/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/100207.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
Sunday, February 7, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 37
Headlines
ACAS CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of 2007-1 Notes
ALADDIN SYNTHETIC: S&P Cuts Rating on Series A-2 Notes to 'CC'
ALTIUS I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ANSONIA CDO: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series 2000-1 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-3 Securities
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-6 Securities
BARRAMUNDI CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-PWR13 Securities
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-PWR10 Securities
BLUEGRASS ABS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
BLUEGRASS ABS: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A-1 Notes From 'B3'
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2004-1 Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2006-1 Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-2 Certs.
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2007-1 Certs.
CD 2005-C1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes of CMBS
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2006-AR1 Notes
CITIZENS FUNDING: Moody's Confirms 'Caa2' Trust Preferred Rating
CONCORD REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 2006-1 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 10 2004-C4 Certificates
CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2006-1 Notes
DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
FORD AUTO TRUST: DBRS Rates Class D Notes at 'BB'
G-FORCE 2005-RR2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five CMBS Classes
GE CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six Series 2000-1 Certs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2005-C1 Securities
GRAND PACIFIC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2006-GG7 Notes
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2007-GKK1 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 10 2005-CIBC13 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three 2005-FL1 Securities
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 12 2005-MF1 Certs.
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-MF5 Certs.
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2006-MF4 Certs.
LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C2 Notes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2001-C2 Certs.
LOCAL INSIGHT: S&P Puts Note Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
LOUISIANA: S&P Corrects 2000 Taxable Bonds From 'BB-/Stable'
MANTOLOKING CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-1 Notes
MERCURY CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2004-1 Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-MKB2 Certs.
MONTAUK POINT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class IA Notes
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 Transactions
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
PAJARO VALLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1999A Certs. to 'BB'
PIONEER VALLEY: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
RACERS SERIES: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2004-2-A Certificates
RAMP 2004-RZ2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2007-2 Certificates
RUTLAND RATED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Sedona 2005-2 Notes
SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 2005-4 Certificates
SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D-2 Notes to 'CCC-'
SORIN REAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1LA to 'Ca'
SUFFIELD CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
VILLLAGE OF RIVERDALE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Ba1'
WAVE SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 Classes of Notes
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1,186 Bonds From 871 RMBS to 'D'
* Moody's Puts Ratings on 262 RMBS Resecuritizations on Watch
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 47 Tranches From 16 CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 58 Classes From 19 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 101 Tranches From 18 CLO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 164 Classes From 17 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 238 Classes From 85 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 299 Classes From 57 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes From Two Mid-State RMBS
* S&P Puts Ratings on 12,000 Classes on CreditWatch Negative
*********
ACAS CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes of 2007-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes from ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P also affirmed the
ratings on three other classes from this transaction and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following S&P's rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed
securities that serve as underlying collateral for ACAS 2007-1.
The securities are from 15 transactions and total $428.4 million
(36.8% of the total asset balance). The downgrades also reflect
S&P's revised credit estimates on the unrated CMBS collateral
($173.6 million, 14.9%). S&P lowered the majority of these credit
estimates.
According to the Dec. 31, 2009, trustee report, ACAS 2007-1 was
collateralized by 117 classes of CMBS ($1.15 billion, 99%) from 21
distinct transactions issued from 2005 through 2007 and four
classes from JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
Trust 2006-RR1, which is a resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit transaction, representing $11.8 million (1%).
ACAS 2007-1 has exposure to these CMBS transactions that Standard
& Poor's has downgraded:
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-LDP5 (classes K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q; $83.7 million,
7.2%);
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C23
(classes L, M, N, O, P and Q; $66.6 million, 5.7%);
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C28
(classes K, L, M, N, O, and P; $43.1 million, 3.7%); and
* ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-2 (classes J, K, L,
M, N and P; $32.2 million, 2.8%).
Standard & Poor's analyzed ACAS 2007-1 and its underlying
collateral according to S&P's current criteria. S&P's analysis
supports the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A BB+ A/Watch Neg
B BB- BBB/Watch Neg
C-FL B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
C-FX B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
D B BB+/Watch Neg
E-FL CCC+ BB+/Watch Neg
E-FX CCC+ BB+/Watch Neg
F-FL CCC- B+/Watch Neg
F-FX CCC- B+/Watch Neg
G-FL CCC- B/Watch Neg
G-FX CCC- B/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
H CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
J CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
K CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
ALADDIN SYNTHETIC: S&P Cuts Rating on Series A-2 Notes to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the notes
from Aladdin Synthetic CDO II SPC's series A-2 to 'CC' from
'CCC-'.
The downgrade follows a number of credit events within the
underlying portfolio, which S&P expects to cause the class of
notes to incur a principal loss.
ALTIUS I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of Notes issued by Altius I Funding, LTD.
The Notes affected by the rating action are:
-- US$354,000,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2040;
Downgraded to Caa3; Previously on February 2, 2009 Downgraded
to B2;
-- Up to US$1,416,000,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due
2040; Downgraded to Caa3; Previously on February 2, 2009
Downgraded to B2.
Altius I Funding, LTD. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage backed
securities.
The rating downgrade actions reflect deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio. Moody's notes that more than
74% of the transaction underlying assets have been the subject of
ratings downgrade since Moody's last review in February 2009 and
68% of its assets are currently on review for downgrade following
Moody's announcement on January 14, 2010 of updates to the loss
projections for US Alt-A and Subprime RMBS issued in 2005-2007.
The OC test is continuing to fail its required level and OC level
has been deteriorating. Defaults currently total $202,308,859 as
compared to $37,391,574 as reported in the January 2009 trustee
report.
In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability. Moody's
explained that in addition to the quantitative factors that are
explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the Moody's
rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors
include but are not limited to the structural protections in the
transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in the
current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision
ANSONIA CDO: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed two classes and downgraded
seven classes of Notes issued by Ansonia CDO 2006-1, Ltd. The
downgrades are due to the deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor and deterioration in the weighted
average recovery rate since Moody's last review. Also, an
increase in Moody's asset correlation since Moody's last review
contributed to the downgrades. Affirmations are due to key rating
parameters remaining within acceptable ranges. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transactions.
Ansonia CDO 2006-1, Ltd., is a collateralized debt obligation
backed by a portfolio of cash collateral in commercial mortgage
backed securities, CRE CDOs, and real estate investment trust
debt. As of the December 30, 2009 payment date, CMBS collateral
comprised approximately 94% of the portfolio with 19% of the CMBS
concentrated in 2006 vintage securitizations. REIT debt comprises
5% of the portfolio and CRE CDO collateral constitutes the
remaining 1%.
On May 5, 2009, non-payment of full interest on certain classes
caused an Event of Default. As of the December 2009 Note
Valuation Report, the EOD is continuing and a declaration of
acceleration of Maturity has not been made. While the risk of
Collateral liquidation is still a possibility, the acceleration of
Maturity has not been declared thereby reducing the risk of much
higher loss severities from such liquidation under current
stressed market conditions. As such, Moody's is removing all
classes from Review for Possible Downgrade.
On December 29, 2009, the Collateral Manager and the Swap
Counterparty resolved their dispute regarding the calculation
amount due to the Counterparty under the Class A-FL Swap
Agreement. The resolution of the dispute has no material impact
on the expected loss assessments on Moody's rated classes.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and MAC.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
6,814 compared to 5,700 at last review.
WAL acts to adjust the credit exposure of the collateral pool.
Moody's modeled to the current WAL of seven years compared to
eight years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 4.6% compared to 5.8% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100% compared to 28% at last review. The
high MAC is due to the increase of very-high risk collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.
Moody's review also incorporated updated asset correlation
assumptions for the commercial real estate sector consistent with
one of Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released
on April 3, 2009. These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations. The updated asset
correlations, depending of vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.
The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-FL, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on November 19, 2009
Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class A-FX, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on November 19, 2009
Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class B, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class H, Downgraded to C; previously on November 19, 2009
Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated August 26, 2009.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series 2000-1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one class,
upgraded two classes and downgraded five classes of Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-1. The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans and concerns
about loans approaching maturity in an adverse market.
The upgrades are due to increased subordination levels due to loan
payoffs and loan amortization. The affirmation is due to key
rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and
Moody's debt service coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable
ranges. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the January 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 87% to
$100.3 million from $771.2 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 85.3% of the pool. Three loans, representing 8% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.
Five loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the trust, resulting in
an aggregate $9.3 million loss (15% severity). There are six
loans, representing 61% of the pool, currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the SCI
Portfolio-411 N. Akard Street Loan ($22.2 million -- 22.1% of the
pool), which is secured by a 349,810 square foot office building
located in Dallas, Texas. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in November 2008 due to imminent default and is now real
estate owned. The property was 99% vacant as of January 2010.
The second largest specially serviced loan is the 350 Route 3
West-Secaucus, NJ Loan ($11.5 million -- 11.5% of the pool), which
is secured by a full-service hotel located in Secaucus, New
Jersey. The loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2009
due to delinquency. The loan had a maturity date of October 1,
2009. The property has changed flags a number of times since
securitization and is currently operating under a La Quinta flag.
The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of office and multifamily properties. Moody's estimates a
$38.5 million aggregate loss for all of the specially serviced
loans (52% loss severity on average). The special servicer has
recognized an aggregate $24 million appraisal reduction for five
of the specially serviced loans.
In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on one loan (11.3%
of the pool) that has 100% lease rollover prior to the loan
maturity in 2012. Moody's estimates a $3.7 million loss for this
troubled loan (33% loss severity). Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from this troubled loan.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.2 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 81%
of the pool, excluding defeased loans. Excluding specially
serviced, troubled and defeased loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 69% compared to 84% at Moody's prior review.
Excluding specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.18X and 1.80X, respectively,
compared to 1.32X and 1.53X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 23 at last review. The decline
in herf is partially offset by the significant increase in credit
subordination due to loan payoffs and principal amortization.
The three largest performing conduit loans represent 18.9% of
the pool. The largest loan is the Wal-Mart Portfolio Loan
($11.4 million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured by six
single-tenant retail properties located in Alabama, Georgia,
Iowa, Louisiana and Texas. The properties are all leased to Wal-
Mart and have lease expirations between April 2011 and January
2012. Property performance has been stable, however one store is
currently vacant and two are being marketed for lease. The loan
matures in February 2012. Moody's valuation incorporates a
stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about refinance risk
because of Wal-Mart's lease expirations before the loan maturity
date. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 149% and 0.76X,
respectively, compared to 55% and 2.84X at last review.
The second largest loan is the Alder Creek Apartments Loan
($4.2 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 152-unit
multifamily property located in Vancouver, Washington. The
property was 95% occupied as of December 2008. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.82X, respectively, compared to 59% and
1.73X at last review.
The third largest loan is the Huntersville Square Shopping Center
Loan ($3.5 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by an
84,000 square foot retail center located approximately 12 miles
north of Charlotte in Huntersville, North Carolina. The center is
anchored by Food Lion and was 100% leased as of June 2009.
Performance has improved since last review due to increased
revenues and stable expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
55.2% and 1.86X, respectively, compared to 57% and 1.79X at last
review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on December
21, 1999, assigned Aaa
-- Class E, $19,311,071, upgraded to Aaa from Aa1; previously on
September 12, 2007, upgraded to Aa1
-- Class F, $11,714,219, upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3; previously on
September 12, 2007, upgraded to Aa3
-- Class G, $11,714,219, downgraded to Baa2 from A3; previously
on September 12, 2007, upgraded to A3
-- Class H, $19,523,698, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1; previously
on September 12, 2007, upgraded to Ba1
-- Class K, $3,904,740, downgraded to Ca from Ba3; previously on
December 21, 1999, assigned Ba3
-- Class L, $15,618,958, downgraded to C from B3; previously on
September 25, 2008, downgraded to B3
-- Class M, $10,732,897, downgrade to C from Caa1; previously on
September 25, 2008, downgraded to Caa1
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-3 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-3 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on seven other classes from the same
transaction.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions. The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect the credit support erosion S&P anticipates
will occur upon the eventual resolution of three specially
serviced loans and one loan that S&P consider to be credit-
impaired. S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.52x and a loan-to-value ratio of 107.5%.
S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.92x and an LTV of
142.6%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 73.1% and 38.0%, respectively. The weighted
average DSC and LTV calculations exclude two defeased loans
($26.3 million; 1.3%), three specially serviced loans
($44.9 million; 2.1%), and one loan that S&P deemed to be credit-
impaired ($4.1 million; 0.2%). S&P estimated losses separately
for the specially serviced and credit-impaired loans, which were
included in its implied default and loss severity figures.
The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels that adequately support the
outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its ratings on the class XC and
XP interest-only (IO) certificates based on its current criteria.
S&P published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009. Once the criteria review is finalized,
S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
S&P affirmed.
Credit Concerns
As of the Jan. 11, 2010 remittance date, six assets
($361.1 million; 17.2%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc. (LNR). In addition, on Jan. 8, 2010,
the Market Place Villas loan ($4.1 million; 0.2%) was transferred
to special servicing but the transfer was too late to be reflected
in the Jan. 11 report. The payment status of the six assets in
special servicing as of the Jan. 11, 2010, remittance date is:
three are 90-plus-days delinquent (2.1%), one is 30 days
delinquent (6.3%), one is late but within its grace period (0.4%),
and one is current (8.4%). Two of the specially serviced assets
are top 10 loans ($307.7 million; 14.7%), which S&P discusses
below, and four of the specially serviced assets have appraisal
reduction amounts in effect totaling $60.7 million. S&P
separately estimated losses for three of the six specially
serviced assets ($44.9 million; 2.1%).
The Ridgedale Center loan, the second-largest loan in the pool,
has a $175.7 million (8.4%) trust and whole-loan balance. This
loan was transferred to the special servicer on April, 17, 2009,
after the borrower's sponsor, General Growth Properties, filed for
bankruptcy on April 16, 2009. The loan is secured by the
Ridgedale Center Mall in Minnetonka, Minnesota, a suburb of
Minneapolis-St. Paul. Constructed in 1974 and renovated in 2000,
the property consists of 1,043,159 sq. ft., 340,779 sq. ft. of
which comprise the in-line stores that serve as collateral for the
loan. On Dec. 15, 2009, the bankruptcy court confirmed a
modification plan for 85 GGP loans, including the Ridgedale Center
loan. The special servicer has confirmed that the maturity date
for the loan has been extended 78 months to Sept. 30, 2016. For
year-end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were 89% and 1.40x,
respectively.
The Pacific Arts Plaza loan, the third-largest loan in the pool,
has a $132 million (6.3%) trust and whole-loan balance. The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Aug. 14, 2009, due to
imminent default. Discussions with the borrower continue, with a
focus on a possible restructuring or the borrower's cooperation
with a transfer of the property, if necessary. The loan is
secured by an 825,061-sq.-ft. office and retail complex located in
Costa Mesa, Calif. The subject property was built in 1980 and
renovated in 2004. The collateral comprises two 15-story office
towers, an eight-story office building with its own two-story
parking garage, a five-story office building, a five-story parking
garage, and four stand-alone retail buildings occupied by
restaurants. For year-end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were 76%
and 0.98x, respectively.
In addition, S&P deemed the Market Place Villas loan
($4.1 million; 0.2%) to be credit-impaired. The loan appears on
the master servicer's watchlist due to delinquent payments and a
low DSC. The loan was recently transferred to the special
servicer due to imminent default. In S&P's view, the loan is at
increased risk of loss over its term. The loan is 30-days
delinquent. The loan is secured by a four-story, mixed-use
property in Richmond, Va., consisting of 31 villas and 18,566 sq.
ft. of commercial/retail space on the first floor. For the first
six months of 2009, the occupancy and DSC were 64% and 0.70x,
respectively, and based on the current leasing status, S&P
estimates that the DSC is similar currently. S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.
The remaining four assets on the special servicer's Jan. 11, 2010,
remittance report comprise 2.5% of the pool. The losses on three
of these four loans ($44.9 million; 1.7%), which were separately
estimated, range from 23% to 62%.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $2.10 billion (99 loans), compared with $2.16 billion
(108 loans) at issuance. Two loans ($26.3 million; 1.3%) had been
defeased as of the January remittance date. Bank of America, the
master servicer, reported financial information for all the
nondefeased loans in the pool. Ninety-eight percent of the
financial information was either full-year 2008 or partial-year
2009 data. S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.65x for the
pool based on the master servicer's reported figures. S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.52x and 107.5%, respectively. The
transaction has experienced $1.1 million in principal losses to
date. Twenty-four loans are on the servicer's watchlist ($295.1
million; 14.1%). Five loans ($27.5 million, 1.3%) have a reported
DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and five loans ($197.9 million, 9.4%)
have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 loans have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.1 billion (55.2%). Using servicer-reported information, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.61x. Two of the top 10
loans are with the special servicer as discussed above and two
other top 10 loans appear on the master servicer's watchlist as
detailed below. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for the top 10
loans were 1.40x and 115.0%, respectively.
The FRI Portfolio loan, the ninth-largest loan ($70.0 million;
3.3%) in the pool, was placed on the servicer's watchlist due to
an upcoming lease expiration. Bass Berry & Sims PLC, which
occupies 139,000 sq. ft., or 19% of the aggregate square footage
of one of the two collateral properties, will not renew its lease
when it expires Jan. 31, 2010. The loan is secured by two office
towers totaling 727,000 sq. ft. One of the properties has 136,222
sq. ft. and is in West Palm Beach, Fla., and was built in 1973 and
renovated in 2004. The other property has 591,189 sq. ft. and is
in Nashville, Tenn., and was built in 1979 and also renovated in
2004. Standard & Poor's estimated that the servicer-reported DSC
for this loan would fall to 0.92x after adjustments are made for
the lease expirations.
The IPC New York/Wichita Portfolio loan, the 10th-largest loan
($50.7 million; 2.4%) in the pool, consists of two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted notes. The loan was placed on
the master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy at the
collateral properties. At year-end 2008, the blended occupancy
was 78%. The IPC New York Portfolio note is secured by a property
in Staten Island, N.Y., and another property in Woodcliff Lake,
N.J., which aggregate 370,401 sq. ft. The IPC Wichita Portfolio
note is secured by two properties in Wichita, Kan., aggregating
402,869 sq. ft. Standard & Poor's estimated that the servicer-
reported DSC will fall to 0.75x after adjustments are made for
lease expirations.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to S&P's conduit/fusion
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels support the
lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-3
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M A AAA/Watch Neg 21.36
A-J BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg 14.80
B BBB AA+/Watch Neg 13.60
C BBB- AA/Watch Neg 12.39
D BB+ AA-/Watch Neg 11.32
E BB A/Watch Neg 9.45
F BB- A-/Watch Neg 8.38
G B+ BBB+/Watch Neg 6.91
H B+ BBB/Watch Neg 5.57
J B BBB-/Watch Neg 4.23
K B- BB+/Watch Neg 3.56
L B- BB/Watch Neg 3.02
M B- BB-/Watch Neg 2.49
N CCC+ B/Watch Neg 2.22
O CCC B-/Watch Neg 1.82
P CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg 1.42
Ratings Affirmed
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-3
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-2 AAA 32.07
A-3A AAA 32.07
A-3B AAA 32.07
A-SB AAA 32.07
A-4 AAA 32.07
XC AAA N/A
XP AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
BANC OF AMERICA: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 2005-6 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2005-6 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P lowered one of
the ratings to 'D'. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 13
other classes, including six raked classes, from the same
transaction, and removed one of the ratings from CreditWatch
negative.
The ratings actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of these actions. The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipate
will occur upon the eventual resolution of the specially serviced
loans. In addition, interest shortfalls primarily due to
cumulative appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions prompted
us to lower S&P's rating on class Q to 'D'.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-provided financial
information, Standard & Poor's calculated an adjusted debt service
coverage of 1.79x and a loan-to-value ratio of 90.1%. S&P further
stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a
weighted average DSC of 1.09x and an LTV of 119.4%. The implied
defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 48.9% and
33.1%, respectively. All of the adjusted DSC and LTV calculations
excluded 10 of the 16 specially serviced assets ($71.7 million,
2.7%) and three defeased loans ($187.3 million, 7.0%). S&P
separately estimated losses for the specially serviced assets,
which S&P included in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.
The affirmations of the ratings on the pooled principal and
interest certificates reflect subordination levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings. The affirmations of the
"KC" raked certificates reflect S&P's analysis of the KinderCare
Portfolio junior nonpooled portion of the loan, from which the
raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flows. The whole
loan is secured by a 708-property, 5.1 million-sq.-ft. portfolio
of day care centers in 37 states throughout the country. For the
nine months ended Sept. 30, 2009, the reported DSC was 2.04x and
occupancy was 100%.
S&P affirmed its rating on the class XW interest-only certificates
based on its current criteria. S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to the IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise its current
IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the IO certificates S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
Sixteen assets ($249.1 million, 9.4%), including the sixth-largest
loan in the pool, are with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.
Ten of these assets ($71.7 million, 2.7%) are in foreclosure, one
($10.3 million, 0.4%) is 30 days delinquent, and five
($167.1 million, 6.3%) are within their respective grace periods.
S&P estimated losses ranging from 26.4% to 75.9% for 10
($71.7 million, 2.7%) of the 16 assets. Three ($59.9 million,
2.3%) of the remaining six assets ($177.4 million, 6.7%) for which
S&P did not provide loss estimates are potential modification
candidates.
The Paramus Park Mall loan ($102.7 million, 3.9%) is the sixth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by 312,198 sq. ft. of a
768,330-sq.-ft. regional mall in Paramus, N.J. The loan was
transferred to LNR on April 17, 2009, due to the bankruptcy filing
of its sponsor, General Growth Properties, on April 16, 2009. On
Dec. 15, 2009, the bankruptcy court confirmed a modification plan
for 85 GGP loans, which did not include this loan. Standard &
Poor's will continue to review the details of the GGP loan
restructurings as they become available. This loan has a
scheduled maturity of Oct. 1, 2015. As of Dec. 31, 2008, DSC for
the property was 1.80x. Occupancy was 93.4% as of March 31, 2009.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the aggregate pooled
trust balance was $2.66 billion, which represents 97.1% of the
aggregate pooled trust balance at issuance. There are 162 assets
in the pool, down from 163 at issuance. The master servicer for
the transaction is Bank of America N.A. The master servicer
provided financial information for 98.1% of the pool, and 98.0% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-
2009 data.
S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.86x for the pool based
on the reported figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.79x
and 90.1%, respectively, which exclude 10 specially serviced
assets ($71.7 million, 2.7%) for which S&P has estimated losses
separately. Based on the servicer-reported DSC figures, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.10x for these 10 loans. To
date, the transaction has not realized any principal losses.
Twenty-seven loans ($235.2 million, 8.8%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including the ninth-largest loan in the
pool, which S&P discuss in detail below. Twenty-four loans
($214.6 million, 8.1%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and
17 of these loans ($161.9 million, 6.1%) have a reported DSC of
less than 1.0x. To date, three loans ($187.3 million, 7.0%) have
been defeased.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $1.25 billion (33.8%). Using servicer-
reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.90x
for the top 10 loans. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10
loans were 1.76x and 88.2%, respectively.
The One Old Country Road loan ($49.8 million, 1.9%) is the ninth-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 320,408-sq.-ft.
office building in Carle Place, N.Y. The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to low DSC. As of Dec. 31, 2008,
the property had a DSC of 0.63x, and as of Sept. 14, 2009, it was
87.5% occupied. The low DSC was attributed to increases in
operating expenses. A new borrower assumed the loan in 2008 and
is attempting to moderate expenses while increasing revenue.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2005-6
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-J A+ AAA/Watch Neg 12.49
B A AA+/Watch Neg 11.46
C A- AA/Watch Neg 10.30
D BBB+ AA-/Watch Neg 9.53
E BBB A+/Watch Neg 8.76
F BBB- A/Watch Neg 7.47
G BB+ A-/Watch Neg 6.57
H BB BBB+/Watch Neg 5.54
J BB- BBB/Watch Neg 4.38
K B+ BBB-/Watch Neg 3.35
L B BB/Watch Neg 2.83
M B- B+/Watch Neg 2.19
N CCC+ B/Watch Neg 2.06
O CCC B-/Watch Neg 1.80
P CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg 1.67
Q D CCC/Watch Neg 1.29
Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2005-6
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M AAA AAA/Watch Neg 20.60
Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2005-6
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-1 AAA 30.91
A-2 AAA 30.91
A-3 AAA 30.91
A-SB AAA 30.91
A-4 AAA 30.91
XW AAA N/A
Ratings Affirmed (Non-Pooled Certificates)
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates 2005-6
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
KC-A A+ N/A
KC-B A N/A
KC-C A- N/A
KC-D BBB+ N/A
KC-E BBB N/A
KC-F BBB- N/A
N/A -- Not applicable.
BARRAMUNDI CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on seven
classes of notes issued by Barramundi CDO I Ltd.
This rating action is a result of the sale and liquidation of
Barramundi's portfolio following an event of default on March 13,
2009, and the subsequent vote for acceleration and sale of the
collateral by the controlling class as of Oct. 23, 2009. The sale
of collateral was completed on Jan. 4, 2010, and the final
distribution date was on Jan. 27, 2010. Proceeds from the sale
were insufficient to repay the senior loan amount and the rated
classes received no interest or principal distributions.
Barramundi was a hybrid structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Dec. 12, 2006, and was managed by C-BASS
Investment Management LLC. The portfolio was composed of
residential mortgage-backed securities, CDOs and asset-backed
securities.
Fitch has downgraded and withdrawn these ratings:
-- $176,731,300 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC' and
withdrawn;
-- $56,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC' and
withdrawn;
-- $76,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC' and
withdrawn;
-- $48,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
withdrawn;
-- $38,400,000 class D notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
withdrawn;
-- $19,200,000 class E notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
withdrawn;
-- $22,000,000 subordinated notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C' and
withdrawn.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 15 2006-PWR13 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P
affirmed S&P's ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of its rating actions. The downgrades of the mezzanine and
subordinate classes also reflect anticipated credit support
erosion upon the eventual resolution of eight specially serviced
loans, as well as its analysis of four loans that S&P determined
to be credit-impaired. S&P's analysis included a review of the
credit characteristics of all of the loans in the pool. Using
servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.35x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 105.6%. S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.92x and an LTV
of 144.3%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 83.6% and 35.0%, respectively. The DSC and LTV
calculations S&P noted above exclude eight ($70.7 million, 2.5%)
of the 12 specially serviced loans and four additional loans that
S&P deemed to be credit-impaired ($59.3 million, 2.1%). S&P
separately estimated losses for these 12 loans and included them
in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
1 and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria. S&P published a request for comment proposing changes
to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009. After S&P finalize its
criteria review, S&P may revise its IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
that S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
As of the January 2010 remittance report, 10 loans ($79.4 million,
2.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer, Helios AMC LLC
(Helios). The payment status of the specially serviced loans is:
one is in bankruptcy proceedings ($6.3 million, 0.2%); seven are
90-plus days delinquent ($67.6 million, 2.4%); and two are 60 days
delinquent ($5.5 million, 0.2%). Five of the specially serviced
loans have appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling
$20.3 million.
The Phillipsburg Commerce Center loan, which has a total exposure
of $24.6 million (0.8%), is the largest loan with the special
servicer and the 22nd-largest loan in the pool. The loan is over
90 days delinquent and is secured by a 760,000-sq.-ft.
industrial/office property in Phillipsburg, N.J. The property is
currently 68% leased. Reported DSC as of October 2009 was under
1.0x. The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
March 10, 2009, due to imminent default after the borrower
acknowledged that it was unable to pay its debts as they became
due. The borrower subsequently defaulted in July 2009. The
special servicer is currently negotiating the terms of a
forbearance agreement with the borrower. S&P believes there will
be a moderate loss upon the resolution of this loan.
The nine remaining specially serviced loans that were listed in
the January remittance report ($55.6 million, 2.0%) have balances
that individually represent less than 0.5% of the total pool
balance. S&P estimated losses for seven of these nine loans that
will result in loss severities ranging from 10.0% to 66.6%. The
special servicer has approved a forbearance agreement for one of
the two loans for which S&P did not estimate a loss. The
remaining loan ($2.3 million, 0.1%) was recently transferred to
Helios.
S&P notes that two additional loans ($85.4 million, 3.0%) were
transferred to the special servicer on Jan. 19, 2010, after the
January 2010 remittance report was published. The Parker Square
loan ($17.7 million, 0.6%) was transferred due to payment default.
The second loan transferred is the fifth-largest loan in the pool,
the DRA Capital Center II & III loan ($67.7 million, 2.4%).
The DRA Capital Center II & III loan had previously been on the
servicer's watchlist for low DSC. The borrower has indicated that
the property's cash flow cannot support the outstanding leasing
costs that are owed to the tenants nor the upcoming tax bill due
this spring. The borrower has requested a loan modification. The
loan was current in its debt service payments as of the January
2010 remittance report. The loan is secured by a 10-building,
531,410-sq.-ft. suburban office complex in Rancho Cordova, Calif.
The reported trailing-nine-month DSC for the period ended
Sept. 30, 2009, was 0.91x, and occupancy was 86.0%. At year-end
2008, DSC was 1.08x and occupancy was 81.0%. New leasing has
occurred this year. Based on the Sept. 30, 2009, rent roll and
including rents that are scheduled to commence through May 2010
after a free-rent period and deducting for $2.5 million in
outstanding leasing costs normalized over the remaining term, S&P
is projecting that DSC will be approximately 0.93x going forward.
In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P deemed four loans
($59.3 million; 2.1%) to be credit-impaired. The largest credit-
impaired loan, the Le Pavillon Hotel loan ($41.0 million; 1.5%),
is the ninth-largest loan in the pool. The loan is secured by a
226-room full-service hotel in New Orleans. The 10-story hotel
was constructed in 1907 and renovated in 2003. As of year-end
2008, the reported occupancy and DSC were 71% and 0.66x,
respectively. For the nine-month period ended Sept. 30, 2009, the
reported occupancy and DSC declined to 64% and 0.31x,
respectively. Of the three additional credit-impaired loans
($18.3 million, 0.6%), one is vacant and two are reported
delinquent. As a result, Standard & Poor's considers these loans
to be at an increased risk of default and loss.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $2.828 billion, which is 97.3% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 303 loans, unchanged from issuance.
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the master servicers,
Prudential Asset Resources Inc. and Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
provided financial information for 99.7% of the pool, and 98.2% of
the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-
2009 data. S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.35x for the
pool based on the reported figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV,
which exclude eight ($70.7 million, 2.5%) of the 12 specially
serviced loans and four credit-impaired loans ($59.3 million;
2.1%), were 1.35x and 105.6%, respectively. Including these
loans, S&P's adjusted DSC is 1.34x. S&P estimated losses
separately for these loans. The transaction has not experienced
any principal losses to date. Sixty-seven loans ($756.0 million,
26.7%) are on the master servicer's watchlist, including five of
the top 10 loans. Fifty-two loans ($586.7 million, 20.7%) have a
reported DSC below 1.10x, and 35 of these loans ($298.6 million,
10.6%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$696.0 million (24.6%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.22x for the top 10 loans.
Five of the top 10 loans ($322.3 million, 11.4%) appear on the
master servicers' watchlists, including one that was transferred
to the special servicer after the January 2010 remittance report.
S&P discuss the two largest loans in detail below. S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.19x and 124.0%,
respectively.
