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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, February 6, 2011, Vol. 15, No. 36

                            Headlines

AES EASTERN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1999 Certs. to 'B3'
ALLSTATE INVESTMENT: S&P Ups Ratings Due to Improved Performance
AMERICAN AIRLINES: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating Class B Certificates
ARES VII: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Certificates
AVENUE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

BACCHUS (US): S&P Upgrades Ratings on Three Notes Classes
BAKER STREET: Moody's Raises Rating on $9.4 Million Notes to Caa3
BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Low-B Rating on Five Class Certs.
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Junks Ratings Three Classes of Certificates
BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2004-TOP14 Certs.

C-BASS CBO: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Two Classes of Notes
CARLYLE HIGH: S&P Removes 3 Note Classes Ratings From Creditwatch
CARLYLE MODENA: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 4 Classes of Certificates
CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Class H Certificates Rating to 'D'

COLUMBUSNOVA CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Four Note Classes
COMM 2005-FL11: S&P Affirms Ratings on 11 Classes of Certs.
CORSAIR (JERSEY): S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on Note Series 89 & 91
CSAM FUNDING: S&P Raises Ratings on Ten Classes of Notes
DEL MAR: Moody's Raises Rating on $13.1 Mil. Class Notes to Caa3

DRYDEN VII: Increased Credit Support Cues S&P to Upgrade Ratings
DRYDEN XI: S&P Augments & Affirms Ratings on 6 Classes of Notes
DRYDEN XVI: S&P Raises Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
DUANE STREET: Moody's Raises Rating on $20 Mil. Notes to Caa3
FIRST 2004-II: S&P Removes Notes Ratings on CreditWatch Positive

FIRST INVESTORS: S&P Assigns Ratings on $150MM Automobile Notes
FOXE BASIN: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $13 Million Notes to Caa3
FRANKLIN CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Classes C, D, & E Notes
FRASER SULLIVAN: S&P Assigns Ratings on $350MM Floating-Rate Notes

GENESIS CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Holds Junk Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs.
GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2004-C1 Securities
GSC PARTNERS: S&P Removes Rating on Class D Notes From CreditWatch
GULF STREAM: S&P Raises & Affirms Ratings on Classes of Notes

HALCYON LN: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
HALCYON LOAN: S&P Raises Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
HALCYON STRUCTURED: S&P Affirms Ratings on Class A-1 & D Notes
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Lifts Rating on $16 Mil. Notes to Caa3
HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Lifts Rating on $17 Mil. Notes to Caa2

HSI ASSET: Moody's Affirms Rating on Cl. M-1 Certificates at B2
INDIANA HEALTH: Fitch Affirms Low-B Ratings on Two Revenue Bonds
ING INVESTMENT: S&P Upgrades & Affirms Ratings on Note Classes
LANDMARK III: S&P Removes Notes Ratings From CreditWatch Positive
LANDMARK VI: S&P Raises Ratings on Classes B, C, D, & E Notes

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Low-B Rating on 2 Classes of Certs.
MOMENTUM CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2007-HE3 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Junks Three Classes of Certificates
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades $12.1 Million Sr. Notes to Ba3

NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Junks Three Classes of Floating Rate Notes
OLYMPIC CLO: Class Notes Paydown Cues S&P to Raise Ratings
OVERLAND PARK: Fitch Lowers Rating on $66.2 Mil. Bonds to 'BB'
PACIFIC BAY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Junk Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs.

REAL ESTATE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class L Cert. to Caa2
RIVERBANK REDEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers Tax Bond Rating to 'CCC'
SCHOONER TRUSTE: Moody's Holds Low-B Ratings on 6 Cl. of Certs.
SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Holds Junks Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs.
SHINNECOCK CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on $7.5 Mil. Notes to Caa2

SHINNECOCK CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
SOUTHPORT CLO: S&P Upgrades Ratings on Classes B & C Notes
STANFIELD CARRERA: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
TIERS BOND: S&P Corrects Rating on $124MM Certificates to 'BB'
VENTURE II CDO: S&P Raises Ratings on Class A-1, A-2, & B Notes

VITESSE CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
WACHOVIA BANK: Kyo's Better Performance Cues Fitch to Up Ratings
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Fitch Withdraws Rating on 8 Classes of Certs.
WESTWOOD CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes

* Fitch Downgrades 759 Bonds in 405 US RMB Transactions to 'Dsf'
* Fitch Junks Ratings on Massachusetts Health's 2004A&B Bonds
* S&P Cuts Ratings on 15 Classes of Mortgage Pass-Through Certs.
* S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Classes of Mortgage Pass-Through Cert
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Certs. From Five CMBS Transactions

* S&P Lowers Ratings on 428 Classes From 113 U.S RMBS Transactions

                            *********

AES EASTERN: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on 1999 Certs. to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the 1999 Series Trust Pass
Through Certificates of AES Eastern Energy, L.P., to B3 from Ba2,
the outlook remains negative.  The downgrade reflects a dramatic
deterioration in AEE's prospects and performance that is primarily
a result of compressed dark spreads (margin between the price of
power and the cost of coal) and is reflective of the company's
severely strained liquidity position.

                        Ratings Rationale

In 2010, AEE's operating margin became severely depressed as the
hedges that were implemented as part of the company's rolling
hedge strategy resulted in lower revenues.  These hedges have now
generally expired, leaving the project exposed to significantly
lower market prices.  In addition, the cost of coal has risen
significantly more than anticipated.  Although AEE's larger
facilities are still among the lowest cost coal generators in the
region, the combination of low power prices and high fuel costs
has resulted in these facilities running less frequently, further
reducing the amount of variable margin available to cover fixed
costs.  Whereas the projects historically operated with capacity
factors in the upper 80% range, since the latter half of 2009,
this statistic has been more the range of 60-70%.  As a result,
rent coverage for the full year ended December 2010 is estimated
at under 1.4x whereas in 2009 it was approximately 2.1x and 2008
was approximately 2.8x.

In 2011, assuming markets for AEE's power remain weak, margin
compression is expected to be accelerated to the point that the
project may have difficulty covering its fixed operating expenses.
AEE is taking steps to address these challenges, including the
potential "protective lay-up" of its smaller Westover and
Greenidge units; however currently Moody's anticipate the
company will need to utilize cash on hand (estimated at about
$30 million), and at least a portion of its six month funded rent
reserve to make its $33.9 million non-deferrable rent payment in
July 2011.

In addition to its rent reserve, the project currently benefits
from a $75 million working capital facility (a modest portion of
which is being utilized for required letters of credit) as well as
a $30 million additional liquidity facility which has been
provided in the form of a letter of credit written off AEE's
parent AES NY Surety's $200 million revolving credit facility.
Both the $75 million AEE facility and the $200 million NY Surety
facility are scheduled to terminate in July 2011.  To the extent
these facilities are not renewed or replaced, AEE is not likely to
have sufficient liquidity to fully service its debt over the next
12-18 months.  The longer term outlook for the project is highly
dependent on a significant strengthening of power markets; for
example, the project could on average receive revenues in the
range of $55-$60 MWh while maintaining fuel costs at or near their
current levels, it would likely be able to once again service its
debt.  In Moody's view, this could take significantly longer than
12-18 months.

Although AEE's liquidity is currently severely constrained,
Moody's feel the longer term recovery prospects for the holders of
the pass through certificate holders should be above average.
AEE's two largest facilities (three units), totaling approximately
978 MW provide security for the certificate holders.  AEE's total
lease debt is currently approximately $570 million; however this
includes an equity component.  Net of equity, the balance on the
certificates is approximately $460 million, or approximately $470/
kW.

The rating is not likely to be revised upward in the near to
medium term.  The outlook could be revised to stable if AEE is
successful in replacing or extending its credit facilities or
making other adjustments such that the project will have
sufficient liquidity to survive through a continued period of low
power prices.  The rating could be revised downward if it becomes
clear a payment default or restructuring is imminent.

AES Eastern operates a portfolio of Moody's coal-fired power
plants with a total of 1,166 MWs of base-load generating capacity
in western New York.  The portfolio includes facilities at
Somerset (675 MW) and Cayuga (303 MW), which are leased from
independent owner trusts, in addition to smaller and older units
at Westover (84 MW) and Greenidge (104 MW), which are owned by
subsidiaries of AEE.  All Moody's plants participate in the
NYISO's wholesale energy and capacity markets on a merchant basis.
Somerset and Cayuga, which have historically been among the lowest
cost assets in western and central New York, generate the large
majority of the portfolio's cash flows.  AES Eastern is a wholly
owned subsidiary of AES NY, LLC and AES NY2, LLC, which are, in
turn, both wholly owned subsidiaries of AES Corporation (B1
corporate family rating).  The Pass Through Certificates are
secured by lease payments from AEE (senior unsecured obligations
of AEE payable from all of AEE's cash flows, including those
generated by the AEE-owned plants), in addition to liens on the
Somerset and Cayuga facilities.


ALLSTATE INVESTMENT: S&P Ups Ratings Due to Improved Performance
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-2, B, C, and D notes from AIMCO CLO Series 2005-A, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Allstate Investment Management Co.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed the ratings on the class A-1A and A-1B notes and removed
the rating on the class A-1A notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P have observed in
the deal since December 2009, when S&P lowered S&P's ratings on
all of the classes of notes following a review of the transaction
under S&P's updated criteria for rating corporate collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs).  The affirmations of the class A-1A and
A-1B notes reflects the availability of credit support at the
current rating levels.

At the time of S&P's last rating action, based on the Nov. 9,
2009 trustee report, the transaction was holding approximately
$27.51 million in defaulted obligations and more than
$26.56 million in underlying obligors with ratings in the
'CCC' range.  Since that time, a number of defaulted obligors
held in the deal emerged from bankruptcy, with some receiving
proceeds that were higher than their carrying value in the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratio test calculations.  This, in
combination with a reduction in the 'CCC' range rated assets to
$18.29 million (as reported in the Dec. 8, 2010, trustee report),
benefited all O/C ratio tests.  The class A O/C ratio increased to
122.94% as of Dec. 8, 2010, up from 116.84% as of Nov. 9, 2009.
The class D O/C test increased to 107.46% from 102.11% in the same
period.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

AIMCO CLO Series 2005-A
                 Rating
Class       To           From
A-1A        AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/ Watch Pos
A-2         AA (sf)      AA- (sf)
B           A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)     CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

AIMCO CLO Series 2005-A

Class       Rating
A-1B        AA+ (sf)


AMERICAN AIRLINES: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating Class B Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'A-' rating to
American Airlines Inc.'s (American) series 2011-1 Class A pass-
through certificates with an expected maturity of Jan. 31, 2021,
and its 'BB+' rating to the series 2011-1 Class B pass-through
certificates with an expected maturity of Jan. 31, 2018.  The
final legal maturities will be 18 months after the expected
maturity.  The issues are a drawdown under a Rule 415 shelf
registration.  S&P assigned preliminary ratings to the
certificates Jan. 20, 2011.

The 'A-' and 'BB+' ratings are based on American's credit quality,
substantial collateral coverage by a combination of very desirable
and somewhat-less-liquid aircraft, and on legal and structural
protections available to the pass-through certificates. The
Company will use proceeds of the offering to refinance aircraft
American already owns: 15 Boeing B737-800s (nine of which were
previously collateral for earlier pass-through certificates, three
of which were previously collateral for third-party financings,
and three of which were previously unencumbered), six B757-200s
(four of which were previously collateral for earlier pass-through
certificates and two of which were previously collateral for
third-party financings), two B767-200ERs (previously collateral
for third-party financings), and seven B777-200ERs (four of which
were previously collateral for earlier pass-through certificates
and three of which were previously collateral for third-party
financings).  Each aircraft's secured notes are cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted--a provision S&P believe
increases the likelihood that American would affirm the notes (and
thus continue to pay on the certificates) in bankruptcy.

The pass-through certificates are a form of enhanced equipment
trust certificates (EETC) and benefit from legal protections
afforded under Section 1110 of the federal bankruptcy code and by
a liquidity facility provided by Natixis S.A.  The liquidity
facility is intended to cover up to three semiannual interest
payments, a period during which collateral could be repossessed
and remarketed by certificateholders following any default by the
airline, or to maintain continuity of interest payments as
certificateholders negotiate with American in a bankruptcy with
regard to certificates.

The rating applies to a unit consisting of certificates
representing the trust property and escrow receipts, initially
representing interests in deposits (the proceeds of the
offerings).  The escrow deposits are held by a depositary
bank, The Bank of New York Mellon, pending delivery of the
aircraft that American will refinance with proceeds from the
certificates (13 of which currently secure American's 2001-1 EETCs
and four of which currently secure American's 2001-2 EETCs).
Amounts deposited under the escrow agreements are not the property
of American and are not entitled to the benefits of Section
1110 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and any default arising under an
indenture solely by reason of the cross-default in the indenture
may not be of a type required to be cured under Section 1110.  Any
cash collateral held as a result of the cross-collateralization of
the equipment notes also would not be entitled to the benefits of
Section 1110.  Neither the certificates nor the escrow receipts
may be separately assigned or transferred.

S&P believes that American views these planes as important and
would, given the cross-collateralization and cross-default
provisions, likely affirm the aircraft notes in a bankruptcy
scenario.  In contrast to most EETCs issued before 2009, the
cross-default would take effect immediately in a bankruptcy if
American rejected any of the aircraft notes.  This should prevent
American from selectively affirming some aircraft notes and
rejecting others ("cherry-picking"), which often harms the
interests of certificateholders in a bankruptcy.

S&P considers the collateral pool overall to be of mixed quality,
with some aircraft models more attractive than others. The largest
proportion of initial appraised value (about 81%) is comprised of
good collateral: B737-800s (35%) and B777-200ERs (46%).  The B737-
800 is Boeing's most popular aircraft, a midsize narrowbody plane
that more than 100 airlines worldwide operate.  Given the modern
technology incorporated in the plane, its wide user base, and
expected demand in excess of supply over the next couple of years,
S&P considers it to be the best aircraft collateral available.
Boeing Co. currently says that it does not plan to introduce
successors to the various current B737 models until after 2020,
around the time these certificates should be fully repaid.  The
B777-200ER (extended range) is a successful midsize, long-range
widebody plane.  The larger versions of the B787 and competing
Airbus A350 will eventually provide alternatives, which S&P
expects will occur before these certificates are fully repaid. S&P
believes this could place long-term value
pressure on the B777-200ER.

The balance of value, about 19%, is comprised of B757-200s (13%)
and B767-300ERs (6%). The B757-200s are large narrowbody aircraft
introduced in the 1980's and widely used, especially by U.S.
airlines.  Four of the six aircraft are the ETOPS version, which
can fly across the Atlantic to certain destinations and are useful
for routes that do no have sufficient passengers to support a
widebody aircraft.  Boeing's current generation of narrowbodies
includes successor aircraft, the B737-900 and B737-900ER, although
even the long-range "-ER" version does not have trans-Atlantic
capability.  S&P consider these planes of average desirability as
collateral. The B767-300ER is a small widebody introduced in the
1980s.  This plane has a fairly wide user base and is well suited
to flying routes that cannot support larger models.  It will
eventually be superseded by the new B787.

S&P's analysis of the aircraft collateral, which focuses mainly on
resale liquidity and technological risk, also considers the age of
the aircraft, as well as the characteristics of the models. S&P
judged that the nine to 11 year-old B737-800 aircraft would
exhibit somewhat greater potential volatility of values than the
new delivery B737-800s in an airline industry downturn.  In
addition, S&P feels that the out-of-production B757-200s and B767-
300ERs would exhibit somewhat greater volatility of values.  S&P
factored that into its conclusions.

The initial and maximum loan-to-value (LTV) of the Class A
certificates is 48.3% and of the Class B, 62.4%, using the
appraised base values and depreciation assumptions in the offering
memorandum.  However, S&P focused on more-conservative
maintenance-adjusted lower of the mean or median current
market values for the B757-200s and B767-300ERs, more-conservative
maintenance-adjusted lowest base values for the B777-200ERs, and
more-conservative maintenance-adjusted lower of the mean or median
base values for the B787-800s (none of these disclosed in the
offering memorandum).  S&P also uses more conservative
depreciation assumptions for all of the planes than those in the
prospectus.  S&P assumed that, absent cyclical fluctuations,
values of the B737-800s would decline by 5% of the preceding
year's value per year; the B767-300ERs 7%; and the B757-200s 8%.
Using these values and assumptions, the Class A initial LTV is
higher, 50.9%, and rises slightly to more than 53% at its highest
point before declining gradually; the Class B initial LTV is
higher, 66.5%, and rises slightly to more than 68% at its highest
point before declining gradually.  S&P's analysis also considered
that a full draw of the liquidity facility, plus interest on those
draws, represents a claim senior to the certificates.  However,
this amount is, because of current low interest rates, somewhat
below levels (as a percent of asset value) of EETCs of the past
several years.  Through the life of the transaction, a full draw,
with interest, is equivalent to about 6%-7% of asset value, using
S&P's assumptions.

Ratings List

American Airlines Inc.
Corporate credit rating                  B-/Stable/--

New Ratings
American Airlines Inc.

  Series 2011-1 Class A pass-thru certs   A-(sf)
  Series 2011-1 Class B pass-thru certs   BB+(sf)


ARES VII: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1a, A-1b, remarketed certificates, and B notes from ARES VII CLO
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by Ares
Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed its ratings on the
class A-1a and A-1b notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them
with positive implications on Nov. 8, 2010.  S&P also withdrew its
rating on the composite notes.

The upgrades primarily reflect the increase in credit support
following the continued paydown of the class A-1a and A-1b notes.
The current balance of the class A-1a note is $57.7 million, down
from $100.9 million at the time of S&P's last rating action in
April 2010.  Additionally, the balance of the class A-1b note is
$65.7 million, down from $115.1 million as of April 2010.

Mainly as a result of the aforementioned paydowns, the class A and
B overcollateralization ratios have increased since S&P lowered
some of its note ratings on April 29, 2010, following the
application of its revised corporate CDO criteria.  According to
the Dec. 23, 2010, trustee report the O/C ratios are:

* The class A O/C ratio was 148.65%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 123.20% in February 2010;

* The class B O/C ratio was 115.08%, compared with a reported
  ratio of 107.33% in February 2010; and

* The class C O/C ratio was 87.19%, compared with a reported ratio
  of 90.76% in February 2010.

Improved credit quality available to support the rated notes has
also benefited the transaction.  As of the Dec. 23, 2010 trustee
report, the transaction had $8.55 million in defaulted assets,
down from $25.39 million noted in the Feb. 1, 2010 trustee report,
which S&P referenced for its April 2010 rating actions.

The insured remarketed certificates, which are supported by the
class A-1a notes, are also guaranteed to timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal by Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp.

S&P withdrew its rating on the composite notes, which consisted of
a small portion of both the class A-1b notes and the class C
notes, because they are no longer outstanding.  Standard & Poor's
did not rate the class C notes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                         ARES VII CLO Ltd.

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class               To          From
        -----               --          ----
        A-1a                AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
        A-1b                AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
        Remarketed certs    AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
        B                   BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)

                         Rating Withdrawn

                         ARES VII CLO Ltd.

                                     Rating
                                     ------
               Class              To        From
               -----              --        ----
               Composite notes    NR        CCC- (sf)

                          NR - not rated.

Transaction Information
-----------------------
Issuer:              ARES VII CLO Ltd.
Coissuer:            Ares VII CLO Corp.
Collateral manager:  Ares Management LLC
Underwriter:         Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Trustee:             U.S. Bank National Association
Transaction type:    Cash flow CLO


AVENUE CLO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Avenue CLO II, Ltd.:

  -- US$320,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2017
     (current outstanding balance of $298,326,009), Upgraded to
     Aa1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf);

  -- US$35,500,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3 (sf);

  -- US$22,500,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 15, 2009 Confirmed
     at Ba1 (sf);

  -- US$19,250,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes due 2017,
     Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2009 Confirmed at
     B1 (sf);

  -- US$19,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes due 2017
     (current outstanding balance of $18,032,863), Upgraded to
     Caa3 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios
since the rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  Based on the
December 2010 trustee report, the weighted average rating factor
is 2433 compared to 2653 in May 2009, and securities rated Caa1
and below make up approximately 5.3% of the underlying portfolio
versus 10% in May 2009.  Moody's adjusted WARF has also declined
since the rating action in July 2009 due to a decrease in the
percentage of securities with ratings on "Review for Possible
Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook." The deal also experienced
a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the dollar amount of
defaulted securities has decreased to approximately $18 million
from $41 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  Based on the
December 2010 trustee report, the Senior Class A, Class A, Class
B-1L, and Class B-2L overcollateralization ratios are reported at
121.7%, 114.0%, 108.2%, and 103.2%, respectively, versus May 2009
levels of 117.5%, 110.4%, 104.9%, and 98.8%, respectively, and all
related overcollateralization tests, except the interest diversion
test, are currently in compliance.  The Class A-1L Notes have
amortized by approximately $17.4mm or 5.5% from principal and
interest proceeds since the rating action in July 2009 due to
failure of the overcollateralization tests.  The deal is scheduled
to end the reinvestment period in October 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $402 million, defaulted par of $18.3 million,
weighted average default probability of 23.7% (implying a WARF of
3405), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.8%, and
a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Avenue CLO II, issued on August 11, 2005, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including these:

1.  Various default probabilities to capture potential defaults in
    the underlying portfolio.

2.  A range of recovery rate assumptions for all assets to capture
    variability in recovery rates.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2724)

  -- Class A-1L: +1
  -- Class A-2L: +3
  -- Class A-3L: +2
  -- Class B-1L: +2
  -- Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4086)

  -- Class A-1L: -1
  -- Class A-2L: -1
  -- Class A-3L: -2
  -- Class B-1L: -1
  -- Class B-2L: -2

A summary of the impact of different recovery rate levels on all
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notches' difference
versus the current model output, where a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss), assuming that all other
factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARR + 2% (44.8%)

  -- Class A-1L: +1
  -- Class A-2L: +1
  -- Class A-3L: 0
  -- Class B-1L: +1
  -- Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARR - 2% (40.8%)

  -- Class A-1L: 0
  -- Class A-2L: 0
  -- Class A-3L: -1
  -- Class B-1L: 0
  -- Class B-2L: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the managers'
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deals'
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.  However, as part of the base case, Moody's
   considered a weighted average spread level higher than the
   covenant level due to large differences between the reported
   and covenant levels.

4) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
   number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
   through credit estimates.  In the event that Moody's is not
   provided the necessary information to update the credit
   estimates in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted
   by any default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu
   of updated credit estimates.

5) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes an asset's terminal
   value upon liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of
   an assumed liquidation value (depending on the extent to which
   the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the
   asset's current market value.


BACCHUS (US): S&P Upgrades Ratings on Three Notes Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class C, D, and E notes from Bacchus (U.S.) 2006-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Halcyon Loan Investors LP.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its rating on the class X, A and B notes and removed the class
A rating from CreditWatch with positive implications.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P have observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last
rating action in February 2010.  The ratings affirmations on the
class X, A, and B notes reflect the availability of sufficient
credit support at the current rating level.

According to the Nov. 8, 2010 trustee report, the transaction
held $215,540 in defaulted assets and $11.7 million in 'CCC'
rated assets, down from $23.8 million in defaulted assets and
$33.9 million in 'CCC' rated assets as of the Jan. 7, 2010,
trustee report.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated
notes.  Based on the Nov. 8, 2010, trustee report:

  -- The Class A/B O/C ratio was 130.76%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 119.23% in January 2010;

  -- The Class C O/C ratio was 115.39%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 107.06% in January 2010;

  -- The Class D O/C ratio was 109.53%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 102.30% in January 2010; and

  -- The Class E O/C ratio was 105.00%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 98.19% in January 2010.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Bacchus (U.S.) 2006-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
Class           To           From
X               AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A               AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B               AA (sf)      AA (sf)
C               BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
D               BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)
E               B+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)


BAKER STREET: Moody's Raises Rating on $9.4 Million Notes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of these notes
issued by Baker Street Funding 2005-1 CLO:

  -- US$234,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Notes (current balance of
     $227,044,047), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 5,
     2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$35,000,000 Class A-2 Notes (current commitment balance of
     $33,959,579 and current outstanding balance of $27,359,579),
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 5, 2009 Downgraded
     to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$20,000,000 Class B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
     on June 5, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf);

  -- US$18,000,000 Class C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
     previously on June 5, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$9,400,000 Class E Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the rating action in June 2010.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated January 3, 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2335 compared to
2474 in the May 2010 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 9.5% of the underlying portfolio versus
11.0% in May 2010.  Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the
rating action in June 2010 due to a decrease in the percentage of
securities with ratings on "Review for Possible Downgrade" or with
a "Negative Outlook."  The deal also experienced a decrease in
defaulted securities.  Defaults now total about $10 million of the
underlying portfolio compared to $13 million in May 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the ration action in June 2010.  The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 119.41%, 112.22%, 106.95% and 103.84%, respectively,
versus May 2010 levels of 117.30%, 110.24%, 105.07%, and 102.01%,
respectively.  All related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $329.1 million, defaulted par of
$10.3 million, weighted average default probability of 23.65%, a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43.79%, and a
diversity score of 60.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Baker Street Funding 2005-1 CLO, issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.  Other methodologies and
factors that may have been considered in the process of rating
this issuer can also be found on Moody's website.


