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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, August 22, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 232

                            Headlines

AEGIS ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches
BURNHAM HARBOR: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1LB Notes
BUSHNELL LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
CAPFA CAPITAL: Moody's Junks Rating on $137 Mil. Housing Bonds
CAPITAL PROJECTS: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2000F-1 Bonds to 'B+'

CGCMT 2010-RR2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2010-RR2 Certs.
CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 126 Tranches
CLARIS IV: DBRS Confirms Class I-C Swap, Series 29 at 'BB'
CLARIS IV: DBRS Confirms Class I-C Swap, Series 28 at 'BB'

CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2002-CKS4 Notes
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 38 Tranches
CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 54 Tranches
CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

CWHEQ REVOLVING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches
EQUIFIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Six Tranches
FORD CREDIT: Fitch Retains 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes
FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class D Notes to 'B2'
GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 19 2004-C2 Certs.

GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six 2005-FL3 Certs.
GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Assigns Ratings on 2010-C1 Securities
HASCO 2006-WMC1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 67 Tranches
HOUSING FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2006B-2 Notes to 'B3'
HUDSON MEZZANINE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class S to 'Ca'

JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2008-C2 Certificates
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2003-C1 Certificates
LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Assigns Class E Notes at 'BB'
LONG BEACH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
M-2 SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-D Notes to 'C'

MAGNETITE V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Junks Ratings on Various Series of Bonds
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Raises Rating on 1998 Debt From 'BB+'
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2007-IQ14 Certs.
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 257 Tranches

MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 1999-LIFE1 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Rating on Secured Notes
NEWCASTLE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
NOMURA HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches
OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes

OPTION ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
RENAISSANCE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 59 Tranches
RESMAE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2000-C3 Certs.
SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 17 2001-MM Certs.

SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB/LS3'
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B 2004-1 Notes to 'BB/LS3'
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B 2004-2 Notes to 'BB/LS3'
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B 2004-5 Notes to 'BB/LS3'
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class B to 'BB/LS3'

SORIN REAL: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating on Class A-1B Notes
TIERS FLOATING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Series 2005-11 to 'C'
TIERS FLOATING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Series 2005-12 to 'C'
TRUE NORTH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on CDO Notes to 'D'
TRUE NORTH: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class A Notes

VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY: Moody's Puts 'Ba1' Ratings on Senior Loan
WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2005-WHALE 5 Certs.
WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 2005-C16 Certs.

* Fitch Cuts Rating on City of Bell's $50MM Bonds to 'BB'
* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 38 Classes by Eight SF CDOs
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches From Three CDO Deals
* S&P Puts Ratings on Three Tranches on CreditWatch Positive

                            *********

AEGIS ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 17 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 17
tranches from 6 RMBS transactions issued by Aegis.  The collateral
backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and/or
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

In addition, for these deals, when calculating the rate of new
delinquencies, Moody's took into account loans that were
reclassified from delinquent to current due to modification in
order to not understate the rate of new delinquencies.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: AEGIS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES TRUST 2006-1

  -- Cl. A1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Aa1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. IA3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. A3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. IA3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. IA3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IA4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IIA, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)


BURNHAM HARBOR: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1LB Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Burnham Harbor CDO 2006-1
Ltd.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

* US$110,000,000 Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due September
  2039, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 22, 2009
  Downgraded at Caa2 (sf).

Burnham Harbor CDO 2006-1 Ltd., issued on January 31, 2006, is a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation referencing a portfolio
consisting primarily of residential mortgage-backed securities and
commercial mortgage-backed securities issued in 2004, 2005 and
2006.  RMBS comprise approximately 80% of the underlying
portfolio.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through a decline in the
average credit rating of the reference portfolio (as measured by
an increase in the weighted average rating factor), and an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities.  In
particular, the weighted average rating factor, as reported by the
trustee, has increased from 2337 in April 2009 to 6780 in July
2010.  During the same time, the dollar amount of defaulted
securities increased from $271.5 million to $284.4 million.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodology and its supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
Moody's Special Report below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


BUSHNELL LOAN: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Bushnell Loan Fund II, Ltd.:

  -- US$281,800,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due October 28, 2015 (current balance of
     $130,058,039), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on July 16,
     2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$7,750,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes due October 28, 2015, Upgraded to Aa2
     (sf); previously on July 16, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$21,800,000 Class B Third Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due October 28, 2015, Upgraded
     to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 16, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2
     (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is a
result of substantial deleveraging of the transaction since the
previous rating action in July 2009.  In particular, the Class A-1
notes were paid a total of about $90 million since the previous
rating action, accounting for roughly 41% of the total Class A-1
notes' outstanding balance reported in June 2009.  As a result of
the deleveraging, the rated notes' overcollateralization ratios
have increased significantly since the last rating action.  Based
on the latest trustee report, dated July 19, 2010, the Class A and
Class B overcollateralization ratios are reported at 139.41% and
122.4%, respectively, versus the June 2009 level of 126.7% and
115.7%, respectively.  Moody's expects deleveraging to continue
since the deal is a static transaction.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from a decrease in
the percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook," and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Due
to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used
by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

Bushnell Loan Fund II, Ltd., issued in March 2008, is a static
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


CAPFA CAPITAL: Moody's Junks Rating on $137 Mil. Housing Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the underlying rating
assigned to approximately $137 million of outstanding CAPFA
Capital Corp. 2000F's Student Housing Revenue Bonds (Pegasus
Landing & Pegasus Pointe at University of Central Florida), Senior
Series 2000F-1 to Caa3 from B1.  The Caa3-rated senior bonds are
insured by National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation and also
rated Baa1 based on the bond insurance policy.  The underlying
rating has been removed from watchlist for possible downgrade.
The outlook is negative.  The downgrade is driven by a sharp
decline in project revenue due to stressed occupancy rates and the
expectation that the debt service reserve fund will need to be
tapped to pay debt service payments within the next year.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations of Capital
Projects Finance Authority, secured solely by rental revenue from
two privatized student housing projects - Pegasus Landing and
Pegasus Pointe and various funds pledged under the indenture.  The
Subordinate Series 2000G were not rated or insured.

Recent Developments:

The owner reports that the occupancy rate for Pegasus Landing will
be approximately 66% for Fall 2010.  The decline in occupancy
follows the University of Central Florida's decision to stop
referring students to live at Pegasus Landing after the mold and
water damage was discovered in several of the buildings by the
project owner.  The University has not stopped referring students
to live at Pegasus Pointe, which is currently 87% occupied for
Fall 2010.  The stressed occupancy rates will result in reduced
project rental revenue by nearly 30% from the previous academic
year.

Although not finalized, the costs and scope of remediating the
mold and repairing water damage at Pegasus Landing are expected to
be substantial.  To date, no outside sources of funding have been
identified, and it is projected that rental revenues alone will
not be sufficient to fund remediation costs and pay debt service.

Due to reduced rental revenue, it is likely the project will need
to tap the debt service reserve fund to help pay debt service
within the next year.  The debt service reserve fund is funded at
maximum annual debt service, approximately $10 million.  The trust
indenture indicates that as a matter of last resort, the debt
service reserve fund can be applied to satisfy deficiencies in
operating expenses that are due.  Although it is not certain the
debt service reserve fund will be used for operating expenses, the
presence of this provision in the bond documents weakens
bondholders' security interest in the debt service reserve fund.

                        Last Rating Action

The last rating action was on May 29, 2010, when the Baa3 rating
on the Series 2000F-1 bonds was downgraded to B3 and the outlook
revised to rating under review for possible downgrade.

                             Outlook

The outlook is negative because of the uncertainty about the costs
and schedule around the remediation of the property.

               What Could Change The Rating Up

  -- An inflow of cash from an outside party to fund the cost of
     remediation and supplement rental revenue

                What Could Change The Rating Down

  -- Depletion of the debt service reserve fund and insufficient
     revenues to pay debt service payments

  -- Delays or an inability to remediate the conditions of the
     property.


CAPITAL PROJECTS: S&P Downgrades Rating on 2000F-1 Bonds to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its underlying rating
on Capital Projects Finance Authority, Florida's senior 2000F-1
revenue bonds to 'B+' from 'BBB-.'

The downgrade is based on S&P's assessment of CaPFA's severe
financial stress related to the discovery of mold damage at the
Pegasus Landing housing facility.  The downgrade reflects reduced
occupancy projections, expected operating pressures, and high
projected costs of mold-damage remediation.  The rating remains on
CreditWatch where it was placed with negative implications on
June 7, 2010.

Specifically, the downgrade reflects S&P's assessment of CaPFA's
low projected combined (Pegasus Landing and Pegasus Pointe)
occupancy of 75% for fall 2010, with 88% combined occupancy needed
for break-even financial results, and 92% combined occupancy
needed to meet financial covenants; large remediation costs
related to water and mold damage at the Pegasus Landing housing
facilities, which may be paid by a third party; and a severely
reduced ability to boost occupancy given the suspension of the
University of Central Florida's referral agreement with Pegasus
Landing.

In S&P's opinion, CaPFA's preliminary plan to remediate the damage
and return to full occupancy and a fully funded debt service
reserve account support the 'B+' rating.

The CreditWatch placement in June 2010 followed S&P's review of
information received from CaPFA of a strong potential for a sharp
decrease in occupancy at the Pegasus Landing student housing
complex, and the potential for large remediation costs related to
water and mold damage.  At that time, the number of lease
agreements for fall 2010 was consistent with previous years.
Since June, lease expectations have dropped, resulting in severe
operating pressure expected on a project with historically weak
operating margins.  Payment on the bonds comes exclusively from
rental payments made to CaPFA, the owner of the complexes, by
resident students.

The rating's continued placement on CreditWatch reflects ongoing
uncertainty, in S&P's view, regarding CaPFA's ability to pay
remediation expenses related to mold damage at the facility, and
to weather operating pressures related to reduced occupancy
projections and ongoing remediation repairs.  Support from a
third-party funding source will likely be needed to cover
remediation costs, given CaPFA's limited financial resources.
CaPFA management indicates that a third party may cover the
current cost of remediation.

An inability to secure such third-party support for remediation
expenses would likely lead to a default on the bonds.  In
addition, reduced occupancy levels in fiscal 2011 limit
management's ability to cover debt service with operating revenues
alone.  As a result, management may draw from existing reserves
(including debt service reserves) to make debt service payments in
fiscal 2011.  The size and timing of such draws could affect the
rating in the near future.  Over the next 90 days, S&P will
continue to monitor the situation and CaPFA's ability and capacity
to meet its obligations.


CGCMT 2010-RR2: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two 2010-RR2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded two classes of the Group II
P&I Certificates issued by CGCMT 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-RR2.  The downgrades are
due to deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
certificate, as evidenced by the rating action dated August 12,
2010 on the Group II Underlying Certificate.

CGCMT 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2010-RR2 is a Re-REMIC Pass Through Trust backed by two
commercial mortgage backed securities Certificates: the Group I
P&I Certificates are backed by $47.6 million, or 4.0% of the
aggregate class principal balance, of the super senior Class A-3
issued by Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-C5 (the Group I
Underlying Certificate); the Group II P&I Certificates are backed
by $30.0 million, or 8.5% of the aggregate class principal
balance, of the super senior Class A-4 issued by J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2008-C2 (the Group II Underlying
Certificate).

The Group II Underlying Certificate currently has 29.9% of credit
support.  Depending on the magnitude, severity, and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans and the balance of the pool,
along with any loan payoffs, sequential paydowns may not reach
these classes.  At the same time, losses are likely to erode the
credit enhancement cushion for the super senior classes creating a
potential differential in expected loss between those super senior
classes benefiting first from paydowns and those classes receiving
paydowns last.  Although Moody's believes that it is unlikely that
the Underlying JPMCC Securities will actually experience losses,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the class priority in
the cash flow waterfall is insufficient for the current CRE CDO
ratings on Class JP-A4A and JP-A4B.

When assigning and monitoring the ratings on the CRE CDO
Certificates, Moody's applied ratings-specific cash flow scenarios
assuming different loss timing, recovery and prepayment
assumptions on the underlying pool of mortgages that are the
collateral for the underlying CMBS transaction.  In each scenario,
cash flows and losses from the underlying collateral were analyzed
applying different stresses at each rating level.  The resulting
ratings specific stressed cash flows were then input into the
structure of the resecuritization to determine expected losses for
each class.  The expected losses were then compared to the
idealized expected loss for each class to gauge the
appropriateness of the existing rating.  The stressed assumptions
considered, among other factors, the underlying transaction's
collateral attributes, past and current performance, and Moody's
current negative performance outlook for commercial real estate.

Within the resecuritization, the identified weighted average life
of the Underlying JPMCC Securities is 7.1 years assuming a 0%/0%
constant default rate and constant prepayment rate.  The mean
recovery rate assumption is 50%.

Moody's rating actions are:

  -- Cl. JP-A4A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 22,
     2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. JP-A4B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on April 22,
     2010 Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through a
review of the available Trustee Reports and a periodic basis
through a full review.  Since the ratings of the Certificates are
linked to the rating of the underlying certificate and the
performance of the underlying commercial mortgage pool, any rating
action on the underlying certificate may trigger a review of the
ratings of the Certificates.  This is Moody's first full review
since securitization.


CHATHAM LIGHT: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Chatham Light CLO, Limited, a
synthetic collateralized loan obligation issued in December 2004
referencing a portfolio of primarily senior secured loans:

  -- US$19,000,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due 2017, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously
     on June 15, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  -- US$5,000,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Deferrable Senior
     Subordinate Notes due 2017, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously
     on June 15, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from substantial increase in the overcollateralization
of the notes and modest improvement in the credit quality of the
reference collateral since the last rating action in January 2010.

Since the last rating actions taken in January 2010,
overcollateralization coverage of the Class A, Class B, and
Class C Notes have increased significantly.  Based on the July
2010 trustee report, the Class A, Class B, and Class C Notes
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 238.7%, 145.6% and
108.1%, versus December 2009 levels of 210.4%, 131.9% and 98.8%
respectively.  Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the
reference collateral has modestly improved since the last rating
action in January 2010.  In particular, based on the latest
trustee report dated July 8, 2010, the weighted average rating
factor was 2960 as compared to 3115 in December 2009.
Additionally, defaulted securities currently referenced in the
portfolio total about $13.5 million, accounting for roughly 2.5%
of the reference portfolio notional amount compared to
$36.6 million in December 2009, which accounted for approximately
7.4% of the December reference portfolio notional amount.  Due to
the impact of revised and updated key assumptions described in
"Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and
"Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used
by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

According to Moody's, the ratings of the notes also reflect the
risk exposure to Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (formerly
Financial Security Assurance Inc.), which acts as Guarantor under
the Investment Agreement in the transaction.  On November 12,
2009, Moody's confirmed the Aa3 insurance financial strength
rating of Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. with a negative
outlook.

Moody's also noted that the ratings of the notes, in particular
the Class A-2 notes, are very sensitive to the diversion of
interest proceeds upon overcollateralization test failures.
Currently, all the overcollateralization tests are in compliance,
and the rated notes have not benefited from the diversion of
excess interest since the payment date in July 2010.


CHL MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 126 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 126
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 39 tranches, and upgraded the
ratings of 4 tranches, from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Countrywide.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-B-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-B-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-HYB5

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-J1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HY3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3X, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4X, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5X, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HY6

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-1X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HYB1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-3-A2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HYB2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-IO, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-IO, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-J2

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-9, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-10, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-11, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-12, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. PO, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2007-HY7

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1B, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1B, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-X, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CLARIS IV: DBRS Confirms Class I-C Swap, Series 29 at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the following ratings on the Classes issued by
Claris IV Limited Series 29. Claris IV Limited Series 29 is
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other asset-backed
securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the Class I-A Swap, Class
I-B Swap, and Class I-C Swap address the probability of breaching
their respective attachment points as defined in the transaction
documents at or prior to their maturity dates.

The actions reflect (a) the deterioration in credit quality of the
underlying collateral pool since the transaction was last assigned
a DBRS rating on June 30, 2009, (b) amendments to the transaction
as of August 11, 2010, and (c) additional subordination to the
Claris IV Limited Series 29 Class I-A Swap, Class I-B Swap, and
Class I-C Swap as of August 11, 2010.

  -- $141,131,204 Class I-A Swap, Series 29 at AA (low)
  -- $30,000,000 Class I-B Swap, Series 29 at BBB (low)
  -- $15,000,000 Class I-C Swap, Series 29 at BB (low)


CLARIS IV: DBRS Confirms Class I-C Swap, Series 28 at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the Class I-B Swap and Class I-C
Swap issued by Claris IV Limited Series 28.  DBRS has withdrawn
the rating on the Class I-A Swap, and confirmed the ratings on
Class I-B Swap, Class I-C Swap. Claris IV Limited Series 28 is
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other asset-backed
securities (ABS).  The DBRS ratings of the Class I-B Swap Class I-
C Swap address the probability of breaching their respective
attachment points as defined in the transaction documents at or
prior to their maturity dates.

