36185HDG5 A- A-/Watch Neg
A-II 36185HDH3 A- A-/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Loan Trust 2002-HLTV1
Series 2002-HLTV1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I 36185HDQ3 A- A-/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Loan Trust 2004-HLTV1
Series 2004-HLTV1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-4 36185HDV2 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
GMACM Home Loan Trust 2006-HLTV1
Series 2006-HLTV1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-3 36185HEH2 BBB- BBB-/Watch Neg
A-4 36185HEJ8 BBB- BBB-/Watch Neg
A-5 36185HEK5 BBB- BBB-/Watch Neg
GRMT Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1
Series 2001-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-5NAS 36226MAE3 AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-HS3
Series 2001-HS3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-II 76110VHB7 A A/Watch Neg
M-I-1 76110VGY8 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-I-2 76110VGZ5 CC AA/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2002-HS3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-6 76110VKS6 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-II 76110VKU1 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2003-HS1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-5 76110VLW6 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
A-I-6 76110VLX4 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
A-II 76110VLZ9 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
VFN BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2003-HS2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-II-A 76110VMX3 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
A-II-B 76110VMY1 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
VFN BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2003-HS3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-3 76110VNU8 A A/Watch Neg
A-I-4 76110VNV6 A A/Watch Neg
A-II-A 76110VNX2 A- A-/Watch Neg
A-II-B 76110VNY0 A- A-/Watch Neg
Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HS1
Series 2004-HS1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-4 76110VQA9 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
A-I-5 76110VQB7 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
A-I-6 76110VQC5 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
A-II 76110VQE1 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HS2
Series 2005-HS2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-2 76110VSR0 CC BBB-
A-I-3 76110VSS8 CC BBB-
A-I-4 76110VST6 CC BBB-
A-I-5 76110VSU3 CC BBB-
A-II 76110VSV1 CC CCC
Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A-1 225470W25 CC BB
1A-2 225470W33 CC B+
1P 225470Y56 BB BB/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 1999-HI1
Series 1999-HI1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-6 76110VBX5 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 1999-HI4
Series 1999-HI4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-7 76110VCR7 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 1999-HI6
Series 1999-HI6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VCZ9 A A/Watch Neg
A-I-8 76110VDA3 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 1999-HI8
Series 1999-HI8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VDL9 A A/Watch Neg
A-I-8 76110VDM7 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2000-HI1
Series 2000-HI1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VDW5 A- A-/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2000-HI2
Series 2000-HI2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-5 76110VEC8 A- A-/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2000-HI3
Series 2000-HI3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VEL8 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2000-HI4
Series 2000-HI4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VEU8 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2000-HI5
Series 2000-HI5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VFD5 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2000-HL1
Series 2000-HL1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-2 437184AU8 A A/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2001-HI1
Series 2001-HI1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 76110VFF0 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2001-HI2
Series 2001-HI2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VFY9 A- A-/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2001-HI3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-I-7 76110VGP7 A A/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2002-HI3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-7 76110VJX7 B+ BB/Watch Neg
Home Loan Trust 2005-HI1
Series 2005-HI1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-4 76110VRC4 B B/Watch Neg
A-5 76110VRD2 B B/Watch Neg
Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
IA-1 464126CW9 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
IIA-2 464126CY5 A- A-/Watch Neg
IIA-3 464126CZ2 A- A-/Watch Neg
IIA-4 464126DA6 A- A-/Watch Neg
Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-B
Series 2003-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
IA 464187AR4 AA AA/Watch Neg
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2004-HS2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1-4 76110VQJ0 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-1-5 76110VQK7 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-1-6 76110VQL5 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-II 76110VQM3 BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
RFMSII Series 2001-HS2 Trust
Series 2001-HS2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-5 76110VGF9 A A/Watch Neg
SACO I Trust 2005-10
Series 2005-10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
II-A-1 785778NE7 BBB A
II-A-3 785778NG2 BBB A
II-M-1 785778NJ6 CC BB
SACO I Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 785778PF2 CC CCC
II-A 785778PG0 CC CCC
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-3SL
Series 2007-3SL
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 88157TAA0 CC BB
Ratings Affirmed
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-SL1
Series 2007-SL1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 00442FAB8 AAA
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-SL2
Series 2007-SL2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 00443WAA2 AAA
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2001-S6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
II-P 22540AH35 AAA
B-1 22540AH68 AAA
XB-1 22540AH76 AAA
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S10
Series 2006-S10
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12668YAA1 BB+