BANC OF AMERICA: Moody's Affirms Low-B Rating on Five Class Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of two classes,
downgraded one class and affirmed 15 classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-2:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. A-5, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 26, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on June 26, 2008
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 26, 2008
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. M, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. N, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

  -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Oct. 1, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf) and Confirmed

The upgrade is due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and amortization and overall stable pool
performance.  The pool has paid down by 22% since Moody's last
review.  The downgrade is due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.9% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.6%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
6.9% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating U.S. Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score, a measure of loan
level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity
and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 14 compared to 16 at Moody's prior full review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated July 23, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the January 10, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 49% to
$586.7 million from $1.1 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 52 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 53% of the pool.  The pool contains one loan with an
investment grade credit estimate that represents 6% of the pool.
Eleven loans, representing 18% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Ten loans, representing 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

There have been no realized losses since securitization.  Two
loans, representing 2% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing.  Moody's has estimated an aggregate $6.6 million loss
for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.8 million aggregate loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full or partial year 2010 operating
results for 96% of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and
troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 83% compared to
85% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net
operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.33X, respectively, compared to
1.59X and 1.23X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit estimate is the Prince Kuhio Plaza Loan
($36.1 million -- 6.2%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 504,000 square foot regional mall located in Hilo,
Hawaii.  The mall is owned by an affiliate of General Growth
Properties, Inc. (GGP).  The mall was 85% leased as of September
2010, similar to last review.  Anchor tenants include Sears,
Macy's and Safeway.  The property's performance has declined
since last review, but the decline has been largely offset by
amortization.  The loan amortized 4% since last review.  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.38X,
respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 26% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Eden Prairie Mall Loan
($76.9 million -- 13.1%), which is secured by the borrower's
interest in a 1.1 million square foot regional mall located in
suburban Minneapolis, Minnesota.  The mall is owned by an
affiliate of GGP.  The mall was 92% leased as of September 2010
compared to 97% at last review.  Anchor tenants include Sears,
Target, Von Maur and Kohl's.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
74% and 1.32X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.22X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Broward Financial Loan
($43.5 million -- 7.4%), which is secured by a 325,500 square foot
Class A office tower located in downtown Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
The property was 76% leased as of September 2010 compared to 79%
at last review.  The loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to
the June 2011 lease expiration of the property's largest tenant,
Franklin Templeton, which leases 42% of the property.  The loan
matures in February 2012.  Moody's considers this loan to have a
high default probability because of the Franklin Templeton's
approaching lease expiration and Fort Lauderdale's soft market
conditions.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 128% and 0.84X,
respectively compared to 121% and 0.9X as at last review.

The third largest loan is the MHC Portfolio-Waterford Estates
Loan ($29.4 million -- 5.0%), which is secured by a 731-pad
manufactured housing community located approximately ten miles
south of Wilmington in Bear, Delaware.  The property was 96%
leased as of September 2010 compared to 93% at last review.
Performance has been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
93% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to 96% and 0.99X at last
review.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Junks Ratings Three Classes of Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded these ratings of four classes
and affirmed 12 classes of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-PWR4:

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 21, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug. 27, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug. 27, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. P, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug. 27, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the Herfindahl
Index (Herf), remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on our
current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the
affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 5%
of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes
could decline below the current levels.  If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated August 27, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the January 11, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14% to
$823.3 million from $954.9 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 72 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 55% of the pool.  The pool includes two loans with
investment grade credit estimates, representing 26% of the pool.
Eight loans, representing 14% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with U.S. Government securities.

Sixteen loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the trust since
securitization, resulting in a $3.1 million loss on only one of
the loans.  Currently only one loan, the Payson Village Shopping
Center Loan is in special servicing.  The loan was transferred to
special servicing in November 2009 for payment default.  Moody's
has estimated a $4.1 million loss for this loan based on a January
2010 appraisal.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $3.4 million loss from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 97%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 88%
compared to 92% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs for the conduit component are 1.42X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.21X at last review.  Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's
actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 23 compared to 25 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Shell Plaza Loan,
which is secured by a 1.8 million square foot Class A office
complex located in downtown Houston, Texas.  The major tenants are
Shell Oil Company and Baker Botts.  As of December 2009 the
property was 97% leased, which is the same as at last review.  The
loan sponsor is Hines Sumisei U.S. Core Office Fund, a partnership
between Hines and Sumitomo Life Realty, a subsidiary of Sumitomo
Life.  Performance has been stable.  Moody's credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.38X, respectively, which is the same
as at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the GIC Office
Portfolio Loan, which represents a 12% pari passu interest in a
$683.6 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by 12
office properties totaling 6.4 million SF and located in seven
states.  The highest geographic concentrations are Chicago,
suburban Philadelphia and San Francisco.  As of January 2010, the
portfolio was 87% leased compared to 91% at last review.  The
portfolio's performance has declined since last review due to
decreased rental revenues and increased expenses.  The loan
matures in January 2014.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Baa3 and 1.45X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.44X
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 15% of the pool.
The largest loan is the 40 Landsdowne Street Loan, which is
secured by a 215,000 SF Class A office/biotechnology building
located in an industrial park that abuts the main campus of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The property is 100% leased to Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
through July 2020.  The loan was structured with a 25-year
amortization schedule and has amortized by approximately 4% since
last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.47X,
respectively, compared to 79% and 1.35X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the One North State Street Loan, which
is secured by a 168,000 SF retail condominium unit situated in a
675,000 SF mixed use property located in downtown Chicago,
Illinois.  The property was 97% leased as of September 2010,
compared to 100% at last review.  Major tenants include TJ Maxx
and Filene's Basement.  The loan is on the servicer's watchlist
due to the bankruptcy of Filene's Basement.  Filene's filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2009 but did not include this store
in its list of store closings.  The property's performance has
improved since last review, however, Moody's analysis incorporates
a stressed cash flow reflecting a potential increase in vacancy
due to tenant rollover.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 108% and
1.00X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.93X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Alexandria East Coast Portfolio
Loan, which is secured by five office buildings located in
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  The portfolio totals
205,000 SF and was 78% leased as of September 2010 compared to 88%
at last review.  Two properties are 100% vacant while the other
three properties are 100% leased.  The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to vacancy.  Moody's analysis incorporates a
stressed cash flow reflecting a potential increase in the
portfolio's vacancy rate.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 95% and
1.16X, respectively, essentially the same as at last review.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 2004-TOP14 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class,
downgraded four classes and affirmed 12 classes of Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-TOP 14, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-TOP14:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on May 10, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2004
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Confirmed at A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Confirmed at A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. N, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. O, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov. 12, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

The upgrade is due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and amortization and stable overall
performance.  The pool has paid down by 3% since last review.  In
addition, the pool benefits from 12% defeasance.

The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the pool
resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.  The affirmations are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.9%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
6.0% of the current balance.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels.  If future performance materially declines,
the expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the
cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization rate
used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value).  Conduit model results
at the B2 level are driven by a paydown analysis based on the
individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl
score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary determinant
of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on senior
certificates.  Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis.  Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the remaining conduit classes
are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points.  For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit estimates is melded with the conduit
model credit enhancement into an overall model result.  Fusion
loan credit enhancement is based on the underlying rating of the
loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement levels.
Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based on loan
level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations and
correlations within the pool.  Negative pooling, or adding credit
enhancement at the underlying rating level, is incorporated for
loans with similar credit estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R) (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and
CMM (Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

                         Deal Performance

As of the January 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $607.2
million from $894.5 million at securitization.  The Certificates
are collateralized by 97 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
36% of the pool.  The pool includes two loans with investment
grade credit estimates, representing 4% of the pool.  At last
review the Greenville Place Apartments Loan ($18.9 million -- 3.1%
of the pool) also had an investment grade credit estimate.
However, due to a decline in performance and increased leverage
this loan is now analyzed as part of conduit pool.  Six loans,
representing 12% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized
with U.S. Government securities.

Twenty-two loans, representing 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the trust since
securitization, resulting in a $3.2 million loss (4% loss severity
on average).  Losses at last review totaled $1.3 million.
Currently one loan, the John Deere -- Davenport Loan ($12.5
million -- 2% of the pool), is in special servicing.  The loan has
been modified to extend its maturity date to August 2011 and will
be returned to the Master Servicer.  Moody's does not currently
estimate any losses from this loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool.  Moody's has
estimated a $5.5 million loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from the troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 96%
of the pool.  Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV for the conduit component is 85% compared to 83% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 18% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.3%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs for
the conduit component are 1.71X and 1.37X, respectively, compared
to 1.72X and 1.36X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 27 compared to 29 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the 12 E 22nd Street
Loan ($12.3 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by an
89-unit apartment building located in New York City.  The property
was 98% leased as of December 2009 compared to 100% at last
review.  Moody's credit estimate and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and
1.85X, respectively, compared to Aa1 and 1.90X at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Lincoln Tower
Cooperative Loan ($11.8 million -- 1.9% of the pool), which is
secured by a 387-unit residential co-op located in the upper west
side submarket of New York City.  Moody's credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Aaa and 4.49X, respectively, compared to Aaa and
4.36X at last review.

The loan that previously had a credit estimate is the Greenville
Place Apartments Loan ($18.9 million -- 3.1% of the pool), which
is secured by a 519-unit apartment property located in Greenville,
Delaware.  The property was 82% leased as of September 2010
compared to 73% at last review.  The property's performance has
declined since last review due to a drop in rental revenues and
increased expenses.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and
1.10X, respectively, compared to 67% and 1.49X, at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 20% of the pool.
The largest loan is the U.S. Bank Tower Loan ($64.7 million --
10.7% of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a
$260 million first mortgage loan.  The loan is secured by a 1.4
million square foot (SF) office tower and accompanying parking
garage in downtown Los Angeles, California.  The loan sponsor is
Maguire Properties (Maguire).  The property was 57% leased as of
September 2010 compared to 88% at last review.  The largest tenant
at securitization, Latham & Watkins (20% of the net rentable area
(NRA)) vacated the premises at its December 2009 lease expiration.
Furthermore, the lease for the second largest tenant, Sempra
Energy (16% of the NRA) expired in June 2010.  Even with the
substantial decline in cash flow from the dramatic rise in
vacancy, Moody's projects that the property will still generate
cash flow in excess of debt service.  However, given the softness
in the Los Angeles office market, it is anticipated that new
tenants will be paying lower rents than those currently in place.
In addition, due to Maguire's current financial issues, Moody's is
concerned about the availability of funds for leasing costs.  The
loan is interest-only for the entire term.  The loan is currently
on the master servicer's watch list for high vacancy.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 135% and 0.74X, respectively, compared to
103% and 0.97X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the 840 Memorial Drive Loan
($38.8 million -- 6.4 % of the pool), which is secured by a
129,000 SF biotech lab/office building located in Cambridge,
Massachusetts.  The property was 71% leased as of September 2010,
which is the same as at last review.  The loan is currently on the
master servicer's watch list for high vacancy.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR 125% and 0.82X, respectively, compared to 130% and
0.79X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 1401 & 1501 Nolan Ryan Expressway
Loan ($19.8 million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
three-story Class A office building and a single story R&D
facility, totaling 234,000 SF, located in Arlington, Texas.  The
property is 100% leased to the Siemens Dematic Postal Automation
L.P (SDPA), a member of the Siemens AG family, through January
2014.  The loan matures in February 2014.  Although property
performance has been stable, Moody's analysis reflects a downward
adjustment to the property's net operating income due to concerns
about the leasing and balloon risk due to the lease of the
property's sole tenant expiring within one month of the loan's
maturity.  The loan has amortized 2% since last review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR 82% and 1.19X, respectively, compared to 90%
and 1.08X at last review.


C-BASS CBO: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Two Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of notes issued by C-BASS
CBO V, Ltd./Corp.:

  -- $15,023,054 class B notes at 'AAAsf/LS4', Outlook Negative;
  -- $5,000,000 class C notes at 'AA+sf/LS5', Outlook Negative;
  -- $8,946,900 class D-1 notes at 'CCCsf';
  -- $8,707,891 class D-2 notes at 'CCCsf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also
considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis, as
described below, to conclude the rating affirmations for the rated
notes.

Credit enhancement levels for all classes of notes have improved
since Fitch's last review in January 2010 due to amortization of
the senior notes.  However, this improvement is offset by the
continued deterioration of the portfolio's credit quality, with
21.6% of the portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 3.5
notches.  Currently, 43.6% has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 35.1% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating
category or lower, compared to 37.7% and 33.7% at last review.
The Outlook remains Negative on class B and C notes due to Fitch's
concerns about adverse selection as the portfolio continues to
amortize and become more concentrated.

The Loss Severity ratings of 'LS4' and 'LS5' on the class B and
class C notes, respectively, indicate the tranches' potential loss
severity given default, as evidenced by the ratio of tranche size
to the base-case loss expectation for the collateral, as explained
in Fitch's 'Criteria for Structured Finance Loss Severity
Ratings'.  The LS rating should always be considered in
conjunction with the notes' long-term credit rating.  Fitch does
not assign LS ratings to tranches rated 'CCC' and below.

Since the September 2010 distribution date, the class D-1 and D-2
notes began receiving repayments of previously deferred interest
amounts.  Fitch does not assign Outlooks to tranches rated 'CCC'
and below.

C-BASS V is a static structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Dec. 20, 2002.  Presently, the portfolio
comprises of residential mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed
securities, and CDOs, from 1997 through 2002 vintage transactions.
The initial portfolio was selected by C-BASS Investment Management
LLC.  In November 2010, C-BASS announced that it has entered into
an asset purchase agreement with FIG LLC to sell its collateral
management business.


CARLYLE HIGH: S&P Removes 3 Note Classes Ratings From Creditwatch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on all
notes from Carlyle High Yield Partners IX Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction, managed by
Carlyle Investment Management LLC, and removed the ratings on the
class A-1, A-3, and B notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The transaction has a structural provision that diverts any excess
interest to principal proceeds (to be reinvested) once the
aggregate principal losses -- netted by aggregate gains -- exceed
a specified limit.  Since the net aggregate losses are currently
above this limit, the transaction has and will continue to divert
excess interest into reinvestments until the total diverted
amount matches the "loss replenishment" amount.

The trustee reports that the "loss replenishment amount" prior to
the December 2010 payment was $17.97 million.  The December 2010
payment report indicates that $3.83 million of excess interest was
diverted towards principal proceeds to cover for this loss
replenishment.

In addition to the increased reinvestments from the above
diversion, the transaction's collateral also increased due to a
decrease in the level of defaults.  The trustee reports that the
transaction had $6.67 million par as defaults in December 2010,
down from $28.11 million in November 2009.

As a result, the senior overcollateralization ratio (measured at
class B note) as reported by the trustee increased to 122.48% in
December 2010, compared with 116.43% in November 2009.

Standard & Poor's also notes that the transaction's weighted
average spread and credit quality of the portfolio has improved
since the last rating action.

These factors improved the credit support to all the rated
tranches at their prior rating levels resulting in an upgrade.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it
rates and take Rating Actions, including CreditWatch placements,
when appropriate.

Rating Actions

Carlyle High Yield Partners IX Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A-1               AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2               AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-3               AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B                 AA (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                 A (sf)      BBB (sf)
D                 BBB (sf)    CCC+ (sf)


CARLYLE MODENA: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, and C notes from Carlyle Modena CLO Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation transaction now managed by Carlyle Investment
Management LLC.  S&P removed the ratings on the class B and C
notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its rating on the class D notes.  Carlyle
Modena CLO Ltd. was formerly known as Stanfield Modena CLO Ltd.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the deal since its last rating action in December 2009.  The
affirmation reflects the availability of sufficient credit support
at the current rating levels.

Since S&P's last rating action in December 2009, the class A notes
have paid down $190.4 million and the class B notes have paid down
$2.65 million.  The transaction has also benefited from an
increase in overcollateralization available to support the rated
notes.  The senior overcollateralization ratio test for this deal
rose to 136.04% from 114.43% in October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                          Rating Actions

                      Carlyle Modena CLO Ltd.

                              Rating
                              ------
       Class               To           From
       -----               --           ----
       A                   AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
       B                   AA+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
       C                   A+(sf)       BBB-

                         Ratings Affirmed

                      Carlyle Modena CLO Ltd.

                 Class                  Rating
                 -----                  ------
                 D                      CCC- (sf)


CBA COMMERCIAL: S&P Cuts Ratings on 4 Classes of Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on four
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) pass-
through certificates from CBA Commercial Assets LLC's series 2006-
2.

S&P lowered its ratings on the class M-2 certificates because of a
$1,773,032 principal loss to the outstanding principal balance of
the security.  The principal balance as of the Jan. 25, 2011,
remittance report was $3,119,967.  The class M-3 certificate
experienced a $1,654,266 principal loss and the current
outstanding principal balance of this note class is currently at
zero.  S&P lowered its ratings on the remaining two classes as a
result of continued poor collateral performance and credit support
erosion.

As of the January 2011 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of 194 assets with an aggregate trust balance of 84.0
million, down from 294 assets totaling $130.5 million at issuance.
There are 47 assets totaling 23.3 million (27.7%) with the special
servicer.  To date, the trust has experienced losses on 39 loans.
The M-3 class was initially affected by losses in November 2010.
The total losses to the trust are $13.9 million, with an
approximate average loss severity of 71.8%.

Rating Actions

CBA Commercial Assets LLC
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-2
              Ratings
Class       To          From             Credit enhancement
A           CCC+ (sf)   BB-(sf)                    8.18
M-1         CCC- (sf)   B-(sf)                     3.71
M-2         D (sf)      CCC (sf)                    N/A
M-3         D (sf)      CCC-(sf)                    N/A


CHASE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Class H Certificates Rating to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' on the class H commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.'s
series 2000-1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

The downgrade follows a principal loss to the H class, which the
Jan. 18, 2011, remittance report detailed. The class H certificate
experienced a loss totaling 28.6% of its $5.2 million beginning
certificate balance, and class I lost 100% of its $6.1 million
opening balance.  S&P downgraded the class I certificates to 'D
(sf)' in October 2010 following a principal loss reported
in the September remittance report.

According to the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc. ('LNR'), the
transaction experience a principal loss of $3.0 million when the
property securing the Cady Centre loan was sold on Dec. 30, 2010.
The loan was transferred to LNR on March 12, 2009, due to a
monetary default.  The property is a 23,290-sq.-ft. office
building in Northville, Mich.  The total exposure was $3.4 million
at the time of liquidation. Based on the January 2011 remittance
report, the loss severity was 86.4%.

As of the January 2011 remittance report, the collateral pool
consisted of three loans with an aggregate trust balance of
$21.7 million, down from 91 loans totaling $697.1 million at
issuance. Two assets totaling $9.3 million (43.0%) were with the
special servicer. To date, the trust has experienced losses on 18
assets totaling $46.7 million.  Based on the January 2011
remittance report data, the weighted average loss severity for
these 18 assets was approximately 26.7% (based on the asset
balance at the time of disposition).


COLUMBUSNOVA CLO: S&P Raises Rating on Four Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D, and E notes from ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-I, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Columbus Nova Credit Investment Management LLC, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Deerfield Capital Corp.  S&P removed two of those
ratings from CreditWatch with positive implications.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its rating on the class A notes from the same
transaction.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since December 2009.
At that time, S&P lowered the ratings on all notes following a
review of the transaction under S&P's updated criteria for rating
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

At the time of S&P's last rating action, the transaction held
approximately $15.5 million in defaulted obligations and
$33.0 million in underlying obligors with a rating in the 'CCC'
range, according to the Nov. 10, 2009 trustee report.  As of the
Dec. 10, 2010 trustee report, ColumbusNova CLO 2006-I held
$3.8 million in defaulted obligations and $19.5 million in assets
from underlying obligors with ratings in the 'CCC' range.

Since the last rating action, the transaction redirected a total
of $2.8 million in interest proceeds to the principal collection
account as principal proceeds for the purchase of additional
collateral due to the failure of its interest reinvestment test.
Also, a number of defaulted obligors held in the deal emerged from
bankruptcy, with some receiving proceeds that were higher than
their carrying value in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratio test
calculation.  This, in combination with a reduction in the 'CCC'
range rated assets, benefited the transaction's O/C ratios. The
senior O/C ratio increased to 119.0% as of Dec. 10, 2010, from
116.6% as of Nov. 10, 2009.  In addition, the transaction is
passing its O/C tests, interest coverage tests, and interest
reinvestment test.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in S&P's view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-I
                             Rating
Class                   To           From
B                       AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                       A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                       BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)
E                       BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)

Rating Affirmed

ColumbusNova CLO Ltd. 2006-I
Class            Rating
A                AA+ (sf)


COMM 2005-FL11: S&P Affirms Ratings on 11 Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 11
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from COMM
2005-FL11, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction.  Concurrently, S&P withdrew its rating on one other
class from the same transaction.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, which
included a revaluation of the mortgage collateral securing the
trust's three remaining floating-rate loans.

The affirmation of S&P's ratings on the class X-2-DB and X-3-DB
interest-only certificates reflect its current criteria.

Lastly, S&P withdrew its rating on class X-3-CB following the
reduction of the notional balance in this note class.  This class
was associated with the Camelback Colonnade loan, which was paid
off in full at its extended maturity date of Oct. 9, 2010.

Although the transaction experienced significant deleveraging
since S&P's last review published on June 29, 2009, its ratings
are tempered by the overall cash flow declines of the remaining
loans.

Two of the three remaining loans totaling $119.3 million (50.4%)
were previously with the special servicer and have been returned
to the master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, as
corrected mortgage loans.  The third loan remains with its special
servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.  For the two loans that were
transferred back to the master servicer, it is S&P's understanding
from the respective special servicers, GE Capital Realty Group
Inc. and Green Loan Services LLC, an affiliate of SL Green Realty
Corp., that the respective borrowers paid the workout fees and
that no additional fees will be incurred as long as these two
loans continue to perform.

The collateral consists of three loans; two loans are secured by
retail properties ($36.9 million, 28.2%) and one loan is secured
by a portfolio of golf courses ($93.8 million, 71.8%).

The three floating-rate loans remaining in the trust are indexed
to one-month LIBOR.  The largest remaining loan in the pool, the
Whitehall/Starwood Golf Portfolio, has a trust balance of
$93.8 million (71.8%) and a whole loan balance of $200.1 million.
The whole loan balance includes raked certificate classes in the
amount of $106.3 million.  In addition, there is a mezzanine loan
in the amount of $103.2 million held outside of the trust.  The
whole loan was transferred to the special servicer on May 13,
2010, and was subsequently returned to the master servicer on
Jan. 3, 2011.  The loan is currently secured by 102 golf courses;
since issuance 71 golf courses originally secured by the loan have
been released.  The properties were released in accordance with
the underlying loan documents and the proceeds were utilized to
reduce the outstanding principal balance.  The remaining 102 golf
courses consist of 28 private golf courses, 29 daily fee courses,
and 45 municipal courses.  Based upon S&P's review of earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the
year-ended 2009 provided by the special servicer, GE, S&P's
adjusted net cash flow has declined 36.5% since its last review.

The Whitehall/Starwood Golf Portfolio loan originally matured on
July 9, 2009.  The borrower negotiated a 21-month forbearance
agreement that extended the maturity date of the loan until
July 9, 2012, implemented a cash flow sweep, and suspended
payments to the mezzanine loan until the senior loan is paid in
full.

The second largest loan remaining in the pool, the Crossgate
Commons loan, has a trust balance of $25.5 million (19.5% of the
pool) and a B-note held outside the trust in the amount of
$15.9 million.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on June 11, 2010, and was subsequently modified and returned to
the master servicer on Nov. 3, 2010.  The loan is secured by a
426,761-sq.-ft. retail power center located in Albany, N.Y.  The
center was built in 1994 and expanded in 2000 and is anchored by
Home Depot and a Wal-Mart Supercenter (not part of the
collateral).  The property's operating performance has declined
since issuance.  Based on S&P's review of the borrower's operating
statements for the year-to-date May 31, 2010, the year-end 2009
and its July 2010 rent roll, its adjusted net cash flow has
increased 17.4% since its last review.  This primarily reflects a
slight increase in rents and expense reimbursements at the
property.  Occupancy is at 64.7% which is slightly higher than in
S&P's last review.  Using a capitalization rate of 8.75%, S&P's
analysis yielded a stressed loan-to-value ratio of 91.5% based on
the trust pooled balance.

The Crossgate Commons loan originally matured on Sept. 9, 2010.
The borrower completed a modification that included a two-year
extension of the maturity date, until Sept. 9, 2012, and the
implementation of a cash flow sweep to fund the capital reserve
account up to $440,000.  Any remaining excess cash flow is then
required to fund the tenant improvement/leasing commission reserve
account to serve as additional collateral for the loan.

The DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio loan is the only loan
remaining with the special servicer and the smallest loan in the
pool (8.7%).  The loan has a trust balance of $11.4 million and a
whole loan balance of $153.4 million.  The whole loan is split
into three pari passu notes: a $71.0 million fixed-rate A-1 note
that was contributed to the GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series
2005-C4 transaction, a $71.0 million fixed-rate A-2 note that was
contributed to the GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Series
2006-C1 Trust transaction, and an $11.4 million floating-rate note
that was contributed to this transaction.  The loan is currently
secured by 24 single-tenant retail properties that were formerly
operating as Mervyn's, a discount department store chain.
Mervyn's filed for bankruptcy on Aug. 29, 2008, and rejected all
of its leases on or before Dec. 31, 2008.  The loan was
transferred to Midland, the special servicer, on Oct. 22, 2008,
due to imminent default.

A modification of the three notes was closed on Oct. 1, 2009.  The
modification included an $8.0 million paydown of the A-3 note
(included in this transaction), new funding for both the tenant
improvements and leasing commissions reserve and the debt service
reserve, and the release of collateral properties when sold for
115% of the allocated loan amount.  All of the reserves have since
been depleted.  To date, 11 of the stores have been sold and one
additional sale is pending.  In addition, eight properties have
been completely leased, four properties have been partially
leased, and one property has a pending lease.