The actions reflect (a) the deterioration in credit quality of the
underlying collateral pool since the transaction was last assigned
a DBRS rating on June 30, 2009, (b) amendments to the transaction
as of August 11, 2010, and (c) additional subordination to the
Claris IV Limited Series 28 Class I-B Swap and Class I-C Swap as
of August 11, 2010.  The action on the Class I-A Swap reflects the
amortization in full of the amended swap notional amount.

  -- $0.00 Class I-A Swap, Series 28 at WR*
  -- $58,521,773 Class I-B Swap, Series 28 at BBB (low)
  -- $20,000,000 Class I-C Swap, Series 28 at BB (low)


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2002-CKS4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-CKS4
and placed 10 classes on review for possible downgrade.

The downgrades of Classes N, O and P are due to realized and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $21.6 million loss which has resulted in
a 100% principal loss for Class P and a 1% principal loss for
Class O.

Moody's placed Classes B through M on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly
performing watchlisted loans, interest shortfalls and concerns
about refinance risk in an adverse environment.  One hundred-six
loans, representing 78% of the pool, mature within the next 36
months.

As of the July 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 18% to
$993.6 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 134 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.  Twenty-eight loans, representing
22% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Sixteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $21.6 million loss (29% loss severity on average).
Currently 13 loans, representing 10% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The special servicer has recognized an aggregate
$34.4 million appraisal reduction for 11 of the specially serviced
loans.  The largest specially serviced loan is the McDonald
Investment Center Loan ($26.9 million -- 2.7% of the pool), which
is secured by a 535,005 square foot office building located in
Cleveland, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2009 due to imminent default and is currently real estate
owned (REO).  The remaining 12 loans are secured by a mix of
office, multifamily and industrial properties.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.8 million, affecting Classes M through Q.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and loan modifications.  Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially serviced
loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans, interest shortfalls and the
performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$46.072M Cl. B Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 23, 2006 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$18.429M Cl. C Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on July 9, 2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$30.714M Cl. D Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$16.893M Cl. E Certificate, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded
     to Aa2 (sf)

  -- US$19.965M Cl. F Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to
     A1 (sf)

  -- US$15.357M Cl. G Certificate, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to
     A3 (sf)

  -- US$13.822M Cl. H Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded
     to Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$26.107M Cl. J Certificate, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 29, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$10.75M Cl. K Certificate, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 29, 2002 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$7.679M Cl. L Certificate, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 29, 2002 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$12.285M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Oct. 29, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B1
     (sf)

  -- US$6.143M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on June 26, 2008 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- US$6.07M Cl. O Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on June 26, 2008 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$03M Cl. P Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     June 26, 2008 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 38 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 38
tranches and confirmed ratings of 13 tranches from 11 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Countrywide.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC10

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC11

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC4

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC5

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC6

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC7

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC8

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2B, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OC9

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CWALT INC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 54 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 54
tranches, confirmed the ratings on 6 tranches, and upgraded the
rating on 1 tranche, from 11 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Countrywide.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage loans.
The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating performance
of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions that
remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-HY10

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-HY11

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-HY12

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-HY3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY3

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY4

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY6

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY7C

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY8C

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-HY9

  -- Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes from CWCapital COBALT II Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  S&P removed all of
the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades primarily reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction
following its rating actions on commercial mortgage-backed
securities certificates that collateralize COBALT II.  The
certificates are from six CMBS transactions and total
$53.4 million (7.3% of the total asset balance).  S&P also lowered
its credit estimates on a portion of the CMBS collateral that
Standard & Poor's does not rate ($13.0 million, 1.8%).

The downgrades also reflect S&P's analysis of the deferred
interest affecting classes C through K according to the July 19,
2010 trustee report, as well as the failing overcollateralization
and interest coverage tests noted in the report.

According to the July 19, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* Forty-three CMBS tranches ($481.2 million, 66.1% of the
  collateral pool);

* Seventeen whole loans and senior-interest loans ($222.1 million,
  30.5%);

* Four subordinate-interest loans ($6.6 million, 0.9%); and

* Four CDO tranches ($18.4 million, 2.5%).

COBALT II has exposure to these CMBS transactions that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:

* GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-GG10 (class G; $15.0 million,
  2.1%);

* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
  2004-C1 (class H; $10.0 million, 1.4%); and

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2005-C17 (class
  H; $10.0 million, 1.4%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes 31
defaulted assets:

* 13 loan assets ($123.9 million, 17.0%), 14 CMBS tranches
  ($90.9 million, 12.5%), and four CRE CDO tranches
  ($18.4 million, 2.5%).

Based on information provided by the collateral manager, CWCapital
Investments LLC, and third-party market data providers, Standard &
Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates ranged from 0%
through 100% for the defaulted loan assets.  The defaulted loan
assets are:

* The West Side Terrace senior-interest loan ($30.3 million,
  4.2%);

* The East Tennessee Apartments senior-interest loan ($21.9
  million, 3.0%);

* The Aguilar Apartments senior-interest loan ($15.9 million,
  2.2%);

* The Pala Mesa Resort Hotel senior-interest loan ($13.9 million,
  1.9%);

* The Cluster Park Apartments senior-interest loan ($11.1 million,
  1.5%);

* The Sheraton Denver Tech senior-interest loan ($11.0 million,
  1.5%);

* The Holiday Inn Holyoke senior-interest loan ($10.2 million,
  1.4%);

* The Saratoga Apartments subordinated loan ($3.0 million, 0.4%);

* The Raleys Supermarket senior-interest loan ($2.6 million,
  0.4%);

* The Wesco subordinate loan ($2.5 million, 0.3%);

* The Sweetwater Apartments subordinated loan ($1.0 million,
  0.1%);

* The Dunes at Chesterfield senior-interest loan ($388,971, 0.1%);
  and

* The Wesco subordinate floating loan ($92,400, 0.1%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      CWCapital COBALT II Ltd.
                  Collateralized debt obligations

                              Rating
                              ------
            Class     To                   From
            -----     --                   ----
            A-1A      A                    AA+/Watch Neg
            A-1AR     A                    AA+/Watch Neg
            A-1B      BBB                  A+/Watch Neg
            A-2A      AA                   AAA/Watch Neg
            A-2B      BBB                  A+/Watch Neg
            B         BB+                  A-/Watch Neg
            C         BB-                  BBB+/Watch Neg
            D         B+                   BBB/Watch Neg
            E         B+                   BBB-/Watch Neg
            F         B                    BB+/Watch Neg
            G         B-                   BB+/Watch Neg
            H         CCC+                 BB/Watch Neg
            J         CCC-                 BB-/Watch Neg
            K         CCC-                 B+/Watch Neg


CWCAPITAL COBALT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from CWCapital COBALT I Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on six other classes from the same
transaction.  S&P removed six of the affected ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of COBALT I following its rating actions on certain commercial
mortgage-backed securities certificates that collateralize the
transaction.  The certificates are from six CMBS transactions and
total $33.0 million (8.0% of the total asset balance).  S&P also
lowered S&P's credit estimates on a portion of the CMBS collateral
not rated by Standard & Poor's ($11.5 million, 2.8%).

According to the July 30, 2010, trustee report, the transaction's
current asset pool includes these:

* Forty-nine CMBS tranches ($231.3 million, 56.1% of the
  collateral pool);

* Five whole loans and senior-interest loans ($85.8 million,
  20.8%);

* Seven subordinate-interest loans ($37.7 million, 9.2%);

* Six credit-linked notes ($27.9 million, 6.8%); and

* Six CDO tranches ($29.6 million, 7.2%).

COBALT I has exposure to these CMBS transactions that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:

* GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2003-C1 (classes
  M and N1; $11.7 million, 2.8%);

* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. series
  2004-C1 (classes J and L; $9.2 million, 2.2%); and

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. series 2002-
  C2 (class H; $5.0 million, 1.2%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction includes 25
defaulted assets:

* nine loan assets ($104.4 million, 25.3%), seven CMBS tranches
  ($24.8 million, 6.0%), six credit-linked notes ($27.9 million,
  6.8%), and three CDO tranches ($15.1 million, 3.7%).

Based on information provided by the collateral manager, CWCapital
Investments LLC, and third-party market data providers, Standard &
Poor's estimated asset-specific recovery rates ranging from 0%
through 100% for the defaulted loan assets.  The defaulted loan
assets are:

* The West Side Terrace senior-interest loan ($29.2 million,
  7.1%);

* The Dunes at Chesterfield senior-interest loan ($15.1 million,
  3.7%);

* The Holiday Inn Express Plantation senior-interest loan
  ($14.0 million, 3.4%);

* Four Seasons Town Center subordinate loan ($12.6 million, 3.0%);

* Hilton Garden Inn senior-interest loan ($12.4 million, 3.0%);

* The El Dorado Pointe Apartments subordinated loan ($7.1 million,
  1.7%);

* The Shadow Pines Apartments subordinated loan ($5.6 million,
  1.4%);

* The Brass Mill Center & Commons subordinated loan ($4.4 million,
  1.1%); and

* The Aguilar Apartments subordinated loan ($4.0 million, 1.0%).

According to the trustee report, the transaction is failing three
overcollateralization tests and one interest coverage test.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction and its underlying
assets in accordance with its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     CWCapital COBALT I Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-1       AA+                  AAA/Watch Neg
          B-1       BBB+                 A-/Watch Neg
          B-2       BBB+                 A-/Watch Neg
          C         BB                   BB+/Watch Neg
          D         B+                   BB/Watch Neg

          Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                     CWCapital COBALT I Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                            Rating
                            ------
          Class     To                   From
          -----     --                   ----
          A-2       AA                   AA/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Affirmed

                     CWCapital COBALT I Ltd.
                 Collateralized debt obligations

                         Class     Rating
                         -----     ------
                         E-1       CCC-
                         E-2       CCC-
                         F-1       CCC-
                         F-2       CCC-
                         G         CCC-


CWHEQ REVOLVING: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 13 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 13
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 10 tranches from 13 RMBS
transactions issued by CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consist of home
equity line of credit securitizations.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by financial guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated
at their underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's
guaranty.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, 2007-C

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 57%

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, 2007-G

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 25%

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10% for Group I
    and 14% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-F

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 15% for Group I
    and 20% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-G

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10% for Group I
    and 14% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-H

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 10% for Group I
    and 15% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-K

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 21%

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-L

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 5%

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 B3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-A

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 33%

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-B

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 28% for Group I
    and 35% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-C

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 23% for Group I
    and 31% for Group II

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-D

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 23%

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on March 9, 2009)

Issuer: CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-H

  * Expected Losses (as a % of Original Balance): 32% for Group I
    and 44% for Group II

  -- Cl. 2-A-1A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn March 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 1-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)


EQUIFIRST MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Ratings on Six Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of 6 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from the RMBS transaction
Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1 issued by Equifirst.  The
collateral backing this deal primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Equifirst Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-7, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FORD CREDIT: Fitch Retains 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings concluded that the reduction of the minimum required
transferor's interest percentage, or required pool percentage,
will not impact the outstanding ratings on the Ford Credit
Floorplan Master Owner Trust A, series 2006-4 dealer floorplan
asset-backed securities.

The amendment is enacted by Ford Motor Credit Company, the sponsor
and servicer of FCFMOT A, and removes the required transferor's
interest percentage from the current required level of 4% to 0% of
the note balance, effective.

The outstanding ratings on FCFMOT A, series 2006-4, are listed
below.  The DFP ABS are backed by a revolving pool of dealer
floorplan receivables arising under accounts established by U.S.
retail motor vehicle dealers with FMCC to finance their
inventories of new and used automobiles and light-duty trucks.

FMCC provided Fitch with over three years of historical monthly
dilution data for FCFMOT A, which had not experienced actual
dilutions year to date.  The examination of the data showed that
had there been zero excess cash available to cover potential
dilutions, the dilution levels for the trust would have been
minimal.  Fitch deemed the data provided by FMCC adequate.  Fitch
based its opinion on the analysis of the data, and the minimal
impact of the amendment on the performance of FCFMOT A and
outstanding ratings of the series 2006-4.

Additionally, if the dilutions are not covered by the excess cash
flows in FCFMOT A, the resulting liability becomes a corporate
obligation of FMCC, according to the transaction documents, and
non-payment thereof would constitute an event of default by FMCC.

FCFMOT A, series 2006-4 outstanding ratings:

  -- $2,124,300,000 class A asset-backed notes rated 'A', Outlook
     Stable.

  -- $125,700,000 class B asset-backed notes rated 'BB', Outlook
     Stable.


FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Class D Notes to 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of these notes issued by Franklin CLO I, Limited:

  -- US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Subordinated Secured Notes Due
     May 2012 (current balance of $14,590,895), Upgraded to B2
     (sf); previously on July 22, 2009, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
mainly a result of substantial deleveraging of the transaction
since the previous rating action in July 2009.  In particular, the
Class B Notes and the Class C Notes have been paid in full.  The
Class D Notes have been paid a total of about $1.4 million since
the previous rating action, accounting for roughly 9% of the Class
D Notes' outstanding balance reported in July 2009.  As a result
of the deleveraging, the collateral coverage of the Class D Notes
has increased significantly.  Moody's also notes that the credit
profile of the underlying portfolio has been relatively stable
since the last rating action.  In particular, based on the trustee
report dated July 30, 2010, the weighted average rating factor is
2196 compared to 2225 in June 2009.

The rating action also reflects concerns about incremental losses
arising from a possible liquidation of the collateral should an
event of default occur as a result of a failure to pay interest on
the Class D Notes.  There is currently a considerable shortfall in
the amount of interest proceeds generated to pay the current
interest due on the Class D Notes.  According to the July 30, 2010
trustee report, there is approximately $18 million of assets with
a weighted average spread of 2.173%.  The interest proceeds
generated from these assets do not adequately support the interest
due on $14.6 million of Class D Notes with a spread of 6.25%.  As
a result, on the last two payment dates, a portion of principal
proceeds were used to pay the current interest due on the Class D
Notes.  To the extent that principal collections in a given
payment period are less than the difference between the interest
due on the Class D Notes and the amount of interest proceeds
available, an interest payment default will occur.  Based on the
amortization schedule of the remaining collateral that the trustee
provided, scheduled interest and principal collections available
for the February 2011 payment date will be insufficient to cover
interest due on the Class D Notes.  Accordingly, there is an
increased likelihood that an event of default may occur as a
result of a failure to pay such interest.  As provided in the
CLO's indenture, following the occurrence of an event of default,
a majority of the Class D noteholders may direct the sale and
liquidation of the collateral, thereby exposing the noteholders to
potential losses.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.


Franklin CLO I, Limited, issued on June 29, 2000, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


GE COMMERCIAL: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 19 2004-C2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 19 classes and
downgraded six classes of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C2.
The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans and refinance risk associated
with loans approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Five
loans, representing 3% of the non-defeased pool, mature within the
next two years and have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio less than 1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index
(Herf) remaining within acceptable ranges.  In addition, the pool
benefits from increased subordination resulting from amortization
and loan payoffs.  The pool's outstanding balance has declined by
16% since Moody's last review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to $1.1 billion
from $1.4 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 106 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 42%
of the pool.  Thirteen loans, representing 13% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

The pool includes three loans with underlying ratings,
representing 17% of the outstanding loan balance.  At last review,
the Lake Grove Plaza Loan also had an investment grade underlying
rating.  Due to increased leverage the loan no longer has an
underlying rating and is analyzed as part of the conduit pool.

Twenty-four loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, including two of the top ten loans in the
pool.  The watchlist includes loans which meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council's
(CREFC; formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities Association)
monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring
of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could impact performance.

The pool has experienced a $1.3 million loss (32% loss severity on
average) since securitization.  One loan, representing 1% of the
pool, is currently in special servicing.  This loan is the
Continental Communities -- Rolling Hills MHC Loan ($7.5 million --
0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a manufactured housing
property located in Massillon, Ohio.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing on March 12, 2009 due to maturity default.  The
loan is current and the maturity was extended to October 2010 with
an additional conditional extension to April 2011.  Moody's is
concerned that this loan has a high probability of default and has
recognized a $1.3 million loss (17% expected loss) for the loan.