The Paces West loan is the second-largest loan in the pool and is
on the servicer's watchlist. The loan has a trust balance of
$84.0 million (3.0%). The loan is secured by a two-building
office complex totaling 646,471 sq. ft. in Atlanta. The reported
trailing-nine-month DSC for the period ended Sept. 30, 2009, was
1.09x and occupancy was 82.0%, down from 1.13x and 85.0%,
respectively, as of year-end 2008. The loan appears on the
servicer's watchlist due to low DSC.
The CSM Hotel Portfolio loan is the third-largest loan in the pool
and the second-largest loan on the servicer's watchlist. The loan
has a trust balance of $82.0 million (2.9%). The loan is secured
by eight cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted extended-stay,
limited-service, and full-service hotels located in five states.
The reported trailing-nine-month DSC for the period ended
Sept. 30, 2009, was 1.05x, down from 1.73x as of year-end 2008.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels
support the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M A AAA/Watch Neg 20.55
A-J BBB AAA/Watch Neg 12.33
B BB+ AA/Watch Neg 10.02
C BB AA-/Watch Neg 8.99
D BB- A/Watch Neg 7.58
E B+ A-/Watch Neg 6.55
F B+ BBB+/Watch Neg 5.39
G B BBB/Watch Neg 4.24
H B- BB+/Watch Neg 3.21
J CCC+ BB-/Watch Neg 2.57
K CCC B+/Watch Neg 2.44
L CCC B/Watch Neg 2.06
M CCC- B-/Watch Neg 1.80
N CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg 1.54
O CCC- CCC/Watch Neg 1.28
Ratings Affirmed
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-1 AAA 30.83
A-2 AAA 30.83
A-3 AAA 30.83
A-AB AAA 30.83
A-4 AAA 30.83
A-1A AAA 30.83
X-1 AAA N/A
X-2 AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 2005-PWR10 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR10 and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of the rating actions. The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect the credit support erosion S&P anticipates
will occur upon the eventual resolution of seven specially
serviced assets. S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.38x and a loan-to-value ratio of 111.6%.
S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its 'AAA'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.92x and an LTV of
146.0%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 70.6% and 41.7%, respectively. S&P's weighted
average DSC and LTV calculations exclude seven specially serviced
loans ($71.6 million; 2.8%) for which S&P separately estimated
losses, which S&P included in its implied default and loss
severity figures. The calculations also exclude six defeased
loans ($51.8 million, 2.1%).
The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect subordination levels that are consistent with the
outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-1
and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current criteria.
S&P published a request for comment proposing changes to its IO
criteria on June 1, 2009. Once S&P finalize the criteria review,
S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the ratings on the IO certificates
S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
As of the January 2010 remittance report, 10 assets
($322.4 million; 12.8%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, Centerline Servicing Inc. The payment status of the
assets is: one is in foreclosure (1.2%), five are 90-plus-days
delinquent (1.2%), one is 60 days delinquent (0.5%), two are less
than 30 days delinquent (9.7%), and one is late but within its
grace period (0.2%). Five of the specially serviced assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $21.0 million. S&P
separately estimated losses for seven of the specially serviced
assets ($71.6 million; 2.8%), which all ranged in size from 1.2%
to 0.1% of the pool balance. The special servicer is evaluating
workout resolutions for two of the three remaining loans
($221.7 million, 8.8%), and the third loan ($29.1 million, 1.1%)
was modified and brought current.
The largest loan with the special servicer and the second-largest
loan in the pool, the World Market Center loan, has a
$216.1 million (8.6%) trust and whole-loan balance. The loan is
secured by a 1,091,878-sq.-ft., 10-story home furniture and
furnishing accessories showroom and design center within a few
miles of downtown Las Vegas. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Sept. 24, 2009, due to imminent default and
now is less than 30 days delinquent. The occupancy and DSC for
year-end 2008 were 88% and 1.05x, respectively. The property was
83% occupied as of the Sept. 30, 2009, rent roll, and S&P
estimates a current DSC of 0.74x. The special servicer is in the
process of having preliminary discussions with the borrower. If
both parties do not reach an agreement, the ultimate resolution of
the asset could result in a significant loss to the trust.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $2.53 billion (209 loans), compared with $2.63 billion
(213 loans) at issuance. Prudential Asset Resources Inc. and
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., the master servicers, reported financial
information for all of the nondefeased loans in the pool. Ninety-
nine percent of the financial information was either full-year
2008 or partial-year 2009 data. S&P calculated a weighted average
DSC of 1.45x for the nondefeased pool based on the master
servicer's reported figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.38x and 111.6%, respectively. Standard & Poor's adjusted DSC
and LTV calculations exclude seven specially serviced loans
($71.6 million; 2.8%) and six defeased loans ($51.8 million,
2.1%). S&P separately estimated losses for the seven specially
serviced loans. The transaction has not experienced any principal
losses to date. Fifty-six loans are on the master servicers'
watchlists ($499.7 million; 19.8%). Nine loans ($296.2 million,
11.7%) have a reported DSC between 1.0x and 1.1x, and 23 loans
($274.4 million, 10.9%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 real estate loan exposures have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $1.0 billion (41.0%). Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.35x. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures for these top 10 loans
were 1.21x and 120.1%, respectively. One of the loans, the World
Market Center loan ($216.1 million; 8.6%), is specially serviced,
as discussed above, while three other loans appear on the master
servicers' watchlists due to low DSCs.
The Crocker Park loan, the fifth-largest loan ($97.4 million;
3.9%) in the pool, is secured by a class A mixed-use development
in Westlake, Ohio, approximately 15 miles from downtown Cleveland.
Newly constructed in 2004 and 2005, the property comprises 393,468
sq. ft. of retail space, 84,167 sq. ft. of office space, and 158
luxury residential units. For year-end 2008, the occupancy and
DSC were 90% and 0.47x, respectively. The loan is a period
interest-only loan that began to amortize in January 2008, which
affected the year-end 2008 DSC. Based on the current leasing
status, S&P estimate a current DSC of 0.71x.
The College Square Mall loan, the ninth-largest loan
($37.2 million; 1.5%) in the pool, is secured by a 405,908 sq. ft.
regional mall built in 1969 and renovated in 2002 in Cedar Falls,
Iowa. For year-end 2008, the occupancy and DSC were 89.7% and
0.79x, respectively. In addition, for the trailing-12-months
ended June 30, 2009, the occupancy and DSC were 85.9% and 0.76x,
respectively. Based on the available information, S&P estimate a
current DSC near the above DSC range.
The Skamania Lodge loan, the 10th-largest loan ($35.7 million;
1.4%) in the pool is secured by a 254-room, full service hotel in
Stevenson, Wash. It was built between 1991 and 1992 and renovated
between 2001 and 2002. For year-end 2008, the DSC was 1.39x, and
the ADR and occupancy were $167.41 and 61.0%, respectively. Based
on available information, S&P estimate a DSC of 1.06x for the
trailing six months ended June 30, 2009.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans with the special servicer and
the remaining loans in the pool according to its conduit/fusion
criteria. The resultant credit enhancement levels support the
lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M A- AAA/Watch Neg 20.85
A-J BB+ AAA/Watch Neg 12.51
B BB AA+/Watch Neg 11.73
C BB- AA/Watch Neg 10.56
D B+ AA-/Watch Neg 9.64
E B+ A+/Watch Neg 8.99
F B+ A/Watch Neg 7.95
G B+ A-/Watch Neg 6.91
H B BBB+/Watch Neg 5.73
J B BBB/Watch Neg 4.69
K B- BBB-/Watch Neg 3.26
L B- BB+/Watch Neg 3.13
M B- BB/Watch Neg 2.74
N CCC+ BB-/Watch Neg 2.22
O CCC B+/Watch Neg 1.95
P CCC- B/Watch Neg 1.69
Q CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg 1.30
Ratings Affirmed
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2005-PWR10
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-1 AAA 31.27
A-2 AAA 31.27
A-3 AAA 31.27
A-AB AAA 31.27
A-4 AAA 31.27
A-1A AAA 31.27
X-1 AAA N/A
X-2 AAA N/A
N/A -- Not applicable.
BLUEGRASS ABS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes and downgraded four
classes of notes issued by Bluegrass ABS CDO III, Ltd. as a result
of continued credit deterioration in the portfolio since Fitch's
last rating action in August 2008. Approximately 73.3% of the
portfolio has been downgraded since the last review.
As of the Dec. 31, 2009 trustee report, the current balance of the
portfolio is approximately $179.5 million. Approximately 73.3% of
the portfolio has been downgraded since Fitch's last rating action
in August 2008, resulting in approximately 65.9% of the portfolio
with a Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 54% with a
rating in the 'CCC' rating category or below compared to 41% and
23.9%, respectively, at last review.
Bluegrass CDO III entered an event of default on July 30, 2008,
due to the portfolio balance declining below the balance of the
class A-1 and A-2 notes. The controlling class directed the
acceleration of the maturity of the transaction on Dec. 11, 2008,
and it went into effect on the March 16, 2009 distribution date.
As a result, all interest and principal collections remaining
after paying fees have been going toward redeeming the class A-1
notes rather than to pay class A-2 and class B accrued interest.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio. Due to the
significant collateral deterioration, credit enhancement levels
available to all classes of notes are exceeded by the 'CCC' rating
loss rate, the lowest rating loss level projected by SF PCM.
Given this and the sequential pay structure due to the
acceleration, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for
all classes of notes in this transaction can be assessed without
performing cash flow model analysis under the framework described
in the 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs-Amended'
report.
The class A-1 notes are downgraded to 'C' because taking into
account performance expectations on the portion of the portfolio
not considered defaulted, recoveries for defaulted collateral and
future excess spread, Fitch believes default is inevitable at or
prior to maturity. With a remaining class A-1 balance of
$124.7 million and a performing portfolio of $98.4 million, the
defaulted securities are not expected to have high enough
recoveries to compensate for this difference. Additionally, the
current amount of excess spread in the transaction is negligible
compared to the remaining class A-1 balance. Even after the
interest rate swap expires in March 2011, it will be very unlikely
that the portfolio will be able to generate sufficient excess
spread to make up for the degree of principal shortfall that is
expected.
The remaining rated notes, classes A-2, B, C, D-1, D-2 and
combination securities, are no longer receiving any distributions
due to the acceleration of the transaction, and are not expected
to receive any proceeds going forward. Because the class A-2 and
class B notes are rated to timely receipt of interest, the missed
interest distributions due to the acceleration constitute a
default, resulting in the downgrades to 'D'. The class C, class
D-1 and class D-2 notes and the combination securities are rated
to ultimate receipt of interest and will continue to defer
interest payments until maturity, at which point they are expected
to default.
Bluegrass CDO III is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Sept. 15, 2004, and is managed by
Invesco Institutional N.A. Inc. The portfolio is composed of
residential mortgage-backed securities (54.7%), commercial
mortgage-backed securities (23.4%), asset-backed securities
(13.9%), SF CDOs (6.3%) and corporate CDOs (1.7%).
Fitch has taken these rating actions as indicated:
-- $124,717,365 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'BB';
-- $49,000,000 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CCC';
-- $27,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
-- $14,261,042 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
-- $7,358,765 class D-1 notes affirmed at 'C';
-- $3,800,469 class D-2 notes affirmed at 'C';
-- $4,970,682 combination securities affirmed at 'C'.
BLUEGRASS ABS: Moody's Junks Rating on Class A-1 Notes From 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Bluegrass ABS CDO II Ltd.
The class of notes affected by the rating action is:
-- US$248,000,000 Class A-1 Notes Due April 2039 (current
balance of $134,216,427), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
March 20, 2009 Downgraded to B3
Bluegrass ABS CDO II Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio primarily comprised of Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securities issued from 2002-2004 .
The rating downgrade action reflects deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio. Credit deterioration of the
collateral pool is observed through several factors, including a
decline in performing par value, an increase in the weighted
average rating factor or WARF and failure of coverage tests.
Moody's notes that the performing collateral pool decreased from
approximately $181.7 million in March 2009 to a current reported
balance of $122.1 million and the WARF increased from 873 to 1191
during the same period. The trustee also reports that all
Overcollateralization and Interest Coverage Tests are currently
failing.
According to article 5.01(1) of the Indenture dated April 14,
2004, a default in the payment of Cumulative Interest Amount on
any Class A Note or Class B Note will result in an event of
default. On the most recent quarterly distribution date,
January 12, 2010, the Issuer diverted monies from the principal
proceeds account to help satisfy the obligation to pay Class B
interest. Moody's surveillance analysis considered the likelihood
of the transaction experiencing an Event of Default in the
foreseeable future and the consequences to Class A-1 Notes should
such an event occur.
In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability. Moody's
explained that in addition to the quantitative factors that are
explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the Moody's
rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors
include but are not limited to the structural protections in the
transaction, the recent performance of the transaction in the
current market environment, how legal risks and issues are
addressed in transaction documentation, the collateral manager's
track record, and the potential for selection bias in the
portfolio. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2004-1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2004-1 due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial backed securities
transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $1.5 million, which represents
3% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the January 25, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 59%
to $41.9 million from $102.0 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 126 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 20% of the pool.
To date, 20 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $4.6 million (62% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes M-6
through M-8 and a 37% principal loss for Class M-4. Currently,
there are 20 loans, representing 13% of the pool, in special
servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $2.8 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (50% loss severity on average).
The servicer has recognized an aggregate $1.7 million appraisal
reduction on 11 of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $17,143,380, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
previously assigned Aaa on 7/13/2005
-- Class A-2, $7,941,657 downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 7/13/2005
-- Class A-3, $4,049,266, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 7/13/2005
-- Class IO, $42,558,721, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 7/13/2005
-- Class M-1, $2,930,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Aa2;
previously downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1 on 2/11/2009
-- Class M-2, $3,570,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2;
previously downgraded to Baa2 from A2 on 2/11/2009
-- Class M-3, $3,700,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2;
previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2 on 2/11/2009
-- Class M-5, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
to Ca from B3 on 2/11/2009
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2006-1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes of
CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2006-1 due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial backed securities
transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $3.1 million, which represents
3% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the January 25, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 38%
to $103.9 million from $166.8 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 188 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 20% of the pool.
Nine loans, representing 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
To date, 26 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $10.8 million (77% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes M-5
through M-8 and an 83% principal loss for Class M-4. Currently,
there are 44 loans, representing 19% of the pool, in special
servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $13.5 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (70% loss severity on average).
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A, $89,287,512, downgraded to Caa2 from Aa1; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa
-- Class X-1, Notional, downgraded to Caa2 from Aa1; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa
-- Class M-1, $4,587,000, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to A1 from Aa2
-- Class M-2, $4,587,000, downgraded to C from Baa2; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Baa2 from A3
-- Class M-3, $5,004,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to B1 from Ba1
-- Class M-4, $503,706, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa3 from B2
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2006-2 due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial backed securities
transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $3.0 million, which represents
3% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the December 28, 2009 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 22%
to $101.1 million from $130.5 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 221 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 23% of the pool.
To date, 17 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $2.9 million (54% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes M-7
through M-8 and in a 10% principal loss for Class M-6. Currently,
there are 59 loans, representing 33% of the pool, in special
servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate $13.5 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (41% loss severity on average).
The servicer has recognized an aggregate $6.2 million appraisal
reduction on eight of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A, $83,887,009, downgraded to Ca from A2; previously
downgraded to A2 from Aaa on 2/9/2009
-- Class X-1, Notional, downgraded to Ca from A2; previously
downgraded to A2 from Aaa; on 2/9/2009
-- Class M-1, $3,751,000, downgraded to C from Baa2; previously
downgraded to Baa2 from Aa2 on 2/9/2009
-- Class M-2, $4,893,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on 2/9/2009
-- Class M-3, $2,773,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1on 2/9/2009
-- Class M-4, $2,283,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
downgraded to Ca from Ba3 on 2/9/2009
-- Class M-5, $1,142,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
downgraded to Ca from B2 on 2/9/2009
CBA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2007-1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of eight classes
of CBA Commercial Assets, Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2007-1 due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
specially serviced loans. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial backed securities
transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $2.9 million, which represents
3% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the January 25, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 14%
to $109.6 million from $127.6 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 201 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 22% of the pool.
Five loans, representing 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
To date, ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate loss of $3.4 million (76% loss severity on
average). Currently, there are 56 loans, representing 31% of the
pool, in special servicing. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$24 million loss for the specially serviced loans (70% loss
severity on average). The servicer has recognized an aggregate
$1.4 million appraisal reduction on eight of the specially
serviced loans.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A, $93,846,486, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to A1 from Aa1
-- Class X-1, Notional, downgraded to Ca from A1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to A1 from Aa1
-- Class M-1, $3,509,000, downgraded to C from Baa2; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3
-- Class M-2, $3,669,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1
-- Class M-3, $2,233,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to B2 from Baa3
-- Class M-4, $1,436,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2
-- Class M-5, $1,755,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa3 from B1
-- Class M-6, $1,276,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Ca from B3
CD 2005-C1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes of CMBS
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from CD 2005-C1
Commercial Mortgage Trust and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on
nine other classes from the same transaction.
The ratings actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of these actions. The downgrades of the subordinate
classes also reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipates
will occur upon the eventual resolution of the specially serviced
loans. S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool. Using servicer-
provided financial information, Standard & Poor's calculated an
adjusted debt service coverage of 1.56x and a loan-to-value ratio
of 99.1%. S&P further stressed the loans' cash flows under its
'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 0.98x and an LTV
of 129.3%. The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA'
scenario were 74.2% and 31.5%, respectively. All of S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV calculations excluded seven of the 14
specially serviced assets ($96.8 million, 2.6%) and two defeased
loans ($9.3 million, 0.3%). S&P separately estimated losses for
the specially serviced assets, which S&P included in its 'AAA'
scenario implied default and loss figures. S&P also excluded one
cooperative apartment loan ($2.4 million, 0.1%) from its adjusted
DSC and LTV calculations. This loan did not default under S&P's
'AAA' scenario due to its relatively low leverage.
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its rating on the class X
interest-only certificates based on its current criteria. S&P
published a request for comment proposing changes to the IO
criteria on June 1, 2009. After S&P finalizes its criteria
review, S&P may revise its current IO criteria, which may affect
outstanding ratings, including the rating on the IO certificates
S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
Fourteen assets ($319.1 million, 8.5%), including the third-
largest loan in the pool, are with the special servicer, LNR
Partners Inc. Three of these assets ($15.8 million, 0.4%) are
real estate owned (REO) by the trust, three ($20.8 million, 0.6%)
are in foreclosure, four ($78.8 million, 2.1%) are more than 90
days delinquent, one ($10.6 million, 0.3%) is 30 days delinquent,
and three ($193.1 million, 5.1%) are within their respective grace
periods.
The Maine Mall loan ($136.7 million, 3.6%) is the third-largest
loan in the pool and is secured by 554,578 sq. ft. of 1.0 million-
sq.-ft. regional mall in Portland, Maine. In addition to the
pooled balance, the property is also encumbered by a $78.7 million
subordinate loan, which is held outside the trust. The loan was
transferred to LNR on April 23, 2009, due to the bankruptcy filing
of General Growth Properties on April 16, 2009. On Dec. 15, 2009,
the bankruptcy court confirmed a modification plan for 85 GGP
loans, including the Maine Mall loan. LNR has confirmed that the
maturity date of this loan was extended 66 months until Dec. 10,
2016. For year-end 2008, reported DSC was 1.65x for the pooled
trust balance, and 1.08x for the whole loan balance. Occupancy
was 84.2% as of Oct. 1, 2009.
The 13 remaining specially serviced loans ($182.4 million, 4.8%)
have balances that individually represent less than 1.1% of the
total pool balance. S&P estimated losses ranging from 10.0% to
76.9% for seven ($96.8 million, 2.6%) of these assets. Four
($29.2 million, 0.8%) of the remaining seven loans
($222.3 million, 5.9%) for which S&P did not provide estimates are
potential modification candidates.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the aggregate trust
balance was $3.77 billion, which represents 97.2% of the aggregate
trust balance at issuance. There are 223 assets in the pool
compared with 225 at issuance. The master servicer for the
transaction, Midland Loan Services Inc., provided financial
information for 94.3% of the nondefeased pool, and 97.3% of the
servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or interim-2009
data. S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.59x for the pool
based on the reported figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were
1.56x and 99.1%, respectively, which excludes seven specially
serviced assets ($96.8 million, 2.6%) for which S&P estimated
losses separately. To date, the transaction has realized
$1.7 million in principal losses in connection with one loan.
Forty-three loans ($583.6 million, 15.5%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including the sixth- and 10th-largest loans
in the pool. Thirty-three loans ($321.1 million, 8.5%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 20 of these loans
($240.6 million, 6.4%) have a reported DSC of less than 1.0x. To
date, two loans ($9.3 million, 0.3%) have been defeased.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$1.25 billion (33.8%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.90x for the top 10 loans.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV for the top 10 loans were 1.76x and
88.2%, respectively. The third-largest loan ($136.7 million,
3.6%) is with the special servicer, as detailed above, while two
other top 10 exposures ($153.2 million, 4.1%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.
The Florence Mall loan ($95.2 million, 2.5%) is the sixth-largest
loan in the pool and is secured by 298,078 sq. ft. of a 929,000-
sq.-ft. regional mall in Florence, Ky. The loan appears on the
master servicer's watchlist due to the bankruptcy filing of its
sponsor, GGP. This property is not part of the bankruptcy filing.
As of Dec. 31, 2008, the property had a DSC of 1.69x and 99.7%
occupancy.
The Union Square Apartments loan ($58.0 million, 1.5%) is the
10th-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 542-unit
multifamily complex in Palm Beach Gardens, Fla. The loan appears
on the master servicer's watchlist due to payment delinquency and
is currently less than 30 days delinquent. As of Dec. 31, 2008,
the property had a DSC of 1.21x, and as of May 31, 2009, it was
92.6% occupied.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
CD 2005-C1 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-M AA- AAA/Watch Neg 20.67
A-J A- AAA/Watch Neg 12.51
B BBB+ AA+/Watch Neg 11.74
C BBB AA/Watch Neg 10.57
D BBB- AA-/Watch Neg 9.41
E BB+ A/Watch Neg 7.85
F BB A-/Watch Neg 6.82
G BB- BBB+/Watch Neg 5.65
H B+ BBB/Watch Neg 4.49
J B BBB-/Watch Neg 3.19
K B- BB/Watch Neg 2.41
L B- BB-/Watch Neg 2.16
M CCC+ B/Watch Neg 1.77
N CCC B-/Watch Neg 1.51
O CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg 1.25
P CCC- CCC/Watch Neg 0.99
Ratings Affirmed
CD 2005-C1 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-1 AAA 31.03
A-1D AAA 31.03
A-2FL AAA 31.03
A-2FX AAA 31.03
A-3 AAA 31.03
A-SB AAA 31.03
A-4 AAA 31.03
A-1A AAA 31.03
X AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2006-AR1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1, a U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transaction backed by U.S.
prime jumbo residential mortgage collateral. S&P also lowered its
ratings on 17 classes from Residential Asset Securitization Trust
2005-A5, a U.S. RMBS transaction backed by Alternative-A
residential mortgage loan collateral. S&P also downgraded the
class B-3 certificates from Residential Asset Securitization 2005-
A5 Trust to 'D'. In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class B-1 certificates from the same transaction.
Standard & Poor's has established loss projections for all rated
prime jumbo, subprime, and Alt-A transactions issued in 2005,
2006, and 2007.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given its current projected losses due to increased
delinquencies. The downgrade to 'D' on class B-3 from Residential
Asset Securitization 2005-A5 Trust reflects its assessment of
interest shortfalls sustained on the affected class during recent
remittance periods.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.
In the case of prime jumbo collateral, in order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a
percentage specific to each rating category, up to 235% for an
'AAA' rating. For example, in general, S&P would assess whether
one class could withstand approximately 127% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 154% of
its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each
class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 235% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
In the case of Alt-A collateral, in order to maintain a rating
higher than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could withstand
losses exceeding its base-case loss assumptions at a percentage
specific to each rating category, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.
For example, in general, S&P would assess whether one class could
withstand approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a
different class could withstand approximately 120% of its base-
case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with
an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
S&P also lowered its ratings on certain senior classes due to
principal shortfalls/write-downs in the final period of particular
cash flow scenarios. These classes may not have experienced any
principal shortfalls/write-downs in any of the prior periods of
the particular stress scenario; however, the structural mechanics
of the transaction created circumstances in which one or more
classes within a transaction may have relied on principal proceeds
to satisfy interest amounts due in earlier periods, thus resulting
in a write-down in the final period.
The use of principal to satisfy interest obligations is generally
created within structures that utilize cross-collateralization and
contain multiple loan groups. Based on certain stress scenarios,
if a particular group is performing worse than another group or
set of groups, that group can become undercollateralized when S&P
compare the group collateral balance with the related senior class
balance(s). Based on the defined interest amount needed to
satisfy the interest liability of the related class (or classes),
interest shortfalls may occur if a group collateral balance is
insufficient to produce the necessary interest obligations of the
related liabilities.
Generally, cross-collateralization is designed to allow
overcollateralized groups to provide cash flow to
undercollateralized groups to mitigate this issue. However, if
the overcollateralized group has a pass-through rate that is lower
than the pass-through rate of the undercollateralized group,
available interest may not be sufficient to satisfy the
undercollateralized group's interest requirement. Therefore, the
principal portion of available funds may be used to satisfy
interest obligations based on the interest-principal payment
priority within the structure.
In the final period, a situation may occur in which available
funds are not sufficient to satisfy the interest and principal
requirements necessary to pay the bond in full, as principal in
prior periods was used to satisfy interest obligations.
Additionally, in some cases, even super-senior certificates can be
exposed to this risk because structures may pay principal pro rata
with senior support classes. Although the senior class was not
exposed to a write-down in any of the prior periods, the senior
class could be susceptible to a write-down in the final period due
to the aforementioned issues.
The affirmed rating reflects S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for this class is sufficient to cover
losses associated with this rating level.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime
jumbo and Alt-A mortgage loans that are secured by first and
second liens on one- to four-family residential properties.
Rating Actions
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR1
Series 2006-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A1 17307G2Z0 BB+ AAA
I-A2 17307G3A4 CCC BBB+
I-X 17307G3B2 BB+ AAA
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A5
Series 2005-E
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 45660LJX8 BBB- AAA
A-2 45660LJY6 BBB+ AAA
A-3 45660LJZ3 A AAA
A-4 45660LKA6 BB+ AAA
A-5 45660LKB4 BBB- AAA
A-6 45660LKC2 A AAA
A-7 45660LKD0 BB+ AAA
A-8 45660LKE8 AA- AAA
A-9 45660LKR9 BB+ AAA
A-10 45660LKS7 BB+ AAA
A-11 45660LKT5 BBB- AAA
A-12 45660LKU2 BBB+ AAA
A-13 45660LKV0 BBB- AAA
PO 45660LKF5 BB+ AAA
A-X 45660LKG3 AA- AAA
B-2 45660LKK4 CC CCC
B-3 45660LKL2 D CCC
Rating Affirmed
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A5
Series 2005-E
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 45660LKJ7 CCC
CITIZENS FUNDING: Moody's Confirms 'Caa2' Trust Preferred Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the Caa2 trust preferred
rating of Citizens Funding Trust I. At the same time, Moody's
affirmed the ratings of the parent company, Citizens Republic
Bancorp, Inc. (Citizens; issuer rating of B2, subordinated debt
rating of B3), and its lead bank, Citizens Bank, Michigan (bank
financial strength of D-, deposits of Ba3/Not-Prime, other senior
obligations of B1). The outlook on all entities is negative. The
confirmation of Citizens' trust preferred rating concludes the
review that was initiated on October 1, 2009.
The rating confirmation follows Citizens' announcement that it
will suspend the payment of dividends on its trust preferred
securities. The Caa2 rating was initially positioned based on an
expected loss analysis, which factored in the probability that
coupons could be skipped on a cumulative basis. The rating
already incorporates the risk of loss that investors in those
securities face with the announced deferral, said Moody's.
The affirmation of Citizens' other ratings follows the company's
fourth quarter earnings announcement. Although Citizens' credit
costs remain high, they are within Moody's expectations. Moody's
added that Citizens' recent exchange of common stock for holding
company subordinated debt and trust preferred securities improved
the company's capital position, putting it in a better position to
absorb heightened credit costs in the near to medium term. The
negative outlook on Citizens and its subsidiaries reflects the
potential for a more severe and/or protracted economic downturn in
Michigan, which would put additional pressure on Citizens' capital
position.
Outlook Actions:
Issuer: Citizens Funding Trust I
-- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review
Confirmations:
Issuer: Citizens Funding Trust I
-- Preferred Stock Preferred Stock, Confirmed at Caa2
Moody's last rating action on Citizens was on October 1, 2009,
when Moody's upgraded Citizens' subordinated debt rating to B3
from Caa2 and kept Citizens Funding Trust I's trust preferred
rating of Caa2 under review, direction uncertain. At the same
time, Moody's confirmed Citizens' B2 issuer rating and all of the
ratings of its lead bank, Citizens Bank, Michigan (bank financial
strength of D-, deposits of Ba3/Not-Prime, other senior
obligations of B1).
Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc., is headquartered in Flint,
Michigan, and reported assets of $11.9 billion at December 31,
2009.
CONCORD REAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on All 2006-1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Concord Real Estate
CDO 2006-1, Ltd./LLC reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 41.2%. Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines.
The transaction is primarily collateralized by subordinate
commercial real estate debt (69% of total collateral are either B-
notes or mezzanine loans). Fitch expects significant losses upon
default for these assets since they are generally highly
leveraged, thin debt classes. Further, three assets (4.5%) are
currently reported to be defaulted, and two subordinate loans
(8.2%) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern. Fitch expects
significant losses on the defaulted assets and Fitch Loans of
Concern.
Concord 2006-1 is a $465 million CRE collateralized debt
obligation managed by WRP Management LLC. The transaction has a
five-year reinvestment period during which principal proceeds may
be used to invest in substitute collateral. The reinvestment
period ends in December 2011. As of the January 2010 trustee
report and per Fitch categorizations, the CDO was substantially
invested: CRE B-notes (40.7%), mezzanine loans (28.6%), whole
loans (10.7%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS;
13.6%), and a CRE CDO class (1.9%). The CDO also holds 4.5% in
uninvested principal proceeds.
As of the January 2010 trustee report, the overcollateralization
and interest coverage ratios of all classes have remained above
their covenants. However, due to par haircuts associated with the
defaulted assets, the class F and class G OC ratios currently have
thin cushions over their covenants.
Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 50.7% of the
portfolio is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario,
defined as the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average
cash flow decline is 13% from third-quarter 2009 cash flows.
Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be low at 18.7%, due
to the significant concentration of subordinated assets.
The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is a
B-note (7.5%) secured by a 575-room full service resort located in
Tucson, AZ. The hotel's performance has been significantly
affected by the economic downturn, with a 78% decline in revenue
per available room from third quarter 2008 to third quarter 2009.
As such, Fitch modeled a term default with a substantial loss
under its base case scenario.
The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a B-note (7.1%) secured by a 569-room hotel located in Beverly
Hills, CA. The hotel, built in 1955, has hosted numerous high
profile events and fundraisers. The property underwent an
$80 million renovation starting in 2003; however, its performance
has struggled during the recent economic downturn. RevPAR
declined 25% from third quarter 2008 to third quarter 2009. Fitch
modeled a term default with a substantial loss under its base case
scenario.