                         Ratings Affirmed

                          COMM 2005-FL11
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                     Class          Rating
                     -----          ------
                     B              AAA (sf)
                     C              AAA (sf)
                     D              AAA (sf)
                     E              AA- (sf)
                     F              A- (sf)
                     G              BBB- (sf)
                     H              BB+ (sf)
                     J              BB (sf)
                     K              B- (sf)
                     X-2-DB         AAA (sf)
                     X-3-DB         AAA (sf)

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                          COMM 2005-FL11
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                  Rating
                                  ------
                Class        To           From
                -----        --           ----
                X-3-CB       NR           AAA (sf)


CORSAIR (JERSEY): S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on Note Series 89 & 91
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'D (sf)' ratings
on the notes issued by Corsair (Jersey) No. 2 Ltd.'s series 89 and
91, both synthetic corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions.

S&P's rating withdrawals follow notes' redemptions in whole, as
well as their subsequent terminations.

Ratings Withdrawn

Corsair (Jersey) No. 2 Ltd.
           Rating
Series   To      From
89       NR      D (sf)
91       NR      D (sf)

NR -- Not rated.


CSAM FUNDING: S&P Raises Ratings on Ten Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on all 10
classes of notes from CSAM Funding IV, a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by CSFB Alternative
Capital Inc.  At the same time, S&P removed its ratings on the
class A-2, B-1, and B-2 notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The upgrades reflect improved performance S&P has observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since its last rating action in
November 2009, as well as paydowns to the class A-1, A-1V, and A-
1NV note balances.

According to the January 2011 trustee report, the balance of
defaulted obligations in the transaction was $15 million, down
from $35 million as of the October 2009 trustee report (used as
reference for November 2009 analysis).  Similarly, there were
$25 million of 'CCC' rated obligations in the transaction
according to the January 2011 trustee report, down from
$52 million as of the October 2009 trustee report.

The transaction has also paid down approximately $68 million on
the class A-1, A-1V and A-1NV notes since S&P's last rating
action, including a $45 million payment in the Jan. 10, 2011
distribution, which increased the overcollateralization (O/C)
available to support the rated notes.  Currently, the notes are
passing all O/C and interest coverage tests.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deem necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

CSAM Funding IV

                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-1           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-1V          AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-1NV         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-2           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1           A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2           A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1           BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)
C-2           BBB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)
D-1           BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)
D-2           BB- (sf)    B+ (sf)


DEL MAR: Moody's Raises Rating on $13.1 Mil. Class Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of the notes
issued by Del Mar CLO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$75,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
     (current balance of $73,114,461), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$250,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 (current
     balance of $241,676), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     May 28, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$180,250,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
     (current balance of $174,248,822), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf);

  -- US$23,625,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$15,575,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$15,050,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Caa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$13,125,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 (current
     balance of $12,020,463), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and increase in the overcollateralization ratios of the
rated notes since the rating action in May 2009.

The deal has benefited from improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in May 2009.
Based on the December 2010 trustee report, the weighted average
rating factor is 2432 compared to 2800 in April 2009, and
securities rated Caa1 and below make up approximately 4.8% of the
underlying portfolio versus 5.9% in April 2009.  Moody's adjusted
WARF has also declined since the rating action in May 2009 due to
a decrease in the percentage of securities with ratings on "Review
for Possible Downgrade" or with a "Negative Outlook.  The deal
also experienced a decrease in defaults.  In particular, the
dollar amount of defaulted securities has decreased to
$4.6 million from approximately $20.8 million in April 2009.

Moody's also notes that the overcollateralization ratios of
the rated notes have improved primarily as a result of lower
overcollateralization haircut amounts from discount obligations
and excess securities rated Caa and below.  As of the latest
trustee report dated December 20, 2010, the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D, and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at
118.8%, 112.4%, 106.8%, and 102.7%, respectively, versus April
2009 levels of 112%, 106%, 100.9%, and 96.9%, respectively.  The
Class E overcollateralization ratio has increased in part due to a
turbo feature in the deal whereby excess interest is diverted to
delever the Class E Notes in the event of a Class E
overcollateralization ratio test failure.  Moody's also notes that
the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest and
that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $321 million, defaulted par of $4.6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 26.26% (implying a WARF of
3310), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 43%, and a
diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in Moody's cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Del Mar CLO I, Ltd., issued on July 18, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.





DRYDEN VII: Increased Credit Support Cues S&P to Upgrade Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1LB, A-1L, A-2L, A-3F, B-1L, and B-2L notes issued by Dryden
VII-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004, a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction managed by Prudential Investment Management.  At
the same time, S&P removed S&P's ratings on the class B-1L and B-
2L notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive
implications on Nov. 8, 2010.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on
the class A-1LA and combo U notes.

The class combo U notes are fully backed by a U.S. treasury strip.

The upgrades primarily reflect the increase in credit support,
following the continued paydown of the class A-1LA and A-1L notes.
The current balance of the class A-1LA note is $57.8 million, down
from $130 million at the time of S&P's last rating action in
January 2010.  Additionally, the balance of the class A-1L note is
$64.2 million, down from $113 million, over the same time period.

Mainly as a result of the aforementioned paydowns there has been
an increase in all of the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since
S&P lowered some of S&P's note ratings on Jan. 15, 2010, following
the initial application of S&P's revised corporate CDO criteria.
According to the Dec. 7, 2010, trustee report the O/C ratios are:

  -- The senior class A O/C ratio was 137.69%, compared with a
     reported ratio of 119.5% in December 2009;

  -- The class A O/C ratio was 124.87%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 112.05% in December 2009;

  -- The class B-1L O/C ratio was 114.23%, compared with a
     reported ratio of 105.47% in December 2009; and

  -- The class B-2L O/C ratio was 111.01%, compared with a
     reported ratio of 103.4% in December 2009.

The transaction has also benefited from an improvement in credit
quality available to support the rated notes. As of the Dec. 7,
2010 trustee report, the transaction had $4.4 million in defaulted
assets.  This was down from $29.9 million noted in the Dec. 7,
2009 trustee report, which S&P referenced for its January 2010
rating actions.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Dryden VII-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-1LB         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-1L          AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-2L          AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
A-3F          AA+ (sf)    A (sf)
B-1L          A+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2L          BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

Dryden VII-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004
Class         Rating
A-1LA         AAA (sf)
U Combo       AAA (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer:              Dryden VII-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004
Co-Issuer:           Dryden VII-Leveraged Loan CDO 2004 Corp.
Collateral manager:  Prudential Investment Management
Underwriter:         Bear Stearns Cos. LLC (The)
Trustee:             Deutsche B


DRYDEN XI: S&P Augments & Affirms Ratings on 6 Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2A, A-3, B, C-1, C-2, and D notes issued by Dryden XI-Leveraged
Loan CDO 2006, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by Prudential Investment Management.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 and A-2B notes and
removed S&P's ratings on the class A-3, B, C-1, and C-2 notes from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Nov. 8, 2010.

The raised ratings reflect an improvement in credit quality
available to support the rated notes since S&P lowered all of
S&P's note ratings on Nov. 9, 2009, following the initial
application of S&P's revised corporate CDO criteria.  As of the
Jan. 5, 2011 trustee report, the transaction had $12.7 million in
defaulted assets.  This was down from $64.4 million noted in the
Oct. 5, 2009 trustee report, which S&P referenced for S&P's
November 2009 rating actions.  Furthermore, assets from obligors
rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at $30.3 million in
January 2011, compared with $54.3 million in October 2009.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported the following O/C ratios in the Jan. 5, 2011,
monthly report:

  -- The class A O/C ratio was 124.48%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 117.68% in October 2009;

  -- The class B O/C ratio was 115.18%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 108.99% in October 2009;The class C O/C ratio was
     108.74%, compared with a reported ratio of 102.95% in October
     2009; and

  -- The class D O/C ratio was 105.56%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 99.51% in October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2A          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
A-3           AA+ (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B             A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1           BBB (sf)     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2           BBB (sf)     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Dryden XI-Leveraged Loan CDO 2006

Class         Rating
A-1           AA+ (sf)


DRYDEN XVI: S&P Raises Ratings on Four Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, C, and D notes from Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Prudential Investment Management.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its rating on the class A-1 notes and removed S&P's ratings on the
class B, C, and D notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them
with positive implications on Nov. 8, 2010.

The upgrades reflect an improvement in credit quality available to
support the rated notes since S&P lowered all of S&P's ratings on
Jan. 11, 2010, following the initial application of S&P's revised
corporate CDO criteria.  As of the Dec. 10, 2010 trustee report,
the transaction had $9.4 million in defaulted assets, down from
$36.6 million noted in the Nov. 10, 2009 trustee report, which S&P
referenced for its January 2010 rating actions. Furthermore,
assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at
$25.3 million in December 2010, compared with $37.6 million in
November 2009.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Dec. 10, 2010,
monthly report:

  -- The class A O/C ratio was 124.42%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 118.25% in November 2009;

  -- The class B O/C ratio was 114.57%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 109.00% in November 2009;

  -- The class C O/C ratio was 110.21%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 104.84% in November 2009; and

  -- The class D O/C ratio was 105.87%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 100.63% in November 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           AA (sf)     AA- (sf)
B             A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB (sf)    BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB (sf)     B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed

Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
Class         Rating
A-1           AA+ (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer              Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006
Coissuer            Dryden XVI Leveraged Loan CDO 2006 Corp
Collateral manager  Prudential Investment Management
Underwriter         UBS Investment Bank
Trustee             Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type    Cash flow CLO


DUANE STREET: Moody's Raises Rating on $20 Mil. Notes to Caa3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of these notes
issued by Duane Street CLO IV, Ltd.:

  -- US$37,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 9, 2009 Downgraded
     to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$40,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$35,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$20,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$10,000,000 Class F Combination Notes Due 2021 (current
     Rated Balance of $8,510,774), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously
     on June 9, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in June 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated December 31,
2010, the weighted average rating factor is currently 2504
compared to 2772 in the May 2009 report, and securities rated
Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up approximately 6.7% of the underlying
portfolio versus 13.1% in May 2009.  Additionally, defaulted
securities total about $2 million of the underlying portfolio
compared to $44 million in May 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in May 2009.  The Class A,
Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 131.93%, 123.46%, 115.54%, 109.41% and
106.19%, respectively, versus May 2009 levels of 124.07%, 116.25%,
108.93%, 103.24% and 100.25%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's
also notes that the Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest
and that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $715 million, defaulted par of $8.2 million, a
weighted average default probability of 28.02%, a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 42.85%, and a diversity score of 60.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Duane Street CLO IV, Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


FIRST 2004-II: S&P Removes Notes Ratings on CreditWatch Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, and C notes issued by First 2004-II CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by TCW Asset Management Co.  At the same time, S&P removed S&P's
ratings on the class B and C notes from CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The upgrades reflect improved performance that has positively
affected the overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the
notes since S&P downgraded the notes in December 2009.  At the
time of S&P's last rating action, based on the trustee report
dated Oct. 5, 2009, the transaction was holding approximately
$27 million in defaulted obligations and more than $73 million
in underlying obligations from obligors with ratings in the 'CCC'
range.  Since that time, a number of defaulted obligors with loans
held in the portfolio emerged from the bankruptcy process, and
some received proceeds that were higher than their carrying value
in the O/C ratio test calculations.  As of Dec. 3, 2010 trustee
report, the transaction held approximately $3 million in defaulted
obligations and $35 million in 'CCC' range rated assets.  The
combination of reduced defaulted obligations and 'CCC' range rated
assets has benefited all of the transaction's O/C ratio tests.  As
of Dec. 3 2010, the class A O/C ratio was 128.65%, the class B O/C
ratio was 116.13%, and the class C O/C ratio was 109.06%, compared
with respective ratios of 122.30%, 110.39%, and 103.67% as of
Oct. 5, 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take Rating
Actions as S&P deems necessary.

Rating Actions

First 2004-II CLO Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A-1               AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
A-2               AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf
B                 A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                 BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Transaction Information

Issuer:             First 2004-II CLO Ltd.
Co-Issuer:          First 2004-II CLO Corp.
Collateral manager: TCW Asset Management Co.
Underwriter:        JPMorgan Securities Inc.
Indenture trustee:  The Bank of New York Mellon
Transaction type:   Cash flow CLO


FIRST INVESTORS: S&P Assigns Ratings on $150MM Automobile Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to First
Investors Auto Owner Trust 2011-1's $150 million automobile
receivables-backed notes.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   * The availability of approximately 36.3%, 31.5%, 24.9%, 20.0%,
     and 16.8% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E
     notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
     (including excess spread).  These credit support levels
     provide more than 3.75x, 3.25x, 2.50x, 1.90x, and 1.55x
     coverage of S&P's 9.00%-9.50% expected cumulative net loss
     range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   * The timely interest and principal payments made under
     stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate to
     the assigned ratings.

   * S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
     scenario, the ratings on the class A and B notes would not
     decline by more than one rating category, which is consistent
     with S&P's rating stability criteria, and the ratings on the
     class C and D notes would remain within the two-rating
     category outlined in S&P's rating stability criteria.

   * The collateral characteristics of the pool being securitized.

   * First Investors Financial Services Inc.'s 21-year history of
     originating and underwriting auto loans, 12-year history of
     servicing auto loans for itself and as a third-party servicer
     for other companies, and track record of securitizing auto
     loans since 2000.

   * Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s experience as the committed backup
     servicer.

   * The transaction's payment and legal structures.

Ratings Assigned
First Investors Auto Owner Trust 2011-1

Class       Rating          Type            Interest
Amount
                                            rate           (mil.
$)
A-1         A-1+ (sf)       Senior          Fixed
24.25
A-2         AAA (sf)        Senior          Fixed
85.75
B           AA (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed
8.75
C           A (sf)          Subordinate     Fixed
13.50
D           BBB (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed
11.75
E           BB (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed             6.00


FOXE BASIN: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of notes from Foxe Basin CLO 2003 Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation transaction managed by GSO Capital Partners L.P.
At the same time, S&P removed its ratings on the class A-2 and A-3
notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.  S&P also
affirmed its ratings on three additional classes of notes from the
same transaction.

The upgrades reflect improved performance S&P has observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio since its last rating action in
February 2010, as well as paydowns to the class A-1 note balance.

According to the December 2010 payment report, which S&P used
in its current analysis, the balance of defaulted obligations
in the transaction's asset portfolio was $11 million, down from
$17 million as of the January 2010 payment report (used as
reference for February 2010 analysis).  Similarly, there were
$11 million of 'CCC' rated obligations in the transaction
according to the December 2010 payment report, down from
$32 million as of the January 2010 payment report.

The transaction has also paid down approximately $123 million on
the class A-1 notes since S&P's last rating action.  The paydowns
included a $30 million payment in the Dec. 15, 2010 distribution,
which increased the overcollateralization available to support the
rated notes.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

              Ratings Raised And Creditwatch Actions

                     Foxe Basin CLO 2003 Ltd.

                             Rating
                             ------
           Class         To          From
           -----         --          ----
           A-2           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           A-3           AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
           B             BBB (sf)    BB+ (sf)

                         Ratings Affirmed

                     Foxe Basin CLO 2003 Ltd.

                      Class         Rating
                      -----         ------
                      A-1           AAA (sf)
                      C             CCC- (sf)
                      D             CCC- (sf)


FRANKLIN CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $13 Million Notes to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Franklin CLO V, Limited:

  -- US$21,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes due 2018, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on July 21,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf);

  -- US$13,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes due 2018, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the rating action in July 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
since the rating action in July 2009.  The Senior and Mezzanine
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 118.64% and 106.45%,
respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 111.49% and 100.19%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class E
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

The credit quality of the underlying portfolio has been stable
since the rating action in July 2009.  In particular, as of the
latest trustee report dated January 7, 2011, the weighted average
rating factor is currently 2461 compared to 2451 in the June 2009
report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower make up
approximately 3.6% of the underlying portfolio versus 4.7% in June
2009.  Additionally, the deal experienced a decrease in defaulted
securities.  Defaults now total about $9 million of the underlying
portfolio compared to $26 million in June 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par balance,
including principal proceeds, of $461 million, defaulted par of
$8.9 million, weighted average default probability of 24.76%, a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.9%, and a
diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Franklin CLO V, Limited, issued in May 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in rating Franklin CLO V, Limited,
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.


FRANKLIN CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Classes C, D, & E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
C, D, and E notes from Franklin CLO VI Ltd., a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction.  At the same
time, S&P removed its rating on the class C notes from CreditWatch
with positive implications.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on the
class A and B notes and removed S&P's rating on class B notes from
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The rating actions reflect the improvement in the transaction's
increased credit support as indicated by the higher
overcollateralization (O/C) levels reported by the trustee.
The class C, D, and E O/C ratios, which were failing in October
2009, have increased since the last rating action in November
2009.  All are currently above their minimum requirements.

The trustee calculated the class A/B, C, D, and E O/C ratios to be
118.91%, 112.17%, 107.11% and 103.67%, respectively, as of
December 2010.  The corresponding O/C ratios were 112.39%,
106.13%, 101.35%, and 97.94% in October 2009.  The failure of the
class C O/C ratio led to a paydown of the class A notes, which are
now at 96.17% of the original balance.

In addition, the transaction has a reinvestment test in the
interest proceeds section of the waterfall (after payment of class
E interest) that, when breached, diverts 60% of the available
interest to reinvestments and 40% to pay down the class E notes.
If the test continues to fail after the reinvestment period
expires in July 2013, 100% of the excess interest goes to pay down
the class E notes.  This test was also failing since October 2009
and as a result of paydowns, the class E note balance is currently
at 95.96%.   The December 2010 monthly report indicates that the
test is passing, but it failed during the November 2010 payment
report.

The transaction also benefited from lower defaults and an
improvement in the credit quality of the portfolio.  According
to the December 2010 monthly trustee report, the transaction has
$8.99 million in defaulted securities, down from $16.44 million
in October 2009.  Similarly, the trustee reports aggregate
'CCC' rated assets of $28 million in December 2010, down from
$49 million in October 2009.

The reduction in the 'CCC' rated assets improved the class D and E
supplemental test results, particularly the largest obligor
default test.  These supplemental tests reflect S&P's updated
criteria for corporate CDO transactions published on Sept. 17,
2009.

As a result of improved credit support due to the factors listed
above, S&P raised its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes.  S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class A and B note to reflect adequate
credit support at its current rating.  Standard & Poor's will
continue to monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take rating
actions, including CreditWatch placements, when appropriate.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Franklin CLO VI Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
B                 A+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                 BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                 BB+ (sf)    CCC- (sf)
E                 CCC+ (sf)   CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed
Franklin CLO VI Ltd.
Class             Rating
A                 AA+ (sf)


FRASER SULLIVAN: S&P Assigns Ratings on $350MM Floating-Rate Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Fraser Sullivan CLO V Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO V
Corp.'s $350.6 million floating-rate notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
securitization of a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans and a limited amount of senior
secured first-lien revolving loans, second-lien loans, and
unsecured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 28,
2011.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

  -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
     notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
     payable to the subordinated notes;

  -- The transaction's cash flow structure, as assessed by
     Standard & Poor's using the assumptions and methods outlined
     in its corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
     criteria, which can withstand the default rate projected by
     Standard & Poor's CDO Evaluator model;

  -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
     bankruptcy remote;

  -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
     primarily of speculative-grade senior secured term loans; the
     portfolio manager's experienced management team;

  -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments that S&P
     expects on the preliminary rated notes, assessed using S&P's
     cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the
     assigned preliminary ratings under various interest rate
     scenarios, including LIBOR rates ranging from 0.29% to 5.16%;
     and

  -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest coverage
     tests, a failure of which will lead to the diversion of
     interest and principal proceeds to reduce the balance of the
     rated notes outstanding.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Fraser Sullivan CLO V Ltd./Fraser Sullivan CLO V Corp.

Class                   Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1                     AAA (sf)             273.00
A-2                     AA (sf)               13.50
B (deferrable)          A (sf)                30.10
C (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              15.00
D (deferrable)          BB (sf)               19.00
E                       NR                     6.80
F                       NR                    13.20
EF                      NR                    30.00

NR -- Not rated.


GENESIS CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, D, and E notes from Genesis CLO 2007-2 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by LLCP
Advisors LLC.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class F notes.

The upgrades reflect the $239 million of note paydowns S&P has
observed since its last rating action in February 2010, the
analysis for which was based on the Dec. 1, 2009 trustee report.
The affirmation of the rating on the class F notes reflects the
availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
level.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization available to support the rated notes.  Based
on the Dec. 1, 2010 trustee report, which S&P used to complete its
analysis:

* The class A/B O/C ratio was 129.25%, compared with 119.67% in
  December 2009;

* The class C O/C ratio was 119.10%, compared with 112.26% in
  December 2009;

* The class D O/C ratio was 112.17%, compared with 107.05% in
  December 2009;

* The class E O/C ratio was 106.97%, compared with 102.84% in
  December 2009;

* The class F O/C ratio was 102.03%, compared with 98.70% in
  December 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                      Genesis CLO 2007-2 Ltd.


                              Rating
                              ------
         Class           To           From
         -----           --           ----
         A               AAA (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
         B               AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
         C               A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
         D               BBB (sf)     BB+ (sf)
         E               BB- (sf)     B- (sf)

                         Rating Affirmed

                      Genesis CLO 2007-2 Ltd.

                    Class           Rating
                    -----           ------
                    F               CCC- (sf)


GMAC COMMERCIAL: Moody's Holds Junk Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed six classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C2 as
follows:

  -- Cl. X, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on July 6, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
     Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
     Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on July 6, 1999
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on July 6, 2005
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on April 15, 2009
     Downgraded to C (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on March 30, 2007
     Downgraded to C (sf)

The upgrades are due to increased credit subordination levels
resulting from paydowns and amortization and overall stable pool
performance.  The pool has paid down 54% since Moody's prior
review.

Moody's affirmed six classes because the current credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings based on our current base expected
loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
6.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 6.6% Moody's stressed scenario loss is
12.3% of the current balance.  Due to the high level of credit
subordination, it is unlikely that investment grade classes would
be downgraded even if losses are higher than Moody's expected
base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the
world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions" published in April
2005, "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000, and "CMBS: Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease Backed Transactions" published in
October 1998.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit estimate of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit
enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are
selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other
concentrations and correlations within the pool.  Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit estimate
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit estimates in
the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 16 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's employs also the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0.  The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan
level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, property type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated
proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations and
correlations.

For deals that include a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.6 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to derive credit enhancement levels for CTL
component.  Under Moody's CTL approach, the rating of a
transaction's certificates is primarily based on the senior
unsecured debt rating of the tenant, usually an investment grade
rated company, leasing the real estate collateral supporting the
bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is the key factor in
determining the probability of default on the underlying lease.
The lease generally is "bondable", which means it is an absolute
net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust through a lock-
box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in full all
interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property should be
owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower, which
grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated April 15, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the January 18, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to
$118.1 million from $974.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 31% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 88% of the pool.  Seven loans,
representing 70% of the pool, are secured by credit tenant leases
(CTLs).  Six loans, representing 8% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by U.S. Government securities.  At last review
defeasance represented 21% of the pool balance.

Four loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $20.1 million.  Due to realized losses,
classes M and N have been eliminated entirely and class L has
experienced a 75% principal loss.  At Moody's prior review the
pool had experienced an aggregate $19.5 million realized loss.

One loan, representing 3% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing.  The loan is secured by a 147-unit multifamily property
located in Balch Springs, Texas.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in January 2009 and is now real estate owned.
Moody's has estimated a $1.9 million loss for this specially
serviced loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 and partial year 2010
operating results for 97% and 90% of the conduit pool,
respectively.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 59% compared to 98% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 15% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.9%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.36X and 2.06X, respectively, compared to
1.15X and 1.33X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the outstanding pool
balance. The largest loan is the Briarcliff Summit Apartments Loan
($7.1 million -- 6.0%), which is secured by a 201-unit apartment
complex located in Atlanta, Georgia. As of September 2009 the
property was 90% leased and had a reported DSCR of 0.86X.  The
loan matures in May 2011.  Moody's considers this loan to be a
high default risk because of poor performance and approaching
maturity and has identified it as a troubled loan.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 137% and 0.79X, respectively, compared to
143% and 0.76X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Bal Seal Engineering Loan, which is
secured by a 125,000 square foot industrial property located in
Foothill Ranch, California.  The property is 100% leased to Bal
Seal Engineering Company through January 2019.  Performance has
been stable.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 47% and 2.29X,
respectively, compared to 55% and 1.96X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Anchorage Business Park Loan, which
is secured by a 190,000 square feet retail center located in
anchorage, Alaska.  The property was 98% leased as of June 2010
compared to 97% at last review.  Performance has improved since
lat review due to higher revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 40% and 2.66X, respectively, compared to 47% and 2.25X at last
review.

The CTL component includes seven loans secured by properties
leased to six tenants under bondable leases.  The largest
exposures are Ingram Micro Inc., CarMax, and Costco Wholesale
Corporation.

Credits representing approximately 81% of the CTL exposure are
publicly rated by Moody's.  The bottom-dollar weighted average
rating factor for the CTL component has improved to 1,247 compared
to 1,439 at last review.  WARF is a measure of the overall quality
of a pool of diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure
of the default probability within the pool.


