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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 4, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 183

                            Headlines



ACACIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ADIRONDACK 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
ALISAL WATER: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2007A Senior Bonds
AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches
ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes

ARCAP 2004-RR3: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2004-RR3 Certs.
ARTUS LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
AYRESOME CDO: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1a to 'Ca'
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on 15 Series 2004-5 Certs.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2000-2 Certs.

BEA CBO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'D'
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-PWR5 Notes
BUCKEYE TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 10 Classes of Bonds
CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes
CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes

CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Bonds
CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Bonds
CAPCO AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 1998-D7 Certs.

CAPITAL TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2003A Bonds to 'B3'
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class M-4 Notes to 'D'
CHILDREN'S TRUST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 11 Asset-Backed Bonds
CMBSPOKE 2006-I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
COLUMBIA TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes

CREDIT AND REPACKED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2005-3 Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-TFL2 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-C1 Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-C2 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-CK2 Certs.

CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1997-C1 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-TFL1 Certs.
CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Junks Rating on Class A Notes From 'B-'
CSFB HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 32 Tranches

CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Various Certificates
CW CAPITAL: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-2L to 'Ca'
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-CG3 Certs.
FAIRWAY LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

FIRST CMBS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
FMC REAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
FORD CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
GALLATIN FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
G-STAR 2002-1: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

G-STAR 2002-2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-1 Certificates
GFCM LLC: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Certs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-C2 Securities
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-C3 Certs.

GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-FL4 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Rating Action on 2002-C1 Certs.
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Two Tranches
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-GL II Certs.
GSR MORTGAGE: Fitch Junks Rating on Class 1-A-1 From 'AAA'

GUAM ECONOMIC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Three Bonds
HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-1 Notes
HARTWICK COLLEGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2002A Bonds to 'Ba2'
HELLER FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999 PH-1 Notes

ILLINOIS HEALTH: Fitch Downgrades Rating on 1999A Bonds to 'BB+'
IRWIN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 60 Tranches
JER CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of Certs.
JP MORGAN: Fitch Rates Various Series 2010-C1 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-FL2 Securities

JP MORGAN: Moody's Assigns Ratings on 2010-C1 Securities
JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Series 1999-C8 Certs.
JPMORGAN-CIBC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certs.
JPMORGAN COMMERCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on 1999-C7 Securities
JUPITER INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 2006-01 Notes

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-LLF C5 Certs.
LB COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class F to 'CC/RR3'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2002-C7 Certs.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2002-C4 Certificates
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2000-C3 Notes

LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Rates Class E Series 2010-2 Notes at 'BB'
LNR CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
LNR CFL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Keeps 'BB-' Rating
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-C1 Certificates

MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1997-C2 Certificates
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2005-CKI1 Certs.
MICHIGAN TOBACCO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-TOP13 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-XLF Certs.

MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-XLF Certs.
MEZZ CAP: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
NASSAU COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Bonds
NORTHERN TOBACCO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Five Bonds
MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-LIFE1 Notes

MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating son Seven 2007-XLF Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2005-XLF Certificates
MULBERRY STREET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1U to 'Ca'
MULBERRY STREET: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A-1B Notes to 'Ca'
MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'B1'

PNC MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series 2000-C1 Certs.
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $33.530 Mil. Certs. to B
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $33.146 Mil. Certs. to B
RICHARDSON HOSPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Various Bonds From 'BB+'
RED MOUNTAIN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1997-1 Certs.

RITE AID: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series 1999-1 Certificates
ROCKLAND TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2005B Bonds
SATURN VENTURES: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A-1 Senior Notes
SILICON VALLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Bonds
SIMSBURY CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes

STARWOOD HOTELS: Moody's Keeps Rating on Times Square Certs.
STRUCTURED ASSET: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1996-CFL Certs.
STUDENT LOAN: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
SUFFOLK TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
TEXAS STUDENT: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001A Bonds to 'Ca'

TIAA RE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Ten 2004-C15 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2006-C23 Certificates
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Ten 2005-C20 Certs.

* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 16 Classes of Credit Card ABS Deals
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 281 Bonds From 267 RMBS Deals to 'D'
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes on 12 TRUP CDO Transactions
* Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 731 Tranches From 202 RMBS Deals

* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes From Eight RE-REMIC Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Classes of Notes From Three CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Classes From Six CMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes From Six RMBS Deals



                            *********



ACACIA CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of two classes of notes issued by Acacia CDO 7, Limited.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$231,700,000 Class A Notes Due 2045 (current balance of
     $151,595,721), Downgraded to Ca; previously on January 30,
     2009 Downgraded to B1;

  -- US$28,100,000 Class B Notes Due 2045, Downgraded to C;
     previously on January 30, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Acacia CDO 7, Limited is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities originated between 2002 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  In this case, the
weighted average rating factor, as reported by the trustee, has
increased from 1031 in January 2009 to 1722 in June 2010.
Defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee, have also
increased from $18 million to $100 million in that period.
Additionally, approximately $47 million of RMBS within the
underlying portfolio are currently on review for possible
downgrade following on Moody's updated loss projections for these
securities announced earlier this year.  Moody's also explained
that the rating migration in this transaction of six notches
applicable to the Class A Notes, from B1 to C, was driven largely
by the decline in overcollateralization applicable to the Class A
Notes.  The current as reported by the trustee has fallen to
58.7%.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


ADIRONDACK 2005-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Adirondack 2005-1.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$267,500,000 Class A-1LT-a Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $120,269,078), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 26, 2009 Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$1,070,100,000 Class A-1LT-b Floating Rate Notes Due 2040
     (current balance of $774,115,890), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on March 26, 2009 Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$60,800,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2040 (current
     balance of $47,979,163), Downgraded to C; previously on March
     26, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Adirondack 2005-1i s a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities originated between 2000 and 2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  Defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, has also increased from
$94 million in March 2009 to $231 million in June 2010.  Moody's
noted that the transaction is negatively impacted by a large pay-
fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap where payments to the
hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of the excess spread in
the deal.  Principal proceeds are being used to meet the Issuer's
interest payment obligations with respect to the Class A and Class
B Notes.  Additionally, the ratings assigned to approximately
$390 million of RMBS within the underlying portfolio are currently
on review for possible downgrade following on Moody's updated loss
projections announced earlier this year for these types of RMBS.
Overcollateralization with respect to the Class A1 Notes has
declined to 82 percent and to 77.8% with respect to the Class A-2
Notes.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


ALISAL WATER: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2007A Senior Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its continuous surveillance effort, Fitch Ratings takes
these actions on Alisal Water Corporation:

  -- $7.9 million of outstanding 2007A senior secured taxable
     bonds affirmed at 'BB+';

  -- Issuer Default Rating affirmed at 'BB-'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

At this time, Fitch also withdraws its 'BB+' rating on Alco's 2009
senior secured parity taxable bonds because the bonds never sold.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The utility's financial metrics are relatively weak, although
     rate base increases should enhance margins and ultimately
     improve liquidity levels.

  -- The California regulatory environment is relatively
     predictable, with the utility achieving rate relief as
     needed.

  -- The customer base is limited and includes a narrow economic
     profile.

  -- Capital needs are manageable, which should keep leverage
     ratios at reasonable levels.

  -- The utility provides an essential service and water supplies
     are sufficient to meet long-term demands.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Changes in financial metrics.
  -- California regulatory environment.

Security:

The bonds are secured by a security interest in pledged
collateral, which consists of all tangible and intangible assets
owned by Alco.

Credit Summary:

At the end of calendar 2009 (Alco's fiscal year also ends
Dec. 31), Alco's cash and cash equivalents improved to $376,000
from just $71,000 the prior year.  However, liquidity remains weak
at just 32 days cash.  EBITDA covered long-term debt service by an
adequate 1.5 times for 2009, but other key financial metrics,
although improved from 2008, remain relatively weak.  FFO to debt
was under 7% while EBITDA to interest was 1.9x and FFO to interest
was under 2x.  Alco's financial projections anticipate more
favorable performance beginning in 2011 as a result of a current
and expected rate base filings.  Given Alco's limited financial
flexibility, maintenance of the ratings will depend on timely rate
relief to recover costs and generate adequate cash flows to fund
capital needs.

Debt-to-total-capital and debt-to-EBITDA ratios were relatively
high for the rating category at 88% and 7.7x in 2009,
respectively.  These levels have increased in recent years largely
as a result of issuance of the 2007A bonds.  Despite plans to
issue additional debt in the near-term, Alco plans to convert a
portion of its debt to equity, which ultimately should reduce
leverage ratios.

Alco provides water service to around 28,000 persons in the
eastern portion of the city of Salinas, California.  As with other
water providers, Alco's business profile benefits from a
monopolistic market position.  Water supplies are derived
exclusively from groundwater sources, with available supplies
sufficient to meet demands for the foreseeable future.


AMERICAN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 18 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 18
tranches and has upgraded the rating of 1 tranche from 3 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by American Home.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Cl. V-A-4-D issued by American Home Mortgage Investment Trust
2005-2 is wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated).  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2-2, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4-C, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-4-D, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 14, 2010
     Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Jan 21,
     2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. V-M-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-M-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-M-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 14, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
its rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed securities that
serve as underlying collateral for Anthracite 2005-HY2.  The
downgraded securities are from 11 transactions and total
$212.2 million (48.5% of the total asset balance).  The downgrades
also reflect real estate investment trust securities held as
collateral that has experienced negative rating actions
($12.9 million, 3%).

According to the May 20, 2010, trustee report, Anthracite 2005-HY2
was collateralized by 68 classes of CMBS ($390.9 million, 91.2%)
from 16 distinct transactions issued in 1998 through 2005.  The
collateral also includes seven REIT securities ($37.9 million,
8.8%).  Anthracite 2005-HY2 has exposure to these CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc's series 2005-2 (classes
  J through O; $36.5 million, 8.3%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc's series 2005-5 (classes
  J through O; $33.8 million, 7.7%); and

* Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-MCP1 (classes J through N and
  P; $33.3 million, 7.6%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed Anthracite 2005-HY2 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd.
      Commercial mortgage-related securities series 2005-HY2

                                Rating
                                ------
         Class            To               From
         -----            --               ----
         A                A                AA/Watch Neg
         B                BBB              AA/Watch Neg
         C-FL             BB               A-/Watch Neg
         C-FX             BB               A-/Watch Neg
         D-FL             B+               BBB/Watch Neg
         D-FX             B+               BBB/Watch Neg
         E                B                BBB-/Watch Neg
         F                CCC-             B+/Watch Neg


ARCAP 2004-RR3: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2004-RR3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc., a U.S.
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.
At the same time, S&P withdrew its rating on class X, an interest-
only class.

The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction following interest shortfalls to the transaction.
It also reflects S&P's analysis of the transaction following
the downgrade of four underlying CMBS certificates that
collateralize ARCAP 2004-RR3.  The downgraded underlying
certificates are from two transactions and total $22.1 million
(4.9% of the total asset balance).  S&P also revised S&P's
credit estimates on a portion of the CMBS collateral not rated
by Standard & Poor's ($134.2 million, 30%).  S&P lowered the
majority of the credit estimates.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes M and N to 'D' due to interest
shortfalls that S&P expects will continue for the foreseeable
future.  The classes have experienced interest shortfalls for at
least the past nine months.  Cumulative interest shortfalls to the
transaction total $1.9 million, according to the June 21, 2010,
trustee report.  The interest shortfalls resulted from shortfalls
on the underlying CMBS collateral.  The interest shortfalls
primarily reflect the master servicer's recovery of prior
advances, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions, servicers'
nonrecoverability determinations for advances, and special
servicing fees.  If the liquidity interruptions to ARCAP 2004-RR3
continue, S&P will evaluate the interruptions and may take further
rating actions as S&P determine appropriate.

The class X certificate is an interest-only certificate with a
balance that references the aggregate certificate balances of the
principal and interest certificates.  S&P withdrew its rating on
class X, as S&P downgraded all of the interest and principal
classes of certificates from this transaction below
'AA-' in accordance with its criteria, "Global Methodology For
Rating Interest-Only Securities."

According to the June 21, 2010, trustee report, ARCAP 2004-RR3 was
collateralized by 52 CMBS classes ($447.6 million, 100%) from 17
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2004.  ARCAP 2004-
RR3 has exposure to these CMBS transactions that Standard & Poor's
has downgraded:

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2001-CIBC2
  (classes H, L, and M; $16.8 million, 3.8%); and

* Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2003-KEY1 (class J; $5.2 million,
  1.2%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCAP 2004-RR3 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and withdrawn ratings.

                         Ratings Lowered

                ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                    Class    To           From
                    -----    --           ----
                    A-2      BBB+         AA-
                    B        BBB-         A-
                    C        BB           BBB
                    D        BB-          BBB
                    E        B            BBB-
                    F        B-           BB+
                    G        CCC+         BB+
                    H        CCC          BB-
                    J        CCC-         B+
                    K        CCC-         B
                    L        CCC-         B-
                    M        D            CCC
                    N        D            CCC-

                         Rating Withdrawn

                ARCap 2004-RR3 Resecuritization Inc.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                    Class    To           From
                    -----    --           ----
                    X        NR           AAA

                          NR - Not rated.


ARTUS LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Artus Loan Fund 2007-I, Ltd.:

  -- US$780,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
     (current outstanding balance of $598,962,441), Upgraded to
     Aa2; previously on August 26, 2009 Downgraded to A1;

  -- US$42,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to A2; previously on August 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa1;

  -- US$52,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to Baa3; previously on August 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to B1; previously on August 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from significant delevering of the Class A-1L notes
since the last rating action, which resulted in increases in the
overcollateralization ratios of the notes.  In addition, the
transaction has benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio.

Since the last rating actions on August 26, 2009, the Class A-1L
notes have been paid down by approximately $164 million, or
roughly 22% of their outstanding balance reported in July 2009.  A
substantial proportion of this paydown is attributable to
principal prepayments on the underlying loans and collateral sales
by the manager.  Based on the latest trustee report dated June 3,
2010, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class B-1L, and Class B-2L
overcollateralization ratios increased to 126.43%, 116.94%,
111.32%, and 104.66%, respectively, compared to July 2009 levels
of 118.86%, 111.65%, 107.27%, and 98.74%, respectively.  Moody's
expects delevering of the Class A-1L notes to continue as a result
of the end of the deal's reinvestment period in May 2009.

Moody's also observed an improvement in the average credit rating
(as measured by the weighted average rating factor) of the
portfolio.  In particular, the weighted average rating factor in
June 2010 is reported to be 3053 compared to 3232 in July 2009.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Artus Loan Fund 2007-I, Ltd, issued in November 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


AYRESOME CDO: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1a to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Ayresome CDO I, Limited.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$206,925,000 Class A-1a Notes Due 2045 (current balance of
     $114,196,752), Downgraded to Ca; previously on April 22, 2009
     Downgraded to B2.

Ayresome CDO I, Limited, is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio that consists primarily of
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2002-
2007.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  Defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, has increased from
$38 million in April 2009 to $83 million in May 2010.  Moody's
noted that the transaction is negatively impacted by a large pay-
fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap where payments to the
hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of the excess spread in
the deal.  Principal proceeds were used to meet the Issuer's
payment obligations with respect to interest payable on the Class
A Notes.  Additionally, the ratings of approximately $64 million
of RMBS within the underlying portfolio are currently on review
for possible downgrade following on Moody's updated loss
projections announced earlier this year with respect to certain
types of RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13 for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  - Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Rating on 15 Series 2004-5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of 15 classes and
downgraded three classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage
Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-
5.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged loans, increased credit quality dispersion and
refinance risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  Four loans, representing 2% of the pool,
mature within the next six months and a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed DSCR remaining
within acceptable ranges.  The decline in loan concentration, as
measured by the Herfindahl (Index), has been mitigated by
increased credit support due to loan payoffs and amortization.
The pool's balance has declined by 28% since last review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial backed securities transactions.

As of the May10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to
$915.6 million from $1.36 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 88 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 45% of the pool.  Currently, there is one loan,
representing 15% of the pool, with an investment grade underlying
rating.  The three additional loans that had underlying ratings at
last review have all paid off.  Five loans, representing 8% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 3% of the pool.

Twenty loans, representing 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC; formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan was liquidated from the pool resulting in an aggregate
loss of approximately $1.0 million (1% loss severity).  Five
loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Huntington
Apartment ($8.5 million -- 1% of the pool), which is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 212-unit multi-family property
located in Cincinnati, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2009 for maturity default.  The remaining
four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of self
storage, retail and multifamily properties.  Moody's estimates an
aggregate $9.4 million loss for these specially serviced loans
(40% expected loss on average).  The special servicer has
recognized a cumulative $4.3 million appraisal reduction for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on eight poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool.  Moody's estimates a
$15.2 million aggregate loss for these troubled loans (overall 38%
expected loss based on a weighted average 75% default
probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and full-year 2009
operating results for 92% and 72% of the pool, respectively, of
the non-defeased pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 88% compared to 95%
at last review.  Although the pool's overall leverage has
declined, credit quality dispersion has increased.  Based on
Moody's analysis, 22% of the conduit pool has an LTV in excess of
100% compared to 18% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.44X and 1.19X, respectively, compared to
1.38X and 1.06X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 33 compared to 56 at
last review.  The decline in Herf has been mitigated by increased
credit support.  The pool balance has declined by 28% since
Moody's last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Bank of America Center
Loan ($137.0 million -- 15% of the pool), which represents a 33%
participation interest in a $417.0 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by three office buildings totaling 1.8 million
square feet (SF) located in downtown San Francisco, California.
The largest tenants are Bank of America (21% of the net rentable
area; lease expiration in September 2015), Kirkland and Ellis (7%
of the NRA; lease expiration in September 2016) and Goldman Sachs
(6% of the NRA; lease expiration in August 2010).  The complex was
90% leased as of March 2010 compared to 97% at last review.
Property performance has declined since last review due to lower
occupancy declining rents and increased expenses.  In addition,
Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow because the
property's in-place rents are approximately 25% above market
rates.  The loan is full term interest-only and matures in
September 2011.  Vornado Realty is the sponsor.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.36X at last review.

The three largest performing conduit loans represent 16% of the
pool.  The largest loan is the Cheltenham Square Mall Loan
($54.4 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a the
borrower's interest in a 639,406 SF anchored mall (423,440 SF of
collateral) located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The mall is
shadow anchored by Home Depot.  The collateral's largest tenants
are Target (32% of the NRA; lease expiration in January 2030);
Burlington Coat Factory (19% of the NRA; lease expiration in
February 2012) and Shop Rite (17% of the NRA: lease expiration in
March 2015).  As of March 2010, the property was 96% leased
compared to 85% at the end of 2009 and 98% at last review.  The
occupancy fluctuation was due to the departure of Seaman's and
Value City, which were recently replaced by DSW, American
Signature and Conway.  The loan's initial five year interest-only
period has expired and the loan is amortizing on a 25-year
schedule.  Thor Equities is the sponsor.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 113% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.84X
at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the ICG Portfolio
($48.7 million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by two office
properties located in Washington DC.  The two buildings total
259,184 SF.  The property is also encumbered with a $3.0 million
B-note.  The largest tenants are Fannie Mae (34% of the NRA; lease
expiration in September 2013); Georgetown University (19% of the
NRA; lease expiration in October 2018) and Medstar (7% of the NRA;
lease expiration in October 2018).  As of March 2010, the
buildings were 80% leased compared to 71% at the end of 2009 and
95% at last review.  Leasing has fluctuated due to tenants
downsizing and upsizing.  Fannie Mae recently increased its share
of the NRA to 87,137 SF from 62,48 SF at securitization while
Medstar downsized to 19,078 SF from 66,873 SF at securitization.
The loan has benefitted from 3% of principal amortization since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 0.92X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Sun Communities Portfolio
Loan ($38.6 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of five manufactured housing communities containing a
total of 1,646 pads.  As of December 2009, the portfolio was 71%
leased, essentially the same as at last review.  The loan has
benefitted from 6% principal amortization since last review.  Sun
Communities is the sponsor.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94%
and 1.0X , respectively, compared to 98% and 0.95X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $4,982,297, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-3, $305,377,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-4, $188,667,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-AB, $39,487,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-1A, $106,624,344, affirmed at Aaa; previously
     assigned Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class A-J, $90,241,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 11/29/2004

  -- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class B, $39,161,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously assigned
     Aa2 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class C, $13,621,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously assigned
     Aa3 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class D, $22,135,000, affirmed at A2; previously assigned A2
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class E, $11,919,000, affirmed at A3; previously assigned A3
     on 11/29/2004

  -- Class F, $17,026,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously assigned
     Baa1 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class G, $11,919,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously assigned
     Baa2 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class H, $22,134,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned
     Baa3 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class J, $6,811,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1; previously
     assigned Ba1 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class K, $6,811,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba2; previously
     assigned Ba2 on 11/29/2004

  -- Class L, $3,405,000, downgrade to Caa2 from Ba3; previously
     assigned Ba3 on 11/29/2004


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2000-2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes,
confirmed two and downgraded eight classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-2.  The downgrades are due to higher
expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated losses
from loans in special servicing and concerns about loans
approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Although the pool
has paid down significantly since Moody's last review, the
exposure to specially serviced loans has also increased, from 2%
to 53% of the pool.  Additionally, a large portion of the pool,
83%, has or is scheduled to mature within the next six months.

The affirmations are due to significant increased credit
subordination resulting from loan payoffs and amortization and key
rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed ten classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on March 31, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 72% to
$246.6 million from $889.0 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 34 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 59% of the pool.  Five loans, representing 18% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Ten loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $18.1 million realized loss (48% loss
severity on average).  Fifteen loans, representing 53% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan, which is also the largest loan in the pool, is the
111 W.  Jackson Loan ($23.7 million - 9.6%), which is secured by a
540,000 square foot Class B office building located in the
downtown Chicago, Illinois.  Property performance has deteriorated
since securitization due to the loss of several large tenants that
have not been replaced.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in December 2009 due to imminent default and matured in
March 2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the SCI Portfolio -
1401 Elm St.  Loan ($20.6 million -- 8.3% of the pool), which is
secured by 428,884 square feet condominium unit in a 1.3 million
square foot office property located in downtown Dallas, Texas.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in December 2008
after the Bank of America, which leased the entire building,
vacated.  The property is 100% vacant and became real estate owned
(REO) in April 2009.  The servicer has recognized a $16.3 million
appraisal reduction for this loan.  The remaining 13 specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of retail, multifamily, office
and self storage properties.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$50.1 million loss for all specially serviced loans (39% expected
loss on average).  The servicer has recognized an aggregate
$36.9 million appraisal reduction for nine of the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on one poorly
performing watchlisted loan representing approximately 6% of the
pool.  Moody's has estimated a $2.2 million expected loss on this
loan (16% severity based on a 70% probability of default and a 23%
loss given default).

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes J through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.9 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full or partial year 2009 operating
results for 82% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV ratio,
excluding the specially serviced and troubled loans, is 66%,
compared to 83% at Moody's prior full review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.59X and 1.87X, respectively, compared to
1.32X and 1.42X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 15
compared to 38 at last full review.

The top three conduit loans represent 19% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the West*Quest Office Buildings Loan
($19.2 million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by two Class
A office buildings (a total of 315,350 square feet) located in
Linthicum, Maryland.  The property has been fully occupied since
securitization by a single tenant, Northrop Grumman, with a lease
that extends to September 2017.  The loan matures in September
2010 and has amortized 4% since last review.  Although property
performance has been stable since last review, Moody's valuation
reflects current market conditions and the single tenant exposure.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 47% and 2.29X, respectively,
compared to 45% and 2.38X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Silverado Apartments Loan
($13.7 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 440
unit multifamily property located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  Property
performance has declined since last review due to both decreased
occupancy as well as increased operating expenses.  The loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist due low DSCR.  The
decline in performance has been partially offset by principal
amortization.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review.
Moody's has determined that there is a high probability that this
loan may default prior to maturity in August 2010.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to
84% and 1.22X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Gateway Village Shopping
Center Loan ($7.1 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 126,285 square foot retail center in Glendale, Arizona.  The
loan is on the watchlist due to an anticipated repayment date in
May 2010.  Property performance has declined since last review due
to increased vacancy.  As of April 2010, the property was 83%
leased compared to 99% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 79% and 1.44X, respectively, compared to 70% and 1.55X at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $49,845,185, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     at Aaa on 10/27/2000

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned at
     Aaa on 10/27/2000

  -- Class B, $37,816,366, affirmed at Aaa, previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 8/02/2006

  -- Class C, $24,469,413, affirmed at Aaa, previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa3 on 8/02/2006

  -- Class D, $17,795,938, confirmed at Aaa, previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class E, $8,897,968, confirmed at Aaa, previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class F, $11,122,461, downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class G, $17,795,937, downgraded to A3 from A1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class H, $11,122,460, downgraded to B1 from Baa1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class K, $5,561,230, downgraded to C from Ba2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class L, $6,673,476, downgraded to C from Ba3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class M, $2,224,492, downgraded to C from B1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class N, $6,673,477, downgraded to C from B2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class O, $4,448,984, downgraded to C from B3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10


BEA CBO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
class A-2A and A-2B notes issued by BEA CBO 1998-1 Ltd., a cash
flow corporate high-yield collateralized bond obligation, to 'D'.

The downgrades reflect the fact that the outstanding notes were
not paid in full on the transaction's June 15, 2010, maturity
date.

                          Ratings Lowered

                        BEA CBO 1998-1 Ltd.

                                 Rating
                                 ------
                   Class     To          From
                   -----     --          ----
                   A-2A      D           CC
                   A-2B      D           CC


BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2004-PWR5 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings to
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR5.
Rating actions are listed at the end of this release.

The affirmations are to due sufficient credit enhancement to
offset Fitch expected losses following Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses and expected losses associated with
specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses of approximately
1.0% of the remaining pool balance, approximately $10.4 million,
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.

There are currently two loans in special servicing.  The largest
(4.7%) transferred due to a maturity default.  The loan has been
extended until September 2011 and will be transferred back to the
master servicer.  The other specially serviced loan (0.57%) is
secured by a 51,000 square foot retail center located in Garden
City, NY.  The loan transferred to the special servicer due to
imminent default in February 2009.  The center lost a second major
tenant in December 2008 which reduced the occupancy to 26%.  A
recent appraisal indicates losses.

As of the April distribution date, the pool has paid down 15.5% to
$1.04 billion from $1.23 billion at issuance and 10 loans (19%)
have defeased.

The top 10 non-defeased loans represent 32.6% of the pool.  The
loans have generally experienced stable performance since
issuance.  None of the loans have reported debt service coverage
ratios below 1.47 times.  The largest loan in the pool is 2941
Fairview Park Drive which is collateralized by a 353,000 sf office
building in Falls Church, VA.  The servicer reported occupancy and
debt service coverage ratio as of year end 2009, the most recent
available, were 100% and 1.47x, respectively.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted, property specific market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Twenty-nine loans did not pay off at
maturity with two loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's
stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings to these classes, as
indicated:

  -- $73.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $134 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $100 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $579.1 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.3 million class B at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class C at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20 million class D at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13 million class E at 'A'/LS4; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15.4 million class F at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $9.3 million class G at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $18.5 million class H at 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.6 million class J at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class K at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $6.2 million class L at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class M at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $4.6 million class N at 'B/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $3.1 million class P at 'CCC/RR1'.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the $11.6 million
class Q certificates.


BUCKEYE TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 10 Classes of Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 10 and downgrades nine classes of tobacco
settlement asset-backed bonds from Buckeye Tobacco Settlement
Financing Authority, 2007 (Ohio).

Fitch affirms these ratings:

Senior Series 2007A-1 Senior Current Interest Serial Bonds

  -- $14,270,000 due June 1, 2011 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8,075,000 due June 1, 2011 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4,480,000 due June 1, 2012 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $15,815,000 due June 1, 2012 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12,230,000 due June 1, 2013 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $23,995,000 due June 1, 2014 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,640,000 due June 1, 2015 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $35,000,000 due June 1, 2016 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $38,995,000 due June 1, 2017 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades these ratings:

Senior Series 2007A-2 Senior Current Interest Turbo Term Bonds

  -- $200,000,000 due June 1, 2024 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $949,530,000 due June 1, 2024 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $687,600,000 due June 1, 2030 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $505,200,000 due June 1, 2034 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $750,000,000 due June 1, 2047 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $1,383,715,000 due June 1, 2047 to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative.

Senior Series 2007A-3 Senior Convertible Capital Appreciation
Turbo Term Bonds

  -- $274,751,138 due June 1, 2037 to 'BB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative.

First Subordinate Series 2007B Capital Appreciation Turbo Term
Bonds

  -- $191,265,480 due June 1, 2047 to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative.

Second Subordinate Series 2007C Capital Appreciation Turbo Term
Bonds

  -- $128,182,923 due June 1, 2052 to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch affirms and revises the Outlook for this rating:

Senior Series 2007A-2 Senior Current Interest Turbo Term Bonds

  -- $250,000,000 due June 1, 2042 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009, and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked ratings of the serial bonds suggested by the
model are 'A+' or higher, the bonds are being affirmed at the cap
rating of 'BBB+'.  The 2007-A2 bonds due June 1, 2024 are being
affirmed at a level consistent with the model output at 'BBB+'.
The 2007-A2 bonds due June 1, 2024, June 1, 2030, June 1, 2034,
and June 1, 2047, are being downgraded to 'BBB-'.  The 2007A-3 are
being downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB', and the 2007B and 2007C are
both being downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; however, the model
output for these bonds corresponds to ratings one notch lower than
the downgraded ratings, and they may be downgraded depending on
the amount of the 2011 MSA payment received.  The 2007-A2 bond due
June 1, 2042, is being affirmed at 'BBB+' which is a level
consistent with the model output.  The 2007A-3 is being downgraded
to 'BB+' from 'BBB'.  The 2007B and 2007C are both being
downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB-'.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and revises Rating Outlooks on seven classes
from California County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Los Angeles
County Tobacco Asset Securitization Authority) series 2006:

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds 2006A senior convertible
capital appreciation turbo term bonds:

  -- $69,743,134 due June 1, 2021 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $53,944,662 due June 1, 2028 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $72,654,379 due June 1, 2036 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $62,180,171 due June 1, 2041 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- $84,524,254 due June 1, 2046 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable.

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds capital appreciation bonds:

  -- 2006B at 'BBB'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;
  -- 2006C at 'BB+'; Outlook to Negative from Positive.

The affirmations are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept.  30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

The 2021 convertible bond and 2006C CAB are being affirmed at
'BBB+' and 'BB+', respectively, which is at a level consistent
with the model output.  The 2028 convertible, 2036 convertible,
2041 convertible, 2046 convertible, and 2006B CAB are all being
affirmed at their current ratings; however, the model output
corresponds to a rating one notch lower than the affirmed rating
for each bond and the rating may be lowered depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

The Outlook for all of the bonds is revised to Negative,
reflecting Fitch's concern that cash flow will continue to come
under stress.


CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms seven classes from California County Tobacco
Securitization Agency (Golden Gate Funding Corporation) series
2007, and revised Outlooks:

  -- $8,830,000 series 2007A, due May 15, 2021 at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $9,280,000 series 2007A, due May 15, 2036 at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $17,275,000 series 2007A, due May 15, 2047 at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds senior convertible capital
appreciation turbo term bonds:

  -- $6,123,570 series 2007B, due May 15, 2028 at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds subordinate turbo capital
appreciation bonds:

  -- $2,288,202 series 2007C, due May 15, 2057 at 'BBB'; Outlook
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $2,187,675 series 2007D, due May 15, 2057 at 'BBB-'; Outlook
     to Negative from Positive;

  -- $1,928,680 series 2007E, due May 15, 2057 at 'BB+'; Outlook
     to Negative from Positive.

The affirmations are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009, and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) payment percent change the trust would
be able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal
final date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the
MSA payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the 2007A, due May 15, 2021 turbo
bond suggested by the model is 'A-', the bond is being affirmed at
the cap rating of 'BBB+'.  The 2007A, due May 15, 2036, 2007A, due
May 15, 2047, 2007B, 2007C, and 2007D are all being affirmed at a
level consistent with the model output.  The 2007 E capital
appreciation bond is being affirmed at 'BB+'; however, the model
output for this bond corresponds to a rating one notch lower than
the current rating and it may be downgraded depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment received.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms eight and upgrades one class from California
County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Alameda County Tobacco Asset
Securitization Authority) series 2002 and 2006:

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds current interest serial
bonds:

  -- $3,130,000 due June 1, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $2,905,000 due June 1, 2012 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable.

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds current interest turbo term
bonds:

  -- $24,290,000 due June 1, 2019 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $51,485,000 due June 1, 2029 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $45,170,000 due June 1, 2035 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $76,250,000 due June 1, 2042 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds capital appreciation bonds:

  -- 2006A affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative from Positive;

  -- 2006B downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook to Negative from
     Positive.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept.  30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) payment percent change the trust would
be able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal
final date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the
MSA payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked ratings of the serial and 2019, 2029, and
2035 turbo bonds suggested by the model are 'A-' or higher, the
bonds are being affirmed at the cap rating of 'BBB+'.  The 2042
turbo bond and 200A CAB are being affirmed at a level consistent
with the model output at 'BBB+' and 'BBB-', respectively.  The
2006B CAB is being downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+', however the
model output corresponds to a rating one notch lower than 'BB+'
and the rating may be lowered depending on the amount of the 2011
MSA payment.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes and downgraded three
classes of tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds from California
County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Stanislaus County Tobacco
Asset Securitization Authority) series 2002 and 2006, and revised
a Rating Outlook as indicated below:

  -- $24,490,000 current interest turbo term bonds due June 1,
     2033 at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,725,000 current interest turbo term bonds due June 1,
     2043 at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- 2006A capital appreciation bonds downgraded to 'BB-' from
     'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- 2006B capital appreciation bonds downgraded to 'B+' from
     'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- 2006C capital appreciation bonds downgraded to 'B+' from
     'BB'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report,
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level
of stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement payment
percent change the trust would be able to sustain and still pay
the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case 'B'
corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by the
trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual MSA
payment decline of between 0.3% and 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked ratings of the 2033 turbo bond suggested by
the model is 'A-', Fitch is affirming the bond at the cap rating
of 'BBB+'.  The 'BBB+' affirmation on the 2043 turbo bond is
consistent with the model output.  Despite the downgrades to the
2006A CAB, 2006B CAB, and 2006C CAB bonds, the model output
corresponds to a rating of one notch lower than the downgraded
rating for each bond, indicating that the ratings may be
downgraded depending on the amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  The Negative
Outlooks on the other bonds reflect Fitch's concern that cash flow
will continue to come under stress.


CALIFORNIA COUNTY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of tobacco settlement
asset-backed bonds capital appreciation bonds from California
County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Fresno County Tobacco Asset
Securitization Authority) series 2006, and revised Rating Outlooks
as indicated below:

  -- 2046A to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2046B to 'B+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;
  -- 2055C to 'B+' from 'BB'; Outlook to Negative from Stable.

The downgrades are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report, 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level of
stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
payment percent change the trust would be able to sustain and
still pay the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case
'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by
the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual
MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

The downgrades reflect the model output for these bonds, which
corresponds to ratings one notch lower than the current ratings
and they may be downgraded depending on the amount of the 2011 MSA
payment received.

The Negative Outlook on all bonds reflects Fitch's concern that
cash flow will continue to come under stress for bonds with model
output of 'BBB+' or lower.


CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions, including affirming 20 and
downgrading three classes from California Statewide Financing
Authority Series 2002 and 2006, and revising Ratings Outlooks as
indicated:

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds current interest serial
bonds:

  -- $785,000 due June 1, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $775,000 due June 1, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,040,000 due June 1, 2012 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $1,030,000 due June 1, 2012 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $1,020,000 due June 1, 2013 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $1,010,000 due June 1, 2013 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $955,000 due June 1, 2014 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $945,000 due June 1, 2014 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $935,000 due June 1, 2015 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $925,000 due June 1, 2015 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $930,000 due June 1, 2016 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $920,000 due June 1, 2016 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $930,000 due June 1, 2017 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $920,000 due June 1, 2017 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds current interest turbo term
bonds:

  -- $28,045,000 due June 1, 2029 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $27,765,000 due June 1, 2029 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $27,540,000 due June 1, 2037 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $27,265,000 due June 1, 2037 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $33,095,000 due June 1, 2043 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $32,765,000 due June 1, 2043 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds capital appreciation bonds:

  -- 2006A downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative
     from Stable;

  -- 2006B downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- 2006C downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept.  30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the serial bonds suggested by the
model are 'A' or higher, the bonds are being affirmed at the cap
rating of 'BBB+'.  The turbo bonds are being affirmed at a level
consistent with the model output at 'BBB+'.  The 2006A CAB, 2006B
CAB and 2006C CAB are being downgraded to 'BB+', 'BB', and 'B+',
respectively; however, the model output corresponds to a rating
one notch lower than the downgraded rating for each bond,
indicating that the ratings may be lowered depending on the amount
of the 2011 MSA payment.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


CAPCO AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 1998-D7 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to
several classes of CAPCO America Securitization Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-D7.  Fitch has
also assigned Loss Severity ratings and Recovery Ratings to
numerous classes.

The downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets.  Fitch expects losses of 64.5% of the
remaining transaction balance, or $45.4 million, from loans in
special servicing.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 94.4% to $70.4 million from $1.2 billion at
issuance.

Five (78.5%) of the remaining nine loans are in special serving,
including the largest loan remaining in the pool (60%).  One loan
is delinquent, one is in foreclosure, and three are real estate
owned.

The largest specially serviced asset (60%) is a 371,652 square
foot mall located in Charlotte, NC.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2008 and became REO in September 2009.
The mall's last anchor tenant, Burlington Coat Factory, vacated in
March 2010 and the mall is set to close June 30, 2010.  Given the
closure of the mall, the remaining collateral has significantly
less value than at issuance.  Fitch expects significant losses
once the land is sold.

The second largest specially serviced asset (8%) is a 364,696 sf
industrial property in Baltimore, MD.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2004 and has been REO since September
2005.  The special servicer is currently under contract for the
sale of the property, and losses are expected.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially serviced loans,
none incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned RRs as indicated:

  -- $28 million class B-2 to 'CC/RR4' from 'BBB+';
  -- $15.6 million class B-3 to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $24.8 million class B-4 to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR5'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and removed this class from Rating
Watch Negative and assigned an Outlook and LS rating as indicated:

  -- $2 million class B-1 at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 are paid in full.  Classes
B-5, B-6, and B-6H have been liquidated.  In addition, Fitch
withdraws the rating of the interest only class PS-1.


CAPITAL TRUST: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2003A Bonds to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B3 the B2 rating on
the Senior Series 2003A and to Caa2 from Caa1 the Subordinate
Series 2003C rating on the Capital Trust Agency's Multifamily
Housing Revenue Bonds (American Opportunities for Housing - Golf
Villas, Rivermill and Village Square Apartments).  This rating
action affects $14,335,000 of Senior Bonds and $950,000 of
Subordinate Bonds outstanding.  The rating outlook on the bonds
remains negative.

Along with this transaction, the issuer also issued Senior Series
2003B bonds which have matured and Junior Subordinated Series
2003D bonds which are not rated by Moody's.

Legal Security: The bonds are secured by the revenues and
mortgages from three cross-collateralized properties -- Golf
Villas, Rivermill and Village Square Apartments, as well as funds
and investments pledged to the trustee pursuant to the indenture
as security for the bonds.  The Series A and B bonds have a first
lien on all program funds and are paid first in the monthly flow
of funds.  The Subordinate Series C bonds are to be paid before
the Junior Subordinate Series D bonds.  A payment default on the
Series C Subordinate and Series D Junior Subordinate bonds can
only trigger a default if the Series A and B bonds are retired
first.  Excess funds can only be released annually from the
indenture if a 1.40 times debt service coverage ratio is met for
the Series A and B Senior bonds, 1.30 times for the Series C
Subordinate bonds and 1.10 for the Series D Junior Subordinate
bonds.  The debt service reserve fund is set at maximum annual
debt service for the Series A and B bonds to provide ample
coverage in the event of liquidity difficulties.

Interest Rate Derivatives: None

                             Strengths

* The debt service reserves for the Series A and C bonds remain
  filled to the required levels at $1,040,431 and $81,912
  respectively.

* To date, the American Opportunity for Housing has shown the
  willingness to contribute financially to the projects in order
  to ensure timely payment of debt service in full.

                            Challenges

* All three projects have had difficulty maintaining occupancy due
  to significant competition within their real estate sub markets.
  The Golf Villas, Rivermill and Village Square projects reported
  physical occupancy of 71%, 82% and 87% respectively as of
  February 2009.

* Revenues available to pay debt service generated from the
  projects continue to decrease.  Audited financial statements
  show debt service coverage of 0.77x for the senior bonds and
  0.72x for the subordinate bonds for the year ending December 31,
  2009.  As a result, American Opportunity for Housing chose to
  provide the projects with financial assistance for their debt
  service payments.  Given the continued poor performance of the
  projects, taps to the debt service reserves may be imminent if
  the owner does not continue its financial support.

* The debt service reserve funds for the project are invested with
  MBIA, which has a senior unsecured rating of Ba1.

                       Recent Developments

The property management for the projects has changed from the Lynd
Company to United Apartment Group.

                             Outlook

The outlook on the bonds has been remains negative, as Moody's
believes the declines in project occupancy rates and poor
financial performance may continue over the near to medium term.

                 What could change the rating -- UP

Sustained, improved physical and economic occupancy rates and
financial performance along with a stabilization of the local real
estate market.