The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (5.0%) secured by ownership interests in a
multifamily property located in New York, NY. The property
contains over 11,000 residential units and approximately 120,000
square feet of office and retail space. The sponsors' plan was to
convert the majority of rent controlled units to market rates;
however, the plan has faced significant economic and legal
hurdles. The loan became delinquent in January 2010, and the
lenders are in the process of gaining control of the property via
a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. Fitch modeled no recovery on this
highly leveraged mezzanine position.
This transaction was analyzed according to the 'U.S. CREL CDO
Surveillance Criteria,' which applies stresses to property cash
flows and uses debt service coverage ratio tests to project future
default levels for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based
on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.
The default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs.' Based
on this analysis, the breakeven rates for class A-1 are generally
consistent with the 'BBB' rating category, the breakeven rates for
classes A-2 and B are generally consistent with the 'BB' rating
category, and the breakeven rates for class C are generally
consistent with the 'B' rating category.
The ratings for classes D through H are based on a deterministic
analysis, which considers Fitch's base case loss expectation for
the pool, and the current percentage of defaulted assets and Fitch
Loans of Concern factoring in anticipated recoveries relative to
each class' credit enhancement. Based on this analysis, classes D
through G are consistent with the 'CCC' rating category, meaning
default is a real possibility. Fitch's base case loss expectation
of 41.2% exceeds these classes' respective current credit
enhancement levels.
The rating for class H is deemed to be consistent with the 'CC'
rating category, meaning default appears probable given the
minimal cushion between the class' credit enhancement and the
losses expected on the current defaulted assets and Fitch Loans of
Concern in the pool.
Classes A-1 through C were each assigned a Negative Rating Outlook
reflecting Fitch's expectation of further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral. These classes were also
assigned Loss Severity ratings of 'LS4' for class A-1, and 'LS5'
for classes A-2 through C. The LS ratings indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral under the
'B' stress. LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating. Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.
Classes D through H were assigned Recovery Ratings to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities. Recovery Ratings are
calculated using Fitch's cash flow model, and incorporate Fitch's
current 'B' stress expectation for default and recovery rates
(50.7% and 18.7%, respectively), the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-
stress, and a 24-month recovery lag. All modeled distributions
are discounted at 10% to arrive at a present value and compared to
the class' tranche size to determine a Recovery Rating. The
assumptions for the 'B' stress US$ LIBOR up-stress scenario are
found in the report, 'Fitch US$ LIBOR Stresses' (July 31, 2009),
available on Fitch's web site at 'www.fitchratings.com'.
The assignment of 'RR5' to class D reflects modeled recoveries of
18% of its outstanding balance. The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:
-- Present value of expected principal recoveries
($3.1 million);
-- Present value of expected interest payments ($3.4 million);
-- Total present value of recoveries ($6.5 million);
-- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($15 million).
Classes E through H are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' as the
present value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of
each class' principal balance.
Fitch has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks, LS and RRs to
these classes, as indicated:
-- $202,275,000 class A-1 to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $23,250,000 class A-2 to 'BB/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $46,500,000 class B to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- $20,925,000 class C to 'B/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;
-- $37,200,000 class D to 'CCC/RR5' from 'B';
-- $22,087,000 class E to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
-- $24,413,000 class F to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
-- $18,600,000 class G to 'CCC/RR6' from 'B';
-- $18,600,000 class H to 'CC/RR6' from 'B-'.
Additionally, all classes are removed from Rating Watch Negative.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 10 2004-C4 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
downgraded 12 classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-C4. The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans.
The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's debt service coverage
ratio remaining within acceptable ranges. Although the pool has
experienced a decline in diversity, as measured by the Herfindahl
Index, this has been offset by increased subordination due to loan
payoffs and amortization.
Moody's placed 12 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on January 13, 2010 due to anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing. This action concludes the
review. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the January 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to
$921.7 million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 162 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 33% of the pool. Nine loans,
representing 23% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by
U.S. Government securities. Defeasance at last review represented
8% of the pool. The pool includes 78 loans secured by residential
cooperative properties, representing 15% of the pool. These loans
have Aaa underlying ratings, the same as last review.
Twenty-two loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $660,000 (16% loss severity on
average). Seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Village on the Parkway Loan ($45.5 million -- 4.9% of
the pool), which is secured by a 381,000 square foot retail center
located in Addison, Texas. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in October 2009 and is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, manufactured home parks and retail properties. Three
of the loans, representing 5% of the pool, were transferred to
specially servicing because of maturity defaults. The respective
borrowers have negotiated loan extensions for these loans and it
is expected that they will be returned to the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $34 million aggregate loss for the four remaining
specially serviced loans (46% loss severity on average). Moody's
has also estimated a $422,000 loss on one loan (25% severity) that
matures within the next 24 months and has a Moody's stressed DSCR
less than 1.0X.
Moody's was provided with year-end 2008 and partial-year 2009
operating statements for 99% and 90% of the pool respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit pool, excluding
specially serviced loans, is 101% compared to 91% at Moody's prior
full review.
Excluding specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and stressed
DSCRs are 1.32X and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 1.51X and
1.11X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf score of 21, compared to 26 at last review.
The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the Brunswick Square Loan ($82.1 million -
- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest
in a 769,000 retail center located in East Brunswick, New Jersey.
The center is anchored by Macy's and JC Penney, both of which own
their respective buildings and are not part of the collateral. As
of September 2009, the property was 96% leased compared to 90% at
last review. Despite the increase in occupancy, property
performance has declined since last review due to lower revenues.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and 0.82X, respectively,
compared to 99% and 0.94X at last review.
The second largest loan is the Lake Zurich Portfolio Loan
($30.5 million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by two
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted retail centers located in
Lake Zurich, Illinois. The two centers total 363,000 square feet.
As of September 2009 the portfolio was 87% leased. One of the
properties, Deerpath Court Shopping Center, is currently on the
servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 89% and
1.13X at last review.
The third largest loan is the Wayzata Office Loan ($24.3 million -
- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 65,000 square foot
office building and 80-slip marina located in Wayzata, Minnesota.
The property was 92% leased as of June 2009 compared to 95% at
last review. The servicer reported a NCF DSCR of 1.4X for the
first six months of 2009, however, the borrower is 30 days
delinquent. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.94X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 1.07X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-2, $14,297,287, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-3, $33,994,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-4, $105,155,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-5, $24,031,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-6, $267,162,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-1-A, $271,552,122, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-SP, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-Y, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
on 11/12/2004
-- Class A-J, $78,243,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 11/12/2004
-- Class B, $39,832,000, downgraded to A1 from Aa1; previously
Aa1, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class C, $25,607,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A2; previously
A2, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class D, $9,958,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; previously
A3, on 1/13/2010
-- Class E, $12,804,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1; previously
Baa1, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class F, $8,535,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously
Baa2, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class G, $14,226,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3;
previously Baa3, on review for possible downgrade on
1/13/2010
-- Class H, $2,845,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba1; previously
Ba1, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class J, $4,268,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
Ba2, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class K, $5,691,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
Ba3, on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class L, $4,267,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously B1,
on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class M, $2,846,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously B2,
on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
-- Class N, $4,267,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously B3,
on review for possible downgrade on 1/13/2010
CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed six classes of Notes issued by
CRESS 2008-1, Ltd., on review for possible downgrade due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.
CRESS 2008-1, Ltd., is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio
of whole loans and A-notes (75% of the pool balance), B-notes
(12.5%), commercial mortgage backed securities (10%), and
mezzanine loans (2.5%). As of the December 31, 2009 Trustee
report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $747.6 million from $750.0 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class A Notes. The paydown was
triggered by the failure of the Class A/B, the Class C/D/E, the
Class F/G/H, and the Class J/K/L Overcollateralization Tests. Per
the Indenture dated as of January 22, 2008, upon the failure of
any OC Test results, all scheduled interest and principal payments
are directed to pay down the most senior notes, until the failed
OC Test is satisfied.
Nine assets with a par balance of $250.2 million (34% of the pool
balance) were listed as defaulted as of the December 31, 2009
Trustee report, compared to none as of last review.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation. Moody's review will focus on potential
losses from defaulted collateral and these key indicators.
The rating action is:
-- Class A1, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously assigned at Aaa on January 28, 2008
-- Class A2, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on April 27, 2009 Downgraded to A1 from Aaa
-- Class B, Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on April 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2
-- Class C, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on April 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 from A1
-- Class D, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on April 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 from A2
-- Class E, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on April 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 from A3
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated April 27, 2009.
CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three 2006-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd. S&P
removed one of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative, and
two remain on CreditWatch negative. At the same time, S&P
affirmed seven other ratings on this transaction.
The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on 23 commercial mortgage-backed securities
certificates that serve as underlying collateral for Crystal River
2006-1. The certificates are from 14 transactions, and the
securities total $106.6 million (27.5% of the pool balance). S&P
also analyzed its outstanding credit estimates on the unrated CMBS
collateral ($14.5 million, 3.7%). S&P lowered the majority of
these credit estimates. Two ratings on Crystal River 2006-1
remain on CreditWatch negative due to the transaction's exposure
to CMBS collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative
($74.5 million, 19.2%).
According to the Jan. 22, 2010, trustee report, Crystal River
2006-1 is collateralized by 71 CMBS certificates ($388.5 million,
100%) from 32 distinct transactions issued between 2002 and 2007.
Crystal River 2006-1 has exposure to these CMBS that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:
* Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2006-C1 (classes
K, L, M, N, O, and Q; $47.2 million, 12.1%);
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust series 2007-C31 (classes
L, M, and N; $9.2 million, 2.4%); and
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2005-
LDP5 (class J; 8.5 million, 2.2%).
S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch negative
placements on Crystal River 2006-1 in conjunction with its
CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.
Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A B/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
B CCC/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
C CCC- B-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.
Class Rating
----- ------
D CCC-
E CCC-
F CCC-
G CCC-
H CCC-
J CCC-
K CCC-
DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of notes issued by
Diversified Asset Securitization Holdings II, L.P./Corp. as a
result of continued credit deterioration in the portfolio since
Fitch's last rating action in March 2009. Approximately 34.9% of
the portfolio has been downgraded since the last review.
The downgrades to the portfolio have left approximately 45.7% of
the portfolio (including defaults) with a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 35.5% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 39.7% and 31%, respectively at last
review.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio. These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under the various default
timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the
report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended'.
Based on this analysis, the class A-1 and A-1L (together class A-
1) notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent with the rating
assigned below. Although the class A-1 notes have been paid down
16.2% of the balance outstanding at last rating action, the
additional negative migration in the portfolio has increased the
credit risk of the notes. Further, given the negative outlook for
the performance of the underlying assets, Fitch assigned a
Negative Rating Outlook to this class.
Breakevens for the class A-2L and B-1 notes are exceeded by SF PCM
'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults projected by SF
PCM. For these classes, Fitch compared the respective credit
enhancement levels with the amount of underlying assets considered
distressed (rated 'CCC' and lower). These assets have a high
probability of default and low expected recoveries upon default.
The class A-2 and class B notes have the credit enhancement levels
of 21.2% and 6.1% respectively, as compared to the 35.7% of the
portfolio considered distressed. Fitch believes that default is
probable for the class A-2L at or prior to maturity, and therefore
they have been downgraded to 'CC'. Fitch believes that default is
inevitable for the class B-1 notes at or prior to maturity and
therefore they have been downgraded to 'C'.
Fitch has assigned a Loss Severity rating for class A-1 of 'LS3'.
The LS rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'. The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the
probability of default for tranches.
DASH II is a SF CDO originated by Asset Allocation & Management,
LLC in September 2000 and is currently managed by Western Asset
Management Co. Western became the substitute asset manager for
AAMCO in November 2002 and actively managed the portfolio until
DASH II exited its reinvestment period in September 2005. The
portfolio is primarily comprised of residential mortgage-backed
securities (43.4%), asset-backed securities (30.3%) and commercial
mortgage-backed securities (26.3%).
Fitch has downgraded, assigned 'LS' ratings, and revised the
Rating Outlooks for these ratings as indicated:
-- $19,518,364 class A-1 notes to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB'; Outlook
to Negative from Stable;
-- $123,616,308 class A-1L notes to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB; Outlook
to Negative from Stable;
-- $50,000,000 class A-2L notes to 'CC' from 'CCC;
-- $37,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'C' from 'CC'.
FORD AUTO TRUST: DBRS Rates Class D Notes at 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------
DBRS has finalized the following provisional ratings of Ford Auto
Securitization Trust 2010-R1 (the Trust or FAST):
-- AAA to the Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class A-1 (the
Class A-1 Notes)
-- AAA to the Asset -Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class A-2
(the Class A-2 Notes)
-- AAA to the Asset -Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class A-3
(the Class A-3 Notes; collectively, with the Class A-1 Notes
and Class A-2 Notes, the Class A Notes or the Senior Notes)
-- AA to the Asset -Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class B (the
Class B Notes)
-- "A" to the Asset -Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class C (the
Class C Notes)
-- BB(high) to the Asset -Backed Notes, Series 2010-R1, Class D
(the Class D Notes)
On closing, the Trust acquired a portfolio of retail car and light
truck auto loans (the Portfolio of Loans) from Ford Credit Canada
Limited (FCCL). The Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes
and Class D Notes (collectively, the Notes) are pass-through
securities, with monthly payment of interest and principal based
on actual cash flows from the Portfolio of Loans. Principal on
the Notes will be repaid sequentially, with the Class A-1 Notes
being paid prior to repayment of any principal on the Class A-2
Notes and the Class A-2 Notes being paid prior to repayment of any
principal on the Class A-3 Notes. Principal on the Class B Notes
will not be repaid until all of the Class A Notes have been repaid
in full, while no principal on the Class C Notes will be repaid
until all of the principal on the Class B Notes has been repaid in
full. Similarly, no repayments of principal will be made to the
Series D Notes until all other series of the Notes have been
repaid in full. Each of the Class A Notes is rated AAA, the Class
B Notes are rated AA, the Class C Notes are rated "A" and the
Class D Notes are rated BB (high) based on full repayment of the
Notes by their respective Scheduled Final Payment Dates.
The final ratings incorporate the following considerations:
(1) The high level of credit enhancement provided by the
subordination (7.0% of the Initial Adjusted Pool Balance at the
Closing Date and building as principal on the Senior Notes is
repaid), a Reserve Account (1.0% of the Initial Pool Balance) and
annual interest spread of 5.2% of the Initial Adjusted Pool
Balance, assuming no requirements to pay Replacement Servicer Fees
estimated at 1.0%. The Targeted Overcollateralization Amount will
also include the excess of 1.5% of the Current Pool Balance over
1.0% of the Initial Pool Balance, which provides additional
protection to the Notes in the first year.
(2) Non-amortizing nature of the subordinated notes results in
increasing levels of support for Senior Notes as the Notes are
repaid.
(3) Low and consistent historical credit loss levels.
(4) Demonstrated experience of FCCL in the origination and
servicing of retail auto loan securitization transactions
backed by those assets.
(5) Performance guarantee provided by its parent, Ford Motor
Credit Company LLC.
Stress tests using assumptions, including replacement servicer
fees and large increases in delinquency and credit losses,
indicate that credit enhancement provides sufficient protection to
the Notes to warrant the ratings assigned.
G-FORCE 2005-RR2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five CMBS Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust, a resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit transaction. S&P removed four
of the lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative, and 11
additional ratings on the same transaction remain on CreditWatch
negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' rating on the
class X certificates from the same transaction and removed it from
CreditWatch negative.
The lowered ratings reflect the classes' susceptibility to
liquidity interruptions. The downgrades to 'D' of classes J, K,
L, and M reflect interest shortfalls to the classes that S&P
expects to continue for the foreseeable future. The downgrade of
class E to 'CCC+' reflects the class' susceptibility to interest
shortfalls. While class E currently does not have outstanding
interest shortfalls, it did not receive full interest payments in
November and December 2009. The 11 ratings remaining on
CreditWatch negative reflect the transaction's exposure to CMBS
collateral with ratings on CreditWatch negative ($130 million,
16.6%).
S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only certificates
based on its current criteria. S&P published a request for
comment proposing changes to its IO criteria on June 1, 2009.
Once the criteria review is finalized, S&P may revise its current
IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including the
rating on the class X certificates from G-Force 2005-RR2.
According to the Jan. 25, 2010, trustee report, 121 CMBS
certificates ($784.6 million, 100%) from 23 distinct transactions
issued between 1998 and 2002 collateralize G-Force 2005-RR2.
S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
G-Force 2005-RR2's certificates in conjunction with its
CreditWatch resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.
Rating Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
E CCC+/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
J D CCC-/Watch Neg
K D CCC-/Watch Neg
L D CCC-/Watch Neg
M D CCC-/Watch Neg
Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
X AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Ratings Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust
Class Rating
----- ------
A-2 AAA/Watch Neg
A-3FL A+/Watch Neg
A-4A BBB/Watch Neg
A-4B BBB/Watch Neg
B BB+/Watch Neg
C B+/Watch Neg
D B/Watch Neg
F CCC-/Watch Neg
G CCC-/Watch Neg
H CCC-/Watch Neg
GE CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six Series 2000-1 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes and
downgraded three classes of GE Capital Commercial Mortgage
Corporation, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-1. The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced
loans and concerns about refinancing risk associated with loans
approaching maturity. Excluding specially serviced loans, eight
loans, representing 6% of the pool, mature within the next 24
months and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage less than
1.00X.
The affirmations are primarily due to key rating parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges. In
addition, the pool has benefited from increased credit
subordination due to principal amortization and loan payoffs.
On September 21, 2009, Moody's placed three classes on review for
possible downgrade due to anticipated losses from the Embassy
Suites- New Orleans Loan, which had recently been transferred into
special servicing. This action concludes the review. The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to
$522.9 million from $707.3 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 88 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 31% of the pool. Thirty-five loans, representing 42%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government
securities.
Thirteen loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $31 million loss. These
losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes M through J and
a 23% loss to Class I.
Two loans, representing 6% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Embassy
Suites-New Orleans Loan ($28 million -- 5% of the pool), which is
secured by a 372-room limited service hotel located in New
Orleans, Louisiana. The loan was transferred to special servicing
in September 2009 for imminent default. The property has not
covered debt service since 2005 due to the economic disruption
caused by Hurricane Katrina. The special servicer is discussing a
potential loan modification/forbearance agreement with the
borrower.
The second specially serviced loan is secured by a 17,000 square
foot retail center located near Fort Worth, Texas. Moody's
estimates an aggregate $9 million loss for both specially serviced
loans (29% loss severity on average).
In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high probability of default for eight poorly
performing loans (6% of the pool) that mature within the next 24
months. Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $9.9 million
(32% loss severity on average) from these troubled loans. Moody's
rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing
and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for
100% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 78% compared to 93%
at Moody's prior review.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.36X and 1.48X, respectively, compared to
1.25X and 1.32X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf is 40. The pool
has a Herf of 22 compared to 30 at Moody's prior review.
The top three non-defeased performing loan exposures represent 14%
of the outstanding pool balance. The largest exposure is the
Synergy Business Park I and II Portfolio Loans ($36 million - 7%
of the pool), which consist of two cross collateralized and cross
defaulted loans secured by eight office buildings located in
Brentwood (Nashville), Tennessee and totaling 491,800 square feet.
The portfolio was 83% leased as of September 2009 compared to 90%
at last review. Despite the decline in occupancy, the portfolio's
actual cash flow performance has improved since last review.
However, Moody's valuation reflects a stressed cash flow due to
Moody's concerns about near-term lease expirations. The loan has
amortized by approximately 3% since last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 106% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 107%
and 1.01X at last review.
The second largest exposure is the Links at Oklahoma City Loan
($21 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 588-unit
apartment complex located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The
property was 98% leased as of September 2009, essentially the same
as at last review. The property has exhibited strong occupancy
and stable performance since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 76% and
1.32X at last review.
The third largest exposure is the 16522 Hunters Green Parkway Loan
($13 million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 487,000
square foot office/warehouse property located in Hagerstown,
Maryland. The property is currently 100% leased to two tenants.
Petsmart leases 52% of the net rentable area (NRA) and Lippincott,
Williams & Wilkins leases 48% of the NRA. Both leases expire
before the loan maturity in December 2010. The borrower is
currently in discussions with both tenants to extend their
respective leases. Moody's valuation reflects a stressed cash
flow due to Moody's concerns about the near-term lease
expirations. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 81% and 1.26X at last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-2, $387,961,963, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
12/21/2000 assigned Aaa
-- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 12/21/2000
assigned Aaa
-- Class B, $28,293,243, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 8/2/2006
upgraded to Aaa from Aa2
-- Class C, $31,829,898, affirmed at Aa3; previously on
12/27/2007 upgraded to Aa3 from A1
-- Class D, $8,841,638, affirmed at A2; previously on 2/19/2008
upgraded to A2 from A3
-- Class E, $22,988,260, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2; previously
on 9/21/2009 placed on review for possible downgrade
-- Class F, $8,841,638, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa3; previously
on 9/21/2009 placed on review for possible downgrade
-- Class H, $6,189,147, downgraded to C from Ca; previously on
9/21/2009 placed on review for possible downgrade
-- Class I, $4,083,419, affirmed at C; previously on 2/19/2008
downgraded to C
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 2005-C1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2005-C1 and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other classes from the same
transaction.
The downgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria, which was the primary
driver of its rating actions. The downgrades of the subordinate
and mezzanine classes also reflect the credit support erosion S&P
anticipates will occur upon the eventual resolution of eight
specially serviced loans, as well as S&P's analysis of one loan
that S&P determined to be credit-impaired. S&P's analysis
included a review of the credit characteristics of all of the
loans in the pool. Using servicer-provided financial information,
S&P calculated an adjusted debt service coverage of 1.52x and a
loan-to-value ratio of 92.6%. S&P further stressed the loans'
cash flows under its 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average
DSC of 0.99x and an LTV of 123.5%. The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 68.3% and 27.8%,
respectively. The DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above
exclude three defeased loans ($17.2 million, 1.4%), eight
($143.8 million, 11.8%) of the nine specially serviced loans, and
one additional loan that S&P determined to be credit-impaired
($41.4 million, 3.4%). S&P separately estimated losses for the
nine specially serviced and credit-impaired loans and included
them in its 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss figures.
The affirmations of the ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect subordination levels that are consistent with
the outstanding ratings. S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-
1 and X-2 interest-only certificates based on its current
criteria. After S&P finalize its criteria review, S&P may revise
its IO criteria, which may affect outstanding ratings, including
the ratings on the IO certificates that S&P affirmed.
Credit Considerations
As of the January 2010 remittance report, nine loans
($243.8 million, 20.0%) in the pool were with the special
servicers, Helios AMC LLC and LNR Partners Inc. LNR services only
the 125 West 55th Street loan, which is the largest loan in the
pool. The payment status of the specially serviced loans is: one
is in bankruptcy ($7.1 million, 0.6%), six are 90-plus-days
delinquent ($78.9 million, 6.5%), one is 30 days delinquent
($57.8 million, 4.7%), and one is current ($100.0 million, 8.2%).
Two of the specially serviced loans have appraisal reduction
amounts in effect totaling $8.4 million.
The 125 West 55th Street loan, the largest loan in special
servicing and the largest in the pool, has a total exposure of
$100.0 million (8.2%). The loan was transferred to LNR on
Aug. 21, 2009, due to imminent maturity default. The loan matures
March 1, 2010. The loan is secured by a 555,475-sq.-ft. office
building in Midtown Manhattan. For year-end 2008, the reported
DSC was 2.02x and occupancy was 100%, up from 1.58x and 100%,
respectively, at issuance. The borrower has requested an
extension.
The 3301 North Buffalo Drive loan, the second-largest loan in
special servicing and the fifth-largest in the pool, has a total
exposure of $58.0 million (4.7%). The loan was transferred to
Helios on April 17, 2009, due to imminent default from a
significant decrease in occupancy. The loan was 30 days
delinquent as of the January 2010 remittance report and is secured
by a nine-building office park totaling 321,041 sq. ft. in Las
Vegas. As of year-end 2008, the reported DSC was 1.41x and
occupancy was 59%. However, according to the Dec. 31, 2009, rent
roll, the property reported an occupancy of only 36.5%. The
borrower proposed a modification, which the special servicer is
currently reviewing. Should the modification not proceed, S&P
expects a moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.
The seven remaining specially serviced loans ($86.0 million, 7.1%)
have balances that individually represent less than 1.9% of the
total pool balance. S&P estimated losses for all of these loans,
which resulted in weighted average loss severities ranging from
10.0% to 55.4%.
In addition to the specially serviced loans, S&P determined the
seventh-largest loan in the pool, the City Center Square loan
($41.4 million, 3.4%), to be credit-impaired. The loan is secured
by a 655,057-sq.-ft. office property in Kansas City, Missouri, and
is on the master servicer's (Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC's)
watchlist due to low DSC. For the trailing-six-months ended
June 30, 2009, the reported DSC was 0.94x and occupancy was 60%.
On Dec. 2, 2009, the borrower reported that the tenant, Dickinson
Financial, which leased 14% of the NRA, vacated its space. The
tenant will continue to pay rent until its March 31, 2010, lease
expiration. Based on the Sept. 30, 2009, rent roll, as well as
Dickinson Financial's departure, S&P project the DSC and occupancy
to be roughly 0.60x and 48%, respectively. As a result, Standard
& Poor's considers this loan to be at increased risk of default
and loss.
Transaction Summary
As of the January 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
balance was $1.22 billion, which is 76.3% of the balance at
issuance. The pool includes 82 loans, down from 91 at issuance
due to six loan payoffs ($268.0 million, 22.0%) and three
liquidations ($28.6 million principal loss, 1.8%). The master
servicer provided financial information for 98.4% of the pool, and
all of the servicer-provided information was full-year 2008 or
interim 2009 data. S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.47x
for the nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported
figures. S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV, which exclude three defeased
loans ($17.2 million, 1.4%), eight ($143.8 million, 11.8%) of the
nine specially serviced loans, and one credit-impaired loan
($41.4 million, 3.4%) were 1.52x and 92.6%, respectively.
Including the nine specially serviced and credit-impaired loans,
S&P's adjusted DSC is 1.43x. S&P estimated losses separately for
these loans. Twenty-two loans ($359.1 million, 29.4%) are on the
master servicer's watchlist, including three of the top 10 loans.
Eleven loans ($259.1 million, 21.2%) have a reported DSC below
1.10x, and nine of these loans ($162.2 million, 13.3%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.
Summary of Top 10 Loans
The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding balance of
$606.9 million (49.8%). Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.54x for the top 10 loans.
Two of the top 10 loans ($158.0 million total exposure, 12.9%) are
with the special servicer, which S&P discussed in detail above.
Three of the top 10 loans ($150.1 million, 12.3%) appear on the
master servicer's watchlist, including one which S&P determined to
be credit-impaired, which S&P discussed above. S&P discuss the
other two top 10 loans in detail below. Excluding one specially
serviced loan and the credit-impaired loan, S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV for the top 10 loans are 1.60x and 92.9%, respectively.
Including these two loans, S&P's adjusted DSC is 1.51x.
The Windsor Hospitality Portfolio loan is the third-largest loan
in the pool and the largest loan on the servicer's watchlist. The
loan has a trust balance of $85.3 million (7.0%) and a whole-loan
balance of $95.5 million. The loan is secured by four full-
service hotels in Las Vegas, Nev., Asheville, N.C., Arcadia,
Calif., and Alpharetta, Ga. The reported trailing-12-month DSC
for the period ended Sept. 30, 2009, was 1.10x on the A note and
0.99x on the whole loan. These numbers are down from 1.69x on the
A note and 1.59x on the whole loan as of year-end 2008.
The NJ Industrial/Office Portfolio loan is the eighth-largest loan
in the pool. It comprises two cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted loans: portfolio 1 and portfolio 2. Portfolio 1 is on
the master servicer's watchlist due to a major tenant's lease
expiration. The loan is currently secured by two industrial
properties and one office property totaling 231,308 sq. ft. One
tenant, Road Con Systems (which occupied 151,700 sq. ft. or 66% of
the gross leasable area), had a lease that expired on Sept. 30,
2009, and the tenant vacated the property as of year end. The
reported occupancy and DSC for the portfolio one loan for the
trailing-nines ended Sept. 30, 2009, was 100% and 1.70x,
respectively. When S&P account for the Road Con Systems lease
expiration, S&P project occupancy and DSC to be 1.06x and 34%,
respectively.
Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
updated conduit/fusion criteria. The resultant credit enhancement
levels support the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1
Rating
------
Class To From Credit enhancement (%)
----- -- ---- ----------------------
A-J A+ AAA/Watch Neg 13.37
B A- AA/Watch Neg 10.59
C BBB+ AA-/Watch Neg 9.61
D BBB A/Watch Neg 7.64
E BB A-/Watch Neg 6.33
F B+ BBB/Watch Neg 5.02
G CCC BBB-/Watch Neg 3.71
H CCC- BB-/Watch Neg 2.08
J CCC- B/Watch Neg 1.58
K CCC- B-/Watch Neg 1.09
L CCC- CCC/Watch Neg 0.44
Ratings Affirmed
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
A-2 AAA 36.96
A-3 AAA 36.96
A-4 AAA 36.96
A-5 AAA 36.96
A-1A AAA 36.96
A-M AAA 23.86
X-1 AAA N/A
X-2 AAA N/A
N/A - Not applicable.
GRAND PACIFIC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A and Class B
notes issued in Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1. The
notes were placed on review for possible downgrade on August 14,
2009, because of deteriorating pool performance and the lack of
sufficient credit enhancement to cover potential future losses.
The trust is a securitization of small business loans used to
acquire commercial real estate with 40% investor properties and
60% owner-occupied properties at origination. Grand Pacific
Holdings originated the loans and is the subservicer. Wachovia
Bank is the master servicer for the transaction. The original
pool balance of $225 million (including prefunding) comprising of
62 loans has paid down to $52 million representing 23 loans.
Thirteen of those twenty-three loans amounting to 63% of the
remaining pool balance are balloon loans which are coming due in
2010. Additionally, approximately 37% of the remaining pool
balance is currently more than 60 days delinquent or in
foreclosure/REO.
Moody's estimates that the pool will sustain a loss of
approximately 23% (as a percentage of the current pool balance)
over the remaining life of the deal. Because the pool has a small
number of remaining loans, Moody's reviewed each loan in order to
determine its likelihood to default. The review included an
analysis of the business type, property location, past payment
history, borrower's credit worthiness, and the most recent
appraisal or an estimate of market value of the property. Losses
were projected using roll rate analysis and loss severity, ranging
between 20% and 40%, depending on property location and economic
value. In Moody's opinion, balloon loans pose a significant risk
of default in addition to the delinquent loans or loans in
foreclosure/REO. In addition, some of the loans in the pool have
been modified, and it is not clear what percentage of these loans
will default.
Based on the volatility of the expected loss, Moody's has
determined a Aaa volatility proxy (an estimate of credit
enhancement needed to achieve a Aaa rating) of 60%. Credit
enhancement is provided by the subordination, reserve account,
excess spread, and overcollateralization.
The complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Grand Pacific Business Loan Trust 2005-1
-- Cl. A, Downgraded to A1; previously on Aug 14, 2009, Aaa
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Aug 14, 2009, A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Four 2006-GG7 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Series 2006-GG7 and placed 13 classes on review for
possible downgrade. Moody's downgraded the ratings of Classes N,
O, P and Q to a rating of C because they have experienced realized
losses from the liquidation of two specially serviced loans (96%
loss severity on average).