GMAC COMMERCIAL: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 13 2004-C1 Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities from GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.'s series 2004-C1.  S&P lowered
its ratings on seven of these classes to 'D (sf)' due to recurring
interest shortfalls that S&P expects to continue for the
foreseeable future.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on six
other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
its U.S. conduit and fusion CMBS criteria and also reflect
recurring interest shortfalls and credit support erosion that S&P
expects will occur upon the resolution of the assets currently
with the special servicer.  As of the Jan. 10, 2011, remittance
report, the trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling
$177,291 resulting from appraisal subordinate entitlement
deduction amounts associated with four loans, interest not
advanced on one loan, and special servicing fees.  Appraisal
reduction amounts totaling $32.0 million are in effect for these
five loans, which generated ASER amounts of $126,276.  The monthly
interest shortfalls affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class H.  The recurring interest shortfalls have also
reduced liquidity support available to the remaining pooled
classes.

The affirmations on classes A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-1A reflect
subordination levels and liquidity that are consistent with S&P's
outstanding ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the classes X-1
and X-2 interest-only (IO) certificates based on its current
criteria.

                      Credit Considerations

As of the January 2011 remittance report, five loans
($63.7 million, 11.5%) in the pool were with the special
servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.  The payment
status of the five specially serviced assets is: two are real
estate owned (REO; $7.3 million, 1.3); two are 90-plus days
delinquent ($51.3 million, 9.2%); and one is 30 days delinquent
($5.2 million, 0.9%).  Details of the five specially serviced
assets are:

The Fort Washington Executive Center loan ($44.2 million, 7.5%) is
the largest real estate exposure in the pool.  The loan is secured
by three office buildings totaling 393,067 sq. ft. built in 1988
in Fort Washington, Pa., which is 13 miles north of the
Philadelphia central business district.  The loan was transferred
to CWCapital on March 5, 2010, for imminent default, and the loan
is currently in foreclosure.  A $19.3 million ARA is in effect for
this loan.

The Farmer Jack Center loan ($7.2 million, 1.2%) is secured by a
110,908-sq.-ft. retail property built in 1964 in Mount Clemens,
Mich.  The loan was transferred to CWCapital on Oct. 23, 2009, due
to imminent default, and the loan is currently in foreclosure.  A
$5.7 million ARA is in effect for this loan.

The Casa De Topaz Apartments loan ($5.2 million, 1.3%) was
transferred to the special servicer due to imminent maturity
default on Jan. 8, 2010, and is currently in foreclosure.  The
140-unit multifamily property was built in 1995 in Casa Grande,
Ariz.  A $2.9 million ARA is in effect for this loan.

The Shoppes of Kissimmee ($5.0 million, 0.9%) became REO in June
2010 and comprises a 74,230-sq.-ft. retail property built in 1988
in Kissimmee, Fla.  A $3.4 million ARA is in effect for this
asset.

The Cave Creek Shopping Center ($2.3 million, 0.4%) became REO in
July 2010 and comprises a 21,595-sq.-ft. retail property built in
1978 in Phoenix.  A $641,432 ARA is in effect for this asset.

                        Transaction Summary

As of the January 2011 remittance report, the collateral pool had
an aggregate trust balance of $555.3 million, down from $721.4
million at issuance.  The pool includes 54 loans, down from 64 at
issuance.  The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage,
provided full-year 2009 or interim-2010 financial information for
89.5% of the nondefeased loans in the pool.  S&P calculated a
weighted average debt service coverage of 1.66x for the pool based
on the reported figures.  S&P's adjusted DSC and loan-to-value
ratios were 1.60x and 82.5%, respectively.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV figures exclude the transaction's eight defeased loans ($115.2
million, 20.8%) and five specially serviced loans.  S&P separately
estimated losses for the specially serviced loans.  The master
servicer reported a watchlist of 11 ($85.7 million, 15.4%) loans,
including two of the top 10 loan exposures, which S&P discuss
below.  Eight ($44.5 million, 8.0%) loans in the pool have a
reported DSC of less than 1.10x, and five ($25.4 million, 4.6%)
loans have a reported DSC of less than 1.00x.

                 Summary of Top 10 Loan Exposures

The top 10 exposures secured by real estate have an aggregate
outstanding trust balance of $228.7 million (41.2%).  Using
servicer-reported numbers, S&P calculated a weighted average DSC
of 1.75x for the top 10 real estate loans.  S&P's adjusted DSC and
LTV ratios for the top 10 loans are 1.68x and 74.9%, respectively.
The Fort Washington Executive Center loan, which S&P discuss
above, is the largest real estate exposure in the pool and is
currently with the special servicer.

The Columbus International Aircenter II loan is the third-largest
loan in the pool and the largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $27.9 million (5.0%) and is
secured by a 1.1 million-sq.-ft. office complex in Columbus, Ohio.
As of June 2010, reported DSC and occupancy were 1.08x and 94%,
respectively.  According to the master servicer, the loan appears
on their watchlist due to a low DSC.

The Wyndham Valley Forge loan is the seventh-largest loan in the
pool and the second-largest loan on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The loan has a balance of $17.1 million (3.1%) and is
secured by a 229-room lodging property in Wayne, Pa.  For the 12
months ended June 2010, reported DSC and occupancy were 0.99x and
62%, respectively.  According to the master servicer, the loan
appears on their watchlist due to low DSC.

Standard & Poor's analyzed the transaction according to its
current criteria.  The rating actions are consistent with S&P's
analysis.

      Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

               Rating
               ------
  Class    To          From                 Credit enhancement (%)
  -----    --          ----                 ----------------------
  B        AA-(sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg                17.30
  C        A- (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Neg                 15.84
  D        BBB- (sf)   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg                 13.07
  E        BB- (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Neg                  11.61
  F        B- (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg                9.34
  G        CCC- (sf)   BB (sf)/Watch Neg                  7.88
  H        D (sf)      BB- (sf)/Watch Neg                 5.93
  J        D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg                5.12
  K        D (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg                 4.31
  L        D (sf       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                3.49
  M        D (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                3.01
  N        D (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                2.52
  O        D (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg                2.03

                         Ratings Affirmed

             GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc.
    Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

             Class    Rating     Credit enhancement (%)
             -----    ------     ----------------------
             A-1A     AAA (sf)                    21.03
             A-2      AAA (sf)                    21.03
             A-3      AAA (sf)                    21.03
             A-4      AAA (sf)                    21.03
             X-1      AAA (sf)                      N/A
             X-2      AAA (sf)                      N/A

                      N/A -- Not applicable.


GSC PARTNERS: S&P Removes Rating on Class D Notes From CreditWatch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
D notes from GSC Partners CDO Fund VI Ltd. and removed it from
CreditWatch with positive implications.  GSC Partners CDO Fund VI
Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
closed in October 2005.  At the same time, S&P affirmed S&P's
ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, C-1, C-2, and composite notes.

The upgrade reflects the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last
rating action in March 2010.  The affirmations reflect the
sufficient credit available to support the notes at the current
rating levels.

According to the Dec. 23, 2010 trustee report, the transaction
held $22.9 million in defaulted assets and $61.9 million in
'CCC' rated assets.  This is down from $47.2 million defaulted
and $90.2 million in 'CCC' rated assets as of the Dec. 23, 2009
trustee report.  The transaction has also paid down the previously
accumulated deferred interest for classes C-1, C-2, and D.  These
interest deferrals were the result of failing class B and C
principle coverage tests.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Dec. 23, 2010 trustee
report:

   * The class A ratio was 139.73%, compared with a reported ratio
     of 127.15% in December 2009;

   * The class B ratio was 120.45%, compared with a reported ratio
     of 111.56% in December 2009;

   * The class C ratio was 114.88%, compared with a reported ratio
     of 106.81% in December 2009; and

   * The class D ratio was 106.90%, compared with a reported ratio
     of 99.86% in December 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take Rating
Actions as S&P deem necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

GSC Partners CDO Fund VI Ltd.
                        Rating
Class               To           From
D                   BB- (sf)     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Ratings Affirmed

GSC Partners CDO Fund VI Ltd.
Class                                 Rating
A-1                                   AAA (sf)
A-2                                   AAA (sf)
B                                     A (sf)
C-1                                   BBB (sf)
C-2                                   BBB (sf)
Composite                             BBB (sf)


GULF STREAM: S&P Raises & Affirms Ratings on Classes of Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes from Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Gulf
Stream Asset Management LLC.  S&P removed the ratings on the
class B and C notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1R, A-
1A, and A-1B notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the deal since S&P's last rating action in December 2009.  The
affirmations reflect the availability of sufficient credit support
at the current rating levels.

According to the Dec. 10, 2010 trustee report, the transaction
held $2.6 million in defaulted assets and $51.9 million in 'CCC'
rated assets, down from $21.3 million defaulted and $103.4 million
'CCC' assets as of the Oct. 9, 2009 trustee report.  The senior
overcollateralization ratio test for this deal rose to 121.31%
from 119.0% in October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take Rating
Actions as S&P deem necessary.

Rating Actions

Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
Class               To           From
B                   AA- (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                   A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   BBB(sf)      BB+

Ratings Affirmed

Gulf Stream - Sextant CLO 2007-1 Ltd.

Class                  Rating
A-1R                   AAA (sf)
A-1A                   AAA (sf)
A-1B                   AA+ (sf)


HALCYON LN: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1B, A-2, B, C, and D from Halcyon Ln Investors CLO I Ltd., a
cash flow collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by
Halcyon Loan Investors, and removed its ratings on the class A-1B
and A-2 notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.  S&P
also affirmed its rating on the class A-1A note and removed it
from CreditWatch positive.

According to the most recent Jan. 7, 2011, monthly report, the
trustee calculated $22.36 million of assets in the pool to be
rated 'CCC+' or below (excluding defaulted obligations).  This
amount was $51.32 million in the November 2009 trustee report
(which S&P used in its analysis when S&P downgraded the classes in
December 2009).

In addition, the trustee reported zero defaults in the January
2011 monthly report, compared with nearly $15 million of defaults
in the November 2009 trustee report.  The decline in the defaults,
and the trustee's application of a lower 'haircut' for
overcollateralization calculations (due to a reduced exposure to
lower rated assets), contributed to the increase in the O/C ratios
for all tranches.

The trustee calculated the class A, B, C, and D O/C ratios to be
124.2%, 116.8%, 110.9%, and 106.2%, respectively, as of January
2011.  The corresponding O/C ratios were 116.1%, 109.3%, 103.8%,
and 99.2%, respectively, in November 2009.  The class C and D O/C
ratios, which were failing in November 2009, were above their
minimum requirements as of December 2010.  The failure of the O/C
ratios in the past led to a paydown of the class A-1A note, which
is now at 97.26% of its original balance.

The reduction in the 'CCC' rated assets improved the result of
class D's largest obligor default test, which is part of the
supplemental tests that reflect S&P's updated criteria for
corporate collateralized debt obligation transactions published on
Sept. 17, 2009.

As a result of the factors listed above, S&P raised its ratings on
the class A-1B, A-2, B, C, and D notes.  S&P affirmed its rating
on the class A-1A note to reflect the class' adequate credit
support at its current rating.  Standard & Poor's will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, when appropriate.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                  Halcyon Ln Investors CLO I Ltd.

                               Rating
                               ------
         Class             To          From
         -----             --          ----
         A-1A              AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
         A-1B              AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
         A-2               AA- (sf)    A- (sf)/Watch Pos
         B                 A- (sf)     BBB (sf)
         C                 BBB (sf)    BB+ (sf)
         D                 BB (sf)     CCC+ (sf)


HALCYON LOAN: S&P Raises Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1-J, A-2, B, C, and D from Halcyon Loan Investors CLO II Ltd., a
cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by Halcyon Loan Investors, and removed S&P's ratings on the class
A-1-J and A-2 notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.
S&P also affirmed S&P's rating on the class A-1-S note and removed
it from CreditWatch positive.

As per the December 2010 monthly trustee report, the portfolio has
$27.2 million of 'CCC' rated collateral, which has decreased from
$58.53 million reported in the November 2009 trustee report (which
S&P used in its analysis when it downgraded the classes in
December 2009).  In addition, the trustee reported no defaults in
the December 2010 portfolio, compared with nearly $18 million in
defaulted assets in November 2009.

In addition to the improved credit quality and lower defaults, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios also increased since S&P's last
rating action, leading to more support to the tranches.

The trustee calculated the class A, B, C, and D O/C ratios to be
124.1%, 117.2%, 110.0%, and 105.5%, respectively, as of December
2010.  The corresponding O/C ratios were 117.2%, 110.7%, 103.9%,
and 99.4%, respectively, in November 2009.  The class C and D O/C
ratios, which were failing in November 2009, were above their
minimum requirements as of December 2010.  The failure of the O/C
ratios in the past led to a paydown of the class A-1-S notes,
which are now at 96.88% of the original balance.

The reduction in the 'CCC' rated assets improved the result of
class D's largest obligor default test, which is part of the
supplemental tests that reflect S&P's updated criteria for
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions
published on Sept. 17, 2009.

As a result of the factors listed above, S&P raised S&P's ratings
on the class A-1-J, A-2, B, C, and D notes.  S&P affirmed S&P's
rating on the class A-1-S note to reflect the class' adequate
credit support at its current rating.  Standard & Poor's will
continue to monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take
rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, when
appropriate.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Halcyon Loan Investors CLO II Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
A-1-S             AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1-J             AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2               AA- (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
B                 A- (sf)     BBB+ (sf)
C                 BBB (sf)    BB+ (sf)
D                 BB (sf)     CCC- (sf)


HALCYON STRUCTURED: S&P Affirms Ratings on Class A-1 & D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, and C notes from Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long
Secured/Short Unsecured 2007-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Halcyon Asset Management.
At the same time, S&P removed the ratings on the class A-2 and B
notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.  S&P also
affirmed its ratings on the class A-1 and D notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the deal since December 2009, when S&P lowered S&P's ratings on
the class A-2, B, and D notes following a review of the
transaction under S&P's updated criteria for rating corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  The affirmations on the
class A-1 and class D notes reflect the availability of credit
support at the current rating levels.

At the time of S&P's last rating action, based on the Oct. 30,
2009 trustee report, the transaction was holding approximately
$22.95 million in defaulted obligations and more than
$62.44 million in assets from obligors with ratings in the
'CCC' range.  Since that time, a number of defaulted obligors
whose assets are held in the deal emerged from bankruptcy, and
some received proceeds that were higher than their carrying value
in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratio test calculations.  This,
in combination with a reduction in the 'CCC' range rated assets to
$32.46 million (as reported in the Dec. 1, 2010 trustee report),
benefited all O/C ratio tests.  The class A/B O/C ratio increased
to 127.98% as of Dec. 1, 2010, up from 120.11% as of Oct. 30,
2009.  The class D O/C test increased to 111.75% from 104.87% in
the same period.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-1 Ltd.
                 Rating
Class       To           From
A-2         AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C           A+ (sf)      A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Halcyon Structured Asset Management Long Secured/Short Unsecured
2007-1 Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Lifts Rating on $16 Mil. Notes to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded these ratings of these
notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO V, Ltd.:

  -- US$50,000,000 Class A-R First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Revolving Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding
     balance of $44,477,435), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$255,500,000 Class A-T First Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Term Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding
     balance of $227,279,694), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);

  -- US$27,500,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
     on June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$15,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1
     (sf); previously on June 22, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$15,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to B2 (sf);
     previously on November 23, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$16,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding
     balance of $14,031,291), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in June
2009.  In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide
with reinvestment of sale proceeds into substitute assets with
higher par amounts and higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated January 5, 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2356 compared to
2408 in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or
lower make up approximately 7.0% of the underlying portfolio
versus 8.5% in June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities
total about $10.9 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$36.6 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in June 2009.  The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 118.0%, 112.2%, 106.9% and 102.6%, respectively,
versus June 2009 levels of 109.9%, 105.0%, 100.4% and 96.1%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  In particular, the Class A
overcollateralization ratio has benefited from the delevering
of the Class A Notes, which have been paid down by approximately
5.7% or $16.3 million since the rating action in June 2009.
In addition, the Class E overcollateralization ratio has
increased, in part, due to the diversion of excess interest to
delever the Class E Notes.  Since the rating action in June 2009,
$1.97 million of interest proceeds has been diverted to reduce the
outstanding balance of the Class E Notes by 12.3%.  Moody's also
notes that the Class D and Class E Notes are no longer deferring
interest and that all previously deferred interest has been paid
in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs,"
key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as
par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and
weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the
trustee's reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $345.7 million, defaulted par of
$17.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 25.8%,
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.87%, and a
diversity score of 60.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO V, Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.


HEWETT'S ISLAND: Moody's Lifts Rating on $17 Mil. Notes to Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded these ratings of the
following notes issued by Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd.:

  -- US$33,000,000 Class B Second Priority Senior Secured
     Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously
     on July 8, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$14,500,000 Class C Third Priority Senior Secured
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Baa3
     (sf); previously on July 8, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$11,000,000 Class D-1 Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba3
     (sf); previously on July 8, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US$3,000,000 Class D-2 Fourth Priority Mezzanine
     Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on July 8, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US$17,000,000 Class E Fifth Priority Mezzanine Deferrable
     Floating Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding balance of
     $15,794,536), Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in July
2009.  In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide
with reinvestment of sale proceeds into substitute assets with
higher par amounts and higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated January 5, 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2277 compared to
2403 in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or
lower make up approximately 4.2% of the underlying portfolio
versus 7.2% in June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities
total about $5.0 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$37.2 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 118.5%, 113.0%, 108.3% and 103.7%, respectively,
versus June 2009 levels of 113.1%, 108.3%, 103.9% and 99.4%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance.  In particular, the Class A
overcollateralization ratio has benefited from the delevering
of the Class A Notes, which have been paid down by approximately
3.7% or $15.3 million since the rating action in July 2009.
Moody's also notes that the Class D-1, Class D-2, and Class E
Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all previously
deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $364.2 million, defaulted par of $6.2 million,
a weighted average default probability of 24.6%, a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 43%, and a diversity score
of 65.  These default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.  The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily
on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.  In each
case, historical and market performance trends and collateral
manager latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Hewett's Island CLO IV, Ltd., issued in May 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.


HSI ASSET: Moody's Affirms Rating on Cl. M-1 Certificates at B2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of three classes
issued by HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-OPT1.
The collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-
lien adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-OPT1

  -- Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010
     Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. A-4, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 A2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- Cl. M-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan. 13, 2010 B2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Subprime RMBS
Loss Projection Update: February 2010" published in February 2010.
In addition, Moody's has updated pool loss estimates based on
collateral performance to date.  When calculating the rate of new
delinquencies, Moody's took into account loans that were
reclassified from delinquent to current due to modification in
order to not understate the rate of new delinquencies.  The
modified loans that are classified as current were added to the
reported delinquency levels in the pool to calculate the true rate
of new delinquencies.

To assess the rating implications, each individual pool was run
through a variety of scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation, the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street
Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural features of the transaction including priorities of
payment distribution among the different tranches, average life of
the tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash
flows under expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios
include ninety-six different combinations comprising of six loss
levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment curves.  The
volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to small
increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is taken into
consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization later in 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe


INDIANA HEALTH: Fitch Affirms Low-B Ratings on Two Revenue Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance effort, Fitch Ratings has
affirmed its ratings on these bonds issued by the Indiana Health
Facilities Financing Authority on behalf of The Methodist
Hospitals Inc.:

  -- $14,605,000 fixed-rate hospital revenue bonds, series 1996,
     at 'BB+';

  -- $60,550,000 fixed-rate hospital revenue bonds, series 2001,
     at 'BB+'.

The Rating Outlook is revised to Positive from Stable.

  -- The Outlook revision to Positive from Stable is supported by
     Methodist Hospital's (TMH) continued improvement in
     operational performance in fiscal 2009 and through the 10-
     month interim period ending Oct. 31, 2010, which has been
     driven primarily by successful cost containment and targeted
     revenue growth.

  -- The 'BB+' rating reflects TMH's inconsistent operating
     performance driven primarily by a difficult environment for
     medical staff development and a challenging economic
     environment.

  -- TMH's history of strong and consistent liquidity metrics is a
     positive rating factor and serves to mitigate the hospital's
     history of operational volatility.

  -- As one of 12 disproportionate share hospitals in
     Indiana, TMH is sensitive to any changes to funding at the
     state or federal level.

Sustained demonstration of recent operating performance and
profitability over the next nine to 12 months combined with
current liquidity metrics is likely to result in upward movement
in the rating.

The bonds are secured by a pledge of gross revenues of the
obligated group, and a debt service reserve fund.

The Outlook revision to Positive from Stable is supported by TMH's
improved operating profitability in fiscal year 2009 and through
the 10-month interim period ended Oct. 31, 2010.  Since 2008, TMH
has been undergoing a significant turnaround effort, which
continues to generate solid operating profitability.  After a 7.7%
operating loss in 2008, TMH generated a positive 0.6% operating
margin and 10.9% operating EBITDA margin in 2009.  For the 10
month period ending Oct. 31, 2010, TMH produced a 4.3% operating
margin and 12.8% operating EBITDA margin, including a $9 million
DSH payment.  However, TMH generated a 2.1% operating margin and a
9.6% operating EBITDA margin, exclusive of DSH, which compares
favorably to Fitch's 'BBB' rated medians of a 1.9% operating
margin and a 8.7% operating EBITDA margin.

Operating improvements have been driven by cost containment
measures and revenue cycle enhancement which has reduced days in
accounts receivable to a very low 25.4 in fiscal 2009.  Based on
interim results, management is projecting $1.3 million in income
from operations for fiscal year end 2010 which Fitch believes is
reasonable.  An upgrade to the 'BBB' rating category is contingent
upon continued operating performance levels through 2011 that are
comparable to 2010 interim results.

Improvements in operations in fiscal year 2010 have generated
adequate debt service coverage.  Fitch has calculated maximum
annual debt service at $11.3 million which includes approximately
$3 million in annual capital lease expense.  TMH covered MADS at
2.5 times (x) by EBITDA and 2.2x by operating EBITDA for the
interim period ending Oct. 31, 2010, which compares favorably to
the medians for the rating category of 2.5x and 2.4x,
respectively.

TMH's solid balance sheet metrics continue to be a key credit
strength providing financial flexibility that has allowed the
hospital to weather operational challenges in the past.  For the
10 month interim period ending Oct. 30, 2010, unrestricted cash
and investments totaled $143.5 million, which is up 8.5% over the
prior year.  TMH's days cash on hand of 213.1, cushion ratio of
12.7x,and cash to debt of 159.9% compares favorably to Fitch's
'BBB' medians of 122.2 DCOH, cushion ratio of 8.5x, and cash to
debt of 75.9%.  In addition, Fitch believes TMH's debt level is
manageable at 36% of capitalization in 2009 and there are no plans
for additional debt.

The primary credit risks include inconsistent operating
performance, which has been driven by historical instability in
medical staff levels, a challenging economic environment, and
reliance on state DSH revenues.  TMH's Northlake campus operates
in an economically weak service area, which continues to challenge
TMH with a high rate of Medicaid, self-pay and bad debt, which
results in a heavy reliance on DSH payments to support hospital
operations and make it very susceptible to changes in state or
federal reimbursement levels.  TMH received $42 million in DSH
revenues in 2009, and will receive $34 million for 2010.  While
DSH will phase-out as part of health reform starting in 2014, TMH
is pursuing ongoing eligibility for its Northlake campus.  Still,
the longer-term viability of the Indiana DSH program remains
uncertain, and presents a fundamental risk to the stability of
TMH's revenue base going forward.

TMH operates a 302-bed acute care facility in Gary, Indiana, and a
313-bed acute care facility in Merrillville, Indiana.  The
obligated group is comprised of Methodist Hospitals Inc.  Total
revenues for 2009 were $287.7 million. TMH covenants to disclose
audited financial statements within 150 days of fiscal year end.
Annual disclosure is posted to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board's EMMA system.  TMH does not covenant to disclose quarterly
statements -- which is viewed negatively -- however, management
has been very accessible, timely and thorough in its disclosure to
Fitch.


ING INVESTMENT: S&P Upgrades & Affirms Ratings on Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, C, and D notes from ING Investment Management CLO II Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by ING
Alternative Asset Management, and removed S&P's ratings on the A-
2, B, and C notes from CreditWatch with positive implications.  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A and
A-1R notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last
rating action in November 2009.  The affirmations of the ratings
on the class A-1A and A-1R notes reflect the availability of
sufficient credit support at the current rating level.

According to the Dec. 3, 2010 trustee report, the transaction
held $5.9 million in defaulted assets and $40.8 million in 'CCC'
rated assets, down from $25.5 million in defaulted assets and
$82.5 million in 'CCC' assets as of the Sept. 3, 2009 trustee
report.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
According to the Dec. 3, 2010 trustee report, which S&P used to
complete its analysis, the senior O/C ratio was 121.92%, compared
with a reported ratio of 116.71% in September 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

ING Investment Management CLO II Ltd.
                    Rating
Class           To           From
A-2             AAA (sf)     AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
B               AA (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C               A (sf)       BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D               BBB (sf)     CCC+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

ING Investment Management CLO II Ltd.
Class           Rating
A-1A            AAA (sf)
A-1R            AAA (sf)


LANDMARK III: S&P Removes Notes Ratings From CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1L, A-1LB, A-2L, A3-L, and B-1L notes from Landmark III CDO
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed
by Aladdin Capital Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed
S&P's ratings on the class A-1L, A-1LB, and A-2L notes from
CreditWatch, where S&P had placed them with positive implications
on Nov. 8, 2010.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on the class A-1LA
and B-2L notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction since S&P's last Rating Actions in December 2009
following a review of the transaction using S&P's updated criteria
for rating corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

According to the Dec. 7, 2010 trustee report, which S&P used for
S&P's current analysis, the transaction held $17.5 million in
defaulted assets, down from $28.5 million noted in the Oct. 7,
2009 trustee report, on which S&P based S&P's December 2009
downgrades.  In addition, assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC'
category comprised $22 million of the collateral pool in December
2010, compared with $42 million in October 2009.  The senior class
A overcollateralization test improved to 123.01% as of December
2010 from 118.65% as of October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review the ratings assigned to
the notes to assess whether they remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take Rating Actions as
S&P deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Landmark III CDO Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1L        AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1LB       AA+ (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L        AA- (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L        BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)
B-1L        CCC+ (sf)   CCC- (sf)


Ratings Affirmed

Landmark III CDO Ltd.
Class                   Rating
A-1LA                   AAA (sf)
B-2L                    CCC- (sf)


LANDMARK VI: S&P Raises Ratings on Classes B, C, D, & E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B, C, D, and E notes from Landmark VI CDO Ltd., a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by the Aladdin Capital
Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on
the class A notes and removed S&P's ratings on the class B and C
notes from CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive
implications on Nov. 8, 2010.