A-2 12668YAB9 BB+
A-3 12668YAC7 BB+
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S8
Series 2006-S8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12668XAA3 BB+
A-2 12668XAB1 BB+
A-3 12668XAC9 BB+
A-4 12668XAD7 BB+
A-5 12668XAE5 BB+
A-6 12668XAF2 BB+
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-S9
Series 2006-S9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12668GAA0 BB+
A-2 12668GAB8 BB+
A-3 12668GAC6 BB+
A-4 12668GAD4 BB+
A-5 12668GAE2 BB+
A-6 12668GAF9 BB+
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-S1
Series 2007-S1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1-A 12669RAA5 BB+
A-1-B 12669RAL1 BB+
A-2 12669RAB3 BB+
A-3 12669RAC1 BB+
A-4 12669RAD9 BB+
A-5 12669RAE7 BB+
A-6 12669RAF4 BB+
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-S2
Series 2007-S2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12670BAA7 BB+
A-2 12670BAB5 BB+
A-3 12670BAC3 BB+
A-4-F 12670BAD1 BB+
A-4-V 12670BAL3 BB+
A-5-F 12670BAE9 BB+
A-5-V 12670BAM1 BB+
A-6 12670BAF6 BB+
CWHEQ Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-S3
Series 2007-S3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12670HAA4 BB+
A-2 12670HAB2 BB+
A-3 12670HAC0 BB+
FFMLT 2007-FFB-SS
Series 2007-FFB-SS
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 30248EAA6 B
First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FFA
Series 2002-FFA
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 32027NBA8 BB
M-2 32027NBB6 B-
Flagstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-2 33848JAB1 BB+
AF-3 33848JAC9 BB+
AF-4 33848JAD7 BB+
AF-5 33848JAE5 BB+
GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE2
Series 2005-HE2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-4 36185MAD4 BBB-
A-5 36185MAE2 BBB-
A-6 36185MAF9 BBB-
GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HE1
Series 2007-HE1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 36186KAA3 BB+
A-2 36186KAB1 BB+
A-3 36186KAC9 BB+
A-4 36186KAD7 BB+
A-5 36186KAE5 BB+
GRMT Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-1
Series 2001-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 36226MAF0 A
M-2 36226MAG8 BBB
B 36226MAH6 BB
Residential Funding Mortgage Securities II Inc.
Series 2003-HS2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-I-4 76110VMS4 AAA
M-I-1 76110VMU9 AA
M-I-2 76110VMV7 A+
M-I-3 76110VMW5 BBB
Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-HSA2
Series 2007-HSA2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-3 43710RAD3 BB+
A-4 43710RAE1 BB+
A-5 43710RAF8 BB+
A-6 43710RAG6 BB+
Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Trust, Series INDS 2007-1
Series 2007-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 43708DAA4 BB+
Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, Series INDS 2007-2
Series INDS 2007-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 43710CAA2 BB+
Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A1 225470W58 CCC
2P 225470Y98 CCC
G 225470Z71 CCC
Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2007-2
Series 2007-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2A-1F 43710DAR3 BB+
2A-1A 43710DAB8 BB+
2A-2 43710DAC6 BB+
2A-3 43710DAD4 BB+
2A-4 43710DAE2 BB+
Home Loan Trust 2004-HI2
Series 2004-HI2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-5 76110VQS0 BBB-
Home Loan Trust 2004-HI3
Series 2004-HI3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-5 76110VQX9 BBB
Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I A-1 464126BR1 AAA
II M-1 464126BU4 AA+
II M-2 464126BV2 A
II B-1 464126BW0 BBB
Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-B
Series 2003-B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M 464187AV5 A
B 464187AW3 BBB
MESA 2002-1 Global Issuance Company
Series 2002-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 59066RAE7 CCC
Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-9SL
Series 2007-9SL
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 61754TAA4 BB+
PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2007-SL1
Series 2007-SL1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 69337YAA2 AAA
M-1 69337YAB0 AA+
M-2 69337YAC8 AA+
M-3 69337YAD6 AA
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-10SL
Series 2006-10SL
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 88156VAA6 AAA
A-2 88156VAB4 AAA
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-12SL
Series 2006-12SL
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 88157DAA5 AAA
A-2 88157DAB3 AAA
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-4SL
Series 2006-4SL
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 881561W91 CCC
A-2 881561X25 CCC
A-X 881561Y65 CCC
G 881561Y99 CCC
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-6
Series 2006-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 8815612T0 CCC
I-A-2 8815612U7 CCC
I-G 8815613K8 CCC
II-A-1 88156CAA8 CCC
II-A-2 88156CAB6 CCC
II-G 88156CAQ3 CCC
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-1SL
Series 2007-1SL
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 88157GAA8 AAA
A-2 88157GAB6 AAA
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-9SL
Series 2007-9SL
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 88158AAA0 AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 56 Classes From 18 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 56
classes from 18 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loan collateral
issued between 1987-1993. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on 63 classes from these transactions, as well as 32 additional
transactions, and removed six of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses due to increased
delinquencies.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviews the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the impact that projected losses will have on
each class. In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P
assesses whether the class can withstand the base-case loss
assumptions S&P uses in its analysis. To maintain an 'AAA'
rating, S&P assesses whether the class can withstand approximately
235% of its base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps
and qualitative factors applied to specific transactions. To
maintain a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and
'AAA', S&P assesses whether the class can withstand losses
exceeding the base-case assumption at a percentage specific to
each rating category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating. For example,
S&P would assess whether one class could withstand approximately
130% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while S&P would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 155% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.