                What could change the rating -- DOWN

Tapping of the debt service reserves.

The last rating action with respect to Capital Trust Agency's
Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds (American Opportunities for
Housing - Golf Villas, Rivermill and Village Square Apartments)
was on May 15, 2009 when the Senior Series 2003A rating was
downgraded to B2 the Subordinate Series 2003C rating was
downgraded to Caa1.  The rating was subsequently recalibrated to
B2 and Caa1 on May 7, 2010.


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class M-4 Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
M-4 commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from CBA
Commercial Assets 2005-1 to 'D' from 'CCC-'.

The downgrade of the class M-4 certificate reflects a $395,734
principal loss to the outstanding principal balance of the
security due to the liquidation of three assets.  The remaining
principal balance of the certificate was $3,364,265 as of the
June 25, 2010, remittance report.

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 247 loans and nine real estate owned assets with an
aggregate trust balance of $90.0 million, down from 572 loans
totaling $214.9 million at issuance.  There are currently 46 loans
totaling $14.3 million (15.9%) with the special servicer.  Nine of
the assets in the pool are REO (1.9%), 24 are in foreclosure
(8.7%), 34 are 90-plus-days delinquent (11.7%), six are 60-plus-
days delinquent (2.1%), and 11 are 30-plus-days delinquent (3.1%).
To date, the trust has experienced losses on 59 loans.  The total
losses to the trust are $17.1 million.

                          Rating Lowered

                   CBA Commercial Assets 2005-1
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-1

                  Rating
                  ------
    Class       To          From             Credit enhancement
    -----       --          ----             ------------------
    M-4         D           CCC-                            N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


CHILDREN'S TRUST: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 11 Asset-Backed Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 11 and downgrades one class from Children's
Trust Fund Tobacco Settlement (Puerto Rico) asset-backed bonds
series 2002, 2005 and 2008:

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds current interest serial
bonds

  -- $4,000,000 due May 15, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $8,135,000 due May 15, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $13,805,000 due May 15, 2012 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $15,505,000 due May 15, 2013 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $17,265,000 due May 15, 2014 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable.

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds current interest turbo term
bonds

  -- $471,105,000 due May 15, 2033 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $310,380,000 due May 15, 2039 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $296,255,000 due May 15, 2043 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable.

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds capital appreciation bonds

  -- 2005A affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- 2005B affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook to Negative from Positive;

  -- 2008A downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- 2008B affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook to Negative from Stable.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009, and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the serial bonds suggested by the
model are 'A-' or higher, the bonds are being affirmed at the cap
rating of 'BBB+'.  The 2033, 2039 and 2043 turbo bonds are being
affirmed at a level consistent with the model output at 'BBB+'.
The 2005A, 2005B, and 2008B capital appreciation bond are also
being affirmed at 'BBB', 'BBB-', and 'B+', respectively; however,
the model output for these bonds corresponds to ratings one notch
lower than the current ratings and they may be downgraded
depending on the amount of the 2011 MSA payment received.  The
2008A CAB is being downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'.  As with the
other CABs, the model output corresponds to a rating one notch
lower than 'B+' and the rating may be lowered depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


CMBSPOKE 2006-I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded three classes of Notes issued
by CMBSpoke 2006-I Segregated Portfolio due to deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations as evidenced by a deterioration in the weighted
average rating factor since last review.  The rating action, which
concludes Moody's review, is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

CMBspoke 2006-I is a synthetic CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps referencing commercial mortgage
backed securities debt (100% of the pool balance).  All of the
CMBS reference obligations were securitized between 2002 and 2006.
As of the April 23, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate par amount
of reference obligations is $3.32 billion, compared to
$3.33 billion at securitization; the aggregate issued Note balance
is $100 million, the same as that at securitization.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 38 compared to 6 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa1 (86.6% compared to 100% at last review), and A1-A3
(10% compared to 0% at last review) and Baa1 -- Baa3 (3.4%
compared to 0% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 3.7 years
compared to 7.2 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 63%, compared to 68% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 39.3% compared to 66.0% at last review.  The
lower MAC is due to greater ratings dispersion than at the time of
last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to B2; previously on February 26, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B2; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B3; previously on February 26, 2010
     Baa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 8, 2009.


COLUMBIA TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 10 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 10 and downgrades one class from District of
Columbia Tobacco Settlement Financing Corporation series 2001 and
2006:

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds current interest serial
bonds

  -- $7,140,000 due May 15, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $7,145,000 due May 15, 2012 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $8,030,000 due May 15, 2013 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $8,360,000 due May 15, 2014 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable.

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds current interest turbo term
bonds

  -- $114,855,000 due May 15, 2024 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $169,110,000 due May 15, 2033 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $187,540,000 due May 15, 2040 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable.

Tobacco Settlement asset-backed bonds capital appreciation bonds

  -- 2006A downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2006B downgraded to 'B+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2006C downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the serial bonds and 2024 turbo
bond suggested by the model are 'A-' or higher, the bonds are
being affirmed at the cap rating of 'BBB+'.  The 2033 and 2040
turbo bonds are being affirmed at a level consistent with the
model output at 'BBB+'.  The 2006A capital appreciation bond (CAB)
is being downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-', the 2006B CAB is being
downgraded to 'B+' from 'BBB-', and the 2006C CAB is being
downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'.  In the case of the CABs, the model
output corresponds to a rating one notch lower than the current
ratings; therefore, the ratings may be lowered depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


CREDIT AND REPACKED: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 2005-3 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded its
rating on notes issued by Credit and Repacked Securities Limited
2005-3, a collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a
static portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

Issuer: Credit and Repacked Securities Limited 2005-3

  -- Tranche Notes due December 20, 2010, Upgraded to Caa3;
     previously on Feb 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is primarily driven
by an improvement in the credit quality of the reference
portfolio, the remaining credit enhancement protecting the rated
CSO tranche from future portfolio losses and the CSO tranche short
time to maturity (6 months).

The 10 year weighted average rating factor of the portfolio,
adjusted with forward looking measures, has improved from 3375
from the last rating action in February 2009 to 3259, equivalent
to an average rating of the current portfolio of B3.  The near
term evolution of the credit quality of the portfolio can be
assessed by looking at, among other things, (i) the number of
portfolio assets under positive or negative outlook, or on watch
for upgrade or downgrade, (ii) the difference of notches for each
portfolio asset between the Moody's fundamental rating and the
equivalent rating derived from CDS spread (market implied rating).
The results of these observations indicate a potential improvement
of the portfolio credit quality over the months to come, in
particular within the bucket of assets rated in the Caa range,
which are the primary drivers of the rating of the CSO tranche.

The attachment point of the upgraded tranche is 12.75% with
realized losses due to credit events amounting to 7.88% so far,
leaving approximately a 4.87% of cushion before the outstanding
tranche gets affected by additional portfolio losses.  Since
inception of the transaction, the subordination of the rated
tranches has been reduced due to credit events, mostly in 2008 and
2009, on Smurfit-Stone Container Enterprises, Inc., Tribune
Company, Visteon Corporation, Washington Mutual, Inc., Lear
Corporation, Lyondell Chemical Company, Abitibi-Consolidated Inc.,
Bowater Incorporated, Dana Corporation, Quebecor World, Inc. It
would take a material number of additional credit events within
the next 6 months for portfolio losses to affect the rated
tranche: six credit events if Moody's assume a 100% loss on each
of those, 12 if Moody's assume a 50% loss on each of those.

However, although the rating action reflects an improving expected
loss on the rated CSO tranche, Moody's points out that the Caa3
rating still indicates a very high expected loss, primarily driven
by the high portfolio concentration in Ca and Caa rated assets,
amounting to 17% of the initial portfolio notional.

The portfolio is well diversified and has little exposure on the
Banking, Financial, Insurance and Real Estate sectors.  The
highest industry concentrations are Automotive (10.6%), High Tech
Industries (10.6%), and Retail (7.5%).


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-TFL2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 11 classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2007-TFL2, reflecting
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 22.3%.  Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate market value and cash flow declines.  The Negative
Rating Outlooks reflect additional sensitivity analysis related to
further negative credit migration of the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 70% of the pool is
expected to, or has already defaulted in the base case stress
scenario, defined as the 'B' stress.  In its review, Fitch
analyzed servicer reported operating statements and rent rolls,
updated property valuations, and recent lease and sales
comparisons.  Fitch estimates the average recoveries on the pooled
loans will be approximately 68% in the base case.  The defaults
are determined considering the total leverage of each asset,
including additional B-notes and mezzanine debt; however, a
default may not result in a loss to the pooled portion given its
lower leverage position.  The base case term and refinance debt
service coverage ratio for the pooled A-notes is 1.27 times and
0.90x, respectively.

The transaction is collateralized by seven loans, four of which
are hotel/casino (62.7%), two of which are office (30.7%), and one
of which is undeveloped land (6.6%).  The final extension options
for the loans are: 6.6% in 2011, 54.3% in 2012, and 39.1% in 2015.
The transaction's final rated maturity date is April 15, 2022.

Fitch identified six Loans of Concern (95.7%) within the pool, two
of which are in special servicing (21.5%): Planet Hollywood Resort
& Casino (39.1%), Whitehall Seattle Portfolio (25%), Resorts
Atlantic City (14.9%), Biscayne Landing (6.6% of the pooled
proceeds), 100 West Putnam Avenue (5.7%), and Ritz Carlton Half
Moon Bay (4.4%).  Fitch's analysis resulted in loss expectations
for four loans in the base case stress scenario.  The contributors
to losses (by unpaid principal balance) are Planet Hollywood
Resort and Casino, Resorts Atlantic City, Biscayne Landing, and
100 West Putnam Avenue.

The largest contributor to loss, The Resorts Atlantic City loan,
is secured by a 942-room casino/hotel located in Atlantic City,
NJ.  The asset, which is now real estate owned (REO), was
transferred to the special servicer in December 2008 for monetary
default.  The property has exhibited significant declining
performance since issuance due to a number of factors including
increased competition, a smoking ban introduced throughout the
entire Atlantic City gaming market, and the overall negative
performance of the gaming industry due to general macro-economic
conditions throughout the U.S. The servicer is currently marketing
the property and estimates a sale date by the end of the third
quarter of 2010.

The next contributor to loss, Biscayne Landing, consists of a
ground lease on the largest undeveloped parcel of urban land in
South Florida, consisting of 188 acres in North Miami.  The loan
has been in special servicing since January 2008 for payment
default.  In August 2009, a foreclosure agreement was executed,
which provides the trust with essential representations and
warranties from the borrower and a cooperative transfer of all
permits, rights, and obligations.  A receiver was appointed in
September 2009, which has taken over the daily activities of the
property.  The borrower is no longer active on the site.

The special servicer continues efforts to execute a note sale,
with a potential determination date at the end of the second
quarter of 2010.  An updated appraisal was finalized in January
2010, resulting in a value that is significantly less than the
outstanding debt.  Fitch expects certificate level interest
shortfalls to continue, given the decline in value.

The next contributor to loss, Planet Hollywood Resort & Casino, is
secured by a resort, casino, and entertainment complex in Las
Vegas, NV, that includes a 2,519 room hotel, a 116,000 square foot
casino, an outdoor pool area and 32,000 sf spa, eight restaurants,
and 75,000 sf of convention, trade show, and meeting facility
space.  The loan transferred to special servicing in September
2009 due to imminent default and the borrower's request for
relief.  Cash flow after property renovations has not met
expectations from issuance, largely due to the economic downturn.
As of second quarter 2009, the occupancy, average daily rate
(ADR), and revenue per available room were 89.3%, $105, and $93,
respectively, which is significantly below the underwritten
occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR of 93%, $205, and $190.

As part of the loan workout, Harrah's assumed all outstanding debt
associated with the property.  In February 2010, the Nevada Gaming
Commission approved the sale.The loan's initial maturity occurs in
December 2011, with extension options available to 2015.  Harrah's
is one of the largest casino operators in Las Vegas, with nine
casinos and an estimated 25,000 employees.  The Planet Hollywood
asset is expected to benefit from Harrah's extensive experience in
the operation and management of its portfolio of gaming
properties.

Fitch has removed these classes from Rating Watch Negative and has
downgraded, assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss Severity Ratings, and
Recovery Ratings, as indicated:

  -- $486.7 million class A-1 to 'A/LS3 from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $100 million class A-2 to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $207 million class A-3 to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB-; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $45.7 million class B to 'B/LS5' from 'BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $42.6 million class C to 'B/LS5' from BB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $33.5 million class D to 'C/RR2' from 'B';


  -- $36.6 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $36.5 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR6';

  -- $33.5 million class G to 'C/RR6' from ' CCC/RR6';

  -- $39.6 million class H to 'C/RR6' from ' CC/RR6';

  -- $36.6 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR6'.

In addition, these classes remain at:

  -- $39.6 million class K at 'C/RR6';
  -- $33.5 million class L at 'C/RR6'.

In addition, these non-pooled classes remain at:

  -- $8.9 million class BSL-A at 'C/RR6';
  -- $9 million class BSL-B at 'C/RR6';
  -- $8.9 million class BSL-C at 'C/RR6';
  -- $8.9 million class BSL-D at 'C/RR6';
  -- $7.9 million class BSL-E at 'C/RR6';
  -- $9.9 million class BSL-F at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only classes A-X-1 and
A-X-2.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses DSCR tests to project
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  Recoveries
are based on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term
capitalization rates.  This methodology was used to review this
transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage backed security
loan pools are concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO
pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes
held in CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional
in nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income
assumptions that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to
this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the
senior position of the CMBS note or property specific performance
warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral under the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a class's respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a class's respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a class's respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled
certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay interest
shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the classes.
The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the current
outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is used to
assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-C1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks to
several classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2000-C1.  Fitch has also assigned Loss Severity ratings and
Recovery Ratings to numerous classes.

The downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses on
specially serviced assets coupled with expected losses following
Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses to the
transaction.  The majority of the total expected losses are
associated with loans currently in special servicing.  Fitch
expects losses of 20.7% of the remaining transaction balance, or
$23.3 million, from loans in special servicing and loans that
cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 92% to $89 million from $1,112 million at
issuance.  One loan is defeased (0.57% of the current transaction
balance).

There are six specially serviced loans in the pool (48%),
including three of the five largest loans in the pool.  One loans
is delinquent, one are in foreclosure, one is real estate owned,
and three are current.

The largest specially serviced asset (23.5%) is a 190,908 square
foot office property located in Seattle, WA.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in February 2010.  The building is solely
occupied by Amazon.com who is in place until May 2011 but will
vacate the building to move to its new headquarters.  A loan
modification is being discussed with the borrower.

The second largest specially serviced asset is a 529,073 sf
industrial building located in Fresno, CA.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in April 2010 due to maturity default.  The
loan matured May 11, 2010, but the borrower has been unable to
secure refinancing to pay off the loan.  The property is current,
and as of year end 2010 (YE 2010), net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio and occupancy were 1.57 times and 100%,
respectively.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end NOI and
applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 10% to
determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Of the non-defeased or non-specially
serviced loans, two (2.1% of the pool) incurred a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Outlooks, LS ratings and RRs as
indicated:

  -- $30.6 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative; removed from Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $9.8 million class J to 'CC/RR3' from 'BBB'; removed from
     Rating Watch Negative;

  -- $11.1 million class K to 'C/RR5' from 'BB-';

  -- $9.7 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B'.

Fitch has affirmed and revised this class:

  -- $2.1 million class M to 'D/RR6' from 'D/DR4'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed, maintained or revised the Outlook
and assigned LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $13.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $30.6 million class G at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Negative; removed
     from Rating Watch Negative.

Classes A1, A2, B, C, D, and E have paid in full.  Class NR has
been liquidated.  Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only
class A-X.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various actions on Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp, series 1998-C2.

Fitch affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $72.5 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms, assigns LS ratings, and revises
Outlooks on these classes:

  -- $105.6 million class F at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive;

  -- $19.2 million class G at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Positive.

In addition, Fitch affirms and revises the Recovery Rating on this
class:

  -- $11.6 million class I to 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR4'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class AX.


Classes A-1, A-2, B, and C are paid in full.  Fitch does not rate
classes H or J.

The rating actions are due to Fitch expected losses (10.3% of the
current deal balance) upon the disposition of specially serviced
assets along with expected losses from Fitch's prospective review
of potential stresses.  Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one to two
years.

There are 50 of the original 222 loans remaining in transaction,
eight of which have defeased (4.8% of the current transaction
balance).  There are two specially serviced loans in the pool.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Ten loans did not payoff at maturity, and nine loans
incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-CK2 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
assigned Rating Outlooks, and assigned Loss Severity ratings or
Recovery Ratings to Credit Suisse First Boston's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-CK2, as indicated:

  -- $19.8 million class G to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.8 million class H to 'A/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $17.3 million class J to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $17.3 million class K to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $4.9 million class L to 'B-/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $13.6 million class M to 'CC/RR1' from 'BB';

  -- $6.2 million class N to 'C/RR3' from 'B+';

  -- $4.9 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $3.4 million class GLC to 'BB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings as
indicated:

  -- $109 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $364.3 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $32.1 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.4 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $29.6 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.4 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $12.4 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2 and A-SP have been paid in full.  Fitch does not
rate the $9.2 million class P.  The GLC rake class represents the
non-pooled B-note for Great Lakes Crossing.  Fitch withdraws the
rating of the interest only class A-X.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 4% of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the expected losses
(83.3%) come from the loans in special servicing.  Expected loss
as a percentage of the original deal balance is 3.4%.  Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over
the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 35.3% to $651.9 million from $1 billion at
issuance.  Eleven loans (20.2%) have defeased.

Fitch has identified 12 Loans of Concern (15.8%), including three
assets in special servicing (8.6%).  The largest (4%) specially
serviced asset is a collateralized by a 157,225 square foot office
building located in El Segundo, CA.  The loan transferred to the
special servicer in November 2009 for imminent default.  The
property is 48% leased to a single tenant.  Occupancy has remained
below 50% since June 2008 when the other tenant occupation the
remaining space vacated.  The borrower has submitted a
modification proposal and the special servicer is currently
reviewing it.

The second largest (3.9%) specially serviced loan consists of a
16-property office portfolio, totaling 340,065 sf and located in
Lansing, MI.  The loan has been in special servicing since May
2008 after several unauthorized ownership transfers had occurred.
Although the special servicer negotiated a loan modification with
the borrower in the first quarter 2009 (1Q'09), members of the
borrowing entity subsequently did not agree to the terms of the
modification.  The special servicer has decided to pursue
foreclosure.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 23 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with three loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1997-C1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1997-C1.

The affirmations are the result of sufficient credit enhancement
to the remaining Fitch rated classes following Fitch's prospective
review of potential losses as a result of a refinance test.  Fitch
expects losses of less than 1%, or less than $1 million, from
loans that cannot refinance at maturity based on Fitch's
refinance.  These losses will be absorbed by the class J, which
has already experienced losses.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 90.2% to $132.7 million from $1.356 billion
at issuance.  Of the remaining 13 loans, four (39.3%) have
defeased.

There are no specially serviced loans in the pool and three loans
(27%) identified as Loans of Concern by Fitch, including the
second largest loan (24.3%).

The largest LOC (24.3%) is secured by a 360-unit full-service
hotel located on the West coast of Aruba.  The loan has undergone
a decrease in debt service coverage ratio from 2.37 times at
issuance to 1.76x as of full year (FY) 2009.

The second largest LOC (1.4%) is secured by a private club with a
golf course in Glastonbury, CT, a southeast suburb of Hartford.
The loan is on the watchlist due to low NOI DSCR of 0.89x for FY
2009.  The borrower cites the economic decline as the reason for
the property's poor performance of recent.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to the most recent full fiscal year
end net operating income and applying an adjusted market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, one loan (4.3% of the
pool) incurred a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed value.

Fitch has affirmed, assigned Outlooks and LS ratings to these
classes:

  -- $64.4 million class F at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $13.6 million class G at 'AAA/LS-1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $27.1 million class H at 'BBB/LS-1'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $17 million class I at 'B/LS-1'; Outlook Negative.

The $7.5 million class J remains 'D/RR4'.

Fitch does not rate the $3.2 million E class.  Classes A-1A, A-1B,
A-1C, A-2, B, C, and D have paid in full.  Class K has been
liquidated.  Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only class
A-X.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2007-TFL1 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 11 classes of Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2007-TFL1.  The downgrades were due to the
deterioration in the overall performance of the assets in the
trust, the significant concentration of loans secured by hotel
properties and refinancing risk associated with loans approaching
maturity in an adverse environment.  Approximately 48% of the
loans by pooled balance have final extended maturity dates in
2011.  Moody's also affirmed three pooled classes.  The rating
action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 payment date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 9% to $1.2 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization due to the payoff of two loans
initially in the pool and partial pay downs associated with two
additional loans.  The certificates are collateralized by nine
floating-rate loans.  The largest three loans account for 51% of
the pooled balance.  The pool composition includes hotel
properties (66% of the pooled balance), one mixed-use property
consisting of both office and retail space (20%), and office
properties (14%).

There is currently one loan in special servicing, the SLS at
Beverly Hills Loan ($64.2 million - 6% of the pooled balance),
secured by a 297-room hotel located in Beverly Hills, California.
The whole mortgage loan includes a non-trust junior component with
a current balance of approximately $40.4 million.  There is also
mezzanine debt of approximately $22.9 million.  The property was
closed in 2007 and most of 2008 while it was being renovated as
part of its re-positioning to a luxury boutique hotel under the
SLS brand.  The renovations, which at securitization were
scheduled to be completed in 2007, were not completed until 2008.
The hotel did not generate cash flow during the construction
period and the loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2009, when it failed to qualify for the second of three
12-month loan extension options.  A loan modification was
completed in February 2010 extending the maturity date to February
2013.  Modification terms also included a $9.5 million pay down of
the mortgage loan with an additional $4.0 million loan pay down to
take place prior to February 2011.  The loan sponsor is SBE Hotel
Group, the hospitality division of SBE Entertainment Group of
which Sam Nazarian is the CEO.  Net cash flow, after reserves for
furniture fixture and equipment, was negative in calendar year
2009 as the hotel continues to ramp-up after its reopening.

The property was appraised in November 2009 for $116 million or
$400,673/key.  Loan payments are current through June 2010 and the
loan is expected to be returned to the master servicer within two
months.

Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the pool is 90%,
compared to 70% at Moody's last full review in October 2008.
Moody's debt service coverage is 1.25x, compared to 1.51X at last
full review.

The largest five remaining loans in the transaction include:

The Manhattan Mall Loan ($232.0 million -- 20%), the largest loan
in the pool, is secured by a 13-story, 1.1 million square foot
mixed-use property consisting of approximately 815,000 square feet
of office space, 244,000 square feet of retail space and 20,000 SF
of storage.  The property is located on Sixth Avenue between West
32rd and 33rd Streets in New York, NY.  The retail space is
anchored by a 154,038 square foot JC Penney store that opened in
July 2009.  The JC Penney store in Manhattan Mall is JC Penney's
only Manhattan location.  The lease has a 20-year term, expiring
in 2029.  As of April 2010 the office component was approximately
93% leased, compared to 95% at securitization, and the retail
component was 92% leased, compared to 94% at securitization.  The
largest office tenants include Interpublic Group and Bank of
America N.A. who occupy 37% and 17% of the office space,
respectively.  The three largest retail tenants after JC Penney
are Strawberry (5%), Charlotte Russe (4.3%) and Vertical Club
(3.8%).  The interest-only loan matures in February 2011 with one
remaining 12-month extension option.  The loan sponsor is Vornado
Realty L.P.  Moody's LTV ratio and underlying rating for the
pooled debt are 72% and Baa1, respectively, compared to 62% and A1
at Moody's last full review.

The Park Central Hotel Loan ($203.0 million -- 18%), the second
largest loan, is secured by a single hotel condominium unit
containing a 934-guestroom full-service hotel within a larger 33-
story condominium parcel that consists primarily of time share
units.  The property is located on Seventh Avenue, between West
55th and 56th Streets in New York, NY.  Revenue per available room
for the trailing 12-month period ending in March 2010 was $167,
compared to $241 at last full review.  The interest-only loan
matures in November 2010 with one remaining 12-month extension
option.  The $407.0 million mortgage loan includes a
$204.0 million non-trust junior component and there is additional
mezzanine financing in the amount of $58.0 million.  The loan
sponsors are Whitehall Street Global Real Estate L.P. 2001 and
Devon Capital LLC.  Moody's LTV ratio and underlying rating for
the pooled debt are 85% and B1, respectively, compared to 66% and
Baa3 at Moody's last full review.

The JW Marriott Las Vegas Resort & Spa Loan ($150.0 million --
13%), the third largest loan, is secured by a 548-guestroom full-
service hotel that was constructed in 1999 and renovated in 2006.
The hotel is located in Summerlin (Las Vegas), Nevada.  Amenities
include a spa, five restaurants and a casino.  RevPAR for the
trailing 12-month period ending in February 2010 was $81, compared
to $136 at Moody's last full review.  Casino revenue, which in
calendar year 2009 contributed approximately 18% to total revenue,
compared to 20% at securitization, declined approximately 56%
since securitization.  The $160.0 mortgage loan includes a
$10.0 million non-trust junior component.  The interest-only
mortgage loan matures in November 2010 with one remaining 12-month
extension option.  The loan sponsor is Hotspur Resorts Nevada,
Inc. Moody's LTV ratio and underlying rating for the pooled debt
are 116% and Caa3, respectively, compared to 84% and B2 at Moody's
last full review.

The Doubletree Guest Suites Times Square Loan ($140.0 million --
12%), the fourth largest loan, is secured by a 460-guestroom all-
suite full-service hotel located on Broadway at 47th Street, New
York, NY.  The property is partially operated subject to air
rights and ground lease encumbrances which expire in 2037.  The
leases have three, 30-year extension options and are fully
financeable.  RevPAR for the trailing 12-month period ending in
March 2010 was $267, compared to $336 at Moody's last full review.
The interest-only loan matures in January 2011, with one 12-month
extension option remaining.  There is also $130.0 million in
mezzanine debt.  The loan sponsor is Whitehall Street Global Real
Estate L.P.  Moody's LTV ratio and underlying rating for the
pooled debt are 94% and B1, respectively, compared to 67% and Baa2
at Moody's last full review.

The Hines Portfolio Loan ($125.0 million -- 11%), the fifth
largest loan, is secured by 44 cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted office/R&D buildings located primarily in San Jose and
vicinity with a total of 1.6 million square feet .  As of March
2010, the portfolio was approximately 73% leased, compared to 74%
at Moody's last full review and 75% at securitization.  However,
the largest tenant, Mentor Graphics, that leases approximately
208,433 square feet (13% of total net rentable area) will vacate
upon lease expiration in September 2010, reducing portfolio
occupancy to 40%.  The asking rent for the Mentor Graphics space
is significantly lower than the current in-place rent.  CB Richard
Ellis indicates a 1st Quarter 2010 office vacancy rate for the
overall San Jose market of approximately 24% with a 17% decline in
rents projected through 2011.  The market vacancy rate for R&D
space is approximately 18% with a 6% decline in rent projected in
2010.  The interest-only loan matures in November 2010, with one
12-month extension option remaining.  The $270.0 million mortgage
loan includes a $145.0 million non-trust junior component.  The
loan sponsor is Hines Interests Limited Partnership.  Moody's LTV
ratio and underlying rating for the pooled debt are 96% and Caa1,
respectively, compared to 75% and Ba1 at Moody's last full review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $604,687,397, affirmed at Aaa; previously on April
     3, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-X-1, Notional Balance, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     April 3, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-X-2, Notional Balance, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     April 3, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, $239,800,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2;
     previously on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa

  -- Class B, $40,200,000, downgraded to Baa2 from A2; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to A2 from Aa1

  -- Class C, $38,000,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to A3 from Aa2

  -- Class D, $25,700,000, downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Baa1 from Aa3

  -- Class E, $25,300,000, downgraded to Ba2 from Baa2; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Baa2 from A1

  -- Class F, $28,500,000, downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Baa3 from A2

  -- Class G, $26,500,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba1; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Ba1 from A3

  -- Class H, $27,300,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba3; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Ba3 from Baa2

  -- Class J, $26,700,000, downgraded to Caa1 from B1; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to B1 from Baa3

  -- Class K, $36,600,000, downgraded to Caa2 from B2; previously
     on March 19, 2009 downgraded to B2 from Ba2

  -- Class L, $31,700,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1;
     previously on March 19, 2009 downgraded to Caa1 from B2


CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded six classes of Notes issued
by CRESS 2008-1, Ltd. due to the deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in
the weighted average rating factor, and increase in Defaulted
Securities.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

CRESS 2008-1 Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio
A-Notes and whole loans (72.3% of the pool balance), B-Notes
(12.7%), commercial mortgage backed securities (12.4%) and
mezzanine loans (2.6%).  As of the April 30, 2010 Trustee report,
the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to
$679.9 million from $677.5 million at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A Notes, as a result of failing the Class
A/B Par Value Test, but Classes C-O are currently accruing
interest.

There are thirteen assets with par balance of $120.5 million
(33.2% of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Collateral Interests as of the April 30, 2010 Trustee report.
Five of these assets (88.2% of the defaulted balance) are either
A-Notes or whole loans, one asset is CMBS (6.1%), four assets are
B-Notes (4..5%) and one assets is a mezzanine loan (1.1%).
Defaulted Collateral Interests that are not CMBS are primarily
defined as assets that are either foreclosed or past their
extended grace periods.  While there have been no realized losses
to date, Moody's does expect significant losses to occur.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's
modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,422 compared to 8,437 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa-Aa3 (2.0% compared to 0.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(1.4% compared to 2.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.0% compared to
8.0% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 5.5% at last
review), and Caa1-C (96.5% compared to 83.6% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 7.0
years compared to 9.8 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 38.6% compared to 39.7% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0% compared to 22.7% at last review.
The high MAC is due to higher default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on January 28, 2007
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on April 27, 2009
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on April 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa1

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B1; previously on April 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B3; previously on April 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class E, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on April 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated April 27, 2009.


CRYSTAL RIVER: S&P Junks Rating on Class A Notes From 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on class A
from Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd., a commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation transaction, to 'CCC-' from
'B-'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-' ratings on eight
other classes from the same transaction.

The downgrade and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis of
the transaction in light of the continued interest shortfalls
affecting the transaction.  The interest support to class A
continues to deteriorate because funds from the class A interest
reserve account are used to make class A interest payments due to
interest shortfalls on the underlying CMBS collateral.  According
to the most recent trustee report, the class A interest reserve
account has been reduced to $0.8 million from $1 million as of the
previous trustee report.

The rating actions also reflect S&P's analysis of Crystal River
2006-1 following its downgrade of the commercial mortgage-backed
securities certificates that collateralize Crystal River 2006-1.
The CMBS certificates are from three CMBS transactions and total
$8.6 million (2.2% of total asset balance).

According to the June 22, 2010, trustee report, 71 certificate
classes from 32 distinct transactions issued between 2002 and 2007
collateralize Crystal River 2006-1.  Crystal River 2006-1 has
exposure to these CMBS that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust (classes L and M; $4.6 million,
  1.2%); and

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 (class J;
  $4 million, 1%).

S&P has determined that the liquidity interruptions to Crystal
River 2006-1 resulted from interest shortfalls on the underlying
CMBS collateral.  The interest shortfalls primarily reflect the
master servicer's recovery of prior advances, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions, servicers' nonrecoverability
determinations for advances, and special servicing fees.  S&P
previously lowered its rating on class B to 'D' due to interest
payment interruption to that class.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
collateral assets in accordance with S&P's current criteria.
S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed
ratings.

                          Rating Lowered

            Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                Class    To                   From
                -----    --                   ----
                A        CCC-                 B-

                         Ratings Affirmed

            Crystal River Resecuritization 2006-1 Ltd.

                         Class    Rating
                         -----    ------
                         C        CCC-
                         D        CCC-
                         E        CCC-
                         F        CCC-
                         G        CCC-
                         H        CCC-
                         J        CCC-
                         K        CCC-


CSFB HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 32 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 32
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 17 tranches from 19 RMBS
transactions issued by CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust.  The
collateral backing these deal primarily consists of closed end
second lien mortgages and home equity lines of credit.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by financial guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated
at their underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's
guaranty.

Complete List of Actions

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-3

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 23%

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-4

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 28%

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-5

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 42%

  -- Cl. A-1A, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1F1, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1F2, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-HF1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 26%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 41%

  -- Cl. A-1A2, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1F, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-3

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 64%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-4

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 62%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-6

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 71%

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2007-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 54%

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2007-2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 77%

  -- Cl. 2A-1F, Current Rating B3; preiously Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2A-1A, Current Rating B3; preiously Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2A-2, Current Rating B3; preiously Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2A-3, Current Rating B3; preiously Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2A-4, Current Rating B3; preiously Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Caa3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on June 25, 2009)

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2003-6

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 3%

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2003-7

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 5%

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2004-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 5%

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2004-2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 4%

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2004-4

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 9%

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 14%

  -- Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 15%

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 54% for Group 1
    and 31% for Group 2

  -- Cl. 1A-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2A-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18,
     2010 Ca Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2006-5

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 71%

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Various Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of CVS Credit Lease
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series A-1 and Series A-2.  The
rating of the A-1 Certificate is affirmed at Baa2 based on the
current rating of CVS Caremark Corporation (senior unsecured debt
rating Baa2, stable outlook).  The rating of the A-2 Certificate
is affirmed at Ba1 based on CVS's rating as well as the balloon
risk at the certificate's final distribution date.

This action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities.

As of the March 10, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance remained the same as at
securitization.  The Certificates are supported by 96 single-
tenant, stand-alone retail buildings leased to CVS.  Each building
is subject to a fully bondable triple net lease guaranteed by CVS.
Payments on the leases are sufficient to pay all interest on both
Certificates, 100% of the principal of the A-1 Certificates
(October 10, 2010 final distribution date) and 44% of the
principal of the Class A-2 Certificates (January 10, 2023 final
distribution date).  The remaining principal of the A-2
Certificate is insured under residual value insurance policies
issued by Financial Structures Limited and reinsured by Royal
Indemnity Company (Royal).  On September 28, 2006, Moody's
downgraded Royal's financial strength rating to B2 from Ba3 and
subsequently withdrew the rating.  The rating on the A-2
Certificates is notched down from CVS's rating due to the size of
the loan balance at maturity relative to the value of the
collateral assuming the existing tenant is no longer in occupancy
(the dark value).

CVS, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, is the largest
provider of prescriptions in the United States.  The company fills
or manages more than 1 billion prescriptions annually through
about 7,000 CVS pharmacy stores, its pharmacy benefits management
operation, its mail order and specialty pharmacy division,
Caremark Pharmacy Services, and its on-line pharmacy.

Moody's rating action is:

* Series A-1, $158,700,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously
  downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1 on 9/22/2006

* Series A-2, $125,000,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously downgraded
  to Ba1 from Baa2 on 12/2/2003

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease.  The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan.  The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined; the dark value must be
sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of
the lease, to support the expected loss consistent with the
certificates' rating.  Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the
possibility of lease affirmations by the tenant and for the
landlord's claim for lease rejection damages in bankruptcy.
Moody's also may give credit for some amortization of the debt,
depending upon the rating of the credit tenant.  In addition,
Moody's considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The certificates' rating may change as the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant changes.


CW CAPITAL: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Various Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed one class and downgraded 13
classes of Notes issued by CW Capital COBALT II, Ltd., due to the
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor, an
increase in defaulted assets and negative migration in the Par
Value Tests.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

CW Capital COBALT II, Ltd, is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS, 60.8% of the pool balance), whole loans (30.8%), CRE CDOs
(7.2%), B-notes (0.5%), and mezzanine debt (0.8%).  Fifteen CMBS
assets (28.3%) are synthetic reference obligations.  As of the May
28, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $687 million from $700 million at
issuance, with paydowns directed to classes A-1A, A-2A, and a
notional reduction of class A-1AR.  The paydowns are a result of
the failure of the Class A/B, Class C/D/E, Class F/G/H, and Class
J/K Par Value Tests.  Per the Indenture dated May 10, 2006, upon
the failure of any Par Value Test results, all scheduled interest
and principal payments are directed to pay down the most senior
notes, until the failed Par Value Test is satisfied.
Additionally, the reinvestment mechanism is suspended until the
Par Value Tests are satisfied.

Thirty-eight assets with a par balance of $285 million (36.4% of
the pool balance) were reported as Defaulted Securities as of the
May 28, 2010 Trustee report.  Twenty-four of these assets (49.3%
of the defaulted balance) or either CMBS, CRE CDO, or synthetic
reference obligations, 10 are whole loans (48.4%), and four are
mezzanine debt (2.3%).  Defaulted Securities that are whole loans
and mezzanine debt are primarily defined as assets that are either
foreclosed or past their extended grace periods.  While there have
been no realized losses to date, Moody's does expect significant
losses to occur.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's
bottom-dollar WARF is 5,224 compared to 3,553 at last review.  The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(23.1% compared to 16.7% at last review), A1-A3 (1.5% compared to
2.0% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (11.7% compared to 18.9% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (5.1% compared to 11.1% at last review), B1-B3
(3.4% compared to 10.7% at last review), and Caa1-C (55.2%
compared to 40.7% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled an actual WAL
of 3.4 years compared to 4.3 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 37.7% compared to 36.0% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.5% compared to 9.9% at last review.
The low MAC is due to a high level of dispersion of credit within
the collateral pool.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1A, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1AR, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2A, Confirmed at Aaa; previously on 2/26/2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-1B, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class A-2B, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on 2/26/2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class E, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class F, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class G, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class H, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class J, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class K, Downgraded to C; previously on 2/26/2010 Caa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade


DIVERSIFIED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-2L to 'Ca'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Diversified Asset
Securitization Holdings II, L.P.  The notes affected by the rating
action are:

  -- Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca; previously
     on February 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2.

Diversified Asset Securitization Holdings II, L.P., is a
collateralized debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of
primarily Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated
between 1997 and 2003.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decrease in the principal coverage ratio and an
increase in number of assets the ratings of which are currently on
review for possible downgrade.  The Trustee reports that the
transaction is currently failing its coverage tests.  Since
Moody's last review in February 2009, the principal coverage ratio
for Class A and Class B has decreased from 105.8% to 93.0%.  Also,
in April 2010, the ratings of approximately $22 million of pre-
2005 RMBS within the underlying portfolio were placed on review
for possible downgrade following on Moody's recent updated loss
projections applicable to certain types of RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-CG3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings to
three classes of DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp. Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 1999-CG3, as indicated below:

  -- $13.4 million class B-4 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BBB+'.
  -- $8.9 million class B-5 to 'CC/RR2' from 'BBB-';
  -- $11.2 million class B-6 to 'C/RR6' from 'BB'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned Loss Severity ratings
to these classes and revised the Rating Outlook on one of the
tranches:

  -- $12.4 million class B-2 at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26.9 million class B-3 at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.

Fitch has also revised this RR:

  -- Class B-7 to 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR2'.

Classes A-1-A, A-1-B, A-1-C, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, and B-1 have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class D certificates.  The
balances of classes C and B-8 have been reduced to zero as a
result of losses on disposed loans.  The ratings of classes B-8,
and C both remain at 'D/RR6'.  Fitch withdraws the rating of the
interest only class S.  Additional information is available in
Fitch's June 23 press release, 'Fitch Revises Practice for Rating
IO & Pre-Payment Related Structured Finance Securities', available
at 'www.fitchratings.com'.

The downgrade is the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates for
the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which is
similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 26.7% of the remaining pool balance,
the majority of which are from the loans in special servicing, in
addition to the loans that are not expected to refinance at
maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 90.75% to $81.5 million, from
$899 million at issuance.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one to two
years.

Fitch has identified 14 Loans of Concern (73.9%), 11 (64.8%) of
which are in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan (9.8%), BJ's Wholesale Club, is secured by a 109,081 square
foot single tenant building located in Dublin, OH.  Tenant has
been dark but paying rent since November 2002.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in August 2009 due to the
maturity of the note.  Judicial foreclosure has been initiated by
the special servicer and they continue to evaluate resolution
alternatives.

The second largest specially serviced loan (9.2%) is secured by a
full service hotel located in Oklahoma City, OK.  The asset
transferred to special servicing in July 2009 for imminent default
and franchise change without the Lender's consent.  The loan has
been modified with a one-year extension and is performing in
accordance with the modification.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern not specially serviced is the
Oxon Run Manor Apartments (5.1%), a multifamily property located
in Washington, DC.  The loan matures in less than 90 days.  The
borrower is aware of the ARD date and is pursuing take-out
financing to pay off loan.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine
value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, two loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity, with both loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


FAIRWAY LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Fairway Loan Funding Company:

  -- US$32,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2018, Upgraded to B1; previously on August 27, 2009
     Downgraded to B2;

  -- US$32,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due October
     2018, Upgraded to Caa2; previously on August 27, 2009
     Confirmed at Caa3;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class P-1 Combination Notes due October 2018
     (current rated balance of $3,999,501.90), Upgraded to A3;
     previously on August 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- US$3,330,000 Class P-3 Combination Notes due October 2018
     (current rated balance of $2,130,268.28), Upgraded to Caa3;
     previously on August 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
results primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in August 2009.
Moody's also observed small improvements in the
overcollateralization ratios.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the exposure to
securities rated Caa1 and below.  In particular, as of the latest
trustee report dated June 7, 2010, the weighted average rating
factor was 2442 as compared to 2811 in August 2009 and in
compliance with the trigger level of 2800.  Based on the same
report, securities rated Caa1 or lower make up approximately 8.36%
of the underlying portfolio versus 14.10% in August 2009.
Additionally, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $18MM from approximately $54MM in August 2009.