In addition to recognizing a loss from the specially serviced
loan, Moody's has assumed a high default probability on five loans
representing 5% of the pool and has estimated an aggregate loss of
$17.6 million (31% expected loss based on an overall 66% default
probability) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and 2009 operating
results for 82% and 38%, respectively, of the pool.  Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV ratio is 87% compared to 93% at Moody's last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCR are 1.41X and 1.18X, respectively, compared to
1.33X and 1.05X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of the Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on the potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 31 compared to 53 at last review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Tysons Corner
Center Loan ($88.6 million -- 7.9%), which represents a 27.9%
pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured
by the borrower's interest in a 2.0 million square foot regional
mall located in McLean, Virginia.  The mall is anchored by
Bloomingdale's, Macy's Nordstrom and Lord & Taylor.  The
property's financial performance has improved since securitization
due to additional rental income from a 265,000 square foot
renovation/expansion that was completely in 2007.  The property is
currently 100% leased.  The loan has amortized 5% since last
review.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are
Aaa and 2.27X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 2.22X at last
review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Pacific
Place Loan ($80.3 million -- 7.2%), which is secured by a two-
building mixed use property including retail, office and leased
hotel components.  The property is located in the Union Square
submarket of San Francisco, California.  The two buildings are
referred to as Pac One and Pac Two.  Pac One is an eight-story
property built in 1907 and renovated in 1981 and 1999.  Old Navy
occupies a portion of the ground floor and all of the basement,
second and third floors.  Part of the ground floor as well as
floors five through nine are leased to the 200-room Palomor Hotel
through June 2097.  Pac Two is a 16-story building housing the
subject's office component as well as the Container Store on the
two lower levels.  Pac Two was built in 1907 and renovated in
1999.  As of September 2009, the complex was 100% leased, the same
as at last review.  The loan was interest only for the first two
years and now amortizes on a 360-month schedule.  The loan is
divided into a senior component which is security for the pooled
classes and six subordinate components which are security for non-
pooled Classes PPL-A, PPL-B, PPL-C, PPL-D, PPL-E and PPL-F.  The
loan has amortized 6% since last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.09X at last review.

The third largest loan with an underlying rating is the AFR
Portfolio Loan ($11.8 million -- 1.4%), which represents a 5.9%
pari-passu interest in a first mortgage loan secured by 115
properties located in various states.  The properties consist of
office, operation centers and retail bank branches.  As of
December 2009, the portfolio was 86% leased compared to 90% at
last review.  Six properties have been released from the pool and
31 properties, representing 24% of the loan balance, have defeased
since securitization.  Due to property releases, defeasance and
loan amortization, the loan balance has decreased by approximately
41% since securitization.  Moody's current shadow rating and
stressed DSCR for the senior note are A1 and 1.25X, respectively,
compared to A1 and 1.22X at last review.

The loan that previously had an underlying rating is the Lake
Grove Plaza Loan ($27.0 million -- 2.4%), which is secured by a
251,000 square foot retail center built in 1986 and renovated in
1991 and 2003.  The property is located in Lake Grove, New York,
approximately 40 miles east of New York City.  At securitization,
the largest tenant was Stop & Shop, but it vacated the property in
2008.  Since then, Toys R Us has taken over the vacant space
alongside the other major tenants, DSW Shoe Warehouse, Staples and
Michaels.  As of March 2010, the property was 100% leased which is
the same as at last review.  Property performance has declined due
to decreased revenue and increased expenses.  In addition, Moody's
is concerned about near-term rollover exposure.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 70%
and 1.29X at last review.

The top three largest conduit exposures represent 13% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Prince Building Loan ($65.9 million --
5.9%), which is secured by a 312,570 square foot office and retail
building located in the SoHo submarket of New York City.  The
building was built in 1897 and renovated in 1991.  The 12-story,
Class B office building includes 22,335 square feet of street
level retail space and 312,570 square feet of office space.  The
largest tenant is Scholastic, which occupies 43% of the property's
net rentable area through 2013 and 2018.  The three retail tenants
are Equinox, Forever 21 and Armani.  Although Armani only
represents 4% of the NRA (lease expiration January 2012), it
generates approximately 16% of the property's revenue.  As of
September 2009, the property was 99% leased, the same as at last
review.  The loan as amortized 5% since last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.35X, respectively, compared to 91%
and 1.04X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Princeton Office Loan
($52.1 million -- 4.7%), which is secured by a six Class A
office buildings located in the 10-building College Park Research
Center in Plainsboro Township, New Jersey.  The complex was built
in phases between 1976 and 1981 and is encumbered by a ground
lease through 2037 with 20 years of options available.  As of
December 2009, the property was 93% leased compared to 92% at last
review and 85% at securitization.  The loan has amortized 5% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 97% and 1.03X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Stonebriar Plaza Loan ($28.8 million
-- 2.6%), which is secured by a 182,147 square foot retail
property located in Frisco, Texas.  As of February 2010, the
property was 67% leased compared to 97% at securitization.  The
property's performance has declined since last review due to the
occupancy declining.  Moody's believes that there is a high
probability that this loan may default prior to loan maturity.
The loan matures in 2014.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 159%
and 0.61X, respectively, compared to 114% and 0.85X at last
review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- Class A-2, $46,766,012, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     assigned Aaa (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class A-3, $73,388,000, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     assigned Aaa (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class A-4, $575,549,000, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     assigned Aaa (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class A-1-A, $211,231,446, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     assigned Aaa (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class X-1, Notional, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     assigned Aaa (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class X-2, Notional, affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     assigned Aaa (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class B, $41,293,000, affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously
     assigned Aa2 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class C, $17,205,000, affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously
     assigned Aa3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class D, $25,807,000 affirmed at A2 (sf); previously assigned
     A2 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class E, $15,485,000 affirmed at A3 (sf); previously assigned
     A3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class F, $18,926,000 affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously
     assigned Baa1 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class G, $17,205,000 affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously
     assigned Baa2 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class H, $18,925,000 affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously
     assigned Baa3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class J, $10,323,000 downgraded to B1(sf) from Ba1;
     previously assigned Ba1 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class K, $8,603,000 downgraded to B3 (sf) from Ba2;
     previously assigned Ba2 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class L, $6,882,000 downgraded to Caa2 (sf) from Ba3;
     previously assigned Ba3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class M, $5,161,000 downgraded to Caa3 (sf) from B1;
     previously assigned B1 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class N, $5,162,000 downgraded to Ca (sf) from B2; previously
     assigned B2 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class O, $3,441,000 downgraded to C (sf) from B3; previously
     assigned B3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class PPL-A, $3,041,356, affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously
     assigned Baa3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class PPL-B, $3,041,356, affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously
     assigned Ba1 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class PPL-C, $4,671,088, affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously
     assigned Ba2 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class PPL-D, $5,990,974, affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously
     assigned Ba3 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class PPL-E, $3,759,336, affirmed at B1 (sf); previously
     assigned B1 (sf) on April 1, 2004

  -- Class PPL-F, $4,553,140, affirmed at B2 (sf); previously
     assigned B2 (sf) on April 1, 2004


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Six 2005-FL3 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded six classes from Greenwich Capital
Commercial Funding Corp. commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-FL3.  While Fitch expects minimal, if
any, losses to the pooled certificates in the base case, the
downgrades are the result of Fitch's prospective views regarding
commercial real estate values and cash flow decline.  In addition,
the loan has transferred to special servicing due to the inability
to refinance at maturity.  The Negative Rating Outlooks reflect
additional sensitivity analysis related to further negative credit
migration of the underlying collateral.

The remaining loan in the transaction is the $45 million Lowell
Hotel loan ($30 million A Note and $15 million non pooled B Note).
In addition, there is $15 million in mezzanine debt held outside
the trust.  The loan is collateralized by a luxury hotel in New
York, NY.  Under Fitch's updated analysis, the loan was modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress, as the loan has transferred to special servicing.  In this
scenario, Fitch's analysis was based on servicer provided
financial information.  Fitch analyzed servicer reported operating
statements and STR Reports, in addition to other information
received from the master servicer, as the loan recently
transferred to the special servicer.

The loan is collateralized by a 17-story full-service luxury hotel
located on 63rd Street between Madison and Park Avenues in New
York City.  There are 70 rooms with a high percentage of suites
(47 rooms/67% of room count) and suites with fireplaces (33
rooms/47% of room count).  Room sizes range from 400 square feet
(sf) to 2,000 sf.  Amenities include two restaurants, the Post
House located on the ground floor and the Pembroke Room located on
the second floor.

The loan transferred to special servicing Aug. 10, 2010, due to
imminent default when the borrower indicated that they would be
unable to pay off the loan at the final maturity date Sept.  1,
2010.  As the loan just transferred, there is no information yet
on a possible workout strategy.

Property performance has declined.  While RevPAR remains
relatively stable compared to issuance levels, there has been a
significant decline in net operating income.  As of year end (YE)
2009, the servicer reported NOI has declined 43% since YE 2008 and
20% since issuance.  As of the June 2010 STR report, the
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 60.1%, $845, and $507,
respectively, compared to issuance levels (as of trailing 12
months October 2005) of 81.8%, $625 and $511, respectively.
However, the hotel continues to outperform its competitive set.
As of June 2010, the competitive set levels were 54.9%, $683, and
$375, respectively.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
Recovery Ratings to these pooled and non-pooled certificates:

  -- $12.2 million class M to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB+';
  -- $5.9 million class H-LH to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BBB+';
  -- $3.9 million class K-LH to 'CCC'/RR1' from 'BBB';
  -- $4 million class M-LH to 'CCC'/RR6 from 'BBB-';
  -- $1.2 million class N-LH to 'CCC/RR6' from 'BBB-'.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns a
Rating Outlook to this pooled certificate:

  -- $5.1 million class L to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch affirms and assigns Rating Outlooks to these pooled
certificates:

  -- $2 million class H at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $6.7 million class J at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $4.4 million class K at 'A+'; Outlook Negative.

Classes A-1 through G, X-1, and various non-pooled classes related
to individual loans have paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate commercial mortgage
backed security loan pools are concentrated and similar in
composition to CREL CDO pools.  In many cases, the CMBS notes are
senior portions of notes held in CDO transactions.  The assets are
generally transitional in nature, frequently underwritten with pro
forma income assumptions that have not materialized as expected.
Overrides to this methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis
if the property specific performance warranted an alternative
analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

In addition to the CREL CDO methodology, Fitch reviewed the
transaction in conjunction with its 'Rating U.S. Single-Borrower
Commercial Mortgage Transactions,' as there is one remaining loan.
This review included reviewing insurance requirements and borrower
structure.  As there is no current criteria for assigning loss
severity ratings to single-borrower deals, none were assigned to
this transaction's classes.


GS MORTGAGE: Moody's Assigns Ratings on 2010-C1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to
securities issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II 2010-
C1.  The pool consists of 23 loans.  The largest loan is
$99.9 million or 12.7% of the pool balance, and the ten largest
loans represent 75.8% of the pool balance.  The average loan size
is $34.3 million (4.3% of the pool balance).  The provisional
ratings issued on July 30, 2010, have been replaced with these
definitive ratings:

Issuer: GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II

Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1

  -- Cl. A-1, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. X, Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- Cl. B, Assigned Aa2 (sf)
  -- Cl. C, Assigned A2 (sf)
  -- Cl. D, Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  -- Cl. E, Assigned B2 (sf)

The ratings are primarily based on the quality of the collateral,
the credit enhancement furnished by the subordinate tranches, and
the structural and legal integrity of the transaction.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the score assigned to the U.S. Large Loan CMBS sector.  Moody's V
Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of available
credit information and the potential variability around the
various inputs to a rating determination.


HASCO 2006-WMC1: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 67 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 67
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 15 tranches and upgraded the
rating of two tranches from 16 RMBS transactions issued by HASCO.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien, fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Subprime RMBS Loss Projection
Update: February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses
on pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool
(typically 20% for subprime pools).

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool.

The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 20.20%.

If current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To account for
that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a factor ranging
from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging from less than
2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.  Delinquencies for
subsequent years and ultimate expected losses are projected using
the approach described in the methodology publication.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HASCO 2006-WMC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-I1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-NC1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-NC2

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-NC1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT3

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2006-OPT4

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-HE1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-HE2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-NC1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-OPT1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2007-WF1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


HOUSING FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2006B-2 Notes to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the rating assigned to the Housing Finance
Authority of Miami-Dade County, Home Ownership Mortgage Revenue
Bonds, Series 2006B-2 to B3 from Ba3 and removed bonds from
Watchlist for Possible Downgrade.  The downgrade and removal from
Watchlist for Possible Downgrade of the 2006B-2 bonds is based on
a review of the second mortgage loans securing the 2006B-2 bonds.

Moody's decision to downgrade the rating on the 2006B-2 bonds was
based on the struggling housing market in the Miami-Dade MSA and
the credit characteristics of the second mortgage pools for bonds.
All of the second mortgages are 0% coupon bonds, with 30 year
terms that will begin to amortize five years after issuance and
were issued in connection with the issuance of a first mortgages
that were guaranteed by either Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or GNMA-all
of which have strict underwriting guidelines-and securitized into
Mortgaged Backed Securities.  As a result, the credit
characteristics of the second mortgagees are more similar to Prime
borrowers.

However, given that the pool of first loans with second loan
mortgages is small at 57, the fact that approximately 33% of the
loans are delinquent by more than 60+ days, including one loan
that has been foreclosed and 4 that are in foreclosure and the
continuing, and worsening housing price declines in the Miami-Dade
area are factors that represent a significant deterioration in
credit quality of the transaction from Moody's last assessment in
September, 2008.

                What Could Change the Rating -- Up

Significant and lasting improvement in the delinquency and
foreclosure rate of the second loan pool and price appreciation in
the Miami-Dade metropolitan area.

               What Could Change the Rating -- Down

An increase in the delinquency and foreclosure rate of the second
loan pool.

The date of the last rating action was December 10, when Moody's
placed the Series 2006 B-2 bonds on Watchlist for Possible
Downgrade.

The Series 2006 B-2's rating was assigned by evaluating factors
believed to be relevant to the credit profile of the instrument
such as i) the business risk and competitive position of the
issuer versus others within its industry or sector, ii) the
capital structure and financial risk of the issuer, iii) the
projected performance of the issuer over the near to intermediate
term, and iv) the issuer's history of achieving consistent
operating performance and meeting budget or financial plan goals.
These attributes were compared against other issues both within
and outside of the Trust's core peer group and their ratings are
believed to be comparable to ratings assigned to other issuers of
similar credit risk.


HUDSON MEZZANINE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Class S to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Hudson Mezzanine Funding
2006-2, Ltd.:

* US$7,900,000 Class S Floating Rate Notes due 2012 (current
  balance of $3,077,058), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
  December 30, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-2, Ltd., issued on February 8, 2007,
is a static synthetic collateralized debt obligation referencing a
portfolio consisting entirely of residential mortgage-backed
securities issued in 2005.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the reference portfolio, as
well as the diminished amount of interest proceeds being received
by the Issuer.  Credit deterioration of the collateral pool is
observed through a decline in the average credit rating (as
measured by an increase in the weighted average rating factor), an
increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities, and failure
of the coverage tests, among other measures.  All the underlying
assets in the reference portfolio now have a Moody's rating of
"C".  In addition, the Class S Notes are currently not receiving
their full monthly amortizing principal amount due to the
diminished interest proceeds received by the Issuer.

Moody's continues to monitor this transaction using primarily the
methodologies and their supplements for ABS CDOs as described in
the publications below:

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs (August 2009)

  -- Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
     Default (November 2009)

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.  In addition to
the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative
factors are part of rating committee considerations.  These
qualitative factors include the structural protections in each
transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market
environment, the legal environment, and specific documentation
features.  All information available to rating committees,
including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's
analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the
nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may
influence the final rating decision.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 11 2008-C2 Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 11 classes and
affirmed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-C2.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses
for the pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from
loans in special servicing and interest shortfalls.  The
affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and the
Herfindahl, remaining within acceptable ranges.

On July 29, 2010, Moody's placed 11 classes of this transaction on
review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's
review of this transaction.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the July 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 3% to $1.1 billion
from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 78 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 54% of
the pool.  No loans have defeased.  Two loans, representing 3% of
the pool, have investment grade underlying ratings.

Twenty-four loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool resulting in a
$11.0 million realized loss (45% loss severity).  Five loans,
representing 21% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is The Promenade Shops at Dos
Lagos Loan ($125.2 million - 11.1%), which is secured by a 350,000
square foot entertainment lifestyle center located in Corona,
California.  The center was 95% leased at securitization, but has
experienced significant tenant issues due to the downturn in the
economy.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
November 2008 due to imminent default and is now real estate owned
(REO).  The property was appraised at $169.7 million at
securitization.  A January 2010 appraisal valued the property at
$28.5 million, leading the master servicer to recognize a
$108.1 million appraisal reduction in May 2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Westin Portfolio
Loan ($104.0 million -- 9.2%), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $209.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by a 487-unit full service hotel located in Tucson,
Arizona and a 412-unit full service hotel located in Hilton Head,
South Carolina.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
October 2008 due to imminent default and is now 90+ days
delinquent.  The properties were appraised at $303.8 million at
securitization.  A September 2009 appraisal valued the properties
at $142.0 million.  The master servicer recognized a $43.7 million
appraisal reduction in August 2009.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a retail
center, self storage facility and an office property.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $157.3 million loss (66% expected loss on
average) on the specially serviced loans.  The losses for the two
largest loans in special servicing are based on a discount to the
most recent appraisals.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, representing 4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate $12.5 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating
action recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and
magnitude of loss from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes A-J through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$9.9 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with year-end or partial year 2009 operating
statements for 91% of the conduit pool.  Moody's weighted average
LTV for the conduit pool is 117% compared to 139 % at last review.