The upgrades reflect an improvement in credit quality available to
support the notes since S&P downgraded all of S&P's rated notes on
Nov. 17, 2009, following the application of S&P's revised
corporate CDO criteria.  As of the Nov. 30, 2010 trustee report,
the transaction had $13.4 million in defaulted assets, down from
$29.7 million noted in the Oct. 2, 2009, trustee report, which S&P
referenced for S&P's November 2009 Rating Actions.  Furthermore,
assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were reported at
$25.1 million in November 2010, compared with $51.9 million in
October 2009.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Nov. 30, 2010,
monthly report:

   * The class A/B O/C ratio was 122.99%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 116.14% in October 2009;

   * The class C O/C ratio was 113.24%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 107.46% in October 2009;

   * The class D O/C ratio was 106.57%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 101.22% in October 2009; and

   * The class E O/C ratio was 102.54%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 97.31% in October 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take Rating
Actions as S&P deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Landmark VI CDO Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             AA (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB- (sf)   B+ (sf)
E             CCC+ (sf)   CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

Landmark VI CDO Ltd.
Class         Rating
A             AA+ (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer              Landmark VI CDO Ltd.
Coissuer            Landmark VI CDO LLC
Collateral manager  Aladdin Capital Management LLC
Underwriter         Wachovia Capital Markets LLC
Trustee             Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction type    Cash flow CLO


MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Affirms Low-B Rating on 2 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed six classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1-CTL:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on Oct. 5, 1999
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. A-PO, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on Oct. 5, 1999
     Confirmed at Aaa

  -- Cl. IO, Affirmed at Aaa; previously on Oct. 5, 1999 Confirmed
     at Aaa

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on April 18, 2007 Upgraded
     to Aa1

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A3; previously on July 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to A3

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Ba2; previously on July 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at B3; previously on July 23, 2009 Downgraded
     to B3

The upgrade is due to increased credit subordination levels
resulting from paydowns and amortization.  The pool has paid down
13% since Moody's prior review.

Moody's affirmed six classes because the current credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings based on our current base expected
loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
13.4% of the current balance.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
16.7% of the current balance.  Due to the high level of credit
subordination and defeasance, it is unlikely that investment grade
classes would be downgraded even if losses are higher than Moody's
expected base.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most of the
world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate with
elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was: "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) Backed Transactions"
published in October 1998.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used its credit-tenant lease
financing rating methodology for single tenants.  Under Moody's
CTL approach, the rating of a transaction's certificates is
primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating of the tenant,
usually an investment grade rated company, leasing the real estate
collateral supporting the bonds.  This tenant's credit rating is
the key factor in determining the probability of default on the
underlying lease.  The lease generally is "bondable", which means
it is an absolute net lease, yielding fixed rent paid to the trust
through a lock-box, sufficient under all circumstances to pay in
full all interest and principal of the loan.  The leased property
should be owned by a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose borrower,
which grants a first lien mortgage and assignment of rents to the
securitization trust.  The dark value of the collateral, which
assumes the property is vacant or "dark", is then examined to
determine a recovery rate upon a loan's default.  Moody's also
considers the overall structure and legal integrity of the
transaction.

For deals that consist of a pool of credit tenant loans, Moody's
currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public
CDO rating model CDOROMv2.6 to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the ratings.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated July 23, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the January 16, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 46% to
$335.9 million from $630.4 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 91 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten non-
defeased loans representing 35% of the pool.  Eighty of the loans
are CTL loans secured by properties leased to 12 corporate
credits.  Eleven loans, representing 26% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.
At last review defeasance represented 25% of the pool balance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $22.7 million (49% loss severity on
average).  Due to realized losses, classes G,H, J and K have been
eliminated entirely and class F has experienced a 11% principal
loss.  At Moody's prior review the pool had experienced an
aggregate $10.8 million realized loss.

One loan, representing 1% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. Four loans, representing 5% of the pool, are currently
in special servicing.  All of the specially serviced loans are
secured by retail properties previously leased to Circuit City,
which declared bankruptcy in late 2008 and subsequently closed all
its stores.  Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of $11.6 million
for the specially serviced loans. Moody's expected loss is based
on the recent liquidation of four loans previously occupied by
Circuit City which experienced an average severity of 74%.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes K through
F have experienced cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$4.9 million.  Moody's anticipates that the pool will continue
to experience interest shortfalls because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans.  Interest shortfalls are caused by
special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees,
appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions, extraordinary trust
expenses and non-advancing by the master servicer based on a
determination of non-recoverability.

The pool's largest exposures are Rite Aid Corporation
($86.3 million -- 26% of the pool balance; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Caa3 -- stable outlook), Georgia Power Company
($54.5 million -- 16%; Moody's senior unsecured rating A3 --
stable outlook), Kroger Co. ($28.6 million -- 9%; Moody's senior
unsecured rating Baa2 -- stable outlook), and Circuit City
($22.6 million -- 7%) Approximately 73% of the pool, excluding
defeased loans, are publicly rated by Moody's.

The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor for this pool is
3,419 compared to 3,414 at last review.  WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits.  The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of the default probability within the pool.


MOMENTUM CAPITAL: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Four Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Momentum Capital Fund, Ltd.:

  -- US$22,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded
     to A3 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1
     (sf);

  -- US$15,950,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 2, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US$11,250,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
     2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010
     Placed under review for possible upgrade at Caa1 (sf);

  -- US$9,150,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
     Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on November 23, 2010 Placed
     under review for possible upgrade at Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in July 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated December 10, 2010, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2478 compared to 2689
in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 6.22% of the underlying portfolio versus
15.06% in June 2009.  Additionally, the portfolio no longer has
defaulted securities as compared to $12.7 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  The Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 118.56%, 112.09%, 107.93% and 104.77%, respectively,
versus June 2009 levels of 112.00%, 106.00%, 102.14% and 99.20%,
respectively, and all related overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class D and
Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest and that all
previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $328 million, defaulted par of $0 million, a
weighted average default probability of 26.01% (implying a WARF of
3500), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.34%,
and a diversity score of 62.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Momentum Capital Fund, Ltd., issued in September 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed a number of sensitivity analyses to test the impact
on all rated notes, including various default probabilities to
capture potential defaults in the underlying portfolio.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2800)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C: +2
  -- Class D: +1
  -- Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4200)

  -- Class A1: 0
  -- Class A2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Class E: -4
  -- Class E: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

2) The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability
   to deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing
   cushions against the covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the
   impact of assuming lower of reported and covenanted values for
   weighted average rating factor, weighted average spread,
   weighted average coupon, and diversity score.  However, as part
   of the base case, Moody's considered a weighted average rating
   factor lower than the covenant level due to the large
   difference between the reported and covenant levels.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Downgrades Rating on 2007-HE3 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of class A-2b
issued by Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE3.  The
collateral backing these deals primarily consists of first-lien
adjustable-rate subprime residential mortgages.  The current
balance of the class A-2b bond is approximately $68 million as of
January 2011.

                         Ratings Rationale

The action mainly reflects a correction to the rating of class A-
2b issued by Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE3.  In
previous rating action, the principal allocations for the group2
senior bonds of this transaction were incorrectly treated as
sequential in all circumstances.  According to the rules outlined
in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, however, principal
allocations to the group2 seniors after credit support depletion
date will be distributed pro-rata amount the four senior classes
(A-2a, A-2b, A-2c and A-2d).  Moody's rating has been adjusted to
reflect the pro-rata principal allocation to the group 2 seniors
after credit support depletion date, as described in the PSA.

In addition, Moody's has updated pool loss estimates based on
collateral performance to date.  When calculating the rate of new
delinquencies (as described on page 4 of the methodology
publication referenced above), Moody's took into account loans
that were reclassified from delinquent to current due to
modification in order to not understate the rate of new
delinquencies.  The modified loans that are classified as current
were added to the reported delinquency levels in the pool to
calculate the true rate of new delinquencies.

To assess the rating implications, each individual pool was run
through a variety of scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics.  This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural features of the transaction including priorities of
payment distribution among the different tranches, average life of
the tranches, current balances of the tranches and future cash
flows under expected and stressed scenarios.  The scenarios
include ninety-six different combinations comprising of six loss
levels, four loss timing curves and four prepayment curves.  The
volatility in losses experienced by a tranche due to small
increments in losses on the underlying mortgage pool is taken into
consideration when assigning ratings.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, in which unemployment remains at high
levels, and weakness persists in the housing market.  Overall,
Moody's assumes a further 5% decline in home prices with
stabilization later in 2011, accompanied by continued stress in
national employment levels through that timeframe.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE3

  -- Cl. A-2b, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010
     Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Junks Three Classes of Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded these ratings of two classes,
downgraded four classes and affirmed nine classes of Morgan
Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-TOP11:

  -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. X-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug. 20, 2003
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 2, 2007
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Confirmed at A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at A3 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Confirmed at A3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on March 10, 2005
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sept. 17, 2009
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sept. 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. M, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sept. 17, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The upgrades are due to the significant increase in subordination
due to loan payoffs and amortization and overall stable pool
performance.  The pool has paid down by 13% since Moody's last
review.  The downgrades are due to higher expected losses for the
pool resulting from realized and anticipated losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
3.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.8%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
4.7% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion Transactions", published in April 2005.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven by
property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 74 compared to 76 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated September 17, 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the January 13, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to
$755.8 million from $1.2 billion at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 156 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 27% of the pool.  The pool contains five loans with
investment grade credit estimates that represent 19% of the pool.
Twenty-one loans, representing 17% of the pool, have defeased and
are collateralized with U.S. Government securities.  Defeasance at
last review represented 14% of the pool.

Twenty-three loans, representing 9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.3 million.  At last review the pool
had experienced an aggregate $2.5 million loss.  Three loans,
representing 3% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $6.0 million loss for the
specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 5% of the pool and has estimated a
$11.0 million aggregate loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 99%
of the pool.  Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans,
Moody's weighted average LTV is 64% compared to 71% at Moody's
prior review.  Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income.  Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 9.6%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed DSCRs are 1.54X and 1.86X, respectively, compared to
1.73X and 1.69X at last review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Center Tower Loan,
which is secured by by a 462,000 square foot Class A office
building located in Costa Mesa, California.  The property was 82%
leased as of June 2010, similar to last review.  The largest
tenants are Latham & Watkins (24% of the net rentable area (NRA);
lease expiration July 2015), Sheppard Mullin Richter (14% of the
NRA; lease expiration April 2019) and Lewis, Bisbois, Bisgaar (12%
of the NRA; lease expiration July 2014).  Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.62X, respectively,
essentially the same as at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the 516 West 34th Street
Loan ($22.5 million -- 3.0%), which is secured by a 264,000 square
foot office building located in the Midtown Manhattan submarket of
New York City.  The property is 100% leased to two tenants: Coach
Inc. (91% of the NRA; lease expiration June 2015) and Forest
Electric (9% of the NRA; lease expiration June 2012).  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A1 and 1.84X,
respectively, compared to A1 and 1.88X at last review.

The third loan with a credit estimate is the Rexmere Village MHC
Loan ($19.5 million - 2.6%), which is secured by a 774-site
manufacturing housing community located in Davie, Florida.  The
property was 96% leased as of September 2010 compared to 94% at
last review.  The loan is interest-only for its entire 10-year
term.  Performance has improved due to increase in rental
revenues.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
Aa3 and 1.84X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 1.71X at last
review.

The fourth loan with a credit estimate is the ITT Gilfillan
Building Loan ($16.5 million -- 2.2%), which is secured by two
single-story industrial buildings totaling 278,000 square feet,
located in Van Nuys, California.  The buildings are 100% leased to
ITT Industries Inc. through January 2013.  The loan matures in
April 2013.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are
Aa3 and 2.22X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and 2.02X at last
review.

The fifth loan with a credit estimate is the 9401 Wilshire
Boulevard Loan ($14.0 million -- 1.9%), which is secured by a
130,000 square foot office building located in Beverly Hills,
California.  The property was 89% leased as of September 2010
compared to 98% at securitization. The largest tenant is Ervin,
Cohen & Jessup (29% of the NRA, lease expiration August 2017).
Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A2 and
1.81X, respectively, compared to A2 and 1.77X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 6% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Monterey Pines Apartments Loan
($16.8 million -- 2.2%), which is secured by a 286-unit garden
style apartment complex in San Jose, California.  The property was
97% leased as of June 2010 compared to 91% at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.38X, respectively,
compared to 77% and 1.33X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Crowne Point Corporate Center Loan
($50.9 million -- 3.2%), which is secured by a 129,000 square foot
office building located in Gaithersburg, Maryland.  The property
was 71% leased as of June 2010 compared to 98% at last review.
Property performance has declined as a result of the decline in
occupancy.  The loan matures in December 2012.  Moody's considers
this loan to have a high default probability due to its low
occupancy, soft market conditions and near-term maturity and has
identified it as a troubled loan.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 154% and 0.67X, respectively compared to 84% and 1.23X as at
last review.

The third largest loan is the Bisso Corporate Center Loan
($13.7 million -- 1.8%), which is secured by a 141,000 square foot
office building located in Concord, California.  The property was
75% leased as of December 2010 compared to 100% at last review.
The increase in vacancy is due to the Bank of the West vacating
25% of the NRA at its lease expiration in December 2010.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to
61% and 1.74X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Upgrades $12.1 Million Sr. Notes to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced a rating action on Morgan
Stanley ACES SPC 2008-3, a collateralized debt obligation
transaction.

The CSO, issued in 2008, references a portfolio of corporate
synthetic senior secured loans.

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ACES SPC Series 2008-3

  -- US$12.173 million U.S. $12,173,000 Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2012 (Ref No : r169j ) Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on March 17, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's rating action today is the result of the shortened time to
maturity of the CSO, the level of credit enhancement remaining in
the transaction and the stable credit profile of the portfolio,.

The 10-year weighted average rating factor of the portfolio is
3765, equivalent to a Caa1.  There are seven reference entities
with a negative outlook compared to six that are positive, and two
entities on watch for downgrade and two on watch for upgrade.

The portfolio has experienced eight credit events, six since the
last review in March of 2009.  The credit events are equivalent to
3.4 percent loss of the portfolio based on the portfolio notional
value at closing.  After accounting for losses due to credit
events, 6.6% of credit enhancement remains in the transaction.  In
addition, the portfolio is exposed to Gatehouse Media Operating
Inc and MXEnergy Capital Corp. neither of which were subject to a
credit event, but nonetheless are rated Ca.  The CSO has a
remaining life of 1.4 years.

Moody's rating action today factors in a number of sensitivity
analyses and stress scenarios, discussed below.  Results are given
in terms of the number of notches' difference versus the base
case, where higher notches correspond to lower expected losses,
and vice-versa:

  -- Moody's reviews a scenario consisting of reducing the
     maturity of the CSO by 6 months, keeping all other things
     equal.  The result of this run is approximately two notches
     higher than the base case.

  -- Moody's performs a stress analysis consisting of defaulting
     all entities rated Caa1 and below.  The result of this run is
     six notches lower than in the base case.

  -- Moody's conducts a sensitivity analysis consisting of
     notching down by one the ratings of reference entities in the
     Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sector which comprises
     approximately 10% of the portfolio.  The result from this run
     is comparable to the one modeled under the base case.

  -- Removing the notch-down adjustment on ratings of all
     reference entities on negative outlook and on watch for
     downgrade generates a result that is comparable to the base
     Case.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009.

Moody's analysis for this transaction is based on CDOROM v2.8.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moody's analysis of CSOs is subject to uncertainties, the primary
sources of which include complexity, governance and leverage.
Although the CDOROM model captures many of the dynamics of the
Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over
time in default rates for instruments with a given rating,
(b) variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions of legal experts at
the time of issuance, is still subject to potential changes in
law, case law and the interpretations of courts and regulatory
authorities.  The performance of this CSO is also dependent on on-
going decisions made by one or several parties, including the
Manager and the Trustee.  Although the impact of these decisions
is mitigated by structural constraints, anticipating the quality
of these decisions necessarily introduces some level of
uncertainty in our assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility.  All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner liabilities.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario in
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomics conditions evolve
towards a more severe scenario, such as a double dip recession,
the CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent that depends
on the expected severity of the worsening conditions.


NEWCASTLE CDO: Moody's Junks Three Classes of Floating Rate Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has affirmed one and downgraded seven classes of Notes
issued by Newcastle CDO IV, Ltd., due to the deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio as evidenced by an
increase in the weighted average rating factor, and a decrease in
weighted average recovery rate.  The rating action is the result
of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transactions.

  -- Class I-MM Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed at Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- Class II-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to B2
     (sf); previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Class II-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to B2
     (sf); previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- Class III-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to
     Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Class III-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to Caa2
    (sf); previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Class IV-FL Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca
     (sf); previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Class IV-FX Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to Ca
     (sf); previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- Class V Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Downgraded to C (sf);
     previously on Feb. 24, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Newcastle CDO IV, Ltd., is a CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (46.2%),
REIT debt (24.9%), CMBS rake-bonds (15.8%), residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS) (10.5%), small business loans (1.5%), and
real estate bank loans (1.1%).  As of the December 17, 2010
Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of the transaction has
decreased to $352.9 million from $446.1 million at issuance, with
the paydown directed to the Class I Notes. The paydowns are a
result of the failure of the Class I, Class II, Class II, and
Class IV Par Value Tests.  Per the Trust Deed dated March 30,
2004, upon the failure of any Par Value Test, all scheduled
interest and principal payments are directed to pay down the most
senior notes, until the failed Par Value Test is satisfied.
Additionally, there is currently approximately $4.8 million in
accrued interest proceeds to Class II, Class III, Class IV, and
Class V.

Fifteen assets with a par balance of $45.4 million were reported
as Defaulted Securities as of the December 17, 2010 Trustee
report.  Four of these assets are REIT debt, five assets (26.5%)
are RMBS, three assets (25.6%) are CMBS, and three assets (16.1%)
are CMBS rake-bonds.  While there have been no realized losses to
date, Moody's does expect significant losses to occur once they
are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: WARF, weighted
average life, weighted average recovery rate, and Moody's asset
correlation.  These parameters are typically modeled as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
We have completed updated credit estimates for the non-Moody's
rated securities.  The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the
default probability within a collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a
bottom-dollar WARF excluding defaulted securities, of 2,009
compared to 1,186 at last review.  The distribution of current
ratings and credit estimates is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (3.6% compared
to 8.1% at last review), A1-A3 (6.4% compared to 8.9% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (35.8% compared to 39.0% at last review), Ba1-
Ba3 (27.3% compared to 37.1% at last review), B1-B3 (9.4% compared
to 1.3% at last review), and Caa1-C (17.6% compared to 5.5% at
last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the securities in
the pool for time.  Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.2 years compared
to 3.6 years at last review.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool.  Moody's modeled a fixed WARR
of 23.0% compared to 28.1% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool.  Moody's modeled a MAC of 10.6%
compared to 20.2% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.6, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on May 27, 2010.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2, was used to analyze the cash
flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes.  However,
in many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in
certain stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameters.  Rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions.  Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 23.0% to 13.0% or up to 33.0% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 1 notches downward
and 0 to 3 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations.  Performance that falls outside the given
range may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related
securities ratings were issued.  Even so, a deviation from the
expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor
does performance within expectations preclude such actions.  The
decision to take a rating action is dependent on an assessment of
a range of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.  Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the
current stressed macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness
in the commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's
currently views the commercial real estate market as stressed with
further performance declines expected in a majority of property
sectors.  The availability of debt capital is improving with terms
returning towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price
stability will be necessary precursors to commercial real estate
recovery.  Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-
shaped" for 2010 and 2011; Moody's expects overall a sluggish
recovery in most of the world's largest economies, returning to
trend growth rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent
unemployment levels.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Static CDOs Backed by Commercial Real
Estate Securities" published in June 2004, and "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in November 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


OLYMPIC CLO: Class Notes Paydown Cues S&P to Raise Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1L, A-1Lb, A-2L, A-3L, and B-1L notes from Olympic CLO I Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
Churchill Pacific Asset Management LLC.  S&P removed S&P's ratings
on the class A-1L, A-1Lb, and A-2L ratings from CreditWatch with
positive implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings
on the class A-1La, B-2L, and U notes.

The upgrades reflect improved performance S&P has observed in the
deal's underlying asset portfolio and significant paydown of the
class A notes since S&P's last rating action in February 2010.
The affirmation reflects the availability of credit support at the
current rating level.  The 'AAA (sf)' rated class U notes are
fully backed by U.S. Treasury principal strips.

According to the Dec. 6, 2010, trustee report, the transaction
currently holds $7.8 million in 'CCC' rated assets, down from
$18.7 million noted in the Jan. 6, 2010, trustee report.  In
addition, the transaction holds $7.1 million in defaulted
securities, down from $23.1 million in January 2010.  The deal
has paid down $94.43 million to the class A-1La and A-1L
notes since January 2010.  Accordingly, the transaction's
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have improved.  The class A
O/C ratio is 119.30% versus 109.24% in January 2010, the class B-
1L O/C ratio is 107.36% versus 102.53%, and the class B-2L O/C
ratio is 103.88% versus 98.64%.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in S&P's view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take Rating
Actions as S&P deem necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Olympic CLO I Ltd.
    Rating
Class       To          From
A-1Lb       AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-1L        AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2L        AA+ (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
A-3L        A+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)
B-1L        B- (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Ratings affirmed

Olympic CLO I Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1La       AAA (sf)
B-2L        CCC- (sf)
U           AAA (sf)


OVERLAND PARK: Fitch Lowers Rating on $66.2 Mil. Bonds to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings took this rating action on Overland Park Development
Corporation, Kansas as part of its continuous surveillance effort:

  -- $66.2 million outstanding second tier refunding revenue
     bonds, series 2007B downgraded to 'BB' from 'BBB+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


PACIFIC BAY: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on five classes of notes
issued by Pacific Bay CDO Ltd./Inc.  The rating actions are:

  -- $71,327,073 class A-1 notes at 'AAsf/LS4', Outlook Negative;
  -- $64,000,000 class A-2 notes at 'Dsf';
  -- $36,000,000 class B notes at 'Dsf';
  -- $7,137,755 class C notes at 'Csf';
  -- $17,000,000 preference shares at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model for projecting
future default levels for the underlying portfolio.  These default
levels were then compared to the breakeven levels generated by
Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various default timing
and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in the report
'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also
considered additional qualitative factors into its analysis, as
described below, to conclude the rating affirmations for the rated
notes.

The transaction entered an Event of Default in December 2008 and
subsequently, the majority holders of the senior class voted to
accelerate the maturity of the transaction.  Therefore, since the
May 2009 payment date all interest and principal proceeds have
been used to pay the class A-1 interest and principal and will
continue to do so until the notes are paid in full.

Since the last rating action in January 2010, the credit quality
of the collateral has declined with approximately 45.7% of the
portfolio downgraded on average 2.4 notches.  Approximately 58.7%
of the portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below investment grade
and 39.2% has a rating in the 'CCC' rating category or lower,
compared to 48.8% and 36.4%, respectively, at last review.

The affirmation of the class A-1 notes is attributed to the
increase in credit enhancement level available to the notes
resulting from principal amortizations and the application of
interest proceeds to pay down class A-1 notes' balance.  Since
Fitch's last review, approximately 6.5%, or $20.4 million, of the
senior notes' balance amortized down thereby offsetting the effect
of the collateral deterioration.  Presently the class A-1 notes
represent 36.5% of the capital structure and have a CE of 64.6%.
Fitch maintains the Negative Outlook on the notes due to concerns
over future performance of the underlying collateral with 37.6% of
the portfolio presently on Rating Watch Negative.

The Loss Severity rating of 'LS4' for the class A-1 notes
indicates the tranches' potential loss severity given default, as
evidenced by the ratio of tranche size to the base-case loss
expectation for the collateral, as explained in Fitch's 'Criteria
for Structured Finance Loss Severity Ratings'.  The LS rating
should always be considered in conjunction with the notes' long-
term credit rating.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings to tranches
rated 'CCC' and below.

As a result of the acceleration of maturity, class A-2 and B notes
have missed their interest payments since acceleration in May
2009.  These non-deferrable classes have defaulted on the payment
of interest.  Therefore, these classes remain at 'Dsf'.  Fitch
expects the class A-2 notes to recover at least a portion, if not
all, of the missed interest payments by the stated maturity of the
transaction.

The class C notes and the preference shares are no longer
receiving interest distributions and are not expected to receive
any proceeds going forward.  Fitch believes that default is
inevitable for these classes at or prior to maturity due to the
concentration of distressed collateral.  Therefore, these classes
have been affirmed at 'Csf'.

