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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

           Sunday, September 12, 2010, Vol. 14, No. 253

                            Headlines

505 CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
ACT 2005-RR: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1FL Certificates
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2002-PB2 Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2000-WF1 Certificates
BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on Revenue Bonds

CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Tranches
CEDARWOODS CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-FL2 Certs.
CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-TFL1 Certs.

CWABS REVOLVING: S&P Corrects Rating on Class 2-A to 'CCC'
DECO SERIES 2005: Fitch Affirms EUR5.7MM Class H Notes at 'CCCsf'
DELAWARE HEALTH: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'BB' Rating
FRIEDBERGMILSTEIN PRIVATE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Notes
G-FORCE 2005-RR2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-RR2 Notes

G-FORCE CDO: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
GALLERY AT: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 2000-C5C Certificates
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Puts Note Ratings on Negative Watch
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-C1 Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-FL3 Certs.

GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 2003-CIBC7 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Confirms Rating on Series 2003-C1 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 27 2006-LDP9 Certs.
JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-C1 Certs.

KENT FUNDING: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class X Notes From 'B1'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2000-C5 Certs.
LEHMAN XS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 72 Tranches
LNR CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
LOCAL INSIGHT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2001-Canada 5 Notes
NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 100 Tranches
OPUS CDO: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Super Senior Swap to 'Ca'
ORION 2006-1: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Four Classes
RUTLAND RATED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

SACO I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 57 Tranches From 29 RMBS
SACRAMENTO-YOLO PORT: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Rating on Bonds
STARTS LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Tranche
VERDE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2004-C14 Securities

WAMU COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 27 Classes of Certs.

* Fitch Downgrades Island Refinancing Srl's Class B Notes
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Lehman Currency Swap Deals
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Classes From Five CMBS Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Rating on Martinez, California's Bonds to 'BB+'
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches From Six Hybrid CDOs

* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 70 Classes From 31 North American CMBS
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes From Four CMBS Transactions

                            *********

505 CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by 505 CLO III Ltd.:

  -- US$62,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf),

  -- US$48,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     August 2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 25,
     2009 Upgraded to A3 (sf),

  -- US$25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf),

  -- US$15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due August 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     September 25, 2009 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from the delevering of the Class A-1 and Class
A-2 Notes, which have been paid down by approximately 51% or
$241.8 million since the last rating action in September 2009.
As a result of the delevering, the overcollateralization ratios
have increased since the last rating action in September 2009.
As of the latest trustee report dated July 30, 2010, the Class
A/B, and Class C overcollateralization ratios increased to
167.46% and 147% respectively, compared to August 2009 levels of
135.56% and 125.09%, respectively.

Despite improvements in the overcollateralization ratios, however,
Moody's notes that the transaction has experienced credit
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio
since the rating action in September 2009.  Based on the July 2010
trustee report, the weighted average rating factor is 3631
compared to 3553 in August 2009, and securities rated Caa1 and
below make up approximately 24.5% of the underlying portfolio
versus 20.2% in August 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $563.6 million, defaulted par of $21.8 million,
weighted average default probability of 28% (implying a WARF of
4916), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.95%,
and a diversity score of 30.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

505 CLO III Ltd., issued in August of 2008, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans of middle market issuers.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs
that were not updated within the last 15 months, which currently
account for approximately 1.2% of the collateral balance.  In
addition, Moody's applied a 1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade
for CEs last updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-
equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12
months ago.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3933)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5899)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -2

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (45.95%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (41.95%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates.  In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.


ACT 2005-RR: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Class A-1FL Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on class A-
1FL from ACT 2005-RR Depositor Corp. and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on two other classes and removed
them from CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrade and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis of
the transaction following its rating actions on the commercial
mortgage-backed securities certificates that collateralize ACT
2005-RR.  The CMBS certificates are from seven CMBS transactions
and total $59.1 million (11.9% of total asset balance).  S&P
downgraded 11 of these certificates ($45.7 million, 9.2%) to 'D'.
S&P also lowered its credit estimates on a portion of the CMBS
collateral S&P doesn't rate ($94.9 million, 19.2%).

According to the Aug. 23, 2010, trustee report, ACT 2005-RR is
collateralized by 106 CMBS classes ($495.1 million, 100%) from 38
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2004.  ACT 2005-RR
has exposure to these CMBS transactions that Standard & Poor's has
downgraded:

* COMM 2004-LNB4 (classes H through N; $24.6 million, 5%);

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
  2004-LN2 (classes N and P; $12.1 million, 2.4%);

* DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CF1 (class B8; $8.9 million,
  1.8%); and

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2003-C9
  (classes N and O; $8.6 million, 1.7%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed ACT 2005-RR and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

       Rating Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    ACT 2005-RR Depositor Corp.

                                Rating
                                ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       A-1FL            CCC- (sf)        BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    ACT 2005-RR Depositor Corp.

                                Rating
                                ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       A-2              CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-3              CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Reviews Ratings on 10 2002-PB2 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed 10 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-PB2 on review for possible downgrade due
to higher expected losses for the pool resulting from actual and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly performing
watchlisted loans and concerns about refinance risk in an adverse
environment.  Eighty-nine loans, representing 99% of the pool,
mature within the next 36 months.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$16.86493M Cl. C Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 29, 2008 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$14.054108M Cl. D Certificate, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 29, 2008 Upgraded
     to Aa2 (sf)

  -- US$19.675751M Cl. E Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 29, 2008 Upgraded
     to A1 (sf)

  -- US$11.243286M Cl. F Certificate, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 22, 2002 Definitive
     Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- US$14.054108M Cl. G Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$16.86493M Cl. H Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 22, 2002 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$14.054108M Cl. J Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 22, 2002
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$16.86493M Cl. K Certificate, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 22, 2002 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$19.675751M Cl. L Certificate, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 28, 2005
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$8.432465M Cl. M Certificate, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Feb. 28, 2005
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated May 29, 2008.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

                     Deal Performance

As of the August 11, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 33% to
$755.6 million from $1.12 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 90 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 39% of the pool.  Twenty loans, representing 20% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 23%
of the pool.

Twenty-one loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $21.2 million loss (31% loss severity on
average).  Currently eight loans, representing 13% of the pool,
are in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is
the 880 Troy Corporate Center Loan ($28.1 million -- 3.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a total of 186,565 office building
located in Troy, Michigan.  The loan was transferred to special
servicing in January 2010 due to imminent default due to the
termination clause in the sole tenants lease.  The tenant has not
yet terminated.  The remaining seven specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of multifamily, office and retail properties.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


BEAR STEARNS: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Six 2000-WF1 Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2000-WF1, a
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of the remaining collateral
in the pool, the deal structure, and the interest shortfalls that
have affected the trust.

S&P downgraded classes H, I, and J to 'D (sf)' due to recurring
interest shortfalls.  The driver of the interest shortfalls that
have affected these classes is a nonrecoverable advance
determination made in June 2010 by the master servicer, Wells
Fargo Bank N.A., on the Circuit City Corporate Headquarters asset.
S&P lowered its ratings on classes E, F, and G, as these classes
are highly susceptible to future interest shortfalls.  The monthly
interest shortfall amount, as per the Aug. 16, 2010, trustee
remittance report, was $205,878.  This resulted in all of the
classes subordinate to class G to short 100% of their optimal
accrued certificate interest.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Aug. 16, 2010, trustee remittance report, eight assets
($43.1 million, 60.2%) in the pool, all of which are among the top
10 real estate exposures, were with the special servicer, Berkadia
Commercial Mortgage LLC.  The payment status of the specially
serviced assets, as reported, is as follows: two are real
estate owned ($20.4 million, 28.4%), three are in foreclosure
($10.5 million, 14.8%), and three are matured balloons
($12.2 million, 17.0%).  Two of the specially serviced assets
($10.5 million, 14.6%) have appraisal reduction amounts in effect
totaling $1.8 million.  Wells Fargo has also indicated that an
ARA on another asset, the Lakeview Square Shopping Center loan
($1.8 million, 2.6%), in the amount of $1.1 million will be
implemented as early as the September remittance report date.

The Circuit City Corporate Headquarters asset, a five-story,
288,600-sq.-ft. office building in Richmond, Va., is the largest
real estate exposure in the pool with a total exposure of
$18.4 million (21.2%).  The property is currently 100% vacant and
became REO on Aug. 25, 2009.  Berkadia has stated that the
property is under contract for sale, and it anticipates the
transaction to close as early as next month.  In June 2010, the
master servicer determined future advances on this asset to be
nonrecoverable and stopped advancing on the asset.  At the same
time, Wells Fargo began recouping prior advances and interest
thereon associated with the asset.  The total exposure amount
includes approximately $3.2 million of advancing and interest
thereon.  To date, Wells Fargo has recovered only $120,751 of
prior advances.  S&P's analysis of the transaction considered the
potential for additional interest shortfalls that could occur if
Wells Fargo decides to recover a greater portion of the previously
advanced amounts.  S&P expects losses in excess of 100% of the
pooled trust balance upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Tustin French Quarter loan ($6.2 million, 8.7%), the second-
largest asset with Berkadia, is the second-largest real estate
exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured by an 89,800-sq.-ft.
anchored retail strip center in Tustin, Calif.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on March 29, 2010, due to
imminent maturity default, and the loan matured on April 1, 2010.
The reported debt service coverage was 1.13x for year-end 2008,
and occupancy was 96.2% as of year-end 2009.  Berkadia has
indicated that it has ordered an updated appraisal and is
currently in discussions with the borrower to workout the loan.
If a loan modification or extension does not occur, S&P expects a
moderate loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The IDC Petaluma asset ($5.3 million, 7.3%), the third-largest
asset with Berkadia, is the third-largest real estate exposure in
the pool.  The 86,500-sq.-ft. flex industrial/warehouse property
in Petaluma, Calif., recently became REO on July 15, 2010,
following a foreclosure auction.  According to Berkadia, it is
currently working with the receiver to lease-up the vacant space.
The property, which had been 100% vacant since February 2007, is
now 40.5% occupied after a new lease was signed.  An ARA of
$348,179 is in effect against the asset.  The July 2010 appraisal
valued the property at a level that is significantly below the
total exposure of $6.4 million on the asset.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Lake Highlands Plaza asset ($5.2 million, 7.3%), a 98,600-sq.-
ft. retail strip center in Dallas, Texas, is the fourth-largest
asset with Berkadia and the fourth-largest real estate exposure in
the pool.  The property was 14.0% occupied as of June 2010 and
became REO on Jan. 5, 2010.  Berkadia stated that it is currently
evaluating several offers for the property.  An ARA of
$1.5 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Nahatan Place loan ($4.1 million, 5.8%), the fifth-largest
asset with Berkadia, is the fifth-largest real estate exposure in
the pool.  The loan is secured by a 46,600-sq.-ft. retail strip
center in Norwood, Mass.  The loan was transferred to Berkadia on
Nov. 19, 2009, after the borrower did not pay off the loan upon
its Nov. 1, 2009, maturity date.  The reported DSC was 1.00x for
year-end 2009, and occupancy was 58.8% as of May 2010.  According
to Berkadia, the borrower is currently operating under a
forbearance agreement until Nov. 1, 2010.

The remaining three specially serviced assets ($7.1 million, 9.9%)
have balances that individually represent less than 4.4% of the
total pool balance.  S&P estimated losses for two ($4.9 million,
6.9%) of the specially serviced assets.  The weighted average loss
severity for these two assets was 46.4%.  The remaining specially
serviced asset, the Rite Aid loan ($2.2 million, 3.0%), has been
modified and extended until Nov. 1, 2011.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the Aug. 16, 2010, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $71.6 million, which is 8.1% of the balance at
issuance.  The pool includes 28 loans and two REO assets, down
from 181 loans at issuance.  Wells Fargo provided financial
information for 97.8% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, 73.5%
of which was partial- or full-year 2008, and 24.3% was full-year
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.29x for the
pool based on the servicer-reported figures, which exclude eight
defeased loans ($13.0 million, 18.2%).  Two loans ($3.7 million,
5.1%) in the pool are on the master servicer's watchlist,
including one of the top 10 exposures, which S&P discuss below.
Five loans ($18.4 million, 25.7%) have a reported DSC below 1.10x,
three of which ($13.4 million, 18.7%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.00x.  The transaction has experienced $8.6 million in
principal losses to date.

             Summary of Top 10 Real Estate Exposures

The top 10 real estate exposures have an aggregate outstanding
balance of $48.1 million (67.2%).  Using servicer-reported
numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.17x for the
top 10 real estate exposures.  The servicer-reported numbers are
based on the last reported DSC figures, which include partial- or
full-year 2008 financial information for eight of the top 10
exposures (89.6% of the top 10 exposures balance).  The servicer-
reported numbers also include a 1.57x DSC for the nine months
ended Sept. 30, 2008, for the Circuit City Corporate Headquarters
asset (31.5% of the top 10 exposures balance).  Eight of the top
10 exposures ($43.1 million, 60.2%) are with the special servicer
as detailed above, while the seventh-largest exposure
($2.9 million, 4.1%) appears on the master servicer's watchlist,
which S&P discuss in detail below.

The Loera Industrial Portfolio loan ($2.9 million, 4.1%), the
seventh-largest real estate exposure in the pool, is the largest
loan on Wells Fargo's watchlist.  This loan, secured by three
industrial (warehouse/distribution) properties totaling 273,200
sq. ft. in Brownsville and Los Indios, Texas, appears on the
watchlist due to a low combined DSC of 0.91x for year-end 2009.
The combined occupancy for the portfolio was 80.3% as of February
2010.  According to Wells Fargo, the borrower is actively
marketing the vacant space.

Standard & Poor's stressed the assets in the pool according to its
criteria, and the analysis is consistent with its lowered ratings.

                          Ratings Lowered

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF1

                   Rating
                   ------
    Class     To            From         Credit enhancement (%)
    -----     --            ----         ----------------------
    E         B+ (sf)       A (sf)                        87.20
    F         B- (sf)       A- (sf)                       74.79
    G         CCC- (sf)     BBB (sf)                      53.08
    H         D (sf)        BB+ (sf)                      34.47
    I         D (sf)        BB (sf)                       25.17
    J         D (sf)        B+ (sf)                       17.42


BEXAR COUNTY: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on Revenue Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed B3 rating on Bexar County
Housing Finance Corporation's (Honey Creek/Austin Point
Apartments) Multifamily Housing Revenue Bonds Series 2000A and C
rating on Series 2000C bonds.  The outlook on the Series 2000A
remains negative.  This rating action is based on the continued
weak debt service coverage levels based on the current operating
performance, and failure to pay debt service on the Series 2000C
bonds.  The negative outlook reflects continued deteriorating
performance of the project and incorporates forecasts for weak
occupancy for the submarket in the near term.

Legal Security: The bonds are limited obligations payable solely
from the revenues, receipts and security pledged in the Trust
Indenture.

                   Recent Developments/Results:

Although occupancy at the project has risen to 91-94% range in
February and March of 2010 it has subsequently slightly declined
to approximately 90% in July of 2010.  The average occupancy for
the North Central San Antonio submarket, is forecasted to remain
weak, averaging approximately 94% in 2010, according to CB Richard
Ellis.

As per the interim 2010 operating statements debt service coverage
remained weak, indicating continued challenged operating
performance of the project.  Furthermore, due to the reserve and
replacement fund remaining underfunded capital expenditures are
likely being funded from operations.  On April 1, 2010, the
Trustee indicates that the Series 2000C debt service was not paid.
The Series 2000A debt service reserve fund remains fully funded.
Series 2000C debt service and debt service reserve funds remain
underfunded.

Moody's affirmation of 2000A bonds at the B3 rating level reflects
continued low occupancy at the project and weakening debt service
coverage.  Moody's current C rating on the Series 2000C bonds
reflects failure to pay debt service on the bonds and low
potential for recovery.

Outlook

The outlook for the Series 2000A bonds remains negative based upon
continued deteriorating financial position of the project.


CAPITAL ONE: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Seven Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has placed on review for possible upgrade seven tranches
from five auto loan securitizations sponsored by Capital One Auto
Finance, Inc between 2006 and 2007.

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2006-B

  -- Cl. A-4, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec. 14, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3;
     previously on Feb. 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec. 14, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2006-C

  -- Cl. A-4, Aa2 (sf)Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Dec. 14, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company WR;
     previously on March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec. 14, 2009 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-A

  -- Cl. A-4, Baa2(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation Caa2;
     previously on 3/26/2010 Placed on review for possible upgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on April 1, 2008 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-B

  -- Cl. A-4, Baa2(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Feb. 18, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation B3;
     previously on Feb. 18, 2009 Downgraded to B3 from Baa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on May 16, 2007 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Capital One Auto Finance Trust 2007-C

  -- Cl. A-3-A, Baa2(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on April 7, 2008 Upgraded to Baa2(sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company WR;
     previously on March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Oct. 1, 2007 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3-B, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on April 7, 2008 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company WR;
     previously on March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Oct. 1, 2007 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on April 7, 2008 Upgraded to Baa2(sf)

  -- Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company WR;
     previously on March 24, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1

  -- Underlying Rating: Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Oct. 1, 2007 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of lower lifetime cumulative net loss
expectations and build-up in credit enhancement relative to
remaining losses due to the non-declining nature of reserve
accounts in the transactions.

Moody's current lifetime CNL expectations (expressed as a
percentage of the original pool balances) for the 2006-B ranges
between 10.25% and 11.25%.  For the 2006-C, the current
expectation ranges between 9.75% and 10.75%.  The CNL expectations
are being revised down from 11.50% and 11.00% respectively for the
2006-B and 2006-C transactions.

The pool factors are approximately 14% and 17% of the original
pool balance for the 2006-B and 2006-C respectively, and hard
credit enhancement, that does not include excess spread of
approximately 6% per annum, for the Cl. A notes as a percentage of
the remaining collateral balance, is approximately 20% and 22%
respectively.

For the three transactions that were issued in 2007, Moody's
current lifetime CNL expectations are 10.50% to 11.50%, 8.25% to
9.25%, and 8.75% to 9.75% for the 2007-A, 2007-B, and 2007-C,
respectively.  These expectations are also being revised down from
Moody's previous expectations that ranged between 10% to 12.50%.

The pool factors on these transactions range between approximately
21% and 29% of the original pool balance.  Total hard credit
enhancement, that does not include excess spread of approximately
5%-6% per annum, for the Cl. A notes, as a percentage of the
remaining collateral balance, ranges between 14% and 18%.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current macroeconomic environment, in which
unemployment continues to rise, and weakness in the used vehicle
market.  Moody's currently views the used vehicle market as
stronger now than it was a year ago, when the uncertainty relating
to the economy as well as the future of the U.S auto manufacturers
was significantly greater.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The underlying ratings reflect the intrinsic credit quality of the
securities in the absence of the transactions' guarantees from
monoline bond insurers.  The current ratings on the securities are
consistent with Moody's practice of rating insured securities at
the higher of the guarantor's insurance financial strength rating
and any underlying rating.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


CEDARWOODS CRE: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes from Cedarwoods CRE CDO II Ltd. and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its
ratings on three other classes from this transaction and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following its rating actions on commercial
mortgage-backed securities, commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation, and resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit securities that serve as collateral in Cedarwoods II.  The
rated collateral securities are from 74 transactions and total
$529.7 million (63.9% of the total asset balance).  The downgrades
also reflect S&P's lowered credit estimates on a portion of the
unrated collateral securities ($58.4 million, 7.0%).

According to the Aug. 19, 2010, trustee report, the collateral for
Cedarwoods II totaled $829.6 million, and the transaction's
liabilities totaled $600 million.  The current assets included:

* 201 classes of CMBS ($669.3 million, 80.7%) from 110 distinct
  transactions issued from 1999 through 2008;

* 28 classes of re-REMIC and CRE CDO securities ($141.5 million,
  17.1%) from 18 transactions; and

* Five real estate investment trust (REIT) securities
  ($18.8 million, 2.3%).

Cedarwoods II has exposure to these transactions that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:

* LNR CDO 2002-1 Ltd. (classes E-FL, G, and H; $33.0 million,
  4.0%);

* Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PW14
  (classes AJ, B, D, F, and G; $26.1 million, 3.1%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-5 (classes B, C,
  and F; $22.2 million, 2.7%);

* CD 2006-CD3 Mortgage Trust (classes AJ, C, E, F, H, and J;
  $21.4 million, 2.6%); and

* JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-LDP8
  (classes AJ, B, and C; $19.5 million, 2.4%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed Cedarwoods II and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    Cedarwoods CRE CDO II Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       A-1              AA- (sf)         AAA/Watch Neg (sf)
       A-2              A+ (sf)          AAA/Watch Neg (sf)
       A-3              A (sf)           AAA/Watch Neg (sf)
       B                A- (sf)          AA/Watch Neg (sf)
       C                BBB+ (sf)        A/Watch Neg (sf)

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    Cedarwoods CRE CDO II Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       D                BBB (sf)         BBB/Watch Neg (sf)
       E                BBB- (sf)        BBB-/Watch Neg (sf)
       F                BB (sf)          BB/Watch Neg (sf)


COLTS 2007-1: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by CoLTS 2007-1 Ltd.:

  -- US$22,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2021 Notes,
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 19, 2009
     Confirmed at Aa2 (sf);

  -- US$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes due 2021
     Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on October 19, 2009
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf).