Rating Actions
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1987- 3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A1 172921AG3 A AA
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1992- 7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 172921UD8 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Fund America Investors Corp. II
Series 1993- A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 36076RAA1 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-2 36076RAB9 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-3 36076RAC7 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-4 36076RAD5 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
A-5 36076RAE3 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1993- 7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 79548KGS1 B+ AA-
Saxon Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1992- 6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 805570AM0 B+ AA
SLH Mortgage Trust Series 1989-1
Series 1989- 1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
H 863572AS2 D BBB+
Z 863572AW3 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-6
Series 1992- 6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BM 863573KN0 D BBB+
BN 863573KP5 B+ BBB+
BO 863573KQ3 D BBB+
R-1 863573KT7 B+ BBB+
G 863573KR1 BB BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 91-1
Series 1991- 1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
G 863573AH4 D BBB+
H 863573AG6 D BBB+
I 863573AU5 D BBB+
J 863573AJ0 D BBB+
K 863573AK7 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 91-8
Series 1991- 8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
E 863573EE7 D BB
G 863573EJ6 D BB
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-11
Series 1992-11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BJ 863573PU9 B+ AAA
BX 863573PV7 B+ AAA
BY 863573PT2 D AAA
G 863573PQ8 D AAA
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-2
Series 1992- 2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
J 863573FL0 D BBB+
I 863573FT3 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-3
Series 1992- 3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BI 863573GF2 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-5
Series 1992- 5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BN 863573JG7 CCC AAA
BO 863573JK8 B+ AAA
BP 863573JH5 D BBB+
BQ 863573JJ1 CCC AAA
G 863573JL6 CCC BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-8
Series 1992- 8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BX 863573ML2 B+ BBB+
BY 863573MM0 D BBB+
G 863573MQ1 BB BBB+
BF 863573MK4 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 93-2
Series 1993- 2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BI 863573RX1 D BBB+
BX 863573RY9 B+ BBB+
BY 863573RZ6 D BBB+
R-1 863573SB8 B+ BBB+
G 863573QZ7 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 93-3
Series 1993- 3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
CK 863573SP7 D BBB+
CL 863573SQ5 D BBB+
CX 863573SR3 B+ BBB+
CY 863573SW2 D BBB+
G 863573SC6 CCC BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 93-4
Series 1993- 4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
AF 8635739A1 D BBB+
AX 863573TC5 B+ BBB+
AY 863573TB7 D BBB+
R-1 863573TE1 B+ BBB+
G 863573TG6 CCC BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 93-5
Series 1993- 5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
CJ 863573TT8 B+ BBB+
CX 863573TW1 B+ BBB+
G 863573TH4 CCC BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 93-6
Series 1993- 6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BI 863573UJ8 D BBB+
BX 863573UN9 B+ BBB+
AA 863573UL3 B+ BBB+
G 863573UA7 CCC BBB+
Travelers Mortgage Services Inc.
Series 1989- 1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A 89419KAY9 AA- AA
Ratings Affirmed
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1986- P
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 172905BB6 A
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1986- S
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 172905AZ4 A
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1987- B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 172905BG5 A
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1987- D
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 172905BJ9 A
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1987- F
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 172905BM2 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1987-10
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 172921AL2 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1988- 11
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 172921CE6 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1988-17
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 172921CN6 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1989- 1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 172921CP1 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1989-13
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 172921DR6 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1989-19
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 172921EQ7 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1993-14
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-3 172921J74 AAA
A-4 172921J82 AAA
A-5 172921J90 AAA
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1994- 3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-13 172921N95 AAA
A-5 172921M96 AAA
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1994- 5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-7 172921S33 AAA
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1993-20
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-S 23321PGJ1 BBB+
I A-1 23321PGK8 BBB+
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1993-19
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-P 23321PGE2 AAA
S-1 23321PFW3 AAA
A-7 23321PGD4 AAA
M 23321PGF9 AAA
B-1 23321PGG7 AAA
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1994- 3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-P 23321PJE9 AAA
S 23321PHM3 AAA
A-7 23321PHU5 AAA
M 23321PJF6 AA+
Greenwich Capital Acceptance Inc.