Pacific Bay is a cash flow structured finance collateralized debt
obligation that closed on Nov. 4, 2003.  The portfolio is
monitored by Pacific Investment Management Company LLC. and is
composed of 73.8% residential mortgage-backed securities, 9.8%
asset-backed securities, 9.8% corporate bonds, 6.5% commercial
mortgage-backed securities, and 0.1% CDOs, from 1999 through 2005
vintage transactions.


REAL ESTATE: Moody's Affirms Junk Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed these ratings of 18 classes of
Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on April 20, 2005
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded  to Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on March 4, 2010
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.0% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 2.1%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 6%
of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan payoffs
and the severity and timing of losses from specially serviced
loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade classes
could decline below the current levels.  If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating and monitoring this
transaction is "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" dated
May 26, 2000 and "CMBS: Moody's Approach to Surveillance of Large
Loan Transactions", dated March 8, 2005, which can be found at
www.moodys.com.  Other methodologies and factors that may have
been considered in the process of rating this issue can also be
found in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions and CMBS Large Loan Model v 8.0.  Conduit model
results at the Aa2 level are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade.
Conduit model results at the B2 level are driven by a paydown
analysis based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio.
Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level
diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level diversity and
has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other concentrations
and correlations may be considered in our analysis.  Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2, the
remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between these
two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio of
either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 15 compared to 19 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology.  This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.0 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship.  These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated March 4, 2010.

As of the January 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 43.3% to
$197 million from $347.5 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 40 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 64% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans with
investment grade credit estimates that represent 22% of the pool.
Three loans, representing 6% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with Canadian Government securities.

Three loans, representing 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization.  There
are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 4% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.6 million aggregate loss (20% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 60%
of the pool.  Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 71% compared to 83% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.52X and 1.48X, respectively, compared to 1.33X and 1.28X at last
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Bayfield Mall Loan
($26.3 million -- 13.4%), which is secured by a 443,351 square
foot anchored community shopping center located in Barrie,
Ontario.  The loan amortizes on a 25-year schedule.  Performance
has been stable.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed
DSCR are Baa2 and 1.44X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.47X
at last review.

The second loan with a credit estimate is the Desjardins Visa
Building Loan ($17.6 million -- 9%), which is secured by a 201,583
square foot office building located in Montreal, Quebec.  Moody's
current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.58X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.24X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22.6% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 33 Isabella Street Loan, which
is secured by a 416 unit multifamily property located in Toronto,
Ontario.  The property was 97% leased as of May 2010 compared to
99% at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and
0.97X, respectively, compared to 91% and 0.92X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Fernbrae Manor Loan ($11.1 million
-- 5.6%), which is secured by a 186 unit private retirement
residence located in Kelowna, British Columbia.  The property was
94% leased as of May 2010 compared to 100% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.07X, respectively,
compared to 113% and 0.82X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Observatory Place Loan ($9.1 million
-- 4.6%), which is secured by a 86,915 square foot office and
retail property located in Richmond Hill, Ontario.  The property
was 98% leased as of December 2009 compared to 100% at last
review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.35X at last review.


REAL ESTATE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class L Cert. to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded these ratings of two classes
and affirmed 16 classes of Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-1, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D-2, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. E-2, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on April 26, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The downgrades are due to expected losses for the pool resulting
from anticipated losses from troubled loans.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based
on our current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.5% of the current balance.  At last review, Moody's cumulative
base expected loss was 1.2%.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is
5.3% of the current balance.  Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels.  If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating and monitoring this
transaction is "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" dated
May 26, 2000, which can be found at www.moodys.com.  Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issue can also be found in the Credit
Policy & Methodologies directory.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated February 11, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

As of the January 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 7.5% to $475.6
million from $514 million at securitization.  The Certificates are
collateralized by 76 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 51% of
the pool.  The pool contains three loans with investment grade
credit estimates that represent 20% of the pool.  One loan,
representing 0.4% of the pool, has defeased and is collateralized
with Canadian Government securities.

Four loans, representing 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization. There
are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 63%
of the pool.  Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 85% compared to 89% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.43X and 1.28X, respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.21X at last
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow and
the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26 compared to 27 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Langley Power
Centre Loan, which is secured by 228,314 square foot anchored
retail center located in Langley, British Columbia.  The loan
amortizes on a 30-year schedule. Performance has been stable.  The
loan is 100% recourse to RioCan Real Estate Investment Trust.
Moody's current credit estimate is Baa2, same at last review.

The other two loans with credit estimate ratings represent 12% of
the pool.  The Atrium Pooled Interest A-Note is secured by a
1,050,196 square foot office/retail complex located in Toronto,
Ontario.  Moody's current credit estimate and stressed DSCR are A2
and 1.62X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.44X at last review.
The PDC Senior Interest A-Note is secured by a 164,774 square foot
office property located in Verdun, Quebec.  Moody's current credit
estimate Baa3 and 1.43 X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.31X
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 19.6% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Conundrum Portfolio Loan, which
is secured by a 588,650 square foot mixed-use portfolio consisting
of nine industrial properties, five unanchored-retail properties
and one office property located in five cities in Ontario.  The
portfolio was 86% leased as of December 2009 compared to 97% at
last review.  Despite the decline in occupancy, performance has
increased due to increased revenues.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 100% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 110% and 0.89X
at last review.

The second largest loan is the Mississauga Office Loan
($30.1 million -- 6.3%), which is secured by a four office
properties totaling 225,123 square feet located in Mississauga,
Ontario.  The portfolio was 95% leased as of March 2010, similar
at last review.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 94% and 1.04X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Sundance Pooled Interest Loan
($26 million -- 5.5%), which is secured by a 179,619 square foot
office building located in Calgary, Alberta.  The property was
100% leased as of April 2010, similar at last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.02X, respectively, compared to
111% and 0.86X at last review.


RIVERBANK REDEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers Tax Bond Rating to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'CCC'
from 'BB-', and revised its outlook to negative from stable on
Riverbank Redevelopment Agency, Calif.'s series 2007A (non-
housing) and series 2007B (housing) tax allocation bonds.  The
rating action reflects S&P's view of the agency's lowered debt
service coverage and limited availability of available cash to
meet annual debt service obligations beyond fiscal 2012, even with
the use of the bond's debt service reserve fund.  The outlook is
negative.

In particular, the rating action reflects S&P's view of the
project area's:

  -- Severely depressed property market, particularly in
     Riverbank's residential sector, which constitutes 70% of the
     project area;

  -- Three consecutive years of assessed value (AV) declines that,
     due to a high volatility ratio (base-year to total AV),
     resulted in a 74% decline in tax increment revenue; and

  -- Debt service coverage ratio of 0.29x projected for fiscal
     2011, which necessitated drawing on the agency's cash
     reserves.

"Beyond 2011 and 2012, unless substantial assessed value
appreciation occurs, or the agency is able to receive funds from
other sources, we project that the agency will not have funds to
meet debt service payments," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Alda Mostofi.

The agency had an estimated $718,000 of available cash at the end
of fiscal 2010, which the agency has stated is available to cover
the shortfall in debt service coverage the agency projects for
fiscal 2011  Also, a cash-funded debt service reserve fund equal
to maximum annual debt service (MADS) remains intact and is held
with the trustee.


SCHOONER TRUSTE: Moody's Holds Low-B Ratings on 6 Cl. of Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 14 classes of
Schooner Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-5 as follows:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Feb. 28, 2006
     Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base expected loss, the
credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient
to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
1.2% of the current balance, the same as at last review.  Moody's
stressed scenario loss is 6.1% of the current balance.  Depending
on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of
losses from specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level
for investment grade classes could decline below the current
levels.  If future performance materially declines, the expected
level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow
waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of these
classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms.  Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in rating and monitoring this
transaction is "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" dated
May 26, 2000, which can be found at www.moodys.com.  Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issue can also be found in the Credit
Policy & Methodologies directory.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit, ratings and methodologies in "Structured Finance
Quick Check," available without charge at
www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck."

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result.  Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors.  Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions.
Moody's monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets
of quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM Metrics) on Trepp -- and on
a periodic basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior
full review is summarized in a press release dated March 31, 2010.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer / entity page on
moodys.com for the last rating action and the ratings history.

As of the January 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 12.6% to
$423.2 million from $486.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 84 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 39% of the pool.  The pool contains two loans with
investment grade credit estimates that represent 9% of the pool.
Three loans, representing 5% of the pool, have defeased and are
collateralized with Canadian Government securities.

Four loans, representing 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not realized any losses since securitization. There
are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 76%
of the pool. Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 80% compared to 85% at Moody's prior review.  Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.5X and 1.31X, respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.23X at last
review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the
loan balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 43 compared to 46 at Moody's prior review.

The largest loan with a credit estimate is the Briton House Loan
($27.5 million -- 6.5%), which is secured by a 220 unit retirement
home located in Toronto, Ontario.  The loan amortizes on a 25-year
schedule. Performance has been stable.  Moody's current credit
estimate and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.52X, respectively,
compared to Baa2 and 1.49X at last review.

The other loan with a credit estimate rating represents 3% of the
pool.  The Greenwood Beach Retail Centre loan ($12.4 million) is
secured by three retail properties (totaling 105,148 square feet)
located in Toronto, Ontario.  Moody's current credit estimate and
stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.75X, respectively, compared to Baa2
and 1.57X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12.3% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the Lindsay Square loan, which is
secured by 193,933 square foot anchored retail mall located in
Lindsay, Ontario.  The property was 96% leased as of December 2009
compared to 90% at securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 83% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.11X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the 380 & 400 Waterloo Avenue loan
($17.2 million -- 4.1%), which is secured by 262 unit multifamily
property located in Guelph, Ontario.  The property was 100% leased
as of September 2009 compared to 97% at last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 95% and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 93%
and 0.90X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Springdale Square loan
($16.2 million -- 3.8%), which is secured by a 105,453 square
foot anchored retail property located in Brampton, Ontario.  The
property was 100% leased as of March 2010 similar at last review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 0.99X, respectively,
compared to 94% and 0.97X at last review.


SCHOONER TRUST: Moody's Holds Junks Ratings on 2 Classes of Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed these ratings of 14 classes of
Schooner Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-7:

  -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XP, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. XC, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- Cl. E, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- Cl. F, Affirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- Cl. G, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- Cl. H, Affirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2007
     Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- Cl. J, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- Cl. K, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- Cl. L, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct. 22, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges.  Based on our current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.2% of the current pooled balance, which is the same as at last
review.  Moody's stressed scenario loss is 8.9% of the current
pooled balance.  Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the
severity and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the
credit enhancement level for investment grade classes could
decline below the current levels.  If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings of these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term.  From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review.  Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action.  There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macroeconomic environment and continuing weakness in the
commercial real estate and lending markets.  Moody's currently
views the commercial real estate market as stressed with further
performance declines expected in the industrial, office, and
retail sectors.  Hotel performance has begun to rebound, albeit
off a very weak base.  Multifamily has also begun to rebound
reflecting an improved supply / demand relationship.  The
availability of debt capital is improving with terms returning
towards market norms. Job growth and housing price stability will
be necessary precursors to commercial real estate recovery.
Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains "hook-shaped" for
2010 and 2011; Moody's expect overall a sluggish recovery in most
of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth rate
with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published May 26, 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.50 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions.  Conduit model results at the Aa2 level are driven
by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's
property quality grade.  Conduit model results at the B2 level are
driven by a paydown analysis based on the individual loan level
Moody's LTV ratio.  Moody's Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of
loan level diversity, is a primary determinant of pool level
diversity and has a greater impact on senior certificates.  Other
concentrations and correlations may be considered in our analysis.
Based on the model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 and B2,
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points.  For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit estimates is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
underlying rating of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels.  Actual fusion credit enhancement
levels are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage
and other concentrations and correlations within the pool.
Negative pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying
rating level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit
estimates in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 28 compared to 31 at Moody's prior full review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions.  Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST and CMM on Trepp -- and on a periodic
basis through a comprehensive review.  Moody's prior full review
is summarized in a press release dated October 22, 2009.

As of the January 12, 2011 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 10.3% to
$383.5 million from $427.6 million at securitization.  The
Certificates are collateralized by 70 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 10.3% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing 43% of the pool.  The pool does not contain any
loans with investment grade credit estimates.  One loan,
representing less than 1% of the pool, has defeased and is
collateralized with Canadian Government securities.

Thirteen loans, representing 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council monthly reporting package.  As part of our ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization.
There is currently one loan in special servicing.  The specially
serviced loan represents less than 1% of the pool.  The servicer
has not recognized an appraisal reduction and Moody's has not
estimated a loss for the specially serviced loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.8 million loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2009 operating results for 82%
of the pool.  Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 84% compared to 94% at last full review.  Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income.  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.50X and 1.24X, respectively, as compared to 1.36X and 1.10X at
last full review.  Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow and the loan's actual debt service.  Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the MTS Building Loan, which is
secured by two adjacent office buildings located in Winnipeg,
Manitoba.  One of the two buildings serves as MTS Allstream's
corporate headquarters.  MTS is the largest telecommunications
company in Manitoba and the 4th largest company in Canada.  MTS
occupies 89% of the net rentable area via a lease that runs
through December 2021.  The property is 100% leased, which is the
same as last review and at securitization.  Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 98% and .97X, respectively, compared to 115% and
0.84X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Aviva Insurance Complex Loan, which
is secured by a 438,000 square foot mixed-use commercial complex
located in Toronto, Ontario.  The property was 99% leased as of
March 2010 compared to 80% at last review.  Performance has
improved since last review primarily because of the increase in
occupancy.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 95% and 1.03X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Festival Marketplace Loan, which is
secured by a 208,000 square foot enclosed community shopping
center located in Stratford, Ontario.  The property was 97% leased
as of November 2010 compared to 96% at last review.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 98%
and .97X at last review.


SHINNECOCK CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on $7.5 Mil. Notes to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Shinnecock CLO 2006-1, Ltd.:

  -- US $22,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded
     to A1 (sf);

  -- US $24,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
     Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa2 (sf);

  -- US $14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 28,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf);

  -- US $12,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 28,
     2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf);

  -- US $7,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
     Due 2018, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov. 23, 2010
     Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the overcollateralization ratios of
the notes since the last action in May 2009.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In
particular, as of the latest trustee report dated January 7, 2011,
the weighted average rating factor is currently 2374 compared to
2785 in the April 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1 or lower
make up approximately 5.90% of the underlying portfolio versus
15.52% in April 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $6.0 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$15.5 million in April 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in May 2009.  The Senior (Class
A/B) and Mezzanine (Class C/D) overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 119.92% and 108.11%, respectively, versus April 2009
levels of 110.21% and 99.60%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance.  Moody's
also notes that the Class E Notes are no longer deferring interest
and that all previously deferred interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review: Global CLOs," key model
inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted
average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average
recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported
numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool to have a performing par balance, including
principal proceeds balance, of $284 million, defaulted par of
$6.0 million, a weighted average default probability of 27.62%, a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.93%, and a
diversity score of 57.  These default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends, and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also factors.

Shinnecock CLO 2006-1, Ltd., issued in September 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


SHINNECOCK CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Six Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes from Shinnecock CLO 2006-1 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by the
Clinton Group Inc.  At the same time, S&P removed S&P's ratings on
the class A-1, A-2, B, and C notes from CreditWatch, where S&P
placed them with positive implications on Nov. 8, 2010.

The upgrades reflect an improvement in the credit quality
available to support the notes since S&P downgraded all of its
rated notes on Dec. 29, 2009, following the application of S&P's
revised corporate CDO criteria.  As of the Dec. 10, 2010 trustee
report, the transaction had $5.95 million in defaulted assets,
down from $26.3 million noted in the Nov. 10, 2009 trustee report,
which S&P referenced for its December 2009 Rating Actions.
Furthermore, assets from obligors rated in the 'CCC' category were
reported at $17.2 million in December 2010, compared with
$33.2 million in November 2009.

The transaction has also benefited from an increase in
overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes.
The trustee reported these O/C ratios in the Dec. 10, 2010 monthly
report:

   * The class A/B O/C ratio was 119.84%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 115.58% in November 2009;

   * The class C/D O/C ratio was 108.04%, compared with a reported
     ratio of 104.19% in November 2009; and

   * The class E interest reinvestment O/C ratio was 105.05%,
     compared with a reported ratio of 101.20% in November 2009.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take Rating
Actions as S&P deems necessary.

Rating and CreditWatch Actions

Shinnecock CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-1           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AA- (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
C             BBB+ (sf)   BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)
E             B+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)

Transaction Information

Issuer              Shinnecock CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
Coissuer            Shinnecock CLO 2006-1 Inc.
Collateral manager  Clinton Group Inc.
Underwriter         Morgan Stanley
Trustee             Bank of New York Mellon (The)
Transaction Type    Cash Flow CLO


SOUTHPORT CLO: S&P Upgrades Ratings on Classes B & C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B and C notes from Southport CLO Ltd., a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Pacific Investment
Management Co., and removed the class B rating from CreditWatch
with positive implications.  S&P affirmed the ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, D, and 2 notes.

The class 2 note is a combination security backed by the class B
and C notes and a portion of the class D note and equity tranches.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October 2010, and
the transaction commenced paying down its principal proceeds to
the senior notes in the payment sequence as specified in the
indenture.  The class A-1 and A-2 notes received payments of
$9.51 million and $18.71 million, respectively, on the Jan. 18,
2011 payment date that decreased their outstanding balance to
89.84% and 87.30%, respectively.  The payment structure of the
transaction pays interest pari passu to all three class A
tranches; However, class A-2 is scheduled to receive principal
payments ahead of class A-3.  As a result, class A-2 has a chance
of getting fully paid before classes A-1 and A-3 and thus supports
a higher rating.

In addition to the paydown to the senior notes, the transaction
also benefited from the decline in defaults.  The trustee
currently reports $2.3 million as defaults in the January 2011
monthly report, which has decreased significantly from the nearly
$29 million in October 2009, the time of the last rating action.

The current balance of the class D note is 79.18% of its original
balance due to paydowns following the failure of the class D
overcollateralization (O/C) test in the past.  The class D O/C
cure in the interest proceeds section of the waterfall diverts
available interest proceeds -- after payment of any class D
deferred interest -- to pay down the class D note until the test
is cured.  Failure of this test in the past resulted in the class
D note getting paid down by $2.8 million.

All coverage tests are currently passing.  The paydowns and the
decrease in defaults improved the credit support to the rated
tranches leading to the upgrades.  The affirmations reflect
adequate credit support at the current ratings.  Standard & Poor's
will continue to monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take
rating actions, including CreditWatch placements, when
appropriate.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Southport CLO Ltd.
                      Rating
Class             To          From
B                 A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                 B+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed
Southport CLO Ltd.
Class             Rating
A-1               AA+ (sf)
A-2               AAA (sf)
A-3               AA+ (sf)
D                 CCC- (sf)
2                 BB+ (sf)


STANFIELD CARRERA: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on Stanfield
Carrera CLO Ltd.'s class A, B-1, and B-2 notes.  The ratings were
removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on Nov. 8, 2010.  Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.
is a collateralized loan obligation transaction that closed in
December of 2002.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on
the class C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since its last rating
action in December 2009.  The affirmations reflect the
availability of sufficient credit support at the current rating
levels.

According to the Dec. 8, 2010 trustee report, the transaction held
$5.8 million in defaulted assets and $7.2 million in assets rated
'CCC', down from $6.5 million defaulted and $16.2 million in
assets rated 'CCC' as of the Nov. 3, 2009 trustee report.  Since
S&P's last rating action in December 2009, the class A notes have
paid down $112.5 million.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with
the credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                 Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                    Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.

                                      Rating
                                      ------
Class                             To           From
-----                             --           ----
A                                 AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-1                               A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B-2                               A+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    Stanfield Carrera CLO Ltd.

          Class                                 Rating
          -----                                 ------
          C-1                                   CCC+ (sf)
          C-2                                   CCC+ (sf)
          D-1                                   CCC- (sf)
          D-2                                   CCC- (sf)


TIERS BOND: S&P Corrects Rating on $124MM Certificates to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on TIERS
Bond-Backed Certs Trust BSP 1997-5's $124 million certificates by
raising them to 'BB (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'.

S&P's ratings on the certificates are dependent on S&P's rating on
the underlying security, Bangko Sentral ng Philipinas' 8.60%
debentures due June 15, 2027 ('BB').

The rating actions follow S&P's Nov. 25, 2010, raising of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  Due to an
error, S&P did not contemporaneously change its ratings on the
certificates with S&P's rating action on the underlying security.

Ratings Corrected

TIERS Bond-Backed Certs Trust BSP 1997-5
US$124 million bond-backed certificates series BSP 1997-5 due
June 15, 2017

                   Rating
Class              To                  From
ZTF-A              BB (sf)             BB- (sf)
ZTF-B              BB (Sf)             BB- (sf)
Amortizing         BB (sf)             BB- (sf)


VENTURE II CDO: S&P Raises Ratings on Class A-1, A-2, & B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, and B notes from Venture II CDO 2002 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by
MJX Asset Management LLC.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes from CreditWatch with
positive implications.  S&P also affirmed S&P's rating on the
class C notes.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P have observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since S&P's last
rating action in December 2009.

According to the Jan. 5, 2011 trustee report, the transaction held
$10 million in defaulted assets, down from $19 million noted in
the Oct. 5, 2009 trustee report.  In addition, assets from
obligors rated in the 'CCC' category totaled $13 million of the
collateral pool in January 2011, compared with $27 million in
October 2009.  The class A par value test improved to 124.12% as
of January 2011 from 117.44% as of October 2009.  The transaction
has paid down the class A-1 notes by $66 million since S&P's last
rating action.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review the Ratings Assigned to
the notes to assess whether they remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

Ratings and CreditWatch Actions

Venture II CDO 2002 Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-1         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2         A+ (sf)     BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           BBB (sf)    BB (sf)

Rating Affirmed

Venture II CDO 2002 Ltd.
Class                   Rating
C                       CCC- (sf)


VITESSE CLO: S&P Raises Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A1LR, A1L, A2L, A3L, B1L, and B2L notes from Vitesse CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation transaction managed by TCW Asset
Management Co.  S&P removed three of those ratings from
CreditWatch with positive implications.

The upgrades reflect the improved performance S&P has observed in
the transaction's underlying asset portfolio since February 2010.
At that time, S&P lowered the ratings on all notes following a
review of the transaction under S&P's updated criteria for rating
corporate collateralized debt obligations.

At the time of S&P's last rating action, the transaction held
approximately $15.2 million in defaulted obligations and
$104.7 million in underlying obligors with a rating in the 'CCC'
range, according to the Jan. 11, 2010, trustee report.  As of
the Jan. 10, 2011 trustee report, Vitesse CLO Ltd. held just
$0.25 million in defaulted obligations and $43.7 million in
assets from underlying obligors with ratings in the 'CCC' range.

Over the past year, a number of defaulted obligors held in the
deal emerged from bankruptcy, with some receiving proceeds that
were higher than their carrying value in the overcollateralization
(O/C) ratio test calculation, which benefited the transaction's
O/C ratios.  The senior class A O/C ratio increased to 124.1% as
of the Jan. 10, 2011, from 122.8% as of Jan. 11, 2010.

At the time of S&P's last rating action, the class B2L notes
failed to withstand the specified combination of underlying asset
defaults at the 'B' rating level of the largest obligor default
test.  The largest obligor default test is no longer a
constraining factor for the rating on the class B2L notes.

To date, the Vitesse CLO Ltd. transaction has paid down the class
A1LR and A1L notes to approximately 95% of their original
outstanding balances and the class B2L notes to approximately 97%
of their original outstanding balance.

S&P will continue to review its ratings on the notes and assess
whether, in its view, the ratings remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as S&P deems necessary.

                  Rating And Creditwatch Actions

                         Vitesse CLO Ltd.

                                  Rating
                                  ------
     Class                   To           From
     -----                   --           ----
     A1LR                    AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
     A1L                     AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
     A2L                     AA (sf)      AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
     A3L                     A (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
     B1L                     BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)
     B2L                     BB- (sf)     CCC+ (sf)


WACHOVIA BANK: Kyo's Better Performance Cues Fitch to Up Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded these two classes of Wachovia Bank
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-Whale 7:

  -- $68.9 million class KH-1 to 'CCC/RR1' from 'CC/RR6';
  -- $54.1 million class KH-2 to 'CCC/RR3' from 'CC/RR6'.

In addition, Fitch places these pooled classes on Rating Watch
Positive:

  -- $64.9 million class H 'CCC/RR4';
  -- $21.9 million class J 'CCC/RR6';
  -- 25.4 million class K 'CC/RR6'.

The upgrades and Rating Watch Positive placements are due to the
improved performance of the Kyo Ya Portfolio, which represents
approximately 44% of the pooled classes and collateralizes classes
KH-1 and KH-2.  Fitch expects to receive more recent financial
data on the remaining loans in the pool including year-end 2010
information and will resolve the Rating Watch Positive status once
the information is received and analyzed.

As of trailing 12 months September 2010, servicer reported net
operating income for the Kyo Ya Portfolio has improved to
$94.4 million; an improvement of 17% since TTM September 2009 NOI,
which was used to analyze the loan at Fitch's last rating action.
Additionally, as of the November 2010 STR Reports, the portfolio's
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR have improved to 82.1%, $217.5, and
$176.5, respectively.  This is in-line with the portfolio's
performance at issuance when the occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were
81.2%, $216, and $175, respectively.  As of August 2009 and at
Fitch's last rating action, these performance indicators were
74.2%, $204, and $152, respectively.

As a result of the portfolio's improved performance, Fitch's loss
expectations on the loan have reduced: A note losses are not
expected and some recovery is expected on the KH-1 and KH-2
classes.  The loan's final maturity date is July 9, 2011.  If the
loan does not refinance, Fitch expects a transfer to special
servicing.  However, due to the improved performance, significant
reserves, and a better refinance environment, recovery prospects
on the loan are improved since Fitch's last rating action.