Moody's also points out that the overcollateralization ratios of
the rated notes have increased since the last rating actions in
August 2009 and are currently all in compliance.  The Senior Class
A Overcollateralization Test, Class A Overcollateralization Test,
Class B-1L Overcollateralization Test and the Class B-2L
Overcollateralization Test are reported at 121.77%, 112.90%,
107.78%, and 102.96%, respectively versus August 2009 levels of
120.33%, 111.62%, 106.58%, and 100.19%.  Due to the impact of
revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Fairway Loan Funding Company issued in July of 2006 is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


FIRST CMBS: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed two classes and upgraded four
classes of N-45 First CMBS Issuer Corporation Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Bonds, Series 2003-3.  The rating action is due to the
stable to improving performance of the assets in the pool,
principal amortization, and loan repayment.  The rating action is
a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage
backed securities transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 distribution date, the pool balance has
decreased by approximately 40% to $276 million from $462 million
at securitization.  One loan, Tour Bell, Montreal paid off since
Moody's last full review of the transaction.  The remaining bonds
are supported by first mortgage liens on two office properties.

The Place Bell Loan ($138.8 million -- 50% of pooled balance) is
secured by a 989,800 square foot Class A office building located
in Ottawa, Ontario.  The building was 99% occupied as of March
2009, compared to 96% at last review.  The largest tenants are
Bell Canada (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa1) and Public
Works Canada (Moody's senior unsecured rating Aaa) which together
comprise 68% of the net rentable area (NRA).  The loan has an
unlimited guarantee by the sponsor, H&R REIT.  The loan has
amortized by approximately 14% since securitization on a 25-year
schedule.  Moody's current underlying rating is Baa3, the same as
at last review.

The Fifth Avenue Place Loan ($136.7 million -- 50% of pooled
balance) is secured by a 1.47 million square foot Class A office
building complex located in Calgary, Alberta.  The building was
99% occupied as of December 2009, compared to 100% at last review.
The property's net operating income has been steadily increasing
since securitization due to contractual rent steps in a number of
leases.  However, rental rates continue to decline in the Calgary
downtown office market and leases representing 34% of the NRA are
scheduled to expire between 2011 and 2013.  Therefore, a mark-to-
market adjustment was used for in-place rents that were above
market.  The loan has amortized by approximately 14% since
securitization on a 25-year schedule.  Moody's current underlying
rating is Aaa compared to Aa1 at last review.

Moody's pooled net cash flow and value are $47 million and
$505 million compared to $63 million and $683 million at last
review.  Moody's weighted average loan to value ratio for the
transaction is 55% compared to 63% at last review.  Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio for the deal is 1.83x
compared to 1.48x at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $ 161,334,655, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     12/08/2003 assigned Aaa

  -- Class IO, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 12/08/2003
     assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, $47,632,000, upgraded to Aaa from Aa1; previously on
     9/18/2007 upgraded to Aa1 from Aa2

  -- Class C, $31,446,000, upgraded to A1 from A2; previously on
     12/08/2003 assigned A2

  -- Class D, $31,446,000, upgraded to Baa2 from Baa3; previously
     on 12/08/2003 assigned Baa3

  -- Class E, $3,701,072, upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1; previously on
     12/08/2003 assigned Ba1


FMC REAL: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed eight classes of Notes issued by
FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1 on review for possible downgrade due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
evidenced by deterioration in the weighted average rating factor
and an increase in defaulted assets since last review.  The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.

FMC Real Estate CDO 2005-1 is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
currently backed by a portfolio of first mortgage loans (40% of
the pool balance), B/C-notes (28%), and mezzanine loans (32%).

Eight assets with a par balance of $127.2 million (27.6% of the
pool balance, including cash principal) were listed as defaulted
as of the 4/21/2010 Trustee report, compared to 15.6% at last
review.

The current WARF, as reported by the Trustee on 4/21/2010, is
4,762 compared to 4,601 at last review.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  Moody's review will focus on potential losses from
defaulted collateral and these key indicators.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Class B, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Confirmed at Aa2

  -- Class C, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- Class D, Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Class E, Ba2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Class F, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Class G, B2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- Class H, Caa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on 4/15/2009 Downgraded to Caa1

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated 4/15/2009.


FORD CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 15 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 15 and upgrades nine classes of four Ford
Credit Auto Owner Trust transactions as part of its on going
surveillance process.

The affirmations and upgrades are a result of continued available
credit enhancement in excess of stressed remaining losses.  The
collateral continues to perform within Fitch's base case
expectations.  Currently, the securities can withstand stress
scenarios consistent with the current rating categories and still
make full payments of interest and principal in accordance with
the terms of the documents.

As before, the ratings reflect the quality of Ford Motor Credit
Co.'s retail auto loan originations, the sound financial and legal
structure of the transactions, and servicing provided by FMCC.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

2006-B

  -- Class A-4 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive.

2007-B

  -- Class A-3a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AAA' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive.

2008-B

  -- Class A-3a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-3b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Positive.

2008-C

  -- Class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4a notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class A-4b notes affirmed at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class B notes upgraded to 'AA' from 'A'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class C notes upgraded to 'A' from 'BBB'; Outlook Positive;
  -- Class D notes affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Positive.


GALLATIN FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class A-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Gallatin Funding I Ltd.:

* US$21,000,000 Class A-2 Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2014,
  Upgraded to Baa2; previously on July 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1.

According to Moody's, the upgrade rating actions on the notes
result primarily from significant delevering of the Class A-1
notes and a substantial increase in the overcollateralization of
the rated notes since the last rating action in July 2009.

The transaction benefited from the delevering of the Class A-1
notes which have been paid down by approximately $79 million, or
roughly 34% of their outstanding balance reported in June 2009.  A
substantial proportion of this paydown is attributable to
principal prepayments on the underlying loans and asset sales by
the manager.  Moody's expects delevering of the Class A-1 notes to
continue as a result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period.
As a result of the delevering, the overcollateralization level of
the Class A notes has increased since June 2009 as measured by the
ratio of the performing par, principal proceeds, and funds in the
General Collateral Agreement Account and the Excess Spread
Collateral Account over the outstanding balances of the Class A-1
and Class A-2 notes.  Moody's notes that the funds in the General
Collateral Agreement Account and the Excess Spread Collateral
Account provide an additional credit support to the rated Class A
notes.  Additionally, the dollar amount of defaulted securities
has decreased to about $9 million from approximately $36 million
in June 2009.  Due to the impact of revised and updated key
assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.

Finally, Moody's notes that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  Based on the latest trustee report, the percentage of
these securities has increased from 5.6% in June 2009 to 10.4%
currently.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Gallatin Funding I Ltd., issued in June of 2002, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


G-STAR 2002-1: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it is upgrading five
classes of Notes issued by G-Star 2002-1 Ltd. The upgrades are the
result of a correction in the inputs that Moody's used in its
prior analysis and occur despite an overall decline in the credit
quality of the pool.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.

In connection with Moody's last rating action on the Notes,
certain securities were erroneously classified as Defaulted
Obligations when, in fact, they were Credit Risk Securities as
defined in the transaction's legal documents.  A Credit Risk
security is a security whose rating has been downgraded by one
notch, is on review for possible downgrade, or has been withdrawn
or qualified.  In modeling this transaction, Defaulted securities
have a 100% probability of default and 100% loss given default.
Credit Risk securities are modeled based on the probability of
default and expected loss inherent in their public ratings.  By
reclassifying the securities that were mistakenly classified as
Defaulted securities as Credit Risk securities, the expected loss
for the pool has declined.  In Moody's current review, there are
two Defaulted securities (7.7% of the pool balance) and nine
Credit Risk securities (27.7% of the pool balance).

G-Star 2002-1 Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio
of commercial mortgage backed securities (70.1% of the pool
balance), real estate investment trust securities (27.8%) and CRE
CDOs (0.4%).  As of the May 18, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction has decreased to $150.5 million
from $312.0 million at issuance as a result of paydowns to Classes
A-1 MM, A-2, BFL, BFX, and C.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average rating
factor, weighted average life, weighted average recovery rate, and
Moody's asset correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,226 compared to 527 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (11.5% compared to 13.6% at last review),
A1-A3 (11.8% compared to 11.4% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (36.1 %
compared to 40.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (28.3% compared to
31.7% at last review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 3.3% at last
review), and Caa1-C (12.3% compared to 0.0% at last review).  The
prior review distribution excludes both Defaulted Obligations and
Credit Risk Securities.

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 2.5 years compared to 3.4 years at last review.  The prior
review distribution excludes both Defaulted Obligations and Credit
Risk Securities.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 28.1% compared to 30.1% at last review.  The prior review
distribution excludes both Defaulted Obligations and Credit Risk
Securities.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 37.7%.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

The rating actions are:

  -- Class A-1 MM, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on March 10, 2010
     Downgraded to A1

  -- Class A-2, Upgraded to A2; previously on March 10, 2010
     Downgraded to Baa2

  -- Class BFL, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on March 10, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class BFX, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on March 10, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Class C, Upgraded to Caa3; previously on March 10, 2010
     Downgraded to C

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 10, 2010.


G-STAR 2002-2: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed four classes of
notes issued by G-Star 2002-2, Ltd./Corp., as a result of negative
credit migration in the portfolio.

Since Fitch's last rating action in February 2009, approximately
28.2% of the portfolio has been downgraded.  Currently, 11.5% is
on Rating Watch Negative.  Approximately 22.3% of the portfolio
has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade compared to 2.4%
at last review.  Further, the collateralized debt obligation has
paid down $66 million since the last review.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Based on this analysis, the
breakeven rates for classes A through C notes are generally
consistent with the ratings assigned below.

The rating of the class D notes addresses the likelihood that
investors will receive their stated balance of principal by the
legal final maturity date.  Based on the cash flow analysis,
interest proceeds are likely to be insufficient to pay dividends
to the class D notes equal to the amount of the remaining rated
balance.  Fitch has downgraded the class to 'CC', indicating that
default is probable at or prior to maturity.

The Negative Rating Outlook on the class A-2, A-3, B-FL and B-FX
notes reflects Fitch's expectation that underlying commercial
mortgage backed security loans will continue to face refinance
risk at maturity as well as continued pressure in the residential
mortgage backed security space.  The class A-1MM notes' breakeven
rates exhibit considerable cushion for the current rating;
therefore a Stable Rating Outlook is warranted.

Fitch also assigned a Loss Severity rating to the notes.  An LS
rating indicates a tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the expected
loss for the collateral under the 'B' stress.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with probability of
default indicated by a class' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does
not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to classes rated 'CCC' or
lower.

G-Star 2002-2 is a cash flow CRE CDO which closed on Nov. 20,
2002.  The collateral is composed of 61.6% CMBS, 30.1% real estate
investment trusts, 4.6% CDOs, 2.4% asset backed securities, and
1.4% residential mortgage backed securities.

Fitch has downgraded, affirmed, or revised Outlooks, and assigned
an LS rating for these classes as indicated:

  -- $56,616,550 class A-1MM A notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2',
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,180,458 class A-1MM B notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS2',
     Outlook Stable';

  -- $48,166,542 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'AA/LS3' Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $11,138,373 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AA-/LS4', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $14,000,000 class B-FL notes downgraded to 'B/LS3' from
     'BBB', Outlook revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $15,000,000 class B-FX notes downgraded to 'B/LS3' from
     'BBB', Outlook revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,704,999 class C notes downgraded to 'CCC' from 'BB',
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,227,237 class D notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'BB',
     Outlook Stable'.


GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2000-1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative,
and assigned or revised Recovery Ratings to GE Capital Commercial
Mortgage Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2000-1:

  -- $23 million class E to 'A/LS1' from 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.8 million class F to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $23.9 million class G to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB-';

  -- $6.2 million class H to 'C/RR3' from ' CCC/RR1';

  -- $4.1 million class I to 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR3'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed, removed from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned Loss Severity ratings and Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

  -- $8.8 million class D at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed, revised the Rating Outlook and
assigned LS rating as indicated:

  -- $31.8 million class C at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned LS ratings as
indicated:

  -- $335.5 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $28.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-1 has been paid in full while classes J through M have
been reduced to zero due to realized losses.  Fitch withdraws the
rating of the interest only class X.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 3% of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the expected losses
(94.6%) come from the loans in special servicing.  Expected loss
as a percentage of the original deal balance is 6.4%.  Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over
the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 33.5% to $470.4 million from $707.3 million
at issuance.  Thirty-five loans (44.5%) have defeased.

Fitch has identified 14 Loans of Concern (16.5%), including three
assets in special servicing (8.4%).  The largest (5.9%) specially
serviced asset is collateralized by a 372-room hotel located in
downtown New Orleans, LA.  The hotel sustained damage from
Hurricane Katrina that has been repaired; however, cash flow and
performance have never fully recovered.  The loan was scheduled to
mature in May 2010; however, a modification and maturity extension
have been executed.

The second largest (2.2%) specially serviced loan is a 153,074
square foot office property located in Denver, CO.  The loan
transferred in March of 2010 due to monetary default, the borrower
reports cash flow from operations is insufficient to service the
debt.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 14 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with only two loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


GFCM LLC: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes
and downgraded four classes of GFCM LLC, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-1.  The downgrades are due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from highly leveraged watchlisted loans.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 14, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 49% to
$417.1 million from $822.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 130 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 32% of the pool.  The pool contains no defeased loans
or loans with underlying ratings.

Thirty three loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$2.1 million loss (26% loss severity).  There is one loan,
representing less than 1% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The specially serviced loan is the Atherton Road
Office Loan ($1.8 million -- 0.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 25,000 square foot office property located within a business
park situated in Rocklin, California.  The property is 100% vacant
following the loss of its single tenant in December 2009.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in March 2010 due to
imminent payment default but has remained current.  The property
is listed for sale and lease.  The loan is full recourse and
matures in April 2028.  Moody's is not estimating a loss for this
loan at this time.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on seven loans
representing approximately 5% of the pool.  These watchlisted
loans have realized significant declines in occupancy which have
resulted in cash flow declines.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $4.1 million loss from these loans (29% expected loss
based on a 50% default probability).  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of losses from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full and partial-year 2009 operating
results for 67% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 55% compared to
59% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.52X and 2.19X, respectively, compared to
1.47X and 1.99X.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 52 compared to 56 at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 7% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Maryland Industrial Office Portfolio
Loan ($28.6 million -- 6.9%), which is secured by nine industrial
properties and one office building located in Baltimore, Maryland.
The portfolio totals 1.3 million square feet and was 97% leased as
of December 2009 compared to 93% at last review.  Performance has
been stable.  The loan matures in February 2018 and fully
amortizes on a 180-month schedule.  The loan has benefited from 7%
amortization since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
51% and 2.22X, respectively, compared to 63% and 1.76X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Gateway Plaza I & II Loan
($26.0 million -- 6.2%), which is secured by a 339,200 square-foot
power center located in Patchogue (Suffolk County), New York.  The
loan matures in April 2023 and amortizes on a 300-month schedule.
The retail center is anchored by Bob's, Best Buy, Marshall's, King
Kullen and Michaels Stores and was 97% leased as of December 2009
compared to 90% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
71% and 1.4X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.34X at last
review.

The third largest loan is Eastover Ridge Apartment & Brunswick
Office Loan ($13.1 million -- 3.1%), which consists of two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by a 208-unit
apartment complex (Eastover Ridge Apartment) and a 16,000 square
feet medical office building (Brunswick Office) located in
Charlotte, North Carolina.  The loan matures in September 2027 and
fully amortizes on a 300-month schedule.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 90% and 1.15X, respectively, compared to 92% and 1.12X at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-4, $236,610,911, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 10/17/2003

  -- Class A-5, $112,724,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 10/17/2003

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously Aaa on
     10/17/2003

  -- Class B, $11,311,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 11/28/2007

  -- Class C, $13,368,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously upgraded to
     Aa3 from A2 on 11/28/2007

  -- Class D, $11,311,000, affirmed at Baa1; previously upgraded
     to Baa1 from Baa2 on 11/28/2007

  -- Class E, $10,284,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously assigned
     Baa3 on 10/17/2003

  -- Class F, $12,339,000, downgraded to B1 from Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Ba1on 5/28/2009

  -- Class G, $7,198,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1; previously
     downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on 5/28/2009

  -- Class H, $1,979,378, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     downgraded to Caa3 from Ba3 on 5/28/2009

  -- Class J, $0, downgraded to C from Ca ; previously downgraded
     to Ca from B3 on 5/28/2009


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2003-C2 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, removes from Rating Watch and assigns
Rating Outlooks, Recovery Ratings and Loss Severity ratings to
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., 2003-C2, as indicated:

  -- $21 million class F to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $11.3 million class G to 'BBB/LS5' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $16.1 million class H to 'BB/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $21 million class J to 'B-/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8 million class K to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BBB';

  -- $8 million class L to 'CC/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $9.7 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $4.8 million class N to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $4.8 million class O to 'C/RR6' from 'B-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns Outlooks and
LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $133.7 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $471.6 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $40.3 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30.7 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16.1 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $16.8 million class P certificates.  Fitch
withdraws the rating of the interest only classes X-1 and X-2.

The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets.  Fitch
expects losses of 5.34% of the remaining pool balance, or
approximately $44.3 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 35.7% to $830.3 million from $1.3 billion at
issuance.  Twenty-eight of the remaining loans have defeased
(35.5%).

As of March 2010, there are two specially serviced loans (6.9%).
The largest specially serviced loan (5.3%) is secured by a 420-
unit multifamily property located in Novi, MI.  The loan
transferred Jan. 8, 2010 for imminent monetary default.  The loan
is currently 30 days delinquent and the borrower is requesting
relief due to declining performance.  An updated valuation of the
property by an appraiser has indicated a significant decline in
value since origination.

The second largest specially serviced loan (5.1%) is secured by
The Boulevard Mall, a 587,170 square foot retail property located
in Las Vegas, NV.  The pari-passu loan is sponsored by GGP and was
transferred to the special servicer in April 2009 due to the GGP
bankruptcy.  The loan has been modified and is expected to be
returned to the master servicer.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern that is not specially serviced
is the Park Portfolio (2.2%) loan, secured by two office
complexes, one mixed-use property and two medical buildings
located in and around Washington, DC, with a combined total of
407,753 sf.  As of year-end 2009, the overall occupancy for the
portfolio had dropped to 50% from 85% at issuance.  The loan
remains current and cash flow is sufficient to cover debt service
with a servicer reported debt service coverage ratio of 1.13 times
for year-end 2009.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backe securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity.  Under this scenario, 13 loans are not
expected to pay off at maturity with no loans incurring a loss
when compared to Fitch's stressed value.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2004-C3 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded, and assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss
Severity ratings or Recovery Ratings to GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., series 2004-C3, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, as indicated:

  -- $82.9 million class A-J to 'BBB-/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $31.3 million class B to 'B-/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $14.1 million class C to 'B-/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.3 million class D to 'CCC/RR1' from 'A';

  -- $12.5 million class E to 'CC/RR3' from 'A-';

  -- $15.6 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $10.9 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $20.3 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $3.1 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';

  -- $6.3 million class K to 'C/RR6' from ' CCC/RR1';

  -- $4.7 million class L to 'C/RR6' from ' CC/RR3'.

In addition, classes B through J are removed from Rating Watch
Negative.

Fitch affirms and revises the Recovery Rating for this class:

  -- $4.7 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'C/DR4'.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns LS ratings as indicated:

  -- $272.6 million class A-1A at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $30 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $266 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $62.7 million class A-AB at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $138.6 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms these classes:

  -- $3.1 million class N at 'C/RR6';
  -- $1.9 million class O at 'D/RR6'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only classes X-1 and X-
2.  Classes A-1 and A-2 have been paid in full.  Class P is not
rated by Fitch.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 7.5%
of the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.  The majority of the expected losses
(86.8%) come from the loans in special servicing.  Expected loss
as a percentage of the original deal balance is 7.4%.  Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over
the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 20.3% to $997.3 million from $1.25 billion
at issuance.  Five loans (6.5%) have defeased.

Fitch has identified 25 Loans of Concern (28.1%), including 14
assets in special servicing (19.9%).  The largest (5.4%) specially
serviced asset is a collateralized by three multifamily properties
totaling 1,082 units located in Prince Georges County, MD.  The
subject was unable to refinance at maturity however the borrower
is continuing to make monthly payments.  Possible modification
terms have not been agreed upon and the servicer is also pursuing
a foreclosure.

The second largest (3.4%) specially serviced loan is a 302,992
square foot office property located in Chicago, IL, approximately
15 miles northwest of the central business district.  As of
January 2010, the subject was 55% occupied and had a net operating
income debt servicer coverage ratio of 0.86 times.  The servicer
is dual tracking a possible foreclosure and a possible note sale.

The third largest specially serviced loan (1.6%) is secured by a
268 unit multifamily property located in Pensacola, FL.  The
subject was 55% occupied as of January 2010 and the servicer is
dual tracking a possible foreclosure and a possible loan
modification.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 31 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with six loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-FL4 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 10 classes from Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corporation, Series 2006-FL4, reflecting
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 11.5% for the pooled
classes.  The non-pooled junior component certificates were also
downgraded to reflect Fitch's significant loss expectations on
these assets.  Fitch's performance expectation incorporates
prospective views regarding commercial real estate market value
and cash flow declines.  The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect
additional sensitivity analysis related to further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this release.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 58.8% of the pool is
expected to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the average cash flow decline
is 16.4% from fourth quarter 2009 cash flows.  In its review,
Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating statements and rent
rolls, updated property valuations, and recent lease and sales
comparisons.  Given that the loan positions within the pooled
portion of the CMBS are the lower leveraged A-notes (average base
case LTV of 99.3%), Fitch estimates the average recoveries on the
pooled loans will be approximately 80.4% in the base case.  The
defaults are determined considering the total leverage of each
asset, including additional B-notes and mezzanine debt, however, a
default may not result in a loss to the pooled portion given its
lower leverage position.  The base case term and refinance DSCR
for the pooled A-notes is 1.62 times and 1.07x, respectively,
whereas the more highly leveraged non-pooled component notes
(average base case LTV of 114.7%) have a lower modeled recovery of
51.9%.

The transaction is collateralized by 14 loans, six of which are
secured by hotel properties (46.5%), five by office properties
(38.7%), two are secured by retail properties (9.1%) and one loan
is secured by a multifamily property (5.6%).  All of the final
extension options on the loans are within the next five years and
are: 68.3% in 2011, 1.8% in 2012, 26% in 2013, and 3.8% in 2014.

Fitch identified seven Loans of Concern within the pool: PGA
National Resort and Spa (16.6%), Nine Zero Hotel (5.9%), Greenwich
Residential (5.6%), Northwest Plaza (5.3%), Mondrian Scottsdale
(5.1%), 260 East 161st Street (4.4%), 2600 West Olive Avenue
(3.4%), and Sheraton Metairie (1.8%).  Four of these loans,
Greenwich Residential, Northwest Plaza, Mondrian Scottsdale, and
Sheraton Metairie, are in special servicing.

Fitch's analysis resulted in loss expectations for seven loans in
the 'B' stress scenario.  The three largest contributors to losses
(by unpaid principal balance) in the 'B' stress scenario are PGA
National Resort and Spa (19.4% loss severity), Northwest Plaza
(52.6%), and Mondrian Scottsdale (41.7%).  All of the 13 junior
non-pooled component classes resulted in a maturity default under
Fitch's base stress.

The largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the PGA
National Resort and Spa loan, is secured by a 339-room full
service resort located in Palm Beach Gardens, FL.  The resort is
situated on 808 acres and includes five 18-hole golf courses, 19
clay-surface tennis courts, nine food and beverage outlets,
30,000-sf meeting space, and a 35,500-sf spa.  The property also
features one of the largest croquet clubs in the country, with
five tournament-quality courts.  In addition to the 339 rooms at
the property, guests also have the option to stay in the 1,200-sf
cottages owned by third parties and managed by the resort.  Of the
280 homes, approximately 50 are typically operating under a rental
agreement with the borrower, sharing 50% of rental revenues.
Since issuance, the property has experienced a decline in
occupancy and ADR achieved as a result of reduced demand following
the downturn of the economy.  At issuance, the property was 64.8%
occupied with an ADR of $167.55 resulting in a RevPAR of $108.60.
As of TTM ending in September 2009, the property's occupancy ADR
and RevPAR were 58.7%, $158.5 and $93.05, respectively.  According
to the November 2009 STR report, the property has outperformed its
competitive set achieving a RevPAR penetration index of 120.4%.

The second largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the
Northwest Plaza loan is collateralized by a 1,672,613 sf regional
mall and an attached 12-story, 152,605 sf class-B office building
on a 122-acre parcel of fee simple land.  The property is located
in the St. Ann suburb of St. Louis, Missouri, 13 miles north of
the city's downtown.  The loan transferred to special servicer in
October 2008 following payment default and has since been
foreclosed on and is currently REO.  The special servicer,
Wachovia, listed the property for sale and is currently in
negotiations with the City of St. Ann.  Fitch expects that losses
are likely upon the disposition of this asset.

The third largest contributor to loss under the 'B' stress, the
Mondrian Scottsdale loan, is secured by a 194-room full-service
hotel located in Scottsdale, Arizona.  The original loan was used
to acquire, renovate and re-brand the James Hotel into the current
Mondrian Hotel.  The hotel, which was originally constructed in
1966, is located on located on East Indian School Road in Old Town
Scottsdale.  Despite capital expenditures since issuance at the
property, the operating performance failed to meet the sponsor's
original expectations.  According to the STR report which
identifies the competitive set as five hotels consisting of 936
rooms, the RevPAR penetration for the 12 months ending in August
2009 was 73.7%, reflecting the underperformance of the asset.  The
loan transferred to the special servicer in June 2009 as a non-
performing maturity default and foreclosure proceedings began in
January 2010 and are still underway.  An appraisal valuation
completely in July 2009 indicates that losses are likely upon the
disposition of this asset.

Fitch has removed these classes from Rating Watch Negative and
downgraded, assigned Rating Outlooks, Loss Severity Ratings, and
Recovery Ratings, as indicated to the pooled classes:

  -- $35.4 million class B to 'AA/LS4' from 'AA+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $30.7 million class C to 'A/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18 million class D to 'BBB/LS5'from 'AA-'; Outlook Negative.

  -- $16.7 million class E to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $11.3 million class F to 'BB/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $15 million class G to 'CCC/RR1' from 'A-';

  -- $17.6 million class H to 'CC/RR5' from 'BBB+';

  -- $24.3 million class J to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $21.9 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $29 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes, and assigns LS
Ratings as indicated to the pooled classes:

  -- $47.9 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Negative;
  -- $230.4 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Negative.

Additionally, Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and
downgraded and assigned RRs to these non-pooled junior component
classes:

  -- $2.3 million class N-NZH to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $1.6 million class N-NW to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';

  -- $899,005 class O-NW to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $961,005 class P-NW to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $1.2 million class Q-NW to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $1.4 million class N-2600 to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB+';

  -- $2 million class O-2600 to 'CCC/RR3' from 'BB';

  -- $1.3 million class P-2600 to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $1.7 million class Q-2600 to 'CC/RR6' from 'BB-';

  -- $2.2 million class N-MET to 'BB' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $6.6 million class O-MET to 'BB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $770,025 class N-E161 to 'B' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $894,087 class N-SCR to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB';

  -- $1.4 million class O-SCR to 'CCC/RR5' from 'BBB-'.

Class X1 has been paid off in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the senior
position of the CMBS note or property specific performance
warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral under the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' or lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled
certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay interest
shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the classes.
The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the current
outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is used to
assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class H reflects modeled recoveries of
34.4% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($2.2 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($35,844);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($2.2 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($2.5 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Takes Rating Action on 2002-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and
assigns Recovery Ratings to these classes of Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corporation Commercial Mortgage Trust series
2002-C1, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $5.8 million class N to 'CC/RR2' from 'BB-';
  -- $8.7 million class O to 'CC/RR2' from 'B-'.

Fitch downgrades, and assigns or revises Loss Severity ratings and
Recovery Ratings to these classes as indicated:

  -- $14.5 million class J to 'A/LS5' from 'AA-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $20.4 million class K to 'BBB/LS4' from 'A'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $20.4 million class L to 'BB/LS4' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $8.7 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB+';

  -- $4.4 million class P to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and maintained Rating Outlooks for
these classes:

  -- $20 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $608.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $46.5 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.6 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.5 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.4 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16 million class G at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.4 million class H at 'AA+/LS4'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class XC.

Fitch does not rate the $18.9 million class Q.  Class A-1,
interest-only classes XPB and XP, and non-rated class SWD-B are
paid in full.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 2.9% of the remaining pool balance
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating
changes over the next one to two years.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool consists of three
loans with a collateral balance that has paid down 21.9% to
$920.2 million from $1.2 billion at issuance.  Twenty-one loans
(27.9%) have defeased.  Fitch has identified 24 Loans of Concern
(17.6%), including five loans in special servicing (5.8%).

The largest specially serviced asset (2.3%) consists of two, four-
story office buildings located in Northbrook, IL.  The asset
transferred to special servicing in April 2010 for imminent
default as the borrower has indicated they want to restructure the
loan.  The servicer-reported occupancy as of year-end 2009 was
79.9%.

The second largest specially serviced asset (1.9%) is a retail
property located in Ontario, CA.  The real-estate owned asset
transferred to special servicing in 2008 for imminent default, as
the property suffered a significant loss of home furnishing
tenants.

The third largest specially serviced asset (0.8%) is a hotel
property located near a U.S. military base in Dayton, OH.  The
loan is greater than 90 days delinquent, and the special servicer
is pursuing foreclosure.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal YE net operating income
or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues, such as a
significant decline in occupancy, and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Under this scenario, eight loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with three loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


GREENPOINT MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Two Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of two
tranches issued by GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2006-AR4.
The collateral backing the transaction consists primarily of
first-lien adjustable -rate option arm loans originated by
GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.

The downgrade is driven by the accelerated pace of subordination
depletion relative to the amortization of the tranche.  Following
overcollateralization and subordination depletion losses are
allocated pro-rata to all senior certificates.  However, the Class
A-1B bond supports the Class A-1A bond and absorbs losses
allocated to both the Class A-1A and Class A-1B.  The Class A-1B
bond has incurred losses of approximately $1.9 million as of the
May 2010.  The Class A-1A bond remains on review for possible for
downgrade as Moody's completes its review of this transaction.

Moody's generally rates securities Caa1 or lower if it has a very
high likelihood of taking a loss in the expected case.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2006-AR4

  -- Cl. A1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Jan 27, 2010 Ba2 Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A1-B, Downgraded to C; previously on Jan 27, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series 1998-GL II Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two pooled
classes of GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-GL II.  The
affirmations reflect the positive impact of lower leverage due to
amortization on the single remaining loan in the pool, the
inherent value of the asset, strong sponsorship and the offsetting
negative impact of the deteriorating performance of the underlying
collateral.  The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 13, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 5% to $76 million
from $80 million since last review.  The 25-year fixed rate loan
with a rate of 7.80% has an anticipated repayment date of June 11,
2010 with a final maturity date of December 11, 2022.  The loan
sponsor, an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Host Hotels &
Resorts, Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured rating of Ba1; outlook
Negative), has notified the master servicer (Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC) that they do not anticipate paying off the loan at
the ARD date.  An additional deferred interest will accrue at
2.0%.

The Marriott Desert Springs Loan ($75.7 million -- 100% of pooled
balance) is secured by an 884-room full-service resort hotel
located in Palm Desert, CA.  The hotel features two 18-hole golf
courses, a 38,000 square foot spa, 49,000 square feet of meeting
space and other amenities typical of a resort hotel of this
caliber.  The property was built in 1987.  The property's
operating performance has deteriorated significantly in the last
two years.  Revenue per Available Room for calendar year 2008 was
$123.61 compared to full year 2009 results of $95.91.  Net House
Profit showed a similar dramatic decline during the same period
going from $10.4 million in 2008 down to $4.7 million in 2009.
Budget for 2010 year end results are projecting further slide in
both RevPAR and Net House Profit.  According to the master
servicer, the current reserve amount as of mid-April 2010 was
$21.7 million including a debt service reserve of $4.7 million.

The lodging sector experienced unprecedented levels of stress
during the last 18 month-period.  High-end properties, and
particularly, luxury and resort segments suffered the steepest
declines in RevPAR performance.  However, March 2010 was the first
month where US lodging segment as a whole achieved positive RevPAR
growth compared to the same period from the prior year since 4Q
2008.  Luxury and upper-tier segments are expected to show strong
rebound as demand and average daily rate for these segments have
fallen the most.  Although Moody's believe the lodging sector has
bottomed out and is on its way to recovery, Moody's anticipate
that it will take some time for the increase in RevPAR to
translate to growing bottom lines.  As such, Moody's stabilized
value for this property remains unchanged from last review at
$74.9 million.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio declined
slightly to 101% from 106% at last review.  Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio for the loan is at 0.40X compared to 1.08X
at last review.  Although the stressed DSCR as well as actual DSCR
are below 1.0X, Moody's believe that the combination of strong
sponsorship, inherent value of the asset and debt service reserve
warrants an affirmation at this time.  The pool has not
experienced any losses since securitization.

Moody's rating action is:

* Class F, $47,480,911, affirmed at Baa3; previously on March 5,
  2009 downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1

* Class G, $28,183,997, affirmed at B3; previously on March 5,
  2009 downgraded to B3 from B1


GSR MORTGAGE: Fitch Junks Rating on Class 1-A-1 From 'AAA'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one exchangeable class in GSR
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1F:

  -- Class 1-A-1 (3623416H7) downgraded to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AAA'.

The action taken is based on an analysis of the exchangeable
structure of class 1-A-1.  Classes 1-A-11, 1-A-13, 1-A-14, 1-A-15,
and 1-A-16 of the same transaction can together be exchanged for
class 1-A-1.  The current ratings of the bonds that can be
exchanged for class 1-A-1 are:

  -- Class 1-A-11 (3623416T1) rated 'CCC/RR1';

  -- Class 1-A-13 (3623416V6) rated 'CCC/RR2';

  -- Class 1-A-14 (3623416W4) rated 'CCC/RR2';

  -- Class 1-A-15 (3623416X2) rated 'BBB/LS1'; Rating Outlook
     Negative;

  -- Class 1-A-16 (3623416Y0) rated 'CCC/RR2'.

In cases where several bonds can be exchanged for one, the risk of
first dollar loss is generally the same as the risk to the lowest
rated bonds being exchanged.  In this instance the lowest rating
of the bonds being exchanged is 'CCC'.

Fitch performed cash flow analysis to determine the Recovery
Rating for this bond.  Recovery Ratings are assigned to classes
that are expected to incur impairment.  The Recovery Rating scale
is based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Ratings are designed
to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis while taking
into account the time value of money.


GUAM ECONOMIC: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Three Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one and downgraded two classes of
tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds from Guam Economic
Development and Commerce Authority, series 2007:

  -- $17,505,000 series 2007A current interest turbo term bonds
     due June 1, 2032 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $16,070,000 series 2007A current interest turbo term bonds
     due June 1, 2047 downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $3,407,077 series 2007B capital appreciation turbo term bonds
     June 1, 2057 downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level
of stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement payment
percent change the trust would be able to sustain and still pay
the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case 'B'
corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by the
trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual MSA
payment decline of between 0.3% and 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

The 'BBB+' affirmation on the 2007A bonds due 2032 is consistent
with the model output.  The downgrades on the 2007A bond due 2047
and 2007B bonds correspond to the model outputs, which denote
ratings one notch lower than the revised ratings.  The action also
indicates that the ratings may be downgraded depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

The Negative Outlook on all bonds reflects Fitch's concern that
cash flow will continue to come under stress.


HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Notes issued
by HARBOR Series 2006-2 LLC due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
increased ratings distribution since last review.  The rating
action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

HARBOR Series 2006-2 LLC is a static, synthetic CRE CDO currently
backed by portfolio of commercial mortgage back security reference
obligations (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized between 2004 and 2006.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 88 compared to 63 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa (29.9% compared to 36.7% at last review), Aa1-Aa3 (36.4%
compared to 41.9% at last review), and A1-A3 (6.9% compared to
5.4% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 5.6 years
compared to 6.8 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 54.5% compared to a mean of 54.4% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 55.0% compared to 59.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on 2/26/2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B3; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.


HARBOR SERIES: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2006-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded four classes of Notes issued
by HARBOR Series 2006-1 LLC due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio of reference obligations as
evidenced by an increase in the weighted average rating factor and
increased ratings distribution since last review.  The rating
action, which concludes Moody's current review, is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

HARBOR Series 2006-1 LLC is a static, synthetic CRE CDO currently
backed by portfolio of commercial mortgage back security reference
obligations (100% of the pool balance).  All of the CMBS reference
obligations were securitized between 2005 and 2006.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 57 compared to 20 at last
review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates
is: Aaa (51.1% compared to 68.9% at last review), Aa1-Aa3 (27.6%
compared to 16.0% at last review), A1-A3 (15.1% compared to 15.1%
at last review), and Baa1-Baa3 (6.3% compared to 0.0% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 4.6 years
compared to 6.5 at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a variable
WARR with a mean of 61.0% compared to a mean of 63.6% at last
review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlations to default distribution among the instruments within
the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).  Moody's
modeled a MAC of 47.0% compared to 60.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

The rating action is:

  -- Class A, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on 2/26/2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class B, Downgraded to B1; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class C, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Class D, Downgraded to B2; previously on 2/26/2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The
rating outcome may differ from the model output.

Moody's monitors transactions both on a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.


HARTWICK COLLEGE: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2002A Bonds to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the debt rating on
Hartwick College's $21 million of Series 2002A bonds issued
through the County of Otsego Industrial Development Authority to
Ba2 from Ba1.  The outlook has been revised to stable from
negative.  The rating action reflects the College's challenged
student market, continued dependence on operating lines of credit
for seasonal cash flow, long history of operating deficits, and
need for ongoing investment in facilities which could require
additional borrowing.  Moody's has revised the outlook to stable
from negative reflecting expectations for a larger entering
freshmen class in fall 2010, adequate retention of continuing
students, and improved operating performance in FY 2010.

Legal Security: General obligation; cash funded debt service
reserve fund

Interest Rate Derivatives: None.

                            Challenges

* Highly competitive market for students at this small
  undergraduate liberal arts college located in Oneonta, NY as
  demonstrated by the College's declining enrollment levels
  between 2007 and 2009.  In fall 2009, the College accepted 87%
  of freshmen applicants, although management reports that
  applications are up a very high 53% for fall 2010.  Despite the
  spike in applications, the College's yield on admitted students
  is weak, under 20% in fall 2009 and expected to be under 20% for
  fall 2010, highlighting significant competition from both other
  private and public institutions.  In fall 2009, Hartwick
  enrolled 1,444 full-time equivalent students.

* Reliance on operating lines of credit for seasonal cash flow.
  The College currently has three operating lines of credit
  outstanding for a combined $7.2 million authorized amount,
  including a new KeyBank National Association (A2/P-1) line of
  credit for $2.5 million which was established during FY 2010.
  During certain points of the year (typically December and
  June/July) the College draws on the lines prior to receipt of
  next semester's tuition revenue and re-growth of cash balances.
  Management reports that the maximum combined amount drawn on the
  lines was approximately $4 million during FY 2010 and that
  approximately $2 million is currently outstanding on the lines.
  The lines of credit are unsecured and contain various events of
  default, which if breached, could require accelerated repayment
  of the borrowed amount by Hartwick.

* Thin liquidity given challenging student market position and
  pressured operating performance.  As a result of investment
  losses during FY 2009 and an operating deficit by Moody's
  calculation, the College's unrestricted financial resources
  declined to a negative $1.6 million in FY 2009 and expendable
  resources declined to a thin $4.2 million.  FY09 expendable
  resources would cover $24.3 million of debt 0.17 times and would
  cover expenses a very thin 0.09 times.  Investment performance
  has improved during FY 2010, with the endowment up to
  $51.9 million as of 5/31/10, compared to $45.1 million as of
  6/30/09.  Although Hartwick's total financial resource base
  totaled $50 million in FY 2009, a large portion of net assets
  are permanently restricted (nearly 63%).  As of 6/30/09, the
  College's unrestricted cash and investments which could be
  liquidated within a one month timeframe were $10.98 million
  (including $3.7 million drawn on lines of credit).  This
  unrestricted monthly liquidity would cover 93 days of cash
  expenses (62 days excluding line of credit draws).

* Heavy reliance on student charges, with net tuition, fee, and
  auxiliary revenue representing nearly 84% of operating revenue.
  Continued growth of net tuition revenue is a key credit factor.
  The College employs a high sticker price/high tuition
  discounting model, with total undergraduate cost (including
  tuition, room, and board) of over $42,000 in fall 2009 and a
  total tuition discount of 45% in FY 2010.

* Improved, but still strained operating performance with
  historical operating deficits extending over a decade.  By
  Moody's calculation which includes depreciation as an operating
  expense, the College generated a 4.8% operating deficit in FY
  2009 and 5% three-year average annual deficit during FY 2007-
  2009, with cash flow covering debt service an average of 0.97
  times during that timeframe.  Moody's expect moderately improved
  operating performance during FY 2010, largely due to expense
  containment, growth of net tuition revenue (2% growth during FY
  2010), and a reduced endowment draw (limited to $1 million
  during FY 2010).  Although operating performance improved
  modestly in FY 2009, the operating cash flow margin was still
  quite low at 5.1%.