Series 1994-ARM5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 396782CW2 B
A-2 396782CX0 B
B-1 396782CY8 B
B-2 396782CZ5 B
Guardian S&L Assn, Huntington Beach, CA
Series 1989- 7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 40145CAT2 BBB-
Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
Series 1994-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IO 655356CW1 AAA
PO 655356CX9 AAA
M-3 655356DA8 BBB
Paine Webber Mortgage Acceptance Corp. IV
Series 1993- 8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-2 695927DW0 AAA
Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1988- 1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 74434RAA9 AAA
Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1992- 10
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-6 74434RSJ1 AAA
Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1992- 18
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M 74434RVD0 AAA
Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1994-25
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-8 74434UFB5 AAA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1993- 9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 79548KJE9 AA
B-1 79548KJF6 BB
B-2 79548KJG4 B
B-3 79548KJH2 CCC
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994- 1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 79548KJR0 AAA
B-2 79548KJS8 AAA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994-4A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
4A-A 79548KKP2 AAA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994- 5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 79548KLA4 AAA
B-2 79548KLB2 AAA
Saxon Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1994- 2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-11 805570DT2 AAA
I 805570HV3 AAA
A-10 805570DS4 AAA
M 805570DU9 AAA
B-1 805570DV7 AA
B-2 805570DW5 A-
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 91-8
Series 1991- 8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
F 863573EF4 BB
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 87 Tranches From 16 CLO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 87
tranches from 16 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications. The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $6.453 billion.
S&P also affirmed its ratings on 17 tranches from seven
transactions and removed 12 of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect two primary factors:
* The application of S&P's updated corporate collateralized debt
obligation criteria; and
* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.
The downgrades of 17 classes from 11 transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.
The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to its updated criteria.
S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
new CDO criteria. To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions used in the analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate assumed for the cash flows generated for the 'AAA'
liability rating for each transaction.
Table 1
Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating
Transaction Recovery rate (%)
----------- -----------------
ACA CLO 2006-1 Ltd. 42.4
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI 41.8
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VII 42.8
Cannington Funding Ltd. 45.4
Chelsea Park CLO Ltd. 43.6
Comstock Funding Ltd. 43.4
Founders Grove CLO Ltd. 44.2
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. 46.7
Gleneagles CLO Ltd. 42.7
GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. 47.0
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. 41.6
Katonah IV Ltd. 44.1
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. 42.4
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. 42.4
Nautique Funding Ltd. 42.5
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. 46.7
St. James River CLO Ltd. 44.1
S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO
criteria update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
ACA CLO 2006-1 Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
ACA CLO 2006-1 Ltd. A-2 A+ AA/Watch Neg
ACA CLO 2006-1 Ltd. B BBB+ A/Watch Neg
ACA CLO 2006-1 Ltd. C BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
ACA CLO 2006-1 Ltd. D B+ BB/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI A-1D A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI A-1T A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI A-2 A- AA/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI B BBB A/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI C BB BBB/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI D CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VII A AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VII B A+ AA/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VII C BBB+ A/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VII D BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VII E B+ BB/Watch Neg
Cannington Funding Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Cannington Funding Ltd. A-2 AA AA/Watch Neg
Cannington Funding Ltd. B A- A/Watch Neg
Cannington Funding Ltd. C BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
Cannington Funding Ltd. D CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
Chelsea Park CLO Ltd. A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Chelsea Park CLO Ltd. B AA AA/Watch Neg
Chelsea Park CLO Ltd. C A A/Watch Neg
Chelsea Park CLO Ltd. D BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Chelsea Park CLO Ltd. E BB BB/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. A-1A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. A-1B AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. A-2 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. A-3 AA- AA/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. B A- A/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. C BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
Comstock Funding Ltd. D B+ BB/Watch Neg
Founders Grove CLO Ltd. A-1 AA AAA/Watch Neg
Founders Grove CLO Ltd. A-2 AA AAA/Watch Neg
Founders Grove CLO Ltd. B A AA/Watch Neg
Founders Grove CLO Ltd. C BBB A/Watch Neg
Founders Grove CLO Ltd. D B+ BB/Watch Neg
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. A-1L AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. A-2L A+ AA/Watch Neg
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. A-3L BBB+ A-/Watch Neg
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. B-1L B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. B-2L CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