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the rating of these notes:

  -- US$10,000,000 Combination Notes Due 2021 (current rated
     balance of $7,414,481), Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     October 19, 2009 downgrade to Ba2 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the Class B and
Class C Notes result primarily from the delevering of the Class A
Notes, which have been paid down by approximately 37% or $97.4
million since the last rating action in October 2009.  As a result
of the delevering, the Class B and Class C overcollateralization
ratios have increased since the last rating action in October
2009.  As of the latest trustee report dated August 6, 2010, the
Class B, and Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at
148.3%, and 121.9% respectively, versus September 2009 levels of
136.9%, and 119.9% respectively.

Despite improvements in the Class B and Class C
overcollateralization ratios, however, Moody's notes that the
transaction has experienced deterioration in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in October 2009.
Based on the August 2010 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 3242 compared to 3168 in September 2009, and
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 18.2% of the
underlying portfolio versus 10.0% in September 2009.

The downgrade action on the Combination Notes is driven by the
continued failure of both the Class E overcollateralization test
and the interest diversion test since December 2009, which
resulted from an increase in excess Caa haircuts.  As a result,
cash flows to preference shares have been shut off, and
consequently the rated balance of the Combination Notes has not
declined as rapidly as previously anticipated during the last
rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $282.9 million, defaulted par of $25.6 million,
weighted average default probability of 29.21% (implying a WARF of
4842), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.98%,
and a diversity score of 35.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

CoLTS 2007-1 Ltd., issued in February of 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans of middle market issuers.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming a 1.5 notch-equivalent downgrade for CEs last
updated between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent
downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.  For each
CE where the related exposure constitutes more than 3% of the
collateral pool, Moody's applied a 2-notch equivalent assumed
downgrade (but only on the CEs representing in aggregate the
largest 30% of the pool).

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, where a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3874)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +2
  -- Class E: +2
  - Combo Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5810)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: -1
  -- Class C: -1
  -- Class D: -1
  -- Class E: -3
  - Combo Notes: 0

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, where a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.98%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: +1
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: 0
  - Combo Notes: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.98%)
  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B: 0
  -- Class C: 0
  -- Class D: 0
  -- Class E: -1
  - Combo Notes: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates.  In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.  Moody's also conducted stress
   tests to assess the collateral pool's concentration risk in
   obligors bearing a credit estimate that constitute more than 3%
   of the collateral pool.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Four 2001-FL2 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
and affirmed one class of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-FL2.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$5.76M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Nov 22, 2004 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- US$5.88M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Jan 26, 2006 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$4.90M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Jan 26, 2006 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- US$5.88M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Jan 26, 2006 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- US$1.96M Cl. N Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on
     Nov 22, 2004 Downgraded to C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to the continued poor performance of the
single remaining asset in the trust (Hotel Royal Plaza) and higher
expected losses.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in
2001 and has been REO since 2005.  A current appraisal report has
valued the property at $28.7 million and the trust amount is $35
million.  As of August, 17, 2010, the interest shortfalls and
servicer advances total $24.2 million.  The affirmation is due to
the rating being in-line with loss expectations.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be
mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in
collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels due
to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due
to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.  The model also
incorporates a supplementary tool to allow for the testing of the
credit support at various rating levels.  The scenario or "blow-
up" analysis tests the credit support for a rating assuming that
all loans in the pool default with an average loss severity that
is commensurate with the rating level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 3, 2009.  The
previous review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep and incorporated assumptions for capitalization rates and
stressed cash flows that were outlined in "Rating Methodology
Update: US CMBS Conduit and Fusion Review Prompted by Declining
Property Values and Rising Delinquencies" dated February 5, 2009.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on
moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $35 million
from $619 million at securitization as the result of the payoff of
30 loans originally in the pool.  The Certificates are now
collateralized by a single mortgage loan.

The pool has experienced $16.6 million of losses since
securitization.  As of August 17, 2010, servicer advances total
$12.0 million.

The remaining loan in the pool is Hotel Royal Plaza, a 394 room
full service hotel located in Lake Buena Vista, Florida.  The
property went into special servicing in November of 2001 and has
been Real Estate Owned (REO) since September 2005.  The hotel has
a negative net cash flow for the first six months of 2010.  The
February 2010 appraisal has valued the asset at $28.7 million.
The special servicer's expected resolution date for the loan is
December 2011.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is over 100%
similar to last review.

As of August 17, 2010, cumulative unpaid interest totaled
$12.2 million, resulting in interest shortfalls to Classes J
through non-rated Class O.  In general, interest shortfalls are
caused by trust expenses associated with specially serviced loans,
including special servicing fees, legal expenses and other
expenses associated with the resolution of a loan.  Interest
shortfalls can also result when the servicer only advances a
portion of the monthly principal and interest payment for a
specially serviced loan because of a decline in the value of the
underlying property (based on an appraisal reduction
determination), or the servicer recovers previous P&I over-
advances prior to a loan being liquidated.


CREDIT SUISSE: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Nine 2006-TFL1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-TFL1.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- US$52.0M Cl. A-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Aug. 16, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$195M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     on Aug. 16, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Aug. 16, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-X-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Aug. 16, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$39M Cl. B Certificate, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$34M Cl. C Certificate, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$27M Cl. D Certificate, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$29M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$24M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$25M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$25M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$27M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$36M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$32.5M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to the deterioration in the performance of
the two remaining assets in the trust, the Tharaldson Portfolio
Loan (88% of the pool balance) and the Charleston Place Hotel Loan
(12%), and refinancing risk in an adverse environment.  Both loans
mature in less than one year.  Moody's also affirmed four pooled
classes and confirmed one pooled class.  The affirmations and
confirmation were due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio remaining within an acceptable range.  Moody's placed
ten classes on review for possible downgrade on August 26, 2010.
This action concludes Moody's review.

Further downward pressure on ratings will be driven by the
collateral performance and refinance risk of the Tharaldson
Portfolio Loan.  Moody's analysis incorporated the expectation of
gradual improvement in cash flow performance to a sustainable
level 10% above trailing twelve month March 2010 cash flow of
$52.5 million.  The TTM cash flow has fallen 36.5% since 2007.
The probability of default at loan maturity in 2011, is
significant given the overall debt of $801.0 million (including
$145.1 million in mezzanine debt) and the limited time remaining
for robust cash flow recovery to materialize.  Under the terms of
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement the special servicer has the
option to extend the maturity date of the loan to April 2014,
seven years prior to April 2021, the Rated Final Maturity
Distribution Date of the Certificates.  Transferral of the loan to
special servicing may result in interest shortfalls to rated
classes due to special servicing and workout fees and expenses.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS Large
Loan Model v 8.0 which is used for both large loan and single
borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.  The model also incorporates a supplementary tool to
allow for the testing of the credit support at various rating
levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis tests the credit
support for a rating assuming that loans in the pool default with
an average loss severity that is commensurate with the rating
level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 17, 2008.  The
previous review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep and incorporated assumptions for capitalization rates and
stressed cash flows that were outlined in "Rating Methodology
Update: US CMBS Conduit and Fusion Review Prompted by Declining
Property Values and Rising Delinquencies" dated February 5, 2009.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on
moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction.

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 50% to $545.5
million from $1.084 billion at securitization due to the payoff of
five loans and the payment of release premiums associated with the
Tharaldson Portfolio Loan.  The Certificates are collateralized by
two mortgage loans ranging in size from 12% to 88% of the pool.
Neither of the two remaining loans in the pool are on the master
servicer's watchlist, or in special servicing.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.  Watchlisted loans are loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council monthly reporting package.  To date the pool has not
experienced any losses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for
both loans in the pool, and operating results for the trailing 12-
month period ending March 31, 2010 for the Tharaldson Portfolio
Loan.  Moody's weighted average LTV ratio is 94% compared to 89%
at Moody's prior review.  Moody's stressed debt service ratio is
1.32X compared to 1.40X at last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.
Large loan transactions have a Herf of less than 20.  This pool
has a Herf of 1, the same as at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan is the Tharaldson Portfolio Loan ($478.5 million
-- 87.7% of the pool), which is secured by 105 limited service
hotel properties with a total of 8,238 keys located in 26 states.
Two properties, with a total of 194 rooms, have been released from
the loan collateral.  Payments of Release Prices associated with
the two property releases has resulted in a loan pay down of
approximately 2% since securitization.  Each property is operated
under a separate franchise agreement with 60 properties operating
under a brand owned by Marriott International, Inc.; 23 properties
operating under a brand owned by Choice Hotels International,
Inc.; 14 properties operating under a brand owned by Hilton Hotels
Corporation; 4 properties operating under a brand owned by
InterContinental Hotels Group, and 4 properties operating under a
brand owned by Country Inns & Suites By Carlson, Inc. Revenue per
Available Room for the portfolio peaked in 2008 at $71.66,
compared to $64.79 at securitization.  However, RevPAR declined
16.5% to $59.82 in 2009, and continued to decline an additional 2%
to $58.53 in the trailing 12-month period ending March 31, 2010.
Commencing in November 2009 all excess cash flow after debt
service is being deposited into a lender controlled reserve
account as additional collateral for the loan.  As of August 2010
the balance in the reserve account was approximately
$21.6 million.  Moody's LTV ratio and stressed DSC ratio are 96%
and 1.31X, respectively.  Moody's underlying rating is B3,
compared to Ba3 at last review.  The loan has a final extended
maturity in April 2011.  The loan sponsor is Whitehall Street
Global Real Estate Limited Partnership 2005.

The second loan is the Charleston Place Hotel Loan ($67.0 million
-- 12.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 442-key full-service,
luxury hotel located in the historic district of Charleston, South
Carolina.  Collateral for the loan also includes 51,186 square
feet of retail space and a theater parcel that is utilized as a
conference center and ballroom.  RevPAR peaked in 2007 at $191.67,
compared to $168.64 at securitization.  However, RevPAR declined
10% to $171.73 in 2008 and declined an additional 21% to $136.16
in 2009.  Moody's LTV ratio and stressed DSC ratio are 83% and
1.40X.  Moody's underlying rating is Ba2, the same as last review.
The loan has a final extended maturity date in March 2011.  The
loan sponsors are Orient Express Hotels Ltd. and A.  Alfred
Taubman.


CWABS REVOLVING: S&P Corrects Rating on Class 2-A to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on class
2-A from CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-R to
'CCC (sf)' from 'D (sf)'.

The underlying collateral for this transaction consists of home
equity line of credit second-lien mortgage loans.

On Feb. 24, 2010, S&P lowered its rating on this class to 'D (sf)'
based on the trustee's January 2010 remittance report, which
indicated that this class had experienced a principal write-down
of $2.56 million.  However, the trustee subsequently issued a
revised remittance report that did not include the loss previously
allocated to this class.

The corrected rating reflects S&P's analysis of the credit support
for this class as of the June 2010 remittance report.  The class
is backed by a bond insurance policy issued by Syncora Guarantee
Inc. ('NR').

                         Rating Corrected

       CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-R

                                       Rating
                                       ------
    Class      CUSIP       Current    02/24/10     Pre-2/24/10
    -----      -----       -------    --------     -----------
    2-A        126673QB1   CCC (sf)   D (sf)       CCC (sf)


DECO SERIES 2005: Fitch Affirms EUR5.7MM Class H Notes at 'CCCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed DECO Series 2005 - Pan Europe 1 plc
(PE1) and revised the Outlooks on class D and E notes to Stable
from Negative.  The rating actions are:

EUR8.5m class A2 due July 2014 (XS0227107538) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR24.2m class B due July 2014 (XS0227110326) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR39.2m class C due July 2014 (XS0227112884) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR9.8m class D due July 2014 (XS0235684114) affirmed at 'AAsf';
Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

EUR24.5m class E due July 2014 (XS0227113692) affirmed at 'Asf';
Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

EUR19.6m class F due July 2014 (XS0227115630) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Negative

EUR12.2m class G due July 2014 (XS0227116950) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Negative

EUR5.7m class H due July 2014 (XS0227117503) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; assigned a
Recovery Rating of 'RR5'

The rating action reflects the stable collateral performance since
the review last September and the de-leveraging of the
transaction.  Two loans have repaid.  Project Suisse, which repaid
at loan maturity in January 2010, benefited from strong rental
income and long leases.  The other loan to repay at maturity was
Trabrennbahn, whose low balance (EUR12m) aided refinancing.  Fitch
advance rates -- defined as debt outstanding over asset value --
have improved significantly following these repayments.

Most of these estimates of value will not be tested before 2012,
when there is a spike in loan maturities.  However, the Hanover
loan, which accounts for 22% of the note balance, is due
imminently, in October 2010.  The secondary nature of the charged
assets weakens re-letting prospects, and may hamper their
marketability to investors or other lenders.  This is reflected in
Fitch's estimate of a whole loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 108%.

With final legal maturity of the bonds in July 2014, the use of
loan extension at maturity is tightly constrained, which raises
the likelihood of enforcement as a workout route for loans that
default at maturity.  Many of the underlying buildings in the
portfolio are secondary in quality and location, and so in spite
of an impressive roll of tenants, few properties will have
materially grown in value since the last rating review.  As a
result, there continues to be significant balloon risk, which
largely offsets the benefits of deleveraging and modest scheduled
loan amortization, especially for junior noteholders.


DELAWARE HEALTH: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'BB' Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its rating outlook to
stable from negative and affirmed its 'BB' long-term rating and
'BB' underlying rating on Delaware Health Facilities Authority's
$51.7 million series 2002A and 2002B revenue and refunding bonds,
issued for Nanticoke Memorial Hospital.

"The return to a stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion of
Nanticoke's stronger volumes in fiscal 2010, a small improvement
in consolidated operating income results in fiscal 2010 after
accounting for one-time adjustments at the hospital, and
stabilization of the senior management team," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Shivani Singh.  "S&P expects that the
hospital's good business position, balance sheet that S&P believes
remains adequate for the current rating, and management's focus on
ongoing physician recruitment in key specialties will allow for
continued stability in the rating over the next one to two years,"
said Ms. Singh.

The 'BB' rating reflects Standard & Poor's assessment of
Nanticoke's recent history of sometimes large operating losses,
volume declines and senior management turnover issues tempered by
a rebound in volumes in fiscal 2010, good business position with
limited competition within the service area and an adequate
balance sheet characterized by a young age of plant and solid
days' cash on hand.

In Standard & Poor's view offsetting credit considerations include
Nanticoke's larger-than-expected operating losses in fiscal 2010
(unaudited results through June 30, 2010), compared with fiscal
2009 (audited results through June 30, 2009), despite an overall
improvement in patient volumes primarily due to one-time
adjustments at the hospital totaling $3.3 million; and a
vulnerable payor mix, with more than 50% of combined revenues from
governmental payors (Medicare and Medicaid).

Factors supporting the rating in Standard & Poor's view include
Nanticoke's rebound in volumes in fiscal 2010 due to management's
recent volume initiatives pertaining to the recruitment of
additional physicians in key areas and solid liquidity for the
rating level, with unrestricted cash and investments equal to 83
days' cash on hand at fiscal 2010 year-end.  The hospital's
limited facilities needs and lack of additional debt plans also
support the rating.

A higher rating is possible over time if Nanticoke is able to
sustain the improved volumes and generate consistent positive
operating income.  If, however, the hospital reports volume
declines in fiscal 2011, fails to improve operating results as per
budgeted expectations, or its balance sheet metrics demonstrate
deterioration, a negative outlook or lower rating is likely.

The obligated group includes Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, a 139-
bed acute-care facility in Seaford, Del., Lifecare at Lofland
Park, a 110-bed skilled-nursing facility in Seaford that is a
subsidiary of the hospital, and Dual Development Corp., a property
development and management company.  Other nonobligated entities
include Nanticoke Health Services Inc., the parent company; Mid-
Sussex Medical Center, which operates three outpatient sites with
approximately 19 employee physicians; and a captive insurance
company.


FRIEDBERGMILSTEIN PRIVATE: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Five Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by FriedbergMilstein Private Capital
Fund I:

  -- US$325,500,000 Class A First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes Due January 15, 2019
     (current outstanding balance of $204,001,956), Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf); previously on July 2, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  -- US$54,100,000 Class B-1 Second Priority Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due January 15, 2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on July 2, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- US$17,000,000 Class B-2 Second Priority Secured Fixed Rate
     Notes Due January 15, 2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
     on July 2, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf);

  -- US$20,750,000 Class C-1 Third Priority Secured Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes Due January 15, 2019, Upgraded to Baa3
     (sf); previously on July 2, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$13,000,000 Class C-2 Third Priority Secured Deferrable
     Fixed Rate Notes Due January 15, 2019, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
     previously on July 2, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last rating action in July 2009 due to
delevering of the Class A notes of approximately 35% or $108.2
million.  As of the latest trustee report dated August 2, 2010,
the Class A/B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 138.1%, 123.0%, and 110.1%, respectively, versus
June 2009 levels of 121.4%, 111.5%, and 103.0%, respectively.  In
Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of sale proceeds (including higher than previously
anticipated recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.
In addition, the Class C-1 and Class C-2 Notes are no longer
deferring interest and all previously deferred interest has been
paid in full.

Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited from improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action.  Based on the August 2010 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is 3080 compared to 3228 in June
2009.  The deal also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In
particular, the dollar amount of defaulted securities has
decreased to about $84 million from approximately $106 million in
June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds of $373 million, defaulted par of $86 million, weighted
average default probability of 33.36% (implying a WARF of 4562), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 34.65%, and a
diversity score of 48.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

FriedbergMilstein Private Capital Fund I, issued in December of
2004, is a small and middle market collateralized loan obligation.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates, Moody's applied additional default probability
stresses by assuming an equivalent of Caa3 for CEs that were not
updated within the last 15 months.  In addition, Moody's applied a
1.5 notch-equivalent assumed downgrade for CEs last updated
between 12-15 months ago, and a 0.5 notch-equivalent assumed
downgrade for CEs last updated between 6-12 months ago.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in all cases the lowest assumed
rating equivalent is Caa3.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated
notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference versus
the current model output, whereby a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3650)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B-1: +2
  -- Class B-2: +2
  -- Class C-1: +2
  -- Class C-2: +2
  -- Class D-1: +2
  -- Class D-2: +2
  - Combination Securities: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (5474)

  -- Class A: -1
  -- Class B-1: -2
  -- Class B-2: -2
  -- Class C-1: -2
  -- Class C-2: -2
  -- Class D-1: -3
  -- Class D-2: -3
  - Combination Securities: -2

Below is a summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels
on all rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches'
difference versus the current model output, whereby a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (36.7%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B-1: 0
  -- Class B-2: 0
  -- Class C-1: 0
  -- Class C-2: 0
  -- Class D-1: +1
  -- Class D-2: +1
  - Combination Securities: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (32.7%)

  -- Class A: 0
  -- Class B-1: -1
  -- Class B-2: -1
  -- Class C-1: -1
  -- Class C-2: -1
  -- Class D-1: -1
  -- Class D-2: -1
  - Combination Securities: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategies and behavior, 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities, and 3) potential additional
expected loss associated with swap agreements in CDOs as a result
of recent U.S. bankruptcy court ruling on Lehman swap termination
in the Dante case.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Delevering: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction
   is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will
   continue and at what pace.  Delevering may accelerate due to
   high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral
   sales by the manager, which may have significant impact on the
   notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
   selling defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
   market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
   potential volatility in market prices.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, and weighted average coupon.
   Additionally, however, in light of the large positive
   difference between the reported and covenant levels for
   weighted average recovery rate and diversity score, as well as
   consideration of the approaching end of the reinvestment period
   in January 2011, Moody's believes that the manager's ability to
   deteriorate these collateral quality metrics is more limited.
   As a result, Moody's base case analysis incorporates the impact
   of assuming the midpoint of reported and covenanted values for
   the weighted average recovery rate and diversity score.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates.  In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.

5) The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap
   that is currently out of the money.  If fixed rate assets
   prepay or default, there would be a more substantial mismatch
   between the swap notional and the amount of fixed assets,
   resulting in larger cash payments to the hedge counterparty.
   In such cases, payments to hedge counterparties may consume a
   large portion or all of the interest proceeds, leaving the
   transaction, even with respect to the senior notes, with poor
   interest coverage.  Payment timing mismatches between assets
   and liabilities may cause additional concerns.  If the deal
   does not receive sufficient projected principal proceeds on the
   payment date to supplement the interest proceeds shortfall, a
   heightened risk of interest payment default could occur.
   Similarly, if principal proceeds are used to pay interest,
   there may ultimately be a risk of payment default on the
   principal of the notes.


G-FORCE 2005-RR2: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight 2005-RR2 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through
certificates from G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust, a resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit transaction.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on four classes from the same
transaction.  S&P removed 11 ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following its rating actions on the underlying
CMBS certificates that collateralize G-Force 2005-RR2.  The CMBS
certificates are from six transactions and total $123.2 million
(17.3% of the total asset balance).  S&P also revised its credit
estimates on a portion of the CMBS collateral that Standard &
Poor's does not rate ($198.7 million, 27.9%).  S&P lowered the
majority of the revised credit estimates.

S&P lowered its rating on class H to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' due
to interest shortfalls to the class that S&P expects to continue
for the foreseeable future.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only (IO) tranche
based on its current criteria.

According to the Aug. 25, 2010, trustee report, 112 CMBS
certificates ($713.3 million, 100%) from 23 distinct transactions
issued between 1998 and 2002 collateralize G-Force 2005-RR2.  G-
Force 2005-RR2 has exposure to the following CMBS transactions
that Standard & Poor's has downgraded:

* GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2001-C2 (classes
  J through M; $33.8 million, 4.7%);

* GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. series 2002-C1 (classes
  K through O; $31.5 million, 4.4%); and

* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp series 2001-
  CF2 (classes H, J, and K; $24.4 million, 3.4%).

