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T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
Sunday, August 15, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 225
Headlines
AMP ABX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2036 Notes to 'Caa3'
ARCAP 2003-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
ARCAP 2004-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certificates
ARCAP 2005-RR5: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
ANSONIA CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
ANTHRACITE 2004-HY1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Notes
BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2002-PBW1 Certificates
BLUE HERON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1 to 'Caa3'
CAPCO AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1998-D7 Certificates
CHARLIE MAC: Moody's Junks Rating on Class L Bonds From 'A3'
CITICORP MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various 2003-6 Notes
COLORADO HOUSING: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
COMM 2000-C1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Certificates
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Rates Class III-B-5 2001-33 Notes at 'B'
CREST EXETER: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 198 Tranches
CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Fitch Assigns LS Ratings on 1998-C1 Certs.
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-1 Certs.
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-CF2 Certs.
DLJ MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class B-4 Certificate
FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Puts Note Ratings on Negative Watch
FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-C2 Certificates
FREEDOM CERTIFICATES: S&P Raises Ratings on 2004-1 Certs. to 'B'
FREEPORT LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Certs.
GENESIS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1998-C2 Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 2007-GKK1 Notes
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class F 1998-C1 Notes
GULF STREAM-COMPASS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
HARLEY-DAVIDSON CREDIT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 1999-C8 Certificates
JP MORGAN-CIBC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2006-RR1 Notes
LATITUDE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five 2001-C2 Certs.
MADISON SQUARE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1996-C2 Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-IQ14 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class IIIA Notes
N-STAR REAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
NOMURA CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes of Notes
OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
PRIME MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 34 Tranches
RESERVOIR FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
REVE SPC: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Rating on Class A Notes
SIGNATURE 5: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loan Bonds
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2007-6 Student Loan Notes
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 194 Tranches
TRAINER WORTHAM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
VEGA CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2007-ESH Certificates
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2005-C16 Certs.
WCP WIRELESS: Fitch Expects to Rate Class C Notes at 'BB-'
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 38 Bonds From 19 CMBS to 'D'
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 1214 RMBS Transactions
* Moody's Junks Rating on Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority's Bonds
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 37 Tranches From 12 Trust Preferred CDOs
* S&P Cuts Ratings on City of Bell, California's GO Bonds to 'BB'
* S&P Cuts Ratings on Seven Tranches From Corporate-Backed CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 51 Classes From 13 RMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 201 Classes From 89 RMBS Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches From Five CDO Deals
*********
AMP ABX: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2036 Notes to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by AMP ABX 2006-1, Ltd. The
notes affected by the rating action are:
* US$65,000,000 Notes Due 2036 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
previously on March 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf).
AMP ABX 2006-1 is a synthetic collateralized debt obligation
issuance referencing a portfolio of RMBS issued in 2005.
According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
the deterioration in the credit quality of the reference
portfolio. Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors including deterioration in the weighted average rating
factor. Since the last rating action 85% of the securities in the
portfolio have been downgraded. The WARF has deteriorated to 898
from 113 in March 2009 as per Moody's calculations. 30% of the
transaction is now rated below investment grade with the lowest
rated security currently Caa3.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodologies below:
-- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)
-- Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default (November 2009)
In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability. In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.
ARCAP 2003-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust and the
corresponding grantor trust certificates from six additional ARCap
transactions. Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AA+' rating on the
class A note from ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust and the
corresponding grantor trust certificate from the same series. S&P
removed all of the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of ARCap 2003-1 following its rating actions on the underlying
commercial mortgage-backed securities certificates. The CMBS
certificates are from five CMBS transactions and total
$140.8 million (34.7% of total asset balance). S&P also revised
its credit estimates on a portion of the underlying CMBS not rated
by Standard & Poor's ($120.7 million, 29.8%). S&P lowered the
majority of the credit estimates.
The downgrades of ARCap 2003-1 also reflect S&P's analysis of the
deferred interest affecting classes K and L as per the July 21,
2010 trustee report. Additionally, the interest coverage test is
failing. Should the interest deferrals increase, they may lead to
additional rating actions.
ARCap 2003-1 is a multitiered structure, which issued 10
individual rated notes and seven rated grantor trust certificates.
The class A through G notes were each repackaged into separate
newly formed individual grantor trusts, each of which issued
certificates. The cash flow received by each note from the
underlying CMBS collateral is directly passed through to the
corresponding grantor trust certificates. Accordingly, the
ratings on the grantor trust certificates are dependent upon the
ratings of the corresponding notes.
According to the July 21, 2010, trustee report, ARCap 2003-1 has
exposure to 63 CMBS classes ($405.7 million, 100%) from 13
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2003. ARCap 2003-1
has exposure to the following CMBS transactions that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:
* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2001-PB1
(classes L, M, N, O, and P; $37.2 million, 9.2%);
* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2003-C3 (classes K, L, M, N, and O; $36.7 million, 9.0%);
* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CKN2 (classes J, K, L, M, and N; $33.2 million, 8.2%); and
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-C2 (classes J, K, L, M, and N; $25.8 million. 6.3%).
Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2003-1 according to its current
criteria. S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B AA AA+/Watch Neg
C A+ AA+/Watch Neg
D A- AA/Watch Neg
E BBB AA-/Watch Neg
F BBB- A+/Watch Neg
G BB BBB+/Watch Neg
H BB- BBB/Watch Neg
J B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
K CCC+ BB+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class B
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
AA AA+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class C
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
A+ AA+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class D
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
A- AA/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class E
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
BBB AA-/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class F
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
BBB- A+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class G
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
BB BBB+/Watch Neg
Rating Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class A
Grantor trust certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
ARCAP 2004-1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
classes from ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust and the
corresponding grantor trust certificates from six additional ARCap
transactions. Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AA+' ratings on the
class A note from ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust and the
corresponding grantor trust certificate from the same series. S&P
removed all of the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
on ARCap 2004-1 following its rating actions on the underlying
commercial mortgage-backed securities certificates. The CMBS
certificates are from five CMBS transactions and total
$77.6 million (24.9% of total asset balance). S&P also revised
its credit estimates on a portion of the underlying CMBS not rated
by Standard & Poor's ($117.2 million, 37.6%). S&P lowered the
majority of the credit estimates.
The downgrades of ARCap 2004-1 also reflect S&P's analysis of the
deferred interest affecting classes G through L as per the
July 19, 2010 trustee report. Additionally, the interest coverage
test is failing. If the interest deferrals increase, they may
cause additional rating actions.
ARCap 2004-1 is a multi-tiered structure, which issued 10
individual rated notes and seven rated grantor trust certificates.
The class A through G notes were each repackaged into separate
newly formed individual grantor trusts, each of which issued
certificates. Each note received cash flow from the underlying
CMBS collateral, which is directly passed through to the
corresponding grantor trust certificates. Accordingly, the
ratings on the grantor trust certificates are dependent on the
ratings on the corresponding notes.
According to the July 19, 2010, trustee report, ARCap 2004-1 had
exposure to 65 CMBS classes ($312.1 million, 100%) from 17
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2004. ARCap 2004-1
has exposure to the following CMBS transactions that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2003-
LN1 (classes K, L, and M; $28.5 million, 9.1%);
* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2001-
CIB2 (classes J and K; $19.2 million, 6.2%); and
* Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust series 2003-KEY1 (classes K, L, M,
N, and P; $19.8 million, 6.3%).
Standard & Poor's analyzed ARCap 2004-1 according to its current
criteria. S&P's analysis is consistent with the lowered and
affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B AA AA+/Watch Neg
C A- A+/Watch Neg
D BBB+ A/Watch Neg
E BBB- A-/Watch Neg
F BB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
G B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
H B- BB+/Watch Neg
J CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
K CCC- B/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class B
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
AA AA+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class C
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
A- A+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class D
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
BBB+ A/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class E
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
BBB- A-/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class F
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
BB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class G
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
B+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
Collateralized debt obligations
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust, Class A
Grantor Trust Certificate
Rating
------
To From
-- ----
AA+ AA+/Watch Neg
ARCAP 2005-RR5: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Seven Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded seven classes of ARCap 2005-RR5
Resecuritization Inc. as a result of increased principal losses
and interest shortfalls on the underlying portfolio.
Since Fitch's last rating action in October 2009, the portfolio
has experienced approximately $56.8 million of principal losses,
bringing total principal losses since issuance to approximately
$166.1 million (54.2%). As a result of these losses, classes G
and below have been entirely written down, and class F has been
written down by approximately 75%. The remaining collateral pool
is concentrated with 20 assets from 13 obligors, and is expected
to continue to incur significant losses.
As of the July 2010 trustee report, 96% of the underlying
portfolio is experiencing interest shortfalls. As a result of
these shortfalls, classes A-1 through A-3 are no longer receiving
their full interest payments, and classes below A-3 are not
receiving any interest proceeds.
Given that the total percentage of assets experiencing interest
shortfalls exceeds the credit enhancement to all classes, and that
Fitch expects minimal principal recoveries on these assets, Fitch
believes that default is inevitable. As such, classes A-1 and A-2
have been downgraded to 'C', and classes A-3 through E have been
affirmed at 'C'. Classes F through K have been downgraded to 'D',
and classes L through N have been affirmed at 'D' because the
bonds have incurred a principal write down.
This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The analytical
scope of this transaction, however, was limited because the
expected losses from assets that are experiencing interest
shortfalls already exceed the credit enhancement level of the most
senior class of notes. Given the portfolio's distressed and
concentrated nature, Fitch believes that the probability of
default for all classes of notes can be evaluated without
factoring potential further losses from the remaining portion of
the portfolio. Therefore this transaction was not modeled using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model.
ARCap 2005-RR5 is backed by 15 classes of fixed-rate CMBS in 12
separate underlying transactions (66.4%) and the five most junior
classes of ARCap 2004-RR3 (33.6%). Approximately 86.1% of the
collateral is currently rated below 'CC' or not rated. The
transaction closed in August 2005.
Fitch has downgraded and affirmed these classes as indicated:
-- $26,100,000 class A-1 to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- $26,100,000 class A-2 to 'C' from 'CC';
-- $26,150,000 class A-3 at 'C';
-- $21,938,000 class B at 'C';
-- $21,938,000 class C at 'C';
-- $3,134,000 class D at 'C';
-- $12,536,000 class E at 'C';
-- $2,361,942 class F to 'D' from 'C';
-- $0 class G to 'D' from 'C';
-- $0 class H to 'D' from 'C';
-- $0 class J to 'D' from 'C';
-- $0 class K to 'D' from 'C';
-- $0 class L at 'D';
-- $0 class M at 'D';
-- $0 class N at 'D'.
ANSONIA CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes from Ansonia CDO 2006-1 Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC-'
ratings on 11 classes from the same transaction.
The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following the downgrade of 37 classes of
commercial mortgage-backed securities that serve as collateral for
Ansonia 2006-1. The underlying securities are from 11
transactions and total $153.9 million (21% of the total asset
balance). S&P also analyzed its credit estimates on $92.7 million
(13%) of unrated CMBS collateral. S&P lowered most of the credit
estimates. The downgrades also considered the susceptibility of
classes A-FX and A-FL to future interest shortfalls in S&P's
analysis.
According to the July 23, 2010, trustee report, Ansonia 2006-1 was
collateralized by 121 classes ($676.1 million, 93.5%) from 33
distinct transactions issued between 1998 and 2006. The current
assets also included seven real estate investment trust securities
($40 million, 5.5%) and two classes ($7.6 million, 1%) from GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. II's series 2006-CC1, which is a CMBS
resecuritization transaction. Ansonia 2006-1 has exposure to the
following transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:
* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C6 (classes L through P; $42 million, 5.8%);
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C19
(classes K through O; $24.2 million, 3.3%);
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2004-C12
(classes J through O; $21.3 million, 2.9%); and
* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2004-C15
(classes G, H, K through O; $19.8 million, 2.7%).
S&P had previously lowered the ratings on classes B through G to
'D' due to interest shortfalls on the nondeferrable classes.
Standard & Poor's analyzed Ansonia 2006-1 and its underlying
collateral according to S&P's current criteria. S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Ansonia CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-FX CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
A-FL CCC+ BB/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Ansonia CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
Class Rating
----- ------
H CCC-
J CCC-
K CCC-
L CCC-
M CCC-
N CCC-
O CCC-
P CCC-
Q CCC-
S CCC-
T CCC-
ANTHRACITE 2004-HY1: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Four Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes from Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P also affirmed the
ratings on two other classes from this transaction and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following its rating actions on commercial
mortgage-backed securities that serve as underlying collateral for
Anthracite 2004-HY1. The securities are from seven transactions
and total $28.3 million (11.2% of the total asset balance). S&P
lowered the majority ($25.3 million) of these ratings to 'D'. The
downgrades also reflect S&P's lowered credit estimates on a
portion of the collateral that S&P does not rate ($58.6 million,
23%).
According to the July 21, 2010 trustee report, Anthracite 2004-HY1
was collateralized by 30 classes of CMBS ($252.6 billion, 100%)
from 14 distinct transactions issued from 1998 through 2004.
Anthracite 2004-HY1 has exposure to the following CMBS
transactions that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:
* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. series
2001-CK6 (classes O and P; $9.3 million, 3.7%);
* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. series
2003-CPN1 (class O; $5 million, 2%);
* GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2004-C2 (class
O; $3.5 million, 1.4%); and
* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. series 2004-1 (class O;
$3 million, 1.2%).
Standard & Poor's analyzed Anthracite 2004-HY1 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria. S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A B+ A/Watch Neg
B CCC- BBB-/Watch Neg
C CCC- BB+/Watch Neg
D CCC- B+/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Anthracite 2004-HY1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
E CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
F CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
BALLYROCK CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Ballyrock CLO II, Ltd.:
-- US$290,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf) (current balance of $179,082,118); previously on
July 14, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
-- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded
to A1 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to A3
(sf);
-- US$18,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1
(sf).
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from substantial delevering of the transaction and the
improvement in the Class A/B overcollateralization ratio since the
rating action in July 2009.
Since the last rating action, the Class A Notes were paid down by
about $106 million, accounting for roughly 37% of the total Class
A Notes' outstanding balance reported in June 2009. As a result
of the delevering, the Class A/B overcollateralization ratio has
improved from 122.2% in June 2009 to 139.5% in July 2010. Moody's
expects delevering to continue as a result of the end of the
deal's reinvestment period in November 2008.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.
Ballyrock CLO II, Ltd., issued in November 2003, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of two
tranches of securities issued by Banc of America Funding 2006-7
Trust. At closing, the securitization was backed by fixed-rate,
Alt-A mortgage loans originated by SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., Bank
of America, N.A., MortgageIT, Inc., and various other originators.
The downgrades are driven by a loss of $486.7 thousand allocated
to the Class T2-A-1 and a loss of $158.8 thousand allocated to the
Class T2-A-2 according to the July 2010 remittance report; and
balance of loans delinquent 60 days or more, including loans in
foreclosure and real estate owned, compared to the credit
enhancement provided by subordination and excess spread. The
Class T2-A-1 and Class T2-A-2 remains on review for possible
downgrade as Moody's completes its review of this transaction.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Banc of America Funding 2006-7 Trust, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-7
-- Cl. T2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. T2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) and Remains On Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
BEAR STEARNS: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 2002-PBW1 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns, maintains, or revises Rating
Outlooks, Recovery Ratings, and Loss Severity ratings to Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2002-PBW1, as indicated:
-- $9.2 million class E to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook
revised to Negative from Stable;
-- $13.8 million class F to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $13.8 million class G to 'B/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook Negative;
-- $16.1 million class H to 'B-/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Negative;
-- $10.4 million class J to 'CCC/RR2' from 'B-/LS5';
-- $3.5 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B-/LS5';
-- $5.8 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1';
-- $9.2 million class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR4.
Classes F, G, and H are removed from Rating Watch Negative.
In addition, Fitch affirms these classes and assigns, maintains,
or revises Rating Outlooks, RR, and LS ratings as indicated:
-- $25.8 million class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1' revised from 'AAA/LS2';
Outlook Stable;
-- $385.9 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1' revised from 'AAA/LS2';
Outlook Stable;
-- $26.5 million class B at 'AAA/LS5' revised from 'AAA/LS4';
Outlook Stable;
-- $31.1 million class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook to Stable;
-- $8.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook to Stable;
-- $1.6 million class N at 'C/RR6'.
Fitch withdraws these ratings:
-- Interest-only class X-1;
-- Interest-only class X-2.
Fitch does not rate the $13.8 million class P.
The downgrades are due to an increase in Fitch expected losses
following Fitch's prospective review of potential stresses and
expected losses associated with specially serviced assets. Fitch
expects losses of 6.5% of the remaining pool balance,
approximately $37.6 million, from the loans in special servicing
and the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based
on Fitch's refinance test. The majority of losses (6.0%) are from
loans currently in special servicing.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 37.6% to $575.2 million from $921.2 million
at issuance. Nineteen of the remaining loans have defeased
(20.5%), including five of the top 10 loans.
As of June 2010, there are four specially serviced loans (7.1%).
The largest specially serviced loan (3.9%) is the second largest
loan in the pool and is secured by a 295,000 square foot (sf)
office property located in Dayton, OH. The property was formerly
known as the Fifth Third Center; however, Fifth Third Bank vacated
in 2009 and the property was 28.5% occupied as of March 2010.
Foreclosure is scheduled in August, and significant losses are
expected.
The second largest specially serviced asset (1.9%) is secured by a
300-unit multifamily property located in Stone Mountain, GA. The
loan transferred to special servicing in November 2008 and is
currently Real Estate Owned. Reported occupancy was 55%, as
management has worked to evict delinquent tenants. Significant
losses are expected.
The largest Fitch Loan of Concern that is not specially serviced
is the Lott Portfolio (1.1%), a portfolio of six self-storage
facilities located throughout Georgia. The property has a
servicer-reported year-end 2009 net operating income (NOI) debt
service coverage ratio of 1.07 times and occupancy rate of 70.6%,
down from 1.27x and 79.9% as of year-end 2008.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the performing loans by applying a
10% reduction to year-end 2009 NOI, 10% reduction to year-end 2008
NOI when 2009 was not available, or alternative valuation when an
appropriate cash flow was not available, and applying an adjusted
market cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x
or higher were considered to payoff at maturity. Under this
scenario, 16 loans are not expected to payoff at maturity with
three loans incurring a loss when compared to Fitch's stressed
value.
BLUE HERON: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1 to 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Blue Heron Funding VI, Ltd.
The notes affected by the rating action are:
-- US$1,113,750,000 Class A-1 Blue Heron Funding VI Notes, due
May 21, 2047 (current balance of $863,423,414), Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2
(sf).