* High age of plant (22 years) and future capital needs which
  could require additional borrowing.  The Board expects to review
  various capital projects, including renovation of a student
  center and the pool, at a board retreat during summer 2010 and
  evaluate various financing options, including fundraising and
  borrowing.

* Moody's notes sizeable manager concentration within the
  endowment, with one particular multi-strategy equity fund
  representing more than half of the endowment as of 5/31/10
  ($26.6 million of the $51.9 million portfolio).  Concerns about
  this asset concentration are mitigated by the fact that the fund
  is a fund of funds, including over 20 equity managers.  As of
  May 31, 2010, the College's endowment asset allocation included
  approximately: 61.5% in public equities, 9% in hedge funds, 10%
  in private equity and real estate, 4% in a commodities fund, and
  15% in fixed income and cash.

                             Strengths

* Strong student demand for fall 2010 and expectation of larger
  incoming freshmen class.  Although the College has a very
  challenging student market as described in more detail above,
  current accepted freshmen deposits are strong and management is
  budgeting for an entering freshmen class of 450 students (514
  deposits currently, compared to a much smaller entering class of
  402 in fall 2009).  The recent substantial application increase
  is attributed to a branding strategy, better outreach and
  communication with potential students, heightened visibility and
  interest in the College's new 3-year bachelor of arts degree,
  and increased efforts of a relatively new Vice President for
  Enrollment Management.

* Continued growth of net tuition per student.  In FY 2009,
  Hartwick generated a relatively high net tuition per student of
  $17,041, a 16% increase over FY 2005.  The College will
  implement a 4% tuition increase for fall 2010.

* Ongoing management and board focus on improvement of operating
  performance, solidification of market niche, and stabilization
  of enrollment levels.  Moody's believe that the College's
  decision to limit its endowment draw to $1 million in FY 2010
  and continued focus on expense containment demonstrate a strong
  commitment to improving operating performance.

* Historically healthy gift revenue given its small size.  In FY
  2009, the College generated $3.1 million of total gift revenue.
  Average annual gift revenue during FY 2007 through 2009 is much
  higher at $8.4 million including becoming the beneficiary of a
  trust valued at more than $9 million in FY 2009 ($7.3 million
  market valuation as of May 31, 2010).  The College will annually
  receive 5% of the trust's market valuation up to $600,000
  annually.

* The Series 2002A bonds benefit from cash funded debt service
  reserve fund.

                              Outlook

Moody's has revised the outlook to stable from negative reflecting
expectations for a larger entering freshmen class in fall 2010,
adequate retention of continuing students, improved operating
performance in FY 2010, and manageable future borrowing plans to
support capital investment.

                What Could Change the Rating -- UP

Longer term stabilization of enrollment and continued growth of
net tuition revenue, accompanied by a consistent trend in positive
operating cash flow, re-growth of unrestricted financial
resources, and reduced dependence on lines of credit

                What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN

Deterioration in liquidity, enrollment declines, worsening of
operating deficits, significant additional borrowing absent growth
of revenue available to pay debt service

Key Indicators (Fall 2009 Enrollment, FY 2009 Audited Financial
Information):

* Total Full Time Equivalent Enrollment (FTE): 1,444

* Freshmen Selectivity: 87%

* Freshmen Matriculation: 19%

* Net Tuition per Student: $17,041

* Unrestricted Financial Resources: -$1.6 million

* Expendable Financial Resources: $4.2 million

* Total Financial Resources: $50.4 million

* Monthly Liquidity: $10.98 million ($7.3 million excluding
  amounts drawn on lines of credit)

* Expendable Financial Resources to Direct Debt: 0.17 times

* Expendable Financial Resources to Operations: 0.09 times

* Monthly Days Cash on Hand: 93 days (62 days excluding amounts
  drawn on line of credit)

* Three-Year Average Operating Margin: negative 5.0%

* Operating Cash Flow Margin: 5.1%

* Actual Debt Service Coverage: 0.97 times

* Reliance on Student Charges: 84%

Rated Debt

* Series 2002A: Ba2

Last Rating Action:

The last rating action with respect to Hartwick College was on
June 19, 2009, when a municipal finance scale rating of Ba1 was
affirmed and the outlook was revised to negative from stable.
That rating was subsequently recalibrated to Ba1 with a negative
outlook on May 7, 2010.


HELLER FINANCIAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two 1999 PH-1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of two classes,
affirmed three classes and downgraded two classes of Heller
Financial Commercial Mortgage Asset Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999 PH-1.  The upgrades are due to increased
credit subordination due to amortization and loan payoffs.  The
pool balance has decreased by 67% since Moody's last review.  The
downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans and concerns about loans approaching maturity in an
adverse environment.  Twelve loans, representing 57% of the pool,
have or will mature within the next seven months or have passed
their respective anticipated repayment dates.  All of these loans
are either on the servicer's watchlist or are in special
servicing.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.  Although
loan concentration, which is measured by Herf, has declined
significantly since securitization, it is similar to last review.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance has decreased by approximately 84%
to $160.4 million from $1.0 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 22 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 85% of the pool.  The pool includes
one loan with an investment grade underlying rating, representing
6% of the pool.  Four loans, representing 8% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Eight loans, representing 35% of the current pool balance, are
currently on the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist
includes loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC; formerly
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association) monthly reporting
package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction,
Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material
issues that could impact performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated since securitization, resulting in
a $16.9 million loss (47% overall loss severity).  Six loans,
representing 27% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Somerset Grove II Loan
($33.2 million -- 20.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
450,000 square foot office building located in Somerset, New
Jersey.  At securitization the property was 100% leased to AT&T
Corp. (AT&T).  AT&T vacated in 2008 but continued to pay rent
until its April 2009 lease expiration.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in January 2009 for imminent default and
matured in May 2009.  The loan is currently real estate owned
(REO).

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by
multifamily and manufactured housing properties.  Moody's has
estimated a $26.5 million aggregate loss for the specially
serviced loans (61% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four loans,
representing approximately 17% of the pool.  These loans mature
within the next 12 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X or have significant performance problems.  Moody's has
estimated a $7.9 million aggregate loss on these loans (29%
weighted average expected loss based on an overall 63% default
probability).

Moody's was provided with partial and year-end 2009 and full-year
2008 operating statements for 65% and 89%, respectively, of the
pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit pool,
excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, is 87% compared
to 89% at Moody's prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.13X and 1.40X, respectively, compared to
1.14X and 1.43X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 8, essentially the same as last review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Station Plaza Office
Complex Loan ($10.0 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 320,500 square foot office building located in Trenton, New
Jersey.  The property has been 100% leased since securitization,
with 87% of the space leased to several New Jersey State agencies
through October 2017.  The loan, which matures in August 2013,
fully amortizes over its 15-year term and has amortized by
approximately 19% since last review.  Moody's current underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 3.84X, respectively, compared
to Aaa and 3.07X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 36% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Barefoot Landing Loan ($29.8 million -
- 18.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 244,000 square foot
entertainment/retail center located in Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina.  The property was 95% leased as of December 2009
compared to 100% at last review.  The property's financial
performance declined since last review due to lower rental
revenues and increased expenses.  The decline in performance has
been partially offset by principal amortization.  The loan has
amortized 4% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
95% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 91% and 1.31X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Springfield -- Prescott &
IDOT Loan ($17.5 million -- 10.9%), which is secured by a 248,500
square foot office complex located in Springfield, Illinois.  The
complex was 100% leased as of April 2010, the same as last review.
The largest tenant is the Illinois Department of Public Aid (73%
of net rentable area; lease expiration 6/2014).  The loan is on
the master servicer's watchlist because it passed its January 2009
ARD.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97% and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 98% and 1.27X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Springfield -- Bressmer-
Mendenhall Loan ($10.0 million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 157,620 square foot office complex located in
Springfield, Illinois.  The complex currently 100% vacant after
formerly being 100% leased to two state agencies.  Due to the
vacancy and the soft Springfield office market, Moody's is
projecting a high probability of default on the loan.  The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 200% and 0.59X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.26X at
last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 5/27/1999

  -- Class D, $3,104,816, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 8/2/2006

  -- Class E, $12,622,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 10/10/2006

  -- Class F, $37,865,000, upgraded to Aa1 from Aa3; previously
     upgraded to Aa3 from A1 on 5/21/2009

  -- Class G, $17,670,000, upgraded to Aa3 from A2; previously
     upgraded to A2 from A3 on 5/21/2009

  -- Class L, $15,146,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from B3 on 5/21/2009

  -- Class M, $7,573,000, downgraded to C from Ca; previously
     downgraded to Ca from Caa2 on 5/21/2009


ILLINOIS HEALTH: Fitch Downgrades Rating on 1999A Bonds to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' the rating on
approximately $2,575,000 of outstanding Illinois Health Facilities
Authority revenue bonds, series 1999A (Bethesda Home and
Retirement Center).  The Rating Outlook has been revised to Stable
from Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrade reflects a deterioration in Bethesda Home and
     Retirement Center's financial and operating profile that led
     to two consecutive years of Bethesda failing to meet its 1.1
     times coverage covenants.

  -- The financial deterioration in fiscal 2008 and 2009 was
     caused by weaker occupancy, below budget Medicare census, and
     turmoil in the financial markets; realized losses on
     investments were particularly detrimental to Bethesda as it
     had historically relied on investment income and realized
     gains to offset operating losses.

  -- Over the same period, Bethesda was forced to suspend a campus
     repositioning project that would have added new independent
     living units.

  -- Liquidity remains solid for Bethesda, with days cash on hand
     of 351, a cushion ratio of 15.2x and cash to debt of 238% as
     of March 31, 2010, reflecting its low level of debt
     ($2.3 million), and small expense base ($6.5 million in
     2009).

  -- Bethesda has implemented cost savings and other initiatives
     focused on improving occupancy and increasing its Medicare
     census; first quarter 2010 results indicate that these
     initiatives are beginning to positively affect operating
     results.

Key Rating Drivers:

  -- Bethesda's rebound in operating performance in first quarter
     2010 needs to be sustained throughout the current fiscal
     year.

  -- A longer term credit factor will be Bethesda's ability to
     execute on its plan to find an affiliate partner that will
     advance its campus repositioning project.

Security:

Pledge of gross revenues and mortgage.

Credit Summary:

The rating downgrade reflects a deterioration in Bethesda's
financial profile over the past two years, driven by lower
occupancy as well as volatility in Bethesda's investment income.
Total overall occupancy has declined at Bethesda since 2005 when
it was 80%, with overall occupancy at 61% at year end 2009.
Bethesda has been working to increase its Medicare census, a key
revenue driver for Bethesda as Medicare provides for higher
reimbursement relative to Medicaid for short stays, and short-term
Medicare residents are also a feeder for longer-term residency at
Bethesda.  However, in 2008 and 2009, the Medicare census remained
below budget.

Bethesda's service area remains highly competitive with
approximately 15 long-term care facilities with over 2,000 beds
located within a five-mile radius of the facility, including a
number of hospitals in the area with their own rehabilitation
units.  Further stress on occupancy has been caused by the overall
drop in utilization during the current economic downturn at area
hospitals that refer to Bethesda.

The lower census has weakened Bethesda's operating performance,
and Bethesda had a negative excess margin of 11.6% ($662,000 loss)
in 2009.  The bottom line loss reflects operating losses as well
as realized losses on investments.  Historically, Bethesda has
relied on investment income to support debt service coverage.
With the realized losses, Bethesda's debt service coverage was
below the covenant of 1.1x coverage, which marked the second
consecutive year that this has occurred.  Bond documents mandate a
consultant call in when failing to make the 1.1x coverage for a
second consecutive year.  Bethesda is in contact with the bond
trustee.

The Stable Outlook reflects Bethesda's strong first quarter
results which indicate that marketing and cost saving initiatives
that Bethesda has been implementing are beginning to gain
traction.  First quarter results are exceeding budget and show
occupancy rising to 67%, led by an increase in the Medicare
census, a positive excess margin of 9.2% ($160,000 in excess
income), and debt service coverage of 3.4x.  Moreover, Bethesda's
liquidity in the interim period remains solid at 351 DCOH, 15.2x
cushion ratio, and 238% cash to debt.  A key rating driver over
the next year will be Bethesda's ability to maintain the current
operational improvement.

Finally, Bethesda's board is beginning the process of seeking an
affiliation partner, in part, to help move forward a campus
repositioning project, which includes the building of new
independent living units, that Bethesda suspended during the
economic downturn.  In preparation for the project, Bethesda
closed down its ILU building, moving out the last resident in July
2009, and cleared land on its campus for the new structures.

Bethesda is a long-term care facility located in the Mont Clare
neighborhood of Chicago.  Total revenue in 2009 was $6 million.
Bethesda is required to submit to the master trustee audited
financial statements within 120 days of each fiscal year
(including balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement,
and a compliance certificate) and the first three quarterly
unaudited statements within 45 days after each fiscal quarter-end
(including balance sheet and income statement only).  Fitch views
the disclosure requirements negatively since information is
required to be sent only to the trustee and not directly to
bondholders or the NRMSIRs.  However, Bethesda has recently begun
regular conference calls for bondholders and has made efforts to
voluntarily disclose interim results, which Fitch views
positively.


IRWIN HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 60 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 60
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 30 tranches from 17 RMBS
transactions issued by Irwin trusts.  The collateral backing these
deal primarily consists of closed end second lien mortgages and
home equity lines of credit.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by financial guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.
RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated
at their underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's
guaranty.

Complete List of Actions

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2002-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 4% for Group I
    and 14% for Group II

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 8%

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 5% for Group I
    and 11% for Group II

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 15%

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Confirmed at B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 16% for Group I
    and 24% for Group II

  -- Cl. IA-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 34% for Group I
    and 37% for Group II

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IIA-4, Confirmed at Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-3

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 42% for Group I
    and 43% for Group II

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010
     Aaa Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-P1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 18% for Group I
    and 17% for Group II

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 55% for Group I
    and 56% for Group II

  -- Cl. IA-1, Confirmed at Ca; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-2, Downgraded to Caa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-3, Downgraded to C; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. IIA-4, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2002-A

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 5% for Group I
    and 12% for Group II

  -- Cl. IA-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IIM-1, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIM-2, Downgraded to B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIB-1, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-A

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 8%

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-B

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 7%

  -- IA, Confirmed at Aa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- M, Confirmed at A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-C

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 2%

  -- M-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Sep 26, 2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Sep 26, 2003 Assigned
     A2

  -- B-1, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Sep 26, 2003 Assigned
     Baa2

  -- B-2, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Sep 26, 2003 Assigned
     Baa3

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-D

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 8%

  -- M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-1, Confirmed at Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba2 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- B-2, Confirmed at B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2005-A

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 11%

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to A3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aaa
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2005-B

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 14% for Group I
    and 4% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M-3, Confirmed at B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-1, Confirmed at Caa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-2, Confirmed at Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-3, Confirmed at Ba3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2005-C

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 14% for Grouup I
    and 6% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1M-1, Downgraded to A1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M-2, Downgraded to Baa1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M-3, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1M-4, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Baa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-1, Downgraded to B2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ba3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1B-2, Downgraded to C; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-1, Confirmed at Aa2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Aa2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-2, Confirmed at A2; previously on Mar 18, 2010 A2
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-3, Confirmed at B1; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2M-4, Confirmed at B3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 B3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2B-1, Confirmed at Caa3; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa3
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


JER CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  S&P removed all of
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction following
interest shortfalls to two nondeferrable classes, which caused an
event of default.  Classes B-1 and B-2 experienced interest
shortfalls according to the June 17, 2010, trustee remittance
report, which prompted us to downgrade these classes to 'D'.

S&P lowered its rating on class A to 'B' to reflect its view of
the class' susceptibility to a future liquidity interruption.  S&P
downgraded the deferrable class C, D, E, F, and G notes to 'CCC-'
to reflect continued liquidity interruptions.

The trustee, Bank of America N.A., delivered an EOD notice to
Standard & Poor's on June 25, 2010, which noted that JER 2005-1
had experienced an EOD under section 5.1 (a) of its indenture.
The notice indicates a default in the payment of interest accrued
on the class B-1 and B-2 notes that continued for a period of four
business days, which resulted in an EOD.

The liquidity interruption resulted from the failure of the
underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities collateral for
JER 2005-1 to produce sufficient interest proceeds to pay the full
interest amounts due to the nondeferrable interest classes.
According to the trustee's remittance reports, the amount of
interest available each month from the collateral has steadily
declined in each of the past six months, to $608,950 in June 2010
from $1.3 million in January 2010.  According to the most recent
trustee report, 73 classes of CMBS ($404.3 billion, 96.6%) from 13
distinct transactions issued in 1998 through 2005 collateralize
JER 2005-1.  The current assets also included three classes
($14.4, 3.4%) from Mach One 2004-1 LLC, which is a CMBS
resecuritization.

Standard & Poor's analyzed JER 2005-1 according to its current
criteria.  S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     JER CRE CDO 2005-1 Ltd.

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class    To                   From
           -----    --                   ----
           A        B                    AA-/Watch Neg
           B-1      D                    BBB+/Watch Neg
           B-2      D                    BBB+/Watch Neg
           C        CCC-                 BBB/Watch Neg
           D        CCC-                 BB+/Watch Neg
           E        CCC-                 BB/Watch Neg
           F        CCC-                 BB-/Watch Neg
           G        CCC-                 B/Watch Neg


JP MORGAN: Fitch Rates Various Series 2010-C1 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2010-C1:

  -- $416,124,000 class A-1 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $131,283,000 class A-2 'AAALS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $61,488,000 class A-3 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $608,895,000* class X-A 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $107,452,454* class X-B 'NR';
  -- $16,118,000 class B 'AA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $26,863,000 class C 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14,327,000 class D 'BBB/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $16,117,000 class E 'BBB-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8,955,000 class F 'BB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7,163,000 class G 'B+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6,268,000 class H 'B-/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11,641,454 class NR 'NR'.

*Notional amount and interest only.


JP MORGAN: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2006-FL2 Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades one class and withdraws the rating on one
class from J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
2006-FL2.

This class is downgraded:

  -- $25.6 million class L to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X-2.

The downgrade of Class L is due to a realized loss to the class,
which is not deemed to be recoverable.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Assigns Ratings on 2010-C1 Securities
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to
securities issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2010-C1.  The rated notes are collateralized by
36 fixed rate loans secured by 96 individual commercial properties
located across 31 states.

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2010-C1

  -- Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
  -- Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3
  -- Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
  -- Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
  -- Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
  -- Cl. G, Definitive Rating Assigned B1
  -- Cl. H, Definitive Rating Assigned B3

The ratings are primarily based on the quality of the collateral,
the credit enhancement furnished by the subordinate tranches, and
the structural and legal integrity of the transaction.

The V Score for this transaction is Low/Medium, which is in line
with the score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and Fusion CMBS
sector.  Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the
quality of available credit information and the potential
variability around the various inputs to a rating determination.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Series 1999-C8 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class,
downgraded two classes and affirmed five classes of J.P. Morgan
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 1999-C8.  The upgrades are due to the
increased credit support due to loan payoffs and principal
amortization.  The deal has amortized by approximately 53% since
Moody's prior review in March 2009.  The downgrades are due to
higher expected losses for the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged
loans.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio remaining within acceptable ranges.  The decline in
loan concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl Index, has been
mitigated by increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.

As of the April 15, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 86% to $102.1 million
from $731.5 million at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 71% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 11% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
One loan, the Vartan Building Loan ($14.3 million -- 14.0% of the
pool) was included in the most recent remittance statement but it
paid off on May 4, 2010 and is no longer in the pool.

Seven loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC; formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $41.1 million loss (41% loss severity on average).  Six
loans, representing 40% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Woodfield
Gardens Apartments Loan ($21.0 million -- 20.6% of the pool),
which is secured by a 692-unit apartment complex located in
Rolling Meadows, a suburb of Chicago, Illinois.  The loan has been
in special servicing since May 2007.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of office, multifamily, and self storage properties.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate $19.2 million loss for these specially
serviced loans (overall 47% expected loss).  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $10.5 million appraisal reduction for
three of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two loans
representing 7% of the pool.  These loans are both on the
servicer's watchlist and either mature within the next month or
have experienced a significant decline in performance.  Moody's
has estimated an aggregate $2.5 million loss for these loans
(overall 38% expected loss based on a weighted average 76% default
probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes potential
uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of loss from these
troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and full-year 2009
operating results for 88% and 74%, respectively, of the performing
pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
conduit weighted average LTV is 66% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.15X and 1.75X, respectively, compared to
1.08X and 1.32X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf is 40.  The pool
has a Herf of 8 compared to 20 at Moody's prior review.  The
decline in Herf has been mitigated by increased credit support.

The top three non-defeased performing loans represent 15.0% of the
pool balance.  The largest performing loan is the Post
Distribution Building Loan ($6.5 million -- 6.3% of the pool),
which is secured by a 264,000 square foot industrial building
located in suburban Tacoma, Washington.  The property is 100%
leased toPacific Distribution through February 2013.  Although
performance has been stable, Moody's analysis reflects a stressed
cash flow based on a dark/lit analysis.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 87% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.64X at
last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Quail Park III Loan
($5.3 million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 71,296
square foot office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The
center was 82% leased as of March 2010 compared to 93% at year-end
2009.  Moody's analysis is based on a stressed cash flow due to
Moody's concern about potential income volatility due to upcoming
lease rollovers and a soft office market.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.41X, respectively, compared 65% and
1.71X at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Ridge Terrace Health Care
Center Loan ($3.5 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 120-bed nursing home located in Lantana, Florida.  The
property has experience negative cash flow since 2007.  Moody's
has assumed a high probability of default due to the property's
poor performance.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 200% and
0.73X, respectively, compared 65% and 1.71X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 8/17/1999
     assigned Aaa

  -- Class C, $9,697,909, affirmed at Aaa; previously on 7/6/2006
     upgraded to Aaa from A1

  -- Class D, $14,630,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     10/17/2007 upgraded to Aaa from Aa2

  -- Class E, $25,603,000, upgraded to Aaa from Aa2; previously on
     3/19/2009 upgraded to Aa2 from Aa3

  -- Class F, $10,972,000, affirmed at A3; previously on 9/25/2008
     upgraded to A3 from Baa1

  -- Class G, $16,459,000, downgraded to B2 from Ba3, previously
     on 3/11/2004 downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2

  -- Class H, $20,116,000, downgraded to C from Caa2; previously
     on 3/19/2009 downgraded to Caa2 from B3

  -- Class J, $4,671,672, affirmed at C; previously on 6/15/2005
     downgraded to C from Ca


JPMORGAN-CIBC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securities Trust 2006-RR1, a U.S. resecuritization of real estate
mortgage investment conduit transaction.  S&P removed all of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch negative.

The lowered ratings primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the
transaction following its downgrades of five CMBS certificates
that serve as underlying collateral for JPMCIBC 2006-RR1.  The
downgraded CMBS ($34.3 million, 6.5% of the pool balance) are from
five CMBS transactions.  The downgrades also reflect S&P's revised
credit estimates on unrated CMBS collateral ($55.9 million,
10.7%).  S&P lowered the ratings on all of these credit estimates.

The downgrades also reflect S&P's analysis of the liquidity
interruption affecting the transaction.  In the June 22, 2010,
trustee report, classes B through L did not receive full interest
payment, with aggregate current interest shortfalls totaling
$376,325.  S&P downgraded classes D through H to 'D' due to
accumulated interest shortfalls.  S&P expects these classes will
continue to experience interest shortfalls for the foreseeable
future.  S&P has determined that the liquidity interruptions to
GSMS 2006-RR3 resulted from interest shortfalls on the underlying
CMBS collateral.  The interest shortfalls primarily reflect the
master servicer's recovery of prior advances, appraisal
subordinate entitlement reductions, servicers' nonrecoverability
determinations for advances, and special servicing fees.  If the
liquidity interruptions to JPMCIBC 2006-RR1 continue, S&P will
evaluate the interruptions and may take further rating actions as
S&P determine appropriate.  S&P previously lowered its ratings on
classes J, K, and L to 'D'.

According to the June 22, 2010, trustee report, 83 CMBS
certificates ($523.9 million, 100%) from 53 distinct transactions
issued between 2002 and 2006 collateralized JPMCIBC 2006-RR1.
JPMCIBC 2006-RR1 has significant exposure to these CMBS
certificates that Standard & Poor has downgraded:

* JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
  2006-CIBC14 (class H; $14.5 million, 2.8%);

* LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C1 (class K; $8 million,
  1.5%); and

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1 (class J; $5.1
  million, 1%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed JPMCIBC 2006-RR1 and its underlying
collateral according to S&P's current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

JPMorgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Trust 2006-RR1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
          Class            To               From
          -----            --               ----
          A-1              BB+              BBB+/Watch Neg
          A-2              B-               BB/Watch Neg
          B                CCC-             B/Watch Neg
          C                CCC-             CCC+/Watch Neg
          D                D                CCC/Watch Neg
          E                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          F                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          G                D                CCC-/Watch Neg
          H                D                CCC-/Watch Neg


JPMORGAN COMMERCIAL: S&P Raises Ratings on 1999-C7 Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
G and H commercial mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.'s series 1999-C7.  At the same
time, S&P removed its rating on the class G certificate from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using its
U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria.  S&P previously downgraded
these classes because of interest shortfalls, which the securities
subsequently recovered.  The upgrades reflect significant
deleveraging in the transaction, but upward rating momentum was
tempered by the transaction's relatively small loan pool (19
loans) and the fact that six of the remaining loans (37.6% of
pool, on a balance basis) have debt service coverage of less than
1.10x.

S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool.  Using servicer-provided financial
information, S&P calculated an adjusted DSC of 1.73x and a loan-
to-value ratio of 46.4%.  S&P further stressed the loans' cash
flows under S&P's 'AAA' scenario to yield a weighted average DSC
of 1.51x and an LTV ratio of 58.3%.  The implied defaults and loss
severity under the 'AAA' scenario were 38.5% and 22.9%,
respectively.

All of the DSC and LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude the
transaction's one specially serviced asset ($3.5 million, 14.8%)
and one ($1.2 million, 5.2%) asset that S&P determined to be
credit-impaired.  S&P separately estimated losses for these assets
and included them in the 'AAA' scenario implied default and loss
figures.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the Country Suites by
Carlson loan ($4.2 million total exposure, 18.0%) was the sole
asset with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.  The
loan, which is the second-largest asset in the pool, is secured by
a 114-room lodging property in Coon Rapids, Minn.  The asset was
transferred to the special servicer in September 2008 due to
maturity default, and is currently classified as a matured
balloon.  There is a $642,879 appraisal reduction amount (ARA) in
effect against the asset.  Standard & Poor's expects a moderate
loss upon the resolution of this asset.

S&P also determined the Las Cascades Apartments loan
($1.2 million, 5.2%) to be credit-impaired.  This loan, which is
the fifth-largest in the pool, is secured by a 156-unit
multifamily property in Phoenix, Ariz.  The property's reported
DSC was 0.14x as of December 2009, and occupancy was 85.3% as of
March 2010.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist
because of the low DSC.  Given the property's declining
performance, S&P considers this loan to be at an increased risk of
default and loss.

Only one asset ($2.0 million, 8.4%) has a final maturity scheduled
to occur within the next two years, and S&P considered this
maturity in S&P's current rating actions.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the June 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $23.4 million, down from $801.4 million
at issuance.  The pool includes 19 assets, down from 145 at
issuance.  The master servicer, also Midland, provided interim
2009 or full-year 2009 financial information for 85.2% of the
assets in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.57x for the pool based on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted
DSC and LTV ratio were 1.73x and 46.4%, respectively.  S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV figures exclude the transaction's specially
serviced asset ($3.5 million, 14.8%) and one ($1.2 million, 5.2%)
asset that S&P determined to be credit-impaired.  S&P separately
estimated losses for these assets.  Servicer-reported financial
information was available for one of these assets, which had a
December 2009 DSC of 0.14x.  Five ($4.5 million, 19.1%) loans are
on the master servicer's watchlist, including three of the top 10
loan exposures: one is discussed above and two of are discussed
below.  Six ($8.8 million, 37.6%) assets in the pool have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and five ($8.0 million, 34.2%)
assets have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                    Summary of Top 10 Exposures

The top 10 exposures have an aggregate outstanding trust balance
of $18.4 million (78.4%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.49x for the top 10 assets.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV ratio for the top 10 exposures are
1.68x and 51.1%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV figures
exclude two ($4.7 million, 20.0%) of the top 10 exposures, one
that is with the special servicer and one that S&P determined to
be credit-impaired.  The credit-impaired asset had a servicer-
reported DSC of 0.14x.

The Bavarian Village on the Lake Apartments loan is the eighth-
largest asset in the pool, and the second-largest asset on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $946,783
(4.0%) and is secured by an 81-unit multifamily property in
Clarkson, Miss.  The asset is on the watchlist because of a
decline in performance.  As of December 2009, reported DSC and
occupancy were 0.88x and 90.1%, respectively.  According to the
June 2010 watchlist comments, the low DSC is due to reduced income
and increased operating expenses.

The Office Depot loan is the ninth-largest asset in the pool, and
the third-largest asset on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
loan has a balance of $944,114 (4.0%) and is secured by a 30,000-
sq.-ft. retail property in Dallas, Texas.  The property is 100%
leased to Office Depot.  The asset is on the watchlist for a
decline in performance.  As of December 2009, reported DSC was
0.84x.  According to the June 2010 watchlist comments, the low DSC
is due to increased operating expenses, namely real estate taxes.

       Rating Raised And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

           J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C7

                             Rating
                             ------
                Class      To      From
                -----      --      ----
                G          BB+     CCC/Watch Neg

                           Rating Raised

           J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C7

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                     Class      To      From
                     -----      --      ----
                     H          B+      CCC-


JUPITER INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Confirms Ratings on 2006-01 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has confirmed the
rating of one class of notes issued by Jupiter International Co.
Limited, Series 2006-01.  The notes affected by the rating action
are:

* EUR19,500,000 Tranche Notes due September 20, 2016, Confirmed at
  Caa2; previously on April 22, 2009, Downgraded to Caa2 and
  Remained On Review for Possible Downgrade.

Jupiter International Co. Limited, Series 2006-01, is a static
synthetic CDO transaction referencing a Aaa-rated RMBS asset (the
"Reference Entity") issued out of the Netherlands.  It was
originated on August 11, 2006.

Moody's explained that the rating was confirmed as the expected
losses posed to note holders are consistent with the current
rating.  The rating is primarily based on the rating of Cloverie
2006-11 - Euro EUR19,500,000 Tranche Notes due September 20, 2016,
in which the proceeds from the note issuance by Jupiter
International Co. Limited, Series 2006-01 are invested.  Cloverie
2006-11 - Euro EUR19,500,000 Tranche Notes due September 20, 2016,
is currently rated Caa2, and is a static synthetic CDO with an
initial reference pool consisting of corporate assets.

The rating action also takes into account the analysis of the
Reference Entity and the participation of Citigroup Global Markets
Limited as the Swap Counterparty under the Swap Agreements with
the Issuer, evidencing a credit linked swap transaction and an
interest rate swap transaction relating to the Notes.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2007-LLF C5 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 10 classes from Lehman Brothers
Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-LLF C5, reflecting
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 6.4%.  Fitch's performance
expectation incorporates prospective views regarding commercial
real estate market value and cash flow declines.  The Negative
Rating Outlooks reflect additional sensitivity analysis related to
further negative credit migration of the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, approximately 60% of the pool
is modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 12.0% from generally year-end 2009 or the third-quarter
2009 servicer-reported financial data.  In its review, Fitch
analyzed servicer reported operating statements and Smith Travel
Research reports, updated property valuations, and recent sales
comparisons.  Fitch estimates that average recoveries will be
relatively stable, with an approximate base case recovery of
89.4%.

The transaction is collateralized by 32 loans, 15 of which are
collateralized by office (42.5%), 12 hotel (26.9%), three mixed
use (15.4%), and two industrial (15.2%).  All of the final
extension options on the loans are within the next two years and
are: 24.9% in 2011 and 75.1% in 2012.

Fitch identified six Loans of Concern (13.2%) within the pool, two
of which are specially serviced (6.4%).  Fitch's analysis resulted
in loss expectations for 12 loans in the 'B' stress scenario.  The
largest contributors to losses in the 'B' stress scenario are:
PHOV Hotel Portfolio (4.3%), 1888 Century City (4.0%), and Fifth
Third Center (1.6%).

The PHOV Hotel Portfolio consists of three hotel properties with a
total of approximately 1,132 rooms.  The properties are located in
Burbank, CA, Pleasanton, CA and Denver, CO and are affiliated with
Marriott and Renaissance.  Since issuance, the borrower completed
a $52.9 million ($46,731 per key) capital improvement program
including guest room, corridor, and public area upgrades.  Two of
the properties were reflagged to Marriott from the Hilton and
Crowne Plaza flags.  While performance for the year ended 2008
marked an improvement over issuance, year-end 2009 performance is
in line with issuance figures.  RevPAR at issuance, for 2008, and
for 2009 were $75, $80, and $74, respectively.  The loan was
underwritten by the issuer assuming a stabilized RevPAR of $107.

1888 Century City is a 20-story office building located in the
Century City submarket of Los Angeles.  The property was built in
1970 and renovated in 1996.  At issuance, the property was 73%
occupied with an average in place rent of $34.43 per square foot.
In addition, approximately 26% of the property was scheduled to
roll in 2009, including the largest tenant at 20% of net rentable
area.  The largest tenant did not renew, and approximately half of
the tenant's space remains vacant.  The property's occupancy as of
the November 2009 rent roll (and incorporating servicer updates)
is 63.2%.  The issuer underwrote the loan assuming an occupancy
rate of 90%.

Fifth Third Center is a 30-story office building located in
Nashville's Downtown Nashville.  At issuance, the property was
approximately 72% occupied.  The property subsequently lost its
largest and third largest tenants; however, the property has been
able to maintain its occupancy rate.  As of April 2010, the
property was 70% occupied.  The issuer underwrote the loan
assuming an occupancy rate of 90%.  There was no damage to the
property from the recent floods in Nashville.

Fitch has removed these classes from Rating Watch Negative,
downgraded the ratings and assigned Outlooks, Loss Severity
Ratings, and Recovery Ratings, as indicated:

  -- $472,863,000 class A-2 to 'AA/LS-3 ' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $80,308,000 class A-3 to 'A/LS-4 ' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $52,674,000 class B to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $48,678,000 class C to 'BBB/LS-5' from 'AA-'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $31,839,000 class D to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A+'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $28,756,000 class E to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $28,756,000 class F to 'BB/LS-5' from 'A-'; to Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $28,756,000 class G to CCC/RR4' from 'BBB-';

  -- $51,761,000 class H to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $57,513,000 class J to 'CC/RR6' from 'B'.

In addition, Fitch has removed this class from Rating Watch
Negative and affirmed the rating and assigned an Outlook and LS
rating as indicated:

  -- $1,055,348,020 class A-1 at 'AAA/LS-2'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch withdraws and removes from Rating Watch Negative the rating
of the interest-only class X-2.

Classes X-1, CGC, LCC, MVR, TSS-1, and TSS-2 have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate classes CPE, CQR-1, CQR-2, DMC-1, DMC-2, FBS-
1, FBS-2, FTC-1, FTC-2, HAR-1, HAR-2, HRH, HSS, INO,JHC, NOP-1,
NOP-2, NOP-3, OCS, ONA, OWS-1, OWS-2, PHO, SBG, SFO-1, SFO-2, SFO-
3, SFO-4, SFO-5, UCP, VIS, and WHH.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage
backed security loan pools are concentrated and similar in
composition to CREL CDO pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are
senior portions of notes held in CDO transactions.  The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the property specific performance warranted an alternative
analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned LS ratings, which indicate each tranche's potential
loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche
size to the expected losses for the collateral in the 'B' stress.
LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction with
probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks or LS ratings to classes
rated 'CCC' and lower.

Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash flows and
fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings stresses.
The credit enhancements were then compared to the expected losses
generated in each rating category to determine potential credit
migration over the next two years.  If the Outlook scenario would
imply a lower rating, then the class was assigned a Negative
Outlook.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR4' to class G reflects modeled recoveries of
46% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($13 million);
  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($175,899);
  -- Total present value of recoveries ($13.2 million);
  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($14.5 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.


LB COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Class F to 'CC/RR3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and assigned Recovery Ratings to
these classes of LB Commercial Conduit Mortgage Trust II's
commercial pass-through certificates, series 1996-C2:

  -- $11.6 million class F to 'CC/RR3' from 'B';
  -- Interest-only class IO to 'CC' from 'AAA'.

In addition, Fitch affirms this class:

  -- $0.2 million class G at 'D/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate class J, which has been reduced to zero due to
losses.  Classes A, B, C, D and E have been paid in full.

The downgrades of class IO and F to 'CC' reflect the high
probability of default.  Fitch expects losses of 2.9% of the
remaining pool balance, approximately $0.3 million, from the loans
that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's
refinance test.

To date, the transaction has incurred $29.5 million in losses,
7.4% of the original balance.  As of the April 2010 distribution
date, the pool has paid down 97% to $11.8 million from
$397.2 million at issuance.  Ten of the original 109 loans remain
outstanding, none of which have defeased or are in special
servicing.  Fitch identified five Loans of Concern (33.8%) within
the pool.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating income and
applying an adjusted property specific market cap rate between
7.25% and 10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity.  Two loans did not
pay off at maturity and only one loan incurred a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 2002-C7 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage, series 2002-C7,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $49.8 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $394.4 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $61.6 million class A-1b at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $20.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.8 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.8 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $14.8 million class G at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.3 million class H at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.9 million class J at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $11.9 million class K at 'A+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $19.3 million class L at 'BBB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $7.4 million class M at 'BBB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $5.9 million class N at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.9 million class P at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.5 million class Q at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2.9 million class S at 'B/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Ratings as
indicated:

  -- $8.9 million class T to 'CC/RR1' from 'CCC'.

Fitch does not rate the $8.7 million class U.  Classes A-1 and A-2
have paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest
only classes X-CL and X-CP.

The rating affirmations reflect the stable performance of the pool
and sufficient credit enhancement.  The Rating Outlooks reflect
the likely direction of any rating changes over the next one or
two years.  As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool has
paid down 39.6% to $716.5 million from $1.19 billion at issuance.
Of the original 115 loans, 84 remain in the transaction and 20
(25%) have been defeased.

Fitch has identified 16 Loans of Concern (8.24%), including four
loans in special servicing (1.15%), as well as other loans with
deteriorating performance.

The largest specially serviced loan is collateralized by a retail
property (1%) in Fayetteville, GA.  The loan transferred to
special servicing on Nov. 11, 2008 imminent default as a result of
Linens and Thing's bankruptcy filing.  The leasing prospects for
the vacant space are weak as the sub-market reports additional
vacancies in retail centers nearby.  The property is marketed for
sale.  Losses are expected.

The second specially serviced loan is collateralized by an office
building (0.54%) in Garland, TX.  The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2009 for imminent default.  The property
consists of two office buildings totaling 91,044 sf constructed in
1972 and located in Garland, TX with 64% occupancy.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 16 loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with six loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2002-C4 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity ratings to LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, series 2002-
C4, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates:

  -- $25.5 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.7 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $850.5 million class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.2 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.7 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $16.3 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.9 million class G at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.7 million class H at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.7 million class J at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $12.7 million class K at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $20 million class L at 'BBB-/LS5'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $7.2 million class M at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $7.2 million class N at 'B+/LS5'; Outlook Negative.

In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Recovery Ratings as
indicated:

  -- $3.6 million class Q at 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $1.8 million class S at 'CC/RR3';
  -- $8.9 million class T at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch does not rate the $7.2 million class P.  Classes A-1 and A-2
have paid in full.  Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest
only classes X-CL, X-CP and X-VF.

The rating affirmations reflect the stable performance of the pool
and sufficient credit enhancement to offset Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's analysis which is similar to its recent vintage
fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch expects potential losses of 1.37%
of the remaining pool balance from loans in special servicing and
loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one or two years.
As of the June 2010 distribution date the pool has paid down 23.4%
to $1.11 billion from $1.46 billion at issuance.  Of the original
114 loans, 83 remain in the transaction and 22 (38.4%) have been
defeased.

Fitch has identified 12 Loans of Concern (9.14%), including four
loans in special servicing (2.7%), as well as other loans with
deteriorating performance.

The largest specially serviced loan is collateralized by a class B
office building (2%) in Norwalk, Connecticut.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2009.  Occupancy is
currently 42% and is delinquent due to cash flow problems.  The
borrower has agreed to a stipulated foreclosure judgment.  The
special servicer anticipates this to become REO within 60-120
days.

The second specially serviced loan is collateralized by a 48,914
sf office building (0.56%) located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2009 for imminent
default.  Occupancy is currently 67%.  Special servicer is
pursuing foreclosure and losses are expected.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, five loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with three loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six 2000-C3 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded six classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2000-C3.  The downgrades are due to
higher losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted
loans and refinance risk associated with loans approaching
maturity.  Twenty nine loans, representing 93% of the pool, have
either passed their anticipated repayment dates or have matured.
Twenty of the loans, representing 52% of the pool, have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.00X.

The affirmations and confirmation are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's DSCR
remaining within acceptable ranges.  The decline in loan
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl (Index), has been
mitigated by increased credit support due to loan payoffs and
amortization.  The pool's balance has declined by 74% since last
review.

Moody's placed seven classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on April 8, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the April 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 82% to
$235.4 million from $1.3 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 36 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 65% of the pool.  Two loans, representing 5% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.
Defeasance at last review represented 34% of the pool.