Moody's conduit actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.12X and 0.93X,
respectively, compared to 1.04X and 0.86X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf score of 20 compared to 23 at last review.

The two loans with underlying ratings comprise 3% of the pool.
The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Two Democracy
Plaza Loan ($31.0 million -- 2.7%), which is secured by a 273,000
square foot office building located in Bethesda, Maryland.  The
largest tenant is the National Institute of Health (a U.S.
government-related tenant; Moody's senior unsecured rating Aaa --
stable outlook), which leases 83% of the net rentable area through
October 2010 and September 2012.  The property was 99% leased as
of January 2010, compared to 98% last review.  Moody's current
underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.79X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Lofts at
New Roc Loan ($4.9 million -- 0.4%), which is secured by a 98-unit
cooperative multifamily property located in New Rochelle, New
York.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR are Aaa
and 2.56X, respectively, compared to Aaa and 2.53X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 17.3% of
the pool.  The largest loan is the Block at Orange Loan
($110.0 million -- 9.7%), which represents a pari passu interest
in a $220.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by
700,000 square foot retail entertainment center located in Orange,
California.  The property is anchored by an AMC Entertainment
movie theater, Dave & Buster's, and Vans Skate Park.  The property
was 86% leased as of December 2009 compared to 83% at last review.
Despite the increased occupancy, property performance has declined
due to a decrease in rental income.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 137% and 0.69X, respectively, compared to 135% and 0.68X at
last review.

The second largest performing conduit loan is the Tupper Building
Loan ($43.9 million -- 3.9%), which is secured by a 97,000 square
foot medical office property located in Boston, Massachusetts.
The property is 100% leased to New England Medical Center
Hospitals through September 2017.  The loan is interest-only for
its entire five year term and matures in October 2012.  Although
property performance has been stable since securitization, Moody's
analysis reflects a stressed cash flow due to current market
softness and Moody's concerns about single tenant exposure.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 136% and 0.80X, respectively,
compared to 122% and 0.88X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Station Casinos Headquarters
Loan ($42.3 million -3.7%), which is secured by a 138,000 square
foot office building located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The building
is 100% leased to Station Casinos under a 20-year lease through
October 2027 and serves at its corporate headquarters.  The
property is located adjacent to the Red Rocks Casino, which is
owned and operated by Stations Casinos.  Station Casinos Inc.
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on July 28, 2009.  The
current owners recently won formal approval from a federal
bankruptcy judge to keep ownership of most of the company subject
to confirmation of the reorganization plan court in late August.
Per the servicer, the tenant is requesting rent concession.
Moody's analysis reflects a stressed cash flow based on Moody's
expectation that the rental levels for the property will be
reduced.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 152% and 0.82X,
respectively, compared to 146% and 0.85X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$2.090469M Cl. A-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on May 29, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$68.126000M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on May 29, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$105.514000M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on May 29, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$54.460000M Cl. A-SB Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on May 29, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$354.554000M Cl. A-4 Certificate, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$145.000000M Cl. A-4FL Certificate, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$64.352885M Cl. A-1A Certificate, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$116.589000M Cl. A-M Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$61.209000M Cl. A-J Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$14.574000M Cl. B Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$14.574000M Cl. C Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10.201000M Cl. D Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10.202000M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$13.116000M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$11.659000M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on July 29, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$16.031000M Cl. H Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$14.574000M Cl. J Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$14.573000M Cl. K Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$8.745000M Cl. L Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$4.372000M Cl. M Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$5.829000M Cl. N Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$4.372000M Cl. P Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$2.915000M Cl. Q Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$4.372000M Cl. T Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     May 29, 2008 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2003-C1 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C1 and
placed nine classes on review for possible downgrade.

The downgrades of Classes L, M, N and P are due to realized and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $37.9 million loss which resulted in a
100% principal loss for Classes M, N, and P and a 67% principal
loss for Class L.  Moody's expects additional losses from the
loans in special servicing.

Moody's placed Classes B through K on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly
performing watchlisted loans and interest shortfalls.

As of the July 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 22% to
$853.6 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 92 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 41% of the pool.  Twenty-three loans, representing
23% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S.
Government securities.

Thirteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate $37.9 million loss (81% loss severity on average).
Currently six loans, representing 6% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the 200-220
West Germantown Pike Loan ($14.7 million -- 1.7% of the pool),
which is secured by a 98,000 square foot two-story office building
and a 17,000 square foot one-story office building located in
Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in January 26, 2010 due to a monetary default
and is in foreclosure.  The remaining five loans are secured by a
mix of office, multifamily and retail properties.  The special
servicer has recognized an aggregate $28.5 million appraisal
reduction for six of the specially serviced loans.

As of the most recent remittance date, the transaction has
experienced unpaid accumulated interest shortfalls totaling
$1.1 million affecting Classes K through NR.  Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, appraisal reductions,
extraordinary trust expenses and loan modifications.  Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls because of the high exposure to specially serviced
loans.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced, watchlisted loans and interest shortfalls as well as the
performance of the overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$34.7M Cl. B Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 28, 2006 Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf)

  -- US$10.676M Cl. C Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on April 28, 2006 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$32.031M Cl. D Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on July 31, 2008 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$14.68M Cl. E Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on July 31, 2008 Upgraded to
     Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$17.35M Cl. F Certificate, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on July 31, 2008 Upgraded to
     A2 (sf)

  -- US$17.35M Cl. G Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 28, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$12.011M Cl. H Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 28, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$16.015M Cl. J Certificate, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on April 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$10.677M Cl. K Certificate, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on April 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to B2 (sf)

  -- US$2.179M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on April 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$0 Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     April 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$0 Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     April 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- US$0 Cl. P Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     April 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)


LEAF RECEIVABLES: DBRS Assigns Class E Notes at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS has  assigned provisional ratings to the following notes
issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 4, LLC:

  -- Class A Notes rated AAA
  -- Class B Notes rated AA
  -- Class C Notes rated 'A'
  -- Class D Notes rated BBB
  -- Class E Notes rated BB


LONG BEACH: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 5 tranches
from 5 RMBS transactions issued by Long Beach and WaMu.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates, WaMu Series 2007-HE1 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates, WaMu Series 2007-HE2 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates, WaMu Series 2007-HE3 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A5, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates, WaMu Series 2007-HE4 Trust

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


M-2 SPC: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Series 2006-D Notes to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
rating on M-2 SPC Series 2006-D, a corporate synthetic obligation
referencing a managed portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

  -- EUR5,000,000 Fixed Rate Notes due 2012, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Feb. 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the rated tranche experiencing severe losses due to credit events
since inception on Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal
National Mortgage Association, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,
Washington Mutual Inc., Kaupthing Bank Hf, Idearc Inc., General
Growth Properties Inc., RH Donnelley Corp., CIT Group Inc., and
Ambac Assurance Corporation.  Realized losses on the tranche are
already above 50% of the tranche size.  Although the final
recovery price for Ambac is yet to be determined, any recovery
less than 50% will result in the tranche losing the remainder of
its principal amount.  As the ISDA auction protocol for Ambac
Assurance Corporate resulted in a final price of 20%, a final
recovery price above 50% seems unlikely.  As a result, Moody's
expects that the tranche will suffer a 100% loss.


MAGNETITE V: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Magnetite V CLO, Limited:

  -- US$270,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
     2015 (current outstanding balance of $176,975,793), Upgraded
     to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 10, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3
     (sf);

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
     on July 10, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf).

  -- US$19,000,000 Class C Third Priority Floating Rate Deferrable
     Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 10,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf);

  -- US$11,000,000 Class D Fourth Priority Floating Rate
     Deferrable Notes Due 2015 (current outstanding balance of
     $10,296,898), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on July 10,
     2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from a significant increase in the overcollateralization
of the notes due to delevering and improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since the last rating action
in July 2009.

Moody's notes that the transaction benefited from the substantial
delevering of the Class A notes, which have been paid down by
approximately $80MM since the last rating action, accounting for
roughly 31% of the total Class A notes' outstanding balance
reported in June 2009.  A substantial proportion of the delevering
is attributable to collateral sales and principal prepayments on
the underlying loans.  Moody's expects delevering to continue as
a result of the end of the deal's reinvestment period in October
2008.  As a result of the delevering, the overcollateralization
ratios have increased significantly since the rating action in
July 2009.  In particular, based on the trustee report, dated
July 21, 2010, the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 132.42%, 118.97%,
108.51%, and 103.57%, respectively, versus the June 2009 levels
of 120.70%, 111.97%, 104.77%, and 101.01%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.
The Class D overcollateralization ratio has increased partly due
to the diversion of excess interest to delever the Class D notes
as a result of Class D overcollateralization test failure.  The
outstanding balance of the Class D notes has been reduced by about
$2 million including $1.3 million of deferred interest on the last
payment date in April 2010.  Moody's notes that the Class D notes
are no longer deferring interest and all deferred interest has
been repaid.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor).  As of the latest trustee report,
dated July 21, 2010, the weighted average rating factor is 2768
compared to 2924 in June 2009.  Additionally, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to about $3.6MM from
approximately $10.3MM in June 2009.  Due to the impact of revised
and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review
(2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from
the trustee's reported numbers.

Finally, Moody's notes that the portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes.  Based on the latest trustee report, the percentage of
these securities has increased from 1.4% in June 2009 to 5.4%
currently.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Magnetite V CLO, Limited, issued in September 2003, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Junks Ratings on Various Series of Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'CCC'
from 'BB' on the $26 million series 2004A and 2004B bonds issued
for Northern Berkshire Healthcare, Massachusetts and $3.2 million
series 1996C bonds issued for North Adams Regional Hospital by the
Massachusetts Health & Educational Facilities Authority.

The 'CCC' rating reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of NBH's
significant depletion of liquidity in less than two years coupled
with high debt levels, escalating losses in 2009 and 2010 after
two years of close to breakeven performance, soft volumes and
challenging payor mix.  Also considered in Standard & Poor's
rating analysis is the service area's small size and a local
economy that relies on tourism, which has been hurt by the current
recession.

"The negative outlook reflects S&P's concern about the
organization's ability to return to a positive cash flow quickly
enough to avoid default," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Cynthia Keller Macdonald.  "S&P will likely assign a lower rating
if NBH defaults on its payments to the trustee or bondholders,"
said Ms. Keller Macdonald.

Standard & Poor's does not believe a higher rating is likely in
the near term, although if NBH is able to demonstrate a multiyear
trend of improved operations at a level that allows it to meet its
bond covenants, it would consider a higher rating.  Standard &
Poor's will also reevaluate the rating if NBH enters into an
affiliation agreement with another health care provider or if
there are any changes to the existing debt structure.

NBH recently completed the sale of Sweetwood (a 70-unit retirement
community) and Sweet Brook (a 166-staffed bed skilled-nursing
facility), two long-term-care facilities operated by its
subsidiary, Northern Berkshire Community Services.  The facilities
were sold on Aug. 15 to CareOne, a long-term-care system based in
New Jersey, which assumed control of the facilities, employees,
and all entrance-fee-refund liabilities, but not the $17 million
outstanding long-term debt and notes payable.

In 2009, debt as a percent of capitalization was more than 100%
due to negative unrestricted net assets and the debt burden was
high at 5.6% of revenue.


MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH: S&P Raises Rating on 1998 Debt From 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its underlying rating to
'BBB-' from 'BB+' on Massachusetts Health & Educational Facilities
Authority's series 1998 debt issued for Massachusetts Eye and Ear
Infirmary based on the organization's overall improved strategic
direction, significant increase in liquidity from a legal
judgment, and management's plan to minimize operating losses in
future years.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's assigned its
'BBB-' long-term rating to the authority's series 2010 revenue
bonds issued for MEEI.

Standard & Poor's based its previous speculative-grade 'BB+'
rating on MEEI's persistent operating losses, challenges in
growing its business, and uncertainty surrounding future capital
plans.  With a new CEO in place since 2007, however, management is
focusing on volume growth, increased alliances with Boston's major
academic medical centers, and market share growth through
competition and improved patient access.

Financial and operating factors supporting the 'BBB-' rating
include MEEI's boost in liquidity to a balance of $81.7 million,
or 133 days' cash on hand; reduced operating losses through the
fiscal 2010 interim period ended June 30, 2010; and significant
utilization growth through the fiscal 2010 interim period.
Standard & Poor's believes that much of MEEI's capacity to
maintain the current rating in the future depends on its ability
to limit financial operating losses as planned, generate
sufficient cash flow to maintain an adequate level of liquidity,
and successfully funding its master facilities plan based on its
current projections.

The stable outlook reflects Standard & Poor's view that MEEI's
renewed focus will likely be favorable for the organization and
that its recent boost in liquidity allows for a cushion during
MEEI's capital transition.

"S&P expects that MEEI will realize its financial targets over the
one- to two-year horizon of this outlook period, maintain its
balance of unrestricted reserves, and not issue any additional
debt," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jennifer Soule.
"However, if MEEI's operating losses were to grow significantly,
liquidity were to significantly decline, or the organization
entered into another large debt issuance, a negative outlook or a
lower rating may be warranted," said Ms. Soule.

A higher rating is unlikely during the outlook period as MEEI's
capital spending plans will prevent the overall financial growth
required to achieve the 'BBB' rating level.

Proceeds from MEEI's 2010 bond issuance will fund renovation and
improvement of existing space located at MEEI's main clinical
building and planning costs associated with the relocation and new
construction of research space at its Cambridge Street location.
MEEI will also acquire capital equipment for use in its main
clinical building.

MEEI operates a 42-bed hospital specializing in the treatment of,
and teaching and research related to, disorders of the eye, ear,
nose, throat, and neck.  MEEI is located in downtown Boston and is
the principal teaching hospital of Harvard Medical School.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 11 2007-IQ14 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded 16 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-IQ14.  The downgrades are due to higher expected
losses from the pool resulting from realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced and poorly performing loans,
interest shortfalls and refinance risk associated with loans
maturing in an adverse environment.  Seventy-two loans,
representing 29.4% of the pool mature within the next 36 months.
Sixty-seven of these loans, representing 28.7% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The confirmation and affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.

Moody's placed 17 classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on August 5, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 15, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $4.8 billion
from $4.9 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 421 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
40% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any defeased loans or
loans with underlying ratings.

One hundred twenty-five loans, representing 25% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage
Securities Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a
$6.3 million aggregate loss (48% loss severity on average).
Currently, there are 40 loans, representing 27% of the pool, in
special servicing, including the pool's first, fourth and eighth
largest loans.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Beacon
Seattle & DC Portfolio Loan ($775.0 million -- 16% of the pool),
which represents a pari passu interest in a $2.7 billion first
mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 20 office properties
located in Washington, Virginia and Washington, DC.  The buildings
range from 103,000 to 1.1 million square feet and total 9.8
million square feet.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in April 2010 for imminent default but the loan has
remained current.  The portfolio was 88% leased as of December
2009.  The borrower is a seeking loan modification.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the is the New York
City Apartment Portfolio ($195.0 million -- 4.0%), which is
secured by 37 multifamily properties (1,299 units) located in East
Harlem, New York.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in September 2008 due to the Voluntary Administrative Receivership
filing of the loan's U.K.-based guarantors, Insureprofit Limited
and Starlight Investments Limited.  Performance has been below
original expectations as the conversion of rent regulated units to
market rents is proceeding at a slower pace than originally
projected.  The $5.0 million interest reserve that was established
at securitization was depleted in June 2009 and the loan is now in
monetary default.  In addition to the first mortgage loan, there
is a $20.0 million mezzanine loan secured by a pledge of equity
interests in the borrower which is also currently in payment
default.  The loan is in foreclosure.

The third largest specially serviced loan is City View Center Loan
($81.0 million -- 1.7%), which is secured by a 506,000 square foot
retail center located in Garfield Heights, Ohio.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing on November 12, 2008 due to a
monetary default.  The largest tenant, Wal-Mart, leased 29% of the
GLA through 2027, but vacated in September 2008 because of
concerns about environmental issues at the property.  The property
had previously been utilized as a quarry and later as a landfill
that ceased operations in the 1970's.  The landfill was
subsequently capped and a gas extraction system was installed.
The property was operating a remediation program under the
supervision of the Ohio EPA, which filed a suit in July 2008
against the developer and borrower over alleged failures to comply
with EPA provisions.  The litigation was settled in December 2008
and a consent order had been entered into which required the
previous owner/developer of the property to install supplementary
gas extraction and monitoring systems.  The developer began the
project, but filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2009 and all work
appears to have ceased.  The most recent appraisal was completed
in February 2009 and valued the property at $22.3 million
(compared to $103.4 million at securitization), leading the master
servicer to recognize a $66.3 million appraisal reduction in
August 2009.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
multifamily, industrial, retail, office and hotel properties.
Moody's estimates a $451.4 million aggregate loss from the
specially serviced loans (35% loss severity on average).