Standard & Poor's analyzed G-Force 2005-RR2 and its underlying
collateral according to its current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust

                              Rating
                              ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       A-3FL            BBB- (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-4A             B (sf)           BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-4B             B (sf)           BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
       B                CCC- (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
       C                CCC- (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
       D                CCC- (sf)        B (sf)/Watch Neg
       E                CCC- (sf)        CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
       H                D (sf)           CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                      G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust

                              Rating
                              ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       A-2              AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       F                CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
       G                CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

                          Rating Affirmed

                      G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust

                      Class            Rating
                      -----            ------
                      X                AAA (sf)


G-FORCE CDO: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed four and downgraded four classes of Notes
issued by G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd. due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in realized losses and an increase in impaired
securities.  The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation transactions.

Issuer: G-FORCE CDO 2006-1 Ltd.

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 9, 2009
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. SSFL, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. JRFL, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec. 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

G-Force CDO 2006-1 Ltd. is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (88.7%), non-
pooled, or rake, CMBS (6.3%) and CRE CDOs (5.0%).  As of the
August 25, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $823.2 million from $880.4 million at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A-1 Notes and the
Class SSFL Notes.

In November 2009, a default in the payment of the Class E Notes
occurred.  In December 2009, after the default in the payment of
the Class E was not cured, an EOD occurred, pursuant to Section
5.1(a) of the Indenture.  As of the last payment date, the Class E
Notes are continuing to accrue deferred interest payments.

There are forty-two assets with par balance of $372.6 million
(57.7% of the current pool balance) that are considered Impaired
Securities as of the August 25, 2010 Trustee report.  Forty of
these assets (91.3% of the impaired balance) are CMBS and two of
these assets are CRE CDOs (8.7%).  There have been $183.5 milion
of realized losses to date, Moody's expects additional losses to
occur from the Impaired Securities and other low speculative grade
securities.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life (WAL), weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's
asset correlation (MAC).  These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 2,832 compared to 3,516 at
last review.  The decrease in the bottom-dollar WARF was due to
the significant amount of realized losses that have occurred since
the last review.  The losses occurred to collateral previously
rated in the Caa1-C range resulting in the exclusion of this
collateral from the current WARF calculation.  The distribution of
current ratings and credit estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (30.5% compared
to 26.8% at last review), A1-A3 (5.7% compared to 5.0% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (8.9% compared to 9.8% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(22.6% compared to 18.9% at last review), B1-B3 (7.4% compared to
7.8% at last review), and Caa1-C (24.9% compared to 31.7% at last
review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.3
years compared to 5.4 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 28.9% compared to 26.7% at last review.  The higher WARR is due
to the exclusion of collateral from the current pool as discussed
above.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 6.3% compared to 8.5% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.6, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of key parameters may have have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in assumptions of any one key
parameter may be offset by a change in one or more of the other
key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all other key parameters
static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from 28.9% to
23.9% or up to 33.9% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notches downward and 0 to 2 notches
upward, respectively.  Further, changing the recovery rate
assumption down from 28.9% to 18.9% or up to 38.9% would result in
average rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches
downward and 0 to 3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


GALLERY AT: Moody's Reviews Ratings on Three 2000-C5C Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed three classes of Gallery at
Harborplace Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2000-C5C on review for possible downgrade due
to the deteriorating performance of the collateral and the
potential for higher expected losses resulting from increased
leverage.

Issuer: Gallery at Harborplace Mortgage Trust, Series 2000-C5C

  -- Cl. B-1, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Apr 15, 2010 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-2, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Apr 15, 2010 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. B-3, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Apr 15, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

This methodology uses the excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The
large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure, property type, and sponsorship.
These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity, other
concentrations and correlations.  The model also incorporates a
supplementary tool to allow for the testing of the credit support
at various rating levels.  The scenario or "blow-up" analysis
tests the credit support for a rating assuming that loans in the
pool default with an average loss severity that is commensurate
with the rating level being tested.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior review is
summarized in a press release dated April 15, 2010.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

                  Deal And Performance Summary

This transaction consists of a $10.5 million B-Note which is
subordinate to an A-Note which was securitized in LB-UBS 2000-C5.
The A-Note has amortized approximately 13% to $52.2 million from
$60.0 million at securitization.

The loan is secured by a 411,239 square foot office and retail
mixed used complex located within the Inner Harbor development in
Baltimore, Maryland.  The property was developed in 1987 by The
Rouse Company which was acquired by GGP in 2004.

The office component (265,833 square feet) was 55% leased as of
March 2010, compared to 76% at Moody's prior collateral review.
The retail component (145,406 square feet) was 82% leased as of
March 2010, compared to 92% at Moody's prior collateral review.

The action taken in April 2010 was due to concerns over the impact
of the potential non-reimbursed interest shortfalls due to the
General Growth Properties bankruptcy filing.  With respect to
these interest shortfalls, at last review Moody's concluded that
interest shortfalls will continue to be incurred on these classes
due to reimbursement of advancing by the special servicer and a 1%
work-out fee being charged by the special servicer.  The current
driver for Moody's concern over this loan is the deterioration in
the performance of the collateral.

Moody's review will focus on the deterioration of the property
performance and any additional potential losses from interest
shortfalls above what was anticipated in Moody's April review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Fitch Puts Note Ratings on Negative Watch
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed these seven classes of GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities, Inc., 2003-C2, on Rating Watch Negative:

  -- $16.1 million class E 'AAAsf/LS5';
  -- $21 million class F 'AAsf/LS5';
  -- $11.3 million class G 'BBBsf/LS5';
  -- $16.1 million class H 'BBsf/LS5';
  -- $20.1 million class J 'B-sf/LS5';
  -- $8.1 million class K 'CCCsf/RR2';
  -- $8.1 million class L 'CCsf/RR6'.

Classes E through L have been placed on Rating Watch Negative as a
result of declining values for loans in special servicing.  The
special servicer updated valuation for the Woodbridge Crossing
Retail Center loan represents an approximately 65% decline from
the previous valuation.  As a result of the value declines, the
master servicer will begin recovering expenses from available
interest and additional appraisal reductions will be incurred.
Fitch expects classes F through P to experience interest
shortfalls for the next two to three months.

Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch Negative placements
following a detailed review to assess the impact of the updated
appraised values on the specially serviced loans.  Fitch will also
review the remaining non-defeased loans based on a forward looking
analysis.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six 2002-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six classes
and affirmed 10 classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Series 2002-C1.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$144.484M Cl. A-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Feb. 4, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$405.81M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Feb. 4, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Feb. 4, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$29.29M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     on Feb. 27, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$9.763M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     on Feb. 27, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$15.977M Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on July 9, 2007 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$8.875M Cl. E Certificate, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 28, 2007 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- US$12.426M Cl. F Certificate, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 28, 2007 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$10.651M Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously
     on Aug. 28, 2007 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- US$8.876M Cl. H Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Feb. 27, 2006 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$14.201M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);
     previously on Feb. 27, 2006 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$12.426M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf);
     previously on Feb. 27, 2006 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$5.326M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on Feb. 27, 2006 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$5.325M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Feb. 4, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- US$7.988M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Feb. 4, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- US$3.551M Cl. O Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Feb. 4, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans and refinance risk associated with loans
approaching maturity in a adverse environment.  Sixty-nine loans,
representing 62% of the pool, mature within the next 24 months.
Twelve of these loans, representing 12% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage less than 1.00X.  The
affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the classes
affirmed are sufficient to maintain the existing ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.1% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
7.4% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be
mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in
collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels due
to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due
to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated August 28, 2007.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction.

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to
$574.6 million from $710.1 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 94 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 23% of the pool.  Thirty loans,
representing 37% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at last review
represented 33% of the pool.

Fifteen loans, representing 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.1 million (39% loss severity).  Four
loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Tempe City
Center Loan ($14.4 million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 164,000 square foot office property located in Tempe,
Arizona.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in June
2009 due to imminent default and is currently in the process of
foreclosure.  The property is currently 67% leased.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a
mix of property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate
$14.0 million loss (46% expected loss on average) for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for eight poorly
performing loan representing 6.5% of the pool and has estimated a
$10.0 million loss (27% expected loss based on a 75% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 92% and 48% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 75% compared to 87% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 14.5%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.45X, respectively, compared to
1.29X and 1.26X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's new cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 41 compared to 50 at Moody's prior review.

The top three conduit loans represent 9% of the pool balance.  The
largest loan is the Lakewood Shopping Plaza Loan ($18.9 million --
3.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 203,000 square foot
neighborhood center comprising three retail and two office
buildings located in Lakewood, New Jersey.  The center is anchored
by ShopRite.  The property was 97% leased as of June 2010 compared
to 99% at last review.  The loan matures in August 2011.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.22X, respectively, compared to
80% and 1.21X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Boca Industrial Park Loan
($17.9 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which is secured by six one-
story industrial/flex buildings located in Boca Raton, Florida.
The buildings total 387,000 square feet.  The complex was 87%
leased as of June 2010 compared to 99% at last review.
Performance has improved since the previous review after being
negatively impacted by Hurricane Wilma.  The loan has amortized 5%
since last review.  The loan matures in July 2011.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 99%
and 1.01X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 2551 Broadway Loan ($13.4 million --
2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 36,000 mixed use property
located in Manhattan, New York.  The property was 100% leased as
of July 2010, the same as at last review.  The largest tenant is
Chase Manhattan Bank (50% of the NRA; lease expires in August
2016).  Performance has been stable.  The loan has amortized 4%
since last review.  The loan matures in November 2011.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 55% and 1.76X, respectively, compared to
58% and 1.67X at last review.


GREENWICH CAPITAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 2005-FL3 Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded three non-pooled, or rake
classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FL3.

  -- US$5.90M Cl. H-LH Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf);
     previously on March 4, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$3.94M Cl. K-LH Certificate, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf);
     previously on March 4, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$3.96M Cl. M-LH Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on March 4, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades were due to the declining performance of the single
remaining asset in the trust (Lowell Hotel), and the borrower's
inability to pay off the loan at maturity in September 2010.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in August 2010 due to
imminent default.  This will likely trigger future interest
shortfalls due to special servicing and work-out fees and
expenses.  Under the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
the special servicer has the option to extend the maturity date of
the loan to October 2013, seven years prior to October 2020, the
Rated Final Maturity Distribution Date of the Certificates.

Further downward pressure on the ratings could occur if the
collateral fails to demonstrate Revenue per Available Room and
cash flow improvement in line with Moody's expectation.  Hotels
located in New York City have begun to show improved performance
since the beginning of 2010.  The New York hotel market has seen a
15.3% improvement in RevPAR year to date through July 2010, as
compared to the same period in 2009, based on the Smith Travel
Research 'US Hotel Industry Performance for the month of July
2010' report.  Nationally, amongst all chain segments, the luxury
segment has posted the highest RevPAR increase of 9.1% year to
date through July as compared to the same period last year.
Moody's analyses incorporates a collateral value of $42.9 million
($613,000/key), down 40% from a value of $71.9 million
($1,028,000/key) at securitization.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the
previous review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will
not necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be
mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in
collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels due
to amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due
to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "Hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.  The model also
incorporates a supplementary tool to allow for the testing of the
credit support at various rating levels.  The scenario or "blow-
up" analysis tests the credit support for a rating assuming that
all loans in the pool default with an average loss severity that
is commensurate with the rating level being tested.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 4, 2009.  The
previous review was part of Moody's first quarter 2009 ratings
sweep and incorporated assumptions for capitalization rates and
stressed cash flows that were outlined in "Rating Methodology
Update: US CMBS Conduit and Fusion Review Prompted by Declining
Property Values and Rising Delinquencies" dated February 5, 2009.
See the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

As of the August 6, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $45 million
from $708 million at securitization as the result of the payoff of
13 loans originally in the pool.  The Certificates are now
collateralized by a single mortgage loan.

The remaining loan in the pool, the Lowell Hotel ($45.0 million),
is secured by a first mortgage lien on a 70-room luxury boutique
hotel located on the Upper East Side in New York City.  There is
also a $15 million non-trust junior secured loan component.  The
hotel has experienced stress to the net cash flow similar to other
New York City hotels.  The property posted a RevPAR of $586.3 for
2009, down 18% from 2008.  The loan has been transferred to
special servicing and is not expected to pay off at the September
2010 maturity.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.  As
of August 18, 2010, there are no interest shortfalls.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is over 70%
compared to 59% at last review and 41.7% at securitization.
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio is 1.47X.


GUGGENHEIM STRUCTURED: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Six Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded six classes of Notes issued by Guggenheim
Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 due to the deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor, and increase in
Defaulted Securities.  The rating action is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation transactions.

Issuer: Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 26, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2 is a CRE CDO
transaction backed by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans (21.8%
of the pool balance), B-Notes (36.6%), commercial mortgage backed
securities (31.6%) and mezzanine loans (10.0%).  As of the
August 18, 2010 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the
transaction has decreased to $241.2 million from $305.8 million at
issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A Notes, as a
result of paydown from the collateral pool as well as failing the
Class C, D and E par value tests.

There are four assets with par balance of $65.8 million (27.3% of
the current pool balance) that are considered Impaired Securities
as of the August 18, 2010 Trustee report.  One of these assets
(23.1% of the impaired balance) is A-Note, one asset is B-Note
(21.6%), one asset is C-Note (15.7%) and one assets is CMBS
(39.6%).  Impaired Assets that are not CMBS are defined as assets
which are 30 or more days delinquent in their debt service
payment.  While there have been no realized losses to date,
Moody's does expect significant losses to occur once they are
realized.

Moody's has identified these parameters as key indicators of the
expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted average
life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.
Per the legal documentation as of August 2010 the transactions has
ended its reinvestment period and is now deemed a static
transaction.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's have completed updated credit estimates for the non-
Moody's rated reference obligations.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a
measure of the default probability within a collateral pool.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 6,054 compared to 4,518 at
last review.  The distribution of current ratings and credit
estimates is: Aaa-Aa3 (4.4% compared to 0.0% at last review), A1-
A3 (3.9% compared to .% at last review), Baa1-Baa3 (4.4% compared
to 0.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (6.1% compared to 12.9% at last
review), B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 46.7% at last review), and Caa1-C
(81.1% compared to 36.6% at last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the reference
obligations in the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 1.6
years compared to 2.1 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 21.8% compared to 23.4% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e.  the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 13.8% compared to 18.1% at last review.
The low MAC is due to higher default probability collateral
concentrated within a small number of collateral names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.6, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of key parameters may have have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in assumptions of any one key
parameter may be offset by a change in one or more of the other
key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all other key parameters
static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from 21.8% to
16.8% or up to 26.8% would result in average rating movement on
the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notch downward and 0 to 1 notch
upward, respectively.  Further, changing the recovery rate
assumption down from 21.8% to 11.8% or up to 31.8% would result in
average rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notch
downward and 0 to 2 notch upward, respectively

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.  Primary sources of assumption
uncertainty are the current stressed macroeconomic environment and
continuing weakness in the commercial real estate and lending
markets.  Moody's currently views the commercial real estate
market as stressed with further performance declines expected in a
majority of property sectors.  The availability of debt capital is
improving with terms returning towards market norms.  Job growth
and housing price stability will be necessary precursors to
commercial real estate recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global
scenario remains "hook-shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expect
overall a sluggish recovery in most of the world's largest
economies, returning to trend growth rate with elevated fiscal
deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Seven 2003-CIBC7 Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes,
confirmed one class and downgraded ten classes of J.P. Morgan
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp. Series 2003-CIBC7.  Moody's
rating action is:

  -- US$390M Cl. A-4 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     on Jan. 14, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$85.621M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Jan. 14, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$390.043M Cl. A-1A Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Jan. 14, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 14, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 14, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$34.689M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on July 23, 2007 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$13.875M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on July 23, 2007 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$27.751M Cl. D Certificate, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 26, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$15.610M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to A3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 26, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$17.345M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 26, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10.407M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 26, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$19.078M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 26, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5.204M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Aug. 26, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$5.203M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$8.672M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$8.673M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$3.469M Cl. N Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$2.853M Cl. P Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 26, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and concerns about refinance risk
associated with loans maturing in an adverse environment.  Forty-
three loans, representing 18% of the pool, mature within the next
36 months.  Thirteen of these loans, representing 6% of the pool,
have a Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio less than
1.00X.  The confirmation and affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan-to-value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the confirmed and affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the existing ratings.

On August 26, 2010, Moody's placed 11 classes of this transaction
on review for possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's
review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.6% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.9%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
7.4% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If the performance of the pool declines
materially, the expected level of credit enhancement and the
priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the
current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a pay down analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated June 25, 2009.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

                        Deal Performance

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 35% to $953.4 million
from $1.5 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 162 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 33%
of the pool.  Twenty-three loans, representing 21% of the pool,
have defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government
securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 17% of the
pool.

Twenty-nine loans, representing 23% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21.3 million (47% loss severity).
Eight loans, representing 6% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the Versailles
and Dana Point Apartment Loan ($22.2 million -- 2.4% of the pool),
which is secured by a total of 652 units in two crossed apartment
complexes located in Dallas Texas.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2010 due to delinquency.  The properties
were 46% leased as of December 2009.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the University
Gardens Student Housing Loan ($11.9 million -- 1.2% of the pool),
which is secured by an 80-unit, 320-bed student housing facility
located near the Florida A&M and Florida State campuses in
Tallahassee, Florida.  The property was 72% leased as of May 2010.
The loan transferred into special servicing in February 2007 and
is now real estate owned.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $26.8 million
loss (45% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 12 poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$6.9 million (19% expected loss based on a 55% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 77%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 76% compared to 73% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 10.9% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.88X and 1.55X, respectively, compared to
1.47X and 1.38X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 40 compared to 33 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the One Post Office
Square Loan ($56.1 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which represents
a participation interest in a $112.2 million first mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by a 766,000 square foot Class A office
building located in Boston, Massachusetts.  The property was 100%
leased as of December 2009, an increase from 87% at last review.
The largest tenants include Putnam Investments (32% of the net
rentable area (NRA); lease expiration March 2019), Sullivan &
Worcester (18% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2021) and
Jones Lang LaSalle -- (7% of the NRA; December 2016).  Moody's
underlying rating is Aa1 compared to A1 at last review.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is 2.22X compared to 1.66X at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the Brown Noltemeyer
Portfolio Loan ($29.5 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which consists
of five cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans secured by
eight multi-family properties totalling 2,087 units located in
Louisville, Kentucky.  The loan is structured with a 17-year
amortization schedule and has amortized by approximately 8% since
last review.  Moody's current underlying rating is Aa2, the same
as last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is 2.01X compared to 1.73X
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Hometown America Portfolio III
Loan ($58.3 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by five
manufactured housing communities with 1,953 pads located in four
states.  The property was 84% leased as of December 2009 compared
to 86% at last review.  Although financial performance had
declined since securitization, year-end 2009 operating results
indicate that financial performance has improved and now
approximates securitization levels.  The loan has amortized 2%
since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and
1.09X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.03X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Potomac Run Loan
($42.6 million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 362,000
square foot community shopping center located in Sterling,
Virginia.  The center was 98% occupied as of December 2009
compared to 95% at last review.  The largest tenants include Toys
R Us, Michaels and Office Depot which collectively occupy 30% of
the premises.  Property performance has fluctuated since
securitization due to the loss of Circuit City.  However, HHGregg
recently signed a long-term lease to occupy the former Circuit
City space and opened that store February 2010.  The loan has
amortized 2% since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
110% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.98X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Colony Cove Loan
($38.9 million -- 4.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 2,210-
pad mobile home park located approximately 40 miles south of Tampa
in Ellenton, Florida.  The property was 93% leased as of December
2009, the same as last review.  The loan was structured with a 20-
year amortization schedule and has amortized approximately 5%
since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 51% and
2.02X, respectively, compared to 61% and 1.68X at last review.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Confirms Rating on Series 2003-C1 Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of one class,
affirmed seven classes and downgraded eight classes of J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C1.  Moody's rating action
is:

  -- US$70.584M Cl. A-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on March 28, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- US$595.147M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on March 28, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     March 28, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$34.700M Cl. B Certificate, Confirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10.676M Cl. C Certificate, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$32.031M Cl. D Certificate, Downgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$14.680M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$17.350M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

   -- US$17.350M Cl. G Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$12.011M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$16.015M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$10.677M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Aug. 12, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- US$2.179M Cl. L Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 12, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- US$2.078M Cl. CM-1 Certificate, Affirmed at A3 (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2008 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- US$3.822M Cl. CM-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2008 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$12.888M Cl. CM-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf);
     previously on July 31, 2008 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses from the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and poorly performing loans, interest shortfalls and
refinance risk associated with loans maturing in an adverse
economic environment.  Sixty-three loans, or 72% of the non-
defeased pool, have or will mature within the next 36 months.
Seventeen of these loans, representing 20% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio less than 1.0X.

The confirmation and affirmations are due to key rating
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for those classes affirmed are
sufficient to maintain the existing rating.

Moody's placed nine classes of this transaction on review for
possible downgrade on August 12, 2010.  This action concludes the
review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
5.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
11.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.  In addition, further downgrades may be warranted
if interest shortfalls increase above their current levels.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 23, 2009.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

                        Deal Performance

As of the August 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 22% to
$852.19 million from $1.09 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 92 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 41% of the pool.  The pool includes two loans with
underlying ratings, representing 21% of the pool.  Twenty-three
loans, representing 23% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at
last review represented 21% of the pool.

Thirteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $37.9 million (81% loss severity).  Six
loans, representing 6% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the 200-220
West Germantown Pike Loan ($14.7 million -- 1.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a 98,000 square foot two-story office building
and a 17,000 square foot one-story office building located in
Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in January 2010 due to monetary default and is
in foreclosure.