The Kyo-Ya Hotel Portfolio was originally collateralized by eight
full-service hotels, of which five were located in Hawaii, two in
Orlando, FL and one in San Francisco, CA.  In April 2007, the two
Orlando properties were released.  The current portfolio includes
5,231 rooms and consists of The Sheraton Waikiki, Sheraton Moana
Surfrider, Sheraton Maui, The Royal Hawaiian, The Palace and
Sheraton Princess Kaiulani.


WASHINGTON MUTUAL: Fitch Withdraws Rating on 8 Classes of Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded and withdrawn the ratings on eight
classes of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. 2002-AR13.

The downgrades to 'Dsf' reflect the fact that B1, B2, B3, B4, and
B5 classes have taken $429,707 in losses as of January 2011.

On Nov. 16, 2010, Fitch placed 1,810 classes from various
transactions on Rating Watch Negative due to Fitch's concern of
increased volatility in small pools.  All Fitch rated classes in
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. 2002-AR13 were placed
on Rating Watch Negative at this time.

As of January 2011, Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
2002-AR13 has 10 loans remaining in the transaction.  Based on
Fitch's small loan criteria, 'Considering Small Loan Count Tail
Risk in U.S. RMBS', Fitch is downgrading A1, A2, and M1 to 'Asf'
and subsequently withdrawing the ratings on A1, A2, M1, B1, B2,
B3, B4 and B5 due to the number of loans remaining.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions on these classes:

  -- Class A1 (CUSIP: 929227UB0) downgraded to 'Asf' from
     'AAAsf/LS1', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class A2 (CUSIP: 929227UC8) downgraded to 'Asf' from
     'AAAsf/LS1', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class M1 (CUSIP: 929227UD6) downgraded to 'Asf' from
     'AAAsf/LS1', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class B1 (CUSIP: 929227UE4) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
     'Asf/LS4', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class B2 (CUSIP: 929227UF1) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
     'Csf/RR3', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class B3 (CUSIP: 929227UG9) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
     'Csf/RR6', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class B4 (CUSIP: 929227UJ3) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
     'Csf/RR6', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn;

  -- Class B5 (CUSIP: 929227UK0) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
    'Csf/RR6', removed from Rating Watch Negative, withdrawn.


WESTWOOD CDO: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of these notes issued by Westwood CDO I, Ltd.:

  -- US$342,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $330,297,558),
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 31, 2009 Downgraded
     to A1 (sf);

  -- US$22,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 31, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);

  -- US$30,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 31,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf);

  -- US$16,600,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$4,400,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
     Notes due 2021, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     November 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade;

  -- US$13,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on November 23,
     2010 C (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  -- US$14,700,000 Type I Composite Notes due 2021 (current rated
     balance of $10,428,979), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     July 31, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from improvement in the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in July 2009.
In Moody's view, these positive developments coincide with
reinvestment of sale proceeds (including higher than previously
anticipated recoveries realized on defaulted securities) into
substitute assets with higher par amounts and/or higher ratings.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through an
improvement in the average credit rating (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor) and a decrease in the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below.  In particular,
as of the latest trustee report dated January 10, 2011, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2046 compared to 2824
in the June 2009 report, and securities rated Caa1/CCC+ or lower
make up approximately 6.5% of the underlying portfolio versus
10.4% in June 2009.  Additionally, defaulted securities total
about $9.2 million of the underlying portfolio compared to
$36.6 million in June 2009.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in July 2009.  The Class A, Class
B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 122.2%, 112.6%, 106.7% and 103.3%, respectively, versus June
2009 levels of 114.8%, 106.0%, 100.5% and 97.3%, respectively, and
all related overcollateralization tests are currently in
compliance.  Moody's also notes that the Class D Notes are no
longer deferring interest and that all previously deferred
interest has been paid in full.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs," key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.  In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $431 million, defaulted par of $11.2 million,
a weighted average default probability of 28.3% (implying a WARF
of 3676), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.24%,
and a diversity score of 55.  These default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow
model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.  The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Westwood CDO I, Ltd., issued in January 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities.

A summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2941)

  -- Class A-1: +2
  -- Class A-2: +2
  -- Class B: +2
  -- Class C-1: +3
  -- Class C-2: +3
  -- Class D: +4
  -- Type I Composite Notes: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4411)

  -- Class A-1: -1
  -- Class A-2: -2
  -- Class B: -2
  -- Class C-1: -2
  -- Class C-2: -2
  -- Class D: -2
  -- Type I Composite Notes: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.  CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels.  Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.  Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.  UPG Case only:
   Moody's tested for a possible extension of the actual weighted
   average life in its analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread, weighted average coupon, and
   diversity score.


* Fitch Downgrades 759 Bonds in 405 US RMB Transactions to 'Dsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded 759 bonds in 405 U.S. RMBS transactions
to 'Dsf'.  The downgrades indicate that the bonds in question have
incurred a principal write-down.  Of the bonds that Fitch is
downgrading to 'Dsf' 99% were previously rated 'Csf', indicating
an expected default.  The remaining bonds were rated 'CCsf' and
'CCCsf'.  The action is limited to just the bonds with write-
downs.  The remaining bonds in these transactions have not been
analyzed and the Recovery Ratings have not been updated as part of
this review.

Of the 405 transactions affected by these downgrades, 169 are
Prime, 137 Alt-A and 92 are Subprime. The remaining transaction
types are other sectors.  The majority of the bonds (60%) have a
Recovery Rating of 'RR5' or 'RR6' indicating that minimal recovery
is expected.  Some 40% of the bonds have Recovery Ratings of
either 'RR2' or 'RR3', which indicates anywhere from 50%-90% of
the outstanding balance is expected to be recovered.

The downgrades are part of Fitch's ongoing surveillance process.
Fitch will continue to monitor these transactions for additional
defaults.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions can be found at
'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title search for 'Fitch
Downgrades 759 bonds to 'Dsf' in 405 U.S. RMBS Transactions'.
These actions were reviewed by a committee of Fitch analysts.  The
spreadsheet provides the contact information for the performance
analyst.

The spreadsheet also details Fitch's assignment of Recovery
Ratings to the transactions.  The Recovery Rating scale is
based upon the expected relative recovery characteristics of an
obligation.  For structured finance, Recovery Ratings are designed
to estimate recoveries on a forward-looking basis while taking
into account the time value of money.


* Fitch Junks Ratings on Massachusetts Health's 2004A&B Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its ongoing surveillance efforts, Fitch Ratings has
downgraded these bonds to 'CC' from 'B':

  -- $26,700,000 Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities
     Authority (Northern Berkshire Health Systems) revenue bonds,
     series 2004A&B.

Rating Rationale:

  -- The downgrade to 'CC' indicates that default (as defined by
     Fitch) appears probable and reflects Fitch's grave concerns
     about Northern Berkshire Health Systems' ability to meet its
     ongoing financial obligations.  At Nov. 30, 2010, NBHS
     reported $3.4 million of unrestricted cash and investments,
     which equates to only 17.8 days of cash on hand and is less
     than NBHS's average monthly payroll.

  -- On Aug. 26, 2010, the Bond Trustee (US Bank, N.A.) filed an
     Event of Default Notice due to the failure of the Obligated
     Group to meet minimum debt service coverage and liquidity
     covenants, as defined in the Master Trust Indenture, for the
     year ended Sept. 30, 2009.

  -- NBHS's deteriorating operating performance culminated in a
     $6.3 million operating loss in fiscal 2010 (unaudited) (-9.2%
     operating margin) and negative $0.7 million of operating
     EBITDA (-1.0% operating EBITDA margin) further pressuring
     cash generation.

  -- Management continues to indicate that they are in
     negotiations with Pittsfield, MA based Berkshire Health
     System (rated 'BBB+' by Fitch), to develop an affiliation
     that could result in the formation of a consolidated regional
     health system.  The 'CC' rating does not reflect the effect
     of any potential affiliation arrangement.

  -- Fitch believes a draw on the debt service reserve is likely
     and is incorporated into the rating action.

Security:

The series 2004 bonds are secured by an interest in the gross
revenues of and mortgage on Northern Berkshire Hospital and a debt
service reserve fund.

Credit Summary:

The rating downgrade to 'CC' reflects Fitch's belief that
default (i.e. failure to make payment of principal and interest,
bankruptcy filing and receivership, or coercive exchange of
obligations) is probable and reflects NBHS's sizable operating
losses and dire liquidity position.  Since Fitch's last review in
March 2010, the Bond Trustee (US Bank, N.A.) filed an Event of
Default Notice due to the failure of the Obligated Group to meet
minimum debt service coverage and liquidity covenants, as defined
in the Master Trust Indenture, for the year ended Sept. 30, 2009.
Moreover, operating losses have worsened and unrestricted cash
declined significantly.  In fiscal 2010 (year ended Sept. 30),
NBHS reported a $6.3 million operating loss (negative 9.2%
operating margin) and negative $0.7 million of operating EBITDA (-
1.0% operating EBITDA margin).  As a result, NBHS's unrestricted
cash and investments position has fallen to just $3.4 million
(17.8 DCOH) from $9.1 million at fiscal year end 2009.  Fitch
believes that NBHS declining cash position is insufficient to
supplement the corporation's continued operating losses.  As a
result, Fitch believes a draw on the debt service reserve fund is
likely.

Although the NBHS sold its continuing care retirement community
and nursing care facility in August 2010, the asset sale proceeds
did not garner sufficient monies to materially alter NBHS's
financial profile.  Management continues to indicated that they
are in negotiations with Pittsfield, MA based Berkshire Health
System (rated 'BBB+' by Fitch), to develop an affiliation that
could result in the formation of a consolidated regional health
system.  The 'CC' rating does not reflect the affect of any
potential affiliation arrangement.

Located in North Adams, MA, NBHS consists of 70 staffed bed North
Adams Regional Hospital.  Operating revenues of the health system
were $68.5 million in FY 2010 (unaudited).  NBHS covenants to
provide unaudited quarterly disclosure to bondholders within 45
days of each fiscal quarter end, which includes a consolidated and
consolidating balance sheet, income statement, utilization
statistics, and management discussion and analysis.  The release
of NBHS's 2009 audit (dated Dec. 16, 2010) was delayed as a result
of negotiations with various parties regarding covenant waivers,
which caused a violation of its continuing disclosure agreement
requiring the release of the audit within 150 days of the fiscal
year end.  Financial disclosure is disseminated to the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board's EMMA system.


* S&P Cuts Ratings on 15 Classes of Mortgage Pass-Through Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 15
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 12 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
from 2004 to 2007.  In addition, S&P placed S&P's ratings on 25
classes from one of the downgraded transactions and 13 other
transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also
affirmed its ratings on five classes from two other U.S. RMBS
transactions issued in 2003 and 2004 and removed them from
CreditWatch negative.

The collateral supporting the affected transactions consists of
fixed and adjustable-rate prime, subprime, Alternative-A (Alt-A),
and reperforming mortgage loans.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of interest shortfalls on
the affected classes during recent remittance periods. S&P's
ratings reflect S&P's view of the magnitude of the interest
payment deficiencies that have affected each class to date
compared with the remaining principal balance owed and the
likelihood that certificate holders will be reimbursed for these
deficiencies. The ratings also considered the balance of current
delinquencies of the affected transactions.

All of the classes had speculative-grade ratings before S&P
lowered them, with the exception of class B-2 from Structured
Asset Securities Corp. 2005-RF2.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view of actual reimbursements of
interest shortfalls on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.

The CreditWatch placements reflect S&P's assessment of potential
interest shortfalls on the affected classes in recent remittance
periods being reported by the trustee that would likely negatively
affect the ratings.  Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor
its ratings on securities that experience interest shortfalls, and
upon confirmation of the reported data, S&P will adjust the
ratings as S&P considers appropriate in light of its criteria.

Rating Actions

Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-1
Series    2001-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
M-2        00253CGQ4     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2005-29CB
Series    2005-29CB
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To            From
B-1        12667GUM3     D (sf)        CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2005-32T1
Series    2005-32T1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To            From
B-1        12667GE33     D (sf)        CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2005-37T1
Series    2005-37T1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To            From
B-1        12667G3B7     D (sf)        CC (sf)

Alternative Loan Trust 2005-J8
Series    2005-J8
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To            From
B-3        12667GK69     D (sf)        CC (sf)

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series    2003-11
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
AF-5       03072SLT0     AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
AF-6       03072SLU7     AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2003-3
Series    2003-3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
II-A       07386HCT6     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
VI-A       07386HCL3     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
B-1        07386HCM1     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
B-2        07386HCN9     BB (sf)/Watch Neg    BB (sf)

Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-12
Series    2004-12
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
II-A-5     07386HPJ4     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
II-A-6     07386HPK1     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-3
Series    2005-3
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
II-A-1     07386HRV5     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2004-2
Series    2004-2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
M-1        251563DP4     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
M-2        251563DQ2     B- (sf)/Watch Neg    B- (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR2
Series    2005-AR2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
5A1        36242DJ20     AA- (sf)/Watch Neg   AA- (sf)
2B1        36242DJ61     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AR5
Series    2007-AR5
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
4-A-1-1    45669EAK2     CCC (sf)        B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2006-2
Series    2006-2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
B-1        590219AA9     B (sf)/Watch Neg     B (sf)

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series MLCC 2007-1
Series    2007-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
III-A      59023HAD3     AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg   AA+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6AR
Series    2005-6AR
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
4-A-2      61748HMP3     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

New Century Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-A
Series    2004-A
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
M-I-2      64352VGL9     D (sf)               CCC (sf)
B-I        64352VGM7     D (sf)               CCC (sf)

PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-CIM1
Series    2008-CIM1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
I-2A-1     69337LAC6     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)
I-2A-2     69337LAD4     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
I-B1       69337L9G9     B+ (sf)/Watch Neg    B+ (sf)

Prime Mortgage Trust 2007-1
Series    2007-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
B-1        74162FAH8     D (sf)               CC (sf)

RALI Series 2004-QA6 Trust
Series    2004-QA6
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
NB-III-1   76110HH51     B- (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Neg
NB-III-2   76110HH69     B- (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Neg
NB-III-3   76110HH77     B- (sf)         B- (sf)/Watch Neg

RBSGC Mortgage Loan Trust
Series    2005-RP1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
II-B-1     74927UAL2     AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AA (sf)
I-B-2      74927UAE8     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
II-B-2     74927UAM0     A (sf)/Watch Neg     A (sf)
II-B-3     74927UAN8     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   BBB (sf)

Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-A3
Series    2004-C
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To              From
B-5        45660NE76     D (sf)          CC (sf)

Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A10
Series    2005-J
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To               From
B-1        45660LXT1     D (sf)           CC (sf)

Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A12
Series    2005-L
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To               From
B-1        45660LL98     D (sf)           CCC (sf)
B-2        45660LM22     D (sf)           CC (sf)

Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2005-A9
Series    2005-I
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                From
B-2        45660LTX7     D (sf)            CC (sf)

RFMSI Series 2006-SA1 Trust
Series    2006-SA1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
II-A-1     76111XG98     BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)

Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-1
Series    2004-1
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
1-A        86359BFY2     AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series    2005-RF2
                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                From
B1         86359DEZ6     AA (sf)/Watch Neg AA (sf)
B2         86359DFA0     CCC (sf)          A (sf)/Watch Neg
B3         86359DFB8     D (sf)               CCC (sf)


* S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Classes of Mortgage Pass-Through Cert
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on three
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from two U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions to 'D
(sf)'.  These RMBS transactions were issued between 2006 and
2007.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of principal write-downs
on the affected classes during recent remittance periods.  The
classes were rated 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' prior to being
downgraded to 'D (sf)'.

The defaulted classes are backed by Alternative-A mortgage loan
collateral.  Credit enhancement is provided by subordination.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities that experience principal write-downs, and S&P will
adjust its ratings as S&P considers appropriate in accordance with
its criteria.

Ratings Lowered

American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2007-1
Series 2007-1

                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
A-3        026932AE3     D (sf)               CC (sf)

Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A6
Series 2006-F

                                 Rating
Class      CUSIP         To                   From
2-A-1      76113FAQ3     D (sf)               CCC (sf)
2-A-7      76113FAW0     D (sf)               CCC (sf)


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 37 Certs. From Five CMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 37
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from five
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions.

The downgrades reflect current and potential interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered its ratings on 26 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because
S&P expects the interest shortfalls to continue.

Twenty-two of the 26 classes that S&P downgraded to 'D (sf)' have
had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for four or more
months.  The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective
certificates are primarily due to appraisal subordinate
entitlement reduction amounts in effect for specially serviced
loans and special servicing fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts calculated using recent
Member of the Appraisal Institute appraisals.  S&P also considered
special servicing fees that are likely, in its view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls.

ARAs and resulting ASER amounts are implemented in accordance with
each respective transaction's terms.  Typically, these terms call
for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the
stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past
due, and an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the affected transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)' because
ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to
change, or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the
MAI appraisals.

S&P detail the 37 downgraded classes from the five CMBS
transactions below.

        GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2006-C1 Trust

S&P lowered its ratings on the class E through O certificates
from GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2006-C1 Trust.  The
downgrades affecting classes G through O reflect interest
shortfalls attributable to ASER amounts related to seven
($125.9 million) of the nine ($140.9 million) loans that are
currently with the special servicer, LNR Partners Inc., as well
as special servicing fees.  S&P lowered its ratings on the class
E and F certificates because S&P believes the recurring interest
shortfalls have reduced liquidity support available to these
classes.  As of the January 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs
totaling $58.9 million were in effect for eight loans.  The total
reported current ASER amount on seven loans was $280,102, and the
reported cumulative ASER amount was $2.1 million.  The trust
experienced net monthly interest shortfalls totaling $317,728 and
accumulated interest shortfalls totaling $2.9 million, which have
affected class F and all of the classes subordinate to it.
Classes G through O have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between six and nine months, and S&P expects these
shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P lowered its ratings on these classes to 'D
(sf)'.

    Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. Series 2002-C1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J through P certificates from
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp. Series 2002-C1.  The
downgrades affecting classes N, O, and P reflect interest
shortfalls attributable to ASER amounts related to two ($27.8
million) of the five ($43.6 million) loans that are currently with
the special servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  S&P
lowered its ratings on the class J through M certificates because
S&P believes the recurring interest shortfalls have reduced
liquidity support available to these classes.  As of the January
2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $11.3 million were
in effect for two loans.  The total reported current ASER amount
on these two loans was $97,311, and the reported cumulative ASER
amount was $573,129.  The trust experienced net monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $87,581 and accumulated interest shortfalls of
$1.1 million, which have affected class N and all of the classes
subordinate to it.  Classes N, O, and P have had accumulated
interest shortfalls outstanding for four months, and S&P expects
these shortfalls to remain outstanding for the foreseeable future.
Consequently, S&P lowered its ratings on these classes to 'D
(sf)'.

         GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II Series 2004-GG2

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F through O certificates from
GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II Series 2004-GG2.  The downgrades
affecting classes H through O reflect interest shortfalls
attributable to ASER amounts related to eight ($97.2 million) of
the 10 ($132.0 million) assets that are currently with the special
servicer, LNR, as well as special servicing fees.  S&P lowered its
ratings on the class F and G certificates because S&P believes the
recurring interest shortfalls have reduced liquidity support
available to these classes.  As of the January 2011 trustee
remittance report, ARAs totaling $64.5 million were in effect for
eight assets.  The total reported current ASER amount on these
eight assets was $332,754, and the reported cumulative ASER amount
was $1.9 million.  The trust experienced net monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $421,949 and accumulated interest shortfalls
of $3.9 million, which have affected class H and all of the
classes subordinate to it.  Classes H through O have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between three and nine
months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to remain outstanding for
the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered its ratings on
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
                         Series 2004-PNC1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F through K certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2004-
PNC1.  The downgrades affecting classes H, J, and K reflect
interest shortfalls attributable to ASER amounts related to two
($32.8 million) of the three ($34.1 million) loans that are
currently with the special servicer, Midland Loan Services Inc.,
as well as special servicing fees.  S&P lowered its ratings on the
class F and G certificates because S&P believes the recurring
interest shortfalls have reduced liquidity support available to
these classes (in addition, both classes have experienced interest
shortfalls for one month).  As of the January 2011 trustee
remittance report, ARAs totaling $17.3 million were in effect for
two loans.  The total reported current ASER amount on these two
loans was $83,959, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$1.3 million.  The trust experienced net monthly interest
shortfalls totaling $333,445 and accumulated interest shortfalls
of $3.1 million, which have affected class E and all of the
classes subordinate to it.  Classes H, J, and K have had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between one and 12
months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to remain outstanding for
the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered its ratings on
these classes to 'D (sf)'.

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1

S&P lowered its ratings on the class J through P certificates
from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1.  The downgrades
affecting classes K through P reflect interest shortfalls
attributable to ASER amounts related to nine ($93.3 million) of
the 13 ($301.7 million) assets that are currently with the special
servicer, J.E. Robert Co. Inc., as well as special servicing fees.
S&P lowered its rating on the class J certificate because S&P
believes the recurring interest shortfalls have reduced liquidity
support available to this class (in addition, the class has
carried accumulated interest shortfalls for six consecutive
months).  As of the January 2011 trustee remittance report, ARAs
totaling $89.7 million were in effect for 11 assets.  Current
ASERs were taken against nine of these assets, in the aggregate
amount of $166,195, and the reported cumulative ASER amount was
$2.2 million.  The trust experienced net monthly interest
shortfalls totaling ($67,397).  The net recovery is primarily owed
to a one-time ASER recovery associated with the liquidation of a
specially serviced asset, in the amount of $275,321.  Accumulated
interest shortfalls total $3.2 million and have affected class J
and all of the classes subordinate to it.  Classes K through P
have had accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding between six
and 10 months, and S&P expects these shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, S&P lowered
its ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)'.

                          Rating Actions

        GE Commercial Mortgage Corp. Series 2006-C1 Trust
          Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement    Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------    -------  -----------
E      CCC+ (sf)  B+ (sf)     5.62                     0        0
F      CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)     4.70                    (1,716)   12,119
G      D (sf)     B (sf)      3.78                     62,591   270,598
H      D (sf)     B (sf)      2.85                     62,591   423,899
J      D (sf)     B- (sf)     2.46                     26,490   238,409
K      D (sf)     B- (sf)     2.06                     26,490   238,409
L      D (sf)     B- (sf)     1.66                     26,490   238,409
M      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)   1.53                     8,830    79,470
N      D (sf)     CCC (sf)    1.27                     17,660   158,939
O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   1.14                     8,830    79,470

            Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp.
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-C1

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement    Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------    -------  -----------
J      BBB+ (sf)  A- (sf)     8.25                  0        0
K      BB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)    5.93                  0        0
L      B- (sf)    BB+ (sf)    3.62                  0        0
M      CCC- (sf)  BB (sf)     2.63                  0        0
N      D (sf)     B+ (sf)     1.97                  9,671    33,625
O      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)   0.98                  39,971   159,885
P      D (sf)     CCC (sf)    0.48                  19,988   79,952

                  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. II
   Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-GG2

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement    Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------    -------  -----------
F      BB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   5.96                  0        0
G      CCC+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)   4.89                  0        0
H      D (sf)     BB (sf)     3.52                  105,128  162,654
J      D (sf)     BB- (sf)    3.21                  27,493   82,827
K      D (sf)     B+ (sf)     2.60                  54,985   174,118
L      D (sf)     B (sf)      1.99                  54,985   277,259
M      D (sf)     B- (sf)     1.53                  41,241   252,420
N      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)   1.23                  27,493   242,271
O      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   0.77                  41,237   377,463

       JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-PNC1

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement    Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------    -------  -----------
F      B (sf)     BB (sf)     5.22                  73,751   73,751
G      CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)     3.92                  49,167   49,167
H      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)   1.48                  92,188   92,188
J      D (sf)     CCC (sf)    1.16                  12,140   12,140
K      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   0.34                  30,345   261,052

              Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1
           Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

                                                         Reported
          Rating                                  interest shortfalls ($)
          ------                                  -----------------------
Class  To         From       Credit enhancement    Current  Accumulated
-----  --         ----       ------------------    -------  -----------
J      CCC (sf)   B (sf)       2.34                (152,646) 7,266
K      D (sf)     B- (sf)      1.92                 47,967   287,804
L      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)    1.50                 47,972   292,883
M      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)    1.36                 15,989   111,924
N      D (sf)     CCC (sf)     1.08                 31,978   250,052
P      D (sf)     CCC- (sf)    0.66                 47,972   435,628


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 428 Classes From 113 U.S RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 428
classes from 113 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions backed by prime jumbo mortgage loans issued in
1986-2004.  In addition, S&P affirmed S&P's ratings on 75 classes
from 26 of the downgraded transactions, as well as 11 additional
transactions.  S&P also withdrew S&P's ratings on 67 interest-only
classes and 13 additional classes from 48 transactions.

The downgrades reflect S&P's opinion that projected credit
support for the affected classes may be insufficient to maintain
the previous ratings, as S&P believes the risk of default may be
exacerbated in pools with small numbers of remaining loans.  This
potential risk to the rated classes in S&P's view results from
several things.  They include the increase in volatility for
defaults while the dollar amount of credit support is decreasing;
the lack of optional terminations ("clean-up" calls in which a
designated participant can purchase the remaining loans of the
trust when pool sizes become low) exercised for the related trusts
that would effectively retire the securities; and the lack of
credit enhancement floors that would add additional protection to
the classes within a structure.  As such, S&P has lowered its
ratings on these classes to below 'BB+'.  In S&P's view, ratings
higher than 'BB' would not be commensurate with the increase in
volatility associated with shrinking loan counts and the current
mortgage and housing environment.  However, in certain
cases where a class or transaction benefits from additional
enhancement in the form of bond insurance, mortgage pool
insurance, or a guarantee, S&P factored the additional enhancement
into S&P's rating decision.