Blue Heron Funding VI, Ltd., issued on May 21, 2003, is a
collateralized debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio that
consists primarily of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities. RMBS comprise
approximately 35% of the underlying portfolio, of which the
majority are from pre-2005 vintage.
According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), failure of the coverage tests, and the number of assets
that are currently on review for possible downgrade. In
particular, the weighted average rating factor, as reported by the
trustee, has increased from 489 in March 2009 to 969 in July 2010.
During the same time, the Class A overcollateralization ratio
decreased from 93.2% to 77.6%, and the coverage test is failing.
Also, in April 2010, the ratings of approximately $158 million of
pre-2005 RMBS in the underlying portfolio were placed on review
for possible downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss
projections applicable to certain RMBS.
Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed. For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A. Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.
For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches. Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.
For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.
All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.
Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade. Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.
Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:
-- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)
In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability. In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.
CAPCO AMERICA: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1998-D7 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades CAPCO America Securitization Corp.'s
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 1998-D7:
-- $1.9 million class B-1 to 'BB/LS5' from 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook
Negative.
Class B-3 has been depleted due to losses from previously disposed
specially serviced loans.
The downgrade is the result of interest shortfalls that Fitch
expects to begin with the next remittance date. Fitch does not
expect the bond to receive interest for the next several months
and the recoverability of the shortfalls is uncertain.
Currently three specially serviced loans (38.6%) have been deemed
non-recoverable, as such all operating expenses and trust expenses
associated with the loans will be paid from available interest.
CHARLIE MAC: Moody's Junks Rating on Class L Bonds From 'A3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the rating on the Class L bond issued by
Charlie Mac Trust 2004-2 to Caa1 (sf), from A3 (sf). The Class L
is the most subordinate bond in the structure and is reimbursed
for realized losses from liquidated loans by a letter of credit
provided by U.S. Central Federal Credit Union (A3).
The class L bond, however, has taken losses totaling $15,250 till-
date from five loans that had interest rate reductions through
modifications. The reduction in interest rate reduced funds
available to pay interest. As a result, principal payments were
diverted to cover interest shortfalls. Losses from modifications,
according to Moody's interpretation of the documents, are not
covered by the terms of the LOC. The parties are discussing
potential alternatives, but Moody's believe a successful
resolution is remote.
Moody's generally rates securities Caa1 (sf) or lower if they have
a very high likelihood of taking losses in the expected case. For
more details regarding Moody's approach to rating securities in
default please see "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" available on Moodys.com.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Charlie Mac Trust 2004-2
-- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on April 15, 2010
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
CITICORP MORTGAGE: S&P Corrects Ratings on Various 2003-6 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on
classes IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-PO, and IA-IO from Citicorp
Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2003-6 by reinstating them at
their prior 'AAA' levels. S&P also lowered its ratings on three
other classes and affirmed its ratings on five other classes from
the same transaction.
On Aug. 23, 2006, S&P inadvertently withdrew its ratings on six
senior classes from loan group 1 due to an error. S&P is
reinstating its ratings on these classes to their pre-Aug. 23,
2006, levels, which reflect S&P's current analysis of the credit
support available to these classes as of the June 2010 remittance
report.
The downgrades on the three other classes reflect S&P's opinion
that projected credit support for the affected classes is
insufficient to maintain the previous ratings, given its current
projected losses.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trend of the transaction and its
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis. In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
S&P's base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 235% for an 'AAA' rating. For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 127% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 154% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in its view, withstand approximately
235% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.
The affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.
Ratings Corrected
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP Current Aug. 23, 2006 Pre-Aug. 23, 2006
----- ----- ------- ------------- -----------------
IA-1 172973QE2 AAA NR AAA
IA-2 172973QF9 AAA NR AAA
IA-3 172973QG7 AAA NR AAA
IA-4 172973QH5 AAA NR AAA
IA-PO 172973QJ1 AAA NR AAA
IA-IO 1729739A8 AAA NR AAA
Rating Actions
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 172973QP7 A- A
B-3 172973QQ5 B BB
B-4 172973QR3 CCC B-
Ratings Affirmed
Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2003-6
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
IIA-1 172973QK8 AAA
IIA-2 172973Ql6 AAA
IIA-3 172973QM4 AAA
IIA-IO 1729739B7 AAA
B-1 172973QN2 AA
COLORADO HOUSING: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'BB' rating
on the Colorado Housing & Financing Authority's series 2007
revenue bonds, issued for Evergreen Country Day School, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.
"The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's assessment of
information S&P received from ECDS that there is significant
potential that current debt service payments can not be maintained
with the limited financial resources available to the school,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Blake Cullimore.
ECDS has met its bond payment schedules to date, but was in
violation of its debt service ratio covenants in fiscal 2009 and
expects to remain in violation of its covenants when the fiscal
2010 audit is finalized. Management and the current consultant,
as required by the bond agreement, are trying to resolve the
covenant violations and avoid any potential defaults on the bond
payments.
Over the next 90 days, S&P will continue to monitor the situation
and assess ECDS' ability and capacity to fulfill its obligations.
A rating change would be dependent on S&P's view of ECDS' ability
to resolve covenant violations and avoid any potential default on
the bonds.
COMM 2000-C1: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns or revises a Recovery Rating
to COMM 2000-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2000-C1, as indicated:
-- $26.9 million class G to 'BB/LS5' from 'BBB'; Outlook
Negative;.
-- $6.7 million class H to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB+'.
-- $6.7 million class J to 'C/RR2' from 'B+'.
-- $10.1 million class K to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.
In addition, Fitch affirms and assigns Loss Severity ratings and
an RR as indicated:
-- $31.4 million class C at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.5 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.8 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.2 million class F at 'AA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.8 million class L at 'D/RR6'.
Classes A-1, A-2 and B have paid in full. Classes M and N have
balances of $0 due to realized losses. The ratings on these
classes remain at 'D/RR6'. Fitch does not rate the class O.
Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest only class X.
The downgrade is the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates for
the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis which is
similar to its recent vintage fixed rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis. Fitch expects potential losses of
11.69% of the remaining pool balance, all of which come from the
loans in special servicing. All other loans are expected to
refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 84.9% to $135 million, from
$897.9 million at issuance. No loans have defeased. The Rating
Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any changes to the
ratings over the next one to two years.
Fitch has identified 15 Loans of Concern (66.8%), including 13
loans (45.9%) that are in special servicing. The largest loan in
the pool (19.87%) is considered a Fitch Loan of Concern. It is
secured by a retail center located in Rochester Hills, MI. The
loan has passed its anticipated repayment date date and remains
current. The property is in fair condition with some deferred
maintenance, and is 92% occupied with tenants including Best Buy,
Tuesday Morning, and Kohl's.
The largest specially serviced loan (13.5%), is secured by a
137,676 square feet Class A office building located in Bloomfield
Hills, MI, a suburb of Detroit. The loan transferred to special
servicing in February 2010 for maturity default. Borrower has
proposed a discounted pay-off which is currently under review by
the servicer.
The second largest specially serviced loan (6.0%) is secured by a
manufactured housing property located in Flint, MI. The asset
transferred to special servicing in May 2010 for maturity default.
Borrower has requested an extension. The terms are currently
being negotiated.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine
value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity. Under this scenario, all loans are expected to pay
off at maturity.
CREDIT SUISSE: S&P Rates Class III-B-5 2001-33 Notes at 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services released its ratings on classes
III-B-4 and III-B-5 from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp.'s series 2001-33, a U.S. Alternative-A
residential mortgage-backed securities transaction.
These classes provide credit support in the form of subordination
to the group III senior certificates in this transaction.
The ratings reflect S&P's current analysis of the credit support
available to these classes as of the July 2010 remittance report.
Ratings Released
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2001-33
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
III-B-4 22540VIB0 BBB
III-B-5 22540VIA0 B
CREST EXETER: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed six classes of Notes issued by
Crest Exeter Street Solar 2004-1 due to stable performance of the
underlying portfolio as evidenced by the weighted average rating
factor. The rating action, which concludes Moody's current
review, is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation
transactions.
Crest Exeter Street Solar 2004-1 is a static Re-Remic CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (57.5% of pool balance), real estate
investment trust securities (22.2%), credit tenant lease deals
(7.7%), rake bonds (6.6%), whole loans (3.7%) and CDO securities
(2.3%). As of July 30, 2010, the aggregate Notes balance of the
transaction, including the Income Notes, has decreased to
$259.5 million from $350.0 million at issuance, due to
approximately $90.5 million in pay-downs to the Class A-1 through
E-2 Notes. The deal has a provision directing principal
repayments other than scheduled amortization to pay down all the
Notes pro rata prior to June 2008. After June 2008 all principal
proceeds go to pay down Class A-1 and A-2 pro rata.
Two assets totaling approximately $12.9 million par amount (4.9%
of the pool balance) were listed as defaulted. The deal passes
all the overcollateralization tests and interest coverage tests.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the entire
pool and the results will be reflected in a future Trustee Report.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
840 compared to 781 at last review.
WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time. Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 3.0 years
compared to 4.0 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled the actual
WARR of 42.2% compared to 35.9% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 13.7% compared to 21.5% at last review.
Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.
The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.
As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating actions are:
-- Class A-1, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on January 30,
2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)
-- Class A-2, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on January 30,
2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)
-- Class B-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on January 30,
2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
-- Class B-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on January 30,
2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
-- Class C-1, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on January 30,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
-- Class C-2, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on January 30,
2009 Downgraded to Ba1(sf)
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated January 30, 2009.
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 198 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 198
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 70 tranches from 15 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Countrywide.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans. The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress. The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.
To assess the rating implications of the updated loss l evels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves. The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.
The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans. To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively). This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools. Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk. Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied. Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75. For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%. If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-13T1
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-29T1
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-30T1
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-36T2
-- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-40T1
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-45T1
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-14, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-5T2
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-9T1
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-11T1
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-12T1
-- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-24, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-25, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-26, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-27, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-28, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-29, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-30, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-31, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-32, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-33, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-34, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-35, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-36, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-37, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-38, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-39, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-40, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-41, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-42, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-43, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-44, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-45, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-46, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-47, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-14T2
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-1T1
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-10, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-4, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-6, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-9, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-10, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-12, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-13, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-14, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-15, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-16, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-17, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-18, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-19, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-3T1
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-15, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-16, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-17, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-18, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-19, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-20, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-7T2
-- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-9T1
-- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-6, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-12, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-14, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-17, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-18, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-19, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-20, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-21, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-22, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-23, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-24, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-25, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-26, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-27, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-28, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-29, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-30, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-31, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-32, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-33, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-34, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-35, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-36, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-37, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-38, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-39, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A-40, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-7, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-9, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-10, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-12, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-13, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-14, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-15, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-16, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-17, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-18, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-19, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-20, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-21, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A-22, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 11 classes of Notes issued by
CWCapital Cobalt I, Ltd., due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio as measured by deterioration
in the weighted average rating factor. The rating action, which
concludes Moody's current review, is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.
CWCapital Cobalt I, Ltd., is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
which turned static after the Replenishment Period ended on
May 25, 2010, backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities collateral (57% of the pool, including rake bonds),
whole loan debt (21% of the pool), B-note debt (5% of the pool),
mezzanine debt (4% of the pool), CRE CDO collateral (7% of the
pool), and other derivates assets (6% of the pool). As of
June 30, 2010, the aggregate Notes balance of the transaction,
including the Preferred Share, has decreased to $420.5 million
from $450.9 million at issuance, due to approximately
$33.8 million in pay-downs to the Class A1 Notes. The pay-down
was triggered as a result of the failure of the Class A/B, Class
C/D, and Class E/F/G Overcollateralization Tests. Per the
Indenture, the failure of any Overcollateralization Test results
in all scheduled interest and principal payments being directed to
pay down the most senior notes, until the Overcollateralization
Coverage Test is satisfied.
As of June 30, 2010, total twenty-five assets totaling over
$159.6 million par amount (38% of the pool) were listed as
defaulted. Moody's currently estimates over $107 million in
expected losses to the Notes (over 70% loss severity on average).
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of
the default probability within a collateral pool. Moody's bottom-
dollar WARF is 4,903 compared to 4,079 at last review. The
distribution of current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3
(9.3% compared to 3.1% at last review), A1-A3 (1.9% compared to
5.5% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (2.5% compared to 2.9% at last
review), Ba1-Ba3 (26.3% compared to 37.5% at last review), B1-B3
(15.8% compared to 13.5% at last review), and Caa1-C (44.2%
compared to 37.5% at last review).
WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time. Moody's modeled an actual WAL of three years
compared to 3.6 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 27% compared to 15% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.2% compared to 10.2% at last review.
The low MAC is due to a high level of dispersion of credit within
the collateral pool.
Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010. The cash flow model,
CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its
effect on the capital structure of the deal.
The rating actions are:
-- Class A1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class A2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class B1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class B2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class E1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class E2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class F1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class F2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Class G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on December 11,
2009 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process
that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March, 30 2009.
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Fitch Assigns LS Ratings on 1998-C1 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades and assigns a Loss Severity rating to
Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates series 1998-C1:
-- $45.4 million class G to 'AA/LS5' from 'A'; Outlook Stable.
Additionally, Fitch affirms, assigns LS Ratings, and revises
Recovery Ratings, as indicated:
-- $31.2 million class F at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Positive;
-- $18.1 million class H at 'BBB-/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
Stable;
-- $22.7 million class J at 'B+/LS5' from 'B+'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $15.6 million class K at 'D/RR1'.
Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the classes L and M. Fitch withdraws its rating on the
interest only class X.
The rating actions are the result of Fitch's revised loss
estimates for the transaction following Fitch's prospective
analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate CMBS
analysis. Fitch expects potential losses of 3.78% of the
remaining pool balance, which come from the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 92.7% to $133 million, from $1.8
billion at issuance. Ten of the remaining loans (7.7%) have
defeased. The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any
changes to the ratings over the next one to two years.
Fitch has identified 11 Loans of Concern (31.25%), including four
loans (13.01%) that are in special servicing. The largest Loan of
Concern (6.6%) is a retail center located in Memphis, TN.
Occupancy has been 24% since 2009 when the property's major
tenants, Toys R Us and Kids R Us vacated. Both tenants have
continued paying rent and are expected to continue paying through
lease end in January 2017.
The largest specially serviced loan (6.1%) is secured by 102 room
full service hotel located in Tiburon, CA. The loan transferred
to special servicing in February 2010 for imminent default. The
loan is suffering from increased operating expenses since 2007.
The second largest specially serviced loan (3.8%) is secured by a
multifamily property located in Yonkers, NY. The asset
transferred to special servicing in May 2008 for non-monetary
default due to failing a HUD inspection. HUD has since rescinded
its default notice due to borrower curing the inspection items.
Additionally, borrower has indicated it will not be able to make
payments once the Housing Assistance Payment contract with HUD
expires.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5% to determine
value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity. Under this scenario, two loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity and incur a loss when compared to Fitch's
stressed value.
DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, COMM 1999-
1:
-- $26.2 million class J to 'CCC/RR4' from 'BB-'; Outlook
Negative.
Also, Fitch has affirmed and assigned a Loss Severity rating to
this class:
-- $1.8 million class H at 'A+/LS3'; Outlook Stable.
In addition, Fitch has affirmed this class:
-- $18 million class K at 'D'.
In addition, Fitch withdraws the rating from interest only class
X.
Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F and G have paid in full. The non
rated class L has been depleted from losses in the pool.
The downgrades are the result of expected losses on the specially
serviced loans in the pool as well as the increasing
concentrations since Fitch's last rating action. As of the July
2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate certificate balance
has been reduced by approximately 96.5%, to $46 million from
$1.31 billion at issuance. Two loans (16%) are defeased.
Fitch has identified five Loans of Concern (66.2%), all of which
are in special servicing. The largest Loan of Concern (33.6%) is
secured by two office buildings located in Springfield, IL and was
transferred to special servicing in August 2008 for payment
default. The State of Illinois was the primary tenant and has
delayed rental payments in the past. The loan matured in November
2008. Based on an 2009 appraisal valuation as well as market
conditions, Fitch expects losses upon the disposition of this
asset.
The second largest loan of concern (15.3%) is a 158,001 retail
property located in Montgomery, IL. The loan transferred to
special servicing in September 2009 due to monetary default. An
anchor tenant had gone dark but continued to pay rent through June
2009 when its lease expired. There is also a considerable amount
of vacant inline space. The borrower has requested a modification
which is under review with the special servicer. Based on the
loan performance and market conditions, Fitch expects losses upon
the disposition of this asset.
The third largest Loan of Concern (9.3%) is secured by a 66,914 sf
office property in Mesa, AZ. The loan is passed its ARD and the
borrower has been entered into a cash management agreement with
interest accruing at an additional 2% rate. As of March 2010,
occupancy was 67% and the loan remains current.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and
10.5% to determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity. Under this scenario, two loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with one loan incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 1998-CF2 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on DLJ Commercial Mortgage
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-CF2 and removed certain classes from Rating Watch Negative.
Fitch has also assigned Rating Outlooks to multiple classes.
The upgrade to the senior class is primarily due to substantial
paydown on the transaction as well as the concentration of
defeased loans. The downgrade of the lowest Fitch rated class is
due to an increase in realized losses since the last review as
well as Fitch's expected losses on loans currently in special
servicing. Fitch expects losses to fully deplete the nonrated
class C. Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any
rating changes over the next one to two years.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced 90.7% to $103.3 million from
$1.11 billion at issuance, which consists of 89.2% of paydown and
only 1.5% of realized losses. Five of the remaining loans (11.2%)
have defeased. Interest shortfalls have reached class B-5.
Expected losses on the remaining loans as a percentage of the
current deal balance is 9.4%.
Fitch has designated 13 loans (40%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes three specially serviced loans (24.6%). The
largest specially serviced loan (13.3%) which is also the largest
remaining loan in the pool, is secured by a 267 room full-service
Holiday Inn located in Louisville, KY. The $13.8 million loan
transferred to the special servicer in October 2009 and is over 90
days delinquent as of the July 2010 remittance. The special
servicer and the borrower are discussing a potential modification
that would provide some debt service relief and some funds for a
PIP. For the YTD period ended June 30, 2009, the property
reported occupancy of approximately 70% and a DSCR of 0.74 times.
Fitch expects the trust to experience a loss on this loan.
The second largest specially serviced loan (6.1%) is secured by a
94,000 sf office park located in Flint, MI, approximately 70 miles
northwest of Detroit. The property securing the $6.3 million loan
was foreclosed on in October 2009, and the special servicer is
currently marketing for sale. As a most recent appraisal and
offers have come in below the total loan balance, Fitch expects
the trust to incur a loss on the liquidation.
Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 year-end net operating income (NOI)
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 12% to
determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow. Loans that
could refinance to a DSCR of 1.25x or higher were considered to
pay off at maturity. Of the non-defeased or non-specially
serviced loans, five loans (7% of the overall pool) were assumed
not to be able to refinance, of which Fitch modeled losses on two
loans (1.8%) in instances where Fitch's derived value was less
than the outstanding balance.
Fitch has upgraded and assigned a Rating Outlook and Loss Severity
rating to this class:
-- $50.7 million class B-3 to 'AAA/LS4' from 'A+'; Outlook
Stable;
Fitch has removed class B-3 from Rating Watch Negative.
Fitch has affirmed and assigned Rating Outlooks and LS ratings to
these classes:
-- $11.1 million class B-4 at 'A-/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.2 million class B-5 at 'BB+/LS5'; Outlook Negative.
Fitch has removed class B-4 from Rating Watch Negative.
Lastly, Fitch has downgraded this class as indicated:
-- $13.8 million class B-6 to 'C'/RR2' from 'CCC/'RR2'.
The A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 classes have been paid
in full. Fitch withdraws the rating on the interest-only class S.
Fitch did not rate class C at issuance.
DLJ MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class B-4 Certificate
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating to 'AAA' from
'AA' on the class B-3 commercial mortgage pass-through certificate
from DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.'s series 1996-CF1. In
addition, S&P affirmed its 'B+' rating on the class B-4
certificate from the same transaction.
The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the remaining three
fixed-rate amortizing loans in the transaction. S&P based its
analysis, in part, on a review of servicer operating statement
analysis reports, the most recent borrower-provided rent rolls,
and site inspection reports provided by the master servicer. The
upgrade reflects S&P's analysis of the remaining loans, as well as
substantial reduction in the transaction's outstanding principal
balance. S&P expects the class B-3 balance to be retired within
three months due to scheduled principal payments on the two fully
amortizing loans and one balloon loan.
Transaction Summary
As of the July 12, 2010, trustee remittance report, the collateral
balance was $25.6 million, which is 5.5% of the issuance balance.
The collateral consists of three loans, down from 93 loans at
issuance. The master servicer provided financial information for
each of the loans, using full-year 2009 data. Based on these
reported figures, S&P calculated a weighted average debt service
coverage of 1.94x for the pool. Based on S&P's analysis of the
three remaining loans, its weighted average adjusted DSC and LTV
were 1.38x and 34.9%, respectively. To date, the transaction has
experienced $17.1 million of principal losses in connection with
seven loans. None of the loans are on the master servicer's
watchlist or with the special servicer.
Summary of The Mortgage Loans
The Maccabees Office Center loan ($14.9 million, 58.1%) is the
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 334,461-sq.-ft.
office complex in Southfield, Mich. The loan is a 20-year, fully-
amortizing loan, and it is scheduled to mature on Jan. 1, 2016.
As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.77x. As of July 13,
2010, the property was 96.0% occupied. Reassure America Life
Insurance ('A+') leases 44.6% of the gross leasable area, and its
lease expires Dec. 31, 2013. According to CoStar Realty
Information Inc., vacancy for the Southfield submarket is 20.8%,
which S&P considered in S&P's analysis to derive an adjusted DSC
and loan-to-value ratio of 1.25x and 31.6%, respectively.
The Upper Deck Facility loan ($10.1 million, 39.2%) is the second-
largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 294,779-sq.-ft.
mixed-use facility in Carlsbad, Calif. The facility is divided
into 226,279 sq. ft. of industrial space and 68,500 sq. ft. of
office space. The loan is a 15-year balloon loan, and it is
scheduled to mature on Feb. 1, 2011. As of Dec. 31, 2009, the
reported DSC was 2.19x. As of July 13, 2010, the property was
100.0% leased to The Upper Deck Co., however, 15.0% of the space
has been subleased. In addition, the remainder of the property is
currently being marketed for sublease. According to CoStar,
vacancy for the Interstate 5 Corridor submarket, which includes
Carlsbad, is 14.2%, which S&P considered in its analysis to derive
an adjusted DSC and LTV of 1.55x and 41.6%, respectively.
The Jackson Creek Shopping Center loan ($0.7 million, 2.7%) is the
smallest remaining loan in the pool and is secured by a 171,028-
sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Bloomington, Ind. The loan is a
16-year, fully amortizing loan, and it is scheduled to mature on
Jan. 1, 2012. As of Dec. 31, 2009, the reported DSC was 1.86x.
As of June 30, 2010, the property was 100.0% occupied. S&P's
adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.63x and 7.8%, respectively.
Standard & Poor's stressed the transaction and its collateral
according to its criteria. The analysis was consistent with S&P's
raised and affirmed ratings.
Rating Raised
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1996-CF1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B-3 AAA AA
Rating Affirmed
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1996-CF1
Class Rating
----- ------
B-4 B+
FIRST NATIONAL: Fitch Puts Note Ratings on Negative Watch
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the ratings of asset-backed securities
issued out of First National Master Note Trust on Rating Watch
Negative. Approximately $1.33 billion of securities are affected
by these actions.
The action follows Fitch's announcement on August 6 that it
downgraded the long-term Issuer Default Ratings of First National
Bank of Omaha (the bank) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', and short-term IDR
to 'B' from 'F3'. Fitch also placed the ratings for the Bank on
Rating Watch Negative.
The rating downgrade of the bank reflects increased pressure on
the parent company's liquidity profile and a reduced ability to
serve as a source of strength for the subsidiaries should the need
arise.
Trust performance remains in line with Fitch's expectation. Fitch
plans to resolve the rating watch within a six-month window,
during which period, Fitch may revisit its assumptions and
stresses applied to the trust. Resolution of the Rating Watch
will be dependent upon the resolution of the Watch on the bank and
the collateral performance.
Because credit cards provide revolving credit lines to obligors,
the financial strength of the originator directly impacts its
ability to fund the acquisition of new purchases. In recently its
published 'Global Credit Card ABS Rating Criteria', Fitch
highlights the originator linkage as one of the key risks and the
strength of the originator as one of the important factors when
Fitch evaluates purchase rate stress.
Fitch has placed these on Rating Watch Negative:
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2009-1 class A notes
'AAA/LS2';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2009-1 class C notes
'BBB/LS4';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2009-1 class D notes
'BB/LS5';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2009-3 class A notes
'AAA/LS2';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2009-3 class C notes
'BBB/LS4';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2009-3 class D notes
'BB/LS5';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-2 class C notes
'BBB/LS4';
-- First National Master Note Trust, series 2008-2 class D notes
'BB/LS5'.
FIRST UNION: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1999-C2 Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns a Recovery Rating to this
class of First Union National Bank-Chase Manhattan Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, series 1999-C2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates:
-- $11.8 million class M to 'C/RR3' from 'CCC/RR1'.
Fitch upgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings to these classes:
-- $11.8 million class H to 'AAA/LS3' from 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.8 million class J to 'AA/LS3' from 'A+'; Outlook Stable.
In addition, Fitch affirms, assigns LS ratings and revises Rating
Outlooks for these classes as indicated:
-- $26.7 million class G at 'AAA/LS2'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.8 million class K at 'BB+/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.8 million class L at 'BB-/LS3' Outlook to Stable from
Negative.
Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class IO.
The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate CMBS analysis. Fitch
expects potential losses of 6.39%, approximately $5.6 million, of
the remaining pool balance from the loans in special servicing and
the loans that are not expected to refinance at maturity based on
Fitch's refinance test. The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
92.6% to $87.4 million from $1.2 billion at issuance. Twelve
loans (29.4%) are defeased. Fitch has identified nine Loans of
Concern (26.3%), including three loans in special servicing (12%).
The largest specially serviced asset (5.7% in total) is a
multifamily property located in Smyrna, GA. The loan has a
history of poor performance and was unable to refinance at
maturity. The special servicer is pursuing a deed in lieu of
foreclosure.
The next largest specially serviced asset (4%) is a multifamily
property located in Marietta, GA. The loan has a history of poor
performance and was unable to refinance at maturity. The special
servicer is pursuing a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
The third specially serviced asset (2.4%) is a retail property
located in Medford, OR. This poorly occupied shopping center was
recently extended through 2011.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by, generally, applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end
net operating income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on
performance issues, such as a significant decline in occupancy,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 11% to
determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity. Under this scenario, five loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with four loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.
FREEDOM CERTIFICATES: S&P Raises Ratings on 2004-1 Certs. to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on Freedom
Certificates US Autos Series 2004-1 Trust's $4 million class A and
X certificates to 'B' from 'B-'.
S&P's ratings on the class A and X certificates are dependent on
the lower of S&P's ratings on two underlying securities: (i) Ford
Motor Credit Co. LLC's 7.375% bonds due Feb. 1, 2011 ('B+'); and
(ii) Ally Financial Inc.'s 7.25% unsecured notes due March 2, 2011
('B').
The rating actions follow the Aug. 2, 2010 raising of S&P's rating
on Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC's 7.375% bonds to 'B+' from 'B-'.
However, S&P's ratings on the class A and X certificates are
capped at its lower 'B' rating on Ally Financial Inc.'s 7.25%
unsecured notes. S&P may take subsequent rating actions on the
class A and X certificates due to changes in its ratings assigned
to the two underlying securities.
FREEPORT LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Freeport Loan Trust 2006-1:
-- US$24,937,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Asset-Backed
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
October 8, 2009 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);
-- US$77,437,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Asset-Backed
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
October 8, 2009 Upgraded to A3 (sf);
-- US$26,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset-Backed
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on October 8,
2009 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of substantial deleveraging of the transaction since the
previous rating action in October 2009. In particular, the Class
A-1 Notes (Class A-1A Notes and Class A-1B Notes) have been paid a
total of about $218 million since the previous rating action,
accounting for roughly 84% of the total Class A-1 Notes'
outstanding balance reported in September 2009. As a result of
the deleveraging, the collateral coverage of the rated notes has
increased significantly since the last rating action.
Moody's notes that a significant portion of the collateral pool
includes debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed
through credit estimates. Moody's conducted stress tests to
assess the collateral pool's concentration risk in a small number
of obligors that constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.
Freeport Loan Trust 2006-1, issued in October 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans of middle market
issuers.
GE CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings,
Recovery Ratings or revised Rating Outlooks to these classes of GE
Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp., Series 2001-3 mortgage pass-
through certificates:
-- $7.2 million Class E to 'AA/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14.5 million Class F to 'A/LS5' from 'AAA'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $12 million Class G to 'BBB-/LS5' from 'AA'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $27.7 million Class H to 'B-/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $8.4 million Class I to 'CCC/RR2' from 'BBB';
-- $7.2 million Class J to 'CC/RR2' from 'BBB-';
-- $12 million Class K to 'C/RR6' from 'B+';
-- $4.8 million Class L to 'C/RR6' from 'B-';
-- $4.8 million Class M to 'C/RR6' from 'CCC/RR1'.
In addition, Fitch affirms the ratings and assigns LS ratings as
indicated:
-- $32.2 million Class A-1 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- $478.9 million Class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.2 million Class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.6 million Class C at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.3 million Class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable.
Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only classes X-1 and
X-2.
The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate commercial mortgage
backed security analysis. Fitch expects potential losses of 5.3%,
approximately $37.5 million, of the remaining pool balance from
the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not expected
to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test; 51% of
the non-defeased loans in the transaction are scheduled to mature
in the next 17 months. The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely
direction of any rating changes over the next one to two years.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
26.5% to $708.3 million from $963.8 million at issuance. 29 loans
(29.8%) are defeased. Fitch has identified 28 Loans of Concern
(30.1%), including six loans in special servicing (6.8%).
The largest specially serviced asset (1.8% in total) is a real
estate owned office property located in Arlington, TX. The
largest tenant (85% of the net rentable area), which subleases all
its space, has a lease expiration on Dec.r 31, 2010. It is
unclear whether either of the subtenants will renew.
The next largest specially serviced asset (1.6%) is an REO
multifamily property located in Decatur, GA. The poorly
performing property is currently listed for sale.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by, generally, applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end
net operating income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on
performance issues, such as a significant decline in occupancy,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 9.5% to
determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity. Under this scenario, 31 loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with 10 loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.
GENESIS CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Genesis CLO 2007-2 Ltd.:
-- US$1,236,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Due 2016 (current balance of $840,553,489), Upgraded to Aa1
(sf); previously on June 18, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
-- US$65,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
2016, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf);
-- US$55,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Due 2016, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 18, 2009
Confirmed at B3 (sf).
According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is a
result of delevering of the transaction since the previous rating
action in June 2009. In particular, the Class A Notes were paid a
total of about $239 million since the previous rating action,
accounting for roughly 22% of the total Class A outstanding
balance reported in May 2009. As a result of the delevering, the
Class A/B overcollateralization ratio has increased significantly
since the last rating action. In particular, based on the latest
trustee report, dated July 6, 2010, the Class A/B
overcollateralization ratio is reported at 121.01%, versus the May
2009 level of 114.77%. Moody's expects delevering to continue
since the deal is a static transaction.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.
Genesis CLO 2007-2 Ltd., issued in December 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1998-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., series 1998-C2:
-- $19 million class J to 'B/LS4' from 'BB+'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $19 million class K to 'C/RR2'from 'CC/RR1'.
Fitch affirms these classes:
-- $22.3 million class E at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
-- $88.6 million class F at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44.3 million class G at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
Fitch affirms and revises the Outlook for this class:
-- $19 million class H at 'A/LS4'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.
Classes A-1, A-2, B, C and D have paid in full. Classes L and M
remain at 'D/RR6' due to principal losses.
In addition, Fitch withdraws the 'AAA' rating on Interest-only
class X 'AAA'.
The actions reflect Fitch's prospective review of potential
stresses and expected losses associated with specially serviced
assets. Fitch expects losses of 12.4% of the remaining pool
balance, approximately $28.5 million, from the loans in special
servicing and the loans that are not expected to refinance at
maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 90.6% to $237 million from $2.5 billion at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, 12 have defeased (32.7%).
Interest shortfalls currently extend to the class J notes.
As of July 2010, there are 13 loans (18.6%) in special servicing,
including loans to five single-tenant properties (6.5%) occupied
by Circuit City and another retail property (1.7%) where the major
tenant is Circuit City. Circuit City filed for bankruptcy in late
2008. Three of the properties are located in the Northeast (two
in New York and one in Connecticut), and three are located in the
Midwest (one each in Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin). The
properties are in various states of the foreclosure process, with
half already considered Real Estate Owned.
The next largest Fitch Loan of Concern is secured by a retail
property (2.2%) located in Indianapolis. The borrower was unable
to refinance the property at its May 2008 maturity due to
volatility in the capital markets and environmental issues. The
borrower has been unable to perform under a forbearance agreement,
and the servicer is pursuing foreclosure while evaluating the
environmental condition.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by generally applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net
operating income and applying an adjusted market cap rate between
7.25% and 10.5% to determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to payoff
at maturity. Under this scenario, 16 loans are not expected to
payoff at maturity with six loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 10 2007-GKK1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded ten classes of Notes issued
by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Series 2007-GKK1 due to
the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor, and a decrease in the weighted average recovery
rate. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, Series 2007-GKK1 is a CRE
CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage
backed securities (100.0% of the pool balance). All of the
collateral was issued between 1998 and 2007, with a majority of
the collateral concentrated in 2005 (18.8%), 2006 (54.7%) and 2007
(17.9%). As of the July 22, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction is $633.7 million the same as at
issuance. Seventeen CMBS bonds (19.3% of the pool balance)
experienced interest shortfalls in the latest reporting period.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation. These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4,446 compared to 2,026 at
last review. The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 5.9% at last review), A1-
A3 (4.5% compared to 5.5% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (7.6%
compared to 15.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (17.6% compared to
16.0% at last review), B1-B3 (30.5% compared to 51.6% at last
review), and Caa1-C (39.9% compared to 5.5% at last review).
WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 6.1 years compared to 7.5 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 6.8% compared to 10.9% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 24.3% compared to 40.2% at last review.
Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010. The cash flow model,
CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its
effect on the capital structure of the deal. As always, Moody's
ratings are determined by a committee process that considers both
quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating actions are:
-- Class A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to A1 (sf)
-- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
-- Class B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)
-- Class C, Downgraded to C(sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)
-- Class D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)
-- Class E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)
-- Class F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
-- Class G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Class H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Class J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 6, 2009.
GS MORTGAGE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class F 1998-C1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' rating on
the class F commercial mortgage-backed securities from GS Mortgage
Securities Corp. II's series 1998-C1.
The affirmation reflects S&P's analysis of the remaining
collateral in the pool, the deal structure, and the interest
shortfalls that have affected the trust. As of the July 2010
remittance report, the trust had current interest shortfalls of
$128,259 and cumulative interest shortfalls in the aggregate
amount of $5,589,300. While the class F certificate has a current
credit enhancement level of 48.59%, up from 7.50% at issuance, S&P
affirmed its rating given the reduction of available interest to
the trust, as well as the volume of assets that are currently
specially serviced (18.5% of the pool) and the volume of assets
that S&P has determined to be credit-impaired (6.9%).
The current interest shortfalls primarily relate to four of the
eight assets with the special servicer, Berkadia Commerical
Mortgage LLC. The master servicer, also Berkadia, has made non-
recoverable advance determinations on two of these assets (which
have a total exposure of $15.9 million, 10.8%), for which they are
not advancing interest or expenses. Two other assets have
appraisal reduction amounts in effect totaling $1.7 million.
These two assets experienced current appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions (in the aggregate amount of $13,510 as of
the July 2010 remittance report.
Credit Considerations
As of the July 2010 remittance report, eight ($27.4 million,
18.5%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer. The
payment status of the specially serviced assets is as follows: one
($3.2 million, 2.2%) is classified as real estate owned, one
($863,581, 0.6%) is in foreclosure, four ($19.6 million, 13.3%)
are 90-plus days delinquent, one ($2.3 million, 1.5%) is in its
grace period, and one ($1.4 million, 1.0%) is current in its
payments. ARAs in the aggregate amount of $1.7 million are in
effect against two of the assets. A discussion of the four
largest specially serviced assets follows.
The Northway Plaza Shopping Center loan ($12.3 million total
exposure, 8.3%) is the fourth-largest real estate exposure in the
pool and the largest asset with the special servicer. The loan is
secured by a 296,735-sq.-ft. retail property in Queensbury, N.Y.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in May 2008 due
to imminent maturity default. As of June 2009, reported debt
service coverage and occupancy were 0.12x and 63.8%, respectively.