The remaining five loans are secured by a mix of office,
multifamily and retail properties.  The master servicer has
recognized an aggregate $28.5 million appraisal reduction for six
of the specially serviced loans.  Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $28.5 million loss (60% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$4.5 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 40% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes H through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$1.3 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls because of the high exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions and extraordinary
trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 and partial-year 2010
operating results for 99% and 87%, respectively, of the non-
defeased performing pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 83% compared to
93% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 14.1% to the most recently available
net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.38X, respectively, compared to
1.41X and 1.27X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 30, the same as at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with an underlying rating is the Concord Mills
Loan ($143.1 million -- 17.2%), which represents the senior
component of a $161.9 million mortgage loan.  The loan is secured
by a 1.3 million square foot regional mall located 15 miles
northeast of Charlotte in Concord, North Carolina.  Major tenants
include Bass Pro Outdoor World, Burlington Coat Factory and T.J.
Maxx.  The in-line shops were 87% leased as of December 2009,
essentially the same as at last review.  The loan sponsor is the
Simon Property Group (Moody's preferred stock rating Baa1, stable
outlook).  The non-pooled component is held within the trust and
is the security for non-pooled Classes CM-1, CM-2 and CM-3.  The
loan has amortized by approximately 2% since last review and
matures in December 2012.  Moody's current underlying rating of
the senior component and stressed DSCR are A2 and 1.75X,
respectively, compared to A2 and 1.55X at last review.

The second loan with an underlying rating is the Bishops Gate Loan
($33.6 million -- 4.0%), which is secured by two office buildings
totaling 484,000 square feet located in Mt.  Laurel, New Jersey.
The collateral is 100% leased to PHH Mortgage, a subsidiary of PHH
Corporation (Moody's senior unsecured rating Ba2; stable outlook),
through December 2022.  The loan has an anticipated repayment date
(ARD) of January 2013 and has amortized 2% since last review.
Moody's underlying rating and stressed DSCR are A3 and 2.05X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.90X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 11% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Crossways/Newington Portfolio
($39.7 million -- 4.8%), which consists of two cross-
collateralized loans secured by two industrial/office buildings
totaling 812,000 square feet.  Both properties are located in
Virginia.  As of December 2009, the two properties were 83%
leased, compared 93% at last review.  The loan has amortized 2%
since last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and
1.29X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.37X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Somerset Shoppes Loan
($26.9 million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 187,000
square foot community shopping center located in Boca Raton,
Florida.  Major tenants include T.J.  Maxx, Michaels and
Loehmann's.  The center was 93% leased as of March 2010 compared
to 97% at last review.  Performance has decreased since last
review due to drop in rental income and expense reimbursements.
Additionally, Moody's value reflects the property's significant
upcoming lease rollover in soft local retail market conditions.
The loan has amortized 2% since last review and matures in October
2012.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 0.99X,
respectively, compared to 88% and 1.20X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Prince Georges Metro Center IV Loan
($24.5 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 178,450
square foot class A office building located in near Washington, DC
in Hyattsville, Maryland.  The property was built in 2002 as a
build-to-suit for the US Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) which occupies 100% of the building under a 10-year gross
lease expiring in December 2013.  The loan has amortized 2% since
last review and matures in March 2013.  Although property
performance has been stable since securitization, Moody's analysis
reflects a stressed cash flow due to current market softness and
Moody's concerns about single tenant exposure.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 115% and 0.99X, respectively, compared to 96%
and 1.04X at last review.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 27 2006-LDP9 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 27 classes and
affirmed seven classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2006-LDP9.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$16.537M Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$124.499M Cl. A-1S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$139.777M Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$375M Cl. A-2S, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$175M Cl. A-2SFL, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jan. 22, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$25M Cl. A-2SFX, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     March 17, 2010 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 22, 2007
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$1652.984M Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$145.282M Cl. A-3SFL, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$686.99M Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$363.993M Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$121.432M Cl. A-MS, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$318.494M Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$106.253M Cl. A-JS, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$72.799M Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$24.287M Cl. B-S, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$22.75M Cl. C, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$7.589M Cl. C-S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$50.049M Cl. D, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$16.697M Cl. D-S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$40.949M Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$13.661M Cl. E-S, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$40.949M Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$13.661M Cl. F-S, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$36.399M Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$12.144M Cl. G-S, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$45.5M Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 30,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$15.179M Cl. H-S, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$18.203M Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$18.204M Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$12.135M Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$12.136M Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- US$6.068M Cl. N, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on July 30,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- US$12.135M Cl. P, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     July 30, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans and concerns about refinance risk
associated with loans approaching maturity in an adverse
environment.  Seventeen loans, representing 10% of the pool,
mature within the next 24 months and have a Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio below 1.00X.  The affirmations are due to
key parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain the existing ratings.

On June 30, 2010, Moody's placed 27 classes on review for possible
downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
11.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 4.9%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
26.6% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 11, 2009.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction.

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $4.76 billion
from $4.85 billion at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 244 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
42% of the pool.  The pool includes one loan with an investment
grade underlying rating, representing 1% of the pool.  At
securitization four additional loans, representing 16% of the
pool, also had underlying ratings.  These loans have either
suffered declines in performance or failed to achieve their pro
forma cash flow and are now analyzed as part of the conduit pool
because of increased leverage.

Seventy loans, representing 39% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $38.38 million (90% loss severity).
Nineteen loans, representing 4% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The master servicer has recognized an
aggregate $73.2 million appraisal reduction for 16 of the
specially serviced loans.  The largest specially serviced loan is
the Tucson Portfolio Loan ($29.6 million -- 0.6% of the pool),
which is secured by five multifamily properties located in Tucson,
Arizona.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in April
2009 due to monetary default and is currently in foreclosure.
Currently all five properties are scheduled for auction on August
31, 2010.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Lincoln Village
Shopping Center Loan ($27.8 million -- 0.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 86,910 square foot mixed use building in Lincoln, CA.
The loan transferred into special servicing in March 2009 due to
imminent default and is currently real estate owned.

The remaining 17 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $99.1 million
loss (56% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 16 poorly
performing loan representing 13% of the pool and has estimated a
$242.8 million loss (41% expected loss based on a 87% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2008 and 2009 operating
results for 93% and 88%, respectively, of the pool.  Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 117% compared to 152% at Moody's prior review.  The prior
review was part of Moody's 1st quarter 2009 ratings sweep of 2006-
2008 vintage conduit and fusion CMBS transactions.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.8% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) are 1.37X and
0.91X, respectively, compared to 1.02X and 0.81X at last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 45 compared to 44 at Moody's prior review.

The loan with an underlying rating is the Raytheon LAX Loan
($52.3 million -- 1.1% of the pool), which is secured by two Class
B office buildings, totaling 565,264 SF, located in Los Angeles,
California.  The tenants are Raytheon Company (senior unsecured
rating (P)Baa1; stable outlook; 63% of the net rentable area;
lease expiration December 2018) and DIRECTV (37% of the NRA; lease
expiration December 2013).  As of March 31, 2010 the property was
100% leased, the same as at year end 2008.  Moody's underlying
rating and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.86X, respectively,
compared to Baa3 and 1.81X at last review.

The largest loan that previously had an underlying rating is the
Belnord Loan ($375.0 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is
secured by mixed use property which is predominantly residential
(215 units) located on New York's Upper West Side.  The loan is
currently on the master servicer's watchlist due to a low DSCR.
At loan origination the borrower planned to increase property
value through a comprehensive renovation program and conversion of
rent regulated units to market rents.  Progress has been slower
than expected and multifamily market conditions in Manhattan have
deteriorated since securitization.  More significantly, the
ability to convert rent regulated units to market rates was
derailed by the New York Court of Appeals October 22, 2009 ruling
that owners who participate in the J-51 tax abatement program
could not deregulate apartments and raise regulated rents to
market rates.  This ruling placed an additional financial burden
on the property sponsor in the short run, and will hinder its
ability to increase cash flow in the long run.  The total
potential rent overcharges and damages owed to tenants, while
material, are less of a concern than the ramifications of limited
future rent increases, which ultimately have a negative impact on
value and expected loss.  At securitization, a $35 million
interest reserve and a $15 million turnover/buyout reserve were
established to cover interest shortfalls.  The reserves will most
likely be depleted before the loan reaches maturity.  Moody's has
assumed a high probability of default for this loan.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 198% and 0.36X, respectively, compared to
70% and 1.24X at securitization.

The second loan that previously had an underlying rating is the
Merchandise Mart Loan ($175.0 million -- 3.7% of the pool), which
represents a 50% pari passu interest in a $350.0 million first
mortgage loan.  The property is also encumbered by a
$300.0 million mezzanine loan.  The loan is secured by a
3,44,8,680 SF office and design showroom building located in
downtown Chicago, Illinois.  The sponsor is Vornado Realty, L.P.
The property was 87% leased as of February 2010.  Property
performance has declined due to lower revenues and expense
reimbursements.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.38X,
respectively, compared to 51% and 2.03X at securitization.

The third loan that previously had an underlying rating is the
Centro Heritage Portfolio III Loan ($142.9 million -- 3.0% of the
pool), which is secured by a diverse portfolio of 14 properties
located in seven states.  The loan is currently on the master
servicer's watchlist for deferred maintenance at several of the
properties.  The portfolio is performing slightly below Moody's
original projections due to decreased revenues.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 70% and
1.44X at securitization.

The fourth loan that previously had an underlying rating is the
Tysons Galleria Loan ($49.4 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which
represents a 22% pari passu interest in a $220.9 million first
mortgage loan.  The property is also encumbered by a $31.4 million
B note.  The loan is secured by 309,112 SF mall in McLean,
Virginia.  The sponsor is General Growth Properties, Inc (GGP).
The property had been included in GGP's bankruptcy filing but has
been returned to the master servicer.  The loan has been modified
to extend the maturity date to September 12, 2017.  Property
performance has been stable since securitization but the property
has not achieved the increased rental revenues projected at
securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 0.88X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.25X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 131 South Dearborn Loan
($236.0 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which represents a 50% pari
passu interest in a $472.0 million first mortgage loan.  The
property is also encumbered by a $50.0 million mezzanine loan.
The loan is secured by 1.5 million SF office building located in
downtown Chicago, Illinois.  The three largest tenants are JP
Morgan Chase & Co. (senior unsecured rating Aa3; negative outlook;
36% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2017), Citadel
Investment Group (22% of the NRA; lease expiration December 2013)
and Seyfarth Shaw LLP (21% of the NRA; lease expiration June
2022).  The property was 95% leased as of December 2009, the same
as at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and
0.78X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.83X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Galleria Towers Loan
($232.0 million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by three
Class A office buildings, totaling 1.4 million SF, located in
Dallas, Texas.  The property is also encumbered by a $29.0 million
mezzanine loan.  The loan is currently on the master servicer's
watchlist for having a low DSCR.  Tenants include FedEx Kinko's,
Inc. (14% of the NRA; lease expiration August 2013) and Ryan &
Company, Inc. (7% of the NRA; lease expiration January 2020).
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.72X, respectively,
compared to 124% and 0.76X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Corporate Woods Portfolio Loan
($219.9 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by 20
office buildings and one retail center located in an office park
in Overland Park, Kansas.  The loan has performed in line with
expectations since securitization .  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 116% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 117% and 0.88X at
last review.


JP MORGAN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Five 2002-C1 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five classes
and affirmed nine classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Series 2002-C1.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- US$174M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously
     on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$410.948M Cl. A-3 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- US$30.624M Cl. B Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on March 3, 2006 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$34.708M Cl. C Certificate, Affirmed at Aa1 (sf);
     previously on July 9, 2007 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- US$10.208M Cl. D Certificate, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Sept. 6, 2007 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- US$24.5M Cl. E Certificate, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously
     on Sept. 6, 2007 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- US$12.25M Cl. F Certificate, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Sept. 6, 2007 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$16.333M Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
     (sf)

  -- US$12.249M Cl. H Certificate, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
     (sf)

  -- US$6.125M Cl. J Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
     (sf)

  -- US$4.084M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B1
    (sf)

  -- US$8.166M Cl. L Certificate, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B2
     (sf)

  -- US$4.083M Cl. M Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on Aug. 14, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced loans and refinance risk associated with loans
approaching maturity in an adverse environment.  Eighty-two loans,
representing 74% of the pool, mature within the next 24 months.
Fourteen of these loans, representing 13% of the pool, have a
Moody's stressed debt service coverage less than 1.00X.  The
affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to
value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the existing ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
4.8% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
8.1% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If pool performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 6, 2007.  Please
see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for
the last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction.

                         Deal Performance

As of the August 12, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 26% to
$600.2 million from $816.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 104 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 33% of the pool.  Thirteen loans,
representing 19% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at last review
represented 15% of the pool.

Thirty-three loans, representing 25% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.9 million (35% loss severity).
Three loans, representing 2.5% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Baymeadows Loan ($8.3 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 264-unit multifamily property located in Ridgeland,
Mississippi.  The loan was transferred to special servicing last
month for imminent default.  As of March 2010 property was 75%
leased.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by two
office properties located in Denver, Colorado.  The loans are 90+
days delinquent.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $5.5 million
loss (36% expected loss on average) for the specially serviced
loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 11 poorly
performing loans that mature within the next 24 months.  These
loans represent 10% of the pool.  Moody's has estimated a
$16.2 million loss (26% expected loss based on a 60% probability
default) from these troubled loans.  Moody's rating action
recognizes potential uncertainty around the timing and magnitude
of loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full-year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 97% and 76% of the pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average LTV is 75% compared to 83% at Moody's prior review.
Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.4%
to the most recently available net operating income.  Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.48X, respectively, compared to
1.37X and 1.34X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 39 compared to 48 at Moody's prior review.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the pool.  The
largest loan is the Aramark Tower Loan ($42.7 million -- 7.1%),
which is secured by a 32-story, 634,000 square foot, Class A
office building located in Center City Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The property serves as the world headquarters for Aramark
Services, Inc., which leases 57% of the net rentable are through
September 2018.  The second largest tenant is the Philadelphia
Authority for Industrial Development (28% of the NRA; lease
expiration August 2016).  As of December 2009 the property was 94%
leased compared to 99% at last review.  Performance has been
stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.91X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.88X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 4th & Battery Office Loan
($22.9 million -- 3.8%), which is secured by a 201,000 square foot
office building located in downtown Seattle, Washington.  As of
August 2010 property was 97% leased compared to 95% at last
review.  The largest tenants are PopCap Games Inc. (32% of the
NRA, lease expiration December 2010 and July 2018) and Trubion
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (25% of the NRA, lease expiration April
2013).  Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 84% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.28X at
last review.

The third largest loan is the 300 West Vine Loan ($21.6 million --
3.3%), which is secured by a 23-story, Class A, 388,000 square
foot office building located in Lexington, Kentucky.  As of March
2010 the property was 93% leased compared to 96% at last review.
The largest tenant is Central Bank & Trust Co. (32% of the NRA,
lease expiration October 2022).  Performance has improved due to
higher revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 96% and 1.13X at last review.


KENT FUNDING: Moody's Junks Ratings on Class X Notes From 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Kent Funding II Ltd.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- Class X (current balance of $2,347,516), Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf); previously on April 22, 2009 Downgraded to B1(sf);

                        Ratings Rationale

Kent Funding II Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed primarily by a portfolio of residential mortgage-backed
securities originated in 2005 and 2006.  RMBS comprise
approximately 70% of the underlying portfolio.

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade actions are the result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities, and failure of the coverage tests.  The dollar amount
of defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee in August
2010, is 453,575,459, which comprises about 50% of the portfolio.
The Class A/B Overcollateralization ratio decreased from 53.54% in
April 2009 to 34.53% in August 2010 and all the other OC and IC
tests have been failing and continuously deteriorating.  The WARF
increased from 1709 to 2243.  The Class X, which receives its
payment from interest proceeds, did not receive any payment on the
last payment date in August.  Moody's noted that the transaction
is negatively impacted by a large pay-fixed, receive-floating
interest rate swap where payments to the hedge counterparty absorb
a large portion of the interest proceeds in the deal.

Moody's notes that an Event of Default under Section 5.1(a)(viii)
of the Indenture was declared by the Trustee on June 11, 2008, due
to the calculation of Net Outstanding Portfolio Collateral Balance
divided by the Net Outstanding Portfolio Collateral Balance
falling below 100%.  Acceleration was declared on July 10, 2008.
As provided in Article V of the Indenture during the occurrence
and continuance of an Event of Default, certain parties to the
transaction may be entitled to direct the Trustee to take
particular actions with respect to the Collateral and the Notes,
including the sale and liquidation of the assets.  The severity of
losses of certain tranches may be different depending on the
timing and outcome of a liquidation.

Moody's also explained that in arriving at the rating action
described above it performed a number of sensitivity analyses
whereby one or more key variables were changed.  For example, if
defaulted assets in the pool continue to increase causing a
sustained shortfall in interest payments, then the current rating
could deteriorate by 1 notch.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the
general macro uncertainties are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa (sf) or Aa (sf) were stressed by eleven
notches, and securities currently rated A (sf) or Baa (sf) were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) or B (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while
current Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For 2006 and
2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, currently Aaa (sf) or Aa
(sf) rated securities were stressed by eight notches, and
securities currently rated A (sf), Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were
stressed by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the
B range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current Caa (sf)
securities were treated as Ca (sf).

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa (sf), A (sf) or
Baa (sf) were stressed by five notches, Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed to Caa3 (sf), and B (sf) or Caa (sf) securities were
treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime RMBS originated in the first
half of 2006, those currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by four
notches, while Aa (sf), A (sf) and Baa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current B (sf)
and Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa (sf), A (sf) , Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were stressed by four
notches, currently B (sf) rated securities were treated as Caa3
(sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities were treated as Ca
(sf).  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed by four notches, currently B (sf) rated securities
were treated as Caa3 (sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities
were treated as Ca (sf).

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8 for subprime, April 12th for
Option-ARM and April 13 for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will have
varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa (sf) rated securities were stressed by
four notches, Aa (sf) rated securities by six notches, and A (sf)
or Baa (sf) rated securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM
securities currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by two notches,
Aa (sf) and A (sf) by six notches, and Baa (sf) by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by two notches, A (sf) rated securities were stressed by
six notches, and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by nine
notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba (sf) or below,
and are also currently on review for possible downgrade have been
stressed to Ca (sf).

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition, to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution
for the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO
itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including the correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

The capital structure is incorporated into CDOROM by specifying
the attachment point and the thickness of the tranche.  The
Expected Loss for each tranche is the weighted average of losses
to each tranche across all the scenarios, where the weight is the
likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's defines the loss as
the shortfall in the present value of cash flows to the tranche
relative to the present value of the promised cash flows.  The
discount rate used to present value is the current swap rate plus
the promised spread on the tranche based on its remaining
maturity.  Solely for the purpose of discounting losses, Moody's
assumes that losses on the tranche occur 60% of the way through
the maturity of the tranche.  The final EL of the synthetic SF CDO
tranche is the discounted average of the tranche loss across all
the scenarios simulated in CDOROM.  Since the EL is based on a
simulation process, the convergence of the simulation will depend,
in part, on the number of iterations chosen for the simulation.
Moody's applies a 99% confidence interval to the EL result using a
Standard Error equal to the square root of the EL Variance divided
by the number of Monte Carlo simulations.  If this confidence
interval adjustment is significant, a larger number of iterations
may be used to reduce the standard error.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2000-C5 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of one class of
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-C5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates and placed seven classes on review for
possible downgrade.  The rating action is:

  -- US$44.873M Cl. C Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on July 9, 2007 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- US$14.958M Cl. D Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Dec. 21, 2006 Upgraded
     to Aa3 (sf)

  -- US$7.479M Cl. E Certificate, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Dec. 21, 2006 Upgraded to
     A2 (sf)

  -- US$12.464M Cl. F Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Dec. 21, 2006 Upgraded
     to Baa1 (sf)

  -- US$9.972M Cl. G Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on Dec. 21, 2000
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$19.944M Cl. H Certificate, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009 Downgraded
     to B1 (sf)

  -- US$9.972M Cl. J Certificate, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on March 11, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$2.690M Cl. K Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on March 11, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of Class K is due to realized and anticipated losses
from specially serviced loans.  The pool has experienced an
aggregate $37.2 million loss which has resulted in a 100%
principal loss for Class L through Q and a 46% principal loss for
Class K.  The servicer has recognized appraisal reductions
totaling $11.8 million for two of the loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's placed Classes B through J on review for possible
downgrade due to higher expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from specially serviced and poorly
performing watchlisted loans and concerns about refinance risk
associated with loans maturing in an adverse environment.  Forty-
three loans, representing 67% of the pool, mature within the next
36 months.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 17, 2008.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

As of the August 17, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 67% to
$334.1 million from $997.2 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 54% of the pool.  Twelve loans, representing 20% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 41%
of the pool.

Twenty-six loans, representing 56% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $37.2 million loss (50%
loss severity on average).  Currently 12 loans, representing 20%
of the pool, are in special servicing.  The largest specially
serviced loan is the River Plaza Loan ($24.4 million -- 7.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a 202,253 square foot office
building located in Stamford, Connecticut.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in March 2009 due to imminent
default.  The property was 35% leased as of March 2009 and
performance has declined since securitization.  The remaining 10
loans are secured by a mix of multifamily, retail, office, mobile
home park and industrial properties.

Moody's review will focus on potential losses from specially
serviced and watchlisted loans and the performance of the overall
pool.


LEHMAN XS: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 72 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 72
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 4 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 9 tranches from 7 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Lehman XS Trust.