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $215.9 million appraisal
reduction for 22 of the specially serviced loans.  As a result of
special servicing fees, appraisal reductions and other trust
expenses, the transaction is experiencing interest shortfalls.  As
of the most recent remittance date, classes H through S have
experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $12.3 million.
Moody's expects that interest shortfalls are likely to increase
because of the pool's exposure to specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 33 loans
representing approximately 16% of the pool.  These loans are
either on the watchlist due to declines in performance or mature
within the next 36 months and have a Moody's stressed DSCR less
than 1.0X.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $149.9 million loss
from these loans (19% expected loss on average based on a weighted
average 52% default probability).  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of losses from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full and partial-year 2009 operating
results for 96% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 115% compared to
123% at Moody's last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.28X and 0.94X, respectively, compared to
1.23X and 0.88X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 27 at last review.

The three largest conduit loans represent 13% of the pool.  The
largest conduit loan is the Tabor Center and U.S. Bank Tower Loan
($300.0 million -- 6.1%), which is secured by two Class A office
properties totaling 1.2 million square feet located in downtown
Denver, Colorado.  The two properties were 80% leased as of
December 2009 compared to 82% at last review.  Moody's recognizes
a high default probability for this loan because of the declines
in property performance and near-term loan maturity.  The loan
matures in April 2012.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 180% and
0.53X, respectively, compared to 180% and 0.55X at last review.

The second largest loan is the PDG Portfolio Loan ($212.0 million
-- 4.4%), which is secured by 11 retail properties located in the
Phoenix, Arizona MSA.  The properties range from 35,000 to 288,000
square feet and total 1.5 million square feet.  At securitization,
several of the properties were leased at below market occupancy
levels.  It was anticipated that the occupancy of these properties
would increase, but this has not been achieved.  The portfolio was
71% leased as of December 2009 compared to 77% at last review.
The loan is on master servicer's watchlist due to decrease in DSCR
and the bankruptcy of Movie Gallery, the parent of Hollywood
Video.  Hollywood Video occupied 6% of the portfolio's gross
leasable area (GLA) at securitization.  The loan is interest-only
for its entire 10-year term.  Moody's recognizes a high default
probability for this loan because of poor performance.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 172% and 0.6X, respectively, compared to
163% and 0.63X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Layton Hills Mall Loan
($102.6 million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
727,600 square foot regional mall located in Layton, Utah.  The
property is anchored by Macy's and JC Penny and was 86% leased as
of December 2009.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and
0.89X, respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$72.1M Cl. A-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$682.3M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$500M Cl. A-2FL Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$53.8M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$140.8M Cl. A-AB Certificate, Confirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$1062.242M Cl. A-4 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$150M Cl. A-5FL Certificate, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$714.4M Cl. A-1A Certificate, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$420.487M Cl. A-M Certificate, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$70M Cl. A-MFL Certificate, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$200M Cl. A-J Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$192.389M Cl. A-JFL Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$18.394M Cl. B Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$79.704M Cl. C Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$55.179M Cl. D Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$12.263M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$42.917M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$42.918M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$73.573M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$49.049M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$55.179M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$18.394M Cl. L Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$12.262M Cl. M Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$24.524M Cl. N Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$12.262M Cl. O Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$12.262M Cl. P Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$18.394M Cl. Q Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Sept. 3, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     June 26, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 257 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 257
tranches, upgraded the rating on one tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of 8 tranches from 24 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Morgan Stanley.

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed-rate and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential
mortgage loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly
deteriorating performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with
macroeconomic conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Ten tranches from 4 different transactions are wrapped by MBIA
Insurance Corporation (rated B3).  For securities insured by a
financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of
(i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-11

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-P, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-12XS

  -- Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-13ARX

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-15XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-4-B, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-5-B, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-6-B, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-16AX

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-17XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2-W, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-3-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5-W, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-P, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-P, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 7-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-5AR

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-6AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-P, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-P, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-8AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 4-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 5-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-9AR

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-W, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-W, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-21, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-22, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-23, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-11AR

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-8, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-14AR

  -- Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1XS

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2AX

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-3XS

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3-A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-A, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-SS, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3-SS, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-SS, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5AX

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-6XS

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-SS, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-2-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3-SS, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A-3-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-SS, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1-M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2-SS, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3-SS, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4-SS, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5-SS, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6-SS, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-7-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-7AX

  -- Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-8XS

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1-W, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3-W, Currently at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-9, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-10, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-11, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-12, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-13, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-15, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-16, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-17, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-18, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-19, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-20, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five 1999-LIFE1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 1999-LIFE1.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining collateral
in the pool, the deal structure, and the interest shortfalls that
have affected the trust.  The transaction's asset pool currently
comprises seven loans.  The largest loan in the pool represents
57.4% of the remaining balance, and the top three loans comprise
79.1% of the remaining balance.  Three ($10.9 million, 25.6%) of
the remaining seven loans are with the special servicer, and three
loans ($7.2 million, 17.0%) are on the master servicer's watchlist
due to low debt service coverage.  Furthermore, as of the July
2010 remittance report, the trust had experienced interest
shortfalls of $19,564 during the monthly remittance period and had
amassed cumulative interest shortfalls of $1,983,302.  The
downgrades reflect a reduction of available interest to the rated
classes caused by these shortfalls and the potential that these
classes may short in the future given the portion of collateral
that is currently specially serviced (25.6% of the pool).

The interest shortfalls reported for the July remittance period
primarily relate to the Renaissance Plaza loan ($5.2 million total
exposure, 12.2%), one of three loans with the special servicer,
Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Servicing.  There is an appraisal
reduction amount of $1.1 million in effect against this asset.
The July 2010 remittance report noted that a $10,101 appraisal
subordinate entitlement reduction has been applied to this asset.
S&P discusses the asset further below.

                     Specially Serviced Assets

As of the July 2010 remittance report, three ($10.9 million,
25.6%) assets in the pool were with the special servicer.  Two
($6.6 million, 15.5%) of these assets are classified as matured
balloon loans, and the remaining asset ($4.3 million, 10.2%) is in
its grace period.  There is an ARA of $1.1 million in effect
against the largest specially serviced asset.

The Renaissance Plaza loan ($5.2 million total exposure, 12.2%) is
the second-largest real estate exposure in the pool and the
largest asset with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by
an 83,587-sq.-ft. office property in Appleton, Wis.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in June 2009 due to maturity
default.  There is a $1.1 million ARA in effect against the asset.
S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

The 200 Forest Drive loan ($4.4 million total exposure, 10.2%) is
the third-largest real estate exposure in the pool and the second-
largest asset with the special servicer.  The loan is secured by a
137,139-sq.-ft. industrial property in East Hills, N.Y.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in March 2010.  The loan's
maturity date was modified, and the asset is now scheduled to
mature in March 2011.  As of September 2009, the property was
64.1% occupied (down from 100.0% at December 2008).  While the
December 2008 DSC was 2.15x, Standard & Poor's estimated a 1.12x
going-forward in-place DSC based on the reduced September 2009
occupancy.

The Pembrooke Medical Office loan ($1.7 million total exposure,
4.1%) is the seventh-largest real estate exposure in the pool and
the third-largest asset with the special servicer.  The loan is
secured by a 28,171-sq.-ft. office property in Indianapolis, Ind.
Current financial data is not available for this asset.  The
exposure was transferred to the special servicer in July 2009 for
maturity default, and according to the special servicer, the loan
was modified and the borrower made the modified payments through
December 2009, but is now unable to continue making the modified
payments.  A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure closed on July 13, 2010.
S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual resolution of
this asset.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the July 2010 remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $42.5 million, down from $594.0 million
at issuance.  The pool includes seven assets, down from 126 at
issuance.  The master servicer, also Wells Fargo, provided full-
year 2008 or full-year 2009 financial information for 84.5% of the
assets in the pool.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.39x for the pool based on the reported figures.  This
calculation excludes two ($6.6 million, 15.5%) of the
transaction's three specially serviced assets.  Recent financial
data is not available for these two assets.

The master servicer reported a watchlist of three ($7.2 million,
17.0%) loans, which are discussed below.  The watchlist consists
of the pooled loans with a reported DSC of less than 1.10x.  Two
($4.6 million, 10.9%) of these three loans have a reported DSC of
less than 1.00x.  To date, the pool has experienced principal
losses totaling $16.5 million on 11 assets.

                        Watchlisted Loans

As of the July 2010 remittance report, three ($7.2 million, 17.0%)
loans were on the master servicer's watchlist.  The exposures all
appear on the master servicer's watchlist for low DSC.  Individual
loan discussions follow.

The Festivals Office Park loan ($2.9 million, 6.9%) is the fourth-
largest exposure in the pool and the largest loan on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 29,591-sq.-ft.
office property in Las Vegas, Nev.  As of December 2009, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 0.92x and 78.7%, respectively,
down from 1.28x and 100% at issuance.

The North Hill Centre loan ($2.6 million, 6.1%) is the fifth-
largest exposure in the pool and the second-largest loan on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 67,575-sq.-
ft. retail property in Anderson, S.C.  As of March 2010, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 1.04x and 82.7%, respectively,
down from 1.32x and 100% at issuance.

The Hampton Meadows Apartments loan ($1.7 million, 4.0%) is the
sixth-largest exposure in the pool and the third-largest loan on
the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan is secured by a 72-unit
multifamily property in Cramerton, N.C.  As of December 2009, the
reported DSC and occupancy were 0.73x and 81.9%, respectively,
down from 1.26x and 98.6% at issuance.

The Plaza Madison loan ($24.4 million, 57.4%) is the largest
exposure in the pool, and the only loan that is neither with the
special servicer nor on the master servicer's watchlist.  The loan
is secured by a 210,793-sq.-ft. office property in New York City.
The reported DSC and occupancy were 1.52x and 71.9% as of March
2010 and June 2010, respectively.  The loan is scheduled to mature
in September 2013.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria and the lowered ratings are consistent with its
analysis.

                         Ratings Lowered

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-LIFE1

                  Rating
                  ------
     Class      To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
     -----      --      ----           ----------------------
     E          BBB     A-                              86.76
     F          BB+     BBB+                            69.29
     H          B       BBB-                            41.35
     J          B-      BB+                             23.89
     K          CCC-    BB                              13.41


MORGAN STANLEY: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Rating on Secured Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB-' rating on
the secured notes issued by Morgan Stanley ACES SPC's series 2006-
1, a synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transaction.  S&P's rating on the notes was on
CreditWatch with negative implications before S&P withdrew it.

S&P withdrew the rating because the notes were unwound.


NEWCASTLE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches from 2 RMBS transactions issued by Newcastle.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and/or adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


NOMURA HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 40 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 40
tranches from 10 RMBS transactions issued by Nomura.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

In addition, for certain deals affected by the actions (Nomura
Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE1, Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust
2006-HE2, Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-WF1, Nomura Home
Equity Loan, Inc. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2007-2, Nomura
Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE3,
and Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2007-3), when calculating the rate of new delinquencies, Moody's
took into account loans that were reclassified from delinquent to
current due to modification in order to not understate the rate of
new delinquencies.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-FM1

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE1

  -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-FM1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-FM2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE2

  -- Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-WF1

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-HE3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-3

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


OAK HILL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Oak Hill Credit Partners III,
Limited:

  -- US$28,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     September 18, 2009 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$15,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     September 18, 2009 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf);

  -- US$17,500,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     September 18, 2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$11,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes Due 2015, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     September 18, 2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization of the
notes due to delevering since the last rating action in September
2009.

Moody's notes that the transaction benefited from the delevering
of the Class A-1a and Class A-1b notes, which have been paid down
by approximately $62 million since the last rating action,
accounting for roughly 18% of the total Class A-1a and Class A-1b
notes' outstanding balance reported in August 2009.  As a result
of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios have increased
since the rating action in September 2009.  In particular, based
on the trustee report, dated July 1, 2010, the Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at
141.42%, 123.18%, 113.48%, and 111.94%, respectively, versus the
August 2009 levels of 129.12%, 115.07%, 107.33%, and 106.07%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  A substantial proportion of the
delevering is attributable to collateral sales and principal
prepayments on the underlying loans.  Moody's expects delevering
to continue as a result of the end of the deal's reinvestment
period in December 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  As of the latest
trustee report, dated July 1, 2010, the weighted average rating
factor is 2219 compared to 2507 in August 2009, and securities
rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 8.3% of the
underlying portfolio versus 18.0% in August 2009.  Additionally,
the dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to about
$0.6MM from approximately $24MM in August 2009.  Due to the impact
of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" and "Annual
Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers.

While the transaction has benefited from delevering and
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio,
Moody's noted that the portfolio includes a number of investments
in securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes.
As of the latest trustee report, dated July 1, 2010, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes make up
approximately 10.8% of the underlying portfolio versus 1.7% in
August 2009.  These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

Oak Hill Credit Partners III, Limited, issued on December 17,
2003, is a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans.


OPTION ONE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 12 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12
tranches from 3 RMBS transactions issued by Option One.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

Seven pools from three deals affected by these actions have pool
policies (Option One Mortgage Trust 2006-2, Option One Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-HL1, and Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-
FXD1).  Based on high rescission rates on claims made for defaults
on subprime collateral, Moody's assumed an average ultimate
acceptance rate of 20%.  Of the deals with pool policies, this
resulted in pool policies only attaching for Option One Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-FXD1's three pools.  Without the benefit of the
pool policies, losses to each of these pools would have been about
4 percentage points higher.

In addition, the ratings on tranches associated with Group III
from Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1 reflect interest
shortfalls.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by Ambac Assurance Corporation.  (Segregated Account - Unrated)
and Syncora Guarantee Inc. (rated Ca).  For securities insured by
a financial guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher
of (i) the guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the
current underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the
guaranty) on the security.  The principal methodology used in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have a financial guaranty and is as
described earlier.

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-FXD1

  -- Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 29,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. III-A-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. III-A-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. III-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HL1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Oct. 30, 2008 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on March 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Oct. 30, 2008 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Oct. 30, 2008 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on March 9, 2009)


RENAISSANCE HOME: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 59 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 59
tranches from 11 RMBS transactions issued by Renaissance.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien,
fixed and adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

In addition, for the deals affected by the actions, when
calculating the rate of new delinquencies, Moody's took into
account loans that were reclassified from delinquent to current
due to modification in order to not understate the rate of new
delinquencies.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. AF-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. AF-1, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. AF-1, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-1A, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-1B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-1Z, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-2

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-3

  -- Cl. AF-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AF-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-2, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. AV-3, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


RESMAE MORTGAGE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Three Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 3 tranches
issued by ResMAE Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1, ResMAE Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1.  The collateral backing
this deal primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-
rate subprime residential mortgages.

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Subprime pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on subprime pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

In addition, for this transaction, when calculating the rate of
new delinquencies, Moody's took into account loans that were
reclassified from delinquent to current due to modification in
order to not understate the rate of new delinquencies.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
subprime RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Issuer: ResMAE Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1, ResMAE Asset-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-1

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2C, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2D, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2000-C3 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes
of Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C3, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C7 and placed four
classes on review for possible downgrade.

The downgrades of Classes L, M, and N are due to realized and
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing.  The pool has
experienced an aggregate $23.3 million loss which has resulted in
a 100% principal loss for Classes N and a 59% principal loss for
Class M.

Moody's placed Classes F, G, J, and K on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
poorly performing watchlisted loans and concerns about refinance
risk in an adverse environment.  Thirty-five loans, representing
86% of the pool, have either matured or are scheduled to mature
within the next six months.

As of the July 19, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 70% to
$278.5 million from $914.7 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 42% of the pool.  Nine loans, representing 35% of the
pool, have defeased and are collateralized by U.S. Government
securities.

Twenty loans, representing 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate $23.3 million loss (21% loss severity on average).
Currently ten loans, representing 28% of the pool, are in special
servicing.  The special servicer has recognized an aggregate
$21.7 million appraisal reduction for two of the specially
serviced loans.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Jorie
Plaza Loan ($20.7 million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured
by two office buildings located in Oak Brook, Illinois.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in September 2008 due to
imminent default and is currently real estate owned.  The
remaining nine loans are secured by a mix of office, multifamily,
industrial, and retail properties.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans as well as the performance of the
overall pool.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$13.72M Cl. F Certificate, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct. 4, 2007 Upgraded to A3
     (sf)

  -- US$13.72M Cl. G Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Dec. 19, 2000
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$6.86M Cl. J Certificate, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on July 16, 2009 Downgraded to
     B3 (sf)

  -- US$5.716M Cl. K Certificate, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on July 16, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$10.29M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on July 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$1.89M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on July 16, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- US$0M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 16, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)


SALOMON BROTHERS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 17 2001-MM Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of 17 classes and
affirmed eight classes of Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2001-MM, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-MM.  The upgrades are due to the stable to improving
performance of the assets in the pool and increased subordination
resulting from principal amortization and loan payoffs.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.