According to the special servicer, they are proceeding with
foreclosure. The master servicer has issued a non-recoverable
advance determination in connection with the asset and has stopped
advancing interest. In addition, they are recouping prior
advanced principal, interest, and expenses associated with the
asset. The total exposure amount includes approximately
$1.5 million of advancing and interest thereon. S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.
The Kroger Plaza loan ($4.0 million total exposure, 2.7%) is the
seventh-largest real estate exposure in the pool and the second-
largest asset with the special servicer. The asset is a 53,980-
sq.-ft. retail property in Winchester, Ky. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in September 2008 for maturity
default. Current financial data is not available. According to
the special servicer, the property is currently 63.0% occupied,
and foreclosure is scheduled to occur in August 2010. There is a
$358,882 ARA in effect against the asset. S&P expects a moderate
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.
The K-Mart - Lincoln asset ($3.6 million total exposure, 2.4%) is
the eighth-largest real estate exposure in the pool and the third-
largest asset with the special servicer. The property is a
112,434-sq.-ft. retail asset in Lincoln, Neb. The exposure was
transferred to the special servicer in February 2009 for imminent
default. Current financial data was not available. The asset is
REO. The master servicer has issued a non-recoverable advance
determination in connection with the asset and has stopped
advancing interest. The total exposure amount includes
approximately $414,061 of advancing and interest thereon. S&P
expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this
asset.
The Harbor Bay Biotech Building loan ($3.3 million total exposure,
2.2%) is the 10th-largest real estate exposure in the pool and the
fourth-largest asset with the special servicer. The loan is
secured by a 32,000-sq.-ft. life-science office building with
specialized biology and chemical wet lab space in Alameda, Calif.
The asset was transferred to the special servicer in February
2008. According to the special servicer, the property has been
completely vacant since 2006. Reported cash flow was negative as
of December 2008. The special servicer is discussing a potential
modification agreement, but also preparing to initiate
foreclosure. There is a $1.4 million ARA in effect against the
asset. S&P anticipate a significant loss upon the eventual
liquidation of the asset.
The four remaining specially serviced assets each have total
exposure amounts of less than $3.0 million. Servicer reported DSC
was available for three of these assets, and the weighted-average
DSC was 0.62x. S&P estimated losses on three of the four
remaining specially serviced assets, and the weighted-average loss
severity was 29.6%. The special servicer anticipates that the
fourth asset will be returned to the master servicer.
In addition to the specially serviced assets, S&P determined six
($10.1 million, 6.9%) loans to be credit-impaired. The largest of
these is The Cascade Apartments loan ($2.2 million, 1.5%). The
loan is secured by a 120-unit multifamily property in Arlington,
Texas. As of December 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.50x
and 88.0%, respectively. Given the collateral's poor performance,
S&P considers this loan to be at an increased risk of default and
loss.
The five ($7.9 million, 5.4%) remaining assets that S&P determined
to be credit-impaired all have year-end 2009 reported DSC of less
than 0.80x. Four of these five loans are collateralized by
lodging properties. Given the poor performance of the collateral
properties, S&P considers these five loans to also be at increased
risk of default and loss.
Transaction Summary
As of the July 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $147.6 million, down from $1.86 billion
at issuance. The pool includes 50 assets, down from 322 at
issuance. The master servicer provided full-year 2008 or more
recent financial information for 90.6% of the nondefeased assets
in the pool. S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.11x for
the pool based on the reported figures. This calculation includes
seven ($25.1 million, 17.0%) of the transaction's eight specially
serviced assets and six ($10.1 million, 6.9%) assets that S&P
determined to be credit-impaired. All of these 13 assets either
reported DSC of less than 1.00x or didn't report current DSC.
The master servicer reported a watchlist of 16 ($52.1 million,
35.3%) loans, including two of the top 10 loan exposures.
Seventeen ($35.7 million, 24.2%) assets in the pool have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and 14 ($32.6 million, 22.1%)
assets have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x. To date, the pool
has experienced principal losses totaling $69.7 million on 42
assets.
Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures
The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $83.9 million (56.8%). Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.21x for the top 10 real estate assets. Four ($20.3 million,
13.8%) of the top 10 exposures are currently with the special
servicer and were discussed above. Two ($32.5 million, 22.0%) of
the top 10 assets appear on the master servicer's watchlist.
The Hermanos Melendez Hospital loan ($17.8 million, 12.0%) is the
largest asset in the pool and appears on the watchlist. The loan
is secured by a 206-bed health care facility in Bayamon, Puerto
Rico. As of September 2009, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.15x
and 65.6%, respectively, down from 1.81x and 82.0% at issuance.
The asset appears on the master servicer's watchlist for the
decline in DSC and occupancy.
The Home Mortgage Plaza loan ($14.7 million, 10.0%) is the second-
largest loan in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
watchlist. The loan is secured by a 211,089-sq.-ft. office
property in San Juan, Puerto Rico. As of March 2010, reported DSC
and occupancy were 1.28x and 69.2%, respectively, down from 1.40x
and 100.0% at issuance. The asset appears on the master
servicer's watchlist for the decline in occupancy.
Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria; the affirmed rating is consistent with S&P's
analysis.
Rating Affirmed
GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1998-C1
Class Rating Credit enhancement (%)
----- ------ ----------------------
F BB+ 48.59
GULF STREAM-COMPASS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-I,
Ltd.:
-- US$232,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2015
(current balance of $137,631,029.27), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on June 3, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);
-- US$12,700,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2015,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 3, 2009 Downgraded to
Baa2 (sf);
-- US$10,950,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinated Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
on June 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf).
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from delevering of the Class A Notes, which led to
increases in the overcollateralization ratios, and moderate
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in June 2009.
The Class A Notes were paid a total of $79 million since the
previous rating action, accounting for roughly 36% of the total
Class A Notes' outstanding balance reported in May 2009. As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last rating action. Based on the latest
trustee report dated July 15, 2010, the Class A/B, Class C, Class
D and Class E overcollateralization test ratios are reported at
119.54%, 111.43%, 103.50%, and 98.29%, respectively versus May
2009 levels of 108.85%, 103.89%, 98.94%, and 95.82%. The Class
A/B and the Class C overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance while all of the overcollateralization tests were
failing as of May 2009. Additionally, Moody's notes that
defaulted assets have decreased from $22.1 million in May 2009 to
$8.1 million in July 2010.
Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in defaulted
assets. In particular, as of the latest trustee report dated
July 15, 2010, the weighted average rating factor was 2802 as
compared to 2989 in May 2009. Based on the same report,
defaulted assets have decreased from $22.1 million in May 2009
to $8.1 million in July 2010.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.
Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-I, Ltd., issued on August 27, 2003,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.
HARLEY-DAVIDSON CREDIT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has upgraded nine subordinate tranches from five vehicle-
backed securitizations sponsored by Harley-Davidson Credit Corp
between 2006 and 2008. Consistent with trends noted from other
issuers in the vehicle ABS sector, stabilization in the U.S.
economy has benefitted Harley's outstanding transactions as well.
An additional two months of performance data since the securities
were placed on review for upgrade, have shown continued
stabilization in both net losses and delinquencies. While
lifetime expected cumulative pool losses for each affected
transaction is higher than the original CNL expectation, the
credit enhancement now supporting each security under this action
has increased since deal closing. This build-up in credit
enhancement is due to the sequential pay structures as well as a
higher reserve account target for all transactions due to breach
of performance triggers; specifically, cumulative net loss
trigger.
Moody's expects the Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2006-3 to
incur CNL of 5.75%. The initial expectation for this transaction
at closing was 3.25%. While the revised CNL is higher than
original expectation, total hard credit enhancement for Class B
(excluding excess spread of approximately 6.4% per annum) as a
percentage of the remaining collateral balance is approximately
6%. This is an increase from 2% at closing. Updated remaining
expected loss for the transaction is approximately 3.8% of the
outstanding collateral balance. Moody's volatility proxy Aaa
level for the transaction is approximately 13.4% of the
outstanding collateral balance.
Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2007-1 is expected to incur CNL
of approximately 5.75%. The initial expectation for this
transaction at closing was 3%. Total hard credit enhancement for
Cl. B Cl. C (excluding excess spread of approximately 6.40% per
annum) as a percentage of the remaining collateral balance is
approximately 17% and 6% respectively. This is an increase from
10.0% and 1.5% respectively at closing. Updated remaining
expected loss for the transaction is approximately 3.4% of the
outstanding collateral balance. Moody's volatility proxy Aaa
level for the transaction is approximately 11.8% of the
outstanding collateral balance.
Moody's expects the Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2007-2 to
incur CNL of 7.25%. The initial expectation for this transaction
at closing was 3.50%. Total hard credit enhancement for -- Cl.
B and -- Cl. C (excluding excess spread of approximately 6.7%
per annum) as a percentage of the remaining collateral balance is
approximately 15.8% and 6% respectively. This is an increase from
10.8% and 1.5% respectively at closing. Updated remaining
expected loss for the transaction is approximately 5.2% of the
outstanding collateral balance. Moody's volatility proxy Aaa
level for the transaction is approximately 18.4% of the
outstanding collateral balance.
Moody's expects the Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2007-3 to
incur CNL of approximately 6.75%. The initial expectation for
this transaction at closing was 3.50%. Total hard credit
enhancement for Cl. B and Cl. C (excluding excess spread of
approximately 4.3% per annum) as a percentage of the remaining
collateral balance is approximately 16.1% and 7.5% respectively.
This is an increase from 10.8% and 1.5% respectively at closing.
Updated remaining expected loss for the transaction is
approximately 5.4% of the outstanding collateral balance. Moody's
volatility proxy Aaa level for the transaction is approximately
18.9% of the outstanding collateral balance.
Moody's expects the Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2008-1 to
incur CNL of 6.50%. The initial expectation for this transaction
at closing was 3.50%. Total hard credit enhancement for Cl. B and
Cl. C (excluding excess spread of approximately 6.2% per annum) as
a percentage of the remaining collateral balance is approximately
14.3 % and 6% respectively. This is an increase from 12.3% and
2.3% respectively at closing. Updated remaining expected loss for
the transaction is approximately 6% of the outstanding collateral
balance. Moody's volatility proxy Aaa level for the transaction
is approximately 20.8% of the outstanding collateral balance.
The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics. Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment and
conditions in the used vehicle market. Compared to the U.S.
Vehicle ABS sector, performance of motorcycle backed ABS can be
more volatile due to the non-essential nature of the asset which
may be viewed by most borrowers as less of a necessity than cars.
Seasonality can also impact performance (defaults and recoveries).
Typically, performance improves during the summer riding season
and deteriorates during the winter season. Overall, Moody's
central global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011;
Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world
largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated
fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.
Complete action:
Issuer: Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2006-3
* Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 5.75% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)
-- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
Issuer: Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2007-1
* Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 5.75% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)
-- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
-- Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
Issuer: Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2007-2
* Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 7.25% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)
-- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
-- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
Issuer: Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2007-3
* Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 6.75% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)
-- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
-- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
Issuer: Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Trust 2008-1
* Pool Current Expected Cumulative Net Losses: 6.50% (as a
percentage of the original loan pool balance)
-- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
-- Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on June 8, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
JP MORGAN: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Series 1999-C8 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades and assigns Loss Severity ratings,
Recovery Ratings or revises the Rating Outlook to these classes of
J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp., Series 1999-C8
mortgage pass-through certificates:
-- $16.5 million class G to 'BB/LS4' from 'A-'; Outlook to
Negative from Stable;
-- $20.1 million class H to 'C/RR4' from 'B'.
In addition, Fitch affirms the ratings, assigns LS ratings and
revises RRs as indicated:
-- $9.1 million class D at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.6 million class E at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11 million class F at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4.7 million class J at 'D/RR6' from 'D/RR5'.
Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest-only class X.
The downgrades are the result of Fitch's revised loss estimates
for the transaction following Fitch's prospective analysis, which
is similar to its recent vintage fixed-rate commercial mortgage
backed securities analysis. Fitch expects potential losses of
20.25%, approximately $17.6 million, of the remaining pool balance
from the loans in special servicing and the loans that are not
expected to refinance at maturity based on Fitch's refinance test.
The Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of any rating
changes over the next one to two years.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool has paid down
88.1% to $86.9 million from $731.5 million at issuance. Two loans
(12.2%) are defeased. Fitch has identified 11 Loans of Concern
(57.6%), including seven loans in special servicing (50.4%).
The largest specially serviced asset (24% in total) is a
delinquent multifamily property located in Rolling Meadows, IL. A
recent sale of the property did not close and the special servicer
is moving forward with a previously filed foreclosure action.
The next largest specially serviced asset (6.7%) is a real estate
owned (REO) office property located in St. Louis, MO. This
former railroad station was transferred to special servicing in
2008 after the borrower discontinued loan payments.
The third largest specially serviced asset (5.8%) is a multifamily
property located in Columbus, OH. As part of a foreclosure
action, the property is currently under contract for sale.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by, generally, applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year-end
net operating income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on
performance issues, such as a significant decline in occupancy,
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7.25% and 10.5%
to determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25 times or higher were considered to pay off
at maturity. Under this scenario, two loans are not expected to
pay off at maturity with both loans incurring a loss when compared
to Fitch's stressed value.
JP MORGAN-CIBC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 2006-RR1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded twelve classes of Notes
issued by JP Morgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities
Trust 2006-RR1 due to the deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an increase in the
weighted average rating factor, and a decrease in the weighted
average recovery rate. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.
JP Morgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Trust 2006-
RR1 is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a portfolio of commercial
mortgage backed securities (100.0% of the pool balance). All of
the collateral was issued between 2002 and 2006, with a majority
of the collateral concentrated in 2005 (39.7%) and 2006 (42.7%).
As of the July 21, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance
of the transaction is $523.9 million the same as at issuance.
Thirteen CMBS bonds (19.5% of the pool balance) experienced
interest shortfalls in the latest reporting period.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation. These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 3,200 compared to 1,474 at
last review. The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (1.3% compared to 1.0% at last review), A1-
A3 (10.9% compared to 6.2% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (11.0%
compared to 49.5% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (17.6% compared to 8.3%
at last review), B1-B3 (34.6% compared to 32.0% at last review),
and Caa1-C (24.7% compared to 3.0% at last review).
WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 5.3 years compared to 6.7 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 9.6% compared to 14.5% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 21.5% compared to 38.8% at last review.
Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010. The cash flow model,
CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its
effect on the capital structure of the deal. As always, Moody's
ratings are determined by a committee process that considers both
quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating actions are:
-- Class A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on March 9,
2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)
-- Class A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
-- Class B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)
-- Class C, Downgraded to C(sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)
-- Class D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)
-- Class E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)
-- Class F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
-- Class G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Class H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
-- Class J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
-- Class K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)
-- Class L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated March 9, 2009.
LATITUDE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Latitude CLO II Ltd.:
-- US$45,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2018, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 9, 2009
Downgraded to A2 (sf);
-- US$27,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
June 9, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);
-- US$13,300,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 9,
2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
-- US$9,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding balance of $9,052,613),
Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on June 9, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf).
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from a significant increase in the overcollateralization
of the notes primarily due to delevering of the Class A-1 Notes
and a decrease in the proportion of securities from issuers rated
Caa1 and below since the last rating action in June 2009. In
addition, Moody's notes that the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio has stabilized.
Since the last rating action in June 2009, the Class A-1 Notes
have been paid down by approximately $39 million, or roughly 22%
of their outstanding balance reported in May 2009. The delevering
occurred as a result of the failure of the overcollateralization
tests. The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the
last rating action and all overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance. Based on the latest trustee report dated
July 20, 2010, the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D
overcollateralization ratios increased to 129.7%, 112.9%, 106.1%,
and 102.1%, respectively, compared to May 2009 levels of 115.9%,
103.2%, 97.9%, and 94.6%, respectively.
Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the portfolio has
stabilized since the last rating action, evidenced through stable
average credit rating (as measured by the weighted average rating
factor) and a decrease in the proportion of securities from
issuers rated Caa1 and below. As of the latest trustee report,
dated July 20, 2010, the weighted average rating factor is 2730
compared to 2828 in May 2009, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or
lower make up approximately 9.9% of the underlying portfolio
versus approximately 13.8% in May 2009. Additionally, defaulted
securities have been reduced to about $19.6 million from
$28.4 million in May 2009. Due to the impact of revised and
updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009):
Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis,
such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.
Latitude CLO II Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Five 2001-C2 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and assigned Rating
Outlooks to several classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust
2001-C2. Fitch has also assigned Loss Severity ratings and
Recovery Ratings to numerous classes and taken three classes off
Rating Watch Negative.
The downgrades are primarily due to an increase in realized losses
since the last review as well as Fitch's expected losses on loans
currently in special servicing and loans that are not expected to
pay off at maturity. Fitch expects losses to fully deplete
classes L and M, while classes N, P and Q have already been
reduced to zero. Rating Outlooks reflect the likely direction of
any rating changes over the next one to two years.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced 24.0% to $1 billion from $1.3
billion at issuance, which consists of 22.0% of paydown and 2.0%
of realized losses. Fifty-one loans (45.3%) have defeased,
including seven (20.8%) of the top ten loans. Interest shortfalls
are reaching class H. Expected losses on the remaining loans as a
percentage of the current deal balance is 3.7%.
Fitch has designated 24 loans (19.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which include eight specially serviced loans (6.8%). The largest
specially serviced loan (2.2%) is secured by a 519-unit
multifamily property built between 1972 and 1974, and located in
Atlanta, GA, approximately 20 miles north of the central business
district. The property securing the $22.3 million loan was
foreclosed on in October 2009 and new management is in-place. The
special servicer has reportedly executed the sale of the property
in July 2010 at a price that will result in a loss to the trust.
The second largest specially serviced loan (1.9%) is secured by
two hotels (Wyndham Garden and Baymont Inn) in the downtown
Atlanta area, totaling 453 rooms. The hotels securing the
$19.3 million loan, which were flagged as a Courtyard by Marriott
and Fairfield Inn, respectively, at issuance, are real estate
owned and under contract to be sold. The special servicer
anticipates an August closing date. A realized loss to the trust
will result upon the liquidation.
Fitch stressed the value of the non-defeased loans by generally
applying a 5% haircut to 2009 year-end net operating income (NOI)
and applying an adjusted market cap rate between 7% and 10% to
determine value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage
commercial mortgage backed securities, each loan also underwent a
refinance test by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year
amortization schedule based on the stressed cash flow. Loans that
could refinance to a debt service coverage ratio of 1.25 times or
higher were considered to pay off at maturity. Of the non-
defeased or non-specially serviced loans, 16 loans (14.6% of the
overall pool) were assumed not to be able to refinance, of which
Fitch modeled losses for nine loans (3.5%) in instances where
Fitch's derived value was less than the outstanding balance.