                        Ratings Rationale

The collateral backing these transactions consists primarily of
first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate, Alt-A residential mortgage
loans.  The actions are a result of the rapidly deteriorating
performance of Alt-A pools in conjunction with macroeconomic
conditions that remain under duress.  The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

Class I-A5 issued by Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-10 and Classes I-
A4 and 2-A3 issued by Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-8 are wrapped by
CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. (Insured Rating Withdrawn).
Classes I-A4 and 2-A4 issued by Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-4 are
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated Account --
Unrated).  Class 2-A3A issued by Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-2 is
wrapped by MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded to B3, Outlook
Negative).  For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the
rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's
financial strength rating and (ii) the current underlying rating
(i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The
principal methodology used in determining the underlying rating is
the same methodology for rating securities that do not have a
financial guaranty and is as described earlier.  Moody's withdrew
the insurance financial strength rating of CIFG Assurance North
America, Inc. (CIFG) in November 2009.  As a result securities
wrapped by CIFG are rated at their underlying rating without
consideration of CIFG's guaranty.  In addition, RMBS securities
wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their
underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-1

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-AIO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-10

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc.
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A5A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A5B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-2

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3A, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Downgraded
     to B3, Outlook Negative on Jun 25, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-3

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1B, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-4

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan
     21, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account -- Unrated)

  -- Cl. 1-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1A, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1B, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account -- Unrated)

  -- Cl. 2-A5A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A5B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-6

  -- Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A2C, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4A, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-A4B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 3-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-8

  -- Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc.
     (Insured Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A1A, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: CIFG Assurance North America, Inc.
      (Insured Rating Withdrawn on Nov 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. 2-A4A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-A4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. 2-M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


LNR CDO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Eight Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on eight
classes from LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd. and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on five other classes and removed them from CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The downgrades and affirmations primarily reflect S&P's analysis
of the transaction following its lowered ratings on the commercial
mortgage-backed securities certificates that collateralize LNR
2003-1.  The CMBS certificates are from nine CMBS transactions and
total $136.0 million (20.3% of total asset balance).  S&P also
lowered its credit estimates on a portion of the CMBS collateral
that S&P does not rate ($66.2 million, 9.9%).

According to the Aug. 19, 2010, trustee report, LNR 2003-1 is
collateralized by 135 CMBS classes ($671.5 million, 100%) from 34
distinct transactions issued between 1999 and 2003.  LNR 2003-1
has exposure to the following CMBS transactions that Standard &
Poor's has downgraded:

* Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
  2002-CKS4 (classes L, M, N, and O; $32.1 million, 4.8%);

* Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C3 (classes K, L,
  M, N, and O; $27.6 million, 4.1%);

* Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.'s series 2002-PB2
  (classes K, L, M, and N; $27.1 million, 4.0%); and

* Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.'s series 2000-C1
  (classes H, J, K, and L; $16.1 million, 2.4%).

According to the Aug. 19, 2010, trustee report, LNR 2003-1 is
failing its class F and G par value tests for the first time.  S&P
will monitor any coverage tests failures and may take rating
actions if any failures continue.

Standard & Poor's analyzed LNR 2003-1 and its underlying
collateral according to S&P's current criteria.  S&P's analysis is
consistent with the lowered and affirmed ratings.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                        LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.

                               Rating
                               ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       B                AA+ (sf)         AAA/Watch Neg (sf)
       E-FL             BBB+ (sf)        A/Watch Neg (sf)
       E-Fx             BBB+ (sf)        A/Watch Neg (sf)
       F-FL             BB+ (sf)         BBB+/Watch Neg (sf)
       F-FX             BB+ (sf)         BBB+/Watch Neg (sf)
       G                BB (sf)          BBB/Watch Neg (sf)
       H                BB- (sf)         BB+/Watch Neg (sf)
       J                CCC+ (sf)        B+/Watch Neg (sf)

      Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                        LNR CDO 2003-1 Ltd.

                               Rating
                               ------
       Class            To               From
       -----            --               ----
       A                AAA (sf)         AAA/Watch Neg (sf)
       C-FL             AA (sf)          AA/Watch Neg (sf)
       C-FX             AA (sf)          AA/Watch Neg (sf)
       D-FL             AA- (sf)         AA-/Watch Neg (sf)
       D-FX             AA- (sf)         AA-/Watch Neg (sf)


LOCAL INSIGHT: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of notes from two U.S. corporate securitizations issued by
Local Insight Media Finance LLC and placed them on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

The downgrades reflect weakening in the performance of the
directory publishing sector.  These transactions receive their
cash flow from the ongoing operations of Local Insight Media, a
company that publishes Yellow Pages directories both in print and
on the Internet.  Other sources of revenue include related Web
sites, search engine marketing, video, contracts, intellectual
property, and associated rights/contracts.  The CreditWatch
placements reflect S&P's view of trends that S&P believes may hurt
the cash flows that support the Local Insight Media transactions.

Under its current methodology for rating U.S. corporate
securitizations, the degree to which S&P can raise the rating on a
transaction above the corporate credit rating of the
seller/servicer depends on, among other factors, the structural
and legal enhancements available to support the transaction and
the availability of a satisfactory backup servicer/manager.

Additionally, Standard & Poor's is revising its cash flow
assumptions for these transactions.  The assumptions reflect S&P's
views regarding the business risk of the directory publishing
industry and its impact on the net securitizable cash flows of the
Local Insight Media securitizations under different rating
scenarios.  S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placements after
completing its review of the updated cash flow analysis for these
transactions.

        Ratings Lowered And Placed On Creditwatch Negative

                 Local Insight Media Finance LLC
      $673 million fixed-rate senior and subordinated notes
                          series 2007-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
       Class     To                                From
       -----     --                                ----
       A-1       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg                BB (sf)
       A-2       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg                BB (sf)

                 Local Insight Media Finance LLC
      $673 million fixed-rate senior and subordinated notes
                          series 2008-1

                                 Rating
                                 ------
       Class     To                                From
       -----     --                                ----
       A-1       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg                 BB (sf)
       A-2       BB- (sf)/Watch Neg                 BB (sf)
       B         B- (sf)/Watch Neg                  B (sf)


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Three 2001-Canada 5 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three classes,
confirmed two and affirmed three classes of Merrill Lynch
Financial Assets Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, 2001-Canada 5.  Moody's rating action is:

  -- CAD119.754M Cl. A-2 Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on May 18, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
     (sf)

  -- CAD7.462M Cl. B Certificate, Confirmed at Aaa (sf);
     previously on July 8, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- CAD7.462M Cl. C Certificate, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously
     on July 8, 2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- CAD9.949M Cl. D Certificate, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);
     previously on July 8, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- CAD1.866M Cl. E Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf);
     previously on July 8, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- CAD4.974M Cl. F Certificate, Downgraded to C (sf); previously
     on July 8, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- CAD1.253M Cl. G Certificate, Affirmed at C (sf); previously
     on July 8, 2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. X Certificate, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on
     May 18, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans, concerns about refinance risk
associated with loans maturing in an adverse environment, a
decline in loan diversity, and increased interest shortfalls.  The
confirmations and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement
levels for the confirmed and affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain the existing ratings.

On July 8, 2010, Moody's placed five classes on review for
possible downgrade.  This action concludes Moody's review.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.4% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 8.0%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
6.2% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score
(Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade underlying ratings is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected
based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar underlying ratings
in the same transaction.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 17, 2008.  Please see
the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on moodys.com for the
last rating action and the ratings history.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the ratings.

As of the August 16, 2010 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 39% to
$152.7 million from $248.7 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 38 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 56% of the pool.  Twelve loans, representing 21% of
the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.  Defeasance at last review represented 19%
of the pool.

Two loans, representing 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.7 million.  The disposition of these
loans, which were secured by hotel properties located in Niagara
Falls, Canada, resulted in a 100% loss severity.  One loan,
representing 4% of the pool, is currently in special servicing.
This loan is the Skeena Mall Loan ($6.5 million -- 4% of the
pool), which is secured by a retail center located in Terrace,
British Columbia.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in February 2009 due to delinquency and is currently 90+ days
delinquent.  The property was 51% leased as of June 2010 which is
the same as at last review.  The servicer has recognized an
appraisal reduction of $2.9 million for this loan.  Moody's has
estimated an aggregate $3.2 million loss (49% expected loss on
average) for this specially serviced loan.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes F through
NR have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$470,780.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue to
experience interest shortfalls caused by the specially serviced
loan.  Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees,
including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate
entitlement reductions and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 65%
of the pool.  Excluding the specially serviced loan and defeased
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 52% compared to 71% at
Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 14.2% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding the specially serviced loan and defeased loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.77X and 2.22X, respectively,
compared to 1.50X and 1.78X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt
service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the York Mills Gardens Loan
($17.6 million -- 11.5% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
center located in Toronto, Ontario.  The largest tenants at the
center are Longo's, Shopper's Drug Mart and Roger's Video.  The
property was 97% leased as of August 2010 compared to 99% at last
review.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.6X, respectively, compared to 63%
and 1.5X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Delta Bow Valley Loan
($15.3 million -- 10.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 398
room full service hotel located in Calgary, Alberta.  The property
was had an occupancy of 63% in 2009 compared to 66% at last
review.  The loan has amortized 5% since last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 43% and 2.78X, respectively, compared to 65%
and 1.82X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Dundas Kipling II Loan
($11.9 million -- 7.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 134,237
square foot office property located in Toronto, Ontario.  The
property was 99% leased as of August 2009 which is the same as at
last review.  The loan has amortized 4% since last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.70X, respectively, the
same as at last review.


NOMURA ASSET: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 100 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 100
tranches, confirmed the rating of one tranche and withdrawn the
ratings of four tranches from 13 RMBS transactions issued by
Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan Trust and
Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust.  The collateral backing these deals
primarily consists of first-lien, fixed and adjustable-rate Alt-A
residential mortgages.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in Alt-A pools in conjunction with home price and
unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on Alt-A pools issued
from 2005 to 2007.

To assess the rating implications of the updated loss levels on
Alt-A RMBS, each individual pool was run through a variety of
scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R), the cash flow
model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.  This individual
pool level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural features of the transaction
including priorities of payment distribution among the different
tranches, average life of the tranches, current balances of the
tranches and future cash flows under expected and stressed
scenarios.  The scenarios include ninety-six different
combinations comprising of six loss levels, four loss timing
curves and four prepayment curves.  The volatility in losses
experienced by a tranche due to small increments in losses on the
underlying mortgage pool is taken into consideration when
assigning ratings.

The above mentioned approach "Alt-A RMBS Loss Projection Update:
February 2010" is adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans.  To project losses on
pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first estimates a
"baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the pool that is
dependent on the vintage of loan origination (10%, 19% and 21% for
the 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage respectively).  This baseline rate
is higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for the
vintage to account for the volatile nature of small pools.  Even
if a few loans in a small pool become delinquent, there could be a
large increase in the overall pool delinquency level due to the
concentration risk.  Once the baseline rate is set, further
adjustments are made based on 1) the number of loans remaining in
the pool and 2) the level of current delinquencies in the pool.
The fewer the number of loans remaining in the pool, the higher
the volatility and hence the stress applied.  Once the loan count
in a pool falls below 75, the rate of delinquency is increased by
1% for every loan less than 75.  For example, for a pool with 74
loans from the 2005 vintage, the adjusted rate of new delinquency
would be 10.10%.  If current delinquency levels in a small pool is
low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend.  To
account for that, the rate calculated above is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.2 to 2.0 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 50% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the methodology
publication.

Tranches I-A-3, I-A-4, I-A-5 and I-A-6 issued by NAAC 2007-1 are
wrapped by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Rated Aa3 with a
Negative Outlook).  Tranche II-A-M issued by NAAC 2007-1 and
Tranches A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 issued by NAAC 2007-3 are wrapped
by Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated Account -- Unrated).
For securities insured by a financial guarantor, the rating on the
securities is the higher of (i) the guarantor's financial strength
rating and (ii) the current underlying rating (i.e., absent
consideration of the guaranty) on the security.  The principal
methodology used in determining the underlying rating is the same
methodology for rating securities that do not have a financial
guaranty and is as described earlier.  RMBS securities wrapped by
Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated at their underlying rating
without consideration of Ambac's guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AF1

  -- Cl. I-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AF2

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AP1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AR1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. V-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AR2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. III-A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AR3

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-AR4

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2006-WF1

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-1B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-5, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. I-A-6, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp
     (Confirmed at Aa3, Outlook Negative on Nov. 12, 2009)

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16,
     2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2007-2

  -- Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-7, Downgraded to C; (sf) previously on Jan. 14, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2007-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
     Jan. 21, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-AF1

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2007-1

  -- Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. I-A-4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-1-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-A-1A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-A-1B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-A-4A, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-2-A-4B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan. 14,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


OPUS CDO: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Super Senior Swap to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Opus CDO I Limited.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$435,500,000 Super Senior Swap (current notional of
     $276,578,706), Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 24,
     2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying reference
portfolio.  Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous
factors, including a decline in the average credit rating of the
portfolio (as measured by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor), and an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted
securities.  The weighted average rating factor, as reported by
the trustee, has increased from 4991 in March 2009 to 6378 in
August 2010.  Defaulted securities, as reported by the trustee,
has also increased from $16 million to $42 million in that period.
Additionally, approximately $25 million of RMBS within the
underlying portfolio are currently on review for possible
downgrade as a result of Moody's updated loss projections.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the
general macro uncertainties are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.  Also, in arriving at the rating action described above,
Moody's performed sensitivity analyses whereby one or more key
variables were changed.  For example, if defaulted assets in the
reference portolio continue to increase then the current rating
could deteriorate by one notch.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa (sf) or Aa (sf) were stressed by eleven
notches, and securities currently rated A (sf) or Baa (sf) were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) or B (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while
current Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For 2006 and
2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, currently Aaa (sf) or Aa
(sf) rated securities were stressed by eight notches, and
securities currently rated A (sf), Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were
stressed by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the
B range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current Caa (sf)
securities were treated as Ca (sf).

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa (sf), A (sf) or
Baa (sf) were stressed by five notches, Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed to Caa3 (sf), and B (sf) or Caa (sf) securities were
treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime RMBS originated in the first
half of 2006, those currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by four
notches, while Aa (sf), A (sf) and Baa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current B (sf)
and Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa (sf), A (sf) , Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were stressed by four
notches, currently B (sf) rated securities were treated as Caa3
(sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities were treated as Ca
(sf).  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed by four notches, currently B (sf) rated securities
were treated as Caa3 (sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities
were treated as Ca (sf).

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa (sf) rated securities were stressed by
four notches, Aa (sf) rated securities by six notches, and A (sf)
or Baa (sf) rated securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM
securities currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by two notches,
Aa (sf) and A (sf) by six notches, and Baa (sf) by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by two notches, A (sf) rated securities were stressed by
six notches, and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by nine
notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba (sf) or below,
and are also currently on review for possible downgrade have been
stressed to Ca (sf).

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution
for the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO
itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including the correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

The capital structure is incorporated into CDOROM by specifying
the attachment point and the thickness of the tranche.  The
Expected Loss for each tranche is the weighted average of losses
to each tranche across all the scenarios, where the weight is the
likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's defines the loss as
the shortfall in the present value of cash flows to the tranche
relative to the present value of the promised cash flows.  The
discount rate used to present value is the current swap rate plus
the promised spread on the tranche based on its remaining
maturity.  Solely for the purpose of discounting losses, Moody's
assumes that losses on the tranche occur 60% of the way through
the maturity of the tranche.  The final EL of the synthetic SF CDO
tranche is the discounted average of the tranche loss across all
the scenarios simulated in CDOROM.  Since the EL is based on a
simulation process, the convergence of the simulation will depend,
in part, on the number of iterations chosen for the simulation.
Moody's applies a 99% confidence interval to the EL result using a
Standard Error equal to the square root of the EL Variance divided
by the number of Monte Carlo simulations.  If this confidence
interval adjustment is significant, a larger number of iterations
may be used to reduce the standard error.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


ORION 2006-1: Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and affirmed Orion 2006-1 Ltd./LLC:

  -- $98,500,000 class A notes affirmed at 'Csf';
  -- $81,000,000 class B notes downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
  -- $77,510,897 class C notes affirmed at 'Csf';
  -- $31,475,201 class D notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

The class B notes are a non-deferrable class and are downgraded
due to partial default in the payment of its accrued interest.
The class A, class C and class D notes are affirmed, because the
classes remain undercollateralized and are expected to default at
or prior to maturity.

Orion 2006-1 entered an Event of Default on June 10, 2010, as a
result of the partial default in the payment of accrued interest
to the class B notes.  To date, the transaction has not
accelerated its maturity.  Orion 2006-1 has been relying on
principal proceeds to cover at least a portion of the class B
accrued interest distribution since December 2008 due to
shortfalls in interest collections.  On the Aug. 10, 2010,
distribution date, interest proceeds were insufficient to cover
even the administrative expenses.  This trend is expected to
continue as the portfolio continues to experience defaults and
write-downs.

Orion 2006-1, Ltd./LLC, is a hybrid cash and synthetic structured
finance collateralized debt obligation that closed on May 26,
2006, and is managed by NIBC Credit Management, Inc.  As of the
July 20, 2010 trustee report, the portfolio is comprised of
residential mortgage-backed securities (95.7%) and SF CDOs (4.3%).


RUTLAND RATED: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
notes from Rutland Rated Investments' series 13 and 14, two U.S.
structured finance-backed synthetic collateralized debt
obligations, and removed them from CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The downgrades reflect downward rating migration in the underlying
reference portfolios, as well as synthetic rated
overcollateralization ratios that were below 100% as of the August
review and at a 90-day forward run.

                            Rating List

                    Rutland Rated Investments
          US$25 mil Rutland Rated Investments series 13

                                   Rating
                                   ------
   Class                     To             From
   -----                     --             ----
   Series 13                 BB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

                    Rutland Rated Investments
          US$25 mil Rutland Rated Investments series 14

                                   Rating
                                   ------
   Class                     To             From
   -----                     --             ----
   Series 14                 CCC (sf)       CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg


SACO I: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 57 Tranches From 29 RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 57
tranches, confirmed the ratings of 8 tranches, and upgraded the
rating of one tranche from 29 RMBS transactions issued by SACO I
Trust.  The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of
closed end second lien loans.

                        Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the continued performance
deterioration in second lien pools in conjunction with home price
and unemployment conditions that remain under duress.  The actions
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on second lien pools.

Certain tranches included in this action, noted below, are wrapped
by financial guarantors.  For securities insured by a financial
guarantor, the rating on the securities is the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating and (ii) the current
underlying rating (i.e., absent consideration of the guaranty) on
the security.  The principal methodology used in determining the
underlying rating is the same methodology for rating securities
that do not have a financial guaranty and is as described earlier.

RMBS securities wrapped by Ambac Assurance Corporation are rated
at their underlying rating without consideration of Ambac's
guaranty.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Moody's
notes an increasing potential for a double-dip recession, which
could cause a further 20% decline in home prices (versus its
baseline assumption of roughly 5% further decline).  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization in early 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

If expected losses on the each of the collateral pools were to
increase by 10%, model implied results indicate that most of the
deals' ratings would remain stable, with the exception of Class B-
1 from SACO I Trust 2004-2, class M-2 from SACO I Trust 2004-3,
classes II-A-1 and II-A-3 from SACO I Trust 2005-10, classes II-M-
1 and II-M-2 from SACO I Trust 2005-5, class A from SACO I Trust
2005-6, class A from SACO I Trust 2005-7, classes A-1 and A-2 from
SACO I Trust 2005-GP1, class M-3 from SACO I Trust 2005-WM1, class
II-A from SACO I Trust 2006-12, for each of which model implied
results would be one notch lower (for example, Ba2 versus Ba1, or
Ca versus Caa3).  For Class M-2 from SACO I Trust 2005-WM1 and
class II-A-2 from SACO I Trust 2006-5 the model implied results
would be three notches lower (for example, Ba2 versus Baa2, or
Caa3 versus B3).

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2004-2

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2004-3

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-1

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-10

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 18, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-2

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-3

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-4

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-5

  -- Cl. I-A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-3, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-M-4, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-6

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-7

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-8

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-9

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-GP1

  -- Cl. A-1, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 18,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     March 18, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
     Outlook Negative on Dec. 18, 2009)

  -- Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Current Rating: Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 18,
     2009 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 18, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Confirmed at Aa3,
     Outlook Negative on Dec. 18, 2009)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-WM1

  -- Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-WM2

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2005-WM3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-1

  -- Cl. A, Current Rating: Ca (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2009
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 18, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Syncora Guarantee Inc. (Downgraded to
     Ca, Outlook Developing on Mar 9, 2009)

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-10

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-12

  -- Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-3

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-4

  -- Cl. A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-5

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 18,
     2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-6

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-7

  -- Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-8

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2006-9

  -- Cl. A, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on March 18, 2010 Ca
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2007-1

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: SACO I Trust 2007-2, Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series
2007-2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on March 18, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Saco I Trust 2006-2

  -- Cl. I-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 18, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)

  -- Cl. II-A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on April 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Underlying Rating: Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     March 18, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
     Account - Unrated)


SACRAMENTO-YOLO PORT: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Rating on Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has confirmed the B2 rating on the Sacramento-Yolo Port
District Port Facilities Refunding and Improvement Revenue Bonds,
Series 2001 outstanding in the amount of approximately
$5.0 million.  Additionally, the outlook has been revised to
negative from under review for downgrade.  The bonds are secured
by net revenues of the port (which is now operated by the City of
West Sacramento).  The B2 rating and negative outlook reflect the
continued fiscal stress being experienced at the port resulting in
less than 1.0 times annual debt service coverage and the need for
the port to rely on available cash resources to make debt service
payments.  The rating also reflects the final maturity of the
bonds (July 1, 2014) and Moody's expectation that available
reserves and ongoing revenues will remain sufficient to pay the
remaining debt service.