As of the July 19, 2010 distribution date, the pool balance has
decreased by approximately 73% to $183.0 million from
$674.4 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans secured by office,
multifamily, hotel, and retail properties.  The loans range in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool balance with the top
three loans representing 45% of the pool.  There have been no
losses since securitization and currently there are no loans in
special servicing.

Two loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.  The transaction has experienced no losses since
securitization and currently there are no loans in special
servicing.

This transaction has several unique features in terms of
certificate structure, loan grouping, payment priority and loss
allocation.  The trust consists of five senior certificates
(Classes A-3, X, B, C and D) and 20 junior certificates.  The
junior certificates are divided into seven series corresponding to
specific loan groups.  Each loan group supports three certificates
(E, F and G).  The aggregate principal balance of each loan group
is divided into a senior portion and a junior portion.  The senior
portion of each series supports the pooled classes.  After the
principal balance of the related senior portion has been reduced
to zero, principal payments are then applied to the junior
certificates on a senior/sequential basis within each respective
loan group.  Based on the payment priority and the certificate
structure of this transaction, it is possible that a junior
certificate holder may receive principal payments before the
principal balance of a higher-rated certificate from a different
loan group is reduced to zero.  At securitization there were eight
loan groups but one group, corresponding to Classes E-7, F-7 and
G-7, has been repaid in full.

Moody's was provided with year-end 2009 operating results for 100%
of the pool.  Moody's LTV for the overall pool is 59% compared to
67% at Moody's last review and 73% at securitization.  The LTV of
each loan group is discussed below.

Loan Group A consists of one loan totaling $5.5 million and is the
collateral for Classes F-1 and G-1.  Loan Group A's certificate
balance has declined by approximately 94% since securitization due
to amortization and the payoff of three loans.  The loan in this
group is no longer making principal payments to the senior pooled
classes.  The remaining loan in this group, the Cabana Crowne
Plaza Loan, is secured by a 192-room full-service hotel located in
Palo Alto, California.  The loan has benefitted from amortization
and has paid down 60% since securitization.  The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in May 2014.  The LTV for Loan Group A is
56% compared to 77% at last review.  Moody's upgraded the ratings
of Classes F-1 and G-1 due to improved performance and increased
credit support.

Loan Group B consists of one loan totaling $9.5 million and is the
collateral for Classes E-2, F-2 and G-2.  Loan Group B's
certificate balance has declined by approximately 89% since
securitization due to amortization and the payoff of three loans.
The loan in this group is no longer making principal payments to
the senior pooled classes.  The remaining loan in Loan Group B is
the Mercy West Medical Center Loan, which is secured by a 142,000
square foot medical office building located in Clive, Iowa.  The
loan has benefitted from amortization and has paid down 25% since
securitization.  The loan amortizes on a 264-month schedule and
matures in November 2010.  Moody's LTV for Loan Group B is 69%
compared to 76% at last review.  Moody's upgraded the ratings of
Classes E-2, F-2 and G-2 due to improved performance and increased
credit support.

Loan Group C consists of two loans totaling $29.2 million and is
the collateral for Classes E-3, F-3 and G-3.  Loan Group C's
certificate balance has declined by approximately 66% since
securitization due to amortization and the payoff of two loans.
The largest loan in Loan Group C is the Trails Village Center Loan
($15.0 million), which is secured by 134,000 square foot retail
center located in Las Vegas, Nevada.  The loan fully amortizes and
matures in July 2023.  Overall, the two loans in this group have
amortized 23% since securitization.  Moody's LTV for Loan Group C
is 46% compared to 52% at last review.  Moody's upgraded the
ratings of E-3, F-3 and G-3 due to improved performance and to
increased credit support.

Loan Group D consists of two loans totaling $34.3 million and is
the collateral for Classes E-4, F-4 and G-4.  Loan Group D's
certificate balance has declined by approximately 58% since
securitization due to amortization and the payoff of two loans.
The largest loan in Loan Group D is the Richmond Square Loan
($22.1 million), which is secured by a 360-unit luxury high rise
apartment building located in Arlington, Virginia.  Moody's LTV
for Loan Group D is 46% compared to 52% at last review.  Moody's
upgraded the ratings of E-4, F-4 and G-4 due to improved
performance and increased credit support.

Loan Group E consists of two loans totaling $29.2 million and is
the collateral for Classes E-5, F-5 and G-5.  Loan Group E's
certificate balance has declined by approximately 66% since
securitization due to loan payoffs and amortization.  The
largest loan in Group E is the Glenpointe Center East Loan
($28.8 million), which is secured by a 319,000 square foot office
building located in Teaneck, New Jersey.  Although property
performance has improved since last review due to increased
occupancy, Moody's is concerned about upcoming lease rollovers.
The loan amortizes on a 25-year schedule and matures in November
2012.  Moody's LTV for Loan Group E is 70% compared to 68% at last
review.  Moody's affirmed the ratings of E-5 and F-5 and upgraded
the rating of G-5 due to overall stable performance and increased
subordination.

Loan Group F consists of one loan totaling $26.2 million and is
the collateral for classes E-6, F-6 and G-6.  Loan Group F's
certificate balance has declined by approximately 67% since
securitization due to amortization and the payoff of three loans.
The remaining loan in Loan Group F is the SouthPark Towers II
Loan, which is secured by a 292,000 square foot office building
located in Charlotte, North Carolina.  Property performance has
improved since last review due to increased occupancy.  The loan
amortizes on a 30-year schedule and matures in July 2011.  Moody's
LTV for Loan Group F is 82% compared to 92% at last review.
Moody's affirmed the rating of E-6 and upgraded classes F-6 and G-
6 due to improved performance and increased credit support.

Loan Group G has paid off in full.

Loan Group H consists of two loans totaling $49.1 million and is
the collateral for Classes E-8, F-8 and G-8.  Loan Group H's
certificate balance has declined by approximately 43% since
securitization due to amortization and the payoff of two loans.
The largest loan in Loan Group H is the Stamford Square Loan
($28.0 million), which is secured by a 275,000 square foot Class A
office building located in Stamford, Connecticut.  The property
was 90% occupied as of December 2009, compared to 100% at last
review and securitization.  The loan amortizes on a 25-year
schedule and matures in June 2020.  Moody's LTV for Loan Group H
is 64% compared to 66% at last review.  Moody's affirmed the
ratings of classes F-8 and G-8 and upgraded the rating of E-8 due
to stable performance and increased credit support.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$19.445099M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$19.311544M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Nov. 14, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$24.129605M Cl. C Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- US$10.591148M Cl. D Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on June 30, 2005 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$2.253704M Cl. E-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- US$12.800000M Cl. E-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- US$11.400000M Cl. E-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- US$14.400000M Cl. E-5 Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf);
     previously on April 20, 2005 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$7.900000M Cl. E-6 Certificate, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf);
     previously on June 30, 2005 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$15.000000M Cl. E-8 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
     previously on Nov. 14, 2006 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$1.396559M Cl. F-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
     previously on Nov. 14, 2006 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$5.000000M Cl. F-2 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on April 20, 2005 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$6.100000M Cl. F-3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$2.800000M Cl. F-4 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$5.900000M Cl. F-5 Certificate, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf);
     previously on April 20, 2005 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$1.200000M Cl. F-6 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf);
     previously on June 30, 2005 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- US$5.500000M Cl. F-8 Certificate, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf);
     previously on Nov. 14, 2006 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$4.111964M Cl. G-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$2.211964M Cl. G-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned B2
     (sf)

  -- US$6.211964M Cl. G-3 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$0.511964M Cl. G-4 Certificate, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
     previously on Nov. 14, 2006 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$0.511964M Cl. G-5 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned B2
    (sf)

  -- US$0.511964M Cl. G-6 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf);
     previously on June 30, 2005 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- US$3.811964M Cl. G-8 Certificate, Affirmed at B1 (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     July 31, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Moody's monitors transactions on both a monthly basis through two
sets of quantitative tools: MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends)
and CMM on Trepp, and a periodic basis through a full review.
Moody's prior review is summarized in a press release dated
June 26, 2008.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB/LS3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan bond and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2003-4 and assigned these Rating Outlooks:

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5C affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5D affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5E affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has removed the subordinated bond from Rating
Watch Negative.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B 2004-1 Notes to 'BB/LS3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan bond and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2004-1 and assigned Rating Outlooks as outlined below:

  -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has removed the subordinated bond from Rating
Watch Negative.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B 2004-2 Notes to 'BB/LS3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan bond and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2004-2 and assigned these Rating Outlooks:

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has removed the subordinated bond from Rating
Watch Negative.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class B 2004-5 Notes to 'BB/LS3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan bond and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2004-5 and assigned these Rating Outlooks:

  -- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable;

  -- Class B downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook
     Stable.

Additionally, Fitch has removed the subordinated bond from Rating
Watch Negative.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class B to 'BB/LS3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior student loan bond and
downgraded the subordinate bond issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2003-14 and assigned these Rating Outlooks:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-14

  -- Class A-4 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class A-5 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class A-6 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class A-7 at 'AAA/LS1'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades, removes from Rating Watch Negative and assigns
an Outlook to this class:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-14

  -- Class B to 'BB/LS3' from 'AAA/LS3'; Outlook Stable.

The rating on the subordinate note is downgraded to 'BB' due to
the trust's very high cost structure that will put pressure on the
trust's ability to generate excess spread (which is the only form
of credit enhancement for the subordinate note) and absorb even a
mild level of basis risk stress.


SORIN REAL: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating on Class A-1B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it assigned, as of
May 27, 2010, these ratings to the Note issued by Sorin Real
Estate CDO III Ltd.:

Note

  -- Cl. A-1B, Assigned B3 (sf)

The Note issuance is a result of a "Class A-1B Issuance Event" as
described in the April 6, 2006 Indenture.  The Class A-1B issuance
occurred due to the planned retirement of the A-1A Class.  The new
issued Class A-1B carries the same par balance as the retired
Class A-1A.

Sorin Real Estate CDO III Ltd. is a revolving CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
collateral (60% of the pool balance), asset backed securities
collateral (28%), and CRE CDO collateral (12%).  As of the
April 1, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction, including Subordinated Note, has decreased to
$986 million from $1 billion at issuance, due to approximately
$14.8 million in pay-downs to the Class A-1A/A-1B Notes.  The pay-
down was triggered as a result of the failure of the Class A/B,
Class C, and Class D Overcollateralization Tests.  Per the
Indenture, the failure of any Overcollateralization Test results
in all scheduled interest and principal payments being directed to
pay down the most senior notes, until the Overcollateralization
Test is satisfied.

Six assets with a par balance of $50 million (5.2 % of the pool
balance) were listed as defaulted as of the April 1, 2010 Trustee
report.  Moody's currently estimates zero recovery from these
defaulted assets.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1,811, excluding defaults.
The distribution of current ratings and credit estimates,
excluding defaults, is: Aaa-Aa3 (20%), A1-A3 (22%), Baa1-Baa3
(20%), Ba1-Ba3 (12%), B1-B3 (11%), and Caa1-C (15%).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to the actual
WAL of 5.5 years.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 28.4%, excluding defaults.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 7%, excluding defaults.

Moody's review incorporated updated asset correlation assumptions
for the commercial real estate sector consistent with one of
Moody's CDO rating models, CDOROM v2.5, which was released on
April 3, 2009.  These correlations were updated in light of the
systemic seizure of credit markets and to reflect higher inter-
and intra-industry asset correlations.  The updated asset
correlations, depending on vintage and issuer diversity, used for
CUSIP collateral (i.e. CMBS, CRE CDOs or REIT debt) within CRE
CDOs range from 30% to 60%, compared to 15% to 35% previously.

In cases where CUSIP collateral is resecuritized, CDOROM v2.5 adds
stress to capture the leveraging effect of the derivative
transaction.  Moody's had previously announced on March 4, 2009,
that the additional default probability stress applied to
resecuritized collateral would not be applied to conduit and
fusion CMBS from the 2006 to 2008 vintages due to a first quarter
2009 ratings sweep of such transactions.  Moody's are now applying
the resecuritization stress factor to all vintages of CMBS
collateral to address the enhanced volatility in the
resecuritization and align Moody's modeling of CRE CDOs with its
expected performance.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

These ratings are based upon the quality of the underlying
collateral and the legal structure.  Moody's ratings address only
the credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other non-
credit risks, such as those associated with the timing of
principal prepayments have not been addressed and may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The assigned ratings are not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold
securities or any interest therein.


TIERS FLOATING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Series 2005-11 to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of TIERS Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust, Series 2005-
11, a corporate synthetic obligation referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

  -- $7,500,000 Tiers Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust
     Certificates, Series 2005-11, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Oct. 15, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's explained that the rating actiona taken is the result of
the rated tranche experiencing 100% losses due to credit events on
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage
Association, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Washington Mutual
Inc., Tribune Company, Idearc Inc., CIT Group Inc., and Ambac
Assurance Corporation.


TIERS FLOATING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Series 2005-12 to 'C'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded its
ratings of TIERS Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust, Series 2005-
12, a corporate synthetic obligation referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities.

The rating action is:

  -- $7,500,000 TIERS Floating Rate Credit Linked Trust
     Certificates, Series 2005-12, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Oct. 14, 2008 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's explained that the rating actiona taken is the result of
the rated tranche experiencing 100% losses due to credit events on
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage
Association, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Washington Mutual
Inc., Tribune Company, Idearc Inc., CIT Group Inc., and Ambac
Assurance Corporation.


TRUE NORTH: S&P Downgrades Ratings on CDO Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes issued by True North Ltd. and TrueNorth No. 2 Ltd.,
synthetic corporate investment-grade collateralized debt
obligation transactions, to 'D' from 'CC'.

S&P lowered the ratings because the notes incurred principal
losses due to credit events in the transactions' asset portfolios.


TRUE NORTH: S&P Withdraws 'CCC-' Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC-' rating on
the A notes issued by True North No. 3 Ltd., a synthetic corporate
investment-grade collateralized debt obligation transaction.

S&P withdrew the rating because the notes had terminated.


VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY: Moody's Puts 'Ba1' Ratings on Senior Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned Ba1 ratings to Vishay
Intertechnology, Inc.'s existing senior secured term loan facility
due 2011 and senior secured revolving credit facility due 2012,
which were previously unrated by Moody's.  Vishay's Ba3 corporate
family rating did not change.

Moody's has taken these rating actions:

Ratings Assigned:

* $75 million Senior Secured Term Loan Facility due 2011 -- Ba1
  (LGD2, 22%)

* $250 million Senior Secured Revolving Credit Facility due 2012 -
  - Ba1 (LGD2, 22%)

These ratings were affirmed:

* Corporate family rating -- Ba3
* Probability-of-default rating -- Ba3
* Speculative Grade Liquidity -- SGL-1

The rating on the 3.625% Convertible Subordinated Notes -- B2
(LGD6, 97%) will be withdrawn as the notes have been repaid.

                         Ratings Rationale

The Ba3 Corporate Family Rating reflects Vishay's good operating
scale, diverse product portfolio and low financial risk, including
very good liquidity and strong free cash flow generation, which
partially offset the risks of high demand and price volatility
endemic in the Semiconductor industry, particularly in mature
products.  Moody's estimates that Vishay's debt-to-EBITDA leverage
was about 1.6x (incorporating Moody's standard analytical
adjustments and adjusting for the Vishay Precision Group spin-
off), and its free cash flow-to-debt ratio is expected to exceed
30% for fiscal year 2010.  The rating is supported by Vishay good
market position as a manufacturer and supplier of a broad range of
semiconductors and passive electronic components and its well-
diversified end-markets which include industrials,
telecommunications, automotive, computer and consumer electronics.

Vishay's rating is bolstered by its recently outlined fiscal
strategy of managing total debt-to-EBITDA leverage below 2.5x (pro
forma for acquisitions and on a trailing twelve months basis),
which limits the event risk and uncertainty in the Company's
acquisitions strategy that has at times been aggressive.

The key risks affecting Vishay's Corporate Family Rating are the
highly cyclical demand patterns and the sustained pressure on
average selling prices in the semiconductor industry.  In Moody's
view, further upside to Vishay's operating margin is largely
limited to gains from operating efficiencies, as the majority of
Vishay's portfolio consists of commodity electronic components.
In addition, high levels of investments in manufacturing
capabilities and R&D driven by competition will continue to
consume a large portion of cash flows.

Moody's could upgrade Vishay's ratings if its cash flow from
operations improve through sustainable increase in profitability,
it maintains good liquidity and its balance sheet remains strong.
Specifically, upward rating pressure could develop if Vishay could
sustain debt-to-EBITDA under 2.0x (Moody's adjusted),
incorporating considerations for cyclical nature of the industry,
and its free cash flows exhibit greater stability.