Fitch has downgraded, assigned Rating Outlooks, LS ratings and RRs
to these classes as indicated:
-- $16.5 million class G to 'BBB/LS5' from 'A-'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $23.1 million class H to 'B/LS5' from 'BBB-'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $14.8 million class J to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB-';
-- $11.5 million class K to 'CC/RR3' from 'CCC/RR1';
-- $9.9 million class L to 'C/RR6' from 'CC/RR3'.
Fitch has removed classes G and H from Rating Watch Negative.
Fitch has affirmed, assigned Outlooks, LS ratings and RRs to these
classes as indicated:
-- $755.6 million class A-2 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49.5 million class B at 'AAA/LS4'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62.7 million class C at 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.5 million class D at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.2 million class E at 'AAA/LS5'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.8 million class F at 'AA-/LS5'; Outlook Negative;
-- $9.3 million class M at 'D/RR6'.
Class F was removed from Rating Watch Negative.
Finally, Fitch has affirmed classes N and P, both of which have
been reduced to zero by realized losses, at 'D/RR6'.
The A-1 class has been paid in full. Fitch withdraws the rating
on the interest-only class X. Fitch did not rate class Q which
has been reduced to zero as a result of realized losses.
MADISON SQUARE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes from Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction. Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on four other classes from the same
transaction. S&P removed all seven ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.
The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following its downgrade of three classes of
commercial mortgage-backed securities from two transactions
totaling $87.8 million (20.8% of the total asset balance). S&P's
analysis also considered the revised credit estimates on a portion
of the CMBS collateral that Standard & Poor's does not rate
($222.8 million, 52.8%). S&P lowered the majority of the revised
credit estimates.
According to the July 26, 2010, trustee report, Madison Square
2004-1's current assets included 23 classes ($397.7 billion,
94.3%) of CMBS pass-through certificates from seven distinct
transactions issued between 1996 and 1999. The remaining
collateral for Madison Square 2004-1 consisted of two classes
($24 million, 5.7%) from First Chicago/Lennar Trust's series 1997-
CHL1, which is a U.S. resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit transaction. Madison Square 2004-1 has
exposure to these collateral that Standard & Poor's has
downgraded:
* Commercial Mortgage Asset Trust's series 1999-C1 (classes G and
H; $83.1 million, 19.7%); and
* Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 1998-HF1 (class K;
$4.7 million, 1.1%).
According to the trustee report, the interest-shortfall reserve
fund for Madison Square 2004-1 has a current balance of
$15 million. It is S&P's understanding that the trustee may use
the funds held in this account to pay interest due to the class L
certificates.
Standard & Poor's analyzed Madison Square 2004-1 and its
underlying collateral according to its current criteria. S&P's
analysis is consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.
Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd.
CMBS-backed notes series 2004-1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
P CCC B+/Watch Neg
Q CCC- B/Watch Neg
S CCC- B-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd.
CMBS-backed notes series 2004-1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
L A A/Watch Neg
M BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
N BBB BBB/Watch Neg
O BB+ BB+/Watch Neg
MERRILL LYNCH: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 1996-C2 Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades two classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 1996-C2, and assigns Loss Severity Ratings:
-- $24.5 million class F to 'A/LS-1' from 'AAA'; Outlook
Negative;
-- $39.8 million class G to 'C/RR3' from 'CC/RR3'.
Classes A-1 through E have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the
$1.9 million class H.
Fitch withdraws the rating of the interest only class IO.
The rating actions are the result of Fitch's revised loss
estimates for the transaction following Fitch's prospective
analysis which is similar to its recent vintage fixed rate
commercial mortgage backed security analysis. Fitch expects
potential losses of 13.2% of the remaining pool balance, the
majority of which are from the loans in special servicing, in
addition to the loans that are not expected to refinance at
maturity based on Fitch's refinance test. Rating Outlooks reflect
the likely direction of any rating changes over the next one to
two years.
Fitch is also concerned about the increasingly concentrated nature
of this pool, with 25 loans currently remaining and a weighted
average debt service coverage ratio of 0.99 times. The pool also
has high exposure to Florida, which represents 35.9% of the pool.
Of the remaining loans, 45.8% are fully amortizing.
As of the July 2010 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased 94.2% to $66.3 million from
$1.1 billion at issuance. Realized losses to date to the non-
rated class total $32.2 million. There are three specially
serviced loans (27.9%), each of which is in foreclosure.
The largest loan in the transaction (20.8%) transferred to special
servicing in November 2008 for imminent default. The loan is
collateralized by a 672-unit limited service hotel property in
Orlando, FL. The property lost the Best Western flag in February
2008 and is now an Econo Lodge. The most recent reported year-end
DSCR was 0.78x for 2007.
The second largest specially serviced asset (4.9%) is a 367-unit
hotel property located in Kissimmee, FL. The hotel has been
experiencing cash flow declines since 2001 due to the over-
saturation of the Orlando hotel market. The most recently
reported occupancy was 60% as of December 2007.
In addition to the three specially serviced loans, Fitch has
identified nine other loans (29.6%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes the specially serviced loans and those loans with
low debt service coverage ratio and declining occupancies. The
largest Loan of Concern (7.5%) not specially serviced is secured
by a 138-unit multifamily property located in Grand Rapids, MI.
The property has suffered a severe decline in occupancy with a
March 2010 reported occupancy of 82.0% compared to 98.0%% at year
end 2009.
Fitch stressed the cash flow of the remaining non-defeased loans
by applying a 10% reduction to 2008 fiscal year end net operating
income or adjusted 2009 cash flow based on performance issues,
such as a significant decline in occupancy, and applying an
adjusted market cap rate between 7.5% and 10.5% to determine
value.
Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
each loan also underwent a refinance test by applying an 8%
interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule based on the
stressed cash flow. Loans that could refinance to a debt service
coverage ratio of 1.25x or higher were considered to pay off at
maturity. Under this scenario, 30 loans are not expected to pay
off at maturity with eight loans incurring a loss when compared to
Fitch's stressed value.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Series 2007-IQ14 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 17 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-IQ14 on review for possible downgrade due to higher
expected losses from the pool resulting from realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly performing
watchlisted loans, interest shortfalls and refinancing risk
associated with five year loans maturing in three years. Seventy-
two loans, representing 29% of the pool mature within the next
three years. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities
transactions.
As of the July 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $4.8 billion
from $4.9 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 421 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
40% of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased loans or
loans with underlying ratings.
One hundred twenty-five loans, representing 25% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.
Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$6.3 million aggregate loss (48% loss severity on average).
Currently, there are 40 loans, representing 27% of the pool, in
special servicing, including the pool's first, fourth and eighth
largest loans. The largest specially serviced loan is the Beacon
Seattle & DC Portfolio Loan ($775.0 million -- 16% of the pool),
which represents a pari passu interest in a $2.7 billion first
mortgage loan. The loan is secured by 20 office properties
located in Washington, Virginia and Washington, DC. The
buildings range from 103,000 to 1.1 million square feet and total
9.8 million square feet. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 for imminent default but the loan has
remained current. The portfolio was 88% leased as of December
2009. The Borrower is seeking loan modification. The remaining
specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of multifamily,
industrial, retail, office and hotel properties.
The special servicer has recognized an aggregate $215.9 million
appraisal reduction for 22 of the specially serviced loans. As a
result of special servicing fees, appraisal reductions and other
trust expenses, the transaction is experiencing interest
shortfalls. As of the most recent remittance date, classes H
through S have experienced interest shortfalls totaling
$12.3 million. Moody's expects that interest shortfalls are
likely to increase because of the pool's exposure to specially
serviced loans.
Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and interest shortfalls as well as
the performance of the overall pool.
Moody's rating action is:
-- Class A-AB, $140,800,000, currently rated Aaa (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa (sf) on
6/26/2007
-- Class A-4, $1,062,242,000, currently rated Aaa (sf), on
review for possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa (sf)
on 6/26/2007
-- Class A-5FL, $150,000,000, currently rated Aaa (sf), on
review for possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa (sf)
on 6/26/2007
-- Class A-1A, $714,361,481, currently rated Aaa (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously assigned Aaa (sf) on
6/26/2007
-- Class A-M, $420,487,000, currently rated Aaa (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously confirmed at Aaa (sf) on
9/3/2009
-- Class A-MFL, $70,000,000, currently rated Aaa (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously confirmed at Aaa (sf) on
9/3/2009
-- Class A-J, $200,000,000, currently rated Baa2 (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
from A2 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class A-JFL, $192,389,000, currently rated Baa2 (sf), on
review for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa2
(sf) from A2 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class B, $18,394,000, currently rated Baa3 (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
from A3 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class C, $79,704,000, currently rated Ba2 (sf), on review for
possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba2 (sf) from
Baa1 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class D, $55,179,000, currently rated Ba3 (sf), on review for
possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ba3 (sf) from
Baa2 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class E, $12,263,000, currently rated B2 (sf), on review for
possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B2 (sf) from
Baa3 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class F, $42,917,000, currently rated B3 (sf), on review for
possible downgrade; previously downgraded to B3 (sf) from Ba2
(sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class G, $42,918,000, currently rated Caa1 (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
from Ba3 (sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class H, $73,573,000, currently rated Caa2 (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
from B1(sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class J, $49,049,000, currently rated Caa3 (sf), on review
for possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
from B3(sf) on 9/3/2009
-- Class K, $55,179,000, currently rated Ca (sf), on review for
possible downgrade; previously downgraded to Ca (sf) from
Caa1 (sf) on 9/3/2009
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class IIIA Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC-' rating on
the class IIIA notes from Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's Series 2007-
13, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transaction.
The rating withdrawal follows the complete redemption of the
notes.
Rating Withdrawn
Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series 2007-13
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
IIIA NR CCC-
NR - Not rated.
N-STAR REAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed four and downgrade four classes
of Notes issued by N-Star Real Estate CDO VII Ltd. due to
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as
measured by deterioration in the weighted average rating factor,
and an increase in defaulted assets. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.
N-Star Real Estate CDO VII Ltd. is a revolving CRE CDO backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS, 67% of
the pool balance), CRE CDO (25%), REIT Debt (5.6%), real estate
interests (1.2%), and B Notes (1%). As of the July 2010 Trustee
Report, the aggregate Notes balance of the transaction, including
the Income notes has remained the same since issuance. However,
since Moody's last review, there has been a material amount of
overcollateralization as a result of the purchase of reinvestment
securities. The current outstanding collateral balance is
approximately $737 million compared to approximately $571 million
at last review.
Twenty-one assets totaling approximately $93.7 million par amount
(12.7% of the pool balance) were listed as defaulted, and another
121 assets totaling approximately $543.3 million par amount (73.7%
of the pool balance) as credit risk securities as of July 20,
2010. The credit risk securities, as defined in the indenture,
including any security, which is not currently in default, that
has been placed on watch for downgrade or has been downgraded by
any rating agency. The deal passes all the overcollateralization
tests and interest coverage tests. Additionally, when calculating
the overcollateralization test, the Principle Coverage Amount, as
defined in the transaction documents, is reduced by par value
haircuts based on the underlying collateral current ratings
distribution.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the entire
pool and the results will be reflected in a future Trustee Report.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
3,142 compared to 1,971 at last review.
WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral
pool for time. Moody's modeled to the actual WAL of 6.5 years
compared to 7.4 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled the actual
WARR of 19.1% compared to 24.0% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.2% compared to 17.5% at last review.
Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.
The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal. As always, Moody's ratings are determined by a committee
process that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating actions are:
-- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to A2 (sf)
-- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
-- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
-- Cl. B, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)
-- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
-- Cl. D-FL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 6,
2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Cl. D-FX, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 6,
2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Cl. E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 6, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior full review is summarized in
a press release dated March 6, 2009.
NOMURA CRE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 16 Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded sixteen classes of Notes
issued by Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2, Ltd., due to the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor and increase in
Defaulted Securities. The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.
Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio A-Notes and whole loans (78.7% of the pool balance), B-
Notes (10.7%), commercial mortgage backed securities (5.4%),
collateralized debt obligation securities (3.6%) and mezzanine
loans (1.5%). As of the June 30, 2010 Trustee report, the
aggregate Note balance of the transaction has decreased to
$898.0 million from $901.6 million at issuance, with the paydown
directed to the Class A-1 and A-R Notes, but with unpaid interest
accruing for Classes C through O.
There are nine assets with a par balance of $258.5 million (26.8%
of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the June 30, 2010 Trustee report. Five of these
assets (79.8% of the defaulted balance) are either A-Notes or
whole loans, two assets are B-Notes (9.6%), one asset is CMBS
(6.8%) and one asset is a mezzanine loan (3.9%). While there have
been limited realized losses on the assets to date, Moody's does
expect significant losses to occur once they are realized.
Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation. These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.
WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations. The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9,227 compared to 8,531 at
last review. The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (0.5% compared to 1.4% at last review),
Baa1-Baa3 (3.6% compared to 2.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (0.7%
compared to 3.7% at last review), B1-B3 (1.3% compared to 3.2% at
last review), and Caa1-C (93.8% compared to 89.6% at last review).
WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.0
years compared to 8.0 years at last review.
WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 42.1% compared to 43.1% at last review.
MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 99.9% compared to 25.3% at last review.
The increase in MAC is due to the increase in higher risk
collateral and the reduction in rating dispersion.
Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010. The cash flow model,
CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash flow waterfall and its
effect on the capital structure of the deal. As always, Moody's
ratings are determined by a committee process that considers both
quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore, the rating
outcome may differ from the model output.
The rating actions are:
-- Class A-R, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 10,
2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Class A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on April 10,
2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Class A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 15,
2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)
-- Class B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 15,
2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)
-- Class C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 15,
2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)
-- Class D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)
-- Class E, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
-- Class F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
-- Class G, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to B1 (sf)
-- Class H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)
-- Class J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to B3 (sf)
-- Class K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
-- Class L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Class M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)
-- Class N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
-- Class O, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review. Moody's prior review is summarized in a
press release dated April 15, 2009.
OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Oak Hill Credit Partners II,
Limited:
-- US$5,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 13,
2009 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);
-- US$32,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
2015, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 13, 2009
Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);
-- US$32,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
October 13, 2009 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
-- US$8,500,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
October 13, 2009 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
-- US$22,500,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
October 13, 2009 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
-- US$2,000,000 Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
October 13, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf);
-- US$5,500,000 Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
October 13, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf);
-- US$5,000,000 Class D-3 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
October 13, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf).
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and a significant increase in the overcollateralization
of the notes due to delevering since the last rating action in
October 2009.
Moody's notes that the transaction benefited from the substantial
delevering of the Class A-1a and Class A-1b Notes, which have been
paid down by approximately $94MM since the last rating action,
accounting for roughly 32% of the total Class A-1a and Class A-1b
Notes' outstanding balances reported in September 2009. As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased significantly since the rating action in October 2009.
In particular, based on the trustee report, dated July 1, 2010,
the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 145.41%, 128.24%, 115.07%, and 110.50%,
respectively, versus the September 2009 levels of 125.93%,
114.88%, 105.88%, and 102.64%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance. A
substantial proportion of the delevering is attributable to
collateral sales and principal prepayments on the underlying
loans. Moody's expects delevering to continue as a result of the
end of the deal's reinvestment period in February 2009.
Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below. As of the latest
trustee report, dated July 1, 2010, the weighted average rating
factor is 2133 compared to 2586 in September 2009, and securities
rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 7.7% of the
underlying portfolio versus 19.3% in September 2009.
Additionally, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $0.6MM from approximately $26MM in September
2009. Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.
While the transaction has benefited from delevering and
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio,
Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of investments
in securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes.
As of the latest trustee report, dated July 1, 2010, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes make up
approximately 13.6% of the underlying portfolio versus 1.2% in
September 2009. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.
Oak Hill Credit Partners II, Limited, issued on February 27, 2003,
is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.
PRIME MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 34 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 34
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche, and withdrawn the
rating of one tranche from 3 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Prime Mortgage Trust.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans. The
actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance of
Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress. The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.
To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves. The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-2
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Cl. I-PO, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Aaa (sf)
-- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Aa2 (sf)
-- Cl. I-B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 20,
2005 Assigned A2 (sf)
-- Cl. I-B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Baa2 (sf)
-- Cl. I-B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned Ba2 (sf)
-- Cl. I-B-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 20, 2005
Assigned B2 (sf)
-- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-XB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-4
-- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-6, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-10, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-11, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-A-12, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Prime Mortgage Trust 2005-5
-- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-XB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. I-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
RESERVOIR FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of two classes of notes issued by Reservoir Funding
Limited. The notes affected by the rating action are:
-- US$374,900,000 Class A-1-NV First Priority Senior Non-Voting
Floating Rate Notes Due 2040 (current balance of
$261,177,865), Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
March 26, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);
-- US$100,000 Class A-1-V First Priority Senior Floating Rate
Notes Due 2040 (current balance of $69,666), Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on March 26, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1
(sf).
Reservoir Funding Limited is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities originated between 2003 and 2004.
According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio. Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests. Defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, have increased from
$101 million in March 2009 to $159 million in June 2010. Moody's
noted that the transaction is negatively impacted by a large pay-
fixed, receive-floating interest rate swap where payments to the
hedge counterparty absorb a large portion of the excess spread in
the deal. Additionally, approximately $89 million of RMBS within
the underlying portfolio are currently on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.
Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed. For
purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A. Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.
For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches. Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.
For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.
All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.
Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade. Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:
-- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)
In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability. In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.
REVE SPC: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn its
rating on the notes issued by REVE SPC Segregated Portfolio Series
56, a collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a
managed portfolio of corporate entities.
-- US$500,000,000 ING Managed Synthetic 2007-2 Class A Notes,
due 2012, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf).
Moody's has withdrawn this rating for business reasons following a
restructuring of the transaction. The restructuring changed,
among other things, the initial promise of payment of the notes'
principal and interest. The change of terms constitutes a default
and the rating as of the date of execution of the amendment is
consistent with it.
SIGNATURE 5: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Signature 5 L.P.:
-- US$355,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due 2012 (current
balance of $62,502,674.52), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously
on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
-- US$57,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2012,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf);
-- US$28,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2012, Upgraded
to A1 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3
(sf);
-- US$20,000,000 Class C Fixed Rate Notes Due 2012, Upgraded to
B1 (sf); previously on July 14, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf).
According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from delevering of the Class A Notes, which led to
increases in the overcollateralization ratios, and a moderate
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the last rating action in July 2009.
The Class A Notes were paid a total of $64.5 million since the
previous rating action, accounting for roughly 51% of the total
Class A Notes' outstanding balance reported in June 2009. As a
result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have
increased since the last rating action. Based on the latest
trustee report dated July 16, 2010, Class A, Class B, and Class C
overcollateralization test ratios are reported at 302.07%, 128%,
and 112.72%, respectively versus June 2009 levels of 201.20%,
120.53%, and 108.92%.