Thirteen classes have been placed on review for possible downgrade
due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized
and anticipated losses from loans in special servicing. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $3.45 billion
from $3.61 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 132 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 46%
of the pool. The pool contains one loan, representing 6% of the
pool, with an investment grade underlying rating.
Twenty-six loans, representing 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Fifteen loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by a
mix of office, retail and industrial properties. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Pacific Center Loan ($121.2 million
-- 3.5%), which is secured by a 438,000 square foot office
building located in San Diego, California. The borrower is an
affiliate of Maguire Properties. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in October 2009 for imminent default.
Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-M, $361,165,000, currently rated Aaa, placed on
review for possible downgrade; previously assigned at Aaa on
8/16/2006
-- Class A-J, $261,845,000, currently rated A2, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aaa
on 2/9/2009
-- Class B, $27,088,000, currently rated A3, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa1
on 2/9/2009
-- Class C, $54,175,000, currently rated Baa1, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from
Aa2 on 2/9/2009
-- Class D, $27,087,000, currently rated Baa2, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from
Aa3 on 2/9/2009
-- Class E, $22,573,000, currently rated Baa3, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A1
on 2/9/2009
-- Class F, $45,146,000, currently rated Ba1, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba1 from A2
on 2/9/2009
-- Class G, $31,602,000, currently rated Ba2, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from A3
on 2/9/2009
-- Class H, $45,145,000, currently rated Ba3, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 from
Baa1 on 2/9/2009
-- Class J, $40,632,000, currently rated B2, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2
on 2/9/2009
-- Class K, $36,116,000, currently rated B3, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3
on 2/9/2009
-- Class L, $13,544,000, currently rated Caa2, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from
Ba1 on 2/9/2009
-- Class M, $18,058,000, currently rated Caa2, placed on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from
Ba2 on 2/9/2009
-- Class N, $16,774,939, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on 2/9/2009
-- Class O, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
to Ca from B2 on 2/9/2009
-- Class P, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
to Ca from Caa1 on 2/9/2009
-- Class Q, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
to Ca from Caa2 on 2/9/2009
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2007-GKK1 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GKK1, a
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.
S&P removed three of these ratings from CreditWatch negative, and
the other six lowered ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications. At the same time, S&P affirmed two other ratings on
the same transaction.
The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its downgrades of eight CMBS certificates that serve as underlying
collateral for GSMS 2007-GKK1. The underlying certificates have a
total balance of $66.6 million (10.5% of the pool balance) and are
from six distinct CMBS transactions. S&P also analyzed its
outstanding credit estimates on $68.5 million (10.8%) of unrated
CMBS collateral. S&P lowered most of these credit estimates. Six
of the affected ratings on GSMS 2007-GKK1 remain on CreditWatch
negative due to the transaction's exposure to CMBS collateral with
ratings on CreditWatch negative ($26.9 million, 4.3%).
According to the Jan. 22, 2010, trustee report, 73 CMBS
certificates ($633.7 million, 100%) from 46 distinct transactions
issued between 1998 and 2007 collateralize GSMS 2007-GKK1. GSMS
2007-GKK1 has significant exposure to these CMBS certificates that
Standard & Poor's has downgraded:
* Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2007-GG9
(classes J and K; $27 million, 4.3%);
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-CIBC16
(classes F and G; $25.3 million, 4.0%); and
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2006-C29 (class
H; $8.7 million, 1.4%).
S&P will update or resolve its CreditWatch negative placements on
GSMS 2007-GKK1's certificates in conjunction with its CreditWatch
resolutions of the underlying CMBS assets.
Ratings Lowered And Remaining On Creditwatch Negative
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GKK1
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-1 BBB/Watch Neg A+/Watch Neg
A-2 B+/Watch Neg BB+/Watch Neg
B B-/Watch Neg B+/Watch Neg
C CCC+/Watch Neg B/Watch Neg
D CCC/Watch Neg B/Watch Neg
E CCC/Watch Neg B-/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GKK1
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
F CCC- B-/Watch Neg
G CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
H CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GKK1
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates
Class Rating
----- ------
J CCC-
K CCC-
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 10 2005-CIBC13 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten classes and
downgraded 15 classes of J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC13.
The downgrades are due to higher losses for the pool resulting
from losses from specially serviced loans.
The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's debt service coverage ratio
and the Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.
Moody's placed 14 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on October 8, 2009, due to anticipated losses
from specially serviced loans. Due to higher than expected
estimated losses, Class A-M, which was not placed on review, has
also been downgraded because losses are higher than originally
projected. This action concludes the review. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $2.6 billion
from $2.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 228 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 34%
of the pool.
Forty loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Two loans have been liquidated from the trust, resulting in an
aggregate $3.4 million loss (10% loss severity on average). There
are 18 loans, representing 19% of the pool, currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the DRA-CRT
Portfolio I Loan ($180.9 million -- 7% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of 16 suburban office properties containing
a total of 1.5 million square feet. The properties are located in
Florida (12), North Carolina (2) and Maryland (2). The loan was
transferred to special servicing in November 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently 90+ days delinquent. The portfolio was
69% leased as of December 2008 compared to 85% at last review.
The occupancy decline is attributable to the largest tenant, Blue
Cross Blue Shield, which leased 23% of the net rentable area
(NRA), leaving when its lease expired in January 2009.
The second largest specially serviced loan is the Shore Club Loan
($111.0 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 322-
room full-service boutique hotel located in Miami Beach, Florida.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in September 2009
and is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The remaining 16 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, retail, and industrial properties. Moody's estimates a
$219.3 million aggregate loss for all of the specially serviced
loans (42% loss severity on average). The special servicer has
recognized an aggregate $112.1 million appraisal reduction for
seven of the specially serviced loans.
In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on two loans
representing approximately 1% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $4.4 million (30% loss severity on average) from
these loans. Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 96%
of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 112%, essentially the same as at
Moody's prior review.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.38X and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 0.97X at Moody's last review. Moody's actual DSCR is
based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 55, essentially the same as last review.
The three largest performing loans represent 12% of the pool.
The largest performing loan is the Mellon Bank Center Loan
($171.5 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which is secured by a
703,000 square foot office property located in Los Angeles,
California. The property was 95% leased as of June 2009 compared
to 100% at last review. The largest tenants include O'Melveny &
Meyers LLP (50% NRA; lease expiration September 2015), Capital
Group Companies (16%; lease expiration February 2018) and Mellon
Financial Corporation (15%; lease expiration December 2011). The
loan is interest only for its entire term. Performance has
declined due to increased operating expenses. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.7X, respectively, compared to 119%
and 0.87X at last review.
The second largest loan is the Marriott Myrtle Beach Loan
($74.9 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by 405 room
full service hotel located in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.
Revenue per participating room for the 12-month period ending
December 2008 was $115 compared to $93 at securitization. Despite
the hotel's improved performance, Moody's value reflects a
stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about the future
performance of the hotel sector. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 113% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.42X at
last review.
The third largest loan is the 270 Madison Avenue Loan
($62.0 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by 19-story
office building located in Manhattan, New York. The property was
99% leased as of June 2009, similar to last review. Performance
has been stable since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 110% and 0.9X, respectively, similar to last review.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $9,047,338, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
on 12/7/2005
-- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-2, $130,193,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-2FL, $250,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-3A1, $206,403,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-3A2, $25,000,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-4, $751,702,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-SB, $135,140,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-1A, $317,558,796, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-M, $272,056,000, downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa;
previously assigned Aaa on 12/7/2005
-- Class A-J, $187,039,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Aaa;
previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
10/8/2009
-- Class B, $54,411,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Aa2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class C, $23,805,000, downgraded to B2 from Aa3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class D, $44,210,000, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class E, $34,007,000, downgraded to Ca from A3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class F, $37,407,000, downgraded to C from Baa1; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class G, $30,607,000, downgraded to C from Baa2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class H, $34,007,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class J, $10,202,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class K, $17,003,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class L, $10,203,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class M, $6,801,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class N, $10,202,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
-- Class P, $6,801,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
placed on review for possible downgrade on 10/8/2009
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three 2005-FL1 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of three classes and
upgraded seven commercial mortgage backed securities classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2005-FL1. Moody's is taking this action due to the payoff of
three pooled loans since Moody's last review. The rating action
is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.
The pooled classes are secured by one remaining loan totaling
$107 million. As of the January 15, 2010 distribution date, the
transaction's aggregate certificate balance has decreased by
approximately 89% to $107 million from $1.02 billion at
securitization.
Moody's weighted average LTV for the pooled trust mortgage balance
is 62% compared to 75% at last review on February 24, 2009, and
65% at securitization. Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio for the pooled trust mortgage balance is 1.53X, compared to
1.23X at last review and 1.34X at securitization.
The pool has not experienced losses since securitization and no
loans are in special servicing. This transaction originally paid
principal on a modified pro-rata basis until the pool balance
reached 15% of the initial pool balance. Payments are now made on
a senior sequential basis.
The single remaining loan is the Meadowood Mall Loan, secured by
416,700 square feet of net rentable area in an 888,600 square foot
regional mall. The mall, which is located in Reno, Nevada is
anchored by three department stores, Macy's, J.C. Penney, and
Sears, which are not part of the collateral. The property has
experienced a deterioration in performance. Mall shop occupancy
as of 9/30/2009 was 82% compared to 89% at last full review and
95% at securitization. As of October 2009, comparable sales for
full year 2009 were expected to be $347 per square foot which is a
13% decline from the 2008 comparable sales of $399 per square
foot. At securitization, comparable sales were $478 per square
foot. The mall's performance has been impacted by the weak Reno-
Sparks economy, which has a housing market that is among the worst
in the nation according to Moody's Economy.com. The area's
economic recovery is expected to be slow.
The loan sponsor is a joint venture between Simon Property Group,
Farallon Capital Management and pension trusts associated with
General Motors Corporation. Recently, a modification was
completed resulting in a loan maturity extension until January
2012. The modification included a principal payment of
$30 million which was used to pay down both the A and the B Notes.
The A Note has been reduced from $130 million to $107 million.
Also, a cash management account has been established to sweep all
excess cashflow which will be used to delever the loan. Moody's
current underlying rating is Baa2 compared to Baa1 at last full
review and Baa2 at securitization.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A2, $32,289,401, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on 6/22/05
Assigned Aaa
-- Class B, $10,568,483, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on 8/11/06
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Class C, $8,863,619, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on 4/25/08
Upgraded to Aaa
-- Class D, $7,159,196, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to Aa1
-- Class E, $6,477,514, Upgraded to Aa1; previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to Aa2
-- Class F, $7,840,877, Upgraded to Aa3 previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to A1
-- Class G, $6,477,514, Upgraded to A1; previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to A2
-- Class H, $6,818,135, Upgraded to A2; previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to Baa1
-- Class J, $5,113,711, Upgraded to A3; previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to Baa2
-- Class K, $6,477,514, Upgraded to Baa1, previously on 2/24/09
Downgraded to Ba1
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 12 2005-MF1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 12 classes of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-MF1 due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from interest shortfalls and
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $3.6 million, which represents
1.6% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the January 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 33%
to $260.7 million from $387.3 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 266 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 11% of the pool.
Seventy-seven loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
To date, 16 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $8.7 million (43% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes K through
M and a 40% principal loss for Class J. Currently, there are 31
loans, representing 16% of the pool, in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $18.1 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (44% loss severity on average). The
servicer has recognized an aggregate appraisal reduction of
$12.9 million from 21 of the specially serviced loans.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes E through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.0 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $222,222,863, downgraded to Ba1 from Aa1;
previously downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa on 4/9/2009
-- Class X, Notional, downgraded to Ba1 from Aa1; previously
previously downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa on 4/9/2009
-- Class B, $7,263,000, downgraded to B3 from A1; previously
downgraded to A1 from Aa2 on 4/9/2009
-- Class C, $10,168,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Baa1;
previously downgraded to Baa1 from A2 on 4/9/2009
-- Class D, $6,779,000, downgared to C from Ba1; previously
downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1 on 4/9/2009
-- Class E, $2,905,000, downgraded to C from Ba2; previously
downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2 on 4/9/2009
-- Class F, $2,905,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously
downgraded to B1 from Ba1 on 4/9/2009
-- Class G, $4,842,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on 4/9/2009
-- Class H, $1,936,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
downgraded to Caa1 from B1on 4/9/2009
-- Class J, $1,674,477, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on 4/9/2009
-- Class K, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
to Ca from Caa1 on 4/9/2009
-- Class L, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously downgraded
to Ca from Caa2 on 4/9/2009
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2007-MF5 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of ten classes of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-MF5 due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from interest shortfalls and
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $5.0 million, which represents
1.2% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the January 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 13%
to $425.8 million from $488.3 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 344 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 10% of the pool.
Ninety-four loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
To date, 21 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $14.5 million (70% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes J through
N and a 91% principal loss to Class H. Currently, there are 50
loans, representing 17% of the pool, in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $49.8 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (70% loss severity on average). The
servicer has recognized an aggregate appraisal reduction of
$29 million on the specially serviced loans.
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes E through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.68 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A, $379,700,602, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to A2 from Aaa
-- Class X, Notional, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to A2 from Aaa
-- Class B, $9,155,000, downgraded to C from Baa1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2
-- Class C, $13,428,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Ba1 from A2
-- Class D, $8,545,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1
-- Class E, $3,052,000, downgraded to C from B1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to B1 from Baa2
-- Class F, $4,882,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3
-- Class G, $7,325,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Ba1
-- Class H, $210,998, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa3 from Ba2
-- Class J, $0, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3
LASALLE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Nine 2006-MF4 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
of LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-MF4 due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from interest shortfalls
and realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.
This transaction is classified as a small balance CMBS
transaction. The largest loan is $5.0 million, which represents
1.3% of the outstanding pool balance. Small balance transactions,
which represent less than 1% of the Moody's rated conduit / fusion
universe, have generally experienced higher defaults and losses
than traditional conduit and fusion transactions.
As of the January 20, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 17%
to $372.3 million from $450.9 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 310 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 1.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 11% of the pool.
One hundred and eight loans, representing 34% of the pool, are on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly
reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.
To date, 24 loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate loss of $17.7 million (63% loss severity on average).
These losses have resulted in the elimination of Classes H through
N and a 53% principal loss for Class G. Currently, there are 41
loans, representing 15% of the pool, in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $36.5 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (64% loss severity on average).
Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes D through
N have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.95 million. Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions (ASERs and
extraordinary trust expenses.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A, $331,495,620, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously
on 2/9/2009 downgraded to A2 from Aaa
-- Class X, Notional, downgraded to Caa2 from A2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to A2 from Aaa
-- Class B, $7,891,000, downgraded to C from Baa1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2
-- Class C, $11,836,000, downgraded to C from Ba1; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Ba1 from A2
-- Class D, $9,018,000, downgraded to C from Ba3; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1
-- Class E, $2,255,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to B2 from Baa2
-- Class F, $4,509,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Baa3
-- Class G, $3,707,929, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from Ba2
-- Class H, $0, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
2/9/2009 downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3
LB COMMERCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999-C2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
downgraded five classes and affirmed three classes of LB
Commercial Mortgage Trust 1999-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2. The upgrades are due to the
increased credit support due to loan payoffs and principal
amortization. The deal has amortized by approximately 88% since
Moody's prior review in April 2008.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from loans in
special servicing. Since Moody's last review, the pool has
experienced an aggregate $10.2 million realized loss and specially
serviced loans have increased from 1% to 48% of the pool.
Despite the pool's exposure to specially serviced loans and
decline in loan diversity, as measured by the Herfindahl Index,
Moody's is affirming three classes because subordination levels
provide an adequate protection from expected losses.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 91% to $76.5
million from $892.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 31 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
61% of the pool. Twelve loans, representing 23% of the pool, are
secured by credit tenant leases. The conduit component consists
of two performing loans, representing 21% of the pool, and
fourteen specially serviced loans, representing 48% of the pool.
Three loans, representing 8% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by U.S. Government securities.
There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.
Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $10 million loss (15%
loss severity on average). These losses have resulted in 100%
principal losses of Classes P and N.
Fourteen loans, representing 48% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. All of these loans were transferred to special
servicing due to maturity default. The loans are secured by a mix
of multifamily, retail, and industrial properties. The respective
borrowers for eight of the loans (23% of the pool) are negotiating
loan extensions and it is expected that these loans will be
returned to the master servicer. Moody's estimates an
$11.7 million aggregate loss for the remaining ten specially
serviced loans (37% loss severity on average).
In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on one loan (9% of
the pool) which matures within the next year and has realized a
decline in performance because of increased vacancy. Moody's
estimates a $1.4 million loss for this troubled loan (20% loss
severity). Moody's rating action recognizes potential uncertainty
around the timing and magnitude of loss from this troubled loan.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf is 40. The pool
has a Herf of 10 compared to 28 at Moody's prior review.
The two non-defeased performing loans represent 21% of the
outstanding pool balance-. The largest loan is the Corona Market
Place Loan ($9 million - 12% of the pool), which is secured by a
104,200 square foot unanchored retail center located in Corona
(Riverside County), California. The property was 93% leased as of
September 2009. Property performance has declined since last
review due to an increase in operating expenses. The loan matures
in June 2011. Moody's loan to value ratio and stressed debt
service coverage ratio are 52% and 2.18X, respectively, compared
to 46% and 2.63X at last review.
The second performing conduit loan is the White Rock Marketplace
Loan ($7 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 173,540
square foot retail center located in Dallas, Texas. The loan was
recently transferred from special servicing back to the master
servicer after it was approved for a one year extension. The
property lost its anchor grocery tenant in late 2008 and only a
portion of that space has been released. The property is
approximately 71% leased. Moody's valuation incorporates a
stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about the performance
of this property in a stressed retail environment. The loan has
been extended to July 2010. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
108% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.23X at last
review.
The CTL component consists of 12 loans secured by properties
leased to five tenants. The largest exposures are CVS/Caremark
Corp. (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook; 70%
of the CTL component), Rite Aid Corporation (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Caa3/Ca -- stable outlook; 15% of the CTL
component), and Walgreen Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured
rating A2 -- stable outlook; 11% of the CTL component).
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 10/13/1999
assigned Aaa
-- Class E, $11,903,593, upgraded to Aaa from A1; previously on
12/21/2006 upgraded to A1 from A3
-- Class F, $12,271,000, upgraded to Aa2 from A3; previously on
12/21/2006 upgraded to A3 from Baa2
-- Class G, $11,155,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously on
12/21/2006 upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1
-- Class H, $17,849,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously on
10/13/1999 assigned Ba2
-- Class J, $4,462,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously on
10/13/1999 assigned Ba3
-- Class K, $7,586,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B1; previously
on 10/13/1999 assigned B1
-- Class L, $9,816,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously on
4/25/2008 downgraded to Caa1 from B2
-- Class M, $1,419,135, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously on
4/25/2008 downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1
-- Class N, $0, downgraded to C from Ca; previously on 4/25/2008
downgraded to Ca from Caa3
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 11 2001-C2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 11 classes of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-C2 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing and concerns
about refinancing risk associated with loans approaching maturity
in an adverse environment. Sixteen loans, representing 16% of the
pool, mature within the next two years and have a Moody's stressed
debt service coverage ratio below 1.00X. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.
As of the January 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 21% to $1.04
billion from $1.32 billion at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 119 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 32%
of the pool. The pool contains two loans, representing 13% of the
pool, with investment grade underlying ratings. Forty-eight
loans, representing 43% of the pool, have defeased and are now
collateralized by U.S. Government securities compared to 39% at
Moody's last review.
Twenty-five loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool since last review,
resulting in a $25.6 million aggregate loss (62% loss severity on
average). Nine loans, representing 14% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by
a mix of retail, multifamily and office properties.
Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans and troubled
loans with near-term maturities.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class B, $49,466,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aaa on 10/05/2005
-- Class C, $62,656,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aaa on 2/14/2007
-- Class D, $16,488,000, currently rated Aa1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa1 on 2/14/2007
-- Class E, $13,191,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Aa3 on 2/14/2007
-- Class F, $19,786,000, currently rated A2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously upgraded to A2 on 2/14/2007
-- Class G, $16,489,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously upgraded to Baa1 on 2/14/2007
-- Class H, $23,084,000, currently rated Ba1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba1 on 5/24/2001
-- Class J, $14,840,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba2 on 5/24/2001
-- Class K, $11,541,000, currently rated Ba3, on review for
possible downgrade; previously assigned at Ba3 on 5/24/2001
-- Class L, $9,894,000, currently rated B1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously assigned at B1 on 5/24/2001
-- Class M, $10,697,910, currently rated Caa1, on review for
possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 on
10/24/2007
LOCAL INSIGHT: S&P Puts Note Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's placed its ratings on three classes of senior
and subordinated from Local Insight Media Finance LLC's series
2008-1 corporate securitization on CreditWatch negative due to
Ambac Assurance Corp.'s role as controlling party in this
transaction. Ambac is currently rated 'CC/Watch Developing'.
Because U.S. corporate securitization transactions generally rely
on their controlling party to manage the transition to the back-up
servicer in the event of a corporate bankruptcy, S&P believes this
transaction is exposed to a greater servicer transition risk
because of Ambac's weakened financial state.
S&P placed its ratings on six other U.S. corporate securitization
transactions on CreditWatch negative on Aug. 4, 2009, in effort to
evaluate potential scenarios and consequences reflective of
Ambac's ability after S&P downgraded the monocline to 'CC' on
July 28, 2009. These considerations centered on the company's
continued ability to effectively transition servicing, if
necessary, in this type of transaction. S&P placed its ratings on
Local Insight Media Finance LLC's series 2008-1 because S&P
believes that it is also exposed to similar servicer transitioning
concerns.
Ratings Placed On Creditwatch Negative
Local Insight Media Finance LLC
US$ 313 million fixed-rate senior and subordinated notes
series 2008-1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-1 BBB/Watch Neg BBB
A-2 BBB/Watch Neg BBB
B BB/Watch Neg BB
LOUISIANA: S&P Corrects 2000 Taxable Bonds From 'BB-/Stable'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected and raised its long-
term and underlying rating to 'BBB-/Stable' from 'BB-/Stable' on
New Orleans, Louisiana's series 2000 taxable pension variable-rate
revenue bonds. These bonds are secured by a limited tax pledge of
the city. The series 2000 bonds are also guaranteed by an
insurance policy from Ambac Assurance Corp. (CC/Developing).
However, the long-term rating on these bonds is currently based on
the SPUR (BBB-) on the bonds. According to S&P's criteria, the
rating on a fully credit-enhanced bond issuance is the higher of
the rating on the credit enhancer and the SPUR on the bonds.
On April 21, 2009, S&P raised the SPUR on the City of New Orleans'
limited-tax general obligation debt to 'BBB-' from 'BB-'.
However, due to an administrative error, S&P did not
contemporaneously raise the SPUR on the series 2000 bonds.
Following that omission, the long-term rating was eventually
lowered to 'BB-/Stable' on Aug. 21, 2009, which was the same as
the incorrect SPUR.
MANTOLOKING CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2006-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
seven classes of notes issued by Mantoloking CDO 2006-1 Ltd., a
cash flow collateralized debt obligation of corporate CDO
transaction.
The rating actions follow the sale of the underlying collateral
backing the notes. The available proceeds from the sale were
insufficient to pay the noteholders in full.
Ratings Lowered
Mantoloking CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-1 D B+/Watch Neg
A-2 D CC
A-3 D CC
B D CC
C D CC
D D CC
E D CC
MERCURY CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven 2004-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes of notes issued by
Mercury CDO 2004-1, Ltd./Corp.
As of the December 2009 trustee report, the balance of the
portfolio was $400.7 million, including $97.6 million, or 24.4%,
in par of assets deemed defaulted as per the transaction's
governing documents. Approximately 62.1% of the portfolio has
been downgraded since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009,
resulting in 39.6% of the portfolio with a Fitch derived rating
below investment grade and 32.1% with a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or below, as compared to 26.3% and 17.7%, respectively,
at last review.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio. These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended'.
Based on this analysis, the class A-1NV, A-1VA and A-1VB (class A-
1) notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent with the rating
assigned below. As of the December 2009 distribution date,
approximately 55% of the class A-1 notes' original principal
balance has paid down. Collectively, the class A-1 notes
represent 69.7% of the current capital structure and have a credit
enhancement of 29.7%.
Breakevens for the class A-2A and A-2B (class A-2), class B and
class C notes are exceeded by SF PCM's 'CCC' default level, the
lowest level of defaults projected by SF PCM. For these classes,
Fitch compared the respective credit enhancement levels to the
amount of underlying assets considered distressed (rated 'CCC' and
lower). These assets have a high probability of default and low
expected recoveries upon default. The classes A-2, B, and C notes
have credit enhancement levels of 15.8%, 6.1% and 1.9%,
respectively. While these classes are still receiving interest
distributions, considering the large outstanding amount of the
class A-1 notes and the amount of distressed assets in the
portfolio, Fitch believes that default is inevitable for these
classes at or prior to maturity.
Mercury 2004-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation,
which closed on Nov. 3, 2004, and is managed by Chotin Management
Corporation. The current portfolio is composed of subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities 43.4%, prime RMBS 33%,
structured finance CDOs 20.3%, and middle market CDOs 3.4%.
Fitch has taken rating actions on these classes as indicated:
-- $135,082,597 class A-1NV notes downgraded to 'CCC' from
'BBB', removed from Outlook Negative;
-- $45,003 class A-1VA notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BBB',
removed from Outlook Negative;
-- $148,640,398 class A-1VB notes downgraded to 'CCC' from
'BBB', removed from Outlook Negative;
-- $25,000,000 class A-2A notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- $31,050,000 class A-2B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- $38,880,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
-- $17,000,000 class C notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 14 2005-MKB2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 14 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-MKB2 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged
watch list loans and concerns about refinancing risk associated
with loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.
Fifteen loans, representing 19% of the pool, mature over the next
36 months and seven of these loans (12% of the pool) have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.00X. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 12, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 16% to $958 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The 82 mortgage loans that
collateralize these Certificates range in size from less than 1%
to 7% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 38% of the pool. The pool contains one loan,
representing 3% of the pool, with an underlying investment grade
rating. U.S. Government securities now secure six loans or 20% of
the total pool due to defeasance compared to one loan (6% of the
pool) at Moody's last review.
Nine loans, representing 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
To date, the pool has not experienced any losses. Six loans,
representing 13% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of limited and
full-service hotels, unanchored and anchored retail centers,
multifamily and office properties.
Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced loans and troubled
loans with near-term maturities.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class AJ, $61,128,000, Aaa; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Aaa on 3/30/2005;
-- Class B, $32,696,000, Aa2; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Aa2 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class C, $9,951,000, Aa3; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Aa3 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class D, $21,323,000, A2; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned A2 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class E, $12,795,000, A3; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned A3 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class F, $18,480,000, Baa1; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Baa1 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class G, $11,373,000, Baa2; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Baa2 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class H, $14,216,000, Baa3; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Baa3 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class J, $7,107,000, Ba1; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Ba1 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class K, $5,687,000, Ba2; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Ba2 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class L, $4,264,000, Ba3; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned Ba3 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class M, $4,265,000, B1; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned B1 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class N, $2,843,000, B2; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned B2 on 3/30/2005;
-- Class P, $5,687,000, B3; on review for possible downgrade;
previously assigned B3 on 3/30/2005;
MONTAUK POINT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of notes from Montauk Point CDO II Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized debt obligation backed by mezzanine structured
finance securities, and Sheffield CDO II Ltd., a hybrid CDO of SF
CDO transaction. S&P removed two of the Sheffield CDO ratings
from CreditWatch negative, and two remain on CreditWatch negative.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on eight other tranches
from these transactions.
These rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an event of
default and may be subject to acceleration or liquidation.
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd. triggered an EOD on Jan. 15, 2010,
following a default in the payment of interest due on the non-
payment-in-kind classes (A1S, A1J, and A2).
Sheffield CDO II Ltd. triggered an EOD on July 21, 2009, after
which a majority of the controlling class of noteholders directed
the trustees to proceed with the liquidation of the collateral
backing the rated notes.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Deal Name Class To From
--------- ----- -- ----
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd A1J D CC
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd A1S D CC
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd A2 D CC
Sheffield CDO II Ltd S CCC/Watch Neg BBB-/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd A-1 CCC-/Watch Neg BB/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd A-2 CC CCC/Watch Neg
Sheffield CDO II Ltd A-3 CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd A3 CC
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd A4 CC
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd B CC
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd C CC
Montauk Point CDO II Ltd Comp sec. AAA
Sheffield CDO II Ltd B CC
Sheffield CDO II Ltd C CC
Sheffield CDO II Ltd D CC
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class IA Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its rating on the
class IA notes issued by Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC's series
2007-2, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transaction.
The rating withdrawal follows the complete redemption and
cancellation of the notes.
Rating Withdrawn
Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2007-2
Rating Balance (mil. $)
------ ----------------
Class To From Current Previous
----- -- ---- ------- --------
IA NR CCC- 0.000 50.000
NR - Not rated.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 12 Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all ratings across 12 National
Collegiate Student Loan Trust transactions. The downgrades
reflect default rates that continue to increase in excess of
Fitch's initial expectations, as well as Fitch's ongoing concerns
regarding the level of recoveries on defaulted loans in the
absence of guaranty payments from The Education Resources
Institute, whose bankruptcy remains unresolved. (TERI is the
guarantor of the loans in the NCSLT transactions.)
Calculated loss multiples were indicative of lower ratings for
every class in each of the 12 trusts. A Negative Rating Outlook
was assigned to non-distressed ratings in NCSLT 2003-1 through
2006-2 to reflect Fitch's concern that the collateral may continue
to deteriorate and warrant further downgrades. It also
corresponds with Fitch's negative outlook for the private student
loan sector in general. All non-distressed ratings in NCSLT 2006-
3 to 2007-2 remain on Rating Watch Negative to reflect Fitch's
concerns regarding the timing of when funds in the pledge account
will be available in the relevant trusts. These actions are based
upon Fitch's Global Structured Finance Criteria and U.S. Private
Student Loan ABS Criteria.
For each trust, Fitch conducted a review of the collateral
performance that involved the calculation of loss coverage
multiples based on the most recent variables. A projected net
loss amount was compared to available credit enhancement to
determine the loss multiples. Fitch used historical vintage loss
data provided by the issuer to form a loss timing curve
representative of the private student loan collateral pools of
each trust. After giving credit for seasoning of loans in
repayment, Fitch applied the current cumulative gross loss level
to this loss timing curve to derive the expected gross losses over
the remaining life for each trust. A loan recovery rate of 25%
was applied, which assumes no further payments from TERI.
The available credit enhancement for the trusts consists of excess
spread, overcollateralization (if any), and subordination where
applicable. Fitch assumed excess spread to be the lesser of the
historical average excess spread (earning on the assets minus
interest payments to bondholders and fees) and the most recent 12-
month average excess spread, and applied that same rate over the
remaining life.
Given the high default forecasts relative to the remaining pool
balance, the multiples were compressed to achieve through-the-
cycle rating stability. However, despite the compression,
multiples were indicative of lower ratings in all cases. Ratings
of tranches with a multiple lower than one were downgraded to the
distressed category.