Conversely, the ratings could be downgraded if Vishay's operating
performance falls short of expectations and/or industry operating
conditions deteriorate such that debt-to-EBITDA exceeds 3.5x
(Moody's adjusted) for a protracted period of time.  In addition,
weak liquidity, deteriorating profitability and challenges in
integrating acquisitions could pressure the ratings downward.

The last rating action on Vishay was on August 6, 2010, when
Moody's upgraded Vishay's corporate family and probability of
default rating to Ba3 from B1, its convertible subordinated note
rating to B2 from B3,and its speculative grade liquidity rating to
SGL-1 from SGL-2.

Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., headquartered in Malvern, PA, is one
of the largest manufacturers and suppliers of discrete passive and
active electronic components.  On July 6, 2010, Vishay completed
the previously announced spin-off of Vishay Precision Group.
Excluding VPG's revenues, Vishay generated nearly $2.3 billion in
revenue in the twelve months ended July 3, 2010.


WACHOVIA BANK: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two 2005-WHALE 5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes from Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2005-WHALE 5.  While Fitch does not expect
losses to the remaining loan in the base case, the downgrades are
the result of Fitch's prospective views regarding commercial real
estate values and cash flow decline.  In addition, the remaining
loan is currently in special servicing and future interest
shortfalls due to fees and expenses are possible.  The Negative
Rating Outlooks reflect additional sensitivity analysis related to
further negative credit migration of the underlying collateral.

The remaining loan in the transaction is the $29.7 million
Lightstone Portfolio 2, which is collateralized by two regional
malls.  Under Fitch's updated analysis, the loan was modeled to
default in the base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B'
stress, as the loan is in special servicing.  In this scenario,
Fitch's analysis was based on an updated appraisal value provided
by the special servicer.  In addition, Fitch analyzed servicer
reported operating statements, rent rolls, sales reports in
addition to other information received from the special servicer.

The loan is collateralized by two regional malls: Shawnee Mall in
Shawnee OK, and Brazos Mall in Jackson, TX.  The Shawnee Mall is
anchored by Sears which is part of the collateral, and Dillards
and JC Penney's which are not part of the collateral.  The Brazos
Mall is anchored by JC Penney's and Sears which are part of the
collateral and Dillard's, which is not part of the collateral.

The loan transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to
imminent default; the loan's final maturity was in January 2010
and the borrower indicated that they would not be able to payoff
the loan.  The borrower requested an extension with no new capital
contribution, which was denied, and the special servicer has filed
for foreclosure.  The current borrower and property manager
continue to work to increase occupancy.

The special servicer has received an updated appraisal, and Phase
I and Phase II environmental assessments with no further
recommendations.  The mezzanine lender, who has provided a
proposal to take over as the borrower, has received the asset plan
and the special servicer is waiting for approval.  The lockbox
instituted at issuance continues to pay debt service, operating
expenses and monthly escrows.  The special servicer continues to
sweep all excess cash flow into a Curtailment Reserve, which is
expected to be used to paydown the debt and fund capital
expenditures and TI/LCs.  Although there are currently no interest
shortfalls due to fees or expenses, it is possible that these may
occur in the future.

At issuance, the malls had just been purchased by The Lightstone
Group.  The former borrower had filed for bankruptcy, which had
disrupted the management of the two malls.  In addition, a major
tenant had left the Shawnee Mall.  At issuance, total mall and
inline occupancy for the Shawnee and Brazos Malls were 57% and
32.6%; and 73.5% and 22.8%, respectively.

Occupancy has improved since issuance.  As of trailing 12 month
October 2008, Shawnee and Brazos Mall total mall and inline
occupancy were 71.3% and 61.4%, and 79% and 64%, respectively.  As
of the June 2010 rent roll, the Shawnee and Brazos Mall total mall
and line occupancy were 81% and 74.4%, and 88.8% and 80.8%,
respectively.  However, although occupancy has improved
considerably, inline sales are below issuance levels.  As of the
June 2010 sales reports, the Shawnee and Brazos Mall inline sales
were $162 and $143, respectively, which is below issuance levels
of $194 and $203.  As of TTM September 2008, Shawnee and Brazos
inline sales were $260 and $212, respectively.  The servicer
reported net operating income as of annualized September 2009 is
23% lower than year-end 2008 and 27% lower than YE2007.

Fitch downgrades and assigns a recovery rating to this
certificate:

  -- $10.8 million class L to 'CCC/RR1' from 'BB-'.

Fitch downgrades and assigns a Rating Outlook to this certificate:

  -- $11.4 million class K to 'BBB' from 'AA+'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch has also removed classes L and K from Rating Watch Negative.

Fitch affirms and revises the Rating Outlook to this certificate:

  -- $7.6 million class J at 'AAA', Outlook Stable.

Fitch withdraws the ratings of the interest-only classes X-1B and
X-2.

Classes A-1 through H, and various classes related to individual
loans have paid in full.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. Commercial Real Estate Loan CDOs'.  It applies
stresses to property cash flows and uses debt service coverage
ratio tests to project future default levels for the underlying
portfolio.  Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows and
Fitch's long-term capitalization rates.  This methodology was used
to review this transaction as floating-rate CMBS loan pools are
concentrated and similar in composition to CREL CDO pools.  In
many cases, the CMBS notes are senior portions of notes held in
CDO transactions.  The assets are generally transitional in
nature, frequently underwritten with pro forma income assumptions
that have not materialized as expected.  Overrides to this
methodology were applied on a loan-by-loan basis if the property
specific performance warranted an alternative analysis.

For bonds rated 'B-' or better, the current credit enhancement
levels were compared to the expected losses generated in each
rating category divided by the total deal size.  These classes
were assigned Loss Severity ratings, which indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected losses for the collateral in the
'B' stress.  LS ratings should always be considered in conjunction
with probability of default indicated by a class' long-term credit
rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or LS ratings to
classes rated 'CCC' and lower.

Rating Outlooks were determined by further stressing the cash
flows and fully recognizing all maturity defaults in all ratings
stresses.  The credit enhancements were then compared to the
expected losses generated in each rating category to determine
potential credit migration over the next two years.  If the Rating
Outlook scenario would imply a lower rating, then the class was
assigned a Negative Outlook.

The ratings for bonds rated 'CCC' or lower, are based on a
deterministic analysis.  Bonds are rated 'C' when the expected
losses on currently defaulted loans exceed a classes' respective
credit enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CC' when the combined
base case expected losses on the currently defaulted loans and
loans likely to default exceed a classes' respective credit
enhancement level.  Bonds are rated 'CCC' when the base case
expected loss exceeds a classes' respective credit enhancement
level.

Bonds rated 'CCC' and below were assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) in
order to provide a forward-looking estimate of recoveries on
currently distressed or defaulted structured finance securities.
Recovery Ratings are calculated by subtracting the base case
expected losses in reverse sequential order from the pooled and
non-pooled rake certificates.  Any principal recoveries first pay
interest shortfalls on the bonds and then sequentially through the
classes.  The remaining bond principal amount is divided by the
current outstanding bond balance.  The resulting percentage is
used to assign the Recovery Ratings on the bonds.

In addition to the CREL CDO methodology, Fitch reviewed the
transaction in conjunction with its 'Rating U.S. Single-Borrower
Commercial Mortgage Transactions,' as there is one remaining loan.
This review included reviewing insurance requirements and borrower
structure.  As there is no current criteria for assigning loss
severity ratings to single-borrower deals, none were assigned to
this transaction's classes.


WACHOVIA BANK: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 12 2005-C16 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of twelve classes
and downgraded nine classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-
C16.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from anticipated losses from specially serviced and
highly leveraged watchlisted loans and concerns about refinancing
risk associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
lending environment.  Eleven loans, representing 8% of the pool,
mature within the next 36 months.  Eight of these loans (7% of the
pool) have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio below
1.0X.

The affirmations are due to key rating parameters, including
Moody's loan-to-value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the
Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  In
addition, the pool has experienced increased subordination
resulting from amortization and loan payoffs.  The pool's
outstanding balance has declined by 20% since last review.

On August 5, 2010, Moody's placed nine classes of this transaction
on review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's
review of this transaction.  The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed
securities transactions.

As of the July 16, 2010 statement date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 28% to $1.5 billion
from $2.1 billion at securitization.  The 149 mortgage loans that
collateralize the Certificates range in size from less than 1% to
7% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 36% of the
pool.  The pool contains two loans, representing 10% of the pool,
with investment grade underlying ratings.  Twenty-five loans,
representing 19% of the pool, have defeased and are secured with
U.S. Government securities.

Thirty-two loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (formerly Commercial Mortgage Securities
Association) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization.
Seven loans, representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Fountain
Village Apartments Loan, ($10.8 million, 0.7% of the pool), which
is secured by a 410 unit apartment complex located in Tucson,
Arizona.  This loan was transferred to special servicing November
2009 due to imminent default and is now in foreclosure.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a limited
service hotel, unanchored and anchored retail centers and medical
office buildings.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $11.5 million
loss for the specially serviced loans, which represents an overall
29% expected loss.  The special servicer has recognized an
aggregate $3.9 million appraisal reduction for two of the
specially serviced loans.

In addition to recognizing losses from specially serviced loans,
Moody's has assumed a high default probability on 36 watchlisted
loans, representing 16% of the pool, due to concerns about
declining property performance.  Moody's estimates a $28.9 million
aggregate loss for these troubled loans (overall 21% expected loss
based on a 53% probability of default).  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2008 and 2009 operating
statements for 81% of the pool.  Moody's weighted average LTV for
the conduit pool, excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
is 91% compared to 93% at last review.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
conduit and stressed DSCR are 1.54X and 1.10X, respectively,
compared to 1.51X and 1.08X, respectively, at last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the
loans' actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure loan size diversity,
where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple-notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has an all-in Herf of 35 compared to 45 at last review.

There are two loans with investment grade underlying ratings.  The
largest loan is the 180 Maiden Lane Loan ($93.0 million -- 6.3% of
the pool), which represents a participation interest in a
$186.0 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a
1.1 million square foot Class A office building located in Lower
Manhattan.  As of December 2009, the property was 97% leased
compared to 100% at Moody's last review.  Major office tenants
include AIG, Inc. (Moody's senior unsecured rating of A3 -
negative outlook; 74% of the net rentable area; lease expiration
April 2014) and Stroock Stroock & Lavan (21% of NRA; lease
expiration May 2023).  Moody's current underlying rating and
stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.30X, respectively, the same as at
last review.

The second largest loan with an underlying rating is the Cameron
Village Loan ($47.3 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 630,000 square foot retail center located in downtown
Raleigh, North Carolina.  The center was 86% leased as of March
2010 compared to 92% at last review.  The largest tenants are
Harris Teeter and the Wake County Library.  Financial performance
has declined since last review due to lower occupancy.  The
decline in performance was largely offset by principal
amortization.  Moody's current underlying rating and stressed DSCR
are Baa3 and 1.33X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.35X at
last review.

The top three non-defeased conduit loans represent 15% of the
pool.  The largest conduit loan is the 175 West Jackson Loan
($108.5 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which represents a
participation interest in a $217.0 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by a 1.5 million square foot Class A office
building in the West Loop office submarket of downtown Chicago.
Financial performance has improved since last review due to tenant
rent increases despite a minor decline in occupancy from 97% at
last review to 96% as of December 2009.  Moody's LTV and DSCR are
71% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.21X at last
review.

The second largest conduit loan is the AON Office Building Loan
($61.5 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 412,000
square foot Class A suburban office building located in Glenview,
Illinois.  The property has been 100% leased since securitization.
The primary tenant is the AON Corporation (Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa2 - negative outlook; 98.2% NRA; lease
expiration April 2017).  Financial performance has improved since
last review due to AON's scheduled rental increases.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 94%
and 1.06X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the 17 Battery Place North Loan
($53.0 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 398,000
square foot office building located in Downtown Manhattan.  The
property was 97% leased as of December 2009 compared to 100% at
last review.  The largest tenant is the City of New York (59% NRA;
lease expiration December 2012).  Performance has declined due to
the decline in occupancy and increased operating expenses.
Moody's LTV and DSCR are 116% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to
95% and 1.05X at last review.

Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$150.419M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$67.687M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$569.152M Cl. A-4 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$131.545M Cl. A-J Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$97.085M Cl. A-PB Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$186.639M Cl. A-1A Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. X-C Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-P Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$56.744M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$25.793M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf);
     previously on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- US$33.531M Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at A1 (sf); previously
     on June 26, 2008 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- US$20.635M Cl. E Certificate, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously
     on April 19, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- US$25.793M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$20.634M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$28.373M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$2.579M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$7.738M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10.317M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5.159M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5.158M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Aug. 5, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5.159M Cl. O Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 5, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade


* Fitch Cuts Rating on City of Bell's $50MM Bonds to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes these rating actions on the City of Bell,
California's general obligation and pension obligation bonds:

  -- Approximately $50 million in outstanding city GOs downgraded
     to 'BB' from 'A+';

  -- Approximately $7.5 million in outstanding Bell Public
     Financing Authority taxable POBs, series 2005 downgraded to
     'BB-' from 'A+'.

The GOs and POBs are placed on Rating Watch Negative.

Rating Rationale:

  -- Fitch's actions reflect management weaknesses, a possible
     default on a $35 million 2007 lease revenue bond bullet
     maturity due on Nov. 1, 2010, the impact of a resolution of
     the 2007 financing on the city's operations, and the impact
     of the recent determination by the State Controller regarding
     the property tax levied for pension payments, including to
     repay the 2005 pension obligation bonds.

  -- Management weakness is evidenced through extraordinarily high
     salaries given to some senior level staff and a sizable 2007
     lease revenue bond issuance with near-term maturity exposure
     and the failed purpose of the financing.

  -- Future management practices and policies are at best
     uncertain given recent senior level resignations and possible
     city council turnover.

  -- The State Controller recently determined that the city's
     pension property tax is capped at its 1984 rate, requiring
     the city to pay $2.9 million to the overlapping school
     district.  This payment likely will come from general fund
     reserves and will reduce the city's financial cushion,
     liquidity, and flexibility.  In addition, an increased
     general fund contribution will be needed in the future to
     fully fund POB debt service.

  -- The city's finances show a sizable general fund balance,
     although the reserve includes large advances from other city
     funds that have no apparent established or expected repayment
     schedule.

  -- Bell's economic base is characterized by tax base
     concentration in real estate holdings and industrial
     properties, above-average unemployment, and relatively low
     income levels.  Fitch's rating actions also reflect concern
     about the long-term economic implications of the current
     turmoil.

What Could Trigger A Downgrade:

  -- Failure to make full and timely payment on any city debt or
     similar obligation.

  -- Resolution of the 2007 lease revenue bond maturity that
     unduly pressures general fund operations.

  -- Financial deterioration including reduction in the general
     fund balance or liquidity to a point inconsistent with the
     current ratings.

Security:

The GO bonds are voter-approved and as such are secured by an
unlimited ad valorem property tax.  The authority's POBs are
secured by a separate, limited ad valorem tax dedicated solely to
pension payments, including repayment on bonds issued to refinance
pension obligations.

Credit Summary:

Fitch has not been able to get clarification from the city on
several points important to the rating, but bases these rating
actions on publicly available data including the city's fiscal
2009 comprehensive annual financial report, press articles, and a
discussion with a representative from the State Controller's
office.

The $35 million 2007 lease revenue bonds all mature Nov. 1, 2010,
according to the city's 2009 CAFR.  Fitch did not rate this issue.
Given the large bullet maturity and change in the city's credit
profile, Fitch believes it will now be very difficult for the city
to refinance this obligation.  A default on these bonds, if it
occurs, reflects poorly on city management and will affect the
city's long-term financial condition.  If a refinancing can be
achieved, Fitch believes the new debt structure could weaken
general fund operations.  Also, the purpose of the financing, to
purchase property which the city intended to sublease to a private
entity with the sublease not firm at the time of the bond sale,
evidences questionable debt management practices.  The transaction
with the private entity did not occur, leaving Bell with no rental
income to offset their bond repayment.

Most recently, California's Controller has determined that the
city raised its property tax dedicated to pension payments
(including debt service on the 2005 pension obligation bonds
issued the by Bell Public Financing Authority) in violation of the
state's Revenue and Taxation Code, which capped the tax rate at
its 1984 amount.  As a result, the controller believes the city
overcollected $2.9 million in property taxes, and that this amount
must be paid to the overlapping school district immediately, again
in accordance with the Revenue and Taxation Code.  If this amount
is repaid from general fund cash, it will substantially reduce
liquidity, and likely the year-end fund balance.  Also, the
controller determined that the city must reduce the rate to the
1984 cap, which is a 32% decrease from the current rate.  With
this, Bell's general fund will have to contribute a larger share
to annual pension payment, pressuring current operations during an
already strained period.