Slight improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor). In particular, as of the latest
trustee report dated July 16, 2010, the weighted average rating
factor was 1088 as compared to 1145 in June 2009.
Additionally, Moody's notes that a significant portion of the
assets in the underlying portfolio are investment grade senior
secured, senior unsecured and subordinated bonds. Since the last
rating action in June 2009, Moody's view of the recovery rates of
investment grade bonds has improved. Moody's analysis reflects
the expectation that the recoveries for the investment grade bonds
will be higher than previously assumed.
Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.
Signature 5 L.P., issued on December 28, 2000, is a collateralized
bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
and senior unsecured bonds.
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loans
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan notes and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2007-8 and assigned Outlooks:
-- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook
Stable.
The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Senior Student Loan Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan bond and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2003-1 and assigned Outlooks:
-- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-5C affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
Stable.
Additionally, Fitch has removed the subordinated bond from Rating
Watch Negative.
The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.
Fitch used its Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria and FFELP
student loan ABS rating criteria, as well as the refined basis
risk criteria outlined in Fitch's June 29 press release ('Fitch to
Begin Review of U.S. FFELP SLABS Applying Updated Criteria') to
review the ratings.
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2007-6 Student Loan Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan notes and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2007-6 and assigned Outlooks:
-- Class A-1 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AA+/LS3'; Outlook
Stable.
The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 194 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 194
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche, confirmed the
ratings of 9 tranches, and withdrawn the ratings of 12 tranches
from 11 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by
Structured Asset Securities Corporation.
The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans. The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.
In addition, the ratings on Tranches 2-A1A and 2-A1B issued by
SASCO 2005-4XS have also been adjusted to reflect the fact that
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement allocates losses to these two
classes on a pro-rata basis. Previous rating actions reflected
additional credit enhancement to Tranche 2-A1A from Tranche 2-A1B,
based on conflicting language in the Prospectus Supplement which
denotes Tranche 2-A1B as a support class to Tranche 2-A1A. The
Trustee has confirmed that it is following the PSA, which allows
for only pro-rata loss allocation between the classes, and Moody's
has adjusted its analysis accordingly.
To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios. The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves. The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.
The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans. To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively). This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools. Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk. Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied. Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75. For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%. If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.
Tranches 1-A2B, 1-A3, 1-A4, 1-A5B and 2-A1 issued by SASCO 2005-
2XS, Tranches 1-A2A, 1-A4B, 1-A5A and 3-A5 issued by SASCO 2005-
4XS, Tranches 1-A2A, 1-A3 and 1-A4A issued by SASCO 2005-7XS, and
Tranche 1-A3A issued by SASCO 2005-9XS are wrapped by Ambac
Assurance Corporation (Segregated Account - Unrated). For
securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security. The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier. RMBS securities wrapped by
Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their underlying rating
without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.
Complete rating actions are:
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-11H
-- Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. A-IO1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-14
-- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. B2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-15
-- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A8, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A9, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AX, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-16
-- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-17
-- Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-2XS
-- Cl. 1-A2A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2B, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan
21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A5A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A5B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan
21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-4XS
-- Cl. 1-A2A, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A2B, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A5A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A5B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan
21, 2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 3-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-6
-- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A8, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A9, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A10, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A12, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A13, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A14, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A15, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A16, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A17, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A18, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A19, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A20, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A21, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A7, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A8, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A9, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A10, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A11, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A12, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AX, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PAX, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-7XS
-- Cl. 1-A2A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A2B, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A4A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A4B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-9XS
-- Cl. 1-A3A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Jan. 21, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
-- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)
-- Cl. 1-A3B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A3D, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation, Series 2005-10
-- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A8, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A9, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 4-A10, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A2, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A3, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A5, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A7, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A9, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 5-A10, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 6A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 7A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. 8A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AP, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. AX, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- Cl. PAX, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
TRAINER WORTHAM: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
ratings of three classes of notes issued by Trainer Wortham First
Republic CBO V Limited. The notes affected by the rating action
are:
-- US$255,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes Due 2040 (current balance of
$149,389,276), Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
October 29, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
-- US$34,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes Due 2040, Downgraded to C (sf);
previously on October 29, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf);
-- US$28,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2040, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
October 29, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).
Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO V Limited is a collateralized
debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of primarily
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities originated between 2004 and
2007.
According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio. Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests. Defaulted
securities, as reported by the trustee, have increased from
$83 million in October 2009 to $87 million in July 2010. The
Class A/B Overcollateralization Ratio, as reported by the trustee,
has decreased from 76.48 to 69.50 in that period. Moody's noted
that the transaction is negatively impacted by a large pay-fixed,
receive-floating interest rate swap where payments to the hedge
counterparty absorb a large portion of the excess spread in the
deal. Additionally, approximately $49 million of RMBS within the
underlying portfolio are currently on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.
Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.
For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM. Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.
For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa or Aa were stressed by eleven notches, and
securities currently rated A or Baa were stressed by eight
notches. Those securities currently rated in the Ba or B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca. For 2006 and 2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities,
currently Aaa or Aa rated securities were stressed by eight
notches, and securities currently rated A, Baa or Ba were stressed
by five notches. Those securities currently rated in the B range
were stressed to Caa3, while current Caa securities were treated
as Ca.
For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa, A or Baa were
stressed by five notches, Ba rated securities were stressed to
Caa3, and B or Caa securities were treated as Ca. For subprime
RMBS originated in the first half of 2006, those currently rated
Aaa were stressed by four notches, while Aa, A and Baa rated
securities were stressed by eight notches. Those securities
currently rated in the Ba range were stressed to Caa3, while
current B and Caa securities were treated as Ca. For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa, A, Baa or Ba were stressed by four notches, currently B rated
securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca. For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently
Ba rated securities were stressed by four notches, currently B
rated securities were treated as Caa3, and currently Caa rated
securities were treated as Ca.
Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.
For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A. Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.
For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa rated securities were stressed by four
notches, Aa rated securities by six notches, and A or Baa rated
securities by nine notches. Pre-2005 Option-ARM securities
currently rated Aaa were stressed by two notches, Aa and A by six
notches, and Baa by nine notches.
For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa and Aa rated securities were stressed
by two notches, A rated securities were stressed by six notches,
and Baa rated securities were stressed by nine notches.
All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba or below, and are
also currently on review for possible downgrade have been stressed
to Ca.
Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade. Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:
-- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)
In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability. In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations. These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features. All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.
VEGA CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Vega Capital Ltd.:
-- US$21,000,000 Series 2008-1 Class A Principal At-Risk
Variable Rate Notes due June 24, 2011, Upgraded to Aa2(sf);
previously on September 3, 2009 Upgraded to A1(sf);
-- US$22,500,000 Series 2008-1 Class B Principal At-Risk
Variable Rate Notes due June 24, 2011, Upgraded to A1(sf);
previously on September 3, 2009 Upgraded to A3(sf);
-- US$63,900,000 Series 2008-I Class C Principal At-Risk
Variable Rate Notes due June 24, 2011, Upgraded to Baa3(sf);
previously on September 3, 2009 Upgraded to Ba1(sf).
Vega Capital Ltd. is a catastrophe bond program that can issue
notes in different series to cover a portfolio of natural
catastrophe risks over specific risk periods. Investors in the
Series 2008-I Notes, issued on June 27, 2008, provide protection
to Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. against losses that may result
from the occurrence of up to five individual perils over a risk
period of three years, i.e. until June 24, 2011. The perils
covered by the Series 2008-I issuance includes: European
windstorms, Japan typhoons, Japan earthquakes, California
earthquakes and North Atlantic hurricanes.
Moody's indicated that the upgrades are due in large part to the
fact that no qualified events that can trigger losses to the
transaction have occurred in the first two years of the risk
period covered. With less than one year remaining in the
transaction, the likelihood of occurrence of the number of
qualified events required to attach the different classes of rated
Notes as well as the expected losses for each of them has been
significantly reduced. Additionally, the transaction receives
reserve account payments from Swiss Re on each payment date which
has resulted in a buildup of a significant first loss position in
the capital structure. The trustee report dated as of June 24,
2010, indicates a balance of approximately $62.5 million in this
reserve account.
The ratings issued are primarily based on Moody's analysis of the
probability of occurrence of qualifying events, their timing, and
the severity of losses experienced by investors should those
events occur during the risk period. In addition to the
quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee consideration. These
qualitative factors include the collateral protection mechanisms
in the transaction, structural features and other specific
documentation provisions and the financial strength of the various
parties to the transaction.
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 2007-ESH Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed, revised Rating Outlooks, and placed on
Rating Watch Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-ESH.
These actions reflect the continuing bankruptcy proceedings and
potential purchase of the portfolio, which is expected to close in
September 2010.
An investor group led by Centerbridge Partners, L.P., Paulson &
Co. and Blackstone L.P. was awarded the right to acquire 100% of
the reorganized equity in ESH after prevailing in the bankruptcy
auction on May 28, 2010. On July 20, 2010 the plan of
reorganization was confirmed by the bankruptcy court, with an
anticipated emergence from bankruptcy in September 2010. The
investor group's winning bid was for approximately $3.93 billion.
CW Capital was appointed as the new special servicer in May 2010.
Potential losses are expected on tranches with lower alphabetical
designations.
Performance of the portfolio has begun to stabilize, with the
reported trailing 12 months ended June 2010 occupancy and RevPAR
of 72.7% and $30.15, respectively, compared to 65.7% and $29.39,
respectively as of year end 2009.
The certificates are collateralized by a single $4.1 billion non-
recourse loan with fixed- and floating-rate components secured by
664 owned hotel properties, one office building and one vacant
land parcel located in 44 states and two Canadian provinces. In
addition, there is $3.3 billion of mezzanine debt held outside the
trust. The fixed-rate components mature in June 2012, while the
floating-rate components have a maturity in June 2011, with one
one-year extension option remaining. As of the July 2010
distribution date, the total trust balance has paid down slightly
to $4.05 billion due to the release of one property.
Fitch will continue to monitor the bankruptcy proceedings and any
potential objections that may delay the bankruptcy process. In
addition, the new investor group may need to obtain financing in
order to complete the purchase by the potential closing date in
September 2010. Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch upon
the application of the proceeds following the close of the
potential purchase of the portfolio.
Fitch has affirmed, revised Outlooks and placed certain classes on
Rating Watch Evolving:
-- $554.4 million class A-1 at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
Negative;
-- $121 million class A-2FL at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
Negative;
-- $279 million class A-2FX at 'AAA'; Outlook to Stable from
Negative;
-- $800 million class A-3 at 'BBB-'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $250 million class A-4FL at 'B-'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $525 million class A-4FX at 'B-'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $125.4 million class B at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $85.9 million class C-FL at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $92 million class C-FX at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving,
-- $107.6 million class D at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $114.2 million class E at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $124.5 million class F at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $131 million class G at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $130.4 million class H at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $100 million class J at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving;
-- $214 million class K at 'C/RR6'; Rating Watch Evolving.
Classes A-3, A4-FL and A4-FX previously had a Negative Outlook.
Fitch has affirmed these classes:
-- $200 million class L at 'C/RR6';
-- $100 million class M at to 'C/RR6'.
Fitch withdraws the ratings of interest-only classes X-A and X-B.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Nine 2005-C16 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed nine classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C16 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from anticipated
losses from specially serviced and highly leveraged watchlisted
loans and concerns about refinancing risk associated with loans
approaching maturity in an adverse lending environment. Eleven
loans, representing 8% of the pool, mature within the next three
years. Eight of these loans (7% of the pool) have a Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio below 1.0X. This rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.
As of the July 16, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 28% to $1.48 billion
from $2.06 billion at securitization. The 149 mortgages that
collateralize the Certificates range in size from less than 1% to
10% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 36% of the
pool. Twenty-five loans, representing 19% of the pool, have
defeased and are now collateralized by U.S. Government securities.
Thirty-two loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.
The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
Seven loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loans are secured by mix of
office, multi-family, full-service hotel and anchored and
unanchored retail properties.
Moody's review will focus on the performance of the overall pool
and potential losses from specially serviced and troubled loans
Moody's rating action is:
-- US$25.793M Cl. F Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)
-- US$20.634M Cl. G Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)
-- US$28.373M Cl. H Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
-- US$2.579M Cl. J Certificate, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)
-- US$7.738M Cl. K Certificate, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)
-- US$10.317M Cl. L Certificate, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)
-- US$5.159M Cl. M Certificate, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)
-- US$5.158M Cl. N Certificate, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)
-- US$5.159M Cl. O Certificate, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade; previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)
WCP WIRELESS: Fitch Expects to Rate Class C Notes at 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on WCP Wireless Site
Funding LLC, WCP Wireless Site RE Funding LLC, & WCP Wireless Site
Non-RE Funding LLC's secured wireless site contract revenue notes,
series 2010-1.
Fitch expects to rate the transaction:
-- $184,000,000 class A 'A'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,000,000 class B 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,000,000 class C 'BB-'; Outlook Stable.
The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuers as of Aug. 9, 2010. A modifier will be applied to denote
the ratings of structured finance instruments.
The transaction is an issuance of notes backed by multiple assets
and ownership interests in sites used for wireless communication
equipment and other related purposes. The notes are secured
primarily by mortgages on the interests of the asset entities in
wireless sites representing not less than 95% of the net cash flow
(NCF) from purchased leasehold interests and a perfected security
interest in loan assets. In addition a portion of the notes are
secured by payment obligations guaranteed by AT&T Inc. (rated 'A'
with a Stable Rating Outlook by Fitch).
* Fitch Downgrades Ratings on 38 Bonds From 19 CMBS to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 38 bonds in 19 commercial mortgage-
backed securities transactions to 'D' indicating that the bonds
have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds being downgraded
to 'D' as part of this review were all previously rated 'B-', 'CC'
or 'C' indicating that a default was expected. The action is
limited to just the bonds with write-downs. The remaining bonds
in these transactions have not been analyzed as part of this
review.
Fitch downgrades bonds to 'D' as part of the ongoing surveillance
process and will continue to monitor these transactions for
additional defaults.
A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected
transactions can be found at www.fitchratings.com' by performing a
title search for:
* 'Fitch Downgrades 38 bonds to 'D' in 19 U.S. CMBS Transactions'
The spreadsheet also details Fitch's Recovery Ratings assigned to
the transactions. The Recovery Rating scale is based upon the
expected relative recovery characteristics of an obligation. For
structured finance, Recovery Ratings are designed to estimate
recoveries on a forward-looking basis while taking into account
the time value of money.
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 1214 RMBS Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 1214 U.S. RMBS
transactions in the course of its ongoing review of outstanding
bonds. The review covers all Prime transactions rated by Fitch.
Notable takeaways from Fitch's most recent analysis:
-- Total average expected mortgage losses did not change
materially from the previous review completed in 4Q'09
although some individual pools had significant loss
revisions;
-- Of the 16,580 ratings reviewed, 11,340 were affirmed, 4,407
were downgraded and 833 were withdrawn;
-- Almost 70% of downgrades affected classes already rated below
'B', generally reflecting an increase in the immanency of
bond default rather than an increase in lifetime mortgage
pool loss;
-- Of the 5,516 classes still rated 'AAA' prior to this review,
185 (3%) were downgraded in this review; close to 90% of
classes still rated 'AAA' were issued prior to 2005;
-- Fitch implemented a rating policy for interest-only
classes announced June 23, 2010. The new policy has resulted
in a rating withdrawal for 812 of those classes.
A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected
transactions can be found on Fitch's website under 'Prime RMBS
Rating Actions for August 5, 2010'. Further detail regarding the
loss coverage ratios, projected recovery for each class, and the
expected loss for each mortgage pool can also be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
RMBS Loss Metrics' in double-quotes. Both reports can also be
accessed by using the web links below.
The rating actions reflect Fitch's analysis of expected loss from
the collateral pools in addition to cash flow analysis of each
class. The average updated expected collateral losses as a
percentage of the remaining pool balance are 1.5%, 4%, 8% and 10%
for the pre-2005, 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintages, respectively.
Approximately 2/3 of Fitch-rated Prime transactions are
collateralized with fixed-rate mortgages.
The average expected mortgage pool losses were generally
consistent with the loss assumptions used for the prior review.
However, a number of individual transactions experienced faster-
than-expected deterioration which resulted in rating downgrades.
Some transactions have performed better-than-expected since the
last rating review, but generally upgrades were not given due to
the general volatility of the collateral performance and the
remaining risk in the housing market. Classes currently rated
'B-' or higher, which may be upgraded in the future (if current
pool-specific trends continue), were assigned a Positive Rating
Outlook.
The projected mortgage losses reflect a home price assumption of
approximately another 10% decline in national home prices over the
next year beginning in second quarter-2010. Fitch believes home
prices will continue to be negatively affected by the large number
of distressed loans which have yet to be resolved. Distressed
property liquidations will likely increase as servicers identify a
greater number of borrowers unwilling or unable to have their
loans successfully modified.
Serious delinquencies increased to approximately 11% from
approximately 9% at the time of the last rating review and average
roll-rates from performing-to-delinquency have generally remained
stable. Loan modifications in the Prime sector remain relatively
limited. Fitch estimates approximately 2% of Prime loans in
Fitch-rated pools have been modified. Actual loss severities have
improved modestly on average from 44% to 42% for liquidated loans
incurring a loss.
Approximately 50% of Prime classes have a current rating below
'B', indicating a realized, or an expected, principal writedown.
For senior classes (excluding support-seniors), Fitch projects an
average principal recovery of 99%, 96% and 93% for 2005, 2006 and
2007 vintages, respectively. More class-level detail on the
projected recoveries can be found in the report 'RMBS Loss
Metrics' using the weblink below.
As part of the review, Fitch implemented a new rating policy for
interest-only classes. As a result of the new policy, ratings for
IOs that reference any of these assets were withdrawn: (1) a non-
rated class, (2) multiple classes with different ratings or (3) a
mortgage pool. Remaining ratings assigned to IO securities are
directly linked to the credit risk of the referenced class or
classes.
In addition to the withdrawal of ratings on certain IO classes,
Fitch also withdraws ratings on 14 transactions which relied on
credit support provided by corporate entities no longer rated by
Fitch.
Ratings for these nine transactions are withdrawn due to a credit
dependency on GE Mortgage Insurance Corp., which is no longer
rated by Fitch:
-- CAL FED 1991 CI-2;
-- CAL FED 1991 CI-3;
-- CAL FED 1992 CI-5;
-- CAL FED 1992 MW-1;
-- First Union Mortgage 1997-2;
-- First Union Mortgage 1998-2;
-- First Union RST 1997-A;
-- PHHMC 1994-1;
-- Salomon 1993-1.