The pool includes a credit tenant lease component, which
represents 3% of the pool.  There are no loans with underlying
ratings.  At last review, three loans, representing 29% of the
pool, had investment grade underlying ratings.  However, two of
the loans have defeased or paid off and the third loan, Sangertown
Square, has experienced a decline in performance and is currently
in special servicing due to a balloon default.

Seven loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$5.4 million loss (18% loss severity on average).  There are 21
loans, representing 72% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Sangertown
Square Loan ($55.1 million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a 855,000 square foot regional mall located in New Hartford
(Oneida County), New York.  The mall is anchored by Sears, JC
Penney and Macy's.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in December 2009 due to imminent default and has passed its
December 2009 ARD.  The borrower is seeking a loan modification
and extension.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.37X,
respectively, compared to 62% and 1.61X at last review.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Southern Company
Center Loan ($33.9 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 336,000 square office building located in downtown Atlanta,
Georgia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2006 when the building lost its largest tenant, Southern
Company Service.  The property was 60% leased as of August 2009.

The remaining 19 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
office, industrial, retail, and multifamily properties.  Moody's
estimates a $59.2 million aggregate loss for all the specially
serviced loans (50% loss severity on average).  The special
servicer has recognized an aggregate $10.9 million appraisal
reduction for two of the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on two loans
representing approximately 4% of the pool.  These loans are either
on the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature within
the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than
1.0X.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $3.2 million loss from
these loans (overall 38% expected loss based on a weighted average
75% default probability).  Moody's rating action recognizes
potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude of losses
from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through
P have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$3.0 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full and partial-year 2009 operating
results for 93% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 78%, essentially
the same as at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.48X and 1.37X, respectively, essentially
the same as at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 8, compared to 31 at last review.  The decline
in Herf has been mitigated by increased credit support.

The three largest conduit loans represent 13% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Pepper Square Shopping Center Loan
($16.3 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 192,000
square foot retail shopping center located in Dallas, Texas.  The
center is anchored by Stein Mart and was 90% leased as of
September 2009.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist
because it passed it February 2010 ARD.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 93% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.2X at
last review.

The second largest loan is the Central Forest Shopping Center Loan
($8.7 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 95,000
square foot retail center located in Dallas, Texas.  The property
is anchored by Office Depot and was 82% leased as of September
2009.  The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist because it
passed its February 2010 ARD.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
91% and 1.19X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.37X at last
review.

The third largest loan is Mooresville Festival Shopping Center
Loan ($6.4 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which is secured by an
160,000 square foot retail center located in Mooresville, North
Carolina.  The property is anchored by Kohl's Department store and
was 99% leased as of December 2009.  The loan is on the master
servicer's watchlist because it passed its January 2010 ARD.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.41X, respectively,
compared to 79% and 1.37% at last review.

The CTL component includes three loans secured by 3 properties
leased under bondable leases.  The CTL exposures are Walgreen Co.
($4.3 million -- 2.0% of the pool; Moody's senior unsecured rating
A2, stable outlook) and CVS/Caremark Corp. ($2.2 million -- 0.9%;
Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2, stable outlook).

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 5/18/2000

  -- Class B, $48,024,715, affirmed at Aaa; previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa2 on 7/11/2005

  -- Class C, $48,964,000, affirmed at Aaa; upgraded to Aaa from
     Aa1on 11/7/2006

  -- Class D, $19,585,000, affirmed at Aaa; upgraded to Aaa from
     Aa3 on 11/7/2006

  -- Class E, $13,057,000, affirmed at Aa2; upgraded to Aa2 from
     A2 on 11/7/2006

  -- Class F, $13,057,000, affirmed at A1; upgraded to A1 from
     Baa1 on 11/7/2006

  -- Class G, $11,751,000, confirmed at A2; previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class H, $20,891,000, downgraded to B2 from Baa2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class J, $16,322,000, downgraded to Caa3 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class K, $9,792,000 downgraded to C from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class L, $10,466,000, downgraded to C from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class M, $11,751,000, downgraded to C from Caa1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010

  -- Class N, $3,917,000, downgraded to C from Caa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 4/8/2010


LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Rates Class E Series 2010-2 Notes at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has assigned ratings to the following classes issued by LEAF
Receivables Funding 3, LLC, Equipment Contract Backed Notes,
Series 2010-2:

-- Series 2010-2 Notes, Class A rated AAA
-- Series 2010-2 Notes, Class B rated AA
-- Series 2010-2 Notes, Class C rated A
-- Series 2010-2 Notes, Class D rated BBB
-- Series 2010-2 Notes, Class E rated BB


LNR CDO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine classes of notes issued by LNR
CDO III, Ltd./Corp., due to negative credit migration in the
underlying portfolio.

Since the last rating action in January 2009, the credit quality
of the portfolio has declined with approximately 41% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 4.2 notches.  Fitch
considers 93.7% of the portfolio to be rated below investment
grade, with 50.9% in the 'CCC' rating category or below, compared
to 92% and 29.3%, respectively, at the last review.  Included in
the 'CCC' or lower percentage are 22 unrated first loss commercial
mortgage-backed securities comprising 22.1% of the portfolio.
Approximately 45.6% of the portfolio is experiencing partial or
full interest shortfalls, or deferring interest payments, and is
considered distressed.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for the class A notes are generally consistent with the rating
assigned below.

The cash flow model breakeven rates for the class B through class
G notes were below the 'CCC' rating hurdle.  Therefore, for these
classes, Fitch compared their respective credit enhancement levels
to the distressed portion of the portfolio to determine their
likelihood of default, and downgraded the classes as indicated
below.

Fitch does not assign Outlooks or Loss Severity ratings to classes
rated below the 'B' rating category.

LNR III is a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
that closed on Aug. 8, 2005.  According to the May 25, 2010
trustee report, the portfolio consists of CMBS (98.9%) from 1997
through 2004 vintage transactions and one commercial real estate
mezzanine loan (1.1%).

Fitch has downgraded these classes as indicated:

  -- $319,320,123 class A notes to 'CCC' from 'BB+';
  -- $92,633,884 class B notes to 'CCC' from 'BB';
  -- $63,158,700 class C notes to 'CC' from 'B+';
  -- $23,158,088 class D notes to 'C' from 'B';
  -- $20,666,191 class E-FL notes to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $4,597,595 class E-FX notes to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $21,432,457 class F-FL notes to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $3,831,329 class F-FX notes to 'C' from 'B-';
  -- $27,368,720 class G notes to 'C' from 'CCC'.


LNR CFL: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss
Severity Ratings to these LNR CFL 2004-1 LTD., Series 2004-CFL,
CMBS resecuritization notes:

  -- $3.7 million class I-8 to 'AAA/LS1' from 'A+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $7.8 million class I-9 to 'A/LS1' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4.7 million class I-10 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class I-11 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $2.6 million class I-12 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $242,972 class I-13 to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed and assigned Outlooks and LS
Ratings these classes:

  -- $878,412 class I-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.2 million class I-6 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $3.2 million class I-7 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Classes I-1 through I-4 have paid in full.

LNR CFL 2004-1 is collateralized by a portion of class I in SASCO
1996-CFL, which has been upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB+'.

The upgrades are the result of the low leverage of the remaining
collateral, and the lack of expected losses.


MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Keeps 'BB-' Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook to stable
from negative and affirmed its 'BB-' long-term rating on
Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority's
$43.05 million series 2005D and 2001C revenue bonds issued on
behalf of Milton Hospital.

"The outlook revision to stable reflects S&P's view of the
hospital's improved financial and operating performance due to
volume growth and improved case-mix index in the current year
combined with stabilization of unrestricted cash and investments
at levels that S&P considers weak, but are consistent with the
current rating," said Standard & Poor's Martin Arrick.  "Cost-
control initiatives have also been effective and have included
reducing staffing levels despite increased volume," said Mr.
Arrick.

The 'BB-' rating reflects S&P's view of the hospital's weak
balance sheet, continued excess income losses generating in S&P's
view thin debt service coverage and location in a competitive
environment.  Positive credit factors include Milton's completion
of its construction and renovation projects, which has contributed
to improved inpatient and surgical volumes and improved financial
performance in the current year.

The rating affirmation also reflects S&P's assessment of the
hospital's persistent though decreasing operating losses;
stabilized balance sheet metrics; and location in a competitive
market highlighted by considerable outmigration to Boston's
academic medical centers, although this is currently tempered by a
clinical affiliation with Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center.

Renewed slippage in either volume or balance sheet strength or if
the hospital does not sustain cash flow improvement made this
year, a lower rating or outlook change is likely.  The hospital
would need to demonstrate continued volume improvement, a return
to at least breakeven operations, or growth in liquidity to
achieve a higher rating or positive outlook.

Milton Hospital operates an 81-bed (51 staffed) general acute-care
hospital in Milton, Mass., approximately 10 miles south of
downtown Boston.


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-C1 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, revises Rating Outlooks and assigns Loss
Severity ratings, and Recovery Ratings to Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc.'s mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1999-
C1 as indicated:

  -- $14.7 million class E to 'BBB/LS4' from 'AA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $7.4 million class F to 'CCC/RR1'from 'B'.

The $17.5 million class G remains at 'D' with a revised RR to
'RR6' from 'RR3'.  Classes H and J remain at 'D/RR6' and have been
reduced to zero due to realized losses.  Class A-1, A-2, B, C, and
D have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate class K.  Fitch
withdraws the rating of the interest-only class.

The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS analysis.  Fitch
expects potential losses of 36.99% of the remaining pool balance
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes
over the next one to two years.

As of the May 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 93.2% to $39.7 million from $592 million at
issuance.  There are only eight loans remaining in the trust.  One
loan (17.6%) has defeased.

As of May 2010, there are six specially serviced loans (75.6%).
The largest asset is an office building (36.4%) in Dallas, TX.
The building is currently 43% occupied.  The debt service payments
are being made by reserves and the loan is current.

The second largest specially serviced loan (28.2%) is secured by a
multifamily complex in Harvey, LA.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2001 and has been caught in litigation.
The special servicer and borrower have recently come to a
settlement agreement, subject to bankruptcy court approval.  The
settlement provides an end to litigation which has lasted over
seven years, and the trust will receive an allowed unsecured claim
against the borrower.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.


MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1997-C2 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned Loss Severity ratings to
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, 1997-C2, as indicated:

  -- $37.7 million class F to 'A/LS2' from 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch affirms, assigns LS and Recovery Ratings as
indicated:

  -- $6.9 million class G at 'BB+/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative;

  -- $11.9 million class H at 'D/RR4'.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, and D are paid in full.  Fitch does not
rate the class E or K certificates.  The balance of class J has
been reduced to zero as a result of losses on disposed loans.  The
rating of class J remains at 'D/RR6'.  Fitch withdraws the rating
of the class IO.

The rating actions are the result of Fitch's revised loss
estimates for the transaction following Fitch's prospective
analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate
commercial mortgage backed security analysis.  Fitch expects
potential losses of 1.54% of the remaining pool balance from the
loans in special servicing and the loans that are not expected to
refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.  The Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating changes over
the next one to two years.

As of the June 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 91.3% to $59.9 million from $686 million at
issuance.

Fitch has identified four Loans of Concern (33.8%), including one
asset in special servicing (3.3%).  The specially serviced asset
is a retail property located in Hickory, NC.  The asset became
real estate owned in December 2008.  A lease was recently executed
for the anchor space and there are several prospects for the
smaller shops.

The largest (24.1%) loan of concern is a retail property located
in Tucker, GA.  As of March 2010, the property was 86% occupied
with no prospects.  No concessions are being offered and expenses
are normal to the property.

The second largest (5.13%) loan of concern is secured by a retail
property located in Lima, OH.  The occupancy of this property will
drop to 46% at the end of July.  With one exception the property
has not seen a positive debt service coverage ratio since 2005.

The third largest (2.71%) loan of concern is secured by a multi-
family property located in Dallas, TX.  The property has
experienced a decline in rental income due to a decline in
occupancy.  Concessions in the form of free rent are being
offered.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow and applying an adjusted market
cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity.  Under this scenario, 20 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with eight loans incurring a loss when
compared to Fitch's stressed value.


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2005-CKI1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded 14 classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-CKI1.  The downgrades are due to higher expected
losses for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted loans and
concerns about refinancing risk associated with loans approaching
maturity in an adverse lending environment.  Sixteen loans,
representing 21% of the pool, mature within the next three years.
Six of these loans (10% of the pool) have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio below 1.0X.

The confirmation and affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 15 classes on review for possible downgrade on
June 9, 2010.  This rating action concludes that review.  The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 12, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance decreased 5% to $2.9 billion from
$3.1 billion at securitization.  The 169 mortgage loans that
collateralize these Certificates range in size from less than 1%
to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 39% of the
pool.  The pool contains four loans, representing 10% of the pool,
with investment grade underlying ratings.  Three loans,
representing 2% of the pool, have defeased and are secured with
U.S. Government securities.

Forty loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool since last review,
resulting in a $7.5 million loss (51% loss severity).  Twelve
loans, representing 10% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Louisiana
Boardwalk Loan, ($124.9 million, 4.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 544,175 square foot lifestyle center located in
Bossier City, Louisiana.  This loan was transferred to special
servicing March 30, 2010, but has remained current.

The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mixture
of multi-family, industrial, self storage and retail properties.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $71.2 million loss for the
specially serviced loans, which represents an overall 23.5%
expected loss.  The special servicer has recognized an aggregate
$26.8 million appraisal reduction for eight of the twelve
specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 33 watchlisted
loans, representing 11% of the pool, due to concerns about
declining property performance.  Moody's estimates an
$80.5 million aggregate loss for these troubled loans (overall 25%
expected loss based on a 33% probability of default).  Moody's
rating action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing
and magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating statements for
86% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit
pool, excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, is 103%
compared to 102% at last review.  In addition to an overall
increase in leverage, credit quality dispersion has also
increased.  Based on Moody's analysis, 67% of the conduit pool has
an LTV greater than 100% compared to 55% at last review and 16% of
the pool has an LTV greater than 120% compared to 3% at last
review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.60x and 1.03x, respectively, compared to
1.42x and 1.0x at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loans' actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure loan size diversity,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 27.  The
pool has a Herf of 36 compared to 48 at last review.

There are four loans with underlying ratings.  The largest loan is
the Glendale Galleria loan ($142.5 million -- 4.9% of the pool),
which is secured by the borrower's interest in a 1.3 million
square foot regional mall (collateral consists of 661,000 square
feet of retail and office space) located in Glendale, California.
The loan represents a 55% pari-passu interest in a $260 million
amortizing loan.  There is also a $37 million B Note and
$47 million of mezzanine debt held outside the trust.  As of
December 2009, the property was 95% leased compared to 93% at last
review.  Financial performance has declined from last review due
to lower revenue achievement and higher operating expenses.
Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and
1.3x, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.48x at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the
International Home Furnishings Center Loan ($100.0 million -- 3.4%
of the pool), which is secured by the borrower's interest in the
fee and leasehold interest in two, 14-story furniture showroom
buildings totaling 2.7 million square feet located in High Point,
North Carolina.  Performance has declined since last review due to
the decline in consumer spending for home furnishings.  Moody's
current underlying rating and stressed DSCR is Aa3 and 2.02x,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 3.25x at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the Blue Cross
Building Loan ($28.7 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is
secured by two adjacent office buildings totaling 517,244 square
feet located in Richardson, Texas.  The loan amortizes on a 300-
month schedule.  Moody's current shadow rating is Baa1, unchanged
since last review.

The fourth loan with an underlying rating is The Plaza Loan
($20.0 million -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 171-
unit co-op apartment building located in Ft. Lee, New Jersey.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 45% and 2.06x,
respectively, compared to 41% and 2.38x at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 17.7% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Galileo NXL Retail Portfolio and
Westminster City Center Loan ($255.0 million -- 8.7% of the pool),
which is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in a portfolio
of 19 anchored community shopping centers totaling 3.5 million
square feet.  The properties are crossed collateralized and cross
defaulted and located across 14 states including Colorado (18% of
the allocated balance), Florida (16%) and California (11%).  This
loan is interest-only for its entire term.  Performance has
declined since last review due to a 9% decline in overall
portfolio occupancy from 92% to 83%.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 115% and 0.92x, respectively compared to 96% and 1.05x at
last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Ashford Hotel Portfolio
Loan ($160.5 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of 10 cross-collateralized and cross- defaulted hotel
properties totaling 1,703 guestrooms located across seven states
including Florida (42% of the allocated balance), California (14%)
and Minnesota (12%).  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 127% and
0.95x, respectively, compared to 101% and 1.27x at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Galileo NXL Retail Portfolio
2 ($99.0 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by the fee
and leasehold interest in a portfolio of 13 retail properties
totaling 1.6 million square feet.  The properties are cross
collateralized and cross defaulted and located across nine states
including Texas (36% of the allocated balance), Virginia (18%) and
West Virginia (8%).  The loan is interest-only for its entire
term.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR is 100% and 0.97x,
respectively, compared to 99% and 1.04x at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $14,814,440, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-1A, $136,726,421, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-1D, $11,257,173, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-2, $96,600,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-2FL, 100,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-3, $44,677,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-4FL, $300,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-5, $50,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-6, $1,069,709,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class A-SB, $176,000,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously
     assigned Aaa on 12/09/2005;

  -- Class AM, $307,374,000, confirmed at Aaa, previously placed
     on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa, previously assigned Aaa
     on 12/9/05;

  -- Class AJ, $234,372,000, downgraded to A2 from Aaa, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class B, $53,791,000, downgraded to Baa1 from Aa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class C, $26,895,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Aa3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class D, $53,790,000, downgraded to Ba2 from A2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class E, $30,738,000, downgraded to B3 from A3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class F, $53,790,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Baa1,
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9,
     2010;

  -- Class G, $30,738,000, downgraded to Ca from Baa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class H, $34,579,000, downgraded to C from Baa3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class J, $7,685,000, downgraded to C from Ba1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class K, $11,526,000, downgraded to C from Ba2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class L, $11,527,000, downgraded to C from Ba3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class M, $3,842,000, downgraded to C from B1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class N, $7,684,000, downgraded to C from B2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;

  -- Class P, $11,527,000, downgraded to C from B3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on June 9, 2010;


MICHIGAN TOBACCO: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades three classes from Michigan Tobacco
Settlement Financing Authority tobacco settlement asset-backed
bonds, series 2008:

  -- $114,860,000 series 2008A turbo current interest bonds due
     June 1, 2042 downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook revised
     to Negative from Stable;

  -- $29,874,650 series 2008B taxable capital appreciation turbo
     term bonds due June 1, 2046 downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- $57,673,814 series 2008C capital appreciation turbo term
     bonds due June 1, 2058 downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'; Outlook
     Negative.

The downgrades are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

The 2008A bond is being downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', the 2008B
bond is being downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB' and the 2008C bond is
being downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB'.  In each case, the model
output corresponds to ratings one notch lower than the downgraded
ratings, indicating that the ratings may be lowered depending on
the amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

Negative Outlooks are assigned to all bonds whose model output
indicates a rating of 'BBB+' or below, reflecting Fitch's concern
that cash flow will continue to come under stress.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2004-TOP13 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 18 classes, and assigns Rating Outlooks and
Loss Severity ratings to Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-TOP13, as
indicated:

  -- $74.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $127 million class A-3 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $589.2 million class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.8 million class B at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.2 million class D at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.1 million class E at 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class F at 'AA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.6 million class G at 'A-/LS3'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class H at 'BBB+/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $9.1 million class J at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3 million class K at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class L at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class M at 'BB-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $4.5 million class N at 'B/LS4'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $3 million class O at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $937.8 million interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $668.1 million interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook
     Stable.

Fitch does not rate class P.

The affirmations are due to continued expected stable performance
of the pool following Fitch's prospective analysis of the
transaction.  To date, the pool has incurred no losses.  Fitch
expects losses of approximately 1% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $6.5 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 22.6% to $937.8 million from $1.027 billion
at issuance.  Fifteen of the remaining loans have defeased
(16.6%), and as of April 2010, there are three specially serviced
loans (0.9%).

The largest specially serviced loan (0.6%) is secured by a 44,504
sf retail property located in Sunrise, FL.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in March 2010 due to monetary default.

The second largest specially serviced loan (0.2%) is secured by an
80 unit multifamily property located in Pensacola, FL.  The third
loan in special servicing (0.1%) is cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted with the second largest loan in special servicing
and is a 68 unit multifamily property located in Bay Minette, AL.
The loans transferred to special servicing in February 2010 due to
monetary default.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying a property specific adjusted market cap rate
between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Thirteen loans are not expected to pay off at
maturity and six loans were modeled with a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2005-XLF Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed three classes
from Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Series 2005-XLF commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.  A detailed list of rating
actions follows at the end of this release.

The downgrades are a result of Fitch's loss expectations, which
incorporate prospective views of cash flow declines and commercial
real estate market value declines.

Under Fitch's updated methodology, the entire pool, backed by a
single loan, is modeled to default in the base case stress
scenario, defined as the 'B' stress.  In this scenario, the
modeled cash flow decline is 42% from the year-end 2009 cash flow.
Fitch estimates that the 'B' stress, base case scenario recoveries
will be below average at 53.4%.

The transaction is collateralized by one loan, which is
collateralized by Metrocenter Mall, a 1.4 million square foot
regional mall located along Interstate 17 in Phoenix, AZ.  The
property is currently anchored by Sears, Dillard's, and Macy's,
and includes 56,250 sf of theater space and approximately 470,000
sf of inline space.

The loan transferred to the special servicer in June 2009 due to
imminent default, and has passed its final maturity date in
February 2010.  The property has suffered due to the downturn in
the Phoenix economy.  Two of the anchor spaces are vacant.  Per
the special servicer, the inline occupancy was 75.5% (68.1%
excluding temporary tenants) as of March 2010.

The special servicer has had a court-appointed receiver installed,
who is marketing the property for sale.

Fitch has downgraded and removed this class from Rating Watch
Negative, and assigned a Recovery Rating as indicated:

  -- $64,913,000 class M to 'C/RR5' from 'BB+'.

Fitch has affirmed and removed this class from Rating Watch
Negative and assigned Outlooks as indicated:

  -- $10,322,000 class K at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $36,755,000 class L at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only class X.

The class sizes incorporate the recent payoff of Dominion Tower,
which may not be reflected in the most recent trustee report.
Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E,F, G, H, J, N-TG, N-FB, and O-FB have
all paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage
backed security loan pools are concentrated and similar in
composition to CREL CDO pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are
senior portions of notes held in CDO transactions.  The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the property specific performance warranted an alternative
analysis.

Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash flows and
fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings stresses.
The credit enhancements were then compared to the expected losses
generated in each rating category to determine potential credit
migration over the next two years.  If the Outlook scenario would
imply a lower rating, then the class was assigned a Negative
Outlook.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.

As there is only one loan remaining, the transaction is similar to
a U.S. CMBS single-borrower transaction.  In addition to the CREL
CDO methodology, Fitch reviewed the transaction in conjunction
with its 'Rating U.S. Single-Borrower Commercial Mortgage
Transactions,' including reviewing insurance requirements and
borrower structure.  As there is not current criteria for
assigning loss severity ratings to single-borrower deals, none
were assigned to this transaction's classes.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class M reflects modeled recoveries of
17% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries
     ($11.3 million);

  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($0);

  -- Total present value of recoveries ($11.3 million);

  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($12.4 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2006-XLF Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class from the pooled portion of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2006-XLF reflecting Fitch's base case loss
expectation of 18.6%.  Fitch also downgraded one non-pooled junior
participation certificate to reflect Fitch's updated analysis on
the loan.

Fitch's performance expectation incorporates prospective views
regarding commercial real estate values and cash flow declines.
Although classes F through M are currently taking shortfalls,
Fitch's rating actions consider the high likelihood of recovery of
these shortfalls.  The Negative Rating Outlook reflects additional
sensitivity analysis related to further negative credit migration
of the underlying collateral.

Under Fitch's updated analysis, approximately 47.3% of the pooled
loans, and 73.8% of the non-pooled components, are modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress.  In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline
is 10.8% from generally third- and fourth-quarter 2009 servicer-
reported financial data.

In its review, Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating
statements and rent rolls, updated property valuations, and recent
lease and sales comparisons.  The remaining loan positions within
the pooled portion of the CMBS are the lower leveraged A-notes
(average base case LTV of 48.8%) with expected recoveries
averaging 60.6% on the pooled loans.  The 60.6% average recovery
was significantly impacted by significant expected losses on one
of two specially serviced loans.

The transaction is collateralized by five loans, three of which
are secured by hotels (58.1%), one by office (33.9%), and one by a
cooperative housing development (7.9%).  All of the final maturity
dates including all extension options for the non-specially
serviced loans are in 2010 or 2011.

Fitch identified three Loans of Concern within the pool (73.2%),
each of which is specially serviced.  Fitch's analysis resulted in
loss expectations for two pooled senior participations, and one of
the non-pooled junior participations in the 'B' stress scenario.
The two pooled senior notes that had expected losses (by unpaid
principal balance) in the 'B' stress scenario are: ResortQuest
Kauai (22.9%) and Holiday Inn - Columbus (16.5%)

The ResortQuest Kauai, interest only loan is collateralized by a
311 room full service hotel located on a fee-simple beach front
parcel of land in the city of Kapaa, along the east coast of
Kauai, HI.  The loan transferred to the special servicer January
2009 due to imminent default.  The property's performance has
declined significantly since issuance, as Hawaii tourism suffered
and performance projections never realized.  As of year-end 2009,
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR was 44.1%, $104 and $46, respectively,
compared to the underwriters stabilized estimates of 81.1%, $165
and $134.  In addition, the outdoor Luau space, which had brought
in significant income ($2 million per year) to the property,
burned down.  A receiver is in place and is marketing the property
for sale.  Purchase offers have been received and the special
servicer is working to finalize a sale.  The current income covers
current expenses with no ability to pay debt service.  Although an
appraisal reduction has been performed, the loan has been kept
current through the use of reserves and a settlement with the
guarantor for amounts equivalent to the insurance proceeds from
the outdoor Luau fire.  These funds may not be sufficient to cover
debt service before a potential sale of the property, and the loan
may become delinquent.

The Holiday Inn - Columbus interest only loan was originally
collateralized by a 337-room hotel with a Holiday Inn flag and a
western-themed, 60,000 sf water park located in Columbus, OH.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2008 when the
borrower allowed the Holiday Inn franchise agreement to expire.
In addition, the borrower was unable to extend beyond the initial
Feb. 9, 2008 maturity date.  The special servicer has received the
foreclosure judgment; however, has not conducted the foreclosure
sale, thus avoiding the transfer taxes.  A receiver has been
appointed and is operating the property as well as marketing it
for sale.  A purchase offer, believed to be in line with the
current value of the property, has been received and is
significantly below the debt.  The receiver and special servicer
are finalizing the sale.

The property is now operating as Fort Rapids Indoor Waterpark
Resort.  As of December 2009, the occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were
24.2%, $139, and $33, respectively.  The property continues to
operate at a loss.  The servicer made a non-recoverability
determination in October 2009 and no longer advances debt service,
which has resulted in interest shortfalls.  In addition, the
servicer has reimbursed itself from the trust for prior advances,
resulting in small principal realized losses to class M.  Given
the significant reduction in value from issuance combined with
prior advances, Fitch expects limited recoveries on the sale of
the asset.  However, any principal recoveries will first be
applied to the unpaid interest shortfalls.

Fitch has downgraded and removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity ratings to these pooled
certificates:

  -- $23.7 million class F to 'A/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.7 million class G to 'A/LS4' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.7 million class H at 'A/LS4 from 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.3 million class J at 'BBB/LS4' from 'A'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6.8 million class K to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative.

Fitch has also downgraded, removed from Rating Watch Negative and
assigned a Recovery Rating to this pooled certificate:

  -- $18.5 million class L to 'C'/RR5 from 'CCC'.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed and revised the RR of this pooled
certificate:

  -- $12.5 million class M at 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR5'.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns a
Rating Outlook to these non-pooled component certificate:

  -- $3.1 million class N-LAF to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms, revises the Rating Outlook and assigns a LS rating
to this certificate:

  -- $16.7 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook to Stable from
     Negative.

Fitch affirms, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns a
Rating Outlook to these non-pooled certificates:

  -- $2.3 million class O-LAF at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $2 million class N-SDF at 'A'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms and removes from Rating Watch Negative this non-
pooled certificate:

  -- $9.2 million class N-RQK at 'C/RR6'.

Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings of the interest-only (IO)
classes X-1 and X-2.

Classes A-1 through D have been paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

The assignment of 'RR5' to class K reflects modeled recoveries of
16.4% of its outstanding balance.  The expected recovery proceeds
are broken down:

  -- Present value of expected principal recoveries ($3 million);
  -- Present value of expected interest payments ($25,365);
  -- Total present value of recoveries ($3 million);
  -- Sum of undiscounted recoveries ($3.3 million).

Classes are assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6' when the present
value of the recoveries in each case is less than 10% of each
class' principal balance


MEZZ CAP: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded; removed from Rating Watch Negative;
and assigned Recovery Ratings, Rating Outlooks and Loss Severity
ratings, as indicated:

Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C1:

  -- $23.1 million class A to 'B-/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $2.8 million class B to 'CC/RR4' from 'AA+';

  -- $2.3 million class C to 'CC/RR5' from 'AA-';

  -- $2.8 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';

  -- $1.5 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';

  -- $1.6 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'BB';

  -- $1.1 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'B';

  -- $3.7 million class H to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR5'.

Class J was downgraded to 'D/RR6' from 'C/RR6' due to realized
losses.

Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2:

  -- $34 million class A to 'CCC/RR1' from 'AAA';
  -- $2.1 million class B to 'CC/RR5' from 'AA';
  -- $1.6 million class C to 'CC/RR5' from 'A';
  -- $2.6 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-';
  -- $1 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $1.8 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $1.2 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $3.9 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3:

  -- $40.8 million class A to 'CC/RR3' from 'A';
  -- $1.8 million class B to 'C/RR5' from 'BBB+';
  -- $1.9 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB';
  -- $3.2 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $1.8 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'B';
  -- $1.6 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';
  -- $1.7 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
  -- $4.9 million class H to 'C/RR6' from 'C/RR5'

Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C4:

  -- $59.8 million class A to 'C/RR2' from 'B';
  -- $2.2 million class B to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Mezz Cap Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C5:

  -- $39.5 million class A to 'CC/RR2' from 'A';
  -- $1.2 million class B to 'CC/RR5' from 'BBB';
  -- $1.6 million class C to 'C/RR6' from 'BB';
  -- $2.3 million class D to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-';
  -- $1.1 million class E to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';
  -- $1.8 million class F to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';
  -- $4.4 million class G to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR4'.

These classes remain at 'C/RR6':

  -- Mezz Cap 2004-C2, $0.5 million class J;

  -- Mezz Cap 2005-C3, $0.6 million class J;

  -- Mezz Cap 2006-C4, $2.2 million class C, $3.6 million class D,
     $1.2 million class E, $2.6 million class F, $6.9 million
     class G, $0.8 million class H;

  -- Mezz Cap 2007-C5, $0.5 million class H.

Additionally, Fitch has withdrawn the ratings of the interest-only
class X in each of the Mezz Cap 2004-C1, Mezz Cap 2004-C2, Mezz
Cap 2005-C3, Mezz Cap 2006-C4, and Mezz Cap 2007-C5 transactions.

The downgrades are due to significant deterioration in loan
performance across the pools, as evidenced by principal write-
downs to the junior classes, large increases in the number of
specially serviced loans, and additional interest shortfalls
within the transactions since Fitch's last rating action.  Severe
market value declines have resulted in an elevated number of
specially serviced loans and very high loss severities - typically
100% - on loans liquidated within the last year.

In most cases principal losses have not yet been realized; and
only the unrated and junior-most classes of certificates have
taken principal write-downs to date.  However, the higher leverage
on the loans, coupled with continuing term defaults and projected
defaults upon maturity, make substantial future losses to the
trusts likely.  Of the 27 specially serviced loans that have been
liquidated to date, 24 realized losses of 100%.  Five additional
loans have already been disposed of within their respective A note
transactions at 100% losses to the B notes, but have not yet been
reported in the Mezz Cap transaction remittance reports.  The pace
of liquidations has also begun to increase, with 18 of the
aforementioned dispositions occurring in 2010 and all but four of
the remaining liquidations occurring in 2009.

The current ratings are based on application of Fitch's recent-
vintage U.S. commercial mortgage backed security methodology.  The
ratings are prospective in nature and reflect anticipated losses
associated with the loans currently in special servicing as well
as the potential for losses to occur on the performing loans
having to refinance in the future.  This updated criteria replaces
the previous approach that did not address refinancing in an
illiquid capital market environment.

The transactions are securitized by B notes, which are subordinate
to the first mortgage loans securitized in various CMBS
transactions.  The loans are secured by traditional commercial
real estate property types and are subject to standard
intercreditor agreements that limit the rights and remedies of the
B note holder in the event of default and upon refinancing.  Due
to their subordinate positions, B notes that default and incur a
loss are typically 100% non-recoverable.  Advancing typically
ceases once a loan becomes 30 days past due.

The transactions' defaults generally far exceed the average
delinquencies of typical CMBS deals.  The total proportion of
loans currently in special servicing for each transaction is: Mezz
Cap 2004-C1, 25.6%; Mezz Cap 2004-C2, 11.8%; Mezz Cap 2005-C3,
31.7%; Mezz Cap 2006-C4, 33.3%; and Mezz Cap 2007-C5, 22.6%.
Fitch Loans of Concern make up between 42.3% and 58.4% of each
transaction.

The Mezz Cap 2004-C1, Mezz Cap 2005-C3, Mezz Cap 2006-C4, and Mezz
Cap 2007-C5 transactions are experiencing current interest
shortfalls on all Fitch-rated classes.  Classes F through K of the
Mezz Cap 2004-C2 transaction have been affected by current
interest shortfalls.  Fitch expects that a majority of classes in
the five Mezz Cap B note CMBS transactions will continue to incur
interest shortfalls resulting from loan modifications, advances,
appraisal reductions, special servicing fees, and legal fees.
Fitch expects that most of the current and future shortfalls will
not be recovered.

Fitch examined updated rent rolls, operating statements, and
reports obtained from both the B note and the corresponding A note
servicers.  In determining which specially serviced loans are
expected to incur losses, Fitch reviewed evaluations provided by
each A note's respective special servicer and evaluated expected
workout strategies.  Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of
recent vintage CMBS, each loan also underwent a refinance test
incorporating an 8% interest rate and a 30-year amortization
schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  Loans that could
refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher
were considered to be able to pay off at maturity.  Of the loans
not expected to pay off at maturity, several incurred modeled
losses when compared to Fitch's stressed value.  After applying
expected losses, new credit enhancement levels were calculated.


NASSAU COUNTY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms two and downgrades five classes from Nassau
County Tobacco Settlement Corporation (New York), tobacco
settlement asset-backed bonds, series 2006:

  -- $42,645,000 series 2006A-1 taxable senior current interest
     bonds due June 1, 2021 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37,905,609 series 2006A-2 senior convertible bonds due
     June 1, 2026 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $97,005,000 series 2006A-3 senior current interest bonds due
     June 1, 2035 downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $194,535,000 series 2006A-3 senior current interest bonds due
     June 1, 2046 downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,670,013 series 2006B first subordinate capital
     appreciation bonds due June 1, 2046 downgraded to 'BBB-' from
     'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $9,867,332 series 2006C second subordinate capital
     appreciation bonds due June 1, 2046 downgraded to 'BB+' from
     'BBB-', Outlook Negative;

  -- $37,604,290 series 2006D third subordinate capital
     appreciation bonds due June 1, 2060 downgraded to 'BB' from
     'BB+'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the 2006A-1 bond suggested by the
model is 'A-', the bond rating is at the capped rating of 'BBB+'.
The 2006A-2 bond is being affirmed at a level consistent with the
model output at 'BBB+'.  The 2006A-3 2035, 2006B CAB, 2006C CAB,
and 2006D CAB are being downgraded to 'BBB', 'BBB-', 'BB+' and
'BB', respectively; however, the model output corresponds to a
rating one notch lower than the downgraded rating for each bond,
indicating that the ratings may be lowered depending on the amount
of the 2011 MSA payment.  The A-3 2046 is being downgraded to
'BBB-' from 'BBB' which is consistent with the model output.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


NORTHERN TOBACCO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Five Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms two and downgrades three classes from
Northern Tobacco Securitization Corporation, 2006 (Alaska):

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds current interest turbo term
bonds:

  -- $117,510,000 due June 1, 2023 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     Stable;

  -- $70,105,000 due June 1, 2032 affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $212,270,000 due June 1, 2046 downgraded to 'BBB' from
     'BBB+'; Outlook Negative;

Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds capital appreciation bonds:

  -- 2046B downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  -- 2046C downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on the Structured Finance Criteria
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' published Sept. 30,
2009 and the level of stress each class is able to withstand as
indicated by Fitch's breakeven cash flow model.  The model
indicates, for each class of bonds, the level of the annual Master
Settlement Agreement payment percent change the trust would be
able to sustain and still pay the bond in full by the legal final
date.  The base case 'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA
payment received by the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category
corresponds to an annual MSA payment decline of between 0.3% to
2.5%.  The cash flow model accounts for the amount of the MSA
payment that the transaction has received in 2010, the capital
structure, the reserve account, and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the 2023 turbo bond suggested by
the model is 'A-', the bond is being affirmed at the cap rating of
'BBB+'.  The 2032 turbo bond is being affirmed at 'BBB+'; however,
the model output for this bond corresponds to rating one notch
lower than 'BBB+' and it may be downgraded depending on the amount
of the 2011 MSA payment received.  The 2046 turbo is downgraded to
'BBB' from 'BBB+', the 2046B CAB is downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB'
and the 2046C CAB is downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  As with the
2032 turbo, the model output for these bonds corresponds to
ratings one notch lower than the current ratings and they may be
downgraded depending on the amount of the 2011 MSA payment
received.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  Negative Outlooks
are assigned to other bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress.


MORGAN STANLEY: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 2000-LIFE1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes various actions to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Capital I Trust, series 2000-LIFE1, as indicated:

Fitch affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings to these classes:

  -- $1.9 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $8.6 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $17.2 million class E 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.9 million class F at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and assigns Risk Recovery Ratings to
these classes:

  -- $13.8 million class H to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB+';
  -- $6.9 million class J to 'CC/RR3' from 'BBB-';
  -- $5.2 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'BB-'.

In addition, Fitch downgrades and revises the RR rating of this
class:

  -- 13.8 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.

Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X.

Fitch does not rate classes G or M.  Classes A-1, A-2, and B are
paid in full.

The downgrades are due to expected losses (29.2% of the current
deal balance) upon the disposition of specially serviced assets
along with expected losses from Fitch's prospective review of
potential stresses.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any changes to the ratings over the next one to two
years.

There are 14 of the original 131 loans remaining in the
transaction.  There are currently eight loans (72.7%) in special
servicing.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and
10% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow.  Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity.  Of the non-specially serviced loans, one loan was
unable to refinance, and no loans incurred losses when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating son Seven 2007-XLF Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded seven classes of Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital I Inc. Series 2007-XLF.  This includes
four pooled classes, and three non-pooled, or rake, classes
associated with the HRO Hotel Portfolio Loan and the Starco Office
Portfolio Loan.  The downgrades were due to the deterioration in
the overall performance of the assets in the trust, the
significant concentration of loans secured by riskier property
types including hotels and undeveloped land, and refinancing risk
associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Approximately 78% of the loans by pooled balance
mature during calendar year 2011.  Moody's also affirmed one
pooled class.  Moody's placed seven classes on review for possible
downgrade on May 5, 2010.  This action concludes Moody's review.
The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
certificate balance decreased by approximately 42% to $796 million
from $1.4 billion at securitization due to the payoff of five
loans initially in the pool and partial loan pay downs associated
with five additional loans.  The certificates are collateralized
by ten floating-rate loans ranging in size from 3% to 20% of the
pooled trust mortgage balance.  The largest three loans account
for 50% of the pooled balance.  The pool composition includes
office properties (47% of the pooled balance), hotel properties
(40%) and undeveloped land (13%).

There is currently one loan in special servicing (The New Boston
Office Portfolio Loan -- 8.0% of the pooled balance).  It was
transferred to special servicing on February 8, 2010 due to the
borrower's inability to post additional collateral of $3.5 million
required to satisfy the debt service coverage ratio test necessary
to qualify for the maturity extension to February 9, 2011.  The
loan was modified on April 9, 2010 and will be transferred back to
the master servicer once the three month rehabilitation period is
completed.  Terms of the loan modification include an extension of
the loan maturity to February 9, 2011 with the option to extend
for an additional twelve months.  The additional collateral
required to satisfy the DSCR test can be posted in installments
through January 9, 2011.  Property release provisions were
modified to allow the release of an underperforming property in a
manner that would be accretive to the lender.  Additionally, a
letter of credit in the amount of $9.2 million that was posted by
the borrower in July 2007 to meet the DSCR test after the release
of one property can now be drawn and applied to pay down the loan.
The servicer expects that this will occur on the May 2010 payment
date.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is 91%,
compared to 83% at last review.  Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio for pooled loans is 0.85X, compared to 1.14X at
last review.

Major remaining loans in the transaction include:

The Crowne Plaza Times Square Loan ($151.8 million -- 20%) is
secured by leasehold interests in a 770-key, full service hotel
located at 49th Street and Broadway in the Times Square area of
New York, NY.  The hotel underwent an $85 million renovation that
was completed in late 2008.  In addition to the hotel rooms, loan
collateral includes approximately 180,328 square feet of office
space, 42,121 square feet of retail space and a 159-car parking
garage.  The commercial component was 98% leased as of December
2009.  Two tenants, American Management Associates (155,506 square
feet) and TSI Broadway (46,820 square feet), lease approximately
91% of the commercial space with lease expirations in 2016 and
2019, respectively.  The commercial component contributes
approximately 13% of total gross revenue.