The Negative Watch is maintained for the non-distressed ratings
pertaining to the trusts that have a significant level of pledge
account balances. The ratings account for the funds in the pledge
accounts, but currently, claims against the funds for defaulted
loans are not being filed. This puts pressure on the trusts from
a liquidity standpoint and the Negative Watch may remain until the
funds are utilized by the trusts.
The resolution of the bankruptcy may have a significant and
positive impact on the ratings, depending on the level of recovery
cash flow the trusts end up getting from the bankruptcy estate.
However, given the higher level of uncertainty with respect to the
amount, no recovery payment from the bankruptcy estate is assumed
in the analysis. Fitch is not assigning Recovery Ratings to the
distressed tranches because of this unpredictability. Once the
outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding is known, Fitch anticipates
assigning Recovery Ratings.
Fitch has downgraded these ratings:
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1:
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-7 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B-1 to 'C' from 'A+';
-- Class B-2 to 'C' from 'A+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-1:
-- Class A-2 to 'BB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO-1 to 'BB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO-2 to 'BB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B-1 to 'C' from 'A';
-- Class B-2 to 'C' from 'A'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2/NCF Grantor Trust
2004-2:
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 1 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 2 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B to 'BB+' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C to 'CCC' from 'A+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1/NCF Grantor Trust
2005-1:
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 1 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 2 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative';
-- Class C to 'CC' from 'BBB+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2/NCF Grantor Trust
2005-2:
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5-1 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5-2 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B to 'B+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C to 'CC' from 'BBB+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3/NCF Grantor Trust
2005-3:
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5-1 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5-2 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO-1 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO-2 to 'BBB-' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C to 'CC' from 'BBB+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1:
-- Class A-2 to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B to 'B+' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class C to 'CC' from 'BB+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2:
-- Class A-1 to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-2 to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BB-' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B to 'CCC' from 'A';
-- Class C to 'CC' from 'BB+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3:
-- Class A-1 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-5 to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB+' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class B to 'BB+' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class C to 'B+' from 'A';
-- Class D to 'CCC' from 'BBB'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4:
-- Class A-1 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative ;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class B to 'BB' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class C to 'B' from 'A';
-- Class D to 'CC' from 'BBB'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1:
-- Class A-1 to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class B to 'BB' from 'A+', Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class C to 'B' from 'BBB+';
-- Class D to 'CC' from 'BB+'.
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2:
-- Class A-1 to 'BBB' from 'AAA';
-- Class A-2 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-3 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-4 to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class A-IO to 'BBB' from 'AAA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class B to 'BBB-' from 'AA'; Rating Watch Negative;
-- Class C to 'BB-' from 'A';
-- Class D to 'CCC' from 'BBB'.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D' on
the class C notes from National Collegiate Student Loan Trust's
series 2005-1 and 2005-2. S&P had previously placed the ratings
on CreditWatch with negative implications on Dec. 30, 2009.
S&P lowered the ratings to 'D' because these classes did not
receive interest payments on the Jan. 25, 2010, distribution date
due to a breach of the class C note interest trigger for each
transaction. The class C note interest triggers are tested
monthly, and the breach can be cured if the transaction passes the
appropriate performance tests on subsequent distribution dates.
However, S&P believes that these transactions will continue to
breach their respective class C note interest triggers for the
foreseeable future due to the adverse performance trends that the
underlying pools of private student loans have displayed, as well
as the current pace at which the transactions are realizing
defaults. Although each series has a reserve account in place for
the benefit of the rated notes, the transaction documents do not
contemplate a withdrawal from the reserve account when the class C
interest reprioritization is in effect.
The series 2005-1 transaction breached its class C note interest
trigger due to a failure of its parity test. The parity test
failed because the aggregate outstanding balance of the class A
and B notes exceeded the collateral balance plus amounts on
deposit in the reserve account. Because the aforementioned parity
test fell below 100% (to 99.68% as of the Jan. 25, 2010,
distribution date), cash flow previously allocated to make class C
interest payments was reallocated to pay senior principal
payments. Therefore, payments of interest on the class C notes,
which were senior in priority to principal payments on all classes
of notes, became subordinate to principal in the transaction's
payment waterfall. Consequently, there were insufficient funds to
pay the class C interest after making required principal payments
to the senior noteholders.
The series 2005-2 transaction breached its class C note interest
trigger due to a combined failure of the cumulative default rate
and parity tests. The transaction failed its cumulative default
rate test after it exceeded the scheduled cumulative default
threshold rate, which resets upward each year through September
2012. As of the January 2010 payment date, the cumulative default
rate was 16.14%, which exceeded the threshold rate of 15.75%. The
parity test failed because the aggregate outstanding balance of
the class A and B notes exceeded the sum of the collateral balance
plus the amounts on deposit in the reserve account. The
aforementioned parity test result was 99.39% as of the Jan. 25,
2010, distribution date.
Table 1
Cumulative Default Rate Threshold Resets
Series 2005-2
Date CDR (%)
---- -------
6/1/2006 1.50
9/1/2006 2.00
9/1/2007 5.75
9/1/2008 11.00
9/1/2009 15.75
9/1/2010 18.75
9/1/2011 20.75
9/1/2012 21.50
CDR -- Cumulative default rate.
S&P will continue to review the remaining ratings on the 17
student loan transactions (including National Collegiate Student
Loan Trust's series 2005-1 and 2005-2) that S&P placed on
CreditWatch negative on April 9, 2009. S&P expects to resolve
these CreditWatch placements over the course of the next month.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
C D CC/Watch Neg
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
C D CC/Watch Neg
PAJARO VALLEY: S&P Downgrades Rating on 1999A Certs. to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on
Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, California's certificates
of participation, series 1999A three notches to 'BB' from 'BBB'
and placed the rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.
A Stipulated Agreement for Entry of Judgment has been issued
regarding the agency's increase in groundwater augmentation
charges. Under the settlement, the agency must refund these
charges retroactive to their 2003 and 2004 adoptions, which in
S&P's opinion will drain liquidity. The agency must return about
$10.2 million, in semiannual installments of about $2.1 million.
The agency has repealed the increased augmentation charges, which
S&P believes dramatically reduces its operating revenue. "S&P
believes that given its current financial profile, the agency
might not be able to service the fixed costs associated with the
COPs, notes, and contractual obligations outstanding," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jeffrey Panger.
The remaining augmentation charge is on appeal. According to the
agency's financial report, "given the evolving nature of case law
interpreting California's Proposition 218, the long-term viability
of the augmentation charge is not firmly established". The agency
is developing what it hopes is "a legally defensible and publicly
supported funding mechanism" to replace the remaining $80
augmentation charge, and expects to present such a plan later this
year. "Should these efforts not succeed, the agency has
represented that its ability to meet its obligations will be
substantially impaired," Mr. Panger added.
The rating could stabilize at 'BB' as a result of various actions
that S&P understand the agency is considering. However, if in
S&P's view the agency's actions are not sufficient to allay credit
concerns, S&P could lower the rating further.
PIONEER VALLEY: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn the
ratings of six classes of notes issued by Pioneer Valley
Structured Credit CDO I Ltd. The Issuer experienced an Event of
Default and the Trustee informed Moody's that, acting at the
direction of a Majority of the Controlling Class, the Trustee
scheduled a public auction at which it sold to qualified bidders
all of the Cash Assets of the Issuer. The Trustee also notified
Moody's that it has made a final distribution of all of the
proceeds from the liquidation and that Noteholders have been
directed to surrender their Notes to the Trustee. The notes
affected are:
-- US$870,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
Withdrawn; previously on 1/22/2010 Downgraded to Ca
-- US$0 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due 2045, Withdrawn;
previously on 1/22/2010 Downgraded to Ca
-- US$46,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
Withdrawn; previously on 1/22/2010 Downgraded to C
-- US$29,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2045,
Withdrawn; previously on 2/13/2009 Downgraded to C
-- US$29,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2045, Withdrawn; previously on 2/13/2009 Downgraded to C
-- Class X Notes Due 2010 (with a Class X Fixed Notional Amount
of $23,478,000), Withdrawn; previously on 1/22/2010
Downgraded to Ca
RACERS SERIES: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2004-2-A Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded these
certificates issued by RACERS, Series 2004-2-A:
-- US$5,000,000 Class A1 Certificates, Upgraded to B3;
previously on May 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;
-- US$3,000,000 Class A2 Certificates, Upgraded to B3;
previously on May 21, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.
The deal is a repackaging of the US$44,000,000 Class A-3 Fixed
Rate Senior Secured Notes Due 2012 issued by Arlington Street CDO
(Cayman) Ltd., a High Yield CBO that closed in June 2000. The
Class A-3 notes were upgraded by Moody's from Caa3 to B3 on
January 15, 2010.
RAMP 2004-RZ2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
tranches issued by Ramp 2004-RZ2. The collateral backing these
securities consists primarily of high LTV first-lien, subprime
residential mortgage loans.
A primary driver in the downgrade is an increase in loss
expectations driven by worse than expected performance trends.
Over the past year delinquencies have increased by nearly 70% and
cumulative losses have increased by over 40%, and some of these
bonds have recently incurred principal write-downs. Moody's
expect performance to continue to deteriorate due to the high LTV
collateral coupled with anticipated further macro-economic
deterioration.
The securities are guaranteed by the Financial Guaranty Insurance
Company. In light of the withdrawal of FGIC's insurance financial
strength ratings on March 25, 2009, Moody's ratings on structured
finance securities that are guaranteed or "wrapped" by FGIC are
based solely on the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.
To estimate losses, Moody's first projected delinquencies through
the second half of 2010. Moody's estimated that the proportion of
contractually current or 30-day delinquent loans that will become
seriously delinquent by the second half of 2010 at 8%.
Growth in new delinquency levels beyond the second half of 2010 is
expected to decline with improving economic and housing
conditions. To estimate delinquencies beyond 2010, Moody's
applied a reduction to the new delinquency rate of 50% for 2011,
60% for 2012, 70% for 2013, and 85% for 2014 and beyond. This
deceleration reflects home price and unemployment projections by
MEDC for years beyond 2010.
To calculate the default rate on the projected delinquencies,
Moody's assumed an average roll rate (probability of transition
from delinquency into default) of 95%. The loss on the loan upon
default (severity of loss) is expected to be just under 80%.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RZ2 Trust
* Group I Projected Loss (% of OB): 9%
* Group II Projected Loss (% of OB): 7%
-- Cl. A-II, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jun 5, 2009
Downgraded to Ba3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jun 5,
2009 Downgraded to Ba3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-I-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jun 5, 2009
Downgraded to Ba3
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jun 5,
2009 Downgraded to Ba3
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jun 5, 2009
Downgraded to B1
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jun 5,
2009 Downgraded to B1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
-- Cl. A-I-6, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jun 5, 2009
Downgraded to B1
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Jun 5,
2009 Downgraded to B1
-- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(Insured rating withdrawn on March 25, 2009)
REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 14 2007-2 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes and
downgraded five classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-2. The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from an overall increase in leverage and increased
credit quality dispersion.
The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's debt service coverage ratio
and the Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the January 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to
$362.8 million from $377.3 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 48 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 57% of the pool. The pool's largest loan has an
investment grade underlying rating. No loans have defeased.
One loan, representing 2% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The pool has not experienced any losses to date.
Currently, one loan, representing 0.7% of the pool, is in special
servicing. This specially serviced loan is the 3007 57th Avenue
Loan ($2.7 million), which is secured by a 36,435 square foot
industrial property located in Calgary, Alberta. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in October 2009 due to imminent
default and is currently 90+ days delinquent. The property was
20% leased as of March 2009 compared to 100% at securitization.
The special servicer expects the loan to either be brought current
or paid in full within the next 30 days. Moody's estimates a
minimal loss from this loan.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 98%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit pool is
99% compared to 96% at securitization. In addition to increased
leverage, the pool has experienced increased credit quality
dispersion since securitization. Based on Moody's analysis, 48%
of the pool has an LTV in excess of 100% compared to 27% at
securitization.
Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.05X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.06X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
conduit pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 26 at securitization.
The loan with an underlying rating is the Atrium Pooled Interest
Loan ($38.7 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $116 million first mortgage loan that is
spread among three CMBS deals. The property is also encumbered by
a $74 million B-note. The loan is secured by a 1.05 million
square foot Class A mixed-use complex comprised of three
interconnected office towers and one freestanding office/retail
building. The property is located in downtown Toronto. The
office component contains approximately 916,000 SF and the retail
component contains approximately 136,000 SF. The office
component's largest tenant is the Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce which occupies approximately 40% of the property's net
rentable area on leases expiring in 2013 and 2016. The property
was 99% leased as of September 2009 compared to 86% at
securitization. The property has not achieved the increased cash
flow anticipated at securitization, largely because of increased
expenses. The loan sponsor is Hines REIT. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.44X, respectively, compared to 63% and
1.51X at last review. Moody's current underlying rating is A3
compared to A2 at securitization.
The three largest conduit loans represent 18.2% of the outstanding
pool balance. The largest conduit loan is the Sundance Pooled
Interest Loan ($26.4 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which
represents a pari passu interest in a $53 million first mortgage
that is spread between two CMBS deals. The loan is secured by a
179,619 SF Class A office building located in the Sundance
Business Park in southeast Calgary, Alberta. The property was
100% leased as of April 2009, the same as at securitization. The
property is anchored by Colt Engineering Corporation, which leases
approximately 73% of the NRA on leases expiring in 2011 (24% of
the NRA) and 2016 (50% of the NRA). Performance has declined
slightly since securitization because expenses are higher than
original projections. In addition, Moody's is concerned about the
property's exposure to near-term lease rollovers because of the
decline in the Calgary office market since securitization. Leases
for approximately 47% of the property's NRA, including a portion
of Colt's space, expire in 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 111% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.92X at
securitization.
The second largest conduit loan is the Place Louis Riel Loan
($19.9 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 302
room extended stay full service boutique hotel located in downtown
Winnipeg, Manitoba. One-third of the rooms are designated for
extended stay (over 30 days). Hotel performance has declined
since securitization despite an $11 million renovation program.
Revenue per participating room for the 12-month period ending
September 2009 was $58 compared to $63 at securitization. Moody's
value reflects a stressed cash flow due to Moody's concerns about
the hotel sector due to declines in business and tourist travel.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.99X, respectively,
compared to 93% and 1.28X at securitization.
The third largest loan is the 55 St. Clair Pooled Interest Loan
($19.9 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $40 million first mortgage that is spread between
two CMBS deals. The loan is secured by two multi-tenanted office
buildings located in Toronto, Canada. The property was 96% leased
as of June 2009, slightly higher than at securitization. The
largest tenants include Cryptologic (19% of the NRA; lease
expiration July 2015), AOL Canada, Inc. (11% of the NRA; lease
expiration August 2011) and the Ontario Ministry of Health (10%;
lease expiration April 2012). The loan sponsor is Dundee REIT.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.85X, respectively,
compared to 118% and 0.83X at securitization. The sponsor is
Dundee REIT.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $129,448,744, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class A-2, $157,858,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class XP-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class XP-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class XC-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class XC-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class A-J, $32,544,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
Aaa on 6/27/2007
-- Class B, $8,018,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously assigned Aa2
on 6/27/2007
-- Class C, $9,905,000, affirmed at A2; previously assigned A2
on 6/27/2007
-- Class D-1, $1,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned Baa2
on 6/27/2007
-- Class D-2, $8,960,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned
Baa2 on 6/27/2007
-- Class E-1, $1,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned Baa3
on 6/27/2007
-- Class E-2, $3,300,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned
Baa3 on 6/27/2007
-- Class F, $2,924,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously assigned Ba1
on 6/27/2007
-- Class G, $1,792,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2; previously
assigned Ba2 on 6/27/2007
-- Class H, $943,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3; previously
assigned Ba3 on 6/27/2007
-- Class J, $943,000, downgraded to B3 from B1; previously
assigned B1 on 6/27/2007
-- Class K, $471,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B2; previously
assigned B2 on 6/27/2007
-- Class L, $1,132,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B3; previously
assigned B3 on 6/27/2007
RUTLAND RATED: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Sedona 2005-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one class and downgraded two classes of
notes issued by Rutland Rated Investments - Sedona 2005-2.
Details of the rating action follow at the end of this release.
The downgrades of the class A7-F and B3-L1 notes are a result of
write-downs on the notes following realized principal losses from
exposure to credit events. The class A6-F1 notes remain likely to
default following final valuation of the unsettled credit events
for CIT Group and Aiful Corporation.
Sedona 2005-2 is a static synthetic collateralized swap obligation
that closed in November 2005. The transaction gives investors
leveraged access to the credit risk of a diverse portfolio of
corporate reference entities. Sedona 2005-2 gains access to the
credit risk of the portfolio via a credit default swap between
Sedona 2005-2 and Bear Stearns Credit Products (guaranteed by
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. rated 'F1+/AA-' with a Stable Outlook).
The transaction has a scheduled maturity date of Dec. 20, 2010 for
the class B3-L1 notes and Dec. 20, 2012 for the classes A6-F1 and
A7-F notes. The ratings of the notes address the likelihood that
investors will receive full and timely payments of interest and
ultimate receipt of principal by the scheduled maturity date.
Fitch has taken this rating action:
-- $4,000,000 class A6-F1 notes affirmed at 'C/RR6';
-- $19,446,250 class A7-F notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C/RR6';
-- $0 class B3-L1 notes downgraded to 'D' from 'C/RR6'.
SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 16 2005-4 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes of
Schooner Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-4 due to overall stable pool performance and key
rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index, remaining
within acceptable ranges. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.
As of the January 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10% to
$497.3 million from $551.2 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 76 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 55% of the pool. The pool includes two loans with
investment-grade underlying ratings, representing 19% of the pool.
Three loans, representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by Canadian Government securities.
Three loans, representing 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association's monthly reporting
package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.
The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization and
currently, there are no delinquent loans or loans in special
servicing. There are full or partial recourse provisions on 51%
of the loans in the pool.
Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 operating results for 81%
of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 78% compared
to 87% at securitization.
Moody's stressed DSCR for the pool is 1.31X compared to 1.12X at
origination. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf is 40. The pool
has a Herf of 27 compared to 29 at securitization.
The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Woodbine Centre
Loan ($54 million --11% of the pool), which is secured by a
683,000 square foot anchored retail mall in Toronto, Ontario. The
collateral includes space leased on a month-to-month basis to
Fantasy Fair, a 58,000 square foot amusement center. As of April
2009, the property was 92% leased compared to 95% at
securitization. The largest tenants are The Bay (21% of net
rentable area; lease expiration in August 2015), Sears (20% of the
NRA; lease expiration in September 2015) and Zellers (15% of the
NRA; lease expiration in August 2015). Since securitization,
effective gross income has declined by 10% while operating
expenses have increased by 4%. The property is also encumbered by
a $10.4 million B-note. The loan matures in April 2010. Moody's
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.4X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.44X at securitization.
The second largest loan is the Southland Mall Loan ($41 million --
8% of the pool), which is secured by a 438,000 square foot
enclosed retail center located in Regina, Alberta. As of April
2009, the property was 96% occupied compared to 97% at
securitization. The largest tenants are Wal-Mart (34% of the NRA;
lease expiration in January 2011); Safeway (11% of the NRA; lease
expiration in March 2010) and Cineplex Galaxy (8% of the NRA;
lease expiration in May 2017). Performance has been stable since
securitization. The loan matures in July 2015. Moody's
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.17X at securitization.
The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the pool. The
largest conduit loan is the 66 Slater Street Loan ($30 million --
6% of the pool), which is secured by a 22-story, Class B office
building in downtown Ottawa, Ontario. Due to its close proximity
to the Parliament, Canadian government entities and agencies lease
91% of the building. As of October 2009, the property was 98%
leased compared to 100% at securitization. Performance has
improved since securitization due to increased revenues and
amortization. The loan matures in July 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 89% and
1.10X at securitization.
The second largest conduit loan is the Nordel Crossing Shopping
Centre Loan ($27 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a
133,000 square foot, grocery-anchored retail center located in
Surrey -- a suburb of Vancouver, British Columbia. As of April
2009, the property was 100% leased compared to 95% at origination.
The largest tenants are Save-on-Foods (37% of the NRA; lease
expiration in August 2024) and Shopper's Drug Mart (14% of the
NRA; lease expiration in September 2019). Performance has been
stable. The loan matures in August 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 89% and
1.0X at securitization.
The third largest conduit loan is the Milliken Crossing Shopping
Centre Loan ($24 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a
140,000 square foot, grocery-anchored retail center located in
Toronto, Ontario. As of January 2009, the property was 95% leased
compared to 90% at origination. The largest tenants are T&T
Supermarkets (47% of the NRA; lease expiration in December 2020)
and Shopper's Drug Mart (11% of the NRA; lease expiration in
January 2020). Despite the increased occupancy, performance has
declined due to decreased revenues and increased operating
expenses. The loan matures in September 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 88% and
1.0X at securitization.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-1, $ 221,618,709, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned at Aaa on 10/27/2005
-- Class A-2, $ 219,100,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously
assigned at Aaa on 10/27/2005
-- Class XP-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
Aaa on 10/27/2005
-- Class XP-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
Aaa on 10/27/2005
-- Class XC-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
Aaa on 10/27/2005
-- Class XC-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
Aaa on 10/27/2005
-- Class B, $9,700,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously assigned to
Aa2 on 10/27/2005
-- Class C, $12,400,000, affirmed at A2; previously assigned to
A2 on 10/27/2005
-- Class D, $14,467,758, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned
to Baa2 on 10/27/2005
-- Class E, $2,755,763, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned to
Baa3 on 10/27/2005
-- Class F, $4,133,645, affirmed at Ba1; previously assigned at
Ba1 on 10/27/2005
-- Class G, $2,066,823, affirmed at Ba2; previously assigned at
Ba2 on 10/27/2005
-- Class H, $688,941, affirmed at Ba3; previously assigned at
Ba3 on 10/27/2005
-- Class J, $1,377,882, affirmed at B1; previously assigned at
B1 on 10/27/2005
-- Class K, $1,377,882, affirmed at B2; previously assigned at
B2 on 10/27/2005
-- Class L, $2,066,823, affirmed at B3; previously assigned at
B3 on 10/27/2005
SEAWALL SPC: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D-2 Notes to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
D-2 notes issued by Seawall SPC's series 2007-1 D2, a
collateralized debt obligation transaction, to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'.
The rating remains on CreditWatch negative.
The transaction is a total return swap that is directly linked to
the rating on the class D-2 notes issued by Seawall 2007-1 Ltd.,
which Standard & Poor's lowered to 'CCC-' and left on CreditWatch
with negative implications on Oct. 29, 2009.
SORIN REAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1LA to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded one class of Notes issued by
Sorin Real Estate CDO II Ltd. due to the Issuer's decision to
continue to terminate certain credit default swap transactions as
per the conditions set forth in the transaction's Indenture, dated
as of December 21, 2005. The Note was placed on review for
possible downgrade on September 23, 2009, due to the same reason.
This action concludes Moody's review. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.
Sorin Real Estate CDO II, Ltd., is a synthetic commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation currently backed by a single
reference obligation in a commercial mortgage-backed security
issued in 2005. At securitization, the portfolio included other
CMBS reference obligations and certain real estate investment
trust reference obligations. The aggregate notional balance of
the pool has decreased to $5.0 million from $275 million at last
review and from $600.0 million at issuance, due to the Issuer's
decision to continue to terminate certain CDS transactions.
The remaining $5.0 million reference obligation as of the
January 4, 2010 payment date refers to Class H of the Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1 transaction. Moody's last issued a
press release commenting on this deal on August 27, 2009, where
the tranche was assigned a Caa1 rating. Class H is not currently
on review for further possible downgrade.
In the Trustee Report dated as of December 28, 2009, a Notice was
posted that said: "It is anticipated that Available Interest
Proceeds on the April 2010 Payment Date will be insufficient to
make the required payments to the Class A Notes and the Class X
Notes" and "It is unlikely that any additional amounts will be
paid to any Noteholder or any Holder of the Preferred Shares
following the January 4, 2010 Payment Date." Furthermore, the
Notice indicates that the Issuer Base Administrative Expenses were
paid pro rata in the most recent Payment Date. The Indenture also
indicates that the Senior Investor Swap (Class A-1LA) is
subordinate to the Issuer Base Administrative Expenses as stated
in Section 11(b) of the Indenture. Looking ahead, Moody's
believes that there is a high probability of the Issuer missing a
payment owed to Class A-1LA due to expenses incurred by the Trust
exceeding the reduced payments from the Counterparty to the Trust.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
4,770 compared to 1,664 at last review.
WAL acts to adjust the credit exposure of the collateral pool.
Moody's modeled to the current WAL of 5.4 years compared to
5.7 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a WARR of 0.0%
compared to 13.4% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool. Since there is only one instrument in the
collateral pool remaining, Moody's modeled a MAC of 100% compared
to 28% at last review.
The rating action is:
-- Class A-1LA Downgraded to Ca; previously on September 23,
2009 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. The
rating outcome differs from a directly linked analysis (that would
tie the rating on Class A-1LA to the rating of the underlying
reference obligation) due to the increased probability of future
missed interest payments that result from expenses incurred by the
Trust exceeding the reduced payments from the Counterparty to the
Trust.
Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated September 23, 2009.
SUFFIELD CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five and downgraded four classes of
notes issued by Suffield CLO Ltd./Corp.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria'. Cash flow and
portfolio default modeling were conducted in accordance with
Fitch's 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended'
and 'Global Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs'. Recovery Ratings
were assigned in compliance with Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured
Finance Recovery Ratings' and 'Global Surveillance Criteria for
Corporate CDOs'. Loss Severity Ratings were assigned in
compliance with Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss
Severity Ratings'.
The affirmations are the result of continued amortization of the
liabilities since the last rating review, and the projected
amortization with principal cash currently held in the portfolio.
Since closing, the class I notes have received almost 90% of their
initial principal balance. As of the Dec. 18, 2009 trustee
report, approximately $27.8 million was held in the principal
collection accounts, which will likely be applied toward paying
down the class I notes at the next payment date in March 2010.
Due to the continued redemption of the class I notes, the senior
overcollateralization ratio, which measures asset coverage for the
class I and class II notes, has increased to 220.1% versus a
trigger of 120.5% as of the latest trustee report. The class III-
A and III-B notes have also benefited from the amortization, as
their relative priority has improved. These notes also benefit
from the subordination of the sizeable junior classes of notes,
which help insulate the senior tranches from collateral loss.
While the class I, II, and III notes have all improved their
relative positions due to the ongoing and projected collateral
amortization, the collateral deterioration in the loan portfolio
has negatively affected the class IV, V-A and V-B (collectively,
class V) notes. Currently, Fitch considers 29% of the performing
portfolio to be rated 'CCC+' or below. Further, defaulted assets
represent approximately 11% of the entire portfolio, up from just
1% at Fitch's last review in October 2008. Finally, about 29% of
the underlying portfolio ratings have a Negative Rating Outlook
and an additional 5% of ratings are on Rating Watch Negative,
indicating the possibility of further negative rating migration.
The class III/IV OC test was recorded at 108.7% versus a trigger
of 102% as of the latest trustee report. The OC tests in Suffield
CLO do not include ratings-based haircuts and are not currently
accounting for at least one defaulted issuer. As such, the
collateral coverage indicated by the OC ratios may not be as
sufficient as indicated by these tests. Fitch believes that due
to the experienced and expected future credit deterioration, the
class IV notes may suffer a partial principal loss at their
maturity in September 2014. However, if future credit
deterioration is relatively benign, these notes could be made
whole. Fitch expects the class V notes, which are currently
under-collateralized, to experience a principal loss at maturity
despite the fact they are receiving interest payments and partial
principal payments due to the failure of the class V OC test.
The rating of the class K combination securities addresses the
likelihood that investors will receive the stated balance of
principal by the final maturity date. The class K combination
securities receive 100% of the distributions to the class V-B
notes, and about 13.6% of any distributions to the preferred
shares. To date, the class K combination securities have received
about $18.9 million of their initial $20 million principal
balance. Since the preferred shares are not expected to receive
any future distributions, the class K combination securities will
rely on the class V-B notes to receive at least $1.1 million more
in distributions to satisfy their rating requirement.
Future default timing will be an important factor in the prospects
of receiving this amount. Back-loaded defaults would allow the
class V-B notes to remain current on interest for the foreseeable
future, benefiting the class K combination notes. Front-loaded
defaults, however, could lead to a near-term failure of a class
III/IV OC coverage test and cut off payments to the class V-B
notes. Due to this uncertainty, Fitch believes the 'B' rating
remains appropriate for the class K combination notes.
The rating of the class L combination securities addresses the
likelihood that investors will receive the stated balance of
principal by the final maturity date, as well as a yield of 8.4%
on the original investment. The class L combination notes receive
approximately 4.8% of distributions to the class III-A notes,
28.6% of distributions to the class IV notes, and 7.4% of
distributions to the preferred shares. The floating-rate class
III-A and class IV notes have historically received coupons
significantly lower than the required 8.4% yield on the class L
combination securities, which has been exaggerated by the low
interest rate environment. As a result, the class L combination
securities are not expected to be able to achieve this yield, and
are downgraded to 'C'.
In its review, Fitch analyzed the structure's sensitivity to
ongoing softness in U.S. corporate recoveries. To accomplish
this, Fitch reduced its average recovery rate assumptions for each
asset type by 30% in one sensitivity scenario and by 50% in a
second sensitivity scenario where explicit Recovery Ratings were
not available. The class III notes displayed a degree of
sensitivity to lower recovery rates. This sensitivity, in
addition to the sizeable portion of underlying portfolio credits
with Negative Outlooks, prompted Fitch to assign a Negative
Outlook to the class III notes.
The class I, II and III notes were also assigned Loss Severity
ratings. The LS ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity
Ratings'. The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating. Fitch does
not assign LS ratings to tranches rated 'CCC' and below.
The class IV and V notes were assigned Recovery Ratings in this
rating review based on the discounted total expected future cash
flows projected to be available to these bonds in a base-case
default scenario. Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities. Distressed securities
are defined as bonds that face a real possibility of default at or
prior to maturity and by definition are rated 'CCC' or below. For
further detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's report
'Global Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs'.
Suffield CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation that
closed on Sept. 13, 2000 and is managed by Babson Capital
Management LLC. Suffield CLO exited its reinvestment period in
September 2005 and currently has a portfolio consisting of about
93.7% senior secured loans, with the balance consisting of second
lien loans, senior unsecured bonds, and structured finance
securities.
Fitch has taken these rating actions on these notes. Rating
actions include downgrades, assignment of Loss Severity ratings,
Recovery Ratings, and Rating Outlooks:
-- $36,694,963 class I notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $53,000,000 class II notes affirmed at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $42,000,000 class III-A notes affirmed at 'A/LS3'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $15,000,000 class III-B notes affirmed at 'A/LS3'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $35,000,000 class IV notes downgraded to 'CCC/RR2' from 'B';
-- $5,848,689 class V-A notes downgraded to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC';
-- $14,621,721 class V-B notes downgraded to 'C/RR5' from 'CCC';
-- $19,621,721 class K combination securities affirmed at 'B';
Outlook Stable;
-- $14,700,000 class L combination securities downgraded to 'C'
from 'CC'.