Ratings for these five transactions are withdrawn due to a credit
dependency on PMI Guaranty Co., which is no longer rated by Fitch:
-- CAL FED 1992 CI-6;
-- CAL FED 1992 JO-1;
-- CAL FED 1992 MW-2;
-- CAL FED 1993 CI-7;
-- CAL FED 1993 JO-2.
Finally, the rating for class A-1 in series DLJ 1992-A is affirmed
at 'AAA' and withdrawn due to a lack of broad investor interest.
The class A-1 is the only remaining rated class in the
transaction. The remaining mortgage pool balance is $237,858 and
has paid down to less than 1% of the initial pool balance.
All proposed ratings using the published methodology are reviewed
by a credit rating committee and in some cases the credit
committee may assign a rating that varies from a rating calculated
using standard methodology. For example, this can occur when two
comparable senior classes in the same transaction are assigned the
same rating by the committee despite a model determination that
one class is slightly above a rating threshold while the other is
slightly below the same rating threshold. Approximately 1% of the
rating actions taken in this review involved a credit committee
revision to a rating calculated using standard methodology.
* Moody's Junks Rating on Santa Rosa Bay Bridge Authority's Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating for the Santa
Rosa Bay Bridge Authority's (Florida) Revenue Bonds, Series 1996,
to Caa3 from B3, and maintains the negative outlook. The
downgrade is based on continued traffic and revenue declines per
the Florida Department of Transportation's June 30, 2010 traffic
report, despite a 33% toll rate increase implemented in FY 2008.
The downgrade also reflects projections that show depletion of the
debt service reserve by FY 2012 (beginning October 1, 2011). The
authority began drawing on its DSRF in 2002, with no notable
replenishment since then. The authority has been unable to
maintain indenture covenanted debt service coverage of 1.2 times,
and the bonds are in technical default. The negative outlook is
based on the expected continued declines in traffic over the
coming months due to the negative economic impact of the Gulf oil
spill, and the expectation that regional traffic will continue to
be slow to recover from the economic recession.
Legal Security: Gross toll revenues of the 3.5-mile Garcon Point
Bridge and the DRSF secure the bonds. A $2,179,853 DSRF draw was
made for the July 1, 2010 debt service payment, leaving a balance
of $2,322,512 in the reserve account. Based on the consulting
engineer's forecast this balance will be entirely depleted by FY
2012. Operations and maintenance expenses of the bridge are
funded by the Florida Department of Transportation. It is Moody's
understanding that there is no probability that FDOT will expand
its support of the project beyond coverage of O&M.
Interest Rate Derivatives: None.
Strengths:
* Gross revenue pledge with O&M expenses by FDOT
Challenges:
* Recent Gulf oil spill has further reduced weak traffic levels
* Traffic continued to decline in FY 2009 and FY 2010,eliminating
projected revenue growth from a FY 2008 33% rate increase and
putting negative pressure on the authority's already weak
financial position. The authority has been forced to withdraw
funds from the DSRF to make its semi-annual debt service
payments and Moody's expect the fund will be depleted by in FY
2012
* The July 1, 2007 toll increase to $3.50 from $3.00 (round-trip
fare of $7.00) gives drivers further incentive to use the toll-
free Pensacola Bay Bridge to the west (no toll) and highway 87
to the east
* Annual debt service payments escalate rapidly through life of
bonds
* Based on year-to-date traffic trends and cash flow projections,
a debt service payment default is likely by FY 2012
* Increased competition from Route 87 following its widening to
four lanes from two (construction is scheduled to be completed
in 2011) will likely further reduce bridge traffic and revenue
Recent Developments:
Utilization of the Garcon Point Bridge continues to decline in FY
2010, with June 2010 traffic down 6.4% and revenues down 6.5% from
June 2009 due in part to the negative effects of the Deepwater
Horizon drilling platform oil spill in the Gulf. Traffic declined
3.1% and revenues 3.3% for the 12 months ended June 30, 2010,
compared to FY 2009. A 33% toll rate increase effective on
July 1, 2007 resulted in more traffic diversion than had been
forecasted, thus yielding lower than forecasted revenues. Total
estimated revenues for the 12-months ended June 30, 2010, were
$4.44 million, which Moody's estimate will provide only 0.67 times
coverage of annual debt service ($6.6 million). Based on the
consulting engineer's forecast the current DSRF balance of
$2.322 million will be entirely depleted by FY 2012, unless
revenues grow dramatically (Moody's estimates that revenues need
to grow by 50%) in FY 2011.
In May 2010 the consulting engineer had recommended a toll
increase to $3.75 from $3.50 to generate an estimated 4-5% revenue
increase; however, due to the Gulf oil spill on April 20 2010,
there may be greater sensitivity to a toll increase, and the
consultant recommends a re-evaluation of the toll increase
proposal to be completed by January 1, 2011. A July 21, 2010
board meeting to discuss proposal has been postponed to August 25,
2010.
The service area population is expected to grow only modestly, and
tourism is expected to stagnate in the medium term due to the
national and regional economic and housing downturn. Combined
with the effects of the rising unemployment, and increased
competition from SR 87 to the east and the I-10 Escambia Bridge to
the north and most recently the Gulf oil spill it is unlikely that
Garcon Point Bridge will see any significant increases in traffic
and/or revenue over the near term.
Background
The 3.5-mile Garcon Point Bridge spans Pensacola Bay and connects
Garcon Point to the north and Redfish Point to the south. It
provides access to Gulf Breeze and other areas on the peninsula
from areas north and east of Pensacola Bay. The Santa Rosa Bay
Bridge Authority, established in 1984, oversaw the construction of
the bridge, which opened on May 14, 1999. Original traffic
forecasts were grossly overestimated causing less-than-expected
toll revenues and a strain on the authority's finances from the
first year of operation. For example, URS Consultant's initial
revenue forecasts in 1996 for the first five full years of
operations were roughly 90% over actual revenue figures, which
equaled between $2.5 and $3.3 million each year. Updated traffic
forecasts over the last few years have proven to be inflated as
well, exacerbating the authority's financial problems.
The bridge has significant competition from free alternatives SR
87, the Pensacola Bay Bridge, and I-10, however construction on
these routes in the past several years has positively affected
traffic flow over the Garcon Point Bridge. The widening to four
lanes from two of SR 87 east of the bridge has been a short-term
benefit, but in the long term, the newly expanded highway will
provide competition and divert traffic from the bridge since it
will be a more affordable route to areas east and north of Gulf
Breeze peninsula. The I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge to the northwest
of and almost perpendicular to Garcon Point Bridge was severally
damaged by Hurricane Ivan in 2004, requiring reconstruction that
was completed in 2007. The reopening of the Escambia Bridge was
is a likely contributor to Garcon Point's loss of traffic in 2008.
Outlook
The negative outlook is based on Moody's expectation that revenues
will continue to decrease in FY 2010 based on the impact of the
Gulf oil spill and year-to-date traffic reports, that debt service
coverage will continue to be below one times and that the DSRF
will be depleted by FY 2012 without a dramatic revenue increase.
What could change the rating -- Up
The rating could see upward pressure if traffic and revenue growth
yield revenues sufficient to meet the rate covenant in FY 2011, an
unlikely scenario given that Moody's estimates that growth would
have to exceed 50%.
What could change the rating -- Down
The rating will face additional downward pressure if traffic and
revenue continue to significantly lag forecasts or decrease, and
the authority depletes the DSRF.
Key Indicators:
* Type of System: Toll bridge
* Size of System: 3.5 miles, two lanes
* Transactions, FY 2009: 1.312 million
* Transactions, 12 months ended 6/30/10: 1.268 million
* Estimated Debt Service Coverage, FY 2010: 0.67 times
* Rate Covenant: 120% of all senior outstanding bonds and 100% of
the reserve account deposit requirement
* Debt Service Reserve Fund Balance (August 9, 2010):
$2.322 million
Rated Debt:
* Series 1996; $115.9 million
The last published rating action on the authority's bonds was on
March 2, 2009, when the authority's municipal finance scale rating
was downgraded to B3 negative from B2 stable. The rating was
subsequently recalibrated to B2 on a global scale on May 10, 2010.
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 37 Tranches From 12 Trust Preferred CDOs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 37
tranches from 12 U.S. trust preferred securities collateralized
debt obligation transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
negative. The tranches with lowered ratings have a total issuance
amount of $4.614 billion. At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on 18 tranches from three transactions and removed 13 of
them from CreditWatch negative.
The downgrades reflect three primary factors:
* The application of S&P's corporate CDO criteria;
* The application of S&P's revised recovery assumptions for TruPS
issued by U.S. Banks; and
* In most cases, significant deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying asset portfolios due to increased exposure to
obligors that have either defaulted or deferred payments on
TruPS, along with an increase in the number of TruPS that
experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.
In July 2010, S&P stated that S&P has observed severe negative
credit migration and significant increases in defaults and
deferrals in the pools underlying assets.
In January 2009, S&P indicated its view that the economic and
regulatory conditions pointed to a potential increase in the
number of U.S. banks that defer on their TruPS payment
obligations. Since January 2009, S&P has observed significant
increases in the number of deferrals of U.S. Bank TruPS held by
the CDOs S&P rate. While the rate of increase in the number of
deferrals may have recently slowed, in S&P's view, the economic
and regulatory conditions at the root of these deferrals continue
to unfold.
The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the affirmed tranches
have sufficient credit support to maintain their current ratings
according to its updated criteria.
S&P expects to continue reviewing the remaining transactions with
ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its corporate CDO
criteria update and to resolve the CreditWatch status of the
affected tranches.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
InCapS Funding I CCC- B/Watch Neg
InCapS Funding I A BBB AAA/Watch Neg
InCapS Funding I B-1 CCC- B/Watch Neg
InCapS Funding I C CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III A-1 AA AA+/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III A-2 AA- AA-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III A-3 AA- AA-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III A-4 AA- AA-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III B-1 B- B-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III B-2 B- B-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III B-3 B- B-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities III C CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV A-1 A AA+/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV A-2 BBB A+/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV A-3 BBB A+/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV B-M-1 CCC- B/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV B-M-2 CCC- B/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV C CCC- B-/Watch Neg
I-Preferred Term Securities IV D CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XI A-1 CCC+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XI A-2 CCC BB+/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XXI A-1 CCC BB+/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XXI A-2 CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XXIII AX AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XXIII A-1 CCC+ BBB-/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XXIII A-2 CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
Preferred Term Securities XXIII A-FP CCC- BB-/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I A-1A CCC+ B/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I A-1B CCC+ B/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I A-2 CCC CCC+/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I B-1 CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I B-2 CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I C-1 CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I C-2 CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I C-3 CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ser 1 CCC- CCC-/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ser 5 CCC CCC/Watch Neg
TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ser 6 CCC+ CCC+/Watch Neg
Trapeza CDO X A-1 CCC- BB+/Watch Neg
Trapeza CDO X A-2 CCC- B/Watch Neg
Trapeza CDO X B CC CCC/Watch Neg
Trapeza Edge CDO A-1 B BBB+/Watch Neg
Trapeza Edge CDO A-3 CCC BB/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding IV A-1 CCC- B+/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding IV A-2 CCC- B-/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding III A-1 CCC- BB/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding III A-2 CCC- B+/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding V A-1 CCC- B+/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding V A-2 CCC- B-/Watch Neg
U.S. Capital Funding V A-3 CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
TABERNA Preferred Funding I D CC
TABERNA Preferred Funding I E CC
TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ser 2 CC
TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ser 3 CC
TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ser 4 CC
* S&P Cuts Ratings on City of Bell, California's GO Bonds to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its ratings on the
city of Bell, Calif.'s general obligation (GO) bonds and pension
obligation bonds to 'BB' from 'A-' and placed the ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications. At the same time,
Standard & Poor's lowered its underlying rating on the city's
series 2005 lease revenue bonds to 'BB-' from 'BBB+' and placed
the rating on CreditWatch with negative implications, based on the
downgrade on the city's GO bonds.
"S&P bases the downgrades and CreditWatch placements on its
assessment of Bell's ability and willingness to either refinance
or pay an imminent Nov. 1, 2010, bullet maturity for the city's
$35 million series 2007 taxable lease revenue bond issuance," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Michael Taylor. "S&P understands
from the city's fiscal 2009 audited financial statement that the
bond maturity on the series 2007 private placement debt has
already been extended. S&P believes that the recent resignation
of the city manager and finance director and reports that the
asset purchased with the unrated series 2007 lease secured debt
has decreased in value have created uncertainty as to the city's
future actions," he added.
Standard & Poor's expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement
once it has reviewed the city's intended course of action.
The rated GO bonds are general obligations of the city, secured by
an unlimited ad valorem taxes. The pension obligation bonds are
secured by a first lien on loan payments payable from an unlimited
ad valorem retirement tax, approved by the electorate in 1944,
that can be levied, without limit, to pay costs associated with
public employees' retirement system obligations and debt service.
As such, Standard & Poor's assigned the same rating to the city's
pension bonds as to its GO bonds.
Bell, with what Standard & Poor's views as a stable population of
37,546 in 2009, is located in Los Angeles County, about nine miles
southeast of downtown Los Angeles.
* S&P Cuts Ratings on Seven Tranches From Corporate-Backed CDOs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
tranches from one corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications. At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on four
tranches from four synthetic CDOs backed by commercial mortgage-
backed securities and two tranches from two synthetic CDOs backed
by residential mortgage-backed securities and removed them from
CreditWatch negative. In addition, S&P raised its rating on one
tranche from one corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction and
removed it from CreditWatch positive and affirmed one rating from
one corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction.
S&P downgraded the synthetic CDOs that experienced downward rating
migration in their underlying reference portfolios and had
synthetic rated overcollateralization ratios below 100% as of the
July review and at a 90-day forward run. Due to trades in the
underlying reference portfolio that improved the transaction's
credit risk profile, S&P upgraded one tranche rating which had an
SROC ratio above 100% at the upgraded rating level. The one
affirmation was due to an SROC that was at or above 100% at its
current rating level. The rating withdrawal was due to a complete
redemption of the tranche.
Rating List
ABACUS 2006-NS1 Ltd.
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
D CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
Aphex Capital NSCR 2007-6 Ltd
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A-1 CCC- CCC+/Watch Neg
Claris Limited
US$20.7 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-4
Series 114/2007
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Tranche B- B/Watch Neg
Cloverie PLC
Series 2005-56
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A A- A/Watch Neg
Credit Default Swap
US$1 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref. No. 07ML113512A
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Tranche CCCsrp CCC+srp/Watch Neg
Credit-Linked Trust Certificates
Series 2005-I
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
2005-I-D BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Marvel Finance 2007-3 LLC
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
IA BBB- BB+/Watch Pos
Equinox Funding
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
SR cds NR AAA/Watch Neg
Portfollio Credit Rating of Unfunded Credit Default Swap
involving Morgan Stanley Capital Services Inc.,
and Portfolio CDS Trust 61
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
Un Cr Defa BB+ AA+/Watch Neg
Rutland Rated Investments
EUR5 mil, US$197 mil Dryden XII - IG Synthetic CDO 2006-1
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A1B-$LCS B B+/Watch Neg
A2-$LS CCC CCC+/Watch Neg
A3A-$LS CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
A3B-$LS CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
A3-$LS CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
A3-$FS CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
A3C-$LS CCC- CCC/Watch Neg
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 51 Classes From 13 RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 51
classes from 13 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
transactions backed primarily by scratch-and-dent mortgage loan
collateral issued in 2002-2006. S&P also affirmed its ratings on
44 classes from 10 of the downgraded transactions.
The "scratch-and-dent" collateral backing these transactions
originally consisted predominantly of reperforming first-lien,
fixed- and adjustable-rate, residential mortgage loans secured by
one- to four-family properties.
The downgrades and affirmations incorporate S&P's current and
projected losses, which S&P based on the dollar amounts of loans
currently in the transactions' delinquency, foreclosure, and real
estate owned pipelines, as well as S&P's projection of future
defaults. S&P also incorporated cumulative losses to date in its
analysis when assessing rating outcomes.
S&P derived its loss assumptions using its criteria listed in the
"Related Criteria And Research" section below. As part of S&P's
analysis, S&P considered the characteristics of the underlying
mortgage collateral, as well as macroeconomic influences. For
example, the risk profile of the underlying mortgage pools
influences S&P's default projections, while its outlook for
housing-price declines and the health of the housing market
influence its loss severity assumptions. Furthermore, S&P
adjusted its loss expectations for each deal based on upward
trends in delinquencies.
To assess the creditworthiness of each class, S&P reviewed the
individual delinquency and loss trends of each transaction for
changes, if any, in risk characteristics, servicing, and the
ability to withstand additional credit deterioration. In order to
maintain a 'B' rating on a class, S&P assessed whether, in its
view, a class could absorb the base-case loss assumptions S&P used
in its analysis. In order to maintain a rating higher than 'B',
S&P assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding
the base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to each
rating category, up to 150% for a 'AAA' rating. For example, in
general, S&P would assess whether one class could withstand
approximately 110% of S&P's base-case loss assumptions to maintain
a 'BB' rating, while S&P would assess whether a different class
could withstand approximately 120% of its base-case loss
assumptions to maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an
affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in S&P's view, withstand approximately
150% of its base-case loss assumptions under its analysis.
The lowered ratings reflect S&P's belief that the amount of credit
enhancement available for the downgraded classes is not sufficient
to cover losses at the previous rating levels, given S&P's current
projected losses, due to increased delinquencies. The
affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the classes have sufficient
credit enhancement to support the ratings at their current levels.
Certain senior classes also benefit from senior-support classes
that would provide support to a certain extent before any
applicable losses could affect the super-senior certificates. The
subordination of classes within each structure provides credit
support for the affected transactions.
S&P monitors these transactions to incorporate updated losses and
delinquency-pipeline performance to assess whether, in S&P's view,
the applicable credit enhancement features are sufficient to
support the current ratings. S&P will continue to monitor these
transactions and take additional rating actions as S&P considers
appropriate based on its criteria.