Revenue per available room, calculated by multiplying the average
daily rate by the occupancy rate, for calendar year 2009 decreased
approximately 19% to $208 from $258 at securitization.  Moody's
has a stable outlook for the US lodging industry and although
Moody's expect positive US RevPAR growth in 2010, Moody's think
that it will take some time for the increase in RevPAR to
translate to growing bottom lines.  The loan is interest-only for
the full term with extension options through December 2011.
Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 93% and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage is 0.91X.  Moody's current underlying rating for
the pooled debt is B3.

The HRO Portfolio Loan ($133.3 million -- 17%) is secured by six
full-service hotels totaling 2,179 keys.  The loan has paid down
approximately 12% since securitization due to the release of the
205-key Sheraton College Park hotel.  The six remaining hotels are
branded as Westin, Sheraton, Hilton and Marriott.  One of the
Sheraton hotels, the Sheraton Danbury with 242 keys, is now
without a flag and is currently known as the Danbury Plaza Hotel
and Conference Center.  At securitization the objective for the
portfolio was to improve performance through renovations and
aggressive management.  These assets have not met expectations.
RevPAR for the portfolio was $48 in calendar year 2009 compared to
$72 in 2007.  The last hotel to be renovated was the 349-key
Sheraton Buckhead (Atlanta, Georgia) that re-opened in November
2009 after a $59 million ($169,000/key) renovation and was re-
flagged as a Marriott.

The loan is interest only for the full term with extension options
through October 2011.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 103% and
Moody's stressed DSCR is 0.44X.  Moody's current underlying rating
for the pooled debt is Caa1.  Additionally, there are junior trust
loans secured by the portfolio that are the rake classes M-HRO and
N-HRO that have been downgraded to Caa2 from B1 and Caa3 from B2,
respectively.

Babcock Ranch Loan ($100 million -- 13%) is secured by a 17,890-
acre parcel of vacant land located in Charlotte County and Lee
County, Florida, approximately 15-miles northeast of downtown Fort
Meyers.  The collateral is part of the larger Babcock Ranch that
totals 91,361 acres, with the remaining acres having been sold to
the State of Florida for preservation.  The loan sponsor, Kitson &
Partners and MSREF V Domestic Funding, L.P., intends to develop
the property into a planned community containing at least 17,870
residential units and 6 million square feet of commercial space
with electricity provided by a to-be-constructed solar energy
facility.  The mortgage loan was made in order to provide the
borrower with financing during the period necessary for it to
obtain the approvals needed for development.

Values for undeveloped land in south Florida have fallen
significantly over the past two years as home prices have fallen
and the inventory of unsold homes has risen.  The Cape Coral-Fort
Meyers metro area reportedly has the third highest metro
residential foreclosure rate in the nation with one in every 35
housing units receiving a foreclosure filing (2.82%) despite a
decrease in the rate of foreclosures from 2009 to 1st Quarter
2010.

The loan is interest-only for the full term with extension options
through August 2011.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 93%,
compared to 62% at Moody's last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating for the pooled debt is Caa1.

The Starco Portfolio Loan ($76.2 million -- 10%) is secured by
eight Class A and Class B office properties containing 786,133
square feet.  Seven of the properties are located in northern
Virginia and one is located in Columbia, Maryland.  Four of the
properties are located in the Route 28 Corridor South submarket
that had a 22% vacancy rate as of 1st Quarter 2010.  As of
February 2010, the portfolio was 89% leased with individual
property occupancies ranging from 74% to 100%.  The loan is
interest-only for the full term with extension options through
December 2011.  Moody's LTV for the trust debt is 102% and Moody's
stressed DSCR is 0.87X.  Moody's current underlying rating for the
pooled debt is B3.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1, $280,606,489, affirmed at Aaa; previously on
     February 23, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class A-2, $229,729,000, downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa;
     previously on February 23, 2007 assigned Aaa

  -- Class B, $41,211,000, downgraded to A2 from Aa2; previously
     on March 3, 2009 downgraded to Aa2 from Aaa

  -- Class C, $41,211,000, downgraded to Baa1 from A1; previously
     on March 3, 2009 downgraded to A1 from Aa1

  -- Class D, $25,190,000, downgraded to Baa3 from A3; previously
     on March 3, 2009 downgraded to A3 from Aa2

  -- Class M-HRO, $5,261,723, downgraded to Caa2 from B1;
     previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to B1 from Baa2

  -- Class N-HRO, $8,111,822, downgraded to Caa3 from B2;
     previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to B2 from Baa3

  -- Class M-STR, $2,886,176, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3;
     previously on March 3, 2009 downgraded to Ba3 from Baa3


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2005-XLF Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
L commercial mortgage pass-through certificate from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc.'s series 2005-XLF, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
rating on the class K certificate and withdrew its rating on the
class J certificate from the same transaction.

The rating actions on classes K and L follow S&P's revaluation of
the remaining loan in the trust, the Metrocenter Mall loan, which
is a floating-rate one-month LIBOR-indexed loan that matured on
Feb. 9, 2010.  The downgrade of the class L certificate primarily
reflects the declining performance of the collateral securing the
specially serviced Metrocenter Mall loan.

S&P's affirmation of the 'BBB+' rating on the class K certificate
reflects current credit enhancement levels of 90.8% (based on the
June 15, 2010, trustee remittance report).  In addition, S&P also
considered the outstanding debt balance of $19 per sq. ft. on
class K, which equals the amount per sq. ft. that the mall's
liquidation proceeds need to generate to pay off class K.  Despite
the high credit enhancement levels and low debt per sq. ft., the
sole remaining loan in the trust is with the special servicer and
operating performance at the retail mall has deteriorated.  If the
property's operating performance continues to decline beyond S&P's
expectations, S&P may lower its rating on this class.

S&P withdrew its 'A+' rating on the class J certificate because
the class was fully paid down.  The June 15, 2010, trustee
remittance report reflected this paydown, which followed the
payoff of the $30.0 million Dominion Towers loan on June 10, 2010.

The Metrocenter Mall loan is the remaining loan in the trust.  The
loan, secured by 534,900 sq. ft. of a 1.37-million-sq.-ft. super-
regional mall in Phoenix, has a trust and whole-loan balance of
$112.0 million.  In addition, there is a mezzanine loan with an
outstanding balance of $22.0 million that is held outside the
trust.  The property's operating performance has weakened in the
past year.  Based on S&P's review of the borrower's operating
statements for year-end 2009, its 2010 budget, and its May 7,
2010, rent roll, S&P's adjusted net cash flow has declined 32.4%
since S&P's last review dated Aug. 5, 2009.  This primarily
reflects decreases in rents, occupancy, and other income related
revenues at the property.  Occupancy has fallen to 66.5% from
68.1% since S&P's last review.  Using a capitalization rate of
9.0%, S&P's analysis yielded a stressed loan-to-value ratio of
156.2% on the trust balance.  The master servicer, Midland Loan
Services Inc. (Midland), reported a debt service coverage of 4.21x
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2009.  The current one-month LIBOR
reported in the June 15, 2010, trustee remittance report was
0.34%.

The loan was transferred to the special servicer, also Midland, on
June 26, 2009, due to imminent default after the borrower
expressed difficulty securing refinancing.  The loan matured on
Feb. 9, 2010.  Midland indicated that a receiver was appointed in
late March 2010, and plans to market the property for sale in the
third quarter of 2010.  A September 2009 appraisal valued the
property at a level that is significantly below the trust balance.

S&P previously lowered its rating on the class M certificate to
'D' due to recurring interest shortfalls associated with special
servicing and other expenses related to the Metrocenter Mall loan.

                          Rating Lowered

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-XLF

                                    Rating
                                    ------
              Class          To                From
              -----          --                ----
              L              BB+               BBB-

                          Rating Affirmed

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-XLF

                      Class          Rating
                      -----          ------
                      K              BBB+

                         Rating Withdrawn

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-XLF

                                    Rating
                                    ------
              Class          To                From
              -----          --                ----
              J              NR                A+

                          NR - Not rated.


MULBERRY STREET: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class A-1U to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued Mulberry Street CDO II, Ltd.
The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$30,000,000 Class A-1U Floating Rate Notes Due August 12,
     2038 Downgraded to Ca; previously on December 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

Mulberry Street CDO II, Ltd is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio primarily comprised of Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities and Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs), each from
2003-2005 vintages.

The rating downgrade action reflects deterioration in the credit
quality of the Issuer's underlying asset portfolio.  Credit
deterioration of the collateral pool is observed through several
factors, including a reduction in performing par value, an
increase in the number of assets with ratings on review for
downgrade and deterioration of Principal Coverage Tests.  The
trustee reports a decline in performing par from $289 million in
December 2009 to $251 million in June 2010, only a portion of
which is accounted for by the amortization of the Class A-1 Notes.
Currently, the Moody's ratings of approximately $43 million of
pre-2005 RMBS (approximately 10% of performing par) within the
underlying portfolio were placed on review for possible downgrade
following on Moody's updated expected loss projections applicable
to certain RMBS.  In addition, the trustee reports that all
Overcollateralization Tests are currently failing.

Moody's also notes that on April 28, 2008, as reported by the
Trustee, an Event of Default occurred as described in Section 5.1
(h) of the Indenture dated June 26, 2003, due to a failure to
satisfy the minimum Class A-1 Overcollateralization Ratio.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8 for subprime, April 12 for
Option-ARM and April 13 for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will have
varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


MULBERRY STREET: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A-1B Notes to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Mulberry Street CDO,
Limited.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$40,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes, Due 2037
     (current balance of $25,106,217), Downgraded to Ca;
     previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3.

Mulberry Street CDO, Limited, is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily asset-backed
securities originated between 2000 and 2006.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is in large
measure the result of observed deterioration in the level of
principal coverage of the Class A1 Notes.  The Class A1
Overcollateralization Ratio, as reported by the trustee, has
decreased from 83.79 in April 2009 to 68.24 in June 2010.  Moody's
noted that the transaction is negatively impacted by a large pay-
fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap where payments to the
hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of the excess spread in
the deal.  Additionally, the ratings of approximately $15 million
of RMBS within the underlying portfolio are currently on review
for possible downgrade following on Moody's recent updated loss
projections applicable to certain types of RMBS.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13 for subprime, January 14 for Alt-
A, and January 27 for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches.  Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.  For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches.  Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca.  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Bonds to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B1 from Ba1 and
assigned a negative outlook to the rating on the Michigan
Municipal Bond Authority's (MI) Public School Academy Facilities
Program Revenue Bonds (Detroit Academy of Arts and Sciences),
Series A (tax-exempt) and Series B (federally taxable).  Proceeds
from the Series 2001 bonds financed the acquisition, construction
and renovation of the Academy's facilities.  The B1 rating with
negative outlook affects $28.4 million in outstanding debt.  The
bonds have been removed from Watchlist for possible downgrade.

The downgrade reflects the decline of debt service coverage by net
revenues to below sum sufficient in fiscal 2009, the ongoing
financial weakness in fiscal 2010, and the continued risk
associated with declining enrollment, albeit arguably by design.
DAAS' potential decision to restructure its academic offerings
adds a significant element of uncertainty moving forward.  The
negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the Academy
will remain challenged due to narrow liquidity, continued reliance
on cashflow borrowing for operations and pressured revenue streams
that are expected to remain stressed through the midterm.  The B1
rating continues to reflect the security pledge provided by the
first lien on all state aid payments (less a 3% administrative fee
for the authorizing body) which are transferred directly from the
State Treasurer to the Trustee for the benefit of bondholders.
The rating also reflects an additional bonds test of 1.4 times, a
fully funded debt service reserve, a mortgage on educational
facilities, a history of significant school enrollment fluctuation
and narrow financial operations dependent on external borrowing
for liquidity.

  Significant Enrollment And Management Changes Since Inception;
              Both Remain Uncertain In The Near Term

The Detroit Academy of Arts and Sciences is a public school
academy located in Detroit, Michigan.  DAAS began operations in
the fall of 1997 as a K-5 elementary school with an enrollment of
720 students.  The Academy has since expanded, adding 6th grade in
1999 and 7th through 12th grades in 2001 and now serves
approximately 1,900 students through a full K-12 curriculum.
Enrollment remained relatively stable from 2002 through 2006,
peaking at a high of approximately 2,380 students in the fall of
2006.  Beginning in 2007, enrollment has declined each year with
officials estimating a fall 2010 enrollment count of 1,700,
reflecting a decline o f nearly 28% from 2006.  Officials
attribute the declines to a more focused effort to attract and
retain highly qualified students than in previous years as well as
population loss throughout the service area.  The Academy is
currently planning to restructure its high school program which
may further decrease total student counts through the midterm.  As
enrollment is a key determinant of state aid revenues which
contribute to operating flexibility as well as to the total amount
available for debt service under state law, Moody's will continue
to monitor student counts closely.

Originally sponsored by Central Michigan University, Oakland
University (OU) now serves as the authorizing body for DAAS.  The
Academy recently renewed its three-year charter contract with OU,
the current contract expiring in 2012.  The authorizing body
provides fiscal and administrative oversight, such as a quarterly
financial reporting requirement and academic measurement goals.
Although the high school program has not met Annual Yearly
Progress requirements for several years and is working with state
officials through training and mentoring programs as required, OU
reports that DAAS is currently in good standing.

DAAS and Edison, a private, for-profit management company, entered
into a management agreement in January 1998.  Under Edison's
agreement with DAAS, Edison was responsible for most management
and administration functions, including the educational program,
technology plans and management systems.  Edison also acted as the
construction manager for previous capital projects and provided a
supplemental reserve for the Series 2001A bonds funded at 25% of
maximum annual debt service of that offering.  DAAS largely
reduced Edison's role in 2003 and began operating independently in
2004, expecting to realize fiscal and operational efficiencies.
The Academy is currently governed by a five-member volunteer Board
of Directors and managed by an independent principal and an
internal administrative staff.  School officials report that
outstanding issues regarding the termination of the Edison
contract have been essentially resolved and management expects to
continue to strengthen internal operating procedures moving
forward.  With that, internal management has experienced frequent
turnover in recent years, often making the assembly of timely
information challenging for Moody's.

  Narrow Financial Operations With Continued Cash-Flow Borrowing

The current rating and negative outlook reflect , among other
factors, the below sum-sufficient coverage of debt service by net
revenues in fiscal 2009, the modest operating deficit projected
for the current fiscal year, and the uncertainty associated with
DAAS' plans to restructure its operations going forward.  The
Academy achieved balanced operations on a modified accrual basis
in each of its first five years of operation from fiscal 1998
through fiscal 2002, and an operating surplus of $1.2 million in
fiscal 2003.  Fiscal 2004 was the first year reflective of
operations following termination of the Edison relationship and
although the Academy expected to realize improved financial
performance as a result, DAAS ended fiscal 2004 and fiscal 2005
with substantial operating deficits.  The operating imbalances
were largely due to unexpected one-time capital expenditures and
legal settlement fees as well as increased spending on curriculum
materials and substitute teachers.  For several years beginning in
fiscal 2005, DAAS retained a management consultant per Series 2001
bond covenants, because the required debt service coverage ratio
of 1.4x for the previous offering was not met.

The Academy, which now uses full accrual accounting, ended
fiscal 2006 and 2007 with operating surpluses of $802,000 and
$1.4 million respectively and a cash position of $807,000
(excludes all debt related reserves), equal to 5.6% of operations
at the end of the fiscal year.  DAAS recorded a modest operating
surplus in fiscal 2008 and an operating deficit in 2009 of
$469,000 as student enrollment continued to decline and state aid
per pupil funding remained relatively flat.  Like many other
Michigan school districts, DAAS issues annual state aid
anticipation notes for cash-flow purposes and adheres to a
monthly repayment schedule.  In fiscal 2009, DAAS borrowed a total
of $4.5 million in notes, down from $9.5 million in fiscal 2006.
The district expects to borrow at similar levels moving forward.
The Academy's unrestricted net assets at year end 2009 were
$829,000, an increase from negative $800,000 at the end of fiscal
2005.  Coverage by net revenues of 2009 debt service was .94x
which improved from .72x in fiscal 2004, however decreased
from1.6x and 1.3x in fiscal 2007 and fiscal 2008, respectively.
Management expects to report an additional modest operating
deficit in fiscal 2010 and projects balanced operations moving
forward.

Although not currently mandated by law, DAAS is restructuring its
high school program in an effort to provide a more focused
learning environment for students.  The Academy's high school has
not met AYP requirements since the 2005- 2006 school year and is
currently working with the state to improve curriculum and test
scores.  If the Academy is required to further restructure and
shut down the high school program in the future, Moody's believes
that DAAS will be challenged to meet revenue requirements to
maintain balanced operations moving forward.

   Enrollment-Based State Aid Pledged With Direct-Pay Mechanism

The bonds are secured by monthly installment payments transferred
directly to the Authority from the State Treasurer pursuant to a
Lease Financing Agreement between the Authority, DAAS, and Rock
Management Company, a nonprofit corporation established for the
purpose of owning facilities for lease to DAAS.  In turn, the
Authority has assigned its rights and interest in these monthly
payments to the Trustee for bondholders' benefit.  This lock-box
mechanism provides strong security for the bonds, and allows the
debt service account to fill up first, prior to payment of excess
funds to DAAS for operations.  However, under current Michigan
statute, no more than 20% of state aid payments received in each
fiscal year may be legally available to pay principal and interest
on the bonds.  Maximum annual debt service represented
approximately 94% of state of state aid legally available for debt
service in fiscal 2009.

The Lease Financing Agreement incorporates an existing lease
between DAAS, as tenant, and Rock, as landlord, which owns the
schools facilities.  Rock has irrevocably assigned to the
Authority payments received by DAAS for lease of the building.
State aid payments are made on or before the 20th of the month or
the next business day, in eleven equal installments from October
to August, with no payment made in September, consistent with the
state aid payment schedule for Michigan public school districts.
If state aid is insufficient to make the monthly installment
purchase payment, DAAS pledges to use all other available funds to
meet its general obligation.  The State Treasurer has also been
directed to intercept and/or request an advancement of 97% of the
pledged state aid appropriated for current fiscal year but not yet
payable to the Academy, to be allocated for use by DAAS in the
event the monthly payments are not satisfied.

      Bonds Also Secured By Reserve Funds And Pledged Assets

The bonds are additionally secured by a debt service reserve equal
to maximum annual debt service (estimated at $2.6 million) -- the
traditional "lesser of" three-prong test -- funded primarily with
bond proceeds at closing.  If the trustee withdraws funds from the
debt service reserve account to pay principal and interest on
these bonds, DAAS must replenish the reserve fund within 120 days
to the required level.  Bonds are also secured by a first mortgage
lien on and security interest in the DAAS facilities and land.
The DAAS facilities include real property at the Academy's two
campuses, the East Jefferson facility (roughly 114,000 sq. ft.)
serving K-6th grade, and the Medbury facility (roughly 112,000 sq.
ft) which serves 8th - 12th grade.  DAAS also occupies a third
facility for its 7th grade students through a separate lease with
Rock, however that facility is not included in the security of the
bonds.  Should any portion of the property be sold during the life
of the bonds, proceeds must be used first for principal repayment.
Under the Mortgage Agreement and Lease Financing Agreement, the
school may only further encumber the property and revenue pledged
on a limited basis, and must meet an additional bonds test of 1.4x
future debt service coverage ratio.

                 Michigan Municipal Bond Authority

The Michigan Municipal Bond Authority was established by statute
and created for the purposes of making funds available to public
school academies within the state for financing or refinancing the
acquisition, construction and equipping public school facilities,
among other purposes.  To facilitate this, the Authority is
authorized to issue bonds and notes, the proceeds of which are
used to purchase municipal obligations.  These bonds are not an
obligation of the Authority.

                          Key Statistics

* FY 2009-10 Enrollment: 1,853 (September count)
* FY 2010-11 Enrollment Projection: 1,700 (September count)
* State funding as % of total revenues FY 2009: 81%
* Charter Term: 3 years
* Length of Issue: 30 years
* 2009 debt service coverage: 0.94x
* 2009 maximum annual debt service coverage: 0.8x

                             Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's opinion that the Academy's
operations will remain pressured and it may not meet its objective
of balancing financial operations it in the near term.  Although
the district continues to work to return to balanced operations,
Moody's expects internal and external forces to continue to weigh
very heavily on the district's capacity to restore structural
balance and curtail the continued loss of its student population.
The negative outlook also factors in the possibility that DAAS
will close its high school program further decreasing student
enrollment and available revenues for operations and debt service
payment.

                What Could Change The Rating -- Up

  -- Structurally balanced operations in fiscal 2011 and beyond

               What Could Change The Rating -- Down

  -- Continued revenue losses resulting in ongoing operating
     deficits and a weakened balance sheet

  -- Significant change to the debt profile

  -- Nonrenewal of the Academy's current authorizing charter

The last rating action with respect to the Michigan Municipal Bond
Authority's (MI) Public School Academy Facilities Program Revenue
Bonds (Detroit Academy of Arts And Sciences), Series A and Series
B was on December 15, 2009, when the Ba1 rating was placed on
Watchlist for possible downgrade.


PNC MORTGAGE: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Series 2000-C1 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of four classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded six classes of PNC Mortgage
Acceptance Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2000-C1.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
loans in special servicing, concerns about loans approaching
maturity in an adverse environment and interest shortfalls.
Although the pool has paid down significantly since Moody's last
review, the exposure to specially serviced loans has also
increased, from 1% to 68% of the pool.  Additionally, a large
portion of the pool, 73%, has or is scheduled to mature within the
next six months.

The affirmations are due to significant increased credit
subordination resulting from loan payoffs and amortization and key
rating parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed seven classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on March 31, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.

As of the June 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to
$110.6 million from $801.0 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 15% of the pool, with an average loan
balance of $2.6 million.  The top ten loans represent 59% of the
pool.  Three loans, representing 4% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Three loans, representing 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $13.3 million realized
loss (18% loss severity on average).  Twenty-one loans,
representing 68% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
A majority of the loans were transferred to special servicing due
to balloon default.  The largest specially serviced loan, which is
also the largest loan in the pool, is the Ryder Integrated
Logistics Loan ($16.3 million -- 15.0%), which is secured by a
455,000 square foot light industrial building located in Auburn
Hills, Michigan.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2009 after the property's single tenant vacated and is
currently in the process of foreclosure.  The servicer has
recognized a $11.3 million appraisal reduction for this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 26711
Northwestern Hwy Loan ($11.8 million -- 10.7% of the pool), which
is secured by a 137,476 square foot office building located in
Southfield, Michigan.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in January 2010 due to the failure to pay the balloon
payment at the January 2010 maturity date.  The loan is currently
in the process of foreclosure.  The remaining 19 specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property types.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate $29.1 million loss for all specially
serviced loans (42% expected loss on average).  The servicer has
recognized an aggregate $15.1 million appraisal reduction for six
of the specially serviced loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through O
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$2.1 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full or partial year 2009 operating
results for 81% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV ratio,
excluding the specially serviced loans, is 74% compared to 75% at
Moody's prior full review.

Excluding the specially serviced loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCR are 1.20X and 1.76X, respectively, compared to 1.54X
and 1.54X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity.  Loan concentration has an important bearing on
potential rating volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch
downgrades under adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf
score is 40.  The pool, excluding defeased loans, has a Herf of 16
compared to 81 at last full review.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Willow Run Business Center II Loan
($8.8 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 398,200
square foot industrial property located in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
The property is fully occupied by a single tenant, General Motors,
through August 2012.  Although property performance has been
stable since last review, Moody's valuation reflects current
market conditions due to the near-term 100% rollover exposure.
The loan has passed its July 2009 anticipated repayment date and
is current.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 116% and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 56% and 1.93X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Quality Inn Sports Complex
Loan ($3.3 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 142
room limited service hotel located in Lyndhurst, New Jersey.
Property performance has declined since last review as the hotel
has been impacted by the downturn in the tourism industry.  The
loan is currently on the master servicer's watchlist due low DSCR.
Moody's has determined that there is a high probability that this
loan may default prior to maturity in October 2013.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 173% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to
91% and 1.43X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Hampton Inn Maple Grove Loan
($3.3 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 120 room
limited service hotel located in Maple Grove, Minnesota.  Property
performance has declined since last review as the hotel has been
impacted by the a downturn in the tourism industry.  The loan has
amortized by 9% since last review and matures in October 2013.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.95X, respectively,
compared to 31% and 4.07X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class C, $3,679,847, affirmed at Aaa, previously upgraded to
     Aaa from A1 on 5/23/2006

  -- Class X, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned at
     Aaa on 11/08/2000

  -- Class D, $10,014,000, affirmed at Aaa, previously upgraded to
     Aaa from Aa1 on 7/09/2007

  -- Class E, $26,036,000, affirmed at Aa1, previously upgraded to
     Aa1 from Aa3 on 9/25/2008

  -- Class F, $12,016,000, confirmed at A1, previously placed on
     review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class G, $12,017,000, downgraded to B1 from Baa1, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class H, $ 18,024,000, downgraded to Ca from Ba2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class J, $8,011,000, downgraded to C from Ba3, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class K, $7,010,000, downgraded to C from B2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class L, $8,011,000, downgraded to C from Caa2, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10

  -- Class M, $5,779,870, downgraded to C from Ca, previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 3/31/10


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $33.530 Mil. Certs. to B
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series BLC-2's $33.530 million 8.00%
certificates to 'B' from 'B-'.

S&P's rating on the certificates is dependent on its rating on the
underlying security, Belo Corp.'s $37.000 million 7.25% debentures
due Sept. 15, 2027.

The rating action follows S&P's upgrade of the underlying security
to 'B' from 'B-' on June 21, 2010.  S&P may take subsequent rating
actions on the certificates due to changes in S&P's rating on the
underlying security.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST: S&P Raises Rating on $33.146 Mil. Certs. to B
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on
PreferredPLUS Trust Series BLC-1's $33.146 million 7.875%
certificates to 'B' from 'B-'.

S&P's rating on the certificates is dependent on its rating on the
underlying security, Belo Corp.'s $36.004 million 7.25% debentures
due Sept. 15, 2027.

The rating action follows S&P's upgrade of the underlying security
to 'B' from 'B-' on June 21, 2010.  S&P may take subsequent rating
actions on the certificates due to changes in its rating on the
underlying security.


RICHARDSON HOSPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Various Bonds From 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'BBB-'
from 'BB+' on Richardson Hospital Authority, Texas'
$73.227 million series 2004 bonds and $32.355 million series 1998
bonds, issued for Richardson Regional Medical Center.  The rating
outlook remains developing.

The higher rating reflects Standard & Poor's view of RHA's
affiliation and long-term 20-year lease agreement with Methodist
Hospital of Dallas (doing business as Methodist Health System or
MHS), which has contributed to improved operating results, partly
due to the benefit of more favorable managed-care contracting
through MHS, but also due to general revenue and cost efficiencies
gained through affiliating with a stronger system.

In March 2009, RHA announced it signed a memorandum of
understanding to affiliate with MHS and effective June 1, 2009,
RHA entered into a long-term lease agreement with Methodist
Regional Medical Center, a newly created affiliate organization of
MHS, to lease the assets of RRMC.  As such, RRMC is now doing
business as MRMC.

In S&P's opinion, offsetting credit factors include some
weaknesses in the lease structure such as special termination
rights by either party and a lease term that expires approximately
six years (unless terminated earlier) before the final bond
maturity date in 2035.  Added credit concerns are MMRC's location
in a competitive marketplace, with sizeable system-affiliated
competitors surrounding its primary service area, which has led to
some pressure on business volumes over the past two to three years
and constrained balance sheet metrics for RHA.

The developing outlook reflects the continuing progression of the
affiliation with MHS under the current lease agreement.  MRMC has
shown operational improvement and has met the initial forecasted
operating results for the interim period ending April 2010.  If
MRMC current financial trend continues, S&P believes there is a
good chance they will meet the required operational targets set
forth in the lease agreement, which would trigger a full sale to
MHS over the next 12 to 24 months.  Furthermore, both parties
could accelerate a full sale to MHS in advance of meeting the
triggers if they so choose.

"If a full sale were to occur, the rating would likely be raised
to reflect the higher rating of MHS, assuming the debt becomes a
guaranty of MHS or is on parity with MHS's existing debt," said
Standard & Poor's credit anlsyt Stephen Infranco.  "However, given
some of the structural weaknesses of the lease agreement,
specifically the termination provisions, there is still a chance
that the affiliation could dissolve and the medical center be
returned to RHA, which would likely result in a lower rating as
the same financial difficulties that plagued RRMC before the
affiliation could return," said Mr. Infranco.


RED MOUNTAIN: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Series 1997-1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and revised the Rating Outlook on these
classes of Red Mountain Funding L.L.C.'s, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 1997-1 as shown:

  -- $2.1 million class F at 'B-/LS5'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;

  -- $1.1 million class G remains at 'D/RR5'.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E and interest-only class X-1 have paid
in full.  Classes H through K have been fully depleted by realized
losses.  Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only class X-
2.

The certificates are collateralized by one loan secured by a
healthcare facility in Mississippi.  As of the June 2010
distribution date, the pool's collateral balance has been reduced
by 98.1% to $3.1 million from $158.8 million at issuance.


RITE AID: Moody's Affirms Rating on Series 1999-1 Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of Rite Aid Pass-
Through Trust Certificates, Series 1999-1 based on the current
rating of Rite Aid Corporation (senior unsecured debt rating
Caa3/Ca; stable outlook) and the value of the collateral
supporting the Certificates.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 2, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance has decreased by approximately 22%
to $129.9 million from $167.6 million at securitization.  This
credit tenant lease transaction is supported by 53 stand-alone
retail buildings leased by Rite Aid.  The stores are located in 14
states and the District of Columbia, with the largest
concentration in California.  Each property is subject to a fully
bondable, triple net lease guaranteed by Rite Aid.

The final distribution date of the Certificates is January 2,
2021.  Based on Rite Aid's scheduled lease payments during the
initial lease term, there is a balloon payment due at the maturity
of the Certificates.  To mitigate this balloon risk, the
transaction was structured with residual insurance policies issued
by Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford; financial strength
debt rating A2, stable outlook) to provide the principal balloon
payment.  The ratings of the Certificates are higher than Rite
Aid's debt rating because of the quality of the underlying
collateral, which was primarily newly constructed at
securitization, and the enhancement provided by the Hartford
residual insurance policies.

Moody's rating action is:

* Series A-1, $37,327,535, affirmed at B3; previously downgraded
  to B3 from B1 on 11/29/2000

* Series A-2, $92,576,523, affirmed at B3; previously downgraded
  to B3 from B1 on 11/29/2000

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease.  The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan.  The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined; the dark value must be
sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of
the lease, to support the expected loss consistent with the
certificates' rating.  Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the
possibility of lease affirmations by the tenant and for the
landlord's claim for lease rejection damages in bankruptcy.
Moody's also may give credit for some amortization of the debt,
depending upon the rating of the credit tenant.  In addition,
Moody's considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The certificates' rating may change as the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant changes.


ROCKLAND TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2005B Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed one class of
tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds from Rockland Tobacco Asset
Securitization Corporation, series 2005, and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated below:

  -- $13,084,280 series 2005A bonds due Aug. 15, 2045 downgraded
     to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $2,860,940 series 2005B bonds due Aug. 15, 2050 affirmed at
     'BB+'; Outlook to Negative from Positive.

The various actions are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report,
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level
of stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
payment percent change the trust would be able to sustain and
still pay the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case
'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by
the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual
MSA payment decline of between 0.3% and 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Both the downgrade on the series 2005A bonds and affirmation on
the series 2005B bonds are consistent with the model output.  The
Negative Outlook on all bonds reflects Fitch's concern that cash
flow will continue to come under stress for bonds with model
output of 'BBB+' or lower.


SATURN VENTURES: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class A-1 Senior Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued Saturn Ventures 2004 - Fund
America Investors III, Limited.  The notes affected by the rating
action are:

* US$280,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes (current
  balance of $86,384,159), Downgraded to Caa3; previously on
  November 12, 2009 Downgraded to B1

Saturn Ventures 2004 - Fund America Investors III, Limited is a
collateralized debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio
primarily comprised of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities with
the majority originated in 2003 and 2004.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference portfolio.
Credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including an increase in the Moody's Weighted Average Rating
Factor, the number of defaulted assets and assets whose ratings
are currently on review for possible downgrade.  As reported by
the trustee, the Moody's WARF of the underlying pool of reference
obligations has increased from 1,406 in November 2009 to 1,503 in
June 2010 and non-performing assets increased from approximately
$39 million to $55 million.  Currently, the Moody's ratings of
approximately $46 million of pre-2005 RMBS (approximately 50% of
performing par) within the underlying portfolio are on review for
possible downgrade following on Moody's recent updated expected
loss projections applicable to certain RMBS.  The trustee also
reports that all Principal Coverage Tests are failing.  The amount
of overcollateralizatoin applicable to the Class A Notes now
stands at 64.5%, a decline from 82% reported in November 2009.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating actions noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.  For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  - Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


SILICON VALLEY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes and downgrades one class
of tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds from Silicon Valley
Tobacco Securitization Authority, (Santa Clara County Tobacco
Securitization Corporation), series 2007, and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated below:

  -- $43,604,065 series 2007A, due June 1, 2036 affirmed at 'BBB';
     Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $11,339,136 series 2007A, due June 1, 2041 affirmed at 'BBB';
     Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $13,617,538 series 2007A, due June 1, 2047 affirmed at 'BBB';
     Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $4,407,579 series 2007B, due June 1, 2047 downgraded to 'BBB-
     ' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $20,160,692 series 2007C, due June 1, 2056 affirmed at 'BB+';
     Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $8,901,000 series 2007D, due June 1, 2056 affirmed at 'BB-';
     Outlook to Negative from Stable.

The various actions are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report,
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level
of stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
payment percent change the trust would be able to sustain and
still pay the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case
'B' corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by
the trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual
MSA payment decline of between 0.3% and 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

The 'BBB' rating affirmations on the 2007A, 2036 and 2041 bonds
are consistent with the model output.  Despite the rating
affirmations to the 2007A 2047A, 2007C and 2007D bonds, the model
output corresponds to a rating of one notch lower for each bond,
indicating that the ratings may be downgraded depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment.  The downgrade of the 2007B bonds
to 'BBB-' is consistent with the model output.

The Negative Outlook on all bonds reflects Fitch's concern that
cash flow will continue to come under stress for bonds with model
output of 'BBB+' or lower.


SIMSBURY CLO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings marks two classes as Paid in Full and affirms two
classes of notes issued by Simsbury CLO, Ltd/Corp.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', 'Global
Rating Criteria for Corporate CDOs', 'Global Surveillance Criteria
for Corporate CDOs', 'Criteria for Structured Finance Recovery
Ratings', 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'
and 'Rating Market Value Structures'.

The affirmation of the pro rata class IVA and IVB (class IV) notes
is the result of the collateral coverage provided by the
underlying portfolio, which has continued to amortize.  Since the
last review, the class II senior and III mezzanine notes were paid
in full, leaving the class IV notes as the senior-most remaining
class.  The affirmation of the class V notes at their current
rating level indicates the potential default risk of the
underlying portfolio, as well as their exposure to the market
value risk associated with the sale of long-dated collateral,
which represents 35% of the portfolio.

The remaining performing portfolio collateral is comprised of high
yield loans and bonds issued by 13 unique obligors, with an
aggregate par balance of $7.9 million and an average rating of
'B+'.  In addition, there is currently $4 million of defaulted
assets in the portfolio, which Fitch expects to recover
approximately 25% on average.  Approximately 35% of the portfolio
balance is scheduled to mature after the stated legal final of the
transaction in September 2011, exposing the notes to potential
market value risk.  Additionally, excess interest is limited
indicating there may be potential for an interest shortfall to the
class V notes as the portfolio amortizes or if there are
additional defaults.

This review did not utilize Fitch's Global Cash Flow model given
the short remaining tenor of the transaction and the high obligor
concentration of the portfolio.  Instead, the current principal
cash balance and the projected recovery estimate on the defaulted
collateral were all applied in accordance with the principal
waterfall.  An expected loss was assigned to the remaining
performing assets, with an additional market value haircut for the
long-dated assets, and the expected return from these assets was
also applied in accordance with the principal waterfall.  The
adjusted sum of all available proceeds was used to calculate the
notes expected total return and to determine the long-term credit
rating of the remaining liabilities.  The structural features of
the transaction were also factored into the analysis.

The class IV notes were assigned Loss Severity ratings.  The LS
ratings indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given
default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-
case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's
'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS
rating should always be considered in conjunction with the notes'
long-term credit rating.

The class V notes were assigned a Recovery Rating in this rating
review based on the total discounted future cash flows of
approximately $3.5 million projected to be available to service
the interest and principal of these bonds in a base-case default
scenario.  These discounted cash flows yield ultimate recovery
projections of 93%, which is representative of an 'RR1' on Fitch's
Recovery Rating scale.  Recovery Ratings are designed to provide a
forward-looking estimate of recoveries on currently distressed or
defaulted structured finance securities rated 'CCC' or below.  For
further detail on Recovery Ratings, please see Fitch's reports
'Global Surveillance Criteria for Corporate CDOs' and 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Recovery Ratings'.

Simsbury is a collateralized loan obligation which closed Sept.
15, 1999, and is managed by Babson Capital Management LLC.  The
stated maturity of the transaction is Sept. 24, 2011.

Fitch has taken action on these classes as indicated below:

  -- $0 class II senior notes PIF;
  -- $0 class III mezzanine notes PIF;
  -- $2,051,906 class IVA mezzanine notes affirmed at 'BB/LS4';
  -- $875,654 class IVB mezzanine notes affirmed at 'BB/LS4';
  -- $3,282,220 class V mezzanine notes affirmed at 'CC/RR1'.


STARWOOD HOTELS: Moody's Keeps Rating on Times Square Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of Times Square
Hotel Trust 8.523% Mortgage and Lease Amortizing Certificates
based on the lease obligation of Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc., and the underlying value of the real estate.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the April 1, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate Certificate balance has decreased by approximately 15%
to $143.8 million from $168.9 million at securitization.  This
credit tenant lease transaction is supported by a 53-story W hotel
located on the corner of Broadway and West 47th Street in New York
City.  The property includes 509 guestrooms, 22,000 square feet of
meeting and dining space and 13,000 square feet of retail space.

The hotel property is subject to triple net leases guaranteed by
Starwood (senior unsecured debt rating Ba1, stable outlook).  The
CTL transaction is assigned a higher rating than that of the
lessee because it reflects the credit quality of Starwood as well
as the security of the underlying real estate.  The hotel is a
flagship property for the W chain located in the Times Square sub-
market of New York City.

Moody's rating action is:

* Cusip 887367AA8, $143,792,165, affirmed at Baa3; previously
  assigned Baa3 on 8/9/2001

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology (CTL approach).  Under Moody's CTL
approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is primarily
based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenant, usually an investment grade rated company,
leasing the real estate collateral supporting the bonds.  This
tenant's credit rating is the key factor in determining the
probability of default on the underlying lease.  The lease
generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute net lease,
yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-box,
sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all interest and
principal of the loan.  The leased property should be owned by a
bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which grants a first
lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the securitization trust.
The dark value of the collateral, which assumes the property is
vacant or "dark", is then examined; the dark value must be
sufficient, assuming a bankruptcy of the tenant and rejection of
the lease, to support the expected loss consistent with the
certificates' rating.  Moody's may make adjustments reflecting the
possibility of lease affirmations by the tenant and for the
landlord's claim for lease rejection damages in bankruptcy.
Moody's also may give credit for some amortization of the debt,
depending upon the rating of the credit tenant.  In addition,
Moody's considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.  The certificates' rating may change as the senior
unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family rating) of the
tenant changes.


STRUCTURED ASSET: Fitch Upgrades Ratings on 1996-CFL Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and assigned Loss Severity Ratings to
Structured Asset Securities Corp.'s multiclass pass-through
certificates, series 1996-CFL:

  -- $38.5 million class I to 'BBB/LS1' from 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed this class:

  -- Interest-only class X-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Interest-only class X-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable.

The class J certificates are not rated by Fitch, and classes A
through H and class P have been paid in full.

The upgrade of class I reflects the low leverage of the remaining
loans, all of which are seasoned and have experienced significant
amortization.  The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
any changes to the ratings over the next one to two years.

The affirmations of classes X-1 and X-2 reflect the classes'
senior position in the transaction's waterfall.

As of the April 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 97.3% to $51.9 million from $1.9 billion at
issuance.  Twenty two loans remain, of which 20 are fully
amortizing.  There are no specially serviced or delinquent loans.
Maturity dates include 2010 (0.6%); 2011 (6.1%); 2014 (9.4%); 2015
(17.7%) and 2017 (50.2%).

As the loans are seasoned with significant amortization, each loan
passed Fitch's refinance test.  All remaining loans' LTVs, based
on a Fitch stressed property specific cap rate and a stressed
servicer reported NOI, were below 75% with a weighted average of
42%.  LTVs ranged from 75% to less than 1%.  As a result, Fitch
does not expect any principal losses.