Operations Provide Less Than Sum-Sufficient Debt Service Coverage;
        Cash Resources Being Depleted To Pay Debt Service

Operating revenues, despite a slight rebound in 2009, have
experienced an overall declining trend, decreasing at an average
annual rate of 14.8% from 2005 to 2009.  Non-operating revenues in
the form of proceeds from the sale of real estate transaction had
buttressed debt service coverage and provided the port with a
modest amount of cash reserves.  Due to a lack of additional non-
operating revenues from land sales or other sources, debt service
coverage declined steeply in both 2008 and 2009 to 0.49 times and
0.19 times, respectively.

Cash reserves, which primarily represent the remaining proceeds
from land sales earlier in the decade, declined in 2008 and are
expected to decline 2009 due to the payment of debt service not
covered by net revenues.  Net working capital as a percentage of
2008 gross revenue was 82.3% ($3.6 million) and this figure for
2009 declined to 27.0% ($1.2 million).  Days cash on hand at the
port in fiscal 2008 was 479 and declined to 162 in 2009.  Although
the port's fiscal 2010 audited financial statements are not yet
available, officials report that operating revenues were
insufficient to generate 1.0 times annual debt service coverage
resulting in a modest decline in cash reserves to $1.6 million
from the fiscal 2009 level of $1.8 million.

                  Legal Provisions Are Standard

Net revenues of the district are pledged for repayment of the
bonds.  The rate covenant is standard at 125% annual debt service
on all parity debt service.  Moody's notes, however, that failure
to meet the port's rate covenant is not defined as an event of
technical default.  The additional bonds test is quite strong at
160%.  The reserve requirement is standard, the lesser of 10% of
bond proceeds, 125% average annual debt service, or maximum annual
debt service.  The reserve requirement is met with cash proceeds
of approximately $2.5 million.

                             Outlook

Moody's outlook on the Port of West Sacramento's revenue bonds is
negative.  This outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the port
will continue to face challenges in generating net revenues
sufficient to cover annual debt service and the likelihood of
continued depletion of cash reserves due to weak operating and
financial performance in the medium term.

Key Statistics (Fiscal 2009)

* Operating ratio: 95.5%

* Annual debt service coverage: 0.19x

* Net working capital as % of gross revenue: 27.0% ($1.2 million)

* Days cash on hand: 162 ($1.8 million)

* Debt ratio: 20.2%

* Payout of principal (10 years): 100%

* Debt outstanding: $5.0 million, final maturity July 1, 2014

Information source used to prepare the credit rating is these:
parties involved in the ratings.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the credit satisfactory for the purposes of assigning
a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


STARTS LTD: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 2006-1 Tranche
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on one
tranche from STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.'s 2006-1 and removed it from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P affirmed
one rating on PARCS-R Master Trust's series 2007-2 and removed it
from CreditWatch with negative implications.  Both transactions
are loss-trigger based leveraged super senior synthetic
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

An LSS note is a type of credit-linked note in a synthetic CDO
transaction.  As such, LSS noteholders suffer losses when losses
in the transaction's reference portfolio reach a predetermined
attachment point.  An LSS note's attachment point in the reference
portfolio is typically senior to that required for 'AAA (sf)'
rated mezzanine notes.  Thus, at issuance, the transferred risk is
typically structured to be above the 'AAA (sf)' required
attachment point for the portfolio.

LSS notes not only contain credit risk but also typically contain
market-value risk through a trigger based on the market value of
the underlying reference assets.  The trigger exposes the
noteholder to decreases in the market value of the LSS tranche in
the portfolio.  The trigger is not directly linked to the market
value of the super senior tranche of the portfolio, but rather, is
based on a market-value proxy reflected by portfolio losses.  The
proxy is in the form of "stepped" loss triggers, which increase as
the maturity of the transaction nears.

                          Rating Lowered

                       STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
                              2006-1

                                   Rating
                                   ------
    Class                    To              From
    -----                    --              ----
    Lever sup                AA- (sf)        AA (sf)/Watch Neg

                         Rating Affirmed

                       PARCS-R Master Trust
               2007-2 LSS (floating recovery) units

                                  Rating
                                  ------
   Class                    To              From
   -----                    --              ----
   Units                    BB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg


VERDE CDO: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of one class of notes issued by Verde CDO Limited.  The
notes affected by the rating action are:

  -- US$850,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2045
     (current balance of $757,275,702), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
     previously on February 10, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf).

Verde CDO Limited is a collateralized debt obligation issuance
backed by a portfolio of primarily Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities originated between 2001 and 2007.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating downgrade action is the result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
Such credit deterioration is observed through numerous factors,
including a decline in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(as measured by an increase in the weighted average rating
factor), an increase in the dollar amount of defaulted securities,
and failure of the coverage tests.  The weighted average rating
factor, as reported by the trustee, has increased from 755 in
February 2009 to 1269 in August 2010.  Defaulted securities, as
reported by the trustee, has also increased from $179 million to
$449 million in that period.  Moody's noted that the transaction
is negatively impacted by a large pay-fixed, receive-floating
interest rate swap where payments to the hedge counterparty absorb
a large portion of the excess spread in the deal.  Additionally,
approximately $100 million of RMBS within the underlying portfolio
are currently on review for possible downgrade as a result of
Moody's updated loss projections.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of ABS CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level.  Among the
general macro uncertainties are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.  However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced are sensitive to further change.

Moody's explained that in arriving at the rating action noted
above, the ratings of subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS which
are currently on review for possible downgrade were stressed.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
such 2005-2007 vintage RMBS, Moody's used certain projections of
the lifetime average cumulative losses as set forth in Moody's
press releases dated January 13th for subprime, January 14th for
Alt-A, and January 27th for Option-ARM.  Based on the anticipated
ratings impact of the updated cumulative loss numbers, the stress
varied based on vintage, current rating, and RMBS asset type.

For 2005 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, securities that are
currently rated Aaa (sf) or Aa (sf) were stressed by eleven
notches, and securities currently rated A (sf) or Baa (sf) were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) or B (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while
current Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For 2006 and
2007 Alt-A and Option-ARM securities, currently Aaa (sf) or Aa
(sf) rated securities were stressed by eight notches, and
securities currently rated A (sf) , Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were
stressed by five notches.  Those securities currently rated in the
B range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current Caa (sf)
securities were treated as Ca (sf).

For 2005 subprime RMBS, those currently rated Aa (sf), A (sf) or
Baa (sf) were stressed by five notches, Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed to Caa3 (sf), and B (sf) or Caa (sf) securities were
treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime RMBS originated in the first
half of 2006, those currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by four
notches, while Aa (sf), A (sf) and Baa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by eight notches.  Those securities currently rated in
the Ba (sf) range were stressed to Caa3 (sf), while current B (sf)
and Caa (sf) securities were treated as Ca (sf).  For subprime
RMBS originated in the second half of 2006, those currently rated
Aa (sf), A (sf) , Baa (sf) or Ba (sf) were stressed by four
notches, currently B (sf) rated securities were treated as Caa3
(sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities were treated as Ca
(sf).  For 2007 subprime RMBS, currently Ba (sf) rated securities
were stressed by four notches, currently B (sf) rated securities
were treated as Caa3 (sf), and currently Caa (sf) rated securities
were treated as Ca (sf).

Moody's noted that the stresses applicable to categories of 2005-
2007 subprime RMBS that are not listed above will be two notches
if the RMBS ratings are on review for possible downgrade.

For purposes of monitoring its ratings of SF CDOs with exposure to
pre-2005 vintage RMBS, Moody's considered the various factors
indicating continued negative performance that were described in
Moody's press releases dated April 8th for subprime, April 12th
for Option-ARM and April 13th for Alt-A.  Such seasoned deals will
have varying stress based on RMBS asset type.

For pre-2005 Alt-A, Aaa (sf) rated securities were stressed by
four notches, Aa (sf) rated securities by six notches, and A (sf)
or Baa (sf) rated securities by nine notches.  Pre-2005 Option-ARM
securities currently rated Aaa (sf) were stressed by two notches,
Aa (sf) and A (sf) by six notches, and Baa (sf) by nine notches.

For pre-2005 subprime, Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) rated securities were
stressed by two notches, A (sf) rated securities were stressed by
six notches, and Baa (sf) rated securities were stressed by nine
notches.

All subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM RMBS securities which
originated prior to 2005, are currently rated Ba (sf) or below,
and are also currently on review for possible downgrade have been
stressed to Ca (sf).

Moody's further explained that these stresses are based on a
preliminary sample analysis of deals from a given vintage and
asset type, and that they will be utilized in its SF CDO rating
analysis while subprime, Alt-A and Option-ARM securities remain on
review for downgrade.  Current public ratings will be used for
securities that have undergone an in depth review by Moody's RMBS
team, and that are no longer on review for downgrade.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio.  All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

In deriving its ratings, Moody's uses the collateral instrument's
current rating-based expected loss, Moody's recovery rate table,
and the original rating of the instrument along with its average
life to infer an unadjusted default probability.

The approach Moody's takes to defining the default distribution
for the SF CDO collateral depends on the structure of the CDO
itself.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.6 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs.  Within
this framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework.  Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including the correlation between recovery values.  Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model.  The cash flow model takes into account of: collateral cash
flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of payments
(waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received from
portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present).  The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring.  Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows.  The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate.  For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.



WACHOVIA BANK: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 14 2004-C14 Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from Wachovia
Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2004-C14.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on seven classes from the same
transaction.

The downgrades of the pooled certificate classes follow S&P's
analysis of the transaction using its U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS
criteria.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the loans in the pool.  Using servicer-
provided financial information, S&P calculated an adjusted debt
service coverage of 1.38x and a loan-to-value ratio of 93.0%.  S&P
further stressed the loans' cash flows under S&P's 'AAA (sf)'
scenario to yield a weighted average DSC of 1.04x and an LTV ratio
of 116.7%.  The implied defaults and loss severity under the 'AAA
(sf)' scenario were 38.5% and 31.2%, respectively.  The DSC and
LTV calculations S&P noted above exclude two of the four
($64.3 million; 6.9%) specially serviced assets and five defeased
loans ($111.2 million; 11.9%).  S&P separately estimated losses
for two ($20.3 million; 2.2%) of the four specially serviced
assets, which S&P included in its 'AAA (sf)' scenario implied
default and loss severity figures.

S&P downgraded the class "PP" certificates to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' due to principal losses sustained by the class.  The class
"PP" certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from the
subordinate, nonpooled B note of the Park Place Mall whole loan.

The affirmations of the ratings on the pooled principal and
interest certificates reflect subordination levels that are
consistent with the outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class "MAD" certificates.  The class "MAD"
certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from a subordinate
$13.6 million nonpooled component of the 11 Madison Avenue whole
loan.  The whole loan was defeased in September 2006 and is
performing as S&P expected.  S&P affirmed its rating on the class
XC and XP interest-only (IO) certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, four assets ($64.3
million; 6.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer,
CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  One ($16.5 million, 1.8%) asset
is real estate owned, one ($3.8 million, 0.4%) asset is in
foreclosure, one ($4.8 million, 0.5%) asset is 30-days delinquent,
and one ($39.2 million, 4.2%) asset is current.  Details are as
follows:

The FBI Field Office - Baltimore, Md., is the fourth-largest
exposure in the pool ($39.2 million; 4.2%) and is secured by a
155,755-sq.-ft. office building in Baltimore Md., built in 2004
specifically for the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on Feb. 11, 2010, due
to the parent of the borrower filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The
parent is a U.S. REIT and part of the Australian Rubicon RAML,
which filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  As of year-end 2009, the
reported occupancy and DSC for this property were 100.0% and
1.42x, respectively.  The property is classified as current as of
the latest remittance report.

The Bel Villaggio, Phases I & II loan ($16.5 million, 1.8%) is the
ninth-largest exposure in the pool and is secured by a 77,251-sq.-
ft. boutique retail center built in 2002 in Temecula, Calif.  The
loan was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 17, 2009, due
to monetary default and is currently in foreclosure.  As of year-
end 2008, the reported occupancy and DSC for this property were
76.0% and 0.77, respectively.  Standard & Poor's expects a
moderate loss upon the resolution of this asset.

The Alamance Crossing loan ($4.8 million, 0.5%) is secured by a
63,350-sq.-ft. retail property built in 1995 in Greensboro, N.C.
The asset was transferred to the special servicer on July 16,
2010, due to imminent default and is currently 30 days delinquent.
According to CWCapital, the borrower was notified on July 1, 2010,
that the largest tenant, Southern Family Markets (67% net rentable
area), will no longer be making any rental payments.

The Perry Hill Estates and Ridgeview Heights Portfolio loan
($3.8 million, 0.5%) consists of two multifamily properties
totaling 96 units in Ashford and Willington, Conn.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on July 16, 2009, and is
currently in foreclosure.  Standard & Poor's expects a minimal
loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

                       Transaction Summary

As of the August 2010, remittance report, the transaction had an
aggregate trust balance of $936.3 million (67 loans), compared
with $1.15 billion (83 loans) at issuance.  Wachovia Bank N.A.,
the master servicer, provided financial information for 100% of
the trust balance.  All of the servicer-provided financial
information was full-year 2008, partial-year 2009, or full-year
2009 data.  S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of 1.49x for the
nondefeased loans in the pool based on the reported figures.
S&P's adjusted DSC and LTV were 1.38x and 93.0%, respectively, and
exclude two of the four specially serviced assets and five
defeased loans ($111.2 million; 11.9%).  S&P separately estimated
losses for two of the four specially serviced assets.  Twelve
loans ($134.2 million, 14.3%) are on the master servicer's
watchlist.  Three loans ($23.1 million, 2.5%) have a reported DSC
between 1.0x and 1.1x, and six loans ($53.8 million, 5.8%) have a
reported DSC of less than 1.0x.  The trust has experienced
$1.7 million of principal losses to date.

                     Summary of Top 10 Loans

The top 10 loans secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding balance of $485.8 million (55.8%).  Using servicer-
reported information, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC of
1.55x for the nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P's adjusted DSC
and LTV figures for the top 10 loans were 1.39x and 92.3%,
respectively.  Two of top 10 loans are with the special servicer
and are discussed above.  Two of the top 10 loans are on the
master servicer's watchlist, which S&P discuss below.

The 444 North Michigan Avenue loan ($71.5 million; 7.6%) is the
third-largest loan in the pool and is secured by a 511,201-sq.-ft.
office building constructed in 1976 and renovated in 1991.  The
property is located on Michigan Avenue along Chicago's Magnificent
Mile.  The loan appears on the master servicer's watchlist due to
a low DSC.  The master servicer indicated that it is reviewing two
new leases totaling approximately 20,400 sq. ft. (4.0% gross
leasable area).  For year-end 2009, the reported occupancy and DSC
were 78.1% and 1.18x, respectively.

The Summer View at Sherman Oaks Apartments loan ($15.4 million;
1.6%) is the second-largest loan on the watchlist and the 10th-
largest loan secured by real estate in the pool.  The loan is
secured by a 169-unit multifamily property built in 1964 in
Sherman Oaks, Calif.  This loan also appears on the master
servicer's watchlist due to a low DSC.  As of March 2010, the
reported occupancy and DSC were 95.7% and 0.74x, respectively.
According to the master servicer, a new property manager has been
effective in attracting new tenants.

                      Nonpooled Certificates

S&P downgraded the class "PP" certificates to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' due to principal losses sustained by the class.  The class
"PP" certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from the
subordinate, nonpooled B note of the Park Place Mall whole loan.
According to the August 2010 remittance report and S&P's
discussions with the special servicer, the principal losses are a
result of the ongoing workout fees of approximately $2,184 per
month.  The workout fees are due to a loan modification related to
General Growth Properties' bankruptcy filing.  The class "PP"
certificates first sustained a loss in July 2010 according to the
remittance report for that month and, to date, the total principal
losses incurred by the class "PP" certificates are $39,095.
Ongoing workout fees relating to the whole loan are also being
applied to the pooled certificates.  Thus far, $40,832 has
affected the pooled certificates.

The Park Place Mall loan is the largest loan in the pool with a
current whole-loan balance of $172.0 million (18.4%), which
consists of a senior pooled balance of $135.8 million and a
subordinate, nonpooled junior B note of $36.2 million.  The loan
is secured by approximately 467,141 sq. ft. of an approximately
1.1 million-sq.-ft. regional mall built in 1974 in Tucson, Ariz.
The property features three anchor tenants (Dillard's, Sears, and
Macy's) that are not part of the collateral and over 100 specialty
retailers.  The in-line tenants include Coach, Buckle, Hollister,
Chico's, and Abercrombie & Fitch.  For the 12 months ended
Dec. 31, 2008, the reported DSC and occupancy were 1.55x and
98.8%, respectively, up from 1.29x and 96.0% at issuance.  Based
on S&P's current valuation using an adjusted net cash flow, its
adjusted whole-loan LTV was 74.8%.

Standard & Poor's stressed the loans in the pool according to its
criteria, and the resultant credit enhancement levels are
consistent with S&P's lowered and affirmed ratings.

               Ratings Lowered (Pooled Certificates)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C14

                 Rating
                 ------
     Class     To         From         Credit enhancement (%)
     -----     --         ----         ----------------------
     B         AA- (sf)   AA+ (sf)                      13.42
     C         A+ (sf)    AA- (sf)                      11.87
     D         A- (sf)    A (sf)                         9.86
     E         BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)                        8.63
     F         BBB (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                      7.24
     G         BBB- (sf)  BBB (sf)                       5.84
     H         BB (sf)    BBB- (sf)                      4.14
     J         BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)                       3.83
     K         B+ (sf)    BB (sf)                        3.37
     L         B (sf)     BB- (sf)                       2.60
     M         B- (sf)    B+ (sf)                        2.29
     N         CCC+ (sf)  B (sf)                         1.98
     O         CCC (sf)   B- (sf)                        1.67

              Ratings Affirmed (Pooled Certificates)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C14

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A-2      AAA (sf)                  16.67
             A-3      AAA (sf)                  16.67
             A-4      AAA (sf)                  16.67
             A-1A     AAA (sf)                  16.67
             XC       AAA (sf)                    N/A
             XP       AAA (sf)                    N/A

             Ratings Lowered (Nonpooled Certificates)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C14

                                Rating
                                ------
                      Class     To      From
                      -----     --      ----
                      PP        D (sf)  CCC- (sf)

             Ratings Affirmed (Nonpooled Certificates)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C14

             Class     Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----     ------   ----------------------
             MAD       AAA (sf)                    N/A

                      N/A - Not applicable.


WAMU COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 27 Classes of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 27
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from WaMu
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's series 2006-SL1 and 2007-
SL3.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its ratings on three classes from
series 2007-SL3 and withdrew its rating on one class from series
2006-SL1.

The downgrades reflect S&P's analysis of each transaction and the
credit support erosion S&P anticipates will occur upon the
resolution of the specially serviced assets.  The downgrades also
reflect S&P's opinion that the credit characteristics for the
respective transactions will continue to weaken in view of the
number of loans that reported debt service coverage ratios below
1.0x.

The affirmed ratings reflect credit enhancement levels that S&P
believes provide sufficient support through various stress
scenarios.

The withdrawal of the rating on the interest-only class X from
series 2006-SL1 follows the downgrade of all principal and
interest classes rated 'AA-' or higher in the transaction.

S&P's analysis of the specially serviced assets considered recent
appraisals and brokers' opinions of value to arrive at loss
estimates for the collateral.  S&P's estimates also considered
expenses and fees required to complete the workout process.  S&P's
analysis of the remaining loans in the pool considered the
performance of the collateral to date, as well as the impact
economic conditions may have on future performances.

Details of the two WaMu trusts as of the Aug. 23, 2010, remittance
reports are:

The collateral pool for series 2006-SL1 consisted of 422 assets
with an aggregate trust balance of $468.3 million, compared with
443 loans totaling $511.4 million at issuance.  Twenty-eight
assets totaling $30.4 million (6.5%) are with the special
servicer, KeyBank.  Appraisal reduction amounts totaling
$5.7 million are in effect.  One of the 28 specially serviced
assets is real estate owned (0.3%), three are in foreclosure
(0.6%), 14 are 90-plus-days delinquent (2.9%), one is 60-plus-days
delinquent (0.4%), two are 30-plus-days delinquent (0.1%), one is
in bankruptcy (0.1%), and six are current (2.2%).  To date, the
trust has experienced six losses totaling $3.8 million with an
average loss severity of 71.2%.  S&P ran various stress scenarios
to project losses on the specially serviced assets.  S&P's least
stressful scenario assumed that all loans with balances in excess
of their most recent valuation would default.  This resulted in
46.7% of the specially serviced assets experiencing losses at a
weighted average loss severity of 58.1%.

One hundred twenty loans (25.2%) from series 2006-SL1 appear on
the master servicer's watchlist, primarily due to low DSCs.  One
hundred fifty-three loans (35.8%) have a reported DSC of less than
1.10x, and 114 loans ($116.4 million, 24.9%) have a reported DSC
of less than 1.0x.