Rating Actions
C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates Series 2002-CB6
Series 2002-CB6
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2F 12489WGE8 CCC B
M-2V 12489WGD0 CCC B
B-1 12489WGF5 D CCC
CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2004-R2
Series 2004-R2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A-F1 12669UCB4 A AAA
1A-F2 12669UCC2 A AAA
1A-S 12669UCD0 A AAA
M 12669UCE8 CCC AA
B-1 12669UCF5 CC A
B-2 12669UCG3 CC CCC
CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2005-R2
Series 2005-R2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A-F2 12669GS51 BBB- AAA
2A-1 12669GN98 BBB AAA
2A-2 12669GP21 BBB AAA
2A-3 12669GP39 BBB AAA
2A-4 12669GP47 BBB AAA
2A-IO 12669GN80 BBB AAA
M 12669GP54 CCC AA
B-1 12669GP62 CCC A
Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W1
Series 2003-W1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 31392GWE1 BBB- A
B-2 31392GWF8 CCC BBB
B-3 31392GWG6 CC BB
GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3
Series 2005-RP3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 362341LV9 CCC BBB
B4 362341LW7 CCC BB
B5 362341LX5 CC CCC
GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 362334NW0 CCC BB
B-2 362334NY6 CC CCC
MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
1A1F 57643QAE5 BBB- AAA
1A1S 57643QAF2 BBB- AAA
1A2 57643QAG0 BBB- AAA
1A3 57643QAH8 BB- AAA
1A4 57643QAJ4 BB- AAA
AX 57643QAK1 BBB- AAA
2A1 57643QAL9 BBB- AAA
B1 57643QAP0 CCC AA+
B2 57643QAQ8 CCC AA
B3 57643QAR6 CC BBB+
B4 57643QAS4 CC CCC
MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B1 57643QBV6 BBB AA+
B2 57643QBW4 CCC AA+
B3 57643QBX2 CCC AA-
B4 57643QBY0 CC BBB+
B5 57643QBZ7 CC CCC
NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R1
Series 2004-R1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 62951MAF7 BB- A
B-2 62951MAG5 CCC BBB
NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2004-R2
Series 2004-R2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 62951MAR1 BB+ A
B-2 62951MAS9 CC BBB
NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2004-R3
Series 2004-R3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-2 62951MBE9 BB BBB
Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2005-R3
Series 2005-R3
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 126694JK5 BB A-
B-2 126694JL3 CCC BB
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
A-4 81441PCT6 AA+ AAA
M-1 81441PCQ2 CCC BB
M-2 81441PCR0 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2005-R2
Series 2005-R2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1A-F1 12669GN64 AAA
1A-S 12669GN72 AAA
Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2003-W1
Series 2003-W1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M 31392GWD3 AA
GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-RP3
Series 2005-RP3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1AF 362341LL1 AAA
1AS 362341LM9 AAA
1A2 362341LN7 AAA
1A3 362341LP2 AAA
1A4 362341LQ0 AAA
AX 362341LR8 AAA
2A1 362341LS6 AAA
B1 362341LT4 AA
B2 362341LU1 A
GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-1 362334NU4 AAA
A-2 362334QF4 AAA
A-3 362334QG2 AAA
M-1 362334NV2 AA+
B-1 362334NX8 CCC
MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-1
Series 2006-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
1A1F 57643QBL8 AAA
1A1S 57643QBQ7 AAA
1A2 57643QBM6 AAA
1A3 57643QBN4 AAA
1A4 57643QBP9 AAA
AX 57643QBR5 AAA
2A1 57643QBS3 AAA
NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2004-R1
Series 2004-R1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 62951MAA8 AAA
A2 62951MAB6 AAA
PT 62951MAD2 AAA
M 62951MAC4 AA
NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates Series 2004-R2
Series 2004-R2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 62951MAM2 AAA
A2 62951MAN0 AAA
A3 62951MAT7 AAA
PT 62951MAP5 AAA
M 62951MAQ3 AA
NAAC Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2004-R3
Series 2004-R3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A1 62951MAY6 AAA
AF 62951MAZ3 AAA
AS 62951MBA7 AAA
PT 62951MBB5 AAA
M 62951MBC3 AA
B-1 62951MBD1 A
Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2005-R3
Series 2005-R3
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-F 126694JG4 AAA
A-S 126694JH2 AAA
M 126694JJ8 AA
Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2
Series 2005-2
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
A-2 81441PCN9 AAA
A-3 81441PCP4 AAA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 201 Classes From 89 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 201
classes from 89 U.S. synthetic risk transfer residential mortgage-
backed securities deals issued by RESI Finance L.P., RESIX Finance
Ltd., WASI Finance L.P., Merrill Lynch Mortgage Synthetic Ltd.,
and Smart Home Reinsurance Ltd. S&P also removed three of the
lowered ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on 34 other classes from
eight of the downgraded transactions, as well as six other
transactions.
The downgrades are based on S&P's view that cumulative losses will
increase as a result of the observed increase in delinquencies in
the pool. S&P downgraded 69 classes from RESIX Finance Ltd.
transactions because the ratings on the affected classes are based
on the referenced ratings of RESI Finance Ltd. Partnership's
transactions.
The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available for the related classes is sufficient to withstand
future loss projections.
The underlying pools of loans are predominantly made up of fixed-
and adjustable-rate, first-lien, prime mortgage loans and also
includes subprime loans and home equity lines of credit (HELOC).
S&P looks at several things including the losses S&P is projecting
based on the performance and seasoning of the mortgage pools, the
change in delinquencies over time, and the rating of the
applicable party responsible for making certain interest payments.
S&P will continue to evaluate the ratings on these transactions
and adjust ratings as S&P considers appropriate in accordance with
its criteria.
Rating Actions
MLMS 2005-ACR1 Ltd.
Series 2005-ACR1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-1 55311XAG0 CC CCC
B-2 55311XAH8 CC CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B
Series 2003-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 74951PBC1 BBB A+
B8 74951PBD9 BB A+
B9 74951PBE7 B BBB+
B10 74951PBF4 CCC BBB
B11 74951PBG2 CCC BB
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C
Series 2003-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B5 74951PBV9 BB BBB
B6 74951PBW7 B BBB-
B7 74951PBX5 CCC BB
B8 74951PBY3 CCC BB-
B9 74951PBZ0 CC B+
B10 74951PCA4 CC B
B11 74951PCB2 CC B-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1
Series 2003-CB1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 74951PBN7 BB BB+
B9 74951PBP2 B BB-
B10 74951PBQ0 CCC B+
B11 74951PBR8 CCC B
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D
Series 2003-D
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B5 74951PCE6 BB BBB
B6 74951PCF3 B BBB-
B7 74951PCG1 CCC BB
B8 74951PCH9 CCC BB-
B9 74951PCJ5 CC B+
B10 74951PCK2 CC B+
B11 74951PCL0 CC B
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A
Series 2004-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B6 74951PCQ9 BB BBB-
B7 74951PCR7 B BB
B8 74951PCS5 CCC BB-
B9 74951PCT3 CC B+
B10 74951PCU0 CC B
B11 74951PCV8 CC B-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B
Series 2004-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B5 74951PCY2 BB BBB
B6 74951PCZ9 B BBB-
B7 74951PDA3 CCC BB+
B8 74951PDB1 CCC BB
B9 74951PDC9 CC BB-
B10 74951PDD7 CC B+
B11 74951PDE5 CC B
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C
Series 2004-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B5 74951PDH8 BB BBB
B6 74951PDJ4 B BBB-
B7 74951PDK1 CCC BB
B8 74951PDL9 CC BB-
B9 74951PDM7 CC B+
B10 74951PDN5 CC B
B11 74951PDP0 CC CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-A
Series 2005-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 74951PDQ8 B A
B4 74951PDR6 B A-
B5 74951PDS4 CCC BBB-
B6 74951PDT2 CCC BB+
B7 74951PDU9 CC B
B8 74951PDV7 CC B-
B9 74951PDW5 CC CCC
B10 74951PDX3 CC CCC
B11 74951PDY1 CC CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-B
Series 2005-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 74951PDZ8 CCC A+
B4 74951PEA2 CCC A
B5 74951PEB0 CCC BB
B6 74951PEC8 CC B+
B7 74951PED6 CC CCC
B8 74951PEE4 CC CCC
B9 74951PEF1 CC CCC
B10 74951PEG9 CC CCC
B11 74951PEH7 CC CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-C
Series 2005-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 76113GAA6 CCC BBB+
B4 76113GAB4 CCC BB+
B5 76113GAC2 CC B
B6 76113GAD0 CC B-
B7 76113GAE8 CC CCC
B8 76113GAF5 CC CCC
B9 76113GAG3 CC CCC
B10 76113GAH1 CC CCC
B11 76113GAJ7 CC CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-D
Series 2005-D
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 74951PEJ3 CCC B
B4 74951PEK0 CCC B-
B5 74951PEL8 CC CCC
B6 74951PEM6 CC CCC
B7 74951PEN4 CC CCC
B8 74951PEP9 CC CCC
B9 74951PEQ7 CC CCC
B10 74951PER5 CC CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-A
Series 2006-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 NOTES 76113DAA3 CCC BB
B4 NOTES 76113DAB1 CC B
B5 NOTES 76113DAC9 CC CCC
B6 NOTES 76113DAD7 CC CCC
B7 NOTES 76113DAE5 CC CCC
B8 NOTES 76113DAF2 CC CCC
B9 CERTS 76113DAG0 CC CCC
B10 CERTS 76113DAH8 D CC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-B
Series 2006-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 Notes 76113RAA2 CC CCC
B4 Notes 76113RAB0 CC CCC
B5 Notes 76113RAC8 CC CCC
B6 Notes 76113RAD6 CC CCC
B7 Notes 76113RAE4 D CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-C
Series 2006-C
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 76113VAA3 CC CCC
B4 76113VAB1 CC CCC
B5 76113VAC9 CC CCC
B6 76113VAD7 CC CCC
B7 76113VAE5 D CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2007-A
Series 2007-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 74951RAA2 CC CCC
B4 74951RAB0 CC CCC
B5 74951RAC8 CC CCC
B6 74951RAD6 CC CCC
B7 74951RAE4 CC CCC
B8 74951RAF1 D CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2007-B
Series 2007-B
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 74951QAA4 CC CCC
B4 74951QAB2 CC CCC
B5 74951QAC0 CC CCC
B6 74951QAD8 CC CCC
B7 74951QAE6 CC CCC
B8 74951QAF3 CC CCC
B9 74951QAG1 CC CCC
B10 74951QAH9 CC CCC
B11 74951QAJ5 D CC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-C B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LAQ7 CC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-C B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LAR5 CC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-C B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LAS3 CC B-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-C B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LAN4 CCC BB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-C B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LAP9 CCC BB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-B B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LAD6 B BBB+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-B B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LAE4 CCC BBB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-B B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LAF1 CCC BB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-CB1B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LAH7 BB BB+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-CB1B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LAJ3 B BB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003CB1B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LAK0 CCC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003CB1B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LAL8 CCC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-B B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LAY0 BBB A+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-AB10S
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10-S 76116LAX2 CCC A+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-D B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LBD5 CC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-D B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LBC7 CC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-D B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LBB9 CC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-D B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LBA1 CCC BB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-D B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LAZ7 CCC BB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-A B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LBK9 CC B-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-A B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LBJ2 CC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-A B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LBH6 CC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-A B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LBG8 CCC BB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-A B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LBF0 B BB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-B B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LBL7 CCC BB+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-B B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LBM5 CCC BB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-B B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LBN3 CC BB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-B B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LBP8 CC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-B B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LBQ6 CC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-C B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LBV5 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-C B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LBU7 CC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-C B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LBT0 CC B+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-C B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LBS2 CC BB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2004-C B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LBR4 CCC BB
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-A-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LBW3 CC B
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-A-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LBX1 CC B-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-A-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LBY9 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-A-B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LBZ6 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-A-B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LCA0 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-B-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LCB8 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-B-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LCC6 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-B-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LCD4 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-B-B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LCF9 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-B-B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LCE2 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-C-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LCG7 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-C-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LCH5 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-C-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LCJ1 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-C-B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LCK8 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-C-B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LCL6 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-D-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LCM4 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-D-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LCN2 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-D-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LCP7 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2005-D-B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LCQ5 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-A-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 Notes 76116LCS1 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-A-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 Notes 76116LCT9 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-A-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 Notes 76116LCU6 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-A-B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 Notes 76116LCV4 D CC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-1-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LCY8 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-1-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LCZ5 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-1-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LDA9 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-B-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LDD3 D CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2006-C B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LDJ0 D CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-A-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-7 76116LDQ4 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-A-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B-8 76116LDR2 D CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-B-B7
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B7 76116LDW1 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-B-B8
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B8 76116LDX9 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-B-B9
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B9 76116LDY7 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-B-B10
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B10 76116LDZ4 CC CCC
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2007-B-B11
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B11 76116LEA8 D CC
SASI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-A
Series 2006-A
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
B3 80384AAA3 B BBB+
B4 80384AAB1 CCC BBB
B5 80384AAC9 CCC BB-
B6 80384AAD7 CCC B
B7 80384AAE5 CC CCC
B8 80384AAG0 CC CCC
B9 80384AAJ4 CC CCC
SMART HOME Reinsurance 2006-1 Limited
Series 2006-1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-2 83170GAA2 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-3 83170GAC8 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-4 83170GAE4 CCC BB/Watch Neg
M-5 83170GAG9 CCC B
M-6 83170GAJ3 CC CCC
M-7 83170GAL8 CC CCC
M-8 83170GAN4 CC CCC
WASI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-HES1
Series 2006-HES1
Rating
------
Class CUSIP To From
----- ----- -- ----
M-4 941034AA8 CC B
M-5 941034AB6 CC CCC
M-6 941034AC4 CC CCC
B-1-A 941034AD2 CC CCC
B-1-B 941034AE0 CC CCC
Ratings Affirmed
MLMS 2005-ACR1 Ltd.
Series 2005-ACR1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 55311XAA3 AA+
M-2 55311XAB1 AA
M-3 55311XAC9 A
M-4 55311XAD7 BB
M-5 55311XAE5 B
M-6 55311XAF2 CCC
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A
Series 2003-A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B8 74951PAT5 A+
B9 74951PAU2 A+
B10 74951PAV0 A+
B11 74951PAW8 A-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-B
Series 2003-B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B4 74951PAZ1 A+
B5 74951PBA5 A+
B6 74951PBB3 A+
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-C
Series 2003-C
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B3 74951PBT4 A
B-4 74951PBU1 A-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1
Series 2003-CB1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B3 74951PBH0 A+
B4 74951PBJ6 A+
B5 74951PBK3 A
B6 74951PBL1 A-
B7 74951PBM9 BBB-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D
Series 2003-D
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B3 74951PCC0 A
B4 74951PCD8 A-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A
Series 2004-A
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B3 74951PCM8 A+
B4 74951PCN6 A
B5 74951PCP1 BBB
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-B
Series 2004-B
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B3 74951PCW6 A
B4 74951PCX4 A-
RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C
Series 2004-C
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B3 74951PDF2 A
B4 74951PDG0 A-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-A B11
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B11 76116LAC8 A-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-A B10
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B10 76116LAB0 A+
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-CB1B7
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B7 76116LAG9 BBB-
RESIX Finance Limited
Series 2003-A B9
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
B9 76116LAW4 A+
SMART HOME Reinsurance 2004-1 Limited
Series 2004-1
Class CUSIP Rating
----- ----- ------
M-1 83168LAA5 AA
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Seven Tranches From Five CDO Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
tranches from five U.S. collateralized debt obligation
transactions and removed five of them from CreditWatch with
negative implications. The tranches with lowered ratings have a
total issuance amount of $228.65 million. At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on 32 tranches from 18 transactions and
removed 19 of them from CreditWatch negative. S&P withdrew its
ratings on four classes from four transactions following the
complete paydown of the notes.
The downgrades reflect two primary factors:
* The application of S&P's corporate CDO criteria; and
* Deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO tranches due
to increased exposure to obligors that have either defaulted or
experienced downgrades into the 'CCC' range.
The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the tranches have
adequate credit support to maintain the current ratings according
to S&P's corporate CDO criteria.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
where appropriate.
Rating Actions
Rating
------
Transaction Class To From
----------- ----- -- ----
Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) A-1 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Berkeley Street CDO (Cayman) A-2 CCC CCC/Watch Neg
Bingham CDO A-3 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Cashel Rock CBO Ltd. A-1 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Cashel Rock CBO Ltd. A-2 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Cashel Rock CBO Ltd. A-3 A- A-/Watch Neg
Cashel Rock CBO Ltd. B B+ BBB/Watch Neg
CHYPS CBO 1999-1 Ltd. A-3A D CC
Clearwater Funding CDO 2001-A A-1 AA- AA-/Watch Neg
Clearwater Funding CDO 2001-A A-2 BBB BBB/Watch Neg
Clearwater Funding CDO 2001-A A-3 BB- BB-/Watch Neg
Diamond Investment Grade CDO A AAA AAA/Watch Neg
FMA CBO Funding II L.P. B CC CCC-
FMA IG Funding IV Ltd. A AA- AA-/Watch Neg
Goldman Sachs Asset Management B NR BB/Watch Neg
CBO Ltd.
INA CBO 1999-1 Ltd. A-2 CCC- B-/Watch Neg
INA CBO 1999-1 Ltd. A-2F CCC- B-/Watch Neg
Juniper CBO 2000-1 Ltd. A-3 AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Juniper CBO 2000-1 Ltd. A-3L AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Juniper CBO 2000-1 Ltd. A-4 CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Juniper CBO 2000-1 Ltd. A-4L CC CCC-/Watch Neg
Liberty Square CDO I Ltd. A AAA AAA/Watch Neg
Madison Avenue CDO II Ltd. A AA AA/Watch Neg
Newton CDO Ltd. A-1 BB- BB-/Watch Neg
Newton CDO Ltd. A-2 BB- BB-/Watch Neg
Newton CDO Ltd. B AAA AAA/Watch Neg
PPM America High Grade CBO I A-2B NR AAA/Watch Neg
Stellar Funding Ltd. A-3 NR CCC-
Stony Hill CDO III (Cayman) A BBB+ BBB+/Watch Neg
Wilbraham CBO Ltd. A-2 NR BBB-/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Transaction Class Rating
----------- ----- ------
Cardinal CDO LLC 1B AAA
CHYPS CBO 1999-1 Ltd. A-2 AAA
GSC Partners CDO Fund II Ltd. A AAA
INA CBO 1999-1 Ltd. A-3 CC
Juniper CBO 2000-1 Ltd. B-2 CC
Northwestern Investment A AAA
Management Co. CBO I Fund
Stellar Funding Ltd. A-4 CC
Stony Hill CDO III (Cayman) A Ins 02 AAA
Stony Hill CDO III (Cayman) A Ins 03 AAA
Stony Hill CDO III (Cayman) A Ins 04-1 AAA
Stony Hill CDO III (Cayman) A Ins 04-2 AAA
Wilbraham CBO Ltd. B-1 CC
Wilbraham CBO Ltd. B-2 CC
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/
On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts. The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.
Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.
The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.
For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911. For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA. Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2010. All rights reserved. ISSN: 1520-9474.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers. Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.
The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.
*** End of Transmission ***