Gleneagles CLO Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Gleneagles CLO Ltd. A-2 AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Gleneagles CLO Ltd. B A AA/Watch Neg
Gleneagles CLO Ltd. C B+ A/Watch Neg
Gleneagles CLO Ltd. D CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. A-2 A+ AA/Watch Neg
GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. B BBB+ A/Watch Neg
GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. C CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
GSC Group CDO Fund VIII Ltd. D CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. A-1 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. A-2 BBB+ AA/Watch Neg
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. B-1 BBB+ A+/Watch Neg
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. B-2 BB+ A/Watch Neg
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. C B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Hewett's Island CLO III Ltd. D CCC- B/Watch Neg
Katonah IV Ltd. A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Katonah IV Ltd. B BBB+ A-/Watch Neg
Katonah IV Ltd. C B+ BBB/Watch Neg
Katonah IV Ltd. D-1 CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
Katonah IV Ltd. D-2 CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. A-1L AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. A-1LA AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. A-1LB AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. A-2L A+ AA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. A-3L BBB A/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. B-1L BB BBB-/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. B-2L CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. A1L AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. A-1LA AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. A1LB AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. A2L A+ AA/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. A3L BBB A/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. B1L BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. B2L CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Mountain Capital CLO V Ltd. X AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. A-1A AA AAA/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. A-1B AA AAA/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. A-2A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. A-2B AA AAA/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. A-3 A+ AA/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. B-1 BBB+ A/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. B-2 BBB+ A/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. C B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Nautique Funding Ltd. D CCC+ BB-/Watch Neg
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. A-1B AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. B-2 AA AA/Watch Neg
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. C A A/Watch Neg
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. D BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. E BB BB/Watch Neg
St. James River CLO Ltd. A-R A+ AAA/Watch Neg
St. James River CLO Ltd. A-T A+ AAA/Watch Neg
St. James River CLO Ltd. B BBB+ AA/Watch Neg
St. James River CLO Ltd. C BBB A-/Watch Neg
St. James River CLO Ltd. D BB+ BB+/Watch Neg
St. James River CLO Ltd. E CCC+ B-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Gallatin CLO II 2005-1 Ltd. X AAA
Mountain Capital CLO IV Ltd. X AAA
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. A-1A AAA
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. A-2 AAA
Sandelman Finance 2006-1 Ltd. B-1 AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 645 Classes From 536 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
645 classes of mortgage pass-through certificates issued by 536
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities transactions from
2002-2008. S&P removed 14 of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch
with negative implications. In addition, S&P placed 124 other
ratings from seven transactions on CreditWatch with negative
implications. The ratings on 49 additional classes from five of
these transactions remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
Approximately 82.02% of the defaulted classes were from
transactions backed by Alternative-A or subprime mortgage loan
collateral. The 645 defaulted classes consisted of these:
* 384 classes were from Alt-A transactions (59.53% of all
defaults);
* 145 were from subprime transactions (22.48% of all defaults);
* 63 were from prime jumbo transactions;
* 21 were from closed-end second-lien transactions;
* Seven were from outside-the-guidelines transactions;
* Seven were from reperforming transactions;
* Six were from REMIC (resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit) transactions;
* Five were from first-lien high loan-to-value (LTV) transactions;
* Three were from a home equity line of credit (HELOC)
transaction;
* Two were from a risk-transfer transaction;
* One was from a document-deficient transaction; and
* One was from a seasoned loan transaction.
The 645 downgrades to 'D' reflect S&P's assessment of principal
write-downs on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods. Thirty-six of the defaulted ratings are on classes that
are bond insured by either Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. or
Syncora Guarantee. Although these classes are wrapped, the losses
were still allocated to the respective classes. The CreditWatch
placements reflect the fact that the affected classes are within a
group that includes a class that defaulted from a 'B-' rating or
higher. S&P lowered approximately 94.73% of the ratings from the
'CCC' or 'CC' rating categories, and S&P lowered approximately
98.14% from a speculative-grade category.
S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements affecting these
transactions after S&P completes its reviews of the underlying
credit enhancement. Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor
its ratings on securities that experience principal write-downs,
and S&P will adjust the ratings as S&P deems appropriate.
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
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however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
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then-ending.
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Consulting at 207/791-2852.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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