VILLLAGE OF RIVERDALE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Bonds to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Village of
Riverdale's (Illinois) outstanding general obligation unlimited
tax backed-debt to Ba1 from Baa3 and has assigned a negative
outlook. The rating action affects $1.6 million of outstanding
debt. The downgrade reflects the village's deteriorating
financial position, ongoing annual operating deficits, and the
various challenges the village will face to address its financial
issues. The Ba1 rating also reflects the village's limited tax
base relatively high industry concentration and a high overall
debt burden. The negative outlook reflects Moody's concern
regarding the actual results of fiscal 2009, which have not yet
been released, as well as the viability of the village's deficit
elimination plan in a weak economic environment.
Financial Operations Remain Stressed With Growing Deficit Fund
Balance; Deficit Elimination Plan To Be Carried Out Over Next
Three Years
At the close of fiscal 2008, the village's General Fund balance
stood at a negative $2.4 million, or a negative 28.2% of revenues,
with an unreserved balance of negative $2.6 million. This was the
result of several years of annual operating deficits of up to
$500,000 per year, primarily due to the partial abatement of the
village's bond levy. The village has been able to cash flow its
operations by borrowing funds from the water and sewer enterprise
funds. At the time of the last credit review, management, which
has since changed, had indicated that fiscal 2008 year-end results
would reflect a turnaround from this trend given the village's
recently authorized status as home rule. However, fiscal 2008
closed with a $505,000 General Fund deficit, including a $305,000
transfer to the Debt Service Fund to meet debt service
requirements. While the current administration, which took office
in April 2009, does not have estimates for year-ending April 30,
2009, it is unlikely that the village's financial position was
much improved as prior year budget gaps appear to have been rolled
forward year after year. In fiscal 2010, management has
implemented expenditure reductions such as layoffs, furlough days
and restructured work hours to cut down on overtime. Despite
these efforts, it is projected that the village will close with a
General Fund deficit of approximately $580,000. City officials
have recently begun the fiscal 2011 budget process and believe the
budget gap to be about $2.5 million, which takes into account the
gaps that have rolled forward in prior budgets. To address this
gap, management plans to fully utilize the bond levy as well as
increase the operating levy and charges for permits and fees.
Other measures include layoffs, furlough days, the sale of land,
and charging salaries to other available funds where available,
such as the Motor Fuel Tax Fund. Management plans to eliminate
the deficit fund balance position of the General Fund by
increasing the village's property tax levy up to 15% each year for
These three years, matching the remainder of the current mayor's
term in office. Moody's notes that such a move may be politically
challenging to implement given the current weak economic
environment. Additionally, historical property tax collections
have been weak, with less than 92% collected over the past five
years.
Limited Tax Base Dependent On Redevelopment For Future Growth
The Village of Riverdale is located in Cook County (general
obligation rated Aa3/stable), 20 miles south of downtown Chicago
(rated Aa3/stable) and has significant industrial and commercial
sectors. The village's full valuation is a modest $417 million
and growth over the past five years has been slow, averaging only
1.7% annually. As of 2007, the city's largest taxpayers comprised
21.3% of assessed valuation, reflecting an above average
concentration. Mittal Steel, a manufacturer, is the largest
taxpayer and accounts for 7.3% of assessed valuation. The city
currently owns a significant amount of land which it hopes to sell
to developers for redevelopment. Management reports that there
has already been some success in this plan as a 100,000 square
foot warehouse was recently sold. Due to the mature nature of the
community, future growth will depend on successful redevelopment
and revitalization efforts. Cook County's unemployment rate as of
November 2009 was 10.7%, which slightly higher than the state and
national levels of 10.5% and 9.4%, respectively. Resident income
indices for the Village of Riverdale are below average with median
family income and per capita income levels at 84% and 67%,
respectively, of national medians.
Heavily Leveraged Debt Burden; Direct Debt Expected To Remain
Manageable
At 2.0% of full valuation, the village's direct debt is manageable
though overlapping debt brings this burden up to a high 11.9%.
Amortization of the village's outstanding debt is slower than
average, with 65.0% retired within ten years. The village has no
near-term borrowing plans and all of the village's debt is in
fixed rate mode. Riverdale is not party to any swap agreements.
Outlook
The negative outlook reflects Moody's concern that fiscal 2009
financial results will likely reflect a continuing weakening of
the village's financial positions. The outlook also encompasses
Moody's concern as to the viability of the village's deficit
elimination plan in a weak economic environment, which has already
dampened the village's major operating revenue streams.
What could lead to a rating upgrade (or revise the outlook to
stable):
-- Structurally balanced budgets achieved through financial
solutions that can carry forward to future budgets
-- Material operating surpluses that will eliminate the deficit
General Fund balance position
-- Continuing commitment among management to make mid-year
budget adjustments as necessary to achieve structurally
balance operations
What could lead to a rating downgrade:
-- Continued structural imbalance resulting from negative budget
variances yielding larger deficits in the General Fund
-- Inability or unwillingness to implement deficit elimination
plan as outlined
Key Statistics:
* 2000 Population: 15,055
* 2007 Full valuation: $417 million
* Full value per capita (estimate): $27,687
* 1999 Per capita income (as % of US): $14,461 (67%)
* 1999 Median family income (as % of US): $41,892 (84%)
* 2008 undesignated General Fund balance: Negative $2.6 million (-
31% of General Fund revenue)
* Overall debt burden: 11.9% (direct 2.3%)
* Payout of principal (10 years): 65.0%
* Long-term rated GO debt outstanding: $1.6 million
The last rating action with respect to the Village of Riverdale
(IL) was on December 22, 2009, when the Baa3 rating was placed on
watchlist for possible downgrade.
WAVE SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 19 Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded nineteen classes of Notes
issued by WAVE SPC due to deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor and a decrease in the weighted
average recovery rate since Moody's last review. Three
transactions are affected: WAVE 2007-1, Ltd., WAVE 2007-2, Ltd.,
and WAVE 2007-3, Ltd. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.
WAVE 2007-1, WAVE 2007-2 and WAVE 2007-3 are 100% backed by 2006
and 2007 vintage commercial mortgage backed securities. As of the
January 20, 2010 payment date, the aggregate collateral par amount
is $6.0 billion, the same as at securitization. There have been
no paydowns or losses to the collateral pools. All three Wave
transactions feature a pro-rata principal payment structure among
the Notes with a switch to a sequential principal payment
structure upon failure of their respective senior
overcollateralization and par value tests.
WAVE 2007-1 is backed by AJ tranches (95.5%) and one AM tranche
(4.5%); WAVE 2007-2 is backed by AJ tranches (33.3%), AM tranches
(29.2%) and Super-Senior tranches (37.5%); and WAVE 2007-3 is
backed by AJ tranches (100%). AJ tranches are the junior most
tranches with an original Aaa rating at securitization, AM
tranches are the mezzanine tranches, typically with an original
20% credit enhancement level, that were rated Aaa at
securitization. Super-Senior tranches are the senior-most
tranches with an original 30% credit enhancement level, that were
rated Aaa at securitization.
Recent CMBS collateral downgrades resulted in par value haircuts
within each CRE CDO, causing each transaction to fail its
respective senior Overcollateralization Test. According to the
most recent Trustee reports, WAVE 2007-1 is failing its Class A-1
OC Test (30.85% actual versus a trigger of 107.40%), WAVE 2007-2
is failing its Class A-1 OC Test (62.46% actual versus a trigger
of 105.72%), and WAVE 2007-3 is failing its Class A-1 OC Test
(29.40% actual versus a trigger of 108.67%) as well as its Net Par
Value Test (27.05% actual versus a trigger of 99.89%). Due to the
failure of these tests, any principal proceeds due to the
respective trusts are now allocated on a sequential basis.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, WARR, and MAC. These parameters are typically modeled as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool. Moody's have completed updated credit
estimates for the entire pool and the results will be reflected in
future Trustee Reports.
* WAVE 2007-1: Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 183
compared to 94 at last review. The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (9.3% compared to 12.1%
at last review), A1-A3 (46.4% compared to 87.9% at last review),
Baa1-Baa3 (44.2% compared to 0.0% at last review).
* WAVE 2007-2: Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 155
compared to 41 at last review. The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (53.6% compared to
59.2% at last review), A1-A3 (28.0% compared to 40.8% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (12.7% compared to 0.0% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (4.9% compared to 0.0% at last review).
* WAVE 2007-3: Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 257
compared to 95 at last review. The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (1.5% compared to 0.0%
at last review), A1-A3 (63.1% compared to 100.0% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (33.4% compared to 0.0% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (2.0% compared to 0.0% at last review).
WAL acts to adjust the credit exposure of the collateral pool.
Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 7.4 years, 7.6 years and
7.8 years for WAVE 2007-1, WAVE 2007-2 and WAVE 2007-3,
respectively compared to 8.2 years, 8.3 years and 8.5 years
modeled at last review, respectively.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 41.1%, 56.9% and 40.8% for WAVE 2007-1, WAVE 2007-2 and WAVE
2007-3, respectively, compared to 45.4%, 61.3% and 44.3% at last
review, respectively.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity). Moody's
modeled a MAC of 64.8%, 65.4% and 63.6% for WAVE 2007-1, WAVE
2007-2 and WAVE 2007-3, respectively, the same as at last review.
Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009. These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations. The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or real estate investment
trust debt) within CRE CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15%
to 35% previously.
The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.
The rating actions are:
WAVE 2007-1
$2.0 Billion of Structured Securities Affected
-- Class A-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa
-- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to A1 from Aaa
-- Class B, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to A3 from Aa3
-- Class C, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 from A3
-- Class D, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
Confirmed at Baa3
WAVE 2007-2
$3.0 Billion of Structured Securities Affected
-- Class A-1, Downgraded to Aa2; previously on March 30, 2009
Confirmed at Aaa
-- Class A-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa
-- Class B, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa
-- Class C-FL, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to A2 from Aa2
-- Class C-FX, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to A2 from Aa2
-- Class D-FL, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to Baa2 from A2
-- Class D-FX, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to Baa2 from A2
-- Class E-FL, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1
-- Class E-FX, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 30, 2009
Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1
WAVE 2007-3
$1.0 Billion of Structured Securities Affected
-- Class A-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa
-- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to A1 from Aaa
-- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to A3 from Aa2
-- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on March 25, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 from A3
-- Class D, Downgraded to B3; previously on March 25, 2009
Confirmed at Baa3
As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.
Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior reviews of these three
transactions are summarized in press releases dated March 25, 2009
(WAVE 2007-1 and WAVE 2007-3) and March 30, 2009 (WAVE 2007-2).
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1,186 Bonds From 871 RMBS to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 1,186 bonds in 871 residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D' indicating that the
bond has incurred a principal write-down. The bonds being
downgraded to 'D' as part of this review were all previously rated
'CCC', 'CC', or 'C' indicating that a default was expected. The
action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs. The
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.
Of the 871 transactions impacted by these downgrades 290 are
Subprime, 286 are Prime, and 275 are Alt-A. The remaining 20
bonds are in other transaction types. Ninety-nine percent were
previously rated 'C'. Of the 1,186 bonds being downgraded 1,100
(91%) had a Recovery Rating of '6' indicating that they are
projected to have poor recovery prospects of between 0-10% of the
current principal and related interest on a discounted basis.
Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of the ongoing surveillance
process and will continue to monitor these transactions for
additional defaults.
The spreadsheet also contains Fitch's Recovery Ratings. The
Recovery Rating scale is based upon the expected relative recovery
characteristics of an obligation. For structured finance,
Recovery Ratings are designed to estimate recoveries on a forward-
looking basis while taking into account the time value of money.
The methodology used to assign Recovery Ratings is described in
Fitch's Dec. 16, 2009 report 'U.S. RMBS Criteria for Recovery
Ratings'.
* Moody's Puts Ratings on 262 RMBS Resecuritizations on Watch
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed 262 RMBS resecuritization
tranches with current outstanding balance of $11 billion, on watch
for possible downgrade. The rating is triggered by a downgrade
watch on the underlying ratings of the securities backing these
resecuritization tranches.
The resecuritization bonds are backed by Alt-A and Subprime RMBS
bonds issued between 2005 and 2008. Most resecuritization deals
are structured as pass-through structures with payments received
on the underlying certificates passed through to the
resecuritization bonds. However, the resecuritization deals
typically build-in additional support for the senior bonds issued
in the transaction with certain junior bonds taking losses ahead
of the senior bonds. Increased losses on the underlying
certificates are thus likely to affect the principal recovery on
the junior resecuritization bonds and probably the senior
resecurization bonds as well.
As such, in assigning ratings on the notes in the
resecuritization, Moody's evaluates:
(i) The updated expected loss of the pool of loans backing
the underlying securities portfolio and the updated
ratings on the underlying securities portfolio given
credit enhancement available to them, and
(ii) The structure of the resecuritization transaction,
including the cashflow allocation and the loss allocation
amongst the bonds issued.
Because the ratings on the notes in the resecuritization are
linked to the ratings on the underlying securities and their
mortgage pool performance, any rating action on the underlying
securities may trigger a further review of the ratings on the
notes in the resecuritization. The ratings on the notes in the
resecuritization address the ultimate payment of promised interest
and principal and do not address any other amounts that may be
payable on the notes.
Complete Rating Actions are:
Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-R1 Trust
-- Cl. A-2, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2006-R1
-- Cl. I-A-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-X-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-X-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-X-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-X-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-X-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-A-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-X-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-X-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-X-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-X-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-X-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-A-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-X-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-X-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-X-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-X-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-X-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-A-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-X-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-X-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-X-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-X-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-X-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. VII-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. VIII-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. IX-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-AE-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-6, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-7, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-8, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-9, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-10, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-11, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-12, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-13, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-14, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-15, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-16, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-17, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-18, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-19, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-20, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-21, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-22, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-23, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-24, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-25, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-26, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-27, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-28, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-29, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-AE-30, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-6, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-7, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-8, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-9, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-10, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-11, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-12, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-13, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-14, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-15, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-16, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-17, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-18, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-19, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-20, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-21, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-22, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-23, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-24, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-25, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-26, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-27, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-28, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-29, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. II-AE-30, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-6, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-7, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-8, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-9, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-10, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-11, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-12, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-13, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-14, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-15, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-16, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-17, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-18, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-19, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-20, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-21, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-22, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-23, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-24, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-25, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-26, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-27, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-28, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-29, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. IV-AE-30, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-6, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-7, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-8, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-9, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-10, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-11, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-12, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-13, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-14, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-15, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-16, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-17, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-18, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-19, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-20, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-21, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-22, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-23, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-24, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-25, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-26, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-27, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-28, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-29, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. III-AE-30, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2005-8
-- Cl. A-1, Aa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 30, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3
-- Cl. A-2, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1
-- Cl. A-3, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1
-- Cl. A-4, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 30, 2009 Downgraded to A2
-- Cl. X, A1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1
Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. Trust 2007-R6
-- Cl. I-A-1, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to B2
Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Inc. Trust Notes, Series
2008-R2
-- Cl. I-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: CSMC 2005-1R
-- Cl. 2-A-1, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 2-A-3, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 2-A-5, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 2-A-6, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 2-A-8, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 2-A-9, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3
Issuer: CSMC 2008-1R
-- Cl. A-1, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. A-3, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-37R
-- Cl. A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-2, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY5R
-- Cl. 2-A-1A, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. 2-A-1B, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. 2-A-1C, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 2-A-1D, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-22R
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 1-A-2, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 1-A-4, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 1-A-5, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 1-A-6, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 1-A-7, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 1-A-8, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 1-A-9, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 1-A-10, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 2-A-3, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-26R
-- Cl. A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-3, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-4, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-5, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-6, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-7, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-8, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: CWALT, Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2008-2R
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. 4-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. 5-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 1, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-11, Re-Remic Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-11
-- Cl. I-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. I-A-2, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. I-A-4, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to B3
Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-9
-- Cl. I-A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-3, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-4, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
-- Cl. I-A-5, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-6, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-7, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-8, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-9, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-10, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. I-A-11, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-RR1
-- Cl. A-1A1, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to A2
-- Cl. A-1A2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
Issuer: Deutsche ALT-A Securities, Inc. Re-Remic Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS1
-- Cl. A-1, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2
Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Resecuritization Trust, Series
2007-2R
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-RS1
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. 4-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS1
-- Cl. A-1, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
-- Cl. A-X, Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS3
-- Cl. A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-X, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS4
-- Cl. A-1, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 13, 2009 Downgraded to B2
-- Cl. A-X, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 13, 2009 Downgraded to B2
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS5
-- Cl. A-1, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 4, 2009 Downgraded to B2
-- Cl. A-X, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 4, 2009 Downgraded to B2
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS6
-- Cl. A-1, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 4, 2009 Downgraded to B1
-- Cl. A-X, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 4, 2009 Downgraded to B1
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS7
-- Cl. A-1, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 4, 2009 Downgraded to B2
-- Cl. A-X, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 4, 2009 Downgraded to B2
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Re-REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2007-RS8
-- Cl. 1-A-1, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. 3-A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc., REMIC Trust
Certificates, Series 2008-RS3
-- Cl. A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: Financial Asset Securities Corp. AAA Trust 2005-2
-- Cl. I-A3B, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 20, 2005 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. I-X, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 20, 2005 Assigned Aaa
-- Cl. II-X, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 20, 2005 Assigned Aaa
Issuer: First Horizon Alternative Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-
RE2
-- Cl. A-1, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jun 2, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
Issuer: GSMSC Pass-Through Trust 2008-1R
-- Cl. A1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-R1
-- Cl. A-1, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-2, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. A-3, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R1
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2008-R2
-- Cl. A-1, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to B3
Issuer: Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-4
-- Cl. A1, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to B3
Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-5
-- Cl. A-1, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
-- Cl. A-2, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 13, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. A-3, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 13, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-X, Baa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2
Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-R5
-- Cl. A1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2007-1
-- Cl. A1, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 10, 2009 Downgraded to B2
Issuer: MASTR Resecuritization Trust 2008-1
-- Cl. A-1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A-IO, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Resecuritization Trust 2008-1R
-- Cl. A1, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to B1
-- Cl. A3, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to B1
-- Cl. A6, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A7, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. A9, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to B3
-- Cl. A11, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
-- Cl. A13, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: RBSGC Structured Trust Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2008-A
-- Cl. A1, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
Issuer: RBSGC Structured Trust Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2008-B
-- Cl. A-1, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to B3
Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R1
-- Cl. A-1, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
-- Cl. A-2, Caa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2
-- Cl. A-1, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to B2
-- Cl. A-2, Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3
Issuer: Residential Mortgage Securities Funding 2008-1, Ltd.
-- Notes, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Jul 22, 2009 Downgraded to B3
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 47 Tranches From 16 CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 47
tranches from 16 U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions. At the same time, S&P removed 14 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, S&P placed 20 of the lowered ratings on CreditWatch
negative. S&P's ratings on 10 downgraded tranches remain on
CreditWatch negative, indicating a significant likelihood of
further downgrades. S&P also placed the rating on one additional
tranche on CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed its
ratings on 33 tranches.
The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on U.S. subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities. The CreditWatch
placements primarily affect transactions for which a significant
portion of the collateral assets currently have ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications or have significant
exposure to assets rated in the 'CCC' category.
The 47 downgraded U.S. cash flow and hybrid tranches have a total
issuance amount of $9.039 billion. Fourteen of the 16 affected
transactions are mezzanine structured finance CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities. The other two
transactions are high-grade SF CDOs of ABS that were
collateralized at origination primarily by 'AAA' through 'A' rated
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.
The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
Bristol CDO I Ltd. A-1 AA/Watch Neg AAA
Bristol CDO I Ltd. A-2 AA/Watch Neg AAA
Bristol CDO I Ltd. B CC CCC+
C-Bass CBO VII Ltd. A AAA/Watch Neg AAA
C-Bass CBO VII Ltd. B AA/Watch Neg AAA
C-Bass CBO VII Ltd. C A-/Watch Neg AA+
C-Bass CBO VII Ltd. D BB+/Watch Neg AA-
Duke Funding High Grade III A-1A CC BB+/Watch Neg
Duke Funding High Grade III A-1B1 CC BB+/Watch Neg
Duke Funding High Grade III A-1B2 CCC- BB+/Watch Neg
Duke Funding High Grade III A-2 CC CCC+
Gemstone CDO III Ltd. A-1 CC CCC/Watch Neg
Gemstone CDO III Ltd. A-2 CC BB+/Watch Neg
Gemstone CDO III Ltd. A-3 CC CCC/Watch Neg
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. A-1NV BBB+/Watch Neg AA
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. A-1V BBB+/Watch Neg AA
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. A-2 CCC-/Watch Neg BBB
Huntington CDO Ltd. A-1A BBB-/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Huntington CDO Ltd. A-1B BBB-/Watch Neg AA/Watch Neg
Huntington CDO Ltd. A-2 CCC-/Watch Neg BBB+/Watch Neg
Huntington CDO Ltd. B CC CCC/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd. A-1NV BBB-/Watch Neg AAA
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd. A-1VA BBB-/Watch Neg AAA
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd. A-1VB BBB-/Watch Neg AAA
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd. A-2A CCC-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd. A-2B CCC-/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd. B CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Orchid Structured Finance CDO II A-1 CCC+/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
Orchid Structured Finance CDO II A-2 CC CCC+/Watch Neg
Pacific Coast CDO Ltd. A B+/Watch Neg BBB-/Watch Neg
Phoenix CDO II Ltd. A AA/Watch Neg AAA
River North CDO Ltd. A-1 CCC/Watch Neg A/Watch Neg
River North CDO Ltd. A-2 CC B/Watch Neg
South Coast Funding V Ltd. A-1 A/Watch Neg AAA
South Coast Funding V Ltd. A-2 BB/Watch Neg A
South Coast Funding V Ltd. A-3 BB/Watch Neg A
South Coast Funding V Ltd. B CC BB+
Stack 2004-1 Ltd. A A+/Watch Neg AAA
Stack 2004-1 Ltd. B BB+/Watch Neg AA
Stack 2004-1 Ltd. C CCC+/Watch Neg BBB/Watch Neg
Stack 2004-1 Ltd. D CC B-/Watch Neg
STAtic ResidenTial CDO 2005-A A-1 B/Watch Neg AA-/Watch Neg
STAtic ResidenTial CDO 2005-A A-2 CC BB-/Watch Neg
STAtic ResidenTial CDO 2005-A B CC CCC/Watch Neg
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd. A-1 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
Trainer Wortham First Republic A AA-/Watch Neg AAA
CBO IV, Limited
Trainer Wortham First Republic B BB+/Watch Neg AA+
CBO IV, Limited
Trainer Wortham First Republic C CCC-/Watch Neg A+
CBO IV, Limited
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Bristol CDO I Ltd. C CC
Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd. C-1 CC
Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd. C-2 CC
Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd. D CC
Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd. Sub Nts CC
Gemstone CDO III Ltd B CC
Gemstone CDO III Ltd C CC
Gemstone CDO III Ltd D CC
Gemstone CDO III Ltd E CC
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. B CC
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. C CC
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. D CC
Glacier Funding CDO II Ltd. Pref Shrs CC
Huntington CDO Ltd C-1 CC
Huntington CDO Ltd C-2 CC
Mercury CDO 2004-1 Ltd C CC
Orchid Structured Finance CDO II A-3 CC
Orchid Structured Finance CDO II B CC
Pacific Coast CDO Ltd. B CC
Pacific Coast CDO Ltd. C-1 CC
Pacific Coast CDO Ltd. C-2 CC
River North CDO Ltd B CC
River North CDO Ltd C CC
River North CDO Ltd D-1 CC
River North CDO Ltd D-2 CC
South Coast Funding V Ltd. C-1 CC
South Coast Funding V Ltd. C-2 CC
STAtic ResidenTial CDO 2005-A C CC
STAtic ResidenTial CDO 2005-A D CC
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd A Combo CC
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd B Combo CC
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd C-1 CC
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd C-2 CC
Other Outstanding Ratings
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd. B-1 D
Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd. B-2 D
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd A-2 D
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd B-1 D
Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd B-2 D
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 58 Classes From 19 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 58
classes from 19 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loan collateral
issued from 1991-2004, and removed three of them from CreditWatch
with negative implications. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings
on 305 classes from these transactions, as well as 55 additional
transactions, and removed two of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given its current projected losses due to increased
delinquencies. The downgrades to 'D' of class G from Structured
Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 1992-9 and of the GA, I,
and G classes from Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust
Series 1991-5 reflect S&P's assessment of interest shortfalls
sustained on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviews the
respective transaction's ability to withstand additional credit
deterioration and the impact that projected losses will have on
each class. In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P
assess whether the class can withstand the base-case loss
assumptions S&P use in its analysis. To maintain an 'AAA' rating,
S&P assess whether the class can withstand approximately 235% of
its base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors applied to specific transactions. To maintain
a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P
assess whether the class can withstand losses exceeding the base-
case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating category,
up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, S&P would assess
whether one class could withstand approximately 130% of its base-
case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would
assess whether a different class could withstand approximately
155% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.
Rating Actions
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 07384MJM5 AA AA+
B-2 07384MJN3 B+ A
B-3 07384MJP8 CC CCC
Equity One ABS, INC.
Series 1998-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 294751AG7 A+ A+/Watch Neg
Fannie Mae Remic Trust 1998 W6
Series 1998-W6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 31359UVM4 A+ AA
IndyMac ARM Trust 2001-H2
Series 2001-H2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 45660UAV1 A AA
B-2 45660UAW9 B+ BB
B-3 45660UAX7 CC B
IndyMac ARM Trust IndyMac ARM Grantor Trust 2001-H1
Series 2001-H1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 45660UAA7 CCC AAA
II-A 45660UAB5 CCC AAA
III-A-2 45660UAJ8 CC AAA
X-1 45660UAE9 CCC AAA
X-2 45660UAK5 CCC AAA
B-1 45660UAF6 CC BBB-
B-2 45660UAG4 CC CCC
MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2004-6
Series 2004-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 57643MDR2 BB A
B-3 57643MDS0 CCC BBB
B-4 57643MEB6 CC BB
B-5 57643MEC4 CC B
MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2004-9
Series 2004-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
30-B-3 57643MGE8 CC BBB-
15-B-4 57643MGP3 CCC BB
30-B-4 57643MGS7 CC B
8-B-4 57643MGL2 B BB
15-B-5 57643MGQ1 CC B
30-B-5 57643MGT5 CC CCC
8-B-5 57643MGM0 CC B
Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
Series 1992- 1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 74436JAL1 BBB- AAA
Ryland Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1993-A1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I 783766MS4 BB+ BBB-/Watch Neg
R 783766MT2 BB+ BBB-/Watch Neg
A 783766MR6 BB+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Saxon Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1992- 1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 805570AC2 BBB- AA+
B-2 805570AD0 BBB- AA+
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 5
Series 5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 81743WAA9 AA AAA
X 81743WAJ0 AA AAA
B-1 81743WAC5 BB AA+
B-2 81743WAD3 CC A+
B-3 81743WAE1 CC BBB+
B-4 81743WAF8 CC BB
B-5 81743WAG6 CC CCC
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B1 86358RBE6 AA+ AAA
B2 86358RBF3 BBB AAA
B3 86358RBG1 CCC AA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B2 86358RHA8 CC AA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-15A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 86358RLG0 CCC B
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-21A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 86358RSE8 BBB AAA
B1 86358RSJ7 B+ AAA
B2 86358RSK4 CCC AA
B3 86358RSL2 CC BBB+
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-1A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A3 86358RTY3 BB AAA
1-A4 86358RTZ0 BB AAA
1-A5 86358RUA3 BB- AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A4 86358RWQ6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
B3 86358RWW3 BB- BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-9
Series 1992-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BX 863573NC1 BBB- BBB+
G 863573NJ6 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 91-5
Series 1991- 5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
GA 863573CS8 D BBB+
I 863573CR0 D BBB+
G 863573CT6 D BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 92-7
Series 1992- 7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
BI 863573LC3 CCC BBB+
BX 863573LF6 BBB- BBB+
Ratings Affirmed
American Housing Trust I
Series I
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2 026709AE5 AAA
3 026709AG0 AAA
4 026709AF2 AAA
5 026709AH8 AAA
7 026709AB1 AAA
American Housing Trust IV
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
II 026711AJ0 A
Bank of America Mortgage 2001-4 Trust
Series 2001-4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-WIO 060506XC1 AAA
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2000-2
Series 2000-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 07384MAA0 AAA
A-2 07384MAB8 AAA
B-1 07384MAD4 AAA
B-2 07384MAE2 AAA
B-3 07384MAF9 AA+
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2001-4
Series 2001-4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A 07384MCX8 AAA
II-A 07384MCY6 AAA
B-1 07384MDA7 AAA
B-2 07384MDB5 A
B-3 07384MDC3 CCC
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A 07384MHZ8 AAA
II-A 07384MJA1 AAA
III-A 07384MJK9 AAA
Bear Stearns Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1997-4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-I 073914VG5 AAA
A-II 073914VH3 AAA
A-III 073914VJ9 AAA
A-IV 073914VK6 AAA
B-1 073914VM2 AAA
B-2 073914VN0 AA
B-3 073914VP5 A
Cendant Mortgage Capital LLC
Series 2002-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-4 15131GMF8 AAA
P 15131GMH4 AAA
X 15131GMJ0 AAA
B-1 15131GML5 AAA
B-2 15131GMM3 AAA
B-3 15131GMN1 AAA
Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2002-S4
Series 2002-S4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-23 16162TT63 AAA
A-P 16162TT71 AAA
M 16162TT97 AAA
B-1 16162TU20 AAA
B-2 16162TU38 AAA
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2001-HYB1
Series 2001-HYB1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 12669B2W1 AAA
2-A-1 12669B2X9 AAA
3-A-1 12669B2Y7 AAA
3-A-2 12669B2Z4 AAA
Citibank (West) FSB
Series 1991-CI2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 130209P86 AAA
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1986- J
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 172905AN1 A
Citibank N.A. New York, NY
Series 1987- A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 172905BE0 A
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1988- 1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-3 172921BN7 A
Collateralized Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series N
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
N-2 194196CD1 AAA
N-3 194196CE9 AAA
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2001-5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B-1 22540VBN1 AAA
B-2 22540VBP6 AA+
B-3 22540VBQ4 AA
B-4 22540VCB6 A
B-5 22540VCC4 BB
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1991- 3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 23321PAJ7 AAA
A-1 23321PAH1 AAA
Fannie Mae Remic Trust 1998 W6
Series 1998-W6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M 31359UVK8 AAA
B-1 31359UVL6 AAA
Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1998-W4
Series 1998-W4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M 31359UQG3 AAA
B-1 31359UQH1 AAA
B-2 31359UQJ7 AA+
Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 1998-W7
Series 1998-W7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M 31359UZW8 AAA
B-1 31359UZX6 AAA
B-2 31359UZY4 AA+
Financial Asset Securitization, Inc.
Series 1997-NAMC1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
FXS 31738VAL9 AAA
P 31738VAR6 AAA
Financial Asset Securitization, Inc.
Series 1997-NAMC2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
FXS 31738VBP9 BB
S 31738VBZ7 BB
First Horizon Mtg Pass-Through Trust 2000-H
Series 2000-H
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-B-1 32051DCJ9 AAA
II-B-1 32051DCN0 AAA
III-B-1 32051DCR1 AAA
IV-B-1 32051DCU4 AAA
V-B-1 32051DCX8 AAA
I-B-2 32051DCK6 AAA
II-B-2 32051DCP5 AAA
III-B-2 32051DCS9 AAA
IV-B-2 32051DCV2 AAA
V-B-2 32051DCY6 AAA
D-B-3 32051DCL4 A
First Republic Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-FRB1
Series 2001-FRB1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 336161AZ7 AAA
X 336161BA1 AAA
B-1 336161BC7 AAA
B-2 336161BD5 AA+
B-3 336161BE3 A-
Homeside Mortgage Securities, Inc.