The largest loan in the pool is the Kmart Distribution Center, a
warehouse property located in Ocala, FL.  The loan was transferred
to special servicing in 2002 and returned to master servicing in
2006; however, it has remained current on debt service since 2004.
Although the loan remains a Fitch Loan of Concern due to lack of
recent financial information reported to the servicer, the loan is
low levered, with a current loan per square foot of $10.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining loans by applying a
10% reduction to 2008 or 2009 fiscal year-end net operating
income, if available or higher reductions to the latest reported
net operating income if year-end 2008 or 2009 was unavailable.
Property specific stressed cap rates between 8% and 9% were
applied to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgaged backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow.  All loans
in the pool, due to significant amortization, had resulting debt
service coverage ratios 1.25 times or greater and were considered
to result in full principal repayment.


STUDENT LOAN: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on Student
Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1's class 3-A-1, 3-A-IO, 4-
A-1, and 4-A-IO notes.

S&P's ratings on the class 3-A-1 and 3-A-IO certificates are
dependent on the lower of (i) its ratings on two underlying
securities, the class A-7 ('B-') and class A-IO (not rated) notes
from National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1, and (ii) S&P's
short-term rating on Deutsche Bank AG ('A-1'), which provides an
interest-rate swap on the certificates.

S&P's ratings on the class 4-A-1 and 4-A-IO certificates are
dependent on the lower (i) of S&P's ratings on three underlying
securities, the class A-1 ('B-'), A-2 ('B-'), and A-IO-2 (not
rated) grantor trust certificates from NCF Grantor Trust 2004-1's
series 2004-GT1, and (ii) S&P's short-term rating on Deutsche Bank
AG, which provides an interest-rate swap on the certificates.

Ambac Assurance Corp. ('R') insures all five underlying
securities.

The rating actions follow S&P's withdrawal of the ratings on two
of the underlying securities, the class A-IO notes from National
Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1 and the class A-IO-2 grantor
trust certificates from NCF Grantor Trust 2004-1's series 2004-
GT1, on June 15, 2010.

                        Ratings Withdrawn

         Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust Series 2007-1

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                     Class      To      From
                     -----      --      ----
                     3-A-1      NR      B-
                     3-A-IO     NR      B-
                     4-A-1      NR      B-
                     4-A-IO     NR      B-

                          NR - Not rated.


SUFFOLK TOBACCO: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes and downgraded four
classes of tobacco settlement asset-backed bonds from Suffolk
Tobacco Asset Securitization Corporation, series 2008:

Current interest serial bonds:

  -- $1,315,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2011 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $1,445,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2012 affirmed at 'BBB+'
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $285,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2013 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $445,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2014 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $610,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2015 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $815,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2016 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $840,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2017 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- $2,820,000 series 2008A due June 1, 2018 affirmed at 'BBB+';
     Outlook Stable;

Current interest turbo term bonds:

  -- $40,045,000 series 2008B due June 1, 2028 downgraded to 'BBB'
     from 'BBB+'; Outlook to Negative from Stable;

  -- $62,295,000 series 2008B due June 1, 2048 downgraded to 'BBB-
     ' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

Convertible capital appreciation turbo term bonds:

  -- $107,671,780.60 series 2008C due June 1, 2044 downgraded to
     'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;

Convertible capital appreciation turbo term bonds:

  -- $13,375,082.10 series 2008D due June 1, 2048 downgraded to
     'BB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Negative.

The various actions are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report,
'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level
of stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement payment
percent change the trust would be able to sustain and still pay
the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case 'B'
corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by the
trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual MSA
payment decline of between 0.3% and 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

Although the delinked rating of the serial bonds suggested by the
model are 'A' or higher, Fitch is affirming the bonds at the cap
rating of 'BBB+'.  The downgrades on the 2028 turbo, 2044
convertible, 2048 turbo, and 2048 CAB, correspond to a rating one
notch lower than the downgraded rating for each bond in the model
output, indicating that the ratings may be downgraded depending on
the amount of the 2011 MSA payment.

All bonds with model output that corresponds to ratings above the
'BBB+' rating cap are assigned Stable Outlooks.  The Negative
Outlook on the other bonds reflect Fitch's concern that cash flow
will continue to come under stress.


TEXAS STUDENT: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2001A Bonds to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ca from Caa3, the
rating on Texas Student Housing Authority Student Housing Revenue
Bonds (Austin, Texas Project) Senior Series 2001A and has affirmed
the Junior Series 2001B bonds at C.  The outlook on the senior
bonds is stable.

                       Recent Developments

The occupancy at the project continues to be strong at 98% (as of
May 2010).  However, because revenues are still well below the
levels at underwriting, the project is still facing severe
financial stress.  The trustee reports the project is short for
the July 1 payment and will tap the Senior debt reserve fund
again, which will leave it near depleted.  The Junior debt service
reserve fund is completely depleted.  The Ca rating on the senior
debt reflects a decreased level of expected recovery.  The C
rating on the 2001B bonds reflects a depleted debt service reserve
fund and the expectation that 2001B bondholders will not likely
receive any payment.

                 What could change the rating -- UP

  -- A substantial increase in net operating income and/or
     substantial decrease in local cap rates

                What could change the rating -- DOWN

  -- A substantial decrease in net operating income, or increase
     in local cap rates.

                              Outlook

The outlook is stable because the current ratings reflect
expectations for recovery.


TIAA RE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes of notes issued by TIAA
RE CDO 2003-1 Ltd. due to negative credit migration of the
portfolio since last review.

Since the last rating action in February 2009, the credit quality
of the collateral has declined with approximately 17.3% of the
portfolio downgraded on average 3.4 notches, while only 1.6% was
upgraded one notch.  Approximately 21.9% of the portfolio has a
Fitch derived rating below investment grade and 3.3% has a rating
in the 'CCC' rating category or below, as compared to 9.6% and
2.1%, respectively, at last review.  Currently, six assets which
comprise 7.5% of the portfolio are experiencing interest
shortfalls or deferring interest payments.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model for projecting future default levels
for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are experiencing
interest shortfalls.  Based on this analysis, the breakeven rates
for the classes A-1MM through D notes are generally consistent
with the ratings assigned below.

The breakeven rates for the class E notes do not pass Fitch's base
cash flow model stress.  For this class, Fitch compared the
current credit enhancement level of 4.0% to the percent of
underlying collateral experiencing interest shortfalls.  The class
E notes have been downgraded to 'CC' since default is probable.

The Negative Rating Outlook on classes A-1MM through D reflects
Fitch's expectation that underlying CMBS loans will continue to
face refinance risk at maturity.  Additionally, Fitch assigned
Loss Severity ratings to the class A-D notes.  The LS ratings
indicate each tranche's potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in 'Criteria for
Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating should
always be considered in conjunction with the probability of
default for tranches.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings and
Outlooks for classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

TIAA RE CDO 2003-1 is a static collateralized debt obligation that
closed on Nov. 6, 2003.  The current portfolio consists of 68
bonds from 58 obligors, of which 63.5% are commercial mortgage
backed securities from the 1998 through 2003 vintages, 35.4% are
real estate investment trust debt securities, and 1.1% are
structured finance CDOs.

Fitch has downgraded, assigned LS ratings and revised Outlooks for
these classes as indicated:

  -- $154,358,041 class A-1MM notes to 'AA/LS2' from 'AA+',
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $10,000,000 class B-1 notes to 'A/LS5' from 'AA', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $2,000,000 class B-2 notes to 'A/LS5' from 'AA', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $16,000,000 class C-1 notes to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB+', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $14,000,000 class C-2 notes to 'BB/LS3' from 'BBB+', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $13,500,000 class D notes to 'B/LS4' from 'BB+', Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable;

  -- $12,000,000 class E notes to 'CC' from 'B+'.


TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes of subordinate turbo
capital appreciation bonds (due May 15, 2035) from Tobacco
Settlement Financing Corporation (U.S. Virgin Islands), series
2006, and revised the Rating Outlooks:

  -- $4,764,709 series 2006A to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook to
     Negative from Stable;

  -- $512,471 series 2006B to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook to
     Negative from Positive;

  -- $867,690 series 2006C to 'B+' from 'BB'; Outlook to Negative
     from Positive.

The downgrades are based on Fitch's Sept. 30, 2009 report 'Global
Structured Finance Rating Criteria', along with the level of
stress each class is able to withstand as indicated by Fitch's
breakeven cash flow model.  The model indicates, for each class of
bonds, the level of the annual Master Settlement Agreement payment
percent change the trust would be able to sustain and still pay
the bond in full by the legal final date.  The base case 'B'
corresponds to a 1% increase in the MSA payment received by the
trust every year.  The 'BBB' category corresponds to an annual MSA
payment decline of between 0.3% to 2.5%.  The cash flow model
accounts for the amount of the MSA payment that the transaction
has received in 2010, the capital structure, the reserve account,
and the bonds' legal final dates.

The bond payments are also tied to the tobacco companies making
MSA payments.  Tobacco settlement bonds can be rated up to 'BBB+'
based on Fitch's view of the whole tobacco industry and the
executory nature of the MSA.  In the event of a bankruptcy of a
tobacco company, Fitch believes there is an incentive for the
company to continue to make payments under the MSA.

The downgrade on each of the bonds reflects the model output for
these bonds, which corresponds to ratings one notch lower than the
current ratings.  The ratings may be downgraded depending on the
amount of the 2011 MSA payment received.  The Negative Outlook on
all of the bonds reflecting Fitch's concern that cash flow will
continue to come under stress.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Ten 2004-C15 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of ten pooled
classes and 12 non-pooled rake classes and downgraded nine pooled
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C15.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and poorly performing watchlisted loans and interest
shortfalls.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index remaining within acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed nine classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on June 17, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $1.12 billion
from $1.15 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 84 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 48% of
the pool.  Four loans, representing 5% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by U.S. Government securities.  The pool contains
two loans, representing 18% of the pool, which have investment
grade underlying ratings.  At securitization, one other loan,
representing 8% of the pool, also had investment grade underlying
rating.  However, due to decline in performance and increased
leverage, this loan is now analyzed as part of the conduit pool.

Twenty two loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$6.5 million loss (40% loss severity on average).  There are three
loans, representing 7% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the IRS
Building Loan ($45.8 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is
secured by a 180,000 square foot office building located in
Fresno, California.  The property is 100% leased to the U.S.
Government through 2018.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in January 2010 due to a bankruptcy filing by the
borrower and indemnitor.  The property's cash flow, which is more
than sufficient to service the debt, has been collected in a
suspense account since the commencement of the bankruptcy but will
not be available to apply to debt service until emergence from
bankruptcy.  The loan has passed its November 2009 anticipated
repayment date.  Moody's is not estimating a loss from this loan.
The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by a retail
center and a multifamily property.  Moody's estimates a
$7.4 million aggregate loss for two of the specially serviced
loans (30% loss severity on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on five loans
representing approximately 2% of the pool.  These loans are on the
watchlist due to declines in performance or mature within the next
six months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less than 1.0X.
Moody's has estimated a $8.6 million loss from these loans (39%
expected loss based on a 46% default probability).  Moody's rating
action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and
magnitude of losses from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes L through P
have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $507,220.
Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to experience
interest shortfalls because of the exposure to specially serviced
loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full and partial-year 2009 operating
results for 74% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 93% compared to
97% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.32X and 1.08X, respectively, compared to
1.35X and 1.01X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 21 compared to 26 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the 180 Maiden Lane
Loan ($93.0 million -- 9.3% of the pool), which represents a 50%
interest in a $186.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by a 1.1 million square foot Class A office building
located in the Financial District of New York City.  The property
is anchored by AIG which leases 74% of the net rentable area (NRA)
though April 2014.  The property was 100% leased as of November
2009, the same as at last review.  The property is also encumbered
by a $69.5 million B Note which serves as collateral for non-
pooled Classes 180ML-A, 180ML-B, 180ML-C, 180ML-D, 180ML-E, 180ML-
F and 180ML-G.  The loan is interest only for its entire 62-month
term.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Baa1 and 1.32X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the Coastal Grand
Mall Loan ($86.9 million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by
the borrower's interest in a 882,700 square foot regional mall
located in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.  The property is anchored
by Dillard's, Sears and Belk, all of which own their own
improvements.  As of September 2009 the mall was 99% occupied,
similar to last review.  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.38X, respectively, compared to Baa1
and 1.30 at last review.

The loan that previously had an underlying rating is 175 West
Jackson Loan ($108.7 million -- 10.8% of the pool), which
represents a 50% participation interest in a $217.4 million first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 1.5 million square foot
Class A office building located in the Chicago CBD.  The building
is also encumbered by a $55.0 million B Note, which serves as
collateral for non-pooled Classes 175WJ-A, 175WJ-B, 175WJ-C,
175WJ-D and 175WJ-E.  As of January 2010 the property was 96%
leased, the same as at last review.  The three largest tenants are
MWH Harza Energy & Infrastructure, which leases 11% of the NRA
through June 2015; Aon Service Corp. which leases 9% of the NRA
through April 2012 and Fortis Clearing Americas which leases 6% of
the NRA though March 2016.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73%
and 1.3X, respectively, compared to 74% and 1.21X at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 13% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Gale Portfolio Loan ($69.6 million --
6.9% of the pool), which is secured by four suburban office
properties located in Northern New Jersey.  The portfolio totals
574,000 square feet.  The portfolio was 86% leased as of May 2010
compared to 90% at last review.  Leases representing 15% of the
NRA are scheduled to expire this year.  Despite the decline in
occupancy, performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 105% and 0.98X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.97X
at last review.

The second largest loan is the ADG Portfolio Loan ($40.1 million -
- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by 24 mobile home
communities located in Wisconsin and Maryland.  The portfolio was
85% leased as of December 2009 compared to 91% at securitization.
Despite the decline in occupancy, performance has been stable.
The loan has amortized by 5% since last review.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 98% and
0.96X at last review.

The third largest loan is Slatten Ranch Loan ($25.1 million --
2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 118,000 square foot
retail center located in Antioch, California.  The largest tenants
are Target and JC Penny.  The property was 99% leased as of
November 2009, similar to securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 104% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 98%
and 0.97X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-1A, $93,952,334, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/21/2004

  -- Class A-2, $141,298,230, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/21/2004

  -- Class A-3, $150,227,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/21/2004

  -- Class A-4, $459,608,000, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned
     Aaa on 12/21/2004

  -- Class X-C, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 12/21/2004

  -- Class X-P, Notional, affirmed at Aaa; previously assigned Aaa
     on 12/21/2004

  -- Class B, $33,205,000, affirmed at Aa2; previously assigned
     Aa2 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class C, $14,438,000, affirmed at Aa3; previously assigned
     Aa3 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class D, $21,656,000, affirmed at A2; previously assigned A2
     on 12/21/2004

  -- Class E, $11,549,000, affirmed at A3; previously assigned A3
     on 12/21/2004

  -- Class F, $14,438,000, downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/17/2010

  -- Class G, $12,993,000, downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2;
     previously placed on review for possible downgrade on
     6/17/2010

  -- Class H, $15,881,000, downgraded to B1 from Baa3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class J, $7,219,000, downgraded to B3 from Ba1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class K, $4,331,000, downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class L, $4,331,000, downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class M, $2,888,000, downgraded to Caa3 from B1; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class N, $2,887,000, downgraded to Ca from B2; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class O, $2,887,000, downgraded to C from B3; previously
     placed on review for possible downgrade on 6/17/2010

  -- Class 175WJ-A, $14,125,660, affirmed at Ba2 ; previously
     downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1on 3/27/2007

  -- Class 175WJ-B, $12,700,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously
     downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 on 3/27/2007

  -- Class 175WJ-C, $6,300,000, affirmed at B1; previously
     downgraded to B1 from Ba3 on 3/27/2007

  -- Class 175WJ-D, $9,500,000, affirmed at B2; previously
     downgraded to B2 from B1 on 3/27/2007

  -- Class 175WJ-E, $10,500,000 affirmed at B3; previously
     downgraded to B3 from B2 on 3/27/2007

  -- Class 180ML-A $9,700,000, affirmed at Baa2; previously
     assigned Baa2 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class 180ML-B, $7,400,000, affirmed at Baa3; previously
     assigned Baa3 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class 180ML-C $12,350,000, affirmed at Ba1; previously
     assigned Ba1 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class 180ML-D, $15,000,000, affirmed at Ba2; previously
     assigned Ba2 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class 180ML-E $8,000,000, affirmed at Ba3; previously
     assigned Ba2 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class 180ML-F, $7,550,000, affirmed at B1; previously
     assigned B1 on 12/21/2004

  -- Class 180ML-G, $9,500,000, affirmed at B2; previously
     assigned B2 on 12/21/2004


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 17 2006-C23 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C23 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans and poorly performing
watchlisted loans.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $4.1 billion
from $4.2 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 307 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 36%
of the pool.  Currently, there are two loans, representing 1% of
the pool, with investment grade underlying ratings.  Two loans,
representing 0.4% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized by U.S. Government securities.

Sixty-nine loans, representing 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses to date; however, there
are 15 loans, representing 10% of the pool, currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the 1775
Broadway Office Loan ($248.7 million -- 6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 703,000 square foot Class B office building located
on 57th Street between 8th Avenue and Broadway in Manhattan.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in January 2010 for
imminent default and is 90+ days delinquent.  Current performance
has been negatively impacted by a comprehensive renovation and
repositioning project.  As of May 2010, the property was 23%
occupied compared to 96% at securitization.  The sponsor is Joseph
Moinian.  The remaining 14 specially serviced loans are secured by
a mix of multi-family, lodging, retail, office, industrial and
mixed-use properties.  The special servicer has recognized a
cumulative $76 million appraisal reduction for the specially
serviced loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-M, $422,986,000, currently rated Aaa, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 3/13/2006

  -- Class A-J, $274,941,000, currently rated Aa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Aa3 from Aaa on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class B, $37,011,000, currently rated A1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class C, $52,873,000, currently rated A2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A2 from Aa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class D, $37,011,000, currently rated A3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A3 from Aa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class E, $31,724,000, currently rated Baa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from A1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class F, $42,299,000, currently rated Baa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class G, $52,873,000, currently rated Baa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 from A3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class H, $52,873,000, currently rated Ba2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgrade to Ba2 from Baa1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class J, $58,161,000, currently rated B1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B1 from Baa2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class K, $52,873,000, currently rated B3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 from Baa3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class L, $10,575,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class M, $21,149,000, currently rated Caa1, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class N, $15,862,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class O, $10,575,000, currently rated Caa2, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 from B1 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class P, $15,862,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B2 on
     2/11/2009

  -- Class Q, $15,862,000, currently rated Caa3, on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from B3 on
     2/11/2009


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Ten 2005-C20 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of ten classes
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-C20 on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the June 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to
$3.10 billion from $3.66 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 177 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.

Forty loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly the Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.1 million (17% loss severity).
Thirteen loans, representing 8% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Macon & Burlington Mall Pool ($134.0 million -- 4.3% of the pool),
which is secured by two retail properties totaling 1.9 million
square feet.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
February 2008.  The remaining twelve loans are secured largely by
multifamily, hotel and retail properties.  Nine loans,
representing 6% of the pool, are currently either 90+ days
delinquent or in foreclosure.

Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and watchlisted
loans.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-MFL, $100,000,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/08/2005

  -- Class A-MFX, $266,384,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/08/2005

  -- Class A-J, $ 274,788,000, currently rated Aaa; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa on 9/08/2005

  -- Class B, $ 77,856,000 currently rated Aa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Aa3 from Aa2 on
     1/28/2009

  -- Class C, $ 27,479,000, currently rated A1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to A1 from Aa3 on
     1/28/2009

  -- Class D, $68,697,000 currently rated Baa1; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa1 from A2 on
     1/28/2009

  -- Class E, $41,218,000, currently rated Baa2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 from A3 on
     1/28/2009

  -- Class F, $41,218,000, currently rated Ba2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1 on
     1/28/2009

  -- Class G, $32,059,000, currently rated B2; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 from Baa2 on
     1/28/2009

  -- Class H, $41,218,000, currently rated Caa3; on review for
     possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 from Baa3
     on 1/28/2009


* Fitch Affirms Ratings on 16 Classes of Credit Card ABS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of U.S. Credit Card ABS
transactions.  The Global SF Criteria and U.S. Credit Card ABS
Rating Criteria were used to review the transactions.

The affirmations are based on the performance of the trusts in-
line with the expectation.  A Stable Outlook indicates that, as a
result of the continued positive performance trend for these
trusts, Fitch expects the ratings will remain stable for the next
two years.

Fitch's analysis included a comparison of observed performance
trends over the past few months to Fitch's base case expectations
for each outstanding rating category.  As part of its ongoing
surveillance efforts, Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance of these trusts.

These classes are affirmed with Stable Outlook:

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2008-A3:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A7:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A8:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A11:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A12:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A13:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A14:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;

Citibank Omni Master Trust 2009-A17:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable

First National Master Note Trust 2008-2 Reissued:

  -- Class C at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable;

First National Master Note Trust 2009-1:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable.

First National Master Note Trust 2009-3:

  -- Class A at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class C at 'BBB/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
  -- Class D at 'BB/LS5'; Outlook Stable.


* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 281 Bonds From 267 RMBS Deals to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 281 bonds in 267 residential
mortgage-backed securities transactions to 'D' indicating that the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds being
downgraded to 'D' as part of this review were all previously rated
'CCC', 'CC' or 'C' indicating that a default was expected.  The
action is limited to just the bonds with write-downs.  The
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.

Of the 267 transactions impacted by these downgrades 143 are Prime
and 116 are Subprime.  The remaining eight transactions are other
product types.  Ninety-eight percent were previously rated 'C'.
Ninety-seven percent have an outstanding Recovery Rating of 'RR6'
indicating that minimal recovery is expected.

Fitch downgrades the bonds to 'D' as part of its ongoing
surveillance process and will continue to monitor these
transactions for additional defaults.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions as detailed at the
end of this release for classes of notes issued by eight
structured finance collateralized debt obligations that closed in
2002 with exposure to structured finance assets.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.
Fitch primarily based its analysis of these transactions on
comparing the credit enhancements levels for each class of notes,
calculated based off the par portfolio balance, including cash in
principal collection accounts, to the minimum level of loss
expected from assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and
lower.

Only in two transactions, Orchard Park, Ltd./Inc., and SFA ABS CDO
III, Ltd./Inc., did their respective senior classes' CE levels
meaningfully exceed the minimum level of loss expected from the
portfolios.  For these two CDOs, Fitch complemented the above
analysis with the use of Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model
to project future loss levels at various rating levels.  The 'CCC'
rating loss rate, the lowest rating level loss projected by SF
PCM, exceeds the credit enhancement levels for all the classes of
notes in both Orchard Park and SFA ABS III.  Further, there is
only a negligible amount of interest proceeds being used to pay
down the notes in Orchard Park, while in SFA ABS III there is an
ongoing erosion of principal proceeds to pay accrued interest.
Therefore, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default for all
notes in these transactions can be assessed without performing
cash flow model analysis under the framework described in the
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs - Amended' report.

Due to the extent of collateral deterioration in the remaining six
transactions, Fitch believes that the likelihood of default can be
assessed without using SF PCM or cash flow model analysis.  As the
result of writedowns, the portfolio of South Coast Funding II,
Ltd., is lower than the outstanding balance of the senior tranche,
indicating that default is inevitable for the entire capital
structure.  The remaining five transactions maintain positive CE
levels for at least the senior tranches.  However, future losses
expected from the assets with a Fitch derived rating of 'CC' and
lower are likely to significantly exceed the credit enhancement
levels even for the most senior classes of notes in the
transactions.

Of the eight transactions, six have entered an Event of Default
due to failing collateralization coverage requirements.  The
controlling class in four of those transactions, Mulberry Street
CDO, Ltd., Oceanview CBO I, Ltd., Fulton Street CDO, Ltd., and
South Coast Funding II, Ltd., have accelerated the notes'
maturities whereby redirecting funds otherwise available to pay
other classes' interest due to pay down the most senior classes
outstanding.  However, due to the writedowns already experienced
and future expected losses in the respective portfolios, the
benefit of the accelerations is unlikely to fully compensate for
the lack of par coverage to the senior classes in these
transactions.

Three transactions contain non deferrable classes of notes which
have missed their full interest payment.  These classes have been
downgraded to 'D'.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Charles River CDO I, Ltd.

  -- $157,466,687 class A-1A downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $7,358,256 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';

  -- $20,000,000 class A-2F downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $15,000,000 class A-2V downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $3,464,574 class B-F affirmed at 'C';

  -- $20,187,232 class B-V affirmed at 'C';

  -- $6,348,091 class C affirmed at 'C';

  -- $5,679,128 Combination Securities downgraded to 'C' from
     'CCC'.

Charles River CDO I, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on Nov. 26,
2002, and is managed by TCW Investment Management Company.
Charles River declared an Event of Default on Feb. 2, 2010, due to
the class A-1 overcollaterization test falling below 100%.  The
controlling class has not elected to accelerate the maturity of
the transaction.  The majority of the interest is being used to
pay the out of the money interest rate swap that expires in 2012.
Part of the interest due to class A-1A and all of the interest due
to class A-2 is being fulfilled through the use of principal.  As
of the April 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
commercial mortgage-backed securities, residential mortgage-backed
securities, asset-backed securities, real estate investment
trusts, and CDOs from primarily 2002 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

Fulton Street CDO, Ltd.

  -- $76,820,274 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $34,000,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $11,284,252 class B-1 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $11,533,844 class B-2 affirmed at 'C';
  -- $8,787,333 class C affirmed at 'C'.

Fulton Street CDO, Ltd., is a cash CDO that closed on March 27,
2002, and is now managed by Cutwater Asset Management
Corporation., which assumed the responsibility from Clinton Group,
Inc., in November 2008.  Fulton Street declared an Event of
Default on Sept. 17 2008, due to the class A-1 overcollaterization
test falling below 102%.  The required majority of the controlling
class voted to accelerate the maturity of the transaction on
Sept. 24, 2008.  As a result of the acceleration of maturity, the
class A-2 notes are no longer receiving timely interest
distributions.  A sizable portion of interest is being used to pay
the out of the money interest rate swap that expires in 2012.  A
nominal amount of excess spread and all principal is being used to
pay down the class A-1 notes.  As of the April 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of CMBS, RMBS, ABS, corporate
bonds, and CDOs from primarily 2000 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

Mulberry Street CDO, Ltd.

  -- $25,830,817 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $52,500,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $33,697,837 class B affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6,632,279 class C affirmed at 'C'.

Mulberry Street CDO Ltd./Corp. is a cash CDO that closed on
Dec. 18, 2002, and is now managed by Cutwater Asset Management
Corporation, which assumed the responsibility from the Clinton
Group, Inc., in October 2008.  Mulberry Street declared an Event
of Default on Aug. 28, 2008, due to the class A-1
overcollaterization test falling below 102%.  The required
majority of the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity
of the transaction on Oct. 16, 2008.  As a result of the
acceleration of maturity, the class A-2 notes are no longer
receiving timely interest distributions.  A sizable portion of
interest is being used to pay the out of the money interest rate
swap that expires in December 2012.  A nominal amount of excess
spread and all principal is being used to pay down the class A-1
notes.  As of the March 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is
comprised of RMBS, ABS, SF CDOs, CMBS, and corporate CDOs from
primarily 1997 and 1999 through 2006 vintage transactions.

Oceanview CBO I, Ltd.

  -- $34,115,099 class A-1B downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC'.
  -- $28,000,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $15,582,830 class B-F affirmed at 'C';
  -- $7,073,580 class B-V affirmed at 'C';
  -- $6,309,450 Combo Notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC'.

Oceanview CBO I, Ltd./Corp., is a cash CDO that closed on June 27,
2002, and is now managed by Cutwater Asset Management Corporation,
which assumed the responsibility from Deerfield Capital Management
LLC. in April 2010.  Oceanview CBO I declared an Event of Default
on Dec. 7, 2009, due to the class A-1 overcollaterization test
falling below 103%.  The required majority of the controlling
class voted to accelerate the maturity of the transaction on
March 3, 2010.  Principal proceeds are currently being used to pay
a portion of the interest rate swap payment and the entire accrued
interest for the class A-1B and A-2 notes.  As of the March 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, ABS, SF CDOs,
CMBS, corporate CDOs, and senior unsecured corporate debt from
primarily 1997 through 2005 vintage transactions.

Oceanview A-1B Custodial Receipts

  -- $25,000,000 Oceanview A1B Custodial Receipts downgraded to
     'C' from 'CCC'.

Oceanview A-1B Custodial Receipts are a resecuritization of a
portion of the class A-1B notes issued by Oceanview CBO I combined
with insurance provided by a guarantor.  When Oceanview CBO I
closed in June 2002, XL Capital Assurance Inc., the predecessor of
Syncora Guarantee Inc., had privately insured $25 million of the
$70 million class A-1B notes issued by Oceanview CBO I.

In September 2008, Fitch withdrew the 'CCC' Insurer Financial
Strength rating of Syncora and its subsidiaries.  Prior to
September 2008, the rating of the Custodial Receipts was primarily
based on the IFS rating of Syncora as guarantor.  Because Fitch
had withdrawn the rating of the guarantor, the rating of the
Custodial Receipts is now based on the unenhanced credit profile
of the underlying collateral, the Oceanview CBO I class A-1B
notes.

Orchard Park, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $33,958,339 class A-1 (series 1) downgraded to 'CC' from
     'CCC';

  -- $34,909,024 class A-1 (series 2) downgraded to 'CC' from
     'CCC';

  -- $51,800,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'C' from 'CC'.

Orchard Park, Ltd./Inc., is a static cash CDO that closed on Dec.
20, 2002 with Credit Suisse as administrative agent.  A nominal
amount of interest proceeds are currently being used to redeem the
class A-1 notes.  As of the March 25, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of CDOs, RMBS, ABS and CMBS from 2000
through 2003 vintage transactions.

SFA ABS CDO III, Ltd./Inc.

  -- $41,929,728 class A downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $50,000,000 class B downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $14,471,366 class C affirmed at 'C'.

SFA ABS CDO III, Ltd./Corp., is a SF CDO that closed on June 25,
2002, and is managed by Structured Finance Advisors.  SFA III
declared an Event of Default in July 2005 due to the maturity
dates of securities in the portfolio exceeding the maturity dates
of the class B and C notes.  Another Event of Default occurred in
April 2008 due to the class A, B and C notes being
undercollateralized.  To date, the required majority of the
controlling class has not voted to accelerate the transaction.
Principal proceeds are currently being used to pay a portion of
the interest rate swap payment and the entire accrued interest for
the class A and B notes.  As of the March 30, 2010 trustee report,
the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, ABS, CDOs and ABS from 1996
through 2005 vintage transactions.

South Coast Funding II, Ltd.

  -- $220,408,859 class A-1 downgraded to 'C' from 'CCC';
  -- $40,050,000 class A-2 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $42,500,000 class A-3 downgraded to 'D' from 'CC';
  -- $36,865,832 class B affirmed at 'C'.

South Coast Funding II, Ltd., is a CDO that closed on June 6,
2002, and is managed by TCW Investment Management Company.  South
Coast II declared an Event of Default on Feb. 10, 2009, due to the
class A notes being undercollateralized.  The required majority of
the controlling class voted to accelerate the maturity of the
transaction as of March 2, 2010.  Principal proceeds are currently
being used to fulfill part of the class A-1 accrued interest
distribution.  Additionally, the acceleration has caused proceeds
to be diverted to redeem class A-1 principal rather than pay
accrued interest to the class A-2 and A-3 notes, both non-
deferrable classes.  As of the April 5, 2010 trustee report, the
portfolio is comprised of primarily RMBS, CMBS, CDOs and
commercial ABS from 1999 through 2006 vintage transactions.


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Notes on 12 TRUP CDO Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of notes from 12 TRUP CDO transactions: Alesco Preferred
Funding VII, Ltd., Alesco Preferred Funding VIII, Ltd., Alesco
Preferred Funding XI, Ltd., Alesco Preferred Funding XIV, Ltd.,
Alesco Preferred Funding XV, Ltd., Preferred Term Securities VII,
Ltd., Preferred Term Securities X, Ltd., Preferred Term Securities
XIV, Ltd., Preferred Term Securities XX, Ltd., Preferred Term
Securities XXV, Ltd., Trapeza CDO I, LLC, and Trapeza CDO IX, Ltd.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
mainly the result of significant increase in the actual and
assumed defaults and deferrals of the trust preferred securities
held in their portfolios.  This par loss has resulted in loss of
overcollateralization for the tranches affected and an increase of
their expected losses.  For the majority of these transactions,
the last rating actions occurred in March 2009.  Since then, the
assumed defaulted amounts have increased significantly, with a
large portion of transactions experiencing an increase of the
assumed defaulted amount of more than 100%.

Moody's also gave consideration to the Event of Default analysis
for Trapeza CDO I, LLC.  Although Trapeza CDO I, LLC, has not
declared an Event of Default to date, Moody's notes the current
Class A/B Overcollateralization level is 102.026%.  The
transaction would declare an Event of Default if this level falls
below 100%.  Since this transaction is close to triggering an
Event of Default, additional modeling scenarios were considered in
this case assuming that acceleration has been declared.

The assumed defaulted amounts and model WARF are provided for each
transaction in the text below.  The credit deterioration exhibited
by these portfolios is a reflection of the continued pressure in
the banking sector as the number of bank failures and interest
deferrals of trust preferred securities issued by banks has
continued to increase.  According to FDIC data, 83 U.S. banks have
failed to date this year, while 140 banks failed in 2009, as
compared to 25 in all of 2008.  In Moody's opinion, the banking
sector outlook remains negative.

The portfolios of these CDOs are mainly composed of trust
preferred securities issued by small to medium sized U.S.
community bank and insurance companies that are generally not
publicly rated by Moody's.  To evaluate their credit quality,
Moody's derives credit scores for these non-publicly rated assets
and evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transactions to their
volatility, as described in Moody's Rating Methodology "Updated
Approach to the usage of Credit Estimates in rated Transactions",
October 2009.  The effect of the stress testing of these credit
scores varies between 1 and 3 notches, especially for more
concentrated pools.

The deal performance information and rating action data are
listed:

Alesco Preferred Funding VII, Ltd.

  * Issued in 4/2005 and maturing on 7/2035

  * Current Model WARF[1]: 1744

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $177,856,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions[2]: 1350

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $109,300,000

  -- US$177,000,000 Class A-1-B First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 Notes (current balance of
     $163,077,128.41), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 Notes (current balance of
     $153,535,381.52), Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1.

ALESCO PREFERRED FUNDING VIII, LTD.

  * Issued in 8/2005 and maturing on 12/2035

  * Current Model WARF: 1395

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $231,569,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1618

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $115,500,000

  -- US$110,000,000 Class A-1A Notes (current balance of
     $102,693,269.09), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$255,000,000 Class A-1B Notes (current balance of
     $238,061,669.25), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba2; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class B-1 Notes (current balance of
     $50,450,518.26), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Notes (current balance of
     $5,204,167.59), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$78,500,000 Class C-1 Notes (current balance of
     $79,537,143.45), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$7,500,000 Class C-2 Notes (current balance of
     $7,826,893.80), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C-3 Notes (current balance of
     $12,540,909.71), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$18,000,000 Class D-1 Notes (current balance of
     $18,375,862.33), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$4,500,000 Class D-2 Notes (current balance of
     $4,737,683.57), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$14,500,000 Class E Notes (current balance of
     $14,858,589.65) Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca.

Alesco Preferred Funding XI, Ltd.

  * Issued in 6/2006 and maturing on 12/2036

  * Current Model WARF: 1981

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $157,248,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1623

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $72,600,000

  -- US$174,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due December 23, 2036 (current balance of
     $158,404,644), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$176,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
     Secured Floating Rate Notes due December 23, 2036 (current
     balance of $160,225,387), Downgraded to Baa2; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$95,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due December 23, 2036, Downgraded to Ba3;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3;

  -- US$55,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due December 23, 2036 (current balance of
     $55,798,640), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$40,500,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Floating Rate Notes due December 23, 2036 (current
     balance of $41,461,725), Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$12,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes due December 23, 2036
     (current balance of $13,129,128), Downgraded to C;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$50,500,000 Class C-3 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Fixed Rate Notes due December 23, 2036 (current
     balance of $55,306,360), Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$27,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2036, Downgraded to C;
     previously on April 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Alesco Preferred Funding XIV, Ltd.

  * Issued in 12/2006 and maturing on 9/2037

  * Current Model WARF: 1699

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $282,700,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1842

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $113,700,000

  -- US$12,000,000 Class X First Priority Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2016, Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March
     27, 2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$430,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of
     $408,872,608.63), Downgraded to Baa3; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$80,500,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Downgraded to Ba3; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$103,000,000 Class B Deferrable Third Priority Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of
     $104,308,170.18), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa1;

  -- US$50,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of
     $50,942,790.43), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$32,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance
     of $34,022,229.48), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$21,000,000 Class C-3 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance
     of $22,346,663.36), Downgraded to C; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca.

ALESCO Preferred Funding XV, Ltd.

  * Issued in 3/2007 and maturing on 12/2037

  * Current Model WARF: 1989

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $245,100,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1911

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $83,000,000

  -- US$362,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due December 2037 (current balance of
     $352,111,703.10), Downgraded to Ba2; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to A3;

  -- US$78,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due December 2037, Downgraded to Caa2;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Third Priority Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due December 2037 (current balance of
     $35,399,046.84), Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Third Priority Secured
     Monthly Pay Floating Rate Notes due December 2037 (current
     balance of $35,253,616.92), Downgraded to Ca; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$75,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Floating Rate Notes due December 2037 (current
     balance of $76,337,100.81), Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$7,000,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes due December 2037 (current
     balance of $7,432,912.51), Downgraded to C; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Preferred Term Securities VII

  * Issued in 9/2002 and maturing on 10/2032

  * Current Model WARF: 980

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $154,000,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 2037

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $79,000,000

  -- US$120,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due
     October 3, 2032 Notes (current balance of $32,831,405.53),
     Downgraded to A2; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2.

Preferred Term Securities X, Ltd.

  * Issued in 6/2003 and maturing on 7/2033

  * Current Model WARF: 1446

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $220,595,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1878

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $81,500,000

  -- US$287,000,000 Floating Rate Class A1 Senior Notes Due
     July 3, 2033 (current balance of $224,503,426.61), Downgraded
     to Baa3; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to A2;

  -- US$67,000,000 Floating Rate Class A2 Senior Notes Due July 3,
     2033, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$2,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A3 Senior Notes Due
     July 3, 2033, Downgraded to Ba3; previously on March 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$88,000,000 Floating Rate Class B1 Mezzanine Notes Due
     July 3, 2033 (current balance of $89,667,870.88), Downgraded
     to C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$19,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B2 Mezzanine Notes
     Due July 3, 2033, (current balance of $19,360,108.48),
     Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca;

  -- US$70,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B3 Mezzanine Notes
     Due July 3, 2033, (current balance of $71,836,192.00),
     Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca.

Preferred Term Securities XIV, Ltd.

  * Issued in 6/2004 and maturing on 6/2034

  * Current Model WARF: 1596

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $126,500,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1559

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $39,000,000

  -- US$257,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due June
     24, 2034 (current balance $241,771,349.55), Downgraded to
     Baa1; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to A2.

Preferred Term Securities XX, Ltd.

  * Issued in 12/2005 and maturing on 3/2038

  * Current Model WARF: 1822

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $163,000,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1899

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $75,000,000

  -- US$332,300,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2038
     (current balance of $309,149,566), Downgraded to Ba2;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1;

  -- US$84,600,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due 2038
     (current balance of $82,399,336), Downgraded to B2;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$75,500,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes Due 2038
     (current balance of $74,120,524), Downgraded to C; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3;

  -- US$42,850,000 Floating Rate Class C Mezzanine Notes Due 2038
     (current balance of $43,223,530), Downgraded to C; previously
     on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca.

Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd.

  * Issued in 3/2006 and maturing on 6/2037

  * Current Model WARF: 1552

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $325,600,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1420

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $139,000,000

  -- US$482,600,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due
     June 22, 2037 (current balance of 459,516,575), Downgraded to
     Ba3; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$129,400,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due
     June 22, 2037 (current balance of $127,091,526), Downgraded
     to B3; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2;

  -- US$61,400,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
     June 22, 2037 (current balance of $61,379,205), Downgraded to
     C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2;

  -- US$25,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes
     Due June 22, 2037 (current balance of $26,239,760),
     Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2;

  -- US$82,300,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due
     June 22, 2037 (current balance of $83,880,472), Downgraded to
     C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ca;

  -- US$18,500,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes
     Due June 22, 2037 (current balance of $19,892,698),
     Downgraded to C; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca.

Trapeza CDO I, LLC

  * Issued in 11/2002 and maturing on 11/2032

  * Current Model WARF: 1144

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $75,479,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1649

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $43,479,000

  -- US$161,500,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2032 Notes (current balance of
     $23,668,780.87), Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 27,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class A-2 First Priority Senior Secured Fixed
     Rate Notes Due 2032 Notes (current balance of $2,931,118.36),
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 27, 2009 Confirmed at
     Aa3;

  -- US$54,600,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2032 Notes, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$2,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2032 Notes, Downgraded to B3;
     previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class B-3 Second Priority Senior Secured Fixed
     Rate Notes Due 2032 Notes, Downgraded to B3; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1;

  -- US$29,600,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Secured Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2032 Notes (current balance of $30,721,594.87),
     Downgraded to C; previously on November 12, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2032 Notes (current balance of $10,656,845.17),
     Downgraded to C; previously on November 12, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca;

  -- US$16,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2032 Notes (current balance of $14,802,859.27),
     Downgraded to C; previously on November 12, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca.

Trapeza CDO IX, Ltd.