The collateral pool for series 2007-SL3 consisted of 853 assets
with an aggregate trust balance of $1.2 billion, compared with 899
loans totaling $1.3 billion at issuance.  Fifty assets totaling
$58.8 million (4.9%) are with the special servicer, KeyBank.
Appraisal reduction amounts totaling $17.9 million are in effect.
One of the 50 specially serviced assets is REO (0.1%), eight are
in foreclosure (1.3%), seven are 90-plus-days delinquent (1.1%),
three are 60-plus-days delinquent (0.6%), one is in bankruptcy
(0.1%), and 30 are current (1.8%).  To date, the trust has
experienced 13 losses totaling $4.9 million with an average loss
severity of 25.3%.  S&P ran various stress scenarios to project
losses on the specially serviced assets.  S&P's least stressful
scenario assumed that all loans with balances in excess of their
most recent valuation would default.  This resulted in 72.4% of
the specially serviced assets experiencing losses at a weighted
average loss severity of 54.3%.

One hundred eighty-three loans (21.7%) from series 2007-SL3 appear
on the master servicer's watchlist, primarily due to low DSCs.
Two hundred fifty-one loans (29.3%) have a reported DSC of less
than 1.10x, and 162 loans ($226.9 million, 19.03%) have a reported
DSC of less than 1.0x.

Standard & Poor's stressed the specially serviced assets, the
loans on the watchlist, and certain other loans in the pool as
part of its analysis.  S&P believes the resultant credit
enhancement levels are consistent with the lowered, affirmed, and
withdrawn ratings.

                          Ratings Lowered

        WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-SL1

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class    To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --          ----           ----------------------
    A        A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)                        14.39
    A-1A     A+ (sf)     AAA (sf)                        14.39
    B        BBB+ (sf)   AA (sf)                         12.21
    C        BB+ (sf)    A (sf)                           9.07
    D        BB- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)                        6.88
    E        B- (sf)     BBB (sf)                         5.38
    F        CCC (sf)    BBB- (sf)                        4.56
    G        CCC- (sf)   BB+ (sf)                         2.93
    H        CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)                          2.38
    J        CCC- (sf)   BB- (sf)                         1.83
    K        CCC- (sf)   B+ (sf)                          1.42
    L        CCC- (sf)   B (sf)                           1.02
    M        CCC- (sf)   B- (sf                           0.88

        WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL3
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-SL3

                 Rating
                 ------
    Class    To          From           Credit enhancement (%)
    -----    --          ----           ----------------------
    AJ       AA- (sf)  AAA (sf)                        14.67
    B        A- (sf)   AA (sf)                         12.52
    C        BBB (sf)  AA- (sf)                        11.30
    D        BBB- (sf) A (sf)                           9.28
    E        BB+ (sf)  A- (sf)                          8.34
    F        B+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)                        7.13
    G        B (sf)    BBB (sf)                         6.32
    H        B- (sf)   BBB- (sf)                        5.24
    J        CCC- (sf) BB+ (sf)                         3.76
    K        CCC- (sf) BB (sf)                          3.09
    L        CCC- (sf) BB- (sf)                         2.55
    M        CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)                          2.28
    N        CCC- (sf) B  (sf)                          1.74
    O        CCC- (sf) B- (sf)                          1.47

                         Ratings Affirmed

       WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-SL3
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-SL3

             Class    Rating   Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------   ----------------------
             A        AAA (sf)                  26.52
             A-1A     AAA (sf)                  26.52
             X        AAA (sf)                    N/A

                         Rating Withdrawn

       WaMu Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-SL1

                 Rating
                 ------
      Class    To      From           Credit enhancement (%)
      -----    --      ----           ----------------------
      X        NR      AAA (sf)                          N/A

                       N/A - Not applicable.


* Fitch Downgrades Island Refinancing Srl's Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Island Refinancing Srl's floating
rate non-performing loan notes, due July 2025:

EUR126m Class A (IT0004293558): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
EUR62m Class B (IT0004293574): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf', off Rating
Watch Negative; Outlook Stable;
EUR60m Class C (IT0004293582): affirmed ay 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
EUR32m Class D (IT0004293590): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

The downgrade reflects the underperformance of the transaction
compared with the business plan of the servicer, Pirelli Real
Estate Credit Servicing's ('CSS2+IT/RSS2+ IT'), the negative
impact of prevailing market conditions on the timing and outcome
of judicial and extra-judicial resolutions, and the credit impact
on the Class B notes from interest deferral.  However, while
realisation is subject to various layers of risk, Fitch believes
that the portfolio's residual value is still commensurate with an
investment-grade rating for the classes A and B notes.  The agency
downgraded classes C and D in March 2009 for the same performance-
related reasons.

As of the last interest payment date, July 25, 2010, cumulative
net collections stood at 52% of the business plan provided by the
servicer at closing, down from 56% at year-end 2009.  Performance
continues to fall short of the servicer's expectations: semi-
annual net collections amounted to EUR22 million, compared with a
revised EUR38 million as at end-2009, and some EUR62 million
originally-budgeted at closing (in December 2007).

Nevertheless, the recovered amount on closed positions has
exceeded the servicer's expectations since closing, as evidenced
by the overall profitability ratio of 106% as shown in the 4
August 2010 investor report.  Fitch has been informed that
approximately EUR112 million has been deposited in the tribunals'
accounts, awaiting approval by the same courts for distribution
(to bond holders).  Although these funds should be distributed in
their entirety, delays are not uncommon in Italy, especially in
southern, and some central, regions.

For the class B to D notes, the transaction features an interest
deferral mechanism calibrated against the servicer's initial
business plan.  Since closing, the class D interest deferral
mechanism has been triggered five times and the class C mechanism
twice.  As collections have remained below 60% of the servicer's
initial business plan for two consecutive IPDs, the mechanism has
now also triggered deferral of class B interest at the last IPD.
This structural feature preserves principal for senior note
investors, which is primarily supportive of class A credit
quality.  Since under Italian law interest accrual on deferred
interest is illegal, interest deferral does not represent an
increase in leverage for subordinated note holders (other than to
the minor extent that the weighted average cost of funding will
have risen as a result).

Island Refinancing is a refinance of Island Finance (ICR4) S.p.A.
(ICR4) and Island Finance 2 (ICR7) S.r.l. ICR4 and ICR7 were two
securitisations of NPLs originated in Italy by Banco di Sicilia
S.p.A. (BdS, part of the Unicredit banking group, rated
'A'/Negative/'F1').  The portfolio consisted of secured and
unsecured loans connected to secured NPLs comprising 7,824
business plan credit lines to 3,395 borrowers for a total
unresolved gross book value (GBV) of EUR1,902.1 million.

As of the July 2010 IPD, the reported mortgage gross book value
was EUR1,357.7 million and cumulative net cash flows currently
stand at EUR176.9 million.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on Lehman Currency Swap Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four and affirmed 39 tranches of seven
UK non-conforming transactions, which no longer have currency
swaps in place due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008.  In addition, the senior tranches carrying ratings
above 'CCC' were removed from Rating Watch Negative.

Tranches of notes carrying a rating above 'CCC' have been affirmed
and removed from Rating Watch Negative, on which they were placed
on July 19 2010.  The rating action on these tranches follows the
judgment delivered by the English High Court on July 30, 2010 in
the case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited -v- Eurosail UK
2007-3BL PLC. In his judgment the Chancellor of the English High
Court ruled that Eurosail UK 2007-3BL PLC was not unable to pay
its debts under the UK Insolvency Act 1986 (the "Act"). The
Chancellor also ruled that the existence of a post-enforcement
call option in the transaction had no effect on the solvency of
Eurosail UK 07-3 BL PLC. On 20 August 2010 the class A3
noteholders filed an appeal against the Chancellor's judgment that
the issuer was not insolvent under the Act. Fitch currently has no
information on when the appeal is likely to be heard by the
English Court of Appeal, but the agency expects that the outcome
of the appeal may not be known for the next several months. The
outcome of the appeal could have an impact on the rating of the
notes in all seven transactions. Fitch will be publishing a more
detailed comment on the Eurosail Case over the next few days. The
agency will review any future developments in the Eurosail Case
and will take rating action as necessary.

The upgrades of A1 and A2 notes of EMF UK 2008-1 and B1a notes of
Eurosail UK 07-4 reflect the movement of foreign exchange (FX)
rates in favor of the issuers since December 2008 when Fitch
downgraded the notes and the resulting deleveraging of some of the
senior notes. Fitch now expects the class A1 notes of the EMF UK
2008-1 transaction to pay in full in December 2010. The absence of
currency swaps due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers resulted
in Fitch's downgrade in December 2008 as adverse FX movements left
the transactions significantly under-collateralized. The issuers
of the transactions are exchanging proceeds received from
borrowers at current FX rates, causing a variance in the repayment
of GBP-denominated notes compared with the EUR- and/or USD-
denominated equal ranking notes.

Similarly, the upgrade of the class ETc notes in the Eurosail UK
07-3 transaction is a result of Fitch's expectation that those
notes will pay in full on the upcoming payment dates due to a
stabilisation of underlying collateral performance. However, on
the past two payment dates the Eurosail UK 07-3 transaction's
ability to generate excess spread has been put under pressure with
a number of properties being sold with resulting losses for the
transaction. For this reason, the upgrade has been limited to
'CCC'.

The ratings on the transactions remain exposed to further FX
movements, which could eventually move in favour of the issuers.
In the meantime, due to their structures, the EMF UK 2008-1 and
the Mortgage Funding 2008-1 transactions are also more exposed to
the risk of interest shortfalls on the class A notes, as a result
of tightening in excess spread following deterioration in asset
performance.

With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the transactions also remain
un-hedged for basis and fixed/floating risks. The hedges put in
place at the closings of the transactions were provided by Lehman
Brothers Special Financing, Inc. (LBSFI). In Fitch's view the
absence of a basis hedge in these transactions is having a limited
impact on their ability to generate excess spread, as the current
mismatch between Libor and BBR stands at 23bps. Should the margin
between Libor and BBR reach levels seen in 2008 (in excess of
100bps), the transactions are likely to struggle to generate
sufficient revenue necessary to meet all the payments due in
accordance with the priority of payment schedules. On the other
hand, most of the loans in the underlying pools have reverted to
variable rates; therefore the absence of a fixed/floating swap
will continue to have little to no impact on the excess spread
levels generated by the transactions. In addition, Lehman Brothers
Bauhaus AG, London Branch was the liquidity facility provider on
the EMF-UK and the Mortgage Funding UK transactions and has not
been replaced since September 2008.

In October 2009, Danske Bank failed to renew the liquidity
facility agreement on the Eurosail Prime UK 2007-A and the
Eurosail UK 07-5 transactions. Danske Bank also stated that due to
the issuers' inability to meet the 'no default' representation of
the underlying liquidity facility agreement, these transactions
were unable to make stand-by drawdowns, as indicated in the
transaction documentation in such events. A similar issue occurred
recently in the Eurosail UK 07-6 and the Eurosail UK 07-4
transactions, leaving Eurosail 07-3 as the only transaction out of
the seven referred to above with a liquidity facility in place. In
Fitch's view, the absence of a liquidity facility does not affect
the ratings of these transactions, as its purpose is to provide
support for short-term liquidity shortfalls, which would typically
occur in higher rating scenarios.

The performance of the underlying assets in most of the
transactions has followed the trends seen in other UK non-
conforming transactions, i.e., arrears have stabilized and the
volume of outstanding repossessions has seen a significant decline
compared with levels seen 12 months earlier. Loss recognition in
the Eurosail UK 07-3, the Eurosail UK 07-4 and the Mortgage
Funding 2008-1 transactions has, however, remained quite high in
comparison to most other UK non-conforming transactions. All three
pools contain significant portions of second lien mortgages which
are partly the cause of the high loss severities reported in June
2010. The servicer has proactively been selling high numbers of
repossessed properties with losses, which is another factor behind
the tightening in excess spread levels. Although this has caused a
reserve fund draw in the Eurosail UK 07-4 transaction, the sale of
properties soon after repossession reduces the cost of carry for
the relevant noteholders.

Most of the loans in the underlying pools have now reverted to
variable rates, and are benefiting from low interest rates. Fitch
believes that this is the main cause behind the stabilization in
arrears reported by most UK non-conforming issuers. The agency
expects interest rate rises in 2011, at which stage the ability of
borrowers to meet their monthly payments may be put under
pressure. Fitch also believes that these deals remain exposed to
the effects of unemployment. Both factors are likely to lead to
another wave of arrears and repossessions, which will impact the
transaction's ability to generate excess spread.

The rating actions are:

* Eurosail -- UK 2007-3 BL plc

Class A1b (ISIN XS0308649309) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Stable Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A1c (ISIN XS0308653244) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Stable Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A2a (ISIN XS0308648673) affirmed at 'BBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Negative Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A2b (ISIN XS0308650224) affirmed at 'BBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Negative Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A2c (ISIN XS0308659795) affirmed at 'BBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Negative Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A3a (ISIN XS0308666493) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating revised to
'RR3' from 'RR4'

Class A3c (ISIN XS0308710143) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating revised to
'RR3' from 'RR4'

Class B1a (ISIN XS0308672384) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class B1c (ISIN XS0308716421) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class C1a (ISIN XS0308673192) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class C1c (ISIN XS0308718047) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class D1a (ISIN XS0308673945) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class E1c (ISIN XS0308725844) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class ETc (ISIN XS0309312543) upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Csf'; Recovery Rating
revised to 'RR3' from 'RR5'

* Eurosail-UK 07-4 BL PLC

Class A1a (ISIN XS0311594740) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Stable Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A1c (ISIN XS0311598907) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Stable Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A2a (ISIN XS0311680747) affirmed at 'BBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Negative Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A3a (ISIN XS0311702657) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; removed from RWN; Recovery
Rating 'RR3'

Class A3c (ISIN XS0311704356) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; removed from RWN; Recovery
Rating 'RR3'

Class B1a (ISIN XS0311705759) upgraded to 'CCsf' from 'Csf'; Recovery Rating
revised to 'RR4' from 'RR5'

Class C1a (ISIN XS0311708696) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class D1a (ISIN XS0311713001) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class E1c (ISIN XS0311717416) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

* Eurosail-UK 07-5 NP PLC

Class A1a (ISIN XS0328024608) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR3'
Class A1c (ISIN XS0328025241) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR3'
Class B1c (ISIN XS0328025324) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'
Class C1c (ISIN XS0328025597) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'
Class D1c (ISIN XS0328025670) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

* Eurosail-UK 07-6 NC PLC

Class A1a (ISIN XS0332284651) affirmed at 'BBsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Stable Outlook.; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A2a (ISIN XS0332285039) affirmed at 'Bsf'; removed from RWN; assigned
Negative Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

Class A3a (ISIN XS0332285971) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class B1a (ISIN XS0332286862) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class C1a (ISIN XS0332287084) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Class D1a (ISIN XS0332287597) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

* Eurosail Prime-UK 2007-A plc

Class A (ISIN XS0328494157) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR3'
Class M (ISIN XS0328496368) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'
Class B (ISIN XS0328504567) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'
Class C (ISIN XS0328511265) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'
Class D (ISIN XS0328517205) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'

* EMF-UK 2008-1 Plc

Class A1 (ISIN XS0352307184) upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; assigned Stable
Outlook; assigned Loss Severity Rating 'LS-1'

Class A2 (ISIN XS0352307770) upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating
revised to 'RR2' from 'RR3'

Class A3 (ISIN XS0352932643) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR3'

Mortgage Funding 2008-1 plc
Class A (ISIN XS0350039912) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating 'RR2'


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 28 Classes From Five CMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 28
classes of certificates from five separate U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transactions due to interest
shortfalls.

S&P expects the shortfalls on 19 of these classes to continue, and
as a result, S&P lowered the ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The 19 classes that S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' have experienced
interest shortfalls for five months or more.  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily
due to one or more of the following factors:

Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
specially serviced assets; and

Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts using recent Member of the Appraisal
Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered trust expenses, and
special servicing fees that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls.

Nine of the 28 downgraded classes have experienced shortfalls for
six months or less and are at an increased risk of experiencing
shortfalls in the future.  If these shortfalls continue, S&P will
likely downgrade these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with
each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call
for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the
stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due
and an MAI appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASERs based on ARAs
calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from
the affected transactions to downgrade.  S&P used this approach
because ARAs based on automatic implementation are highly
susceptible to change, or even reversal, once the special servicer
obtains the MAI appraisals.

S&P details the 28 downgraded classes from the five CMBS
transactions below.

         GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2004-C2

S&P lowered its rating on the class M certificates from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2004-C2 transaction
due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related to four of
the five assets that are currently with the special servicer,
Midland Loan Services Inc., as well as special servicing fees.  As
of the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$22.8 million were in effect for six assets.  The total reported
monthly ASER amount was $70,264, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $460,159.  Standard & Poor's considered four ASERs
($70,264), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls total $101,501 and have affected
all classes subordinate to and including class K.  If the
accumulated shortfalls on classes K and L remain outstanding for a
prolonged time period, S&P will likely lower their outstanding
ratings to 'D (sf)'.  Class M has experienced interest shortfalls
for 15 months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded this class to 'D
(sf)'.  S&P previously lowered its ratings on the subordinate
class N and O certificates to 'D (sf)' due to recurring interest
shortfalls.

The collateral pool for the GMAC 2004-C2 transaction consists of
65 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $793.4 million.  As of
the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance report, five assets ($62.4 million;
7.9%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is as follows: four ($39.9 million, 5.0%)
are more than 90 days delinquent, and one ($22.4 million, 2.8%) is
within its grace period.

         GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. 2005-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F, G, H, J, K, and L
certificates from GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s
series 2005-C1 transaction transaction due to interest shortfalls
primarily resulting from ASERs related to six of the 13 assets in
the pool that are currently with the special servicer, Helios AMC
LLC, as well as special servicing fees, and, with respect to the
class F certificates, increased susceptibility to interest
shortfalls in the future.  As of the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance
report, ARAs totaling $40.6 million were in effect for nine
assets.  The total reported monthly ASER amount was $190,514, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $1.15 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered six ASERs ($162,706), all of which were based on
MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees, to
determine its rating actions.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $239,266 and have affected all classes subordinate to and
including class G.  Class G has experienced interest shortfalls
for four months, while classes H, J, K, and L have each
experienced interest shortfalls for 10 months.  S&P expects the
shortfalls on the class H, J, K, and L certificates to recur for
the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these
classes to 'D (sf)'.  S&P previously lowered its ratings on the
subordinate class M, N, and O certificates to 'D (sf)' due to
recurring interest shortfalls.  Two of these classes subsequently
experienced principal losses.

The collateral pool for the GMAC 2004-C2 transaction consists of
78 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $979.1 million.  As of
the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance report, 13 assets ($221.2 million;
22.6%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of these assets is as follows: one ($8.3 million, 0.8%) is
REO, four ($36.9 million, 3.8%) are in foreclosure, six
($152.0 million, 15.5%) are more than 90 days delinquent, and two
($24.0 million, 2.5%) are within their respective grace periods.

         Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C29

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J, K, L, M, N, and O
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series
2006-C29 due to interest shortfalls primarily resulting from ASERs
related to six of the 12 assets that are currently with the
special servicer, Helios, as well as special servicing fees.  As
of the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $89.4
million were in effect for 10 assets.  The total reported monthly
ASER amount was $377,633, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $3.0 million.  Standard & Poor's considered six ASERs
($326,919), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees, to determine its rating actions.
The reported interest shortfalls total $424,129 and have affected
all classes subordinate to and including the class J certificates.
If the accumulated shortfalls on classes J, K, and L remain
outstanding for a prolonged time period, S&P will likely lower
their outstanding ratings to 'D'.  Classes M, N, and O have
experienced interest shortfalls for five, seven, and 10 months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur for the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.  S&P previously lowered its ratings on the subordinate
class P certificates to 'D (sf)' due to recurring interest
shortfalls.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2006-C29 transaction consists of
142 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.36 billion.  As of
the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, 12 assets ($200.7 million,
6.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is as follows: one ($12.3 million,
0.4%) is REO, four ($57.3 million, 1.7%) are in foreclosure, six
($127.3 million, 3.8%) are more than 90 days delinquent, and one
($3.7 million, 0.1%) is less than 30 days delinquent.

               GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. 2007-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class K, L, M, N, O and P
certificates from GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2007-C1
(GECM 2007-C1) due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs
related to six of the 31 assets that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc., as well as special servicing
fees.  As of the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$120.9 million were in effect for 22 assets.  The reported monthly
ASER amount was a recovery of $65,904, which was caused by note
sales and partial loan repayments that occurred in July.  Removing
the effect of these one-time events, the monthly ASER amount is
$287,610, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$2.8 million.  Standard & Poor's considered six ASERs ($202,999),
which were derived from ARAs based on recent MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, to determine its ratings
actions for this transaction.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $259,829, and have affected all classes subordinate to and
including the class K certificates.  If the accumulated shortfalls
on classes K and L remain outstanding for a prolonged time period,
S&P will likely lower its outstanding ratings on these classes to
'D (sf)'.  Classes M, N, O, and P have experienced interest
shortfalls for the past eight months or more, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to recur for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D (sf)'.  S&P
previously lowered its ratings on the subordinate class Q
certificates to 'D (sf)' due to recurring interest shortfalls.

The collateral pool for the GECM 2007-C1 transaction consists of
189 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $3.70 billion.  As of
the Aug. 10, 2010, remittance report, 31 assets ($930.8 million;
25.2%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is as follows: one ($4.9 million,
0.1%) is REO, one ($17.1 million, 0.5%) is a matured balloon, four
($82.2 million, 2.2%) are in foreclosure, 13 ($306.1 million,
8.3%) are more than 90 days delinquent, one ($11.5 million, 0.3%)
is 60 days delinquent, three ($208.6 million, 5.6%) are 30 days
delinquent, seven ($298.5 million, 8.1%) are within their
respective grace periods, and one ($2.1 million, 0.1%) is current.