The rating affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the amount of
credit enhancement available for these classes is sufficient to
cover losses associated with these rating levels.

S&P withdrew 80 ratings for one of two reasons.  S&P withdraw
ratings on 67 interest-only classes based on S&P's current
criteria, which can be found in "Global Methodology For Rating
Interest-Only Securities," published on April 15, 2010.  S&P
withdrew the ratings on an additional 13 classes because they
have received their full amount of scheduled principal and
currently have a zero balance.

Subordination provides credit support for the affected
transactions.  The underlying collateral for these deals consists
of fixed- and adjustable-rate U.S. prime jumbo mortgage loans
secured by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor its ratings on
securities with a small population of mortgage loans remaining and
S&P will adjust its ratings as it considers appropriate in
accordance with S&P's criteria.

Rating Actions

ABN AMRO Mortgage Corp.
Series 2002-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4        00077B3U5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-30       00077B4W0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-P        00077B5A7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-X        00077B5B5   NR                   AAA (sf)
M          00077B5C3   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        00077B5D1   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-2        00077B5E9   B (sf)               AA (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2002-1 Trust
Series 2002-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        06051GAA7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-5        06051GAE9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-WIO      06051GAG4   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-PO       06051GAH2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        06051GAJ8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        06051GAK5   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        06051GAL3   B (sf)               BBB (sf)

Banc of America Funding 2003-2 Trust
Series 2003-2

                              Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      05946XCR2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-WIO    05946XCU5   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05946XCV3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-WIO    05946XCW1   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-PO       05946XCX9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Banc of America Funding Corporation
2000-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2A-2       05946XAV5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2A-WIO     05946XAW3   NR                   AAA (sf)

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-B Trust
2003-B
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      06050HC63   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      06050HD21   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-2      06050HD39   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)
2-A-7      06050HD88   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)
2-A-8      06050HD96   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)
2-A-IO     06050HE20   NR                   AA+ (sf)
2-A-P      06050HE38   BB (sf)              AA+ (sf)
1-WIO                  NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        06050HE46   B (sf)               BB- (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage 2002-5 Trust
Series 2002-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSI
P       To                   From
A-6        06050HHW1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-WIO      06050HHZ4   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-PO       06050HJA7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage 2002-E Trust
2002-E
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        06050HJH2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        06050HJK5   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-2        06050HJL3   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage 2002-J Trust
2002-J
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        06050HVJ4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        06050HVK1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-3        06050HVL9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-4        06050HVM7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        06050HVQ8   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage 2002-K Trust
2002-K
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      06050HXK9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-2      06050HXL7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-3      06050HXM5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-4      06050HXN3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-5      06050HXP8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-6      06050HXQ6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-7      06050HXR4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      06050HXW3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-2      06050HXX1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A-1      06050HXY9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        06050HYC6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        06050HYD4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        06050HYE2   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2002-G
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      06050HKP2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-2      06050HKQ0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-3      06050HKR8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-4      06050HKS6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-5      06050HKT4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-PT       06050HKW7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      06050HKV9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-B-1      06050HLA4   B (sf)               A (sf)
2-B-2      06050HLB2   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2000-2
Series 2000-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        07384MAA0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        07384MAB8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        07384MAD4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        07384MAE2   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        07384MAF9   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2001-4
Series 2001-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A        07384MCX8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A       07384MCY6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        07384MDA7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        07384MDB5   B (sf)               A (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2002-S4
Series 2002-S4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-23       16162TT63   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-P        16162TT71   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          16162TT97   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        16162TU20   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        16162TU38   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Chase Mortgage Finance Trust, Series 2002-S6
Series 2002-S6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IIA-1      16162TV52   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-X        16162TV60   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-P        16162TV78   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          16162TV94   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        16162TW28   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        16162TW36   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2001-HYB1
Series 2001-HYB1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      12669B2W1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669B2X9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669B2Y7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A-2      12669B2Z4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-21
Series 2002-21
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        12669C5W6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-3        12669C5Y2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
PO         12669C5Z9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          12669C6D7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        12669C6B1   B (sf)               A- (sf)
B-2        12669C6C9   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-30
Series 2002-30
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        12669DEW4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        12669DEX2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-3        12669DEY0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          12669DFF0   B (sf)               AA- (sf)
B-1        12669DEZ7   B (sf)               BB- (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-J4
Series 2002-J4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-15     12669DED6   NR                   AAA (sf)
I-A-16     12669DEE4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669DEF1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
PO         12669DEG9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          12669DEJ3   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        12669DEK0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        12669DEL8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-HYB1
Series 2003-HYB1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      12669DC89   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669DC97   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669DD21   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-X        12669DD39   NR                   AAA (sf)
M          12669DD54   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        12669DD62   B (sf)               A+ (sf)
B-2        12669DD70   CC (sf)              B- (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      12669FKR3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669FKS1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669FKT9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          12669FKV4   B (sf)               BBB- (sf)
B-1        12669FKW2   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
B-2        12669FKX0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Citibank (S&Pst) FSB
Series 1991-CI2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          130209P86   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1986- P
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          172905BB6   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1986- S
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          172905AZ4   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1987- A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          172905BE0   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1987- B
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         172905BG5   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1987- D
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          172905BJ9   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1987- F
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         172905BM2   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1987- 3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         172921AG3   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1987-10
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         172921AL2   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1988- 11
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        172921CE6   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1988-17
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        172921CN6   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1989-13
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1         172921DR6   BB (sf)              A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1992- 7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        172921UD8   BB (sf)              BBB+ (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1993-14
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-3        172921J74   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-4        172921J82   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-5        172921J90   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1994- 3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-13       172921N95   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-5        172921M96   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2001-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        22540VBN1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        22540VBP6   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-3        22540VBQ4   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-4        22540VCB6   B (sf)               A (sf)
B-5        22540VCC4   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-19
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
C-B-1      22540V6S6   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-2      22540V6T4   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-3      22540V6U1   NR                   AAA (sf)

DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1991- 3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        23321PAJ7   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-1        23321PAH1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1993-20
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I A-1      23321PGK8   BB (sf)              BBB+ (sf)

DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1993-19
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-P        23321PGE2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
S-1        23321PFW3   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-7        23321PGD4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          23321PGF9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        23321PGG7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1994- 3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-P        23321PJE9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
S          23321PHM3   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-7        23321PHU5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          23321PJF6   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)

DLJ Mortgage Acceptance Corp.
Series 1993- 4A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          23321PCN6   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)

Equity One ABS, INC.
Series 1998-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        294751AG7   BB (sf)              A+ (sf)

Financial Asset Securitization, Inc.
Series 1997-NAMC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
FXS        31738VAL9   NR                   AAA (sf)
P          31738VAR6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-AR2
Series 2002-AR2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A-1     32051DRA2   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-A-1    32051DRC8   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DRD6   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-2        32051DRE4   NR                   BBB (sf)

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-AR1
Series 2003-AR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A-1     32051DTM4   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        32051DTQ5   NR                   BBB (sf)
B-2        32051DTR3   NR                   B- (sf)
B-3        32051DTS1   NR                   CC (sf)
B-4        32051DTT9   NR                   CC (sf)

First Republic Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-FRB1
Series 2000-FRB1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        336161AA2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-1M       336161AB0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        336161AC8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2M       336161AD6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        336161AF1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        336161AG9   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-3        336161AH7   B (sf)               A+ (sf)

First Republic Mortgage Loan Trust 2000-FRB2
Series 2000-FRB2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        336161AM6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        336161AN4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-3        336161AP9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-3M       336161AQ7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X          336161AR5   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        336161AT1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        336161AU8   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-3        336161AV6   B (sf)               AA- (sf)

First Republic Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FRB2
Series 2002-FRB2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        336161BU7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X          336161BV5   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        336161BX1   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-2        336161BY9   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-3        336161BZ6   B (sf)               BBB+ (sf)

FNT MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES FNT 2001-4
Series 2001-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      22540WCP3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-A-X      22540S&PQ9   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-1      22540S&PU0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-2      22540S&PV8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-3      22540S&PW6   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2F
Series 2003-2F
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IA-1       36228FMM5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IA-2       36228FMN3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IA-3       36228FMP8   NR                   AAA (sf)
IIA-4      36228FMV5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IIA-5      36228FMW3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IIA-6      36228FMX1   NR                   AAA (sf)
IIA-X      36228FMZ6   NR                   AAA (sf)
IIA-P      36228FNA0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IIIA-1     36228FNB8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-X        36228FNC6   NR                   AAA (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1A1        36228FD29   B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
2A1        36228FD37   B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
2A2        36228FD45   B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
2A4        36228FD60   B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
3A1        36228FD86   B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
3A2        36228FD94   B+ (sf)              BBB+ (sf)
4A1        36228FE36   BB- (sf)             AAA (sf)

Guardian S&L Assn, Huntington Beach, CA
Series 1989- 7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          40145CAT2   BB (sf)              BBB- (sf)

Homeside Mortgage Securities, Inc.
Series 1998-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-X        437609AM2   NR                   AAA (sf)

Homeside Mortgage Securities, Inc.
Series 1998-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IA-1       437609AV2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IA-X       437609BC3   NR                   AAA (sf)
IIA-1      437609BE9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-X     437609BG4   NR                   AAA (sf)

IndyMac ARM Trust 2001-H2
Series 2001-H2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        45660UAQ2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        45660UAT6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X          45660UAY5   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-3        45660UAU3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        45660UAV1   B (sf)               A (sf)
B-2        45660UAW9   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)

MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2002-3
Series 2002-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      576433BH8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-1      576433BJ4   NR                   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      576433BL9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-A-1      576433BM7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        576433BQ8   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-2        576433BR6   CCC (sf)             BBB- (sf)

Mellon Residential Funding Corp.
Series 1998-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-11       585525BM9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-12       585525BN7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X-1        585525BG2   NR                   AAA (sf)
X-2        585525BH0   NR                   AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Series 1996-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A6         617445CD1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A7         617445CE9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-WL1
Series 2002-WL1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      61746WRG7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-2      61746WUT5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-3      61746WUU2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-4      61746WUV0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-5      61746WUW8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A-6      61746WUX6   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-A-7      61746WUY4   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      61746WRH5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-2      61746WUZ1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-3      61746WVA5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A-4      61746WVB3   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        61746WRJ1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        61746WRK8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        61746WRL6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
A-X-1      61746WRM4   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-X-2      61746WVM9   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-X-3      61746WVN7   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-P        61746WRN2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

MRFC Mortgage Pass-Through Trust, Series 2002-TBC1
Series 2002-TBC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          585525FN3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X          585525FP8   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        585525FR4   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B-2        585525FS2   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-3        585525FT0   B (sf)               A (sf)

Nomura Asset Securities Corp.
Series 1994-3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
IO         655356CW1   NR                   AAA (sf)
PO         655356CX9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M-3        655356DA8   B- (sf)              BBB (sf)

Paine S&Pbber Mortgage Acceptance Corp. IV
Series 1993- 8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        695927DW0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1988- 1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          74434RAA9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1992- 10
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-6        74434RSJ1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1992- 18
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M          74434RVD0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Prudential Home Mortgage Securities Co. Inc. (The)
Series 1994-25
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-8        74434UFB5   AA+ (sf)             AAA (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S9 Trust
Series 2003-S9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        76111JZ72   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-P        76111JZ80   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-V        76111JZ98   NR                   AAA (sf)
M-1        76111J2B9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
M-2        76111J2C7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Ryland Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1991-15
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B          783766GV4   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Ryland Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 1991-16
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B          783766GY8   B (sf)               BBB- (sf)
I          783766GZ5   B (sf)               BBB- (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1993- 9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        79548KJE9   BB (sf)              AA (sf)
B-1        79548KJF6   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994- 1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        79548KJR0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        79548KJS8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994-4A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
4A-A       79548KKP2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994- 5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
B-1        79548KLA4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        79548KLB2   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1999-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A1-4       79548KH35   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A1-6       79548KJ66   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A2         79548KH76   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
PO         79548K9N9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IO         79548K9O6   NR                   AAA (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 2000-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        79548K3A4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        79548K3B2   NR                   AAA (sf)
PO         79548K3F3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
IO         79548K3G1   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        79548K3C0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        79548K3D8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        79548K3E6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2001-CPB1
Series 2001-CPB1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          79549AFL8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        79549AFM6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        79549AFN4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        79549AFP9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 1999-1
Series 1999-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A       86358HGW3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2000-5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-AP       863572Z55   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-AX       8635722W2   NR                   AAA (sf)
1-AP       8635722X0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-AX       8635723F8   NR                   AAA (sf)
3-AP       8635723G6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1         8635723H4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B2         8635723J0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B3         8635723K7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-8A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A2       86358RBT3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A3       86358RBU0   NR                   AAA (sf)
3-A4       86358RCB1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1-II      86358RCJ4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B2-II      86358RCK1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B3-II      86358RCL9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-AX       86358RFY8   NR                   AAA (sf)
3-AP       86358RFB8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-AX       86358RFC6   NR                   AAA (sf)
4-AP       86358RFZ5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-AX       86358RGA9   NR                   AAA (sf)
5-AP       86358RGB7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
5-AX       86358RGC5   NR                   AAA (sf)
6-AP       86358RGD3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
6-AX       86358RGE1   NR                   AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-15A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       86358RKR7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A1       86358RKT3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A2       86358RKU0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A3       86358RKY2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-A1       86358RLA3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
5-A1       86358RLC9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
5-A2       86358RLD7   NR                   AAA (sf)
B1         86358RLE5   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)
B2         86358RLF2   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B3         86358RLG0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2001-19
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-AP       86358RSV0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-AX       86358RSW8   NR                   AAA (sf)
2-AP       86358RTD9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-AX       86358RTE7   NR                   AAA (sf)
B1 (1)                 B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B1 (2)     86358R9M8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B2 (1)                 B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B2 (2)     86358R9N6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B3 (1)                 B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B3 (2)     86358R9O3   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-1A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A1       86358RUC9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A2       86358RUD7   NR                   AAA (sf)
3-A1       86358RUE5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A2       86358RUF2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-A        86358RUH8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-5A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       86358RYP6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A2       86358RYQ4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A3       86358RYR2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A4       86358RYS0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A1       86358RYU5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A2       86358RYV3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
3-A        86358RYX9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-A        86358RYY7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
5-A        86358RYZ4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
6-A        86358RZA8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1         86358RZB6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B2         86358RZC4   B (sf)               AA- (sf)
B3         86358RZD2   B (sf)               BB- (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-8A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
7-A1       86358RE29   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
7-A2       86358RE37   NR                   AAA (sf)
B3         86358RE86   B (sf)               BBB (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-16A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A1       86358RX36   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1-I       86358RX93   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B1-I-X     86358RY27   NR                   AA (sf)
B2-I       86358RY35   B (sf)               A (sf)
2-A1       86358RX51   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
3-A1       86358R2E6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-A1       86358R2G1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
4-A2       86358R2H9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1-II      86358RY50   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B2-II      86358RY68   CCC (sf)             A (sf)
B3         86358RY76   CC (sf)              BBB (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-18A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
3-A        86358R5J2   BB (sf)              BBB (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-6
Series 1992- 6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
G          863573KR1   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-9
Series 1992-9
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
BX         863573NC1   BB (sf)              BBB- (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 91-5
Series 1991- 5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
R-1        863573CQ2   BB (sf)              BBB+ (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 92-5
Series 1992- 5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
BO         863573JK8   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
G          863573JL6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 92-8
Series 1992- 8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
G          863573MQ1   CC (sf)              BB (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 93-5
Series 1993- 5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
G          863573TH4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 93-6
Series 1993- 6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AA         863573UL3   CC (sf)              B+ (sf)
G          863573UA7   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Travelers Mortgage Services Inc.
Series 1989- 1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1A         89419KAY9   BB (sf)              AA- (sf)

Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-AR12
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        939336CR2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        939336CS0   B (sf)               A+ (sf)
B-2        939336CT8   CC (sf)              B (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR14 Trust
Series 2002-AR14
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        939336CZ4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        939336DH3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        939336DA8   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)

Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-AR15
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-5        939336DN0   BB (sf)              AA (sf)
B-1        929227WM4   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-AR16
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        929227WQ5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        929227WR3   B- (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-2        929227WS1   CC (sf)              BB (sf)
B-3        929227WT9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-S6 Trust
Series 2002-S6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4        929227UT1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-21       929227VL7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-22       929227VM5   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-23       929227VN3   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-24       929227VP8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-25       929227VQ6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
P          929227WD4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        929227S&P2   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        929227WF9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        929227WG7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR2 Trust
Series 2003-AR2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        929227E69   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        929227E77   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
M          929227E93   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-1        929227F27   B (sf)               BBB- (sf)

WaMu Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-S4
Series 2002-S4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A3         22540VY55   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A4         22540VY63   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X          22540VZ54   NR                   AAA (sf)
P          22540VZ62   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B1         22540VZ88   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B2         22540VZ96   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B3         22540V2A9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2002-MS2 Trust
Series 2002-MS2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-4      939335H57   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-1     939335L94   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
III-A-1    939335M28   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-X        939335M36   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-P        939335M44   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-B-1      939335M51   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-2      939335M69   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-3      939335M77   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2002-AR1
Series 2002-AR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-1      939335N68   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-2     939335N84   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
III-A-4    939335P41   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-X       939335P58   NR                   AAA (sf)
III-X      939335P66   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-B-1      939335P74   B (sf)               A- (sf)
C-B-2      939335P82   B (sf)               B+ (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2002-MS12 Trust
Series 2002-MS12
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A          939336NE9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
X          939336NF6   NR                   AAA (sf)
P          939336NG4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2002-MS3 Trust
Series 2002-MS3
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-4      939335Q99   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
I-A-10     939335R72   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-2     939335T39   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-3     939335T47   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-X        939335T54   NR                   AAA (sf)
C-P        939335T62   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-B-1      939335T70   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-2      939335T88   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-3      939335T96   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2002-MS6 Trust

Series 2002-MS6
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
II-A-1     939336CE1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-2     939336CF8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
III-A-1    939336CG6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-X        939336CH4   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-X       939336CJ0   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-P        939336CK7   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-P       939336CL5   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-B-1      939336CM3   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-2      939336CN1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-3      939336CP6   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-MS4 Trust
Series 2002-MS4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
I-A-4      939335U94   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
I-A-37     939335Z24   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
II-A-1     9393352J3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
III-A-1    9393352K0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-X        9393352L8   NR                   AAA (sf)
II-X       9393352M6   NR                   AAA (sf)
A-P        9393352N4   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-B-1      9393352Q7   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
II-P       9393352P9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
C-B-2      9393352R5   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
C-B-3      9393352S3   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-1 Trust
Series 2002-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        94978CAB0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-PO       94978CAC8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        94978CAE4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        94978CAF1   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        94978CAG9   B (sf)               AAA (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2002-20 Trust
Series 2002-20
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4        94979MAD3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-5        94979MAE1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-PO       94979MAF8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        94979MAH4   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        94979MAJ0   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-3        94979MAK7   B (sf)               AA+ (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-A Trust
Series 2003-A
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-5        94980BAE2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        94980BAK8   B (sf)               B+ (sf)
B-2        94980BAL6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-C Trust
Series 2003-C
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-4        94980EAD8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-5        94980EAE6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-6        94980EAF3   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-7        94980EAG1   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        94980EAM8   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        94980EAN6   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-3        94980EAP1   B (sf)               A+ (sf)
B-4        94980EAQ9   B (sf)               BBB (sf)
B-5        94980EAR7   B- (sf)              BB (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-D Trust
Series 2003-D
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        949911AA9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        949911AC5   B (sf)               AAA (sf)
B-2        949911AD3   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-3        949911AE1   B (sf)               A (sf)
B-4        949911AF8   B (sf)               BB (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-E Trust
Series 2003-E
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        949783AA2   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-2        949783AB0   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-3        949783AC8   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-4        949783AD6   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
A-WIO      949783AE4   NR                   AAA (sf)
B-1        949783AG9   CCC (sf)             AA+ (sf)
B-2        949783AH7   CC (sf)              A (sf)
B-3        949783AJ3   CC (sf)              B (sf)
B-4        949783AK0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-T Trust
Series 2004-T
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-1        94981BAA9   BB (sf)              AAA (sf)
B-1        94981BAC5   B (sf)               AA (sf)
B-2        94981BAD3   B (sf)               A+ (sf)
B-3        94981BAE1   B (sf)               BBB+ (sf)
B-4        94981BAF8   CCC (sf)             BB- (sf)
B-5        94981BAG6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Banc of America Mortgage 2003-B Trust
Series 2003-B
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        06050HE53   CCC (sf)
B-3        06050HE61   CC (sf)
B-4        06050HE95   CC (sf)
B-5        06050HF29   CC (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage 2002-E Trust
Series 2002-E
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        06050HJM1   CC (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage 2002-J Trust
Series 2002-J
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        06050HVR6   CCC (sf)
B-3        06050HVS4   CC (sf)

Bank of America Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 2002-G
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-B-3      06050HLC0   CCC (sf)

Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2001-4
Series 2001-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        07384MDC3   CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2002-30
Series 2002-30
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        12669DFA1   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-2
Series 2004-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        12669FKY8   CC (sf)
B-4        12669FKZ5   CC (sf)

Citibank N.A.
Series 1986- J
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          172905AN1   A (sf)

Citicorp Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series 1989- 1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        172921CP1   A (sf)

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-19
Class      CUSIP       Rating
II-M-1     22540V6Q0   B (sf)

Equity One ABS, INC.
Series 1998-1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        294751AF9   CC (sf)

FNT MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES FNT 2001-4
Series 2001-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
D-A-P      22540WFV7   CC (sf)
IV-A-1     22540S&PD8   CC (sf)
IV-A-3     22540WFT2   CC (sf)
V-A-1      22540S&PF3   CC (sf)

Greenwich Capital Acceptance Inc.
Series 1994-ARM5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        396782CW2   B (sf)
A-2        396782CX0   B (sf)
B-1        396782CY8   B (sf)
B-2        396782CZ5   B (sf)

GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B1         36228FE44   CC (sf)
B2         36228FE51   CC (sf)
B3         36228FE69   CC (sf)

IndyMac ARM Trust 2001-H2
Series 2001-H2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        45660UAX7   CC (sf)

IndyMac ARM Trust IndyMac ARM Grantor Trust 2001-H1
Series 2001-H1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A        45660UAA7   CCC (sf)
II-A       45660UAB5   CCC (sf)
III-A-2    45660UAJ8   CC (sf)
B-1        45660UAF6   CC (sf)
B-2        45660UAG4   CC (sf)

RFMSI Series 2003-S9 Trust
Series 2003-S9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M-3        76111J2D5   B (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1993- 9
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        79548KJG4   B (sf)
B-3        79548KJH2   CCC (sf)
B-4        79548KJJ8   CC (sf)
B-5        79548KJK5   CC (sf)

Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII Inc.
Series 1994-20
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A          79548KPK8   AA+ (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-1A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A3       86358RTY3   BB (sf)
1-A4       86358RTZ0   BB (sf)
1-A5       86358RUA3   BB- (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2002-18A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A1       86358R5E3   B (sf)
B1-I       86358R5L7   CC (sf)
B2-I       86358R5N3   CC (sf)
2-A1       86358R5G8   BB- (sf)
B1-II      86358R5Q6   CC (sf)
B2-II      86358R5R4   CC (sf)
B3         86358R5S2   CC (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust Series 92-6
Series 1992- 6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
BN         863573KP5   B+ (sf)
R-1        863573KT7   B+ (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 91-8
Series 1991- 8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
F          863573EF4   BB (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 92-11
Series 1992-11
Class      CUSIP       Rating
BJ         863573PU9   B+ (sf)
BX         863573PV7   B+ (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 92-8
Series 1992- 8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
BX         863573ML2   B+ (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 93-3
Series 1993- 3
Class      CUSIP       Rating
CX         863573SR3   B+ (sf)
G          863573SC6   CCC (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 93-4
Series 1993- 4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
AX         863573TC5   B+ (sf)
R-1        863573TE1   B+ (sf)
G          863573TG6   CCC (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 93-5
Series 1993- 5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
CX         863573TW1   B+ (sf)

Structured Mortgage Asset Residential Trust, Series 93-6
Series 1993- 6
Class      CUSIP       Rating
BX         863573UN9   B+ (sf)

Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-AR12
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-3        939336CU5   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR13 Trust
Series 2002-AR13
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1        929227UB0   BB (sf)
A-2        929227UC8   BB (sf)
M-1        929227UD6   B (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR14 Trust
Series 2002-AR14
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        939336DB6   CC (sf)
B-3        939336DC4   CC (sf)

Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2002-AR15
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        929227WN2   CCC (sf)
B-3        929227WP7   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-AR2 Trust
Series 2003-AR2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-2        929227F35   CCC (sf)
B-3        929227F43   CC (sf)

Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2002-AR1
Series 2002-AR1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
C-B-3      939335P90   CCC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-D Trust
Series 2003-D
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-5        949911AG6   CCC (sf)

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-E Trust
Series 2003-E
Class      CUSIP       Rating
B-5        949783AL8   CC (sf)

                           *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases by individuals and business entities estimating
assets and debts or disclosing assets and liabilities at less than
$1,000,000.  The list includes links to freely downloadable images
of the small-dollar business-related petitions in Acrobat PDF
format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                          *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard
C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise Marie Varquez,
Philline Reluya, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via e-
mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


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