  * Issued in 1/2006 and maturing on 1/2040

  * Current Model WARF: 2034

  * Current Assumed Defaulted Amount: $32,500,000

  * Model WARF for March 2009 rating actions: 1260

  * Assumed Defaulted Amount for March 2009 rating actions:
    $18,000,000

  -- US$162,000,000 Class A-1 (current balance of $158,571,777),
     Downgraded to Baa1; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded
     to A1;

  -- US$27,000,000 Class A-2, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class A-3, Downgraded to B1; previously on
     March 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3;

  -- US$23,000,000 Class B-1 (current balance of $23,095,918),
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class B-2 (current balance of $10,041,703),
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3;

  -- US$25,000,000 Class B-3 (current balance of $25,385,000),
     Downgraded to Ca; previously on March 27, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3.


* Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 731 Tranches From 202 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of 731
tranches from 202 seasoned RMBS transactions issued between 1997
and 2003.  These tranches are backed by pools of mortgage loans
with pool factors less than 5% and containing fewer than 40 loans.

Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies apply to pools
with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%.  As a
result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops
below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines to 40 loans
or lower unless specific structural features allow for a
monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

Complete Rating actions:

Issuer: ComFed Savings Bank 1987-01

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 10, 2006 Downgraded to B2

Issuer: ComFed Savings Bank 1988-01

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 10, 2006 Downgraded to B2

Issuer: ComFed Savings Bank 1988-05

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 1, 1997 Modified Rating
     Notation to Caa1

Issuer: Imperial Savings 1988-01

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2

Issuer: Prudential Home Mtg Co 1988-01

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 17, 1995 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: Prudential Home Mtg Co 1988-05

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 12, 1998 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: Ryland-American Home Fund 1988-1

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

Issuer: Ryland-Mercury Savings Trust 1988-2

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 26, 1992 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: SecurNet Mtg Sec I 1988-2 (Goldome)

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 11, 1993 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1989-05

  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2003 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-07

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 13, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-09

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 26, 2000 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-10

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 13, 2009 Upgraded to A1

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-11

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 26, 2000 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1989-12

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 26, 2000 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: SLH Mtg Trust 1989-01

  -- H, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 30, 1989 Assigned Aaa
  -- Z, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 30, 1989 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1990-05

  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2003 Downgraded to Caa1
  -- A-7, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2003 Downgraded to Caa1

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1990-09

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2003 Downgraded to B2

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1990-11

  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 1, 1995 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1990-14

  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2003 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: Guardian S&L Assn 1990-01

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 1, 1997 Modified Rating
     Notation to Caa1

Issuer: KPAC I Mtg 1990-2 (First Nationwide)

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008 Confirmed at Baa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008
     Assigned Baa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Banco Santander Puerto Rico Grantor Trust 1

  -- A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 8, 2009 Upgraded to Aa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Citicorp Mtg Sec Inc 1991-05

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 15, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on May 12, 1995 Downgraded to C

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1991-03 (Carteret)

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 15, 1991 Assigned Aa2
  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 15, 1991 Assigned Aa2

Issuer: Banco Santander Puerto Rico Grantor Trust 2

  -- A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 8, 2009 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Prudential Home Mtg Co 1992-10

  -- A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 1992 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-7, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 1992 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Prudential Sec Fin 1992-01

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 1992 Assigned Aa2

Issuer: CTS Home Equity Loan Trust 1993-04

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1993-01

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1993-02

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Greenwich Capital Acpt 1993-PO1

  -- D, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1993 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: KPAC I Mtg 1993-1 (PHH US Mtg)

  -- A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Downgraded to A2
  -- A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Downgraded to A2
  -- P, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Downgraded to A2
  -- I, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Downgraded to A2
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Downgraded to B2

Issuer: Prudential Home Mtg Co 1993-63

  -- A-05, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 10, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-06, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 10, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-08, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 10, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-18, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 10, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-19, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 10, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-20, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 10, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- M, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 12, 1998 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: Prudential Sec Fin 1993-03

  -- A-8, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-9, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-R, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 27, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 27, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
  -- B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 27, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: SBMS VII 1993-06A (Countrywide)

  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 29, 1993 Assigned Aa3
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 29, 1993 Assigned A2

Issuer: Securitized Asset Sales Inc 1993-05

  -- M, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 30, 1993 Assigned A3

Issuer: Securitized Asset Sales Inc 1993-06

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 9, 2000 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 9, 2000 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 9, 2000 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: Securitized Asset Sales Inc 1993-07

  -- T-A03, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 29, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- T-A06, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 29, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- T-A08, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 29, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- T-A09, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 29, 1993 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: SMART 1993-01

  -- BY, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 27, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- R-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 27, 1993 Assigned Aaa
  -- G, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 12, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1994-01

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1994-02

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1994-03

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Sec Corp 1994-3

  -- Cl. A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. IO, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. PO, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

Issuer: Prudential Home Mtg Co 1994-25

  -- A-8, Current Rating Aaa; previously on May 27, 2009 Confirmed
     at Aaa

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 27, 2009
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- M, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 12, 1998 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- A-R, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 28, 1994 Assigned Aaa

-- AP, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 28, 1994 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Prudential Home Mtg Co 1994-27

  -- M, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 12, 1998 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1996-04

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust Series 1996-1

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-1

  -- A-2, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- S, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Confirmed
     at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-2

  -- A-5, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: IMC Mortgage Loan Trust 1994-1

  -- A-2, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- S, Current Rating: Aa3; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Confirmed
     at Aa3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 21, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov 12, 2009)

Issuer: ABFS Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 29, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CTS Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 1994-02

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

Issuer: CTS Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-2

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: CTS Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-1

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Certificates for Home Improvement Loans, Series 1994-BI

  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Certificates for Home Improvement Loans, Series 1994-CI

  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Ca Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Certificates for Home Improvement Loans, Series 1996-B

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa1 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Cityscape Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 1995-1

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-01

  -- A-8, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008 Upgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2008
     Assigned Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-3

  -- A-8, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-10IO, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: ContiMortgage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-4

  -- A-10, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-12IO, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 2, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: DLJ Mort Acpt Corp., 1995-QE3

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Ca
  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1994-3

  -- A-07, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 1995 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 1995 Assigned Aaa
  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 1995 Assigned Aaa
  -- M, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 1995 Assigned A1
  -- B-01, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 1995 Assigned Baa2
  -- B-02, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 1995 Assigned Ba2

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1995-QE9

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Caa2
  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1996-Q-A

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Aa3
  -- M, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 4, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to C

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1996-Q2

  -- SA, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 11, 2000 Downgraded to A3
  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to A3
  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Baa3
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1999 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: DLJ Mtg Acpt Corp 1996-QJ

  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 29, 1996 Assigned A2
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2006 Downgraded to Ba3
  -- B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2006 Downgraded to Caa2

Issuer: EquiVantage Home Equity Loan Trust 1995-2

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2008
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: EquiVantage Home Equity Loan Trust 1996-1

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 6, 2008 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2008
     Assigned Aaa

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1996-02

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1995-2

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1996-03

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Golden Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed REMIC Certificates,
Series 2000-1

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 28, 2000 Assigned Baa2

Issuer: Green Tree Home Improvement Loans 1995-A

  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2010 Caa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Greenwich Capital Acpt 1994-ARM5

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 21, 1995 Assigned Aaa
  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 21, 1995 Assigned Aa3
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 21, 1995 Assigned Baa1
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 21, 1995 Assigned Baa3

Issuer: Mego Mortgage FHA Title I Loan Trust 1996-1

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

Issuer: Mego Mortgage FHA Title I Loan Trust 1996-2

  -- S, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

Issuer: Mego Mortgage Home Loan Trust 1996-3

  -- IS, Withdrawn; previously on May 14, 2009 Confirmed at A2

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-1

  -- Cl. S, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 27, 2000 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 27, 2000 Assigned A2
  -- Cl. M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 27, 2000 Assigned Baa2

Issuer: Option One/CTS ARM Trust 1995-2

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 26, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: SBMS VII, Inc. 1994-1

  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Baa2
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Ba1

Issuer: SBMS VII, Inc. 1994-3

  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Baa1
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Ba2

Issuer: SBMS VII, Inc. 1994-4A and 1994-4B

  -- 4A-A, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned A1
  -- 4A-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Baa3
  -- 4A-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned B1

Issuer: SBMS VII, Inc. 1994-5

  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Baa2
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 7, 1994 Assigned Ba1

Issuer: Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc., Salomon
Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2000-BoA1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates

  -- Cl. IO, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 29, 2000 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa1

Issuer: Structured Assets Securities Corporation - Series 1995-2

  -- II-A, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 5, 2008 Upgraded to A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- II-AX, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 5, 2008 Upgraded to A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- I-B1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 12, 2003 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- I-B2, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- I-B3, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificiates, Series 1997-
3

  -- 2A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-1A

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mtg Co Loan Trust 1997-04

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1998-1

  -- 2A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008 Upgraded to A3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008
     Assigned A3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- 2A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008 Upgraded to A3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008
     Assigned A3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: AFC Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 1999-4

  -- Cl. 3A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009
     Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: AFC Mtg Loan AB Certs 1997-04

  -- 2A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008 Upgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008
     Assigned Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- 2A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008 Upgraded to Baa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2008
     Assigned Baa1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2001-4

  -- Cl. I-A, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 6, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 6, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities, Inc., Series 1999-2

  -- AV-1, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 19, 1999 Assigned Aaa
  -- AV-2, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 19, 1999 Assigned Aaa
  -- MV-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded to A2
  -- BV, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 12, 2005 Downgraded to B1

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2001-HYB1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 25, 2003 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

Issuer: CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp 2001-4

  -- Cl. M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 25, 2006 Downgraded to
     Ba2

Issuer: CS First Boston Securities Corp 2001-AR7

  -- Cl. IV-B, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 25, 2006 Downgraded to
     Ba3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-11

  -- Cl. III-M, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 25, 2006 Downgraded
     to Ba1

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 11, 2007 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 23, 2008 Downgraded
     to C

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-33

  -- Cl. III-A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2002 Assigned
     Aa3

  -- Cl. III-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 26, 2005 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. III-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 26, 2005 Downgraded
     to Ba2

Issuer: Delta Funding Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-3

  -- B-1A, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 11, 2005 Upgraded to Baa1

Issuer: EquiVantage Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-2

  -- A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 6, 2008 Upgraded to A1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2008
     Assigned A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 6, 2008 Upgraded to A1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on May 23, 2008
     Assigned A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: FNT Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 1, 2001 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-P, Withdrawn; previously on May 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 1, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aaa

Issuer: FNT Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 13, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. I-A-X, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 13, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. I-A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 13, 2001 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: FNT Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 14, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 14, 2001 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: FNT Mortgage-Backed PassThrough Certificates, Series 2001-
5

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- X, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to Aa2
  -- B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to A2

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-01

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 8, 2010 A2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-2

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-3

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-1F

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-3

  -- A-4, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1998-4

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-1

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-2

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1999-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 8, 2009 Confirmed at A2

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Golden National Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates,
Series 1998-GN1

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 12, 1998 Assigned Aaa
  -- M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 12, 1998 Assigned Aa2
  -- M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 12, 1998 Assigned A2

Issuer: Golden National Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates,
Series 1998-GN2

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1998 Assigned Aaa
  -- M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1998 Assigned Aa2
  -- M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1998 Assigned A2
  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 30, 1998 Assigned Baa3
Issuer: Golden National Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates,
Series 1998-GN3

  -- A, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 30, 1998 Assigned Aaa
  -- M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 30, 1998 Assigned Aa2
  -- M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 30, 1998 Assigned A2
  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 30, 1998 Assigned Baa3

Issuer: IndyMac ARM Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-H1

  -- Cl. I-A, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. II-A, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. X-1-I, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. X-2-I, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. X-1-II, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. X-2-II, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. X-1-III, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. X-2-III, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     C

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     C

Issuer: IndyMac ARM Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-H2

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 21, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 21, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. X-I, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 21, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. X-II, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 21, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: Mortgage Lenders Network Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-1

  -- Class A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Provident Bank Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3

  -- A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securities Corporation, Series 1999-RS1

  -- A-II, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Baa2 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)
Issuer: Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2001-CPB1 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates

  -- Cl. A, Withdrawn; previously on May 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 25, 2003 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to A1

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Ba1

Issuer: Structured Asset Sec Corp 2001-1

  -- Cl. 3-AX, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 1-A9, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 1-AX, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 1-AP, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 2-A5, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 3-AP, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 31, 2001 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. B1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- Cl. B2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- Cl. B3, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to A3

Issuer: Structured Asset Sec Corp 2001-15A

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 16, 2008 Confirmed at
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 5-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 28, 2001 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2001-19

  -- Cl. 1-AP, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 1-AX, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 2-A6, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 2-AP, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. 2-AX, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2001-21A

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- Cl. B1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. B2, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

  -- Cl. B3, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-6

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 30, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 30, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 30, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A5, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 30, 2001 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B3, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 31, 2006 Upgraded to
     Baa1

Issuer: Tryon Mortgage Funding, Inc. Series 1997-1

  -- A-8, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Aaa
  -- X, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Aaa
  -- P, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Aaa
  -- R-II, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Aaa
  -- B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Aa2
  -- B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned A2
  -- B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Baa2
  -- B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned Ba2
  -- B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 27, 1997 Assigned B2

Issuer: WMC Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-1

  -- M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 24, 2003 Upgraded to Aaa
  -- M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 24, 2003 Confirmed at A2
  -- B, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 24, 2003 Confirmed at Baa2

Issuer: Bank of America Mortgage 2002-E Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 25, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: Bank of America Mortgage 2002-G Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. 1-A-PT, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-PT, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- Cl. 1-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- Cl. 1-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. 1-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. 1-B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2002-12

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 22, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa1

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-30

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. X, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-9

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 23, 2002 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. II-B, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-18

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 7, 2005 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 25, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-19

  -- Cl. I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-P, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-P, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded to
     A2

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded to
     Baa3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-22

  -- Cl. I-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 7, 2002 Assigned Aa2

  -- Cl. I-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3

  -- Cl. I-M-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-29

  -- Cl. II-P, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 5, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 5, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 5, 2002 Assigned Aa3

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 23, 2008 Downgraded
     to C

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-7

  -- Cl. M-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. M-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. B, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 7, 2005 Upgraded to A2

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR13

  -- Cl. I-A, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-A, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     A3

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. V-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. V-B, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR17

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Upgraded to
     A3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR2

  -- Cl. I-A, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. I-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3

  -- Cl. I-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- Cl. I-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to C

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. II-B, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 25, 2006 Downgraded to
     Ba3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR21

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. IV-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. IV-B, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR25

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 18, 2002 Assigned
     A2

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Downgraded
     to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 20, 2010 Downgraded
     to C

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR28

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. III-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR31

  -- Cl. VII-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 22, 2005 Downgraded
     to Ba2

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-AR33

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 24, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. V-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 9, 2005 Confirmed at
     A2

Issuer: CSFB Trust 2002-NP14

  -- Cl. M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 30, 2005 Downgraded to
     B2

  -- Cl. M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: Cendant Mortgage Capital LLC, CDMC Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 28, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 28, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 28, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. P, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 28, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. X, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 28, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2002-S6

  -- Cl. IA-4, Withdrawn; previously on May 13, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 13, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 13, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-P, Withdrawn; previously on May 13, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa2

Issuer: Equity One Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-2

  -- Cl. AV-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Apr 8, 2010 A1
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-AR2

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3F

  -- Cl. IA-A, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IA-B, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IA-C, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. IB-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 14, 2009 Downgraded to
     A2

  -- Cl. IB-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 14, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. IB-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 14, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- Cl. IB-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 14, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2

  -- Cl. IB-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 14, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. IIA-B2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-B5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IIA-C2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2002-A

  -- Cl. IA-1, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 18, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2002-3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     C

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 12, 2009 Downgraded to
     C

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2002-A3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 9, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 9, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 9, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-IO, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 9, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 9, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa


  -- Cl. III-A-IO, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 9, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-WL1

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 25, 2003 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 17, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. 3-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     A3

  -- Cl. 3-B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     Ba1

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2002-1 Asset
Backed Pass-Through Certificates

  -- Cl. M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: RALI Series 2002-QS10 Trust

  -- Cl. A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-V, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS1 Trust

  -- Cl. M-II-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2

  -- Cl. M-II-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust

  -- Cl. M-II-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1

  -- Cl. M-II-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS4 Trust

  -- Cl. A-II, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2002-HYB1

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 25, 2003 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aa3

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Ba1

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-14A

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa


  -- Cl. 1-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. R, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B1-I, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1-I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B1-II, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B2-I, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B2-I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 24, 2002 Assigned A2

  -- Cl. B2-II, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B3, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Baa1

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-18A

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. R, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B1-I, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B1-I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B1-II, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B2-I-X, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. B2-II, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2007 Confirmed at
     A2

  -- Cl. B3, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 8, 2007 Downgraded to
     Ba1

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-1A

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. 1-A6, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2
  -- Cl. 3-A1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A3, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-A, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 18, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B1-I, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. B1-II, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba2

  -- Cl. B1-III, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B2-I, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- Cl. B2-II, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2

  -- Cl. B2-III, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B3-I Component, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. B3-II Component, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3

  -- Cl. B3-III Component., Withdrawn; previously on Nov 30, 2005
     Upgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. B4-I, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. B4-II, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- Cl. B4-III, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 7, 2006 Upgraded to
     Baa1

  -- Cl. B5-I, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     C

  -- Cl. B5-II, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

  -- Cl. B5-III, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 7, 2006 Upgraded to
     Ba1

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-8A

  -- Cl. 4-A5, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 7-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. 7-A2, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2002-16A

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     A3

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 4-A1, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. 4-A2, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B1-I, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. B1-I-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. B1-II, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

  -- Cl. B2-I, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

  -- Cl. B2-I-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa1

  -- Cl. B2-II, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

  -- Cl. B3, Withdrawn; previously on May 26, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

Issuer: WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 2002-AR13 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A3

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2

  -- Cl. R, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR12

  -- Cl. A, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 25, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR14

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B1

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to C

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-AR16

  -- Cl. A, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A2

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba2

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs.  2002-AR15 Trust

  -- Cl. A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ca

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba1

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs.  2002-AR17 Trust

  -- Cl. II-A, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 26, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. II-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. II-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. II-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3

  -- Cl. II-B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)
Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2003-2

  -- Cl. A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2003-3

  -- Cl. A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2003-2 Trust

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 1-A-WIO, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. 2-A-WIO, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-PO, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 1, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- Cl. B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     B2

  -- Cl. B-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 7, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage 2003-5 Trust

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 25, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 3-A-WIO, Withdrawn; previously on Aug 25, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-PO, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 15, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR12

  -- Cl. IV-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 27, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR15

  -- Cl. IV-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 30, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa3

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR22

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 29, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IV-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 29, 2003 Assigned
     Aa2

  -- Cl. IV-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Dec 29, 2003 Assigned A1

  -- Cl. IV-M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba1

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR24

  -- Cl. VI-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 27, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. VI-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 27, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aa1

  -- Cl. VI-M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR26

  -- Cl. IX-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 27, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. IX-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to A2

  -- Cl. IX-M-3, Withdrawn; previously on Oct 23, 2008 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR5

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. I-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa1

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa1

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2

  -- Cl. II-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa1

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ca

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR9

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 28, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. III-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 27, 2006 Confirmed
     at Aa2

  -- Cl. III-M-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Caa2

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa1

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa1

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2003-4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Nov 17, 2008 Downgraded
     to A1

  -- Underlying Rating: Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2003
     Assigned A1

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 1-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 16, 2003 Assigned
     Baa2

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2003-1

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa3

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa2

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 26, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. 4-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 26, 2003 Assigned Aa2

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2003-7

  -- Cl. 5-M-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jan 13, 2004 Assigned Aa2

Issuer: Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, MLMI Series 2003-A2

  -- Cl. I-A, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-IO, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 16, 2003 Assigned
     Aaa

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2002-S11 Trust

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-V, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2002-S14 Trust

  -- A-V, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFMSI Series 2003-S9 Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-V, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 3, 2010 Aaa Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-AR2

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 19, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 19, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- Cl. M, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 9, 2009 Downgraded to
     Ba3

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC 2002-MS3 Trust

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. I-A-9, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-10, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. R, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-16, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-P, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-19, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-X, Withdrawn; previously on May 24, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC 2002-MS6 Trust

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-8, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. I-A-15, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. A-X, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-P, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     Aaa

  -- Cl. C-B-4, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 27, 2005 Upgraded to
     A1

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned
     Aaa

  -- Cl. II-X, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. II-P, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. R, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 16, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-1 Trust

  -- Cl. A-2, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-PO, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 4, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-10 Trust

  -- Cl. A-11, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 3, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-PO, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 3, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-14 Trust

  -- Cl. A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa
  -- Cl. A-PO, Withdrawn; previously on Jul 31, 2002 Assigned Aaa

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-A Trust

  -- Cl. A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 10, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa2

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-C Trust

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 10, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3

  -- Cl. A-4, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 14, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-5, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 14, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-6, Withdrawn; previously on Feb 14, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-7, Withdrawn; previously on Sep 1, 2004 Upgraded to Aaa

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-D Trust

  -- Cl. A-1, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 26, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. A-R, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 26, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- Cl. B-3, Withdrawn; previously on Jun 10, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes From Eight RE-REMIC Deals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 11
classes of certificates from eight re-securitized real estate
mortgage investment conduit residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions and removed three of them from CreditWatch negative.
Additionally, S&P affirmed its ratings on 71 classes of
certificates from the same transactions and removed two of them
from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the significant
deterioration in performance of the mortgage loans supporting the
underlying certificates.  As a result of this performance
deterioration, the downgraded classes were unable to maintain
their previous ratings at the applicable rating stresses.  The
affirmations reflect S&P's assessment of the credit enhancement
available to the underlying certificates, which in its opinion, is
sufficient to maintain the ratings on the re-REMIC classes.  In
addition, certain re-REMIC classes may also benefit from
supporting classes within the re-REMIC transaction.

When S&P performed its analysis on the re-REMIC classes, S&P
applied its loss projections to the underlying trusts in order to
identify the magnitude of losses that S&P believes could be passed
through to the applicable re-REMIC classes.  Generally, S&P's
projected losses depend on the type of collateral supporting the
underlying trusts.  S&P then stressed these loss projections at
various rating categories in order to assess whether the re-REMIC
classes could withstand such stressed losses at their current
rating levels.

Generally, the underlying collateral for these transactions
consists of prime, subprime, and Alternative-A mortgage loans from
2005-2007 vintages.  In S&P's view, the performance of these
collateral types from these vintages has declined in recent years.
As a result, over the past several years S&P has revised its RMBS
default and loss assumptions, and consequently its projected
losses, to reflect S&P's view of the continuing decline in
mortgage loan performance.  The performance deterioration of most
U.S. RMBS has continued to outpace the market's expectations.

                          Rating Actions

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-10
                         Series    2009-10

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        6A2        17316AAZ3     A-                   A

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-11
                         Series    2009-11

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        6A2        17314QAZ0     CCC                  B

                       CMO Holdings II Ltd.
                         Series    2006-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        I-B-2Note  125879MG8     CC                   BB
        II-A-1Note 125879MH6     BB                   BBB
        II-B-1Note 125879MJ2     CC                   BB

          Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan
               Resecuritization Trust Series 2009-RS3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        A-2        25158FAB9     B                    BB

        J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2009-11
                         Series    2009-11

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        4-A-2      466300BM1     B-                   BBB

        J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2009-12
                         Series    2009-12

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        6-A-2      46634BCX8     BBB+                 A

                Lehman Structured Securities Corp.
                         Series    2005-1

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        52518RCC8     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        52518RCD6     A                    AAA/Watch Neg
    IO         52518RCE4     AAA                  AAA/Watch Neg

          Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2
                         Series    2006-R2

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class      CUSIP         To                   From
    -----      -----         --                   ----
    A-1        76114AAA8     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg
    A-2        76114AAB6     CCC                  AAA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

              Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-10
                        Series    2009-10

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  6A1        17316AAY6     AAA
                  5A2        17316AAX8     AA
                  1A1        17316AAA8     AAA
                  3A1        17316AAN0     AAA
                  1A2        17316AAB6     AAA
                  5A1        17316AAW0     AAA

               Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-11
                        Series    2009-11

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  6A1A       17314QBA4     AAA
                  7A1E       17314QBM8     AAA
                  9A1D       17314QCC9     AAA
                  6A1D       17314QBD8     AAA
                  7A1D       17314QBL0     AAA
                  7A1B       17314QBJ5     AAA
                  9A1B       17314QCA3     AAA
                  7A1H       17314QBQ9     AAA
                  7A1        17314QBE6     AAA
                  6A1C       17314QBC0     AAA
                  7A1F       17314QBN6     AAA
                  6A1B       17314QBB2     AAA
                  9A1        17314QBX4     AAA
                  7A1A       17314QBH9     AAA
                  7A1C       17314QBK2     AAA
                  9A1A       17314QBZ9     AAA
                  9A1C       17314QCB1     AAA
                  6A1        17314QAY3     AAA
                  7A1G       17314QBP1     AAA

                       CMO Holdings II Ltd.
                         Series    2006-2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  I-B-1Notes 125879MF0     BBB

          Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan
              Resecuritization Trust Series 2009-RS3

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-5        25158FAE3     AAA
                  A-6        25158FAF0     AAA
                  A-1        25158FAA1     AAA
                  A-3        25158FAC7     AAA
                  A-4        25158FAD5     AAA

        J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2009-11
                         Series    2009-11

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  4-A-1      466300BL3     AAA
                  4-A-7      466300BS8     AAA
                  4-A-3      466300BN9     AAA
                  4-A-5      466300BQ2     AAA
                  4-A-6      466300BR0     AAA
                  4-A-10     466300BV1     AAA
                  4-A-12     466300BX7     AAA
                  4-A-9      466300BU3     AAA
                  4-A-11     466300BW9     AAA
                  4-A-4      466300BP4     AAA
                  4-A-8      466300BT6     AAA

        J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2009-12
                        Series    2009-12

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  9-A-4      46634BEX6     AAA
                  3-A-8      46634BBU5     AAA
                  9-A-6      46634BEZ1     AAA
                  3-A-5      46634BBR2     AAA
                  6-A-3      46634BCY6     AAA
                  3-A-6      46634BBS0     AAA
                  9-A-5      46634BEY4     AAA
                  6-A-1      46634BCW0     AAA
                  3-A-12     46634BFS6     AAA
                  3-A-4      46634BBQ4     AAA
                  6-A-6      46634BDB5     AAA
                  3-A-1      46634BBM3     AAA
                  9-A-1      46634BEU2     AAA
                  3-A-9      46634BBV3     AAA
                  9-A-7      46634BFA5     AAA
                  6-A-4      46634BCZ3     AAA
                  9-A-2      46634BEV0     BBB
                  9-A-3      46634BEW8     AAA
                  6-A-7      46634BDC3     AAA
                  9-A-8      46634BFB3     AAA
                  3-A-10     46634BBW1     AAA
                  6-A-8      46634BDD1     AAA
                  6-A-5      46634BDA7     AAA
                  3-A-3      46634BBP6     AAA
                  3-A-11     46634BBX9     AAA
                  3-A-7      46634BBT8     AAA

          Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-R2
                        Series    2006-R2

                  Class      CUSIP         Rating
                  -----      -----         ------
                  A-R        76114AAC4     AAA


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Classes of Notes From Three CDOs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 28
classes of notes from three cash flow and one hybrid
collateralized debt obligation transactions to 'D'.  One of these
ratings was previously on CreditWatch with negative implications.

Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd., Klio II Funding Ltd., and McKinley
Funding Ltd. are cash flow CDO transactions and E*Trade ABS CDO VI
Ltd. is a hybrid CDO transaction.

The rating actions reflect the implementation of S&P's criteria
for ratings on CDO transactions that have triggered an EOD and may
be subject to acceleration or liquidation.

S&P lowered its ratings on the hybrid CDO transaction because the
transaction did not have proceeds to pay back par payments to the
noteholders after making the termination payments on the credit
default swap contracts.  For the three cash flow transactions, S&P
has received notices from the trustees stating that after the
liquidation of the portfolio assets, the available proceeds were
insufficient to pay the noteholders in full.

                          Rating Actions

                                                Rating
                                                ------
  Transaction                       Class      To   From
  -----------                       -----      --   ----
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           A-1A       D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           A-1B       D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           A-1C       D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           S          D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           A-2        D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           A-3        D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           B          D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           C          D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           D-1        D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           D-2        D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           D-3        D    CC
Delphinus CDO 2007-1 Ltd.           E          D    CC
E*Trade ABS CDO VI Ltd.             A-1S       D    CC
E*Trade ABS CDO VI Ltd.             A-3        D    CC
E*Trade ABS CDO VI Ltd.             B-1        D    CC
E*Trade ABS CDO VI Ltd.             B-2        D    CC
Klio II Funding, Ltd.               A-1        D    CC
Klio II Funding, Ltd.               A-2        D    CC
Klio II Funding, Ltd.               B          D    CC
Klio II Funding, Ltd.               C          D    CC
Klio II Funding, Ltd.               Pref Shrs  D    CC
Klio II Funding, Ltd.               A LT       D    CCC-/Watch Neg
McKinley Funding Ltd.               ABCP       D    CC
McKinley Funding Ltd.               A-1        D    CC
McKinley Funding Ltd.               A-2        D    CC
McKinley Funding Ltd.               A-3        D    CC
McKinley Funding Ltd.               B          D    CC
McKinley Funding Ltd.               C          D    CC

                     Other Outstanding Ratings

       Transaction                        Class     Rating
       -----------                        -----     ------
       E*Trade ABS CDO VI Ltd.            A1J       D
       E*Trade ABS CDO VI Ltd.            A2        D


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Classes From Six CMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 28
classes of certificates from six U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transactions due to interest shortfalls.

S&P expects the shortfalls to continue affecting 20 of these
classes, so S&P lowered its ratings on these classes to 'D'.

The 20 classes that S&P downgraded to 'D' have experienced
interest shortfalls for seven months or more.  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily
due to one or more of these factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Trust expenses that may include, but are not limited to,
  property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
  and legal expenses;

* Nonrecoverable advance declarations; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered servicer
nonrecoverable advance declarations, trust expenses, and special
servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring
interest shortfalls.

Eight of the 28 downgraded classes have experienced shortfalls for
six months or less and are at an increased risk of experiencing
shortfalls in the future.  If these liquidity interruptions
continue, S&P will likely downgrade these classes to 'D'.

The ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with
each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call
for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the
stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due
and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D'.  S&P used this
approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are
highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P detail the 28 downgraded classes from the six CMBS
transactions below.

     Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.' Series 2007-2

S&P lowered its rating on the class Q certificates from Banc of
America Commercial Mortgage Inc. 2007-2 transaction due to
interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to 12 of the 19
assets that are currently with the special servicer, Helios AMC
LLC, as well as special servicing fees.  As of the June 10, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $101.8 million were in effect for
13 assets.  The total reported monthly ASER amount was $460,099,
and the reported cumulative ASER amount was $2,507,171.  Standard
& Poor's considered 12 ASERs ($415,355), all of which were based
on MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, to
determine its rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $1.16 million and they have affected all classes up to and
including class F.  If the accumulated shortfalls on classes L, M,
N, O, and P remain outstanding for a prolonged time period, S&P
will likely lower its outstanding ratings on them to 'D'.  Class Q
has experienced interest shortfalls for 10 months, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded this class to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the BACM 2007-2 transaction consists of
178 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.1 billion.  As of
the June 10, 2010, remittance report, 19 assets ($1.02 billion;
32.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is: four ($47.8 million, 1.5%) are real
estate owned by the trust, four ($26.7 million, 0.9%) are in
foreclosure, six ($190.6 million, 6.1%) are more than 90 days
delinquent, four ($361.3 million, 11.5%) are within their grace
periods, and one ($394.5 million, 12.6%) is current.

                    CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust

S&P lowered its ratings on the class L, M, N, O, P, and Q
certificates from CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust transaction due to
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to 15
of the 23 assets in the pool that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR Partners Inc., as well as special servicing fees.
As of the June 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$64.8 million were in effect for 16 assets.  The total reported
monthly ASER amount was $378,366, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $2.26 million.  Standard & Poor's considered eight
ASERs ($292,232), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, to determine its rating
actions.  The reported interest shortfalls total $89,874 and they
have affected all classes up to and including class L.  The
monthly shortfall amount would have been higher were it not for a
one-time trust adjustment.  Classes N and O have experienced
interest shortfalls for eight months and classes P and Q have
experienced shortfalls for nine months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.

Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the CD 2007-C5 transaction consists of 160
loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.07 billion.  As of the
June 17, 2010, remittance report, 23 assets ($254.9 million;
12.3%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is: three ($59.4 million, 2.9%) are REO,
eight ($91.6 million, 91.6%) are in foreclosure, six
($27.9 million, 1.3%) are more than 90 days delinquent, three
($63.5 million, 3.1%) are more than 60 days delinquent, two
($9.8 million, 0.5%) are 30 days delinquent, and one
($2.9 million, 0.1%) is less than 30 days delinquent.

     Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust's Series 2007-C5

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J and K certificates from
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2007-C5 due to
interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs related to 19
of the 30 assets that are currently with the special servicer, C-
III Asset Management, LLC, as well as special servicing fees.  As
of the June 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$128.1 million were in effect for 19 assets.  The total reported
monthly ASER amount was $607,220, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $5.2 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 15 ASERs
($449,637), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls total $760,249 and they have
affected all classes up to and including the class H certificates.
Classes J and K have experienced interest shortfalls for nine and
10 months, respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur
in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these
classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the CSCMT 2007-C5 transaction consists of
191 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.7 billion.  As of
the June 17, 2010, remittance report, 30 assets ($550.2 million,
20.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: six ($92.3 million, 3.4%) are
REO, eight ($167.8 million, 6.2%) are in foreclosure, 10
($181.3 million, 6.7%) are more than 90 days delinquent, three
($10.6 million, 0.4%) are 60 days delinquent, two ($92.5 million,
3.4%) are within their grace periods, and one ($5.6 million, 0.2%)
is current.

   Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s Series 2005-GG3

S&P lowered its rating on the class O certificates from Greenwich
Capital Commercial Funding Corp.'s series 2005-GG3 due to interest
shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to seven of the 14 assets
that are currently with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset
Management LLC, as well as special servicing fees.  As of the
June 11, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $42.5 million were
in effect for nine assets.  The resulting reported monthly ASER
amount was $219,366, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$1.1 million.  Standard & Poor's considered six ASERs ($131,942),
which were derived from ARAs based on recent MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, to determine its ratings
actions for this transaction.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $291,365, and have affected all classes up to and including
the class L certificates.  Class O has experienced interest
shortfalls for the past 13 months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P
downgraded this class to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the GCCF 2005-GG3 transaction consists of
125 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $2.9 billion.  As of
the June 11, 2010, remittance report, 14 assets ($385.5 million;
13.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including the
second-largest asset in the pool.  The payment status of the
delinquent assets is: three ($13.2 million, 0.5%) are REO, three
($40.7 million, 1.4%) are in foreclosure, three ($53.9 million,
1.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent, two ($10.8 million, 0.4%)
are 30 days delinquent, two ($53.5 million, 1.9%) are less than 30
days delinquent, and one ($213.4 million, 7.4%) is current.

          GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s Series 2005-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, M, N, and O
certificates from GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2005-C1
(GECMC 2005-C1) due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to five of the 10 assets that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  As of
the June 10, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $57.4 million
were in effect for seven assets.  The resulting reported monthly
ASER amount was $222,885, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $1.3 million.  Standard & Poor's considered three ASERs
($177,005), which were derived from ARAs based on recent MAI
appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, to
determine its rating actions for this transaction.  The reported
interest shortfalls total $283,168 million, which prompted
interest shortfalls up to and including the class H certificates.
Classes L, M, and N have experienced interest shortfalls for the
past 10 months, and class O has experienced interest shortfalls
for the past 13 months.  S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in
the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these
classes to 'D'.

The collateral pool for the GECMC 2005-C1 transaction consists of
106 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.32 billion.  As of
the June 10, 2010, remittance report, 10 assets ($163.3 million;
12.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: two ($56.0 million, 4.2%) are
REO, one ($16.0 million, 1.2%) is in foreclosure, four ($47.2,
3.6%) are matured balloons, one ($6.7 million, 0.5%) is more than
90 days delinquent, one ($21.4 million, 1.6%) is 30 days
delinquent, and one ($16.1 million, 1.2%) is within its grace
period.

              GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10

S&P lowered its ratings on the class G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P,
and Q certificates from GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II's series
2007-GG10 due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related
to 19 of the 27 assets that are currently with the special
servicer, CWCapital, as well as special servicing fees.  As of the
June 11, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $476.9 million
were in effect for 19 assets.  The resulting reported monthly ASER
amount was $2.3 million, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $15.2 million.  Standard & Poor's considered the 19 ASERs,
which were derived from ARAs based on recent MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, to determine its ratings
actions for this transaction.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $2.88 million, which prompted interest shortfalls up to and
including the class G certificates.  Class J has experienced
interest shortfalls for seven months, classes K, L, M, N, and O
have experienced interest shortfalls for the past eight months,
class P has experienced interest shortfalls for the past nine
months, and class Q has experienced interest shortfalls for the
past 10 months.  S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D'.

The collateral pool for the GSMSC 2007-GG10 transaction consists
of 201 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $7.5 billion.  As
of the June 11, 2010, remittance report, 27 assets ($1.17 billion;
15.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is: two ($91.6 million, 1.2%) are
REO, 18 ($877.0 million, 11.6%) are in foreclosure, four
($64.3 million, 0.9%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one
($55.0 million, 0.7%) is 30 days delinquent, one ($61.5 million,
0.8%) is less than 30 days delinquent, and one ($23.0 million,
0.3%) is within its grace period.

                         Ratings Lowered

         Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                 Reported
         Rating                             interest shortfalls($)
         ------                             ----------------------
Class  To    From  Credit enhancement(%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --    ----  ---------------------   -------    -----------
Q      D      CCC-             1.10         53,229        251,259

                    CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                 Reported
         Rating                             interest shortfalls($)
         ------                             ----------------------
Class  To    From  Credit enhancement(%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --    ----  ---------------------   -------    -----------
L      CCC-   B                3.16         55,402        445,922
M      CCC-   B-               2.78         30,064        213,269
N      D      B-               2.53         20,045        160,361
O      D      B-               2.27         20,041        160,331
P      D      B-               2.02         20,045        165,065
Q      D      CCC+             1.90         10,019         90,364

      Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C5
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                 Reported
         Rating                             interest shortfalls($)
         ------                             ----------------------
Class  To    From  Credit enhancement(%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --    ----  ---------------------   -------    -----------
J      D      CCC-             4.22         161,288      1,059,927
K      D      CCC-             3.33         125,446      1,113,842

             Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
                          Series 2005-GG3
            Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                 Reported
         Rating                             interest shortfalls($)
         ------                             ----------------------
Class  To    From  Credit enhancement(%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --    ----  ---------------------   -------    -----------
O      D      CCC-             1.12         52,589        582,230

                   GE Commercial Mortgage Corp.
                          Series 2005-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                 Reported
         Rating                             interest shortfalls($)
         ------                             ----------------------
Class  To    From  Credit enhancement(%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --    ----  ---------------------   -------    -----------
G      B      BB-              6.31              0              0
H      CCC+   B+               4.41         56,995         98,487
J      CCC-   B                4.09         16,252         65,009
K      CCC-   B-               3.46         32,500        146,549
L      D      B-               2.67         40,626        203,132
M      D      CCC+             2.51          8,122         40,611
N      D      CCC              2.03         24,378        145,861
O      D      CCC-             1.72         16,248        211,227

              GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                 Reported
         Rating                             interest shortfalls($)
         ------                             ----------------------
Class  To    From  Credit enhancement(%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --    ----  ---------------------   -------    -----------
G      CCC+   B                7.26         222,666        222,666
H      CCC-   B-               5.88         519,838        920,566
J      D      B-               4.63         472,577      2,275,185
K      D      B-               3.62         378,066      2,738,238
L      D      B-               3.12         178,262      1,426,092
M      D      B-               2.87         89,131        713,046
N      D      B-               2.49         133,694      1,069,550
O      D      B-               2.24         89,131        713,046
P      D      CCC+             1.99         89,131        736,058
Q      D      CCC              1.74         89,131        838,524


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes From Six RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from six U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities transactions issued from
2003 to 2005.

All of the downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of interest
shortfalls on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  The lowered ratings reflect S&P's view of the magnitude
of the interest payment deficiencies that have affected each class
to date compared with the remaining principal balance owed and the
likelihood that certificate holders will be reimbursed for these
deficiencies, as well as the balance of current delinquencies of
the affected transactions.

Six of the lowered ratings are on transactions backed by prime
jumbo mortgage loan collateral.  The remaining lowered rating is
on a transaction backed by Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgage loan
collateral.

S&P lowered its ratings on five of the downgraded classes from the
'CCC' or 'CC' rating categories, and all of the lowered ratings
were speculative grade before the downgrades.

                          Rating Actions

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A2
                          Series 2004-A2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-2        466247CQ4     CCC                  B-

                 JPMorgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3
                          Series 2005-A3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        II-BA-2    466247RG0     D                    CC
        II-BA-3    466247RH8     D                    CC

        Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLMI 2005-A1
                          Series 2005-A1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-1        59020UQJ7     D                    CC

     Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2003-G
                         Series MLCC2003-G

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-3        5899296E3     CCC                  BB-

                   RALI Series 2003-QS11 Trust
                         Series 2003-QS11

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        B-1        76110HFD6     D                    CC

                    RFMSI Series 2004-S6 Trust
                          Series 2004-S6

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class      CUSIP         To                   From
        -----      -----         --                   ----
        III-B-2    76111XND1     D                    CCC



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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