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2007-LDP11

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q and T
certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2007-LDP11 due to interest shortfalls resulting
from ASERs related to 16 of the 27 assets that are currently with
the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC, as well as
special servicing fees.  As of the Aug. 16, 2010, remittance
report, ARAs totaling $261.3 million were in effect for 24 assets.
The resulting reported monthly ASER amount was $1.3 million, which
excludes a one-time recovery of $222,276 associated with the
modification of one loan.  The reported cumulative ASER amount was
$9.9 million.  Standard & Poor's considered 16 ASERs ($884,910),
which were derived from ARAs based on recent MAI appraisals, as
well as current special servicing fees, to determine its ratings
actions for this transaction.  The reported interest shortfalls
total $1.35 million, which prompted interest shortfalls
subordinate to and including the class H certificates.  Classes K,
L, and M have experienced interest shortfalls for the past 10
months, and classes N, P, Q, and T have experienced interest
shortfalls for the past 11 months.  S&P expects these shortfalls
to recur for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the JPMCC 2007-LDP11 transaction consists
of 263 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $5.35 billion.  As
of the Aug. 16, 2010, remittance report, 27 assets ($664.9
million; 12.4%) in the pool were with the special servicer.  The
payment status of the delinquent assets is as follows: seven
($75.1 million, 1.4%) are REO, 11 ($347.6 million, 6.5%) are in
foreclosure, six ($127.0 million, 2.4%) are more than 90 days
delinquent, one ($97.4 million, 1.8%) is 60 days delinquent, one
($7.8 million, 0.2%) is less than 30 days delinquent, and one
($10.0 million, 0.2%) is current.

                         Ratings Lowered

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C2

                                                      Reported
         Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To     From     Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --     ----     ----------------------   -------    -----------
M      D(sf)  CCC-(sf)          1.89            9,637        111,519

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

                                                      Reported
         Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To     From     Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --     ----     ----------------------   -------    -----------
F      B-(sf)   B+(sf)           6.16                0              0
G      CCC-(sf) CCC(sf)          4.53           60,834        179,266
H      D(sf)    CCC-(sf)         2.49           87,681        481,710
J      D(sf)    CCC-(sf)         1.87           22,345        223,452
K      D(sf)    CCC-(sf)         1.26           22,345        223,452
L      D(sf)    CCC-(sf)         0.45           29,792        297,923

              Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C29

                                                      Reported
         Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To     From     Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --     ----     ----------------------   -------    -----------
J      CCC-(sf)  CCC+(sf)         2.63           50,306        171,003
K      CCC-(sf)  CCC(sf)          2.26           53,402        160,206
L      CCC-(sf)  CCC(sf)          2.01           35,601        106,804
M      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.76           35,601        144,070
N      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.63           17,801        119,616
O      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.38           35,606        305,814

            GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2007-C1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                      Reported
         Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To     From     Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --     ----     ----------------------   -------    -----------
K      CCC-(sf)  CCC(sf)          2.53          (31,715)       492,128
L      CCC-(sf)  CCC(sf)          2.26           42,666        255,996
M      D(sf)     CCC(sf)          1.86           63,995        417,721
N      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.59           42,666        349,683
O      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.32           42,666        400,478
P      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.06           42,662        426,616

  JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-LDP11
       Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series

                                                      Reported
         Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
         ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To     From     Credit enhancement (%)   Current    Accumulated
-----  --     ----     ----------------------   -------    -----------
H      CCC(sf)   B-(sf)           5.24          (1,673)       120,865
J      CCC-(sf)  B-(sf)           4.35          237,097        466,764
K      D(sf)     CCC(sf)          2.96          372,582      2,502,458
L      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         2.58           94,561        945,612
M      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         2.33           63,039        630,393
N      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.95           94,566        953,481
P      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.82           31,517        346,690
Q      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.57           63,044        693,483
T      D(sf)     CCC-(sf)         1.19           94,561      1,040,173


* S&P Downgrades Rating on Martinez, California's Bonds to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Martinez,
California's (Ridgecrest Apartments) FHA-insured mortgage
refunding bonds series 1993A to 'BB+' from 'AAA' and removed the
rating from CreditWatch with negative implications, based on S&P's
view of the project's reliance on short-term market rate
investments.

The rating reflects S&P's view of the following: revenues from
mortgage debt service payments and investment earnings are
insufficient to pay full and timely debt service on the bonds plus
fees until maturity; and debt service coverage is projected by
Standard & Poor's to fall below investment-grade levels in 2022.

The rating also reflects S&P's view of the high credit quality of
the Fannie Mae collateral agreement, which S&P considers to be
'AAA' eligible; investments held in 'AAAm'-rated First American
Treasury Obligations Fund Class D money market fund; and an asset-
to-liability ratio of 107.080% as of May 19, 2010.

"S&P believes the bonds are unable to meet all bond costs from
transaction revenues until maturity, assuming these reinvestment
earnings," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Renee J. Berson.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Nine Tranches From Six Hybrid CDOs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on nine
tranches from six U.S. cash flow and hybrid collateralized debt
obligation transactions and removed them from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on 12 other
tranches from four transactions and removed them from CreditWatch
negative.  S&P also withdrew its ratings on two tranches from two
transactions and removed one of them from CreditWatch negative.

The CDO downgrades reflect a number of factors, including credit
deterioration and S&P's negative rating actions on underlying U.S.
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.

The nine downgraded U.S. cash flow tranches have a total issuance
amount of $1.983 billion.  Five of the six affected transactions
are mezzanine structured finance (SF) CDOs of asset-backed
securities, which are collateralized in large part by mezzanine
tranches of RMBS and other SF securities.  The remaining one is a
high-grade SF CDO of ABS that is primarily collateralized at
origination by 'AAA (sf)' though 'A (sf)' rated tranches of RMBS
and other SF securities.

The affirmations reflect current credit support levels that S&P
believes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

S&P withdrew its ratings on two tranches from two transactions
following the complete paydown of the notes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take rating actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                                       Rating
                                       ------
  Transaction                 Class To        From
  -----------                 ----- --        ----
  Acacia CDO 5, Ltd.          A     CCC (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Acacia CDO 5, Ltd.          B     D (sf)    CC (sf)
  C-BASS CBO XIV Ltd          A     CC (sf)   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  Glacier Funding CDO III     A-1   CC (sf)   BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
  High Grade Structured       A-1   CCC (sf)  BB (sf)/Watch Neg
   Credit CDO 2005-1
  High Grade Structured       C     CC (sf)   CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
   Credit CDO 2005-1
  High Grade Structured       X     CC (sf)   CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
   Credit CDO 2005-1
  TIAA Structured Finance     A-1   BB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
   CDO II
  Trainer Wortham First       B     BB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
   Republic CBO IV

                         Ratings Affirmed

                                       Rating
                                       ------
  Transaction                 Class To        From
  -----------                 ----- --        ----
  Birch Real Estate CDO I     A-1   AA (sf)   AA (sf)/Watch Neg
  Birch Real Estate CDO I     A-2   BBB (sf)  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Birch Real Estate CDO I     A-2L  BBB (sf)  BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
  Birch Real Estate CDO I     A-3L  CCC (sf)  CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fortress ABS Opportunities  A     BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fortress ABS Opportunities  A-1a  BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fortress ABS Opportunities  A-2   BBB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fortress ABS Opportunities  B     B (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg
  Fortress ABS Opportunities  Ba    B (sf)    B (sf)/Watch Neg
  TIAA Structured Finance     A-2   CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
   CDO II
  Trainer Wortham First       A     AA- (sf)  AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
   Republic CBO IV
  Trainer Wortham First       C     CCC- (sf) CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
   Republic CBO IV

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                                       Rating
                                       ------
  Transaction                 Class To        From
  -----------                 ----- --        ----
  Birch Real Estate CDO I     A-1L  NR        AAA (sf)
  Inman Square Funding I      I     NR        BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


                     Other Ratings Outstanding

             Transaction                 Class Rating
             -----------                 ----- ------
             Acacia CDO 5, Ltd.          C     CC (sf)
             Acacia CDO 5, Ltd.          D     CC (sf)
             Acacia CDO 5, Ltd.          E     CC (sf)
             Birch Real Estate CDO I     B-1   CC (sf)
             C-BASS CBO XIV Ltd          B     CC (sf)
             C-BASS CBO XIV Ltd          C     CC (sf)
             C-BASS CBO XIV Ltd          D     CC (sf)
             Glacier Funding CDO III     A-2   CC (sf)
             Glacier Funding CDO III     B     CC (sf)
             Glacier Funding CDO III     C     CC (sf)
             Glacier Funding CDO III     D     CC (sf)
             High Grade Structured       A-2   D (sf)
              Credit CDO 2005-1
             High Grade Structured       B     D (sf)
              Credit CDO 2005-1
             Inman Square Funding I      II-FL CC (sf)
             Inman Square Funding I      II-FX CC (sf)
             Inman Square Funding I      III   CC (sf)
             Inman Square Funding I      IV-FL CC (sf)
             Inman Square Funding I      IV-FX CC (sf)
             TIAA Structured Finance     B     CC (sf)
              CDO II
             TIAA Structured Finance     C-1   CC (sf)
              CDO II
             TIAA Structured Finance     C-2   CC (sf)
              CDO II


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 70 Classes From 31 North American CMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 70
classes from 31 North American commercial mortgage-backed
securities, commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation,
and resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit
transactions.

S&P withdrew its ratings on 60 classes from 29 CMBS, CRE CDO, and
re-REMIC transactions following the repayment in full of each
classes' remaining principal balance as noted in each
transaction's respective August and September 2010 remittance
reports.  S&P withdrew its ratings on four interest-only classes
from four transactions following the full reductions of the
classes' notional balances as noted in each transaction's
respective August 2010 remittance reports.

S&P also withdrew its ratings on six additional IO classes from
five CMBS transactions.  S&P withdrew its IO ratings following the
repayment of all principal and interest paying classes rated 'AA-
(sf)' or higher from the respective CMBS transactions, in
accordance with its criteria for rating IO securities.

  Ratings Withdrawn Following Full Repayment Or Balance Reduction

             Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

                  Banc of America Large Loan Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-FM

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        C                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        D                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        E                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
        X                        NR                  AAA (sf)

         Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

    Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2002-TOP6
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

               CD 2005-C1 Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-1D                     NR                  AAA (sf)

                    CD 2006-CD2 Mortgage Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass through certificates, series 2006-CD2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        C                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
        D                        NR                  AA (sf)

               CRIIMI MAE Commercial Mortgage Trust
             Commercial mortgage bonds series 1998-C1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

        First Union National Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-C2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        C                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        X-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

       Guggenheim Structured Real Estate Funding 2005-2, Ltd.
                     CRE notes series 2005-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        S                        NR                  AAA (sf)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-PM1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        X-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-FL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        C                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        D                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        E                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        F                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        G                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        H                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
        J                        NR                  A (sf)
        K                        NR                  BBB+ (sf)

        JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LDP3

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C1
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-3                      NR                  AAA (sf)

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C8
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

                         LEAFs CMBS I Ltd.
                  LEAFs CMBS Trust Series 2002-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1B                     NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-1C                     NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-1MF                    NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        B                        NR                  AA (sf)
        C                        NR                  A+ (sf)
        D                        NR                  BBB (sf)

        Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage
                         Trust 2005-LLF C4
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        F                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        G                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
        H                        NR                  A+ (sf)
        J                        NR                  BB+ (sf)

                         Mansfield Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        B                        NR                  AAA (sf)

             Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1
          Commercial mortgage pass through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-1D                     NR                  AAA (sf)

              ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-1
           Commercial mortgage pass through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

                   Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
               comm mtg pass-thru certs ser 1998-XL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        D                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        E                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        F                        NR                  AA+ (sf)
        X                        NR                  AAA (sf)

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2006-IQ11
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)

      Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2000-LIFE1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        C                        NR                  AA+ (sf)

                   PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-CM1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        B-1                      NR                  AA+ (sf)
        B-2                      NR                  AA (sf)

           Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-C2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        E                        NR                  AAA (sf)

                           Solar Trust
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-1                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        A-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)
        B                        NR                  AAA (sf)
        C                        NR                  AA (sf)

                          STRIPs III LTD
                 STRIPs III CDO Ltd series 2004-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        L                        NR                  BBB+ (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C20

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-3SF                    NR                  AAA (sf)

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C21

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        A-2PFL                   NR                  AAA (sf)

       Ratings Withdrawn Following Application Of Criteria
                         For IO Securities

            Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-2

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        X                        NR                  AAA (sf)

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-FL1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        X-1B                     NR                  AAA (sf)
        X-FL                     NR                  AAA (sf)

      Lehman Brothers Floating Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-LLF C4

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        X-2                      NR                  AAA (sf)

                   PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 1999-CM1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        S                        NR                  AAA (sf)

                           Solar Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-1

                                         Rating
                                         ------
        Class                    To                  From
        -----                    --                  ----
        IO                       NR                  AAA (sf)

                          NR - Not rated.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 17 Classes From Four CMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 17
classes of certificates from four U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities transactions due to interest shortfalls.  S&P expects
the shortfalls on 10 of these classes to continue, and as a
result, S&P lowered the ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

All of the classes downgraded to 'D (sf)' have experienced
interest shortfalls for five or more months.  The recurring
interest shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily
due to one or more of the following factors:

* Appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions in effect for the
  specially serviced assets;

* Interest paid on outstanding advances; and

* Special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASERs based on
appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered interest paid
on outstanding master servicer advances, modified interest rate
reductions, and workout fees, as well as special servicing fees
that are likely, in S&P's view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls.

Seven of the 17 classes experienced shortfalls of three months or
less and are at an increased risk of experiencing shortfalls in
the future.  If these liquidity interruptions continue, S&P will
likely downgrade the classes to 'D (sf)'.

ARAs and resulting ASERs are implemented in accordance with each
respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due, and
an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P exclusively considered ASERs based on
ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  S&P used
this approach because ARAs based on a principal balance haircut
are highly subject to change, or even reversal, once the special
servicer obtains the MAI appraisals.

             Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-1Q13

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, N, and O
certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-1Q13 (MSC
2007-IQ13) due to interest shortfalls primarily resulting from
ASERs related to four assets, including the second- and the
seventh-largest assets in the pool, that are currently with the
special servicer, LNR Partners Inc.  As of the Aug. 16, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $18.8 million were in effect for
four assets.  The resulting reported ASER amount was $90,657, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $695,058.  Standard &
Poor's considered all four ASERs ($90,657), all of which were
based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing
fees, modified interest rate reductions, and workout fees to
determine its rating actions for this transaction.  Reported
current interest shortfalls total $207,190 and have affected all
classes up to and including class H.  Classes N and O have
experienced interest shortfalls for the past seven and 10 months,
respectively, and S&P expects these shortfalls to recur in the
foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to
'D (sf)'.

The collateral pool for the MSC 2007-IQ13 transaction consists
of 174 assets with an aggregate trust balance of $1.61 billion.
As of the Aug. 16, 2010, remittance report, 14 assets
($285.8 million; 17.7%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, including the second-largest ($147.0 million; 51.4%)
and seventh-largest ($27.4 million, 1.7%) assets.  The payment
status of the delinquent assets is as follows: one is real estate
owned (REO)($15.1 million; 0.9%), one is in foreclosure
($11.5 million; 0.7%), eight are three or more months delinquent
($76.3 million; 4.7%), one is one month delinquent ($10.2 million,
0.6%), one has a late monthly payment but is within its grace
period ($21.0 million; 1.3%), one is a performing loan that is in
the process of being modified ($147.1 million; 9.2%), and one is a
performing loan ($4.6 million; 0.3%).

         Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C24

S&P lowered its ratings on the class H, J, K, L, M, N, and O
certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C24
primarily due to interest shortfalls resulting from ASERs related
to seven assets that are currently with the special servicer, also
LNR.  As of the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling
$62.0 million were in effect for seven assets.  The total reported
ASER amount was $272,074, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $2.4 million.  Standard & Poor's considered all seven ASERs
($272,074), all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as
current special servicing fees, and workout fees in determining
its rating actions.  Reported current interest shortfalls totaled
$268,884 and have affected all classes up to and including class
K.  This shortfall amount is net of a $57,061 recovery associated
with the liquidation of another asset that was in the pool.
Classes L, M, N, and O have experienced interest shortfalls for
five months or more, and S&P expects shortfalls for these classes
to recur for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P downgraded
these classes to 'D'.  S&P previously lowered its ratings to 'D
(sf)' on the subordinate certificate classes P and Q due to
recurring interest shortfalls.

The collateral pool for the WBCMT 2006-C24 transaction consists of
114 assets with an aggregate trust balance of $1.61 billion.  As
of the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, eight assets
($116.9 million, 7.3%) in the pool were with the special servicer.
The payment status of these assets is as follows: two are REO
($30.4 million, 1.9%), five are three or more months delinquent
($66.9 million, 4.2%), and one has a late monthly payment but is
within its grace period ($19.6 million, 1.2%).

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3

S&P lowered its ratings on the class L, M, and N certificates from
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' due to recurring interest shortfalls primarily resulting
from ASERs related to eight assets, including the ninth- and the
10th-largest assets in the pool, that are currently with the
special servicer, J.E. Robert Co. Inc.  As of the Aug. 17, 2010,
remittance report, ARAs totaling $38.2 million were in effect for
eight assets.  The total reported ASER amount was $188,906, and
the reported cumulative ASER amount was $2.0 million.  Standard &
Poor's considered all eight ASERs ($188,906), all of which were
based on MAI appraisals, as well as current special servicing fees
in determining its rating actions.  Reported current interest
shortfalls totaled $217,506 and have affected all of the classes
up to and including class K.  Classes L and M have experienced
interest shortfalls for eight months each, and class N has
experienced interest shortfalls for 10 months.  S&P expects
shortfalls for these classes to recur in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P downgraded these classes to 'D'.  S&P previously
lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on the subordinate certificate
classes P, Q, and S due to recurring interest shortfalls.

The collateral pool for the LBUBS 2005-C3 transaction consists of
105 loans with an aggregate trust balance of $1.89 billion.  As of
the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, 14 assets ($169.3 million;
9.0%) in the pool were with the special servicer, including the
ninth- and the 10th-largest assets in the pool.  The payment
status of these assets is as follows: five are in foreclosure
($45.6 million; 2.4%), four are nonperforming matured loans
($59.4 million; 3.2%), three are three or more months delinquent
($26.9 million; 1.4%), one has a late monthly payment but is
within its grace period ($3.7 million; 0.2%), and one, while it
appears on the list, was extended and is performing and was
returned to the master servicer on June 27, 2010 ($33.7 million;
1.8%).

   Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2004-C1

S&P lowered its rating on the class N certificates from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2004-C1 to
'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' due to recurring interest shortfalls
primarily due to ASERs related to six assets that are currently
with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  As of
the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, ARAs totaling $25.6 million
were in effect for six assets.  The total reported ASER amount
was $127,904, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$1.1 million.  Standard & Poor's considered five ASERs ($118,222),
all of which were based on MAI appraisals, as well as current
special servicing fees, and interest paid to the master servicer
on outstanding advances in determining its rating actions.
Reported interest shortfalls totaled $146,878 and have resulted in
interest shortfalls up to class L.  Class N has experienced
interest shortfalls for 10 months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to recur in the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P
downgraded this class to 'D (sf)'.  S&P previously lowered its
rating to 'D (sf)' on the subordinate certificate class O due to
recurring interest shortfalls.

The collateral pool for the CSFB 2004-C1 transaction consists of
235 assets with an aggregate trust balance of $1.19 billion.  As
of the Aug. 17, 2010, remittance report, seven assets
($65.3 million; 5.5%) in the pool were with the special servicer.
The payment status of the delinquent assets is as follows: one is
real estate owned ($5.3 million; 0.4%), three are in foreclosure
($28.3 million; 2.4%), two are three or more months delinquent
($30.8 million; 2.6%), and one has a late monthly payment but is
within its grace period (0.9 million; 0.1%).

                         Ratings Lowered

            Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-IQ13
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class To         From      Credit enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
----- --         ----      ---------------------  -------  -----------
H     CCC+ (sf)  B- (sf)             2.77          2,754      2,754
J     CCC (sf)   B- (sf)             2.26         34,561     34,561
K     CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)           2.13          8,638      8,638
L     CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)           1.87         17,346     32,944
N     D (sf)     CCC (sf)            1.36          8,786     43,813
O     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           0.98          26,766   227,772

             Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C24

                                                       Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class To        From       Credit enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
----- --        ----       ---------------------  -------  -----------
H     B- (sf)   B+ (sf)             6.81              --           --
J     CCC (sf)  B (sf)              4.79              --           --
K     CCC- (sf) B- (sf)             3.55           1,459       21,685
L     D (sf)    B- (sf)             3.08          32,931      138,168
M     D (sf)    CCC+ (sf)           2.61          32,931      177,560
N     D (sf)    CCC (sf)            2.15          32,931      218,140
O     D (sf)    CCC- (sf)           1.84          21,955      205,738

             LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                       Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class To       From       Credit enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
----- --       ----       ---------------------  -------  -----------
L     D (sf)   CCC- (sf)           1.56          28,043        154,586
M     D (sf)   CCC- (sf)           1.43           9,350         74,803
N     D (sf)   CCC- (sf)           1.29           9,347         92,155

       Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

                                                       Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class To         From      Credit enhancement(%)  Current  Accumulated
----- --         ----      ---------------------  -------  -----------
N     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)           1.53         17,029         90,822

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
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                  *** End of Transmission ***