The Negative Rating Watch reflects the current uncertainty
regarding the city's management composition and its impact on
operating policies and practices, as well as the lack of timely
information from the city.  Fitch will continue to seek
information, including the outcome of the Nov. 1, 2010 bullet
maturity on the 2007 lease revenue bonds, in its efforts to
monitor and assess the city and authority's credit quality.  If
the city does not provide needed information on a timely basis,
Fitch will withdraw these ratings.


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on 38 Classes by Eight SF CDOs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 38 classes of
notes issued by eight structured finance collateralized debt
obligations that closed in 2002 and 2003 with exposure to SF
assets.  The rating actions are the result of Fitch's surveillance
process.  The downgrades are due to credit deterioration in the
underlying portfolios.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  The analytical
scope of each CDO review varied depending on the quality of the
portfolio and credit enhancement (CE) available for the CDO's
classes from subordination and excess spread.

For transactions where expected losses from assets with a Fitch
derived rating of 'CC' and lower already significantly exceed the
CE level of the most senior class of notes, Fitch believes that
the probability of default for all classes of notes can be
evaluated without factoring potential further losses from the
remaining portion of the portfolios and without considering the
outcomes of various interest rate and default timing scenarios as
described in the relevant criteria.  Therefore, these transactions
were not modeled using the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit
Model (SF PCM) or cash flow model.

For transactions where expected losses from distressed assets do
not significantly exceed the CE level of the senior class of
notes, Fitch used SF PCM to project losses from the transaction's
entire portfolio, which is represented as the rating loss rate
(RLR).  If CE levels to the most senior class indicated a rating
higher than 'CCC', Fitch performed cash flow model analysis to
evaluate the notes' performance under a range of interest rate and
default timing scenarios.

For all transactions, this review considered realized losses and
credit migration in the underlying portfolios since last review,
the ongoing and future impact of interest rate hedges,
availability of excess spread to pay down the notes, or
conversely, erosion of par due to the use of principal proceeds to
pay interest, and the likelihood of these trends to continue.

Fitch expects continued volatility in the ratings of securities in
the underlying portfolios for classes that are on Negative Rating
Outlook.  The Loss Severity (LS) ratings indicate each tranche's
potential loss severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio
of tranche size to the expected loss for the collateral under the
'B' stress.  The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with probability of default indicated by a class'
long-term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign Rating Outlooks or
LS ratings to notes rated category 'CCC' and lower.  Fitch
currently does not assign Recovery Ratings to notes of SF CDOs.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

ACA ABS 2002-1, Limited/ LLC

  -- $34,359,462 class A notes affirmed at 'BBB', Outlook Stable,
     LS rating revised to 'LS4' from 'LS3';

  -- $64,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';

  -- $17,441,217 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM and cash flow model analysis on ACA 2002-1.
Since Fitch's last review in September 2009, 24.6% of the
portfolio has been downgraded a weighted average of 2.9 notches.
The effect of the decline in credit quality has been offset by
increased CE levels for the class A notes due to the deleveraging
of the transaction.  As of the August 2010 distribution date,
approximately 88.7% of the class A notes' original principal
balance has amortized down with 3.8% paid down since the last
review.  As a result, the CE available to the class A notes
increased from 62%, at last review, to 68.7%.  The Outlook remains
Stable on the class A notes due to cash flow model analysis, which
indicates that notes can withstand further moderate negative
migration in most scenarios.

ACA ABS 2002-1 is a SF CDO that closed on July 29, 2002.  The
portfolio was initially selected by Terwin Money Management LLC
and is now monitored by is monitored by Solidus Capital, LLC.  As
of the June 30, 2010 report, the portfolio is composed of
residential mortgage backed securities consumer and commercial
asset backed securities, commercial mortgage backed securities,
and SF CDOs primarily of the 2003 and 2004 vintages.

Commodore CDO II, LTD./Corp.

  -- $63,974,959 class A-1MM notes downgraded the long-term rating
     to 'CC' from 'CCC' and affirmed the short-term rating at 'C';

  -- $24,336,366 class A-2(a) notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $772,583 class A-2(b) notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $48,600,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $9,025,054 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on Commodore II but did not cash
flow model the transaction.  Since Fitch's last review in November
2009, approximately 46% of the portfolio has been downgraded a
weighted average of 2.3 notches.  Interest collections are not
sufficient to fulfill the entire accrued interest owed to the
class A-2(a) and A-2(b), together class A-2, notes.  Principal
proceeds are being used to fulfill the remaining class A-2
interest distribution and the entire class B accrued interest
amount.  The CE level for the class A-1MM notes exceeds the losses
expected from the distressed portion of the portfolio; however,
the resulting 'CCC' RLR from SF PCM is higher than the class A-1
MM notes' CE level.  The losses expected from the distressed
portion of the portfolio already significantly exceed the CE
levels of the remaining classes in the transaction.

The short-term rating on the class A-1MM notes is based on the
availability of support provided to these notes by the put
agreement provided by AIG Financial Products Corp., whose payment
obligations are absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed by
American International Group, Inc. (rated 'BBB/F1' with a Stable
Outlook by Fitch).  The availability of this put agreement is
contingent upon, among other conditions, the continued fulfillment
of interest payments and the ultimate payment of principal to the
class A-1MM notes.  Therefore, the short-term rating is
commensurate with the likelihood of default of the long-term
rating.

Commodore CDO II is a SF CDO that closed on Dec. 12, 2003 and is
managed by Fischer Francis Trees & Watts, Inc. As of the June 7,
2010 report, the portfolio is composed of RMBS, commercial and
consumer ABS, corporate and SF CDOs and CMBS from 2000 through
2006 vintage transactions.

Fort Point CDO I, Ltd.

  -- $107,808,854 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
  -- $33,000,000 class A-2a notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,000,000 class A-2b notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $14,000,000 class A-3a notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,000,000 class A-3b notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $12,000,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch did not perform SF PCM or cash flow model analysis on Fort
Point I.  Since Fitch's last review in September 2009,
approximately 34.8% of the portfolio has been downgraded a
weighted average of 3.5 notches.  The losses expected from the
distressed portion of the portfolio already exceed the CE level of
the class A-1 notes.  Although a small portion of interest is
being used to pay down the notes, it is not sufficient to offset
the expected losses.

Fort Point I is a SF CDO that closed on Oct. 24, 2002.  The
portfolio was initially selected by State Street Research and is
now managed by BlackRock Financial Management.  The transaction
entered an event of default on Oct. 6, 2009 due to the class A
notes being undercollateralized.  To date, the trustee has not
been directed to accelerate the transaction.  As of the July 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, SF CDOs,
corporate CDOs, senior unsecured debt issued by the real estate
investment trusts (REITs), commercial and consumer ABS, and CMBS
primarily from 1997 through 2004 vintage transactions.

Northlake CDO I, Ltd./Corp.

  -- $86,406,298 class I-MM notes affirmed at 'CCC';
  -- $49,798,697 class I-A notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $45,000,000 class II notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $14,439,378 class III notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $14,000,000 preferred shares affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on Northlake but did not cash flow
model the transaction.  Since Fitch's last review in November
2009, approximately 19.5% of the portfolio has been downgraded a
weighted average of 4.3 notches.  Interest collections are
insufficient to pay the entire hedge counterparty payment and all
interest to the class I-MM, I-A, and II notes is being fulfilled
through the use of principal.  The class III notes and the
preference shares are no longer receiving interest distributions.
The class I-MM CE level is consistent with the 'CCC' rating loss
rate in SF PCM and it has been affirmed at 'CCC'.  The losses
expected from the distressed portion of the portfolio exceed the
CE levels for the all other classes of notes and therefore they
have been affirmed at 'C'.

Northlake is a cash flow CDO that closed on Feb. 26, 2003 and is
monitored by Deerfield Capital Management LLC.  As of the June 30,
2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, corporate
and SF CDOs, CMBS, and commercial and consumer ABS primarily from
2001 through 2005 vintage transactions.

Pasadena CDO, Ltd.

  -- $109,444,006 class A notes downgraded to 'BB/LS3' from
     'BBB/LS3', Outlook Negative;

  -- $66,500,000 class B notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';

  -- $26,500,000 class C notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM and cash flow model analysis on Pasadena
CDO.  Since Fitch's last review in October 2009, 22.4% of the
portfolio has been downgraded a weighted average of 6.8 notches.
Interest proceeds are insufficient to pay the entire hedge
counterparty payment and all interest to the class A and class B
notes is being fulfilled through the use of principal.  The class
A notes' breakeven rates are generally consistent with the 'BB'
rating category.  The class B CE level is comparable to the
expected loss calculation and default appears probable; therefore,
the class B notes have been downgraded to 'CC'.  The losses
expected from the distressed portion of the portfolio exceed the
CE levels for the class C notes and therefore they have been
affirmed at 'C'.

Pasadena CDO is a SF CDO that closed on June 21, 2002, and is
monitored by Western Asset Management Co.  As of the June 30, 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is compromised of RMBS, commercial
and consumer ABS, commercial real estate loan credit tenant
leases, SF CDOs and CMBS from primarily 1997 through 2005 vintage
transactions.

Saturn Ventures I, Inc.

  -- $54,655,243 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'AA/LS3' from
     'AAA/LS3', Outlook remains Negative;

  -- $44,611,659 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'BB/LS3', Outlook
     remains Negative;

  -- $23,198,063 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $19,407,603 class B notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM and cash flow model analysis on Saturn
Ventures I.  Since Fitch's last review in November 2009,
approximately 27.2% of the portfolio has been downgraded a
weighted average of 4.3 notches.  In addition to the credit
deterioration, the class A-1 notes are sensitive to interest rate
volatility.  Approximately 73.2% of the portfolio is comprised of
fixed rate assets, and in a rising interest rate stress, the
amount of excess spread currently available to redeem the class A-
1 notes will be significantly reduced.  The class A-2 notes are
also sensitive to changes in interest rates, though to a lesser
extent and so are affirmed at 'BB'.

Saturn Ventures I is a SF CDO that closed on Oct. 29, 2003, and is
monitored by Church Tavern Advisors, LLC.  As of the July 27, 2010
trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of CMBS, RMBS,
corporate and SF CDOs, REITs and consumer ABS from 1998 through
2005 vintage transactions.

Solstice ABS CDO III, Ltd

  -- $6,314,791 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAA/LS5', Outlook
     Negative;

  -- $107,500,000 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $47,500,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $21,282,531 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'C';

  -- $6,016,781 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM and cash flow model analysis on Solstice
III.  Since Fitch's last review in November 2009, 40.7% of the
portfolio has been downgraded a weighted average of 4.3 notches.
The transaction entered an event of default on July 20, 2009 due
to the collective class A notes being undercollateralized.
Interest proceeds are insufficient to pay the entire class B
accrued interest amount; therefore, the remaining portion is
fulfilled through the use of principal.  The effect of the decline
in credit quality has been offset by increased CE levels for the
class A-1 notes due to the deleveraging of the transaction.  As of
the June 2010 distribution date, approximately 98.2% of the class
A-1 notes' original principal balance has amortized down, with
72.5% paid down since the last review.  The class A-1 notes'
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the 'AAA' rating
category.  It is likely that the class A-1 notes will be paid in
full within the next year.  The losses expected from the
distressed portion of the portfolio exceeds the CE levels for the
all other classes notes and therefore they have been affirmed at
'C'.

Solstice III is a SF CDO that closed on Nov. 13, 2003 and is
managed by Rabobank International.  As of the June 2010 trustee
report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS, corporate and SF CDOs,
and consumer and commercial ABS, from primarily 2002 through 2005
vintage transactions.

Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO III, Ltd.

  -- $66,967,651 class A-1 notes downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC';
  -- $60,750,000 class A-2 notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $9,000,000 class B notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $8,661,846 class C notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $15,288,538 class D notes affirmed at 'C';
  -- $16,000,000 Preferred Shares affirmed at 'C'.

Fitch performed SF PCM analysis on Trainer Wortham III, but did
not cash flow model the transaction.  Since Fitch's last review in
November 2009, 39% of the portfolio has been downgraded a weight
average of 3.6 notches.  Additionally, a small portion of
principal proceeds is being used to pay interest due to the class
A-2 and class B notes.  The CE level for the class A-1 notes
exceeds the losses expected from the distressed portion of the
portfolio; however, the resulting 'CCC' RLR from SF PCM is higher
than the class A-1 notes' CE level.

Trainer Wortham III is a SF CDO that closed on Feb. 19, 2003, and
is monitored by First Republic Investment Management.  As of the
July 27, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of RMBS,
commercial ABS, corporate and SF CDOs, and CMBS from 2002 through
2006 vintage transactions.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six Tranches From Three CDO Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
tranches from three U.S. trust preferred securities collateralized
debt obligation transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  The tranches with lowered ratings
have a total issuance amount of $1.203 billion.

The downgrades reflect three primary factors:

* The application of S&P's corporate CDO criteria;

* The application of S&P's revised recovery assumptions for TruPS
  issued by U.S. banks; and

In most cases, significant deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying asset portfolios due to increased exposure to
obligors that have either defaulted or deferred payments on TruPS,
along with an increase in the number of TruPS that experienced
downgrades into the 'CCC' range.

In July 2010, S&P stated that S&P has observed severe negative
credit migration and significant increases in defaults and
deferrals in the pools of underlying assets for TruPS CDOS.  In
January 2009, S&P indicated its view that the economic and
regulatory conditions pointed to a potential increase in the
number of U.S. banks that defer on their TruPS payment
obligations.  Since January 2009, S&P has observed significant
increases in the number of deferrals of U.S. Bank TruPS held by
the CDOs S&P rate.  While the rate of increase in the number of
deferrals may have recently slowed, S&P believes the economic and
regulatory conditions at the root of these deferrals continue to
unfold.

S&P expects to continue reviewing the remaining TruPS CDO
transactions with ratings S&P placed on CreditWatch following its
corporate CDO criteria update and to resolve the CreditWatch
status of the affected tranches.

                          Rating Actions

                                            Rating
                                            ------
  Transaction                      Class  To     From
  -----------                      -----  --     ----
  MMCaps Funding XVIII Ltd.        A-1    CCC-   BBB-/Watch Neg
  MMCaps Funding XVIII Ltd.        A-2    CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities VIII   A-1    CCC+   BBB-/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities VIII   A-2    CCC-   BB+/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XXVI   A-1    CCC    BB/Watch Neg
  Preferred Term Securities XXVI   A-2    CCC-   B+/Watch Neg


* S&P Puts Ratings on Three Tranches on CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on three
tranches from three corporate-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transactions on CreditWatch with positive implications.
At the same time, S&P placed its ratings on one tranche from one
corporate-backed synthetic CDO transaction and two tranches from
two synthetic CDOs backed by residential mortgage-backed
securities on CreditWatch negative.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on three tranches from two corporate-backed synthetic CDO
transactions and 10 tranches from one synthetic CDO backed by
commercial mortgage-backed securities and removed them from
CreditWatch negative.  The CreditWatch placements and affirmations
followed S&P's monthly review of U.S. synthetic CDO transactions.

The CreditWatch negative placements reflect negative rating
migration in the respective portfolios and synthetic rated
overcollateralization ratios that had fallen below 100% as of the
July month-end run.  The CreditWatch positive placements reflect
improvements in the respective portfolios and SROC ratios that had
risen above 100% at the next higher rating level.  The
affirmations reflect SROC ratios that had increased to 100% or
above as of the month-end run.

                          Rating Actions

                       ABACUS 2006-17 Ltd.

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                     To                From
    -----                     --                ----
    E                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    F                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    G                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    H                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    J                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    K                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    L                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    M                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    N                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg
    O                         CCC-              CCC-/Watch Neg

                  CypressTree Synthetic CDO Ltd.
                        Series 2005-1,3,4&6

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                     To                From
    -----                     --                ----
    2005-1                    BBB-              BBB-/Watch Neg
    2005-3                    BB-               BB-/Watch Neg

                       Lunar Funding I Ltd.
                            Series 10

                                          Rating
                                          ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         10                        B-/Watch Pos      B-

                       Lunar Funding I Ltd.
                            Series 11

                                          Rating
                                          ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         11                        CCC-/Watch Pos    CCC-

                     Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
                          Series 2006-36

                                          Rating
                                          ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         A                         CCC-/Watch Pos    CCC-

                        Newport Waves CDO
                             Series 4

                                     Rating
                                     ------
    Class                     To                From
    -----                     --                ----
    A3-YLS                    B+                B+/Watch Neg

                    Rutland Rated Investments
                            Series 13

                                          Rating
                                          ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         Series 13                 BBB-/Watch Neg    BBB-

                    Rutland Rated Investments
                            Series 14

                                          Rating
                                          ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         Series 14                 CCC+/Watch Neg    CCC+

                    Strata Trust Series 2006-2

                                          Rating
                                          ------
         Class                     To                From
         -----                     --                ----
         Notes                     CCC+/Watch Neg    CCC+



                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
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Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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                  *** End of Transmission ***