Series 1998-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-X 437609AM2 AAA
Homeside Mortgage Securities, Inc.
Series 1998-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IA-1 437609AV2 AAA
IA-X 437609BC3 AAA
IIA-1 437609BE9 AAA
II-A-X 437609BG4 AAA
Imperial S&L Assn.
Series 1988- 1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 453083LR6 AA
IndyMac ARM Trust 2001-H2
Series 2001-H2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 45660UAQ2 AAA
A-2 45660UAT6 AAA
X 45660UAY5 AAA
A-3 45660UAU3 AAA
MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2004-6
Series 2004-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 57643MCM4 AAA
1-A-2 57643MDU5 AAA
2-A-1 57643MCN2 AAA
2-A-2 57643MCP7 AAA
2-A-3 57643MCQ5 AAA
2-A-4 57643MCR3 AAA
2-A-5 57643MCS1 AAA
2-A-6 57643MCT9 AAA
2-A-7 57643MCU6 AAA
2-A-8 57643MCV4 AAA
2-A-9 57643MCW2 AAA
2-A-10 57643MCX0 AAA
2-A-11 57643MCY8 AAA
2-A-12 57643MCZ5 AAA
2-A-13 57643MDA9 AAA
2-A-14 57643MDB7 AAA
2-A-15 57643MDC5 AAA
3-A-1 57643MDD3 AAA
4-A-1 57643MDE1 AAA
5-A-1 57643MDF8 AAA
5-A-2 57643MDT8 AAA
6-A-1 57643MDG6 AAA
7-A-1 57643MDH4 AAA
15-PO 57643MDJ0 AAA
30-PO 57643MDK7 AAA
15-A-X 57643MDL5 AAA
30-A-X 57643MDM3 AAA
1-B-1 57643MDV3 AA
B-1 57643MDQ4 AA
1-B-2 57643MDW1 A
1-B-3 57643MDX9 BBB
1-B-4 57643MDY7 BB
1-B-5 57643MDZ4 B
MASTR Asset Securitization Trust 2004-9
Series 2004-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 57643MFC3 AAA
2-A-1 57643MFD1 AAA
2-A-2 57643MFE9 AAA
2-A-3 57643MFF6 AAA
2-A-4 57643MFG4 AAA
3-A-1 57643MFH2 AAA
3-A-2 57643MFJ8 AAA
3-A-3 57643MFK5 AAA
3-A-4 57643MFL3 AAA
3-A-5 57643MFM1 AAA
3-A-6 57643MFN9 AAA
3-A-7 57643MFP4 AAA
4-A-1 57643MFQ2 AAA
5-A-1 57643MFR0 AAA
6-A-1 57643MFS8 AAA
7-A-1 57643MFT6 AAA
PO 57643MFU3 AAA
15-A-X 57643MFV1 AAA
30-A-X 57643MFW9 AAA
8-A-2 57643MGG3 AAA
15-B-1 57643MFZ2 AA
8-B-3 57643MGK4 BBB
8-B-1 57643MGH1 AA
15-B-2 57643MGA6 A
8-B-2 57643MGJ7 A
15-B-3 57643MGB4 BBB
ML Trust VII
Series
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 552927AA3 AAA
B 552927AB1 AAA
ML Trust XLIV
Series
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
G 55291HCA0 AAA
L 55291HBY9 AAA
ML Trust XLVII
Series
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
Z 55291HCY8 AAA
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Series 1996-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A6 617445CD1 AAA
A7 617445CE9 AAA
AP 617445CF6 AAA
Morgan Stanley Mortgage Trust 30
Series 30
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
30-6 61790RAG1 AAA
30-7 61790RAF3 AAA
MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust Series 1999-TBC3
Series 1999-TBC3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 585525DF2 AAA
B-1 585525DH8 AAA
B-2 585525DJ4 AAA
B-3 585525DK1 AAA
MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2000-TBC2
Series 2000-TBC2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 585525ED6 AAA
X 585525EE4 AAA
B-1 585525EG9 AAA
MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2000-TBC3
Series 2000-TBC3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 585525EN4 AAA
X 585525EP9 AAA
B-1 585525ER5 AAA
B-2 585525ES3 AAA
B-3 585525ET1 AAA
MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2001-TBC1
Series 2001-TBC1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 585525FC7 AAA
X 585525FD5 AAA
B-1 585525FE3 AAA
B-2 585525FF0 AAA
B-3 585525FG8 AA+
MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2002-TBC1
Series 2002-TBC1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 585525FN3 AAA
X 585525FP8 AAA
B-1 585525FR4 AA+
B-2 585525FS2 AA
B-3 585525FT0 A
Ryland Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1991-14
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
14-X 783766FX1 BBB+
14B-1 783766GG7 BBB+
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994-4A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
4A-A 79548KKP2 AAA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994-20
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 79548KPK8 AAA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1999-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1-4 79548KH35 AAA
A1-6 79548KJ66 AAA
A2 79548KH76 AAA
PO 79548K9N9 AAA
IO 79548K9O6 AAA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 2000-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 79548K3A4 AAA
A-2 79548K3B2 AAA
PO 79548K3F3 AAA
IO 79548K3G1 AAA
B-1 79548K3C0 AAA
B-2 79548K3D8 AAA
B-3 79548K3E6 AAA
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 4
Series CLASS A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 81743TAA6 A-
Structured Asset Mortgage Investment, Inc.
Series 1998-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-I 86358HAF6 AAA
A-II 86358HAG4 AAA
A-III 86358HAH2 AAA
A-IV 86358HAJ8 AAA
B-1 86358HAL3 AAA
B-2 86358HAM1 AAA
B-3 86358HAN9 AAA
B-4 86358HAR0 A+
B-5 86358HAS8 BB
A-V 86358HAK5 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 1999-1
Series 1999-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
II-A 86358HGW3 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 1995-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
II-A 863572GE7 AAA
II-AX 863572GG2 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 1997-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A-4 863572QM8 AAA
2-AP 863572QN6 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-AX 8635722W2 AAA
1-AP 8635722X0 AAA
3-AX 8635723F8 AAA
3-AP 8635723G6 AAA
B1 8635723H4 AAA
B2 8635723J0 AAA
B3 8635723K7 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-AP 86358RAV9 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-8A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A2 86358RBT3 AAA
1-A3 86358RBU0 AAA
3-A4 86358RCB1 AAA
B1-II 86358RCJ4 AAA
B2-II 86358RCK1 AAA
B3-II 86358RCL9 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-AX 86358RFY8 AAA
3-AP 86358RFB8 AAA
3-AX 86358RFC6 AAA
4-AP 86358RFZ5 AAA
4-AX 86358RGA9 AAA
5-AP 86358RGB7 AAA
5-AX 86358RGC5 AAA
6-AP 86358RGD3 AAA
6-AX 86358RGE1 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-11
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-AP 86358RGX9 AAA
B1 86358RGZ4 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-15A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A1 86358RKR7 AAA
2-A1 86358RKT3 AAA
2-A2 86358RKU0 AAA
3-A3 86358RKY2 AAA
4-A1 86358RLA3 AAA
4-A2 86358RLB1 AAA
5-A1 86358RLC9 AAA
5-A2 86358RLD7 AAA
B1 86358RLE5 AA+
B2 86358RLF2 AA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-19
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-AP 86358RSV0 AAA
1-AX 86358RSW8 AAA
2-AP 86358RTD9 AAA
2-AX 86358RTE7 AAA
B1 (1) 86358RTF4 AAA
B1 (2) 86358R9M8 AAA
B2 (1) 86358RTG2 AAA
B2 (2) 86358R9N6 AAA
B3 (1) 86358RTH0 AAA
B3 (2) 86358R9O3 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-1A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A1 86358RUC9 AAA
2-A2 86358RUD7 AAA
3-A1 86358RUE5 AAA
3-A2 86358RUF2 AAA
4-A 86358RUH8 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A2 86358RWE3 AAA
2-AP 86358RWF0 AAA
CAX 86358RWN3 AAA
PAX 86358RXT9 AAA
AP 86358RWS2 AAA
AX 86358RWT0 AAA
B1 86358RWU7 AAA
B2 86358RWV5 AA
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 91-5
Series 1991- 5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
R-1 863573CQ2 BBB+
Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 92-12
Series 1992-12
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
BX 863573UU3 AAA
WaMu Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2001-AR3 Trust
Series 2001-AR3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A 929227EL6 AAA
II-A 929227EM4 AAA
Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Ceritificates
Series 2002-MS2 Trust
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-4 939335H57 AAA
II-A-1 939335L94 AAA
III-A-1 939335M28 AAA
C-X 939335M36 AAA
C-P 939335M44 AAA
C-B-1 939335M51 AAA
C-B-2 939335M69 AAA
C-B-3 939335M77 AAA
Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-MS1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-4 939335B53 AAA
I-A-13 939335C60 AAA
I-A-22 939335D77 AAA
II-A-1 939335D85 AAA
II-A-4 939335E35 AAA
III-A-4 939335F42 AAA
III-A-11 939335G33 AAA
CX 939335G41 AAA
CP 939335G58 AAA
C-B-1 939335G66 AAA
C-B-2 939335G74 AAA
C-B-3 939335G82 AAA
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-1 Trust
Series 2002-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 94978CAB0 AAA
A-PO 94978CAC8 AAA
B-1 94978CAE4 AAA
B-2 94978CAF1 AAA
B-3 94978CAG9 AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 101 Tranches From 18 CLO Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 101
tranches from 18 U.S. collateralized loan obligation transactions
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications. The
affected tranches have a total issuance amount of $8.789 billion.
S&P also affirmed its ratings on 18 tranches from 11 transactions
and removed 16 of them from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect two primary factors:
* The application of S&P's new corporate collateralized debt
obligation criteria; and
* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CLO tranches due
to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.
The downgrades of 10 classes from eight transactions resulted from
S&P's application of the largest-obligor default test, which is
one of the supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its
criteria update.
S&P's analysis incorporated the asset recovery assumptions in its
new CDO criteria. To provide additional transparency into the
assumptions used in the analysis, S&P is providing the tiered
recovery rate assumed for the cash flows generated for the 'AAA'
liability rating for each transaction.
Table 1
Tiered Recovery Rate For 'AAA' Liability Rating
Transaction Recovery rate (%)
----------- -----------------
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. 45.4
Carlyle High Yield Partners IV Ltd. 46.9
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. 48.1
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. 43.1
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. 43.9
Eastland CLO Ltd. 41.9
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. 47.8
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. 41.2
Grand Horn CLO Ltd. 44.9
Greenbriar CLO Ltd. 41.8
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt Long 43.4
Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd. 44.6
Katonah X CLO Ltd. 45.2
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. 43.7
LCM II Ltd. Partnership 47.9
Octagon Investment Partners VIII 42.5
Sierra CLO II Ltd. 42.6
Stratford CLO Ltd. 40.3
Venture VI CDO Ltd. 41.7
S&P will continue to review the remaining transactions with
ratings placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO criteria
update and resolve the CreditWatch status of the affected
tranches.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. A-2 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. B AA- AA/Watch Neg
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. C BBB+ A/Watch Neg
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. D B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Carlyle High Yield Partners A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
IV Ltd.
Carlyle High Yield Partners A-2 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
IV Ltd.
Carlyle High Yield Partners A-3 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
IV Ltd.
Carlyle High Yield Partners B A- A-/Watch Neg
IV Ltd.
Carlyle High Yield Partners C-1 CCC- B+/Watch Neg
IV Ltd.
Carlyle High Yield Partners C-2 CCC- B+/Watch Neg
IV Ltd.
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. A-1a AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. A-1b AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. A-2 AA AA/Watch Neg
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. B-1 A A/Watch Neg
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. B-2 A A/Watch Neg
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. C BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Cavalry CLO I Ltd. D BB BB/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. A-1-J AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. A-1-R AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. A-1-S AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. A2 A+ AA/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. B BBB+ A/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. C BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
CIFC Funding 2007-II Ltd. D B+ BB/Watch Neg
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. A-2 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. B A AA/Watch Neg
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. C BBB- A/Watch Neg
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. D CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
Duane Street CLO 1 Ltd. E CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. A-1 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. A-2a AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. A-2b A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. A-3 BBB+ AA/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. B B+ A/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. C CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
Eastland CLO Ltd. D CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. A-2 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. A-3 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. B A+ AA/Watch Neg
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. C BBB- A-/Watch Neg
Four Corners CLO 2005-1 Ltd. D CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. A-1A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. A-1B AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. A-2 AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. B A AA/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. C BB+ A/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. D CCC+ BBB/Watch Neg
Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. E CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Grand Horn CLO Ltd. A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Grand Horn CLO Ltd. B AA AA/Watch Neg
Grand Horn CLO Ltd. C A- A/Watch Neg
Grand Horn CLO Ltd. D BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
Grand Horn CLO Ltd. E B+ BB/Watch Neg
Greenbriar CLO Ltd. A A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Greenbriar CLO Ltd. B BBB+ AA/Watch Neg
Greenbriar CLO Ltd. C BB+ A/Watch Neg
Greenbriar CLO Ltd. D B+ BBB/Watch Neg
Greenbriar CLO Ltd. E CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Long Secured/Short
Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt A-2 A- AA/Watch Neg
Long Secured/Short
Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt B BBB A/Watch Neg
Long Secured/Short
Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt C BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
Long Secured/Short
Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt D B+ BB/Watch Neg
Long Secured/Short
Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Halcyon Structured Asset Mgmt X AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Long Secured/Short
Unsecured 2007-3 Ltd.
Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd. A-2 A+ AAA/Watch Neg
Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd. B BBB- A/Watch Neg
Hudson Canyon Funding II Ltd. C BB+ BB+/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. A-1a AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. A-1b AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. A-2a AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. A-2b AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. B AA AA/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. C A- A/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. D BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
Katonah X CLO Ltd. E B+ BB/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. A-1L A AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. A-1L AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. A-1L B AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. A-2L A+ AA/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. A-3L BBB+ A-/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. B-1L BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
Landmark IV CDO Ltd. B-2L CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
LCM II Ltd. Partnership A AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
LCM II Ltd. Partnership B AA- AA/Watch Neg
LCM II Ltd. Partnership C A A/Watch Neg
LCM II Ltd. Partnership D BBB- BBB/Watch Neg
LCM II Ltd. Partnership E1 B+ BB/Watch Neg
LCM II Ltd. Partnership E2 B+ BB/Watch Neg
Octagon Investment Partners A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
VIII
Octagon Investment Partners A-2 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
VIII
Octagon Investment Partners B A+ AA/Watch Neg
VIII
Octagon Investment Partners C BBB A/Watch Neg
VIII
Octagon Investment Partners D BB- BBB/Watch Neg
VIII
Octagon Investment Partners E CCC- BB/Watch Neg
VIII
Sierra CLO II Ltd. A-1L AA AAA/Watch Neg
Sierra CLO II Ltd. A-1LV AA AAA/Watch Neg
Sierra CLO II Ltd. A-2L A AA/Watch Neg
Sierra CLO II Ltd. A-3L BBB- A/Watch Neg
Sierra CLO II Ltd. B-1L B+ BBB/Watch Neg
Sierra CLO II Ltd. B-2L CCC- BB/Watch Neg
Sierra CLO II Ltd. X AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Stratford CLO Ltd. A-1 AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Stratford CLO Ltd. A-2 BBB+ AAA/Watch Neg
Stratford CLO Ltd. B BBB- AA/Watch Neg
Stratford CLO Ltd. C B+ A/Watch Neg
Stratford CLO Ltd. D CCC- BBB/Watch Neg
Stratford CLO Ltd. E CCC- BBB-/Watch Neg
Venture VI CDO Ltd. A-1 AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Venture VI CDO Ltd. A-1-S AA+ AAA/Watch Neg
Venture VI CDO Ltd. A-1-J AA- AAA/Watch Neg
Venture VI CDO Ltd. A-2 A+ AA/Watch Neg
Venture VI CDO Ltd. B BBB+ A/Watch Neg
Venture VI CDO Ltd. C BB+ BBB/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Ballyrock CLO III Ltd. S AAA
Washington Boulevard 2009-1 A AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 164 Classes From 17 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 164
classes from 17 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime and prime jumbo mortgage loan
collateral issued in 2004 and removed 27 of the ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on 155 classes from these transactions and seven
additional deals. S&P also removed one of the affirmed ratings
from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses in light of
increased delinquencies.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis.
For subprime transactions, in order to maintain a rating higher
than 'B', S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses
exceeding S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a percentage
specific to each rating category, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating.
For example, in general, S&P would assess whether one class could
withstand approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions
to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a
different class could withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-
case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with
an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand
approximately 150% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions under its
analysis.
For the prime transactions, in order to maintain an 'AAA' rating,
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand approximately 235%
of its base-case loss assumptions, subject to individual caps and
qualitative factors applied to specific transactions. To maintain
a rating in categories between 'B' (the base case) and 'AAA', S&P
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
base-case assumption at a percentage specific to each rating
category, up to 235% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, S&P would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 130% of its
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while S&P
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 155% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BBB' rating.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion) and excess spread.
The underlying pool of loans backing these transactions consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. subprime and prime jumbo
mortgage loans that are secured by first and second liens on one-
to four-family residential properties.
Rating Actions
Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3
Series 2004-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1M2 004375BF7 BB A+
1M3 004375BG5 CCC BBB+
1M4 004375BH3 CCC BBB
1B 004375BJ9 CCC BBB
2M5 004375BV2 BBB- A-
2M6 004375BW0 B+ BBB+
2M7 004375BX8 B- BBB
2B 004375BY6 CCC BBB
Banc of America Funding 2004-3 Trust
Series 2004-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
30-B-1 05946XHH9 BB- AA
30-B-2 05946XHJ5 CCC A
30-B-3 05946XHK2 CCC BBB
30-B-4 05946XHP1 CC BB
30-B-5 05946XHQ9 CC B
15-B-5 05946XHT3 CC B
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-8
Series 2004-8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-B-IO 05949ATF7 CC AAA
X-B-5 05949AUG3 CC B
5-B-IO 05949AUR9 AA AAA
5-B-3 05949AUC2 BB BBB+
5-B-4 05949AUM0 B BB+
5-B-5 05949AUN8 CCC B+
2-B-2 05949ATY6 BBB- A
2-B-3 05949ATZ3 B- BBB
2-B-4 05949AUJ7 CCC BB
2-B-5 05949AUK4 CC B
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-9
Series 2004-9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 05949AVL1 AA- AAA
1-A-2 05949AVM9 AA AAA
1-A-3 05949AVN7 AA+ AAA
1-A-4 05949AVP2 A+ AAA
1-A-5 05949AVQ0 AA- AAA
1-A-6 05949AVR8 AA- AAA
1-A-7 05949AVS6 AA- AAA
1-A-8 05949AVT4 AA AAA
1-A-9 05949AVU1 AA AAA
1-A-10 05949AVV9 AA AAA
1-A-11 05949AVW7 AA AAA
30-IO 05949AVZ0 AA+ AAA
X-PO 05949AWJ5 A+ AAA
3-B-IO 05949AWH9 A+ AAA
3-B-1 05949AWR7 A+ AA
3-B-3 05949AWT3 CCC BBB
3-B-4 05949AXA3 CC BB
3-B-5 05949AXB1 CC B
30-B-5 05949AWV8 CC CCC
3-B-2 05949AWS5 B A
Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-7
Series 2004-7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 07384MX98 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
I-A-2 07384MZ54 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
II-A-1 07384MY22 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
II-X 07384MZ62 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
III-A 07384MY30 BBB AAA/Watch Neg
IV-A 07384MY48 BBB- AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 07384MY71 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B-2 07384MY89 CC BBB/Watch Neg
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-HYB7
Series 2004-HYB7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 12669GBY6 A- AAA
1-A-2 12669GBZ3 A- AAA
1-A-1-IO 12669GBX8 A- AAA
1-A-2-IO A- AAA
1-A-3 12669GDG3 BBB AAA
2-A 12669GCA7 BBB AAA
3-A 12669GCB5 BBB+ AAA
3-A-IO 12669GCC3 BBB+ AAA
4-A 12669GCD1 BBB AAA
4-A-IO 12669GEL1 BBB AAA
5-A 12669GCE9 BBB AAA
5-A-IO 12669GCF6 BBB AAA
M 12669GCG4 B AA
B-1 12669GCH2 CCC BB
B-2 12669GCJ8 CC CCC
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J8
Series 2004-J8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-2 12669GDJ7 A- AAA
1-A-3 12669GDK4 BBB- AAA
2-A-1 12669GDM0 BBB AAA
2-A-2 12669GDN8 BBB- AAA
2-X 12669GDP3 BBB AAA
3-A-2 12669GDR9 BBB- AAA
3-A-4 12669GDT5 BBB- AAA
3-A-5 12669GDU2 BBB- AAA
3-A-6 12669GDV0 BBB- AAA
3-A-7 12669GDW8 BBB- AAA
3-A-8 12669GDX6 BBB- AAA
PO-A 12669GDZ1 BBB- AAA
PO-B 12669GEA5 BBB- AAA
3-A-3 12669GDS7 BBB- AAA
3-X 12669GDY4 BBB- AAA
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J9
Series 2004-J9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A-1 12669GFE6 AA AAA
2-A-1 12669GFF3 AA+ AAA
2-A-2 12669GFG1 AA+ AAA
2-A-6 12669GFL0 AA AAA
4-A-1 12669GFN6 AA AAA
X-A-1 12669GFP1 AA AAA
X-B-2 AA AAA
PO-A 12669GFR7 AA AAA
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-HYB3
Series 2004 HYB3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A 17307GJX7 AA- AAA
II-A 17307GJY5 BBB AAA
III-A 17307GJZ2 AA- AAA
B-4 17307GKF4 CC CCC
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2004-7
Series 2004-7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-1 2254W0JR7 BBB AAA
I-A-2 2254W0JS5 A AAA
I-A-3 2254W0JT3 BBB AAA
I-A-4 2254W0KY0 AA AAA
I-A-5 2254W0KZ7 BBB AAA
I-A-6 2254W0LA1 BBB AAA
III-A-2 2254W0JZ9 BBB AAA
III-A-3 2254W0KA2 BBB AAA
IV-A-1 2254W0KB0 A- AAA
VI-A-1 2254W0KD6 BBB AAA
A-X 2254W0KE4 A AAA
A-P 2254W0KG9 AA AAA
C-P 2254W0KH7 BBB AAA
II-A-1 2254W0JU0 AA+ AAA
II-A-3 2254W0JW6 AA+ AAA
II-A-4 2254W0JX4 AA+ AAA
II-A-5 2254W0LB9 AA+ AAA
II-A-6 2254W0LC7 AA+ AAA
II-A-7 2254W0LD5 AA- AAA
V-A-1 2254W0KC8 AA+ AAA
C-B-1 2254W0KM6 CCC AA
D-B-1 2254W0KJ3 CCC AA
C-B-2 2254W0KN4 CCC A
D-B-2 2254W0KK0 CC A
C-B-3 2254W0KP9 CC BBB
D-B-3 2254W0KL8 CC BB
C-B-4 2254W0KV6 CC BB
C-B-5 2254W0KW4 CC B
DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1
Series 2004-AR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1A 23332UAA2 AA+ AAA
A-1B 23332UAB0 A- AA
B-1 23332UAH7 B- BB
B-2 23332UAJ3 CC CCC
Home Equity Asset Trust 2004-8
Series 2004-8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 437084GT7 BBB AA
M-4 437084GU4 B+ AA-
M-5 437084GV2 CCC BBB
M-6 437084GW0 CC BB-
B-1 437084GX8 CC B
Prime Mortgage Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-A-5 74160MET5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 74160MFG2 BBB- AA
B-2 74160MFH0 CCC A
B-3 74160MFJ6 CCC BBB
B-4 74160MFK3 CC BB
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-19
Series 2004-19
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7-I 863579JT6 D CC
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-20
Series 2004-20
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1-A1 863579GY8 B+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A2 863579GZ5 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
1-A3 863579HA9 B+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A1 863579HB7 BB+ AAA/Watch Neg
2-A2 863579HC5 B+ AAA/Watch Neg
3-A1 863579HD3 BB AAA/Watch Neg
3-A2 863579HE1 B+ AAA/Watch Neg
4-A 863579HF8 BB- AAA/Watch Neg
5-A 863579HG6 BB- AAA/Watch Neg
B1 863579HH4 B- AA+/Watch Neg
B1X 863579HJ0 B- AA+/Watch Neg
B2 863579HK7 CCC AA+/Watch Neg
B2X 863579HL5 CCC AA+/Watch Neg
B3 863579HM3 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B3X 863579HN1 CCC AA/Watch Neg
B4 863579HP6 CC AA/Watch Neg
B4X 863579HQ4 CC AA/Watch Neg
B5 863579HR2 CC AA-/Watch Neg
B5X 863579HS0 CC AA-/Watch Neg
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-N Trust
Series 2004-N
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 94979LAM5 BB- AA
B-2 94979LAN3 CCC A
B-3 94979LAP8 CC BBB
B-4 94979LAQ6 CC B
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-S Trust
Series 2004-S
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 94981WAH8 BB- AA
B-2 94981WAJ4 CCC BBB
B-3 94981WAK1 CC B
B-4 94981WAM7 CC CCC
B-5 94981WAN5 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-3
Series 2004-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1A4 004375BB6 AAA
1A5 004375BC4 AAA
1A6 004375BD2 AAA
1M1 004375BE0 AA+
2A2 004375BL4 AAA
2A5 004375BP5 AAA
2A6 004375BQ3 AAA
2M1 004375BR1 AA+
2M2 004375BS9 AA
2M3 004375BT7 A+
2M4 004375BU4 A
Banc of America Funding 2004-3 Trust
Series 2004-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 05946XGP2 AAA
1-A-2 05946XGQ0 AAA
1-A-3 05946XGR8 AAA
1-A-4 05946XGS6 AAA
1-A-5 05946XGT4 AAA
1-A-6 05946XGU1 AAA
1-A-7 05946XGV9 AAA
1-A-8 05946XGW7 AAA
1-A-9 05946XGX5 AAA
1-A-10 05946XGY3 AAA
1-A-11 05946XGZ0 AAA
1-X-PO 05946XHE6 AAA
30-IO 05946XHD8 AAA
2-A-1 05946XHB2 AAA
2-A-2 05946XHC0 AAA
15-PO 05946XHF3 AAA
15-IO 05946XHG1 AAA
2-X-PO AAA
15-B-2 05946XHM8 A
15-B-3 05946XHN6 BBB
15-B-4 05946XHS5 BB
15-B-1 05946XHL0 AA
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-8
Series 2004-8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-9 05949ASR2 AAA
1-A-18 05949ATA8 AAA
1-A-19 05949ATB6 AAA
1-A-20 05949ATC4 AAA
3-A-1 05949ATL4 AAA
4-A-1 05949ATM2 AAA
15-PO 05949ATS9 AAA
15-IO 05949ATT7 AAA
20-IO 05949AUD0 AAA
5-A-1 05949ATN0 AAA
5-IO 05949ATP5 AAA
5-PO 05949ATQ3 AAA
5-B-1 05949AUA6 AA
5-B-2 05949AUB4 A+
2-A-1 05949ATG5 AAA
2-A-2 05949ATH3 AAA
2-A-3 05949ATJ9 AAA
2-A-4 05949ATK6 AAA
2-B-1 05949ATX8 AA
Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-9
Series 2004-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A-1 05949AWA4 AAA
2-A-2 05949AWB2 AAA
15-PO 05949AWC0 AAA
15-IO 05949AWD8 AAA
3-A-1 05949AWE6 AAA
3-PO 05949AWF3 AAA
3-IO 05949AWG1 AAA
15-B-1 05949AWN6 AA
15-B-2 05949AWP1 A
15-B-3 05949AWQ9 BBB
15-B-4 05949AWX4 BB
15-B-5 05949AWY2 CCC
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J8
Series 2004-J8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A-1 12669GDH1 AAA
1-X 12669GDL2 AAA
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-J9
Series 2004-J9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
2-A-3 12669GFH9 AAA
2-A-4 12669GFJ5 AAA
2-A-5 12669GFK2 AAA
3-A-1 12669GFM8 AAA
X-A-2 AAA
X-B-1 12669GFQ9 AAA
PO-B 12669GFS5 AAA
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2004-7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IA-1 172973E47 AAA
IA-2 172973E54 AAA
IA-3 172973E62 AAA
IA-4 172973E70 AAA
IA-5 172973E88 AAA
IA-6 172973E96 AAA
IA-7 172973F20 AAA
IA-8 172973F38 AAA
IA-PO 172973F46 AAA
IIA-1 172973F53 AAA
IIA-PO 172973F61 AAA
CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2004-7
Series 2004-7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
III-A-1 2254W0JY2 AAA
C-X 2254W0KF1 AAA
II-A-2 2254W0JV8 AAA
DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1
Series 2004-AR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2A 23332UAC8 AAA
A-2B 23332UAD6 AA
X-2 23332UAF1 AAA
GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9
Series 2004-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
3A1 36242DBK8 AAA
Home Equity Asset Trust 2004-8
Series 2004-8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 437084GR1 AA+
M-2 437084GS9 AA
Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-9
Series 2004-9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A 61748HFT3 A
2-A 61748HFU0 A
3-A-1 61748HFV8 AAA
3-A-2 61748HFW6 A
3-A-3 61748HFX4 A
3-A-4 61748HFY2 A
3-A-5 61748HFZ9 A
3-A-6 61748HGA3 AAA
3-A-X 61748HGB1 AAA
3-A-P 61748HGC9 A
4-A 61748HGD7 A
5-A 61748HGE5 A
5-A-X 61748HGF2 A
5-A-P 61748HGG0 A
B-1 61748HGH8 CCC
Prime Mortgage Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 74160MEP3 AAA
I-A-2 74160MEQ1 AAA
I-A-3 74160MER9 AAA
I-A-4 74160MES7 AAA
I-A-6 74160MEU2 AAA
I-A-7 74160MEV0 AAA
I-A-8 74160MEW8 AAA
I-PO 74160MEX6 AAA
II-A-1 74160MEY4 AAA
II-A-2 74160MEZ1 AAA
II-A-3 74160MFA5 AAA
II-PO 74160MFB3 AAA
II-X-1 74160MFC1 AAA
RFMSI Series 2004-PS1 Trust
Series 2004-PS1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 76111XPP2 AAA
M-1 76111XPR8 AA
M-2 76111XPS6 A
M-3 76111XPT4 BBB
B-1 76111XPU1 BB
B-2 76111XPV9 B
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-19
Series 2004-19
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A1 863579JD1 AA
1-A2 863579JE9 AA
1-A2X 863579JF6 AA
2-A1 863579JG4 CCC
2-A2 863579JH2 CCC
Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II Trust 2004-AR8
Series 2004-AR8
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1A 86359LGE3 AAA
A-2A 86359LGF0 AAA
A-2B 86359LGG8 AAA
X-1 86359LGH6 AAA
X-2 86359LGJ2 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR4
Series 2004-AR4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-1 86359LDH9 AAA
II-A-1 86359LDJ5 AAA
III-A-1 86359LDW6 AAA
X 86359LDK2 AAA
Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR6
Series 2004-AR6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1A 86359LEV7 AAA
A-1B 86359LFJ3 AAA
A-2 86359LEW5 AAA
A-3 86359LFK0 AAA
X 86359LEX3 AAA
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-N Trust
Series 2004-N
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-5 94979LAE3 AAA
A-6 94979LAF0 AAA
A-7 94979LAG8 AAA
A-9 94979LAJ2 AAA
Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-S Trust
Series 2004-S
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 94981WAA3 AAA
A-5 94981WAE5 AAA
A-6 94981WAF2 AAA
A-7 94981WAL9 AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 238 Classes From 85 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 238
classes from 85 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed primarily by scratch-and-dent mortgage loan
collateral issued from 2001 through 2008. S&P removed 11 of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.
Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on 318 classes from 87
transactions and removed four of them from CreditWatch negative
(see list).
The "scratch-and-dent" collateral backing these transactions
originally consisted predominantly of re-performing,
nonperforming, outside-the-guidelines, and document-deficient
first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate, residential mortgage loans
secured by one- to four-family properties.
The downgrades, affirmations, and CreditWatch resolutions
incorporate S&P's current and projected losses, which S&P based on
the dollar amounts of loans currently in the transactions'
delinquency, foreclosure, and real estate owned (REO) pipelines,
as well as S&P's projection of future defaults. S&P also
incorporated cumulative losses to date in its analysis when
assessing rating outcomes.
S&P derived its loss assumptions using its criteria listed in the
"Related Research" section below. As part of its analysis, S&P
considered the characteristics of the underlying mortgage
collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences. For example, the
risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools influences S&P's
default projections, while its outlook for housing-price declines
and the health of the housing market influence its loss severity
assumptions. Furthermore, S&P adjusted its loss expectations for
each deal based on upward trends in delinquencies.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis. In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.
The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given its current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies. The
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that there is sufficient credit
enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates. The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.
S&P reviewed two transactions issued in 2008. Both of these
transactions comprise loans that were considerably seasoned at the
time of origination. As a result, S&P incorporated this seasoning
when S&P applied its loss severity and default assumptions.
For transactions backed by non-performing loans, S&P calculated
its projected defaults by evaluating the current pipeline of
delinquent loans. S&P incorporated the available liquidation data
to arrive at its opinion of potential loss severity and extent of
default. S&P used this information in conjunction with its
rating-specific assumptions to project cash flows and assess
whether the outstanding ratings on the classes were appropriate,
in its view. Based on S&P's view of the timing and amount of cash
flow available for a security, S&P adjusted the ratings
accordingly.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in its view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P deem
appropriate.
Rating Actions
2002-CB4 Trust
Series 2002-CB4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 12489WFE9 AA AAA
B-1 12489WFF6 CCC AAA
B-2 12489WFG4 CCC AAA
2003-CB2 Trust
Series 2003-CB2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 04542BCW0 A AAA
M-2 04542BCX8 BB AA
B-1 04542BCY6 B BBB
B-2 04542BCZ3 CCC BBB-
2003-CB3 Trust
Series 2003-CB3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 12489WGN8 BBB AA+
B-1 12489WGP3 B AA
B-2 12489WGQ1 CCC A
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 004421HG1 B- BBB
M-4 004421HH9 CCC BBB-
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD3
Series 2005-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 004421TQ6 AA AA+
M-2 004421TR4 BBB A+
M-3 004421TS2 CCC A-
M-4 004421TT0 CC BBB+
M-5 004421TU7 CC BBB
B-1 004421TN3 CC BB+
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-4 004421KN2 B BBB
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD2
Series 2005-SD2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-4 004421QH9 BB BBB
M-5 004421QJ5 CCC BBB-
American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-SD2
Series 2007-SD2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 02662AAA0 CCC AAA
M-1 02662AAB8 CCC AA
M-2 02662AAC6 CCC A
M-3 02662AAD4 CC BBB
M-4 02662AAE2 CC BB
M-5 02662AAF9 CC B
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2005-C
Series 2005-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 07325NBU5 BB BBB
B-3 07325NBV3 CCC BBB-
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass Through Trust Series 2006-B
Series 2006-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 07325NDV1 BBB AA-
M-3 07325NDW9 CCC A
M-4 07325NDX7 CCC A-
B-1 07325NDY5 CCC BBB+
B-2 07325NDZ2 CCC BBB
B-3 07325NEA6 CC BBB-
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A
Series 2006-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 07325NDD1 BB BBB
B-3 07325NDE9 B BB
BayView Financial Securities Company LLC
Series 2004-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 073249CD4 B- BBB
BayView Financial Securities Company LLC
Series 2004-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 073247BQ0 CCC BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2001-3
Series 2001-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 07384YBQ8 B AA
M-2 07384YBR6 CCC BB
B 07384YBS4 CC B
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 07384YCY0 B A
B 07384YCZ7 CCC BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2
Series 2002-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 07384YES1 CCC BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2
Series 2003-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 07384YJV9 BBB A
B 07384YJW7 CCC BB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-3
Series 2003-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 07384YLW4 B BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD1
Series 2003-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 07384YKP0 B BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD3
Series 2003-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 07384YNE2 B BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 07384YSZ0 BB A
M-3 07384YTF3 B BBB+
B-2 07384YTB2 CCC BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 073879HA9 BB A
M-3 073879HB7 B BBB
B 073879HC5 CCC BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 07384YSH0 B BBB
B 07384YSJ6 CCC BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 073879GC6 BBB A
M-3 073879GD4 B BBB
B 073879GE2 CCC BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD4
Series 2004-SD4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 073879MG0 B BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 073877CE0 B- A
M-3 073877CF7 CCC BB+
M-4 073877CG5 CC BB
M-5 073877CH3 CC B
M-6 073877CJ9 CC CCC
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-3
Series 2005-3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 073877DN9 B AA
M-2 073877DP4 CCC BBB
M-3 073877DQ2 CCC BB
M-4 073877DR0 CCC B+
M-5 073877DS8 CC B
M-6 073877DT6 CC CCC
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-SD2
Series 2005-SD2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
I-M-1 073877BJ0 A- AA
I-M-2 073877BK7 BB A
I-M-3 073877BL5 B A-
I-M-4 073877BM3 B BBB+
I-M-5 073877BN1 B- BBB
I-M-6 073877BP6 CCC BBB-
I-B 073877BW1 CCC BB
II-M-1 073877BS0 BBB+ AA
II-M-2 073877BT8 B A
II-M-3 073877BU5 CCC BBB
II-B 073877BV3 CCC BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 07388FAF0 BBB A
M-4 07388FAG8 BB A-
M-5 07388FAH6 B BBB+
M-6 07388FAJ2 B- BBB
M-7 07388FAK9 CCC BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-SD1
Series 2006-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 07384YVH6 BB A
M-3 07384YVJ2 CCC BBB
M-4 07384YVK9 CC BBB-
C-BASS 2003-RP1 Trust
Series 2003-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 124860DU8 CCC BBB-
B-1 124860DV6 CC CCC
C-BASS 2004-RP1 Trust
Series 2004-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-IO 124860EE3 AA+ AAA
B-1 124860EL7 BB BBB+
B-2 124860EM5 CCC BBB
C-BASS 2005-RP1 Trust
Series 2005-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 124860FE2 B BBB+
B-2 124860FF9 CCC BB
C-BASS 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 124860GM3 BBB A-
B-1 124860GN1 CCC BBB+
B-2 124860GP6 CC BBB
C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust
Series 2006-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 124779AG4 BB BBB+
B-2 124779AH2 B BBB-
B-3 124779AJ8 CCC BB+
B-4 124779AK5 CCC BB+
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Notes Series 2001-CB4
Series 2001-CB4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
IB-1 12489WEB6 BB BBB
C-Bass Trust 2001-CB3
Series 2001-CB3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 12489WDU5 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
B-1 12489WDV3 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2004-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 17307GHY7 BB AAA
M-1 17307GHZ4 B AA+
M-2 17307GJA7 CCC AA
M-3 17307GJB5 CCC A+
M-4 17307GJC3 CC A
M-5 17307GJD1 CC A-
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2005-HE2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 17307GSW9 BB BBB
M-4 17307GSX7 CCC BBB-
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2005-SHL1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 17307GR83 B BBB
M-4 17307GR91 CCC BBB-
Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2003-SD2
Series 2003-SD2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 126671ZH2 CCC B
Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2003-SD3
Series 2003-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 126671M78 B BBB
Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 1266712K1 BBB AA
B-1 1266712L9 BB A
B-2 1266712M7 CCC BBB+
CSFB Trust 2003-CF14
Series 2003-CF14
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 22541N7P8 CCC A
B 22541N7Q6 CC B
CSFB Trust 2004-CF1
Series 2004-CF1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 22541SBY3 BBB A
B 22541SBZ0 B BB-
CSMC Trust 2006-CF2
Series 2006-CF2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 12638EAB0 CCC BBB+
B-2 12638EAC8 CC BBB-
CSMC Trust 2006-CF3
Series 2006-CF3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 12638GAA7 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
M-1 12638GAB5 CCC AA/Watch Neg
M-2 12638GAC3 CCC AA-/Watch Neg
M-3 12638GAD1 CCC A/Watch Neg
M-4 12638GAE9 CC BBB+/Watch Neg
M-5 12638GAF6 CC BBB/Watch Neg
M-6 12638GAG4 CC BBB-/Watch Neg
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 126673FM9 BBB AA
M-3 126673FN7 B A-
B-1 126673FP2 CCC BBB+
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2004-SD4
Series 2004-SD4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 126673SF0 BB A+
M-3 126673SG8 B BBB+
B-1 126673SH6 CCC BBB-
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 126673G48 BB AA-
M-3 126673G55 B A-
B-1 126673G63 CCC BBB+
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2006-SD4
Series 2006-SD4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 232433AA0 CCC A
M-1 232433AB8 CCC BBB
M-2 232433AC6 CCC B
M-3 232433AD4 CCC B-
EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-A
Series 2003-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 268668BS8 A AAA
A-2 268668BU3 BBB AAA
M-1 268668BW9 BB AA
M-2 268668BY5 B A
B 268668CA6 CCC B
EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-A
Series 2004-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-3 268668DC1 A AAA
M-1 268668DD9 B A
M-2 268668DE7 CCC BB
B 268668DS6 CC CCC
EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-B
Series 2004-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-2 268668DX5 A AAA
M-1 268668DY3 CCC AA
M-2 268668DZ0 CC BBB
GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-LT1
Series 2005-LT1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-1 36290PBS5 CCC AAA
M-1 36290PBT3 CCC A
M-2 36290PBU0 CCC BB
B-1 36290PBV8 CC B-
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-01
Series 2004-01
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 576436AC3 BBB A
M-3 576436AD1 CCC BBB
M-4 576436AE9 CC BBB-
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-02
Series 2004-02
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 576436AQ2 B BB+
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-01
Series 2005-01
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 576436BX6 A- AA
M-2 576436BY4 CCC A
M-3 576436BZ1 CC BB
M-4 576436CA5 CC B
B 576436CB3 CC B-
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-02
Series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-3 576436CG2 BB A
M-4 576436CH0 B BBB+
M-5 576436CJ6 CCC BBB
M-6 576436CL1 CCC BBB-
B 576436CK3 CCC BB
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 61744CBG0 B BBB
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD2
Series 2004-SD2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 61744CEC6 BB BBB
B-2 61744CED4 CCC BBB-
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 61744CGQ3 BB A
B-1 61744CGR1 B BBB+
B-2 61744CGS9 CCC BBB
Quest Trust 2002-X1
Series 2002-X1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 748351AD5 CC BB+
RAAC Series 2005-RP1 Trust
Series 2005-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-4 76112BJT8 BB BBB+
M-5 76112BJU5 BB BBB
RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-5 76112BXT2 B BBB-
M-6 76112BXU9 CCC BBB-
Residential Loan Trust 2008-AH1
Series 2008-AH1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M 761150AC5 BB A
B 761150AE1 CCC BBB
RFSC Series 2003-RP1 Trust
Series 2003-RP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 760985UJ8 CCC BB
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Union Planters Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2003-UP1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 79549ASN0 B AA
M-3 79549ASP5 CCC A+
Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2003-CB1
Series 2003-CB1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 79549ARY7 B AA
B-1 79549ARZ4 CCC A
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-HEL1
Series 2003-GEL1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M4 80382UAG8 B BBB-
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL2
Series 2004-GEL2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 80382UAP8 CC CCC
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL3
Series 2004-GEL3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 80382UAU7 CC CCC
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-GEL1
Series 2005-GEL1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M3 86359BX30 B BB
M4 86359BX48 CCC B
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 81441PBT7 BBB AA
M-2 81441PBU4 B A
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-1 81441PCB5 A AA
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF4
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B1 86359DQD2 BBB AA
B2 86359DQE0 CCC A
B3 86359DQF7 CC BB
B4 86359DQG5 D B
Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Series 2005-RF1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B1 86359DBY2 B AA
B2 86359DBZ9 CCC A
B3 86359DCA3 CC BB
B4 86359DCB1 CC B
Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Series 2005-RF5
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B2 86359DRW9 CCC A
B3 86359DRX7 CCC BBB
B4 86359DRY5 CC BB
B5 86359DRZ2 CC B
Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Series 2005-RF6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 86359DWH6 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
AIO 86359DWJ2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
B1 86359DWK9 BBB AA/Watch Neg
B2 86359DWL7 CCC A/Watch Neg
B3 86359DWM5 CCC BBB/Watch Neg
B4 86359DWN3 CC BB/Watch Neg
Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-NP2
Series 2004-NP2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 86359BQ79 B AAA
M1 86359BQ87 CCC AA
M2 86359BQ95 CCC A
B 86359BR29 CC BBB
Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2006-RF2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 86361AAA7 A AAA
AIO 86361AAB5 A AAA
B1 86361AAC3 B AA
B2 86361AAD1 CCC A
B3 86361AAE9 CCC BBB
B4 86361AAF6 CC BB
B5 86361AAG4 CC B
Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2008-RF1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B2 86362DAE2 CCC A
B3 86362DAF9 CCC BBB
B4 86362DAG7 CCC BB
B5 86362DAH5 CCC B
Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-EQR1
Series 2004-EQR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 881561EB6 CC CCC
Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-4 897896BC9 CCC B
Wachovia Loan Trust 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 92977XAC7 BB BBB
Ratings Affirmed
2002-CB4 Trust
Series 2002-CB4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-IO 12489WEY6 AAA
M-1 12489WFD1 AAA
2003-CB2 Trust
Series 2003-CB2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-3 04542BCS9 AAA
2003-CB3 Trust
Series 2003-CB3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-1 12489WGJ7 AAA
M-1 12489WGM0 AAA
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 004421HD8 AAA
M-1 004421HE6 AA
M-2 004421HF3 A
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD3
Series 2005-SD3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 004421TP8 AAA
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 004421KJ1 AAA
M-1 004421KK8 AA+
M-2 004421KL6 A+
M-3 004421KM4 BBB+
ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD2
Series 2005-SD2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 004421QD8 AAA
M-1 004421QE6 AA
M-2 004421QF3 A
M-3 004421QG1 BBB+
BayView Financial Asset Trust 2003-A
Series 2003-A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IO-1 07324QCQ7 AAA
IO-2 07324QCY0 AAA
PO 07324QCR5 AAA
A 07324QCT1 AAA
M-1 07324QCU8 AA+
M-2 07324QCV6 AA
M-3 07324QCW4 A
M-4 07324QCX2 A-
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass Through Trust 2005-C
Series 2005-C
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1C 07325NBM3 AAA
A-2 07325NBN1 AAA
M-1 07325NBP6 AA
M-2 07325NBQ4 AA-
M-3 07325NBR2 A
M-4 07325NBS0 A-
B-1 07325NBT8 BBB+
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass Through Trust Series 2006-B
Series 2006-B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-IO 07325NDJ8 AAA
1-A2 07325NDL3 AAA
1-A3 07325NDM1 AAA
1-A4 07325NDN9 AAA
1-A5 07325NDP4 AAA
2-A2 07325NDR0 AAA
2-A3 07325NDS8 AAA
2-A4 07325NDT6 AAA
M-1 07325NDU3 AA
Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A
Series 2006-A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-IO 07325NCN0 AAA
1-A1 07325NCP5 AAA
1-A2 07325NCQ3 AAA
1-A3 07325NCR1 AAA
1-A4 07325NCS9 AAA
1-A5 07325NCT7 AAA
2-A3 07325NCW0 AAA
2-A4 07325NCX8 AAA
M-1 07325NCY6 AA
M-2 07325NCZ3 AA-
M-3 07325NDA7 A
M-4 07325NDB5 A-
B-1 07325NDC3 BBB+
BayView Financial Securities Company LLC
Series 2004-A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 073249BT0 AAA
M-1 073249BU7 AA
M-2 073249BV5 AA-
M-3 073249BW3 A
M-4 073249BX1 A-
B-1 073249BY9 BBB+
BayView Financial Securities Company LLC
Series 2004-C
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 073247BJ6 AAA
A2A 073247BK3 AAA
A2B 073247BV9 AAA
M-1 073247BL1 AA
M-2 073247BM9 AA-
M-3 073247BN7 A
M-4 073247BP2 A-
BayView Financial Securities Company LLC
Series 2004-D
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 07325NAB8 AAA
M-1 07325NAC6 AA
M-2 07325NAD4 AA-
M-3 07325NAE2 A
M-4 07325NAF9 A-
B-1 07325NAG7 BBB
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2001-3
Series 2001-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 07384YBL9 AAA
A-2 07384YBM7 AAA
A-3 07384YBN5 AAA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-1
Series 2002-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A5 07384YCU8 AAA
2-A 07384YCV6 AAA
M-1 07384YCX2 AA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2
Series 2002-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 07384YEM4 AAA
A-2 07384YEN2 AAA
M-1 07384YEQ5 AA+
M-2 07384YER3 AA-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2
Series 2003-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 07384YJN7 AAA
A-2 07384YJP2 AAA
A-3 07384YJQ0 AAA
M-1 07384YJU1 AA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-3
Series 2003-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 07384YLS3 AAA
A-IO 07384YLT1 AAA
M-1 07384YLU8 AA
M-2 07384YLV6 A
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD1
Series 2003-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 07384YKL9 AAA
M-1 07384YKM7 AA
M-2 07384YKN5 A
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD3
Series 2003-SD3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 07384YNB8 AAA
M-1 07384YNC6 AA
M-2 07384YND4 A
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 07384YSW7 AAA
A-IO 07384YSX5 AAA
M-1 07384YSY3 AA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 073879GX0 AAA
A-3 073879HY7 AAA
A-5 073879JA7 AAA
M-1 073879GZ5 AA+
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 07384YSE7 AAA
M-1 07384YSF4 AA
M-2 07384YSG2 A
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 073879GJ1 AAA
A-3 073879GK8 AAA
A-4 073879GL6 AAA
M-1 073879GB8 AA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD4
Series 2004-SD4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 073879MC9 AAA
A-2 073879MF2 AAA
M-1 073879MD7 AA
M-2 073879ME5 A
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 073877CB6 AAA
A-3 073877CC4 AAA
M-1 073877CD2 AA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-3
Series 2005-3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 073877DK5 AAA
A-3 073877DM1 AAA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-2 073877AB8 AAA
I-A-3 073877AC6 AAA
I-M-1 073877AD4 AA
I-M-2 073877AE2 A
I-M-3 073877AF9 A-
I-M-4 073877AG7 BBB+
I-M-5 073877AH5 BBB
I-M-6 073877AJ1 BBB-
I-B 073877AQ5 BB
II-A 073877AK8 AAA
II-M-1 073877AL6 AA
II-M-2 073877AM4 A
II-M-3 073877AP7 BBB
II-B 073877AN2 BBB-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-SD2
Series 2005-SD2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
I-A-2 073877BG6 AAA
I-A-3 073877BH4 AAA
II-A-1 073877BQ4 AAA
II-A-2 073877BR2 AAA
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-2
Series 2006-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 07388FAA1 AAA
A-2 07388FAB9 AAA
A-3 07388FAC7 AAA
M-1 07388FAD5 AA
M-2 07388FAE3 AA-
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-SD1
Series 2006-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 07384YVF0 AAA
M-1 07384YVG8 AA
C-BASS 2003-RP1 Trust
Series 2003-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 124860DR5 AAA
M-1 124860DT1 AA
C-BASS 2004-RP1 Trust
Series 2004-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 124860EF0 AA+
M-2 124860EG8 AA-
M-3 124860EK9 A
C-BASS 2005-RP1 Trust
Series 2005-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-3 124860FG7 AAA
AV 124860FA0 AAA
M-1 124860FB8 AA
M-2 124860FC6 A
M-3 124860FD4 A-
C-BASS 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-2 124860GF8 AAA
AF-3 124860GG6 AAA
AV-2 124860GJ0 AAA
M-1 124860GK7 AA
M-2 124860GL5 A
C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust
Series 2006-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 124779AA7 AAA
A-2 124779AB5 AAA
M-1 124779AD1 AA
M-2 124779AE9 A
M-3 124779AF6 A-
C-BASS 2006-RP2 Trust
Series 2006-RP2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 1248M3AA1 AAA
A-2 1248M3AB9 AAA
A-3 1248M3AC7 AAA
C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates
Series 2002-CB1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-2 12489WEK6 AAA
B-1 12489WEL4 BBB
C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Notes Series 2001-CB4
Series 2001-CB4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IA-1 12489WDY7 AAA
IM-1 12489WDZ4 AA
IM-2 12489WEA8 A
IIM-2 12489WEE0 A
IIB-1 12489WEF7 BBB
C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates Series 2002-CB2
Series 2002-CB2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12489WEQ3 AAA
A-2 12489WER1 AAA
M-1 12489WET7 AAA
M-2 12489WEU4 BBB
B-1 12489WEV2 CCC
B-2 12489WEW0 CCC
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2005-HE2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 17307GST6 AAA
M-1 17307GSU3 AA
M-2 17307GSV1 A
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc.
Series 2005-SHL1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 17307GR42 AAA
M-1 17307GR67 AA
M-2 17307GR75 A
Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2003-SD2
Series 2003-SD2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 126671ZD1 AAA
A-2 126671ZE9 AAA
M-1 126671ZF6 AA
M-2 126671ZG4 BBB
Countrywide Home Loan Trust 2003-SD3
Series 2003-SD3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-2 126671M60 A
Countrywide Home LoanTrust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 1266712G0 AAA
A-2 1266712H8 AAA
M-1 1266712J4 AA+
CSFB Trust 2003-CF14
Series 2003-CF14
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 22541N7N3 AA
CSFB Trust 2004-CF1
Series 2004-CF1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 22541SBW7 AAA
M-1 22541SBX5 AA
CSFB Trust 2005-CF1
Series 2005-CF1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-3 225458M21 AAA
M-1 225458M54 AA
M-2 225458M62 A
B 225458M70 BBB
CSMC Trust 2006-CF1
Series 2006-CF1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 225470TY9 AAA
M-1 225470TZ6 AA
M-2 225470UA9 A
B-1 225470UB7 BBB+
B-2 225470UC5 BBB
B-3 225470UD3 BBB-
CSMC Trust 2006-CF2
Series 2006-CF2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 12638EAA2 AAA
M-1 12638EAE4 AA
M-2 12638EAF1 AA-
M-3 12638EAG9 A
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 126673FJ6 AAA
A-2 126673FK3 AAA
M-1 126673FL1 AA+
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2004-SD4
Series 2004-SD4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 126673SC7 AAA
A-2 126673SD5 AAA
M-1 126673SE3 AA+
CWABS Asset-Backed Notes Trust 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1-C 126673K35 AAA
A-2 126673G22 AAA
M-1 126673G30 AA+
EMC Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-B
Series 2004-B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 268668DW7 AAA
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-01
Series 2004-01
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 576436AA7 AAA
A-2 576436AG4 AAA
M-1 576436AB5 AA
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2004-02
Series 2004-02
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 576436AK5 AAA
M-1 576436AL3 AA
M-2 576436AM1 A
M-3 576436AN9 BBB
M-4 576436AP4 BBB-
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-01
Series 2005-01
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 576436BV0 AAA
MASTR Specialized Loan Trust 2005-02
Series 2005-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 576436CD9 AAA
M-1 576436CE7 AA+
M-2 576436CF4 AA
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD1
Series 2004-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 61744CBD7 AAA
M-1 61744CBE5 AA
M-2 61744CBF2 A
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD2
Series 2004-SD2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 61744CDZ6 AAA
M-1 61744CEA0 AA
M-2 61744CEB8 A
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-SD3
Series 2004-SD3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 61744CGN0 AAA
M-1 61744CGP5 AA
Quest Trust 2002-X1
Series 2002-X1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 748351AC7 AAA
RAAC Series 2005-RP1 Trust
Series 2005-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 76112BJP6 AAA
M-1 76112BJQ4 AA+
M-2 76112BJR2 A+
M-3 76112BJS0 A-
RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust
Series 2005-RP2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 76112BXN5 AAA
M-1 76112BXP0 AA
M-2 76112BXQ8 A
M-3 76112BXR6 BBB+
M-4 76112BXS4 BBB
Residential Loan Trust 2008-AH1
Series 2008-AH1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 761150AA9 AA
RFSC Series 2003-RP1 Trust
Series 2003-RP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 760985UH2 AA
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 2001-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 79548K6E3 AAA
M-2 79548K6F0 AA
M-3 79548K6G8 BBB
Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc.
Union Planters Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2003-UP1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 79549ASK6 AAA
M-1 79549ASM2 AAA
Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-CB1
Series 2003-CB1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF 79549ARU5 AAA
M-1 79549ARX9 AAA
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-HEL1
Series 2003-GEL1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M2 80382UAE3 A
M3 80382UAF0 BBB
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL2
Series 2004-GEL2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 80382UAJ2 AAA
A2 80382UAQ6 AAA
M1 80382UAK9 AA
M2 80382UAL7 A
M3 80382UAM5 BBB+
M4 80382UAN3 BBB
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-GEL3
Series 2004-GEL3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 80382UAR4 AAA
M1 80382UAS2 AA
M2 80382UAT0 A
SASCO Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2005-GEL1
Series 2005-GEL1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 86359BW80 AAA
M1 86359BW98 AA
M2 86359BX22 A
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1
Series 2004-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-3 81441PBR1 AAA
AV 81441PBS9 AAA
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-3 81441PBZ3 AAA
AV 81441PCA7 AAA
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1
Series 2005-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF-1 81441PCE9 AAA
AF-2 81441PCF6 AAA
AV 81441PCG4 AAA
M-1 81441PCH2 AA
M-2 81441PCJ8 A
B-1 81441PCK5 BBB
B-2 81441PCL3 BB
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2004-GEL1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 86359BMQ1 AAA
M1 86359BMR9 AA
M2 86359BMS7 A
M3 86359BMT5 BBB
M4 86359BMU2 BB
Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2005-RF4
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 86359DQB6 AAA
AIO 86359DQC4 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Series 2005-RF1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 86359DBW6 AAA
AIO 86359DBX4 AAA
Structured Asset Securities Corporation
Series 2005-RF5
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1-A 86359DRS8 AAA
1-AIO 86359DRT6 AAA
2-A 86359DRU3 AAA
B1 86359DRV1 AA
Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
Series 2008-RF1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
AF 86362DAA0 AAA
AI 86362DAB8 AAA
AO 86362DAC6 AAA
A 86362DAK8 AAA
B1 86362DAD4 AA
Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 897896AW6 AAA
A-2 897896AX4 AAA
M-1 897896AZ9 AA
M-2 897896BA3 A
M-3 897896BB1 BB
Wachovia Loan Trust 2005-SD1
Series 2005-SD1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 92977XAA1 AAA
M-1 92977XAD5 AA+
M-2 92977XAE3 AA
M-3 92977XAF0 A
B-1 92977XAB9 BBB+
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 299 Classes From 57 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 299
classes from 57 residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan collateral
issued between 2002 and 2004. S&P removed 11 of the lowered
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on 165 classes from 46 of the downgraded
transactions, as well as two addition transactions and removed 16
of them from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit support
for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous
ratings, given S&P's current projected losses in light of
increased delinquencies.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis. In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
its base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for an 'AAA' rating. For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of its base-case loss assumptions to maintain a
'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the reviewed
transactions. In addition, some classes may also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion), excess spread, and
bond insurance.
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes From Two Mid-State RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes from two Mid-State Trust residential mortgage-backed
securities transactions backed by U.S. subprime mortgage loan
collateral issued from 1995 to 2004. In addition, S&P affirmed
its ratings on nine classes from one of the downgraded
transactions and two additional Mid-State deals and removed one of
these ratings from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that current projected credit
support for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the
previous ratings due to increased delinquencies. In accordance
with S&P's rating criteria, the rating on class A from Mid-State
Trust IV reflects the higher of (i) the rating on the bond
insurer, Capital Markets Assurance Corp. (BB+/Watch Neg), and (ii)
Standard & Poor's Underlying Rating on the securities. The
current rating on class A from Mid-State Trust IV reflects the
rating of the SPUR.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in S&P's
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in S&P's analysis. In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of S&P's base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions. In addition, some classes also benefit from
overcollateralization (prior to its depletion), excess spread, and
bond insurance. The underlying pool of loans backing these
transactions consists of fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage
assets, including mortgage loans, building and installment sale
contracts, and promissory notes and related mortgages on
standardized, partially finished, detached single-family homes.
Rating Actions
Mid-State Trust IV
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 59549PAA6 BBB BBB+
Mid-State Trust VII
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A 595498AA4 BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Mid-State Trust X
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B 59549RAE4 BB BBB
Ratings Affirmed
Mid-State Capital Corporation 2004-1 Trust
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A 59560UAA9 AAA
M-1 59560UAB7 AA
M-2 59560UAC5 A-
B 59560UAD3 BBB
Mid-State Trust X
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 59549RAA2 AAA
A-2 59549RAB0 AAA
M-1 59549RAC8 AA
M-2 59549RAD6 A
* S&P Puts Ratings on 12,000 Classes on CreditWatch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on 12,000
classes of U.S. prime, subprime, and Alternative-A residential
mortgage-backed securities issued in 2005-2007 on CreditWatch with
negative implications. In addition, 222 ratings remain on
CreditWatch negative. The affected classes are from 1,809
transactions, have a total original par amount of approximately
$962.96 billion, and have a current aggregate principal balance of
roughly $537.90 billion. The breakdown by collateral type is:
Original Bal. Current Bal.
(Bil. $) (Bil. $)
------------- ------------
Subprime 350.77 175.61
Prime 243.99 180.20
Alt-A 368.20 182.09
Total 962.96 537.90
S&P's revised loss projections for the prime transactions also
reflect an increase in S&P's loss severity assumption for prime
collateral to 45%. In addition, the performance of residential
collateral supporting the affected transactions continues to
deteriorate, which has resulted in elevated defaults and losses
for all three asset types. The CreditWatch placements reflect
S&P's view of this poor performance, coupled with the increase in
its loss severity assumption for the prime transactions. S&P
expects to review these transactions and resolve the CreditWatch
placements over the next several months.
A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization provides credit support for the affected
transactions. The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime subprime, and Alt-A
mortgage loans secured by first and second liens on one- to four-
family residential properties.
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/
On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts. The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.
Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.
The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.
For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911. For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA. Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2010. All rights reserved. ISSN: 1520-9474.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers. Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.
The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Christopher
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*** End of Transmission ***