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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, July 8, 2012, Vol. 16, No. 188

                            Headlines

ACA ABS 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on $82.3-Mil. Notes
AMERICREDIT 2012-3: Moody's Rates Class E Securities 'Ba1'
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Secs.
APIDOS CLO IX: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB(sf)' Rating on Cl. E Notes
BAYVIEW 2007-CAD1: Moody's Cuts Rating on IO Securities to 'B3'

BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Takes Action on $428MM of RMBS Transactions
CAPITAL TRUST 2005-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to 'D(sf)'
CITIGROUP 2009-6: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. 13A2 Certs. to 'Ca'
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $228MM U.S. Alt-A RMBS
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1998-C2: Fitch Cuts Rating on J Notes to CCsf

CREDIT SUISSE 2001-CP4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. F Notes to 'CCC'
CSFB MORTGAGE 2001-S6: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 5 Certs.
CUMBERLAND II: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes from 'Ba1'
CWHEQ 2006-RES: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 RMBS Classes
DEBORAH HEART: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Outstanding Bonds

DENALI CAPITAL: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba3'
DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
G-FORCE 2005-RR2: S&P Cuts Rating on A-3FL Notes to 'CCC-(sf)'
GOAL CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating for Class C-1 Notes
GTP COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on $155-Mil. Notes

HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $387-Mil. 2004 RMBS
JP MORGAN 2012-CIBX: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates 'B2'
LBSBC NIM 2007-3: S&P Lowers & Withdraws Ratings on 3 Note Classes
LB-UBS COMM. 2001-C7: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 7 CMBS Classes
LB-UBS COMM. 2003-C5: Fitch Cuts Rating on $8.8MM Notes to 'CCCsf'

LONGHORN CDO III: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ca'
LSTAR 2011-1: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on Class F Securities
MACH ONE 2005-CDN1: S&P Lowers Rating on 13 CMBS Re-REMIC Classes
MADISON SQUARE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-MKB1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 4 Cert. Classes

MORGAN STANLEY 1999-CAM1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratng on Cl. N. Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ14: Moody's Rates Cl. A-JFX Certs. 'Caa2'
NOMURA CRE: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Seven Note Classes
ORIGEN MANUFACTURED: S&P Cuts Ratings on Six Note Classes
PROTECTIVE LIFE: Fitch Lowers 3 Certificate Classes to 'CCC'

PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $9.3MM Notes
RESI FINANCE 2006-B: Fitch Withdraws Junk Rating on 11 Notes
SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-4: Fitch Rates $47MM Cl. E Notes at 'BBsf'
SATURN VENTURES: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on 2 Note Classes
SHEFFIELD CDO: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-(sf)'

SLM STUDENT LOAN 2003-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. B Notes
SLM STUDENT LOAN 2003-4: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. B Notes
STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Tranches to Caa1
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Takes Action on $642MM Alt-A RMBS
STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Takes Action on $1.6-Bil. RMBS Deals

SYMPHONY VIII: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on $17.2MM Cl. E Notes
UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C2: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates '(P)B2'
VERMONT STUDENT: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Bonds to 'B1'
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C12: Fitch Keeps 'CCC' Rating on 2 Note Classes
WAMU COMMERCIAL 2006-SL1: Fitch Junks Rating on 5 Cert. Classes

WESTBROOK CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 201-C7: Moody's Rates 13 CMBS Classes
WG HORIZONS: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'

* Moody's Takes Action on $653 Million WaMu U.S. Alt A RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $484-Mil. of GMAC-RFAC Trusts' U.S. RMBS
* Moody's Takes Action on $225MM of Goldman Sach's U.S. RMBS
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $376MM of RMBS Issued in 2004
* S&P Downgrades 16 Ratings on 10 U.S. CDO Transactions

* S&P Cuts Rating on 29 Classes from 9 U.S. RMBS Transactions
* S&P Cuts 13 Ratings on 4 US CMBS Deals on Interest Shortfalls
* S&P Lowers Ratings on 7 Classes From 3 US CMBS Transactions
* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 26 Classes From Nine CDO Transactions
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Classes From 7 US RMBS Transactions

* S&P Raises Ratings on 50 Tranches From 44 CDO Transactions
* S&P Raises Ratings on 18 Tranches From Four CDO Transactions

                            *********

ACA ABS 2002-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on $82.3-Mil. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of notes issued by ACA
ABS 2002-1, Limited/ L.L.C. (ACA ABS 2002-1) as follows:

-- $13,122,667 class A notes at 'BBBsf', Outlook Negative;
-- $64,000,000 class B notes at 'Csf';
-- $18,378,725 class C notes at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. Fitch
used its Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
Fitch then compared these default levels to the breakeven levels
generated by its cash flow model of the CDO under various default
timing and interest rate stress scenarios. This is as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors in its analysis (as
described below) which led to the rating affirmations for the
rated notes

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2011, the credit quality
of the underlying collateral has declined further. Approximately
26.3% of the portfolio was downgraded a weighted average of four
notches. Currently, 62.8% of the portfolio has a Fitch derived
rating below investment grade. Additionally, 40% has a rating in
the 'CCC' rating category or lower, compared to 53.1% and 34%,
respectively at the last review.

The affirmation of the class A notes is due to amortization of the
capital structure offsetting the deterioration of the underlying
portfolio. Principal amortizations and excess interest proceeds
due to the failing class A/B overcollateralization test have been
used to redeem the class A notes' balance. The class A notes have
received $14.7 million (52.7% of the prior review balance) since
the last review. The cash flow model indicates a range of passing
ratings for the class A notes across different interest rate and
default timing scenarios.

In general, the model results are consistent with the current
rating on the class A notes. The lower passing ratings in Fitch's
'up' interest rate scenarios demonstrate the notes sensitivity to
interest rates. This reflects the fact that approximately 70.9% of
the portfolio earns a fixed rate coupon. All notes are floating-
rate and the interest rate swap expires in August 2012.
Additionally, the notes remain exposed to potential adverse
selection as the portfolio continues to amortize. In Fitch's
opinion, the 'BBBsf' rating and Negative Outlook appropriately
reflect the notes' exposure to the risks described.

For the class B and C notes Fitch compared the credit enhancement
level to the expected losses from the distressed and defaulted
assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This comparison
indicates that default continues to appear inevitable for the
class B and C notes at or prior to maturity.

ACA ABS 2002-1 is a structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed on July 29, 2002 and is managed by
Solidus Capital, LLC. As of the May 2012 trustee report, the
portfolio is primarily comprised of residential mortgage-backed
securities (43.8%), consumer and commercial asset-backed
securities (26%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (16.5%)
and SF CDOs (13.7%) from 1998 through 2005 vintage transactions.


AMERICREDIT 2012-3: Moody's Rates Class E Securities 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-3
(AMCAR 2012-3). This is the third public subprime transaction of
the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2012-3

Cl. A-1, rated P-1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, rated Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, rated Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, rated Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, rated Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, rated Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, rated Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, and the experience and expertise of
AmeriCredit as servicer.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities," published in
May 2011.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the AMCAR 2012-
3 pool is 10.25% and total credit enhancement required to achieve
Aaa rating (i.e. Aaa proxy) is 38.5%. The loss expectation was
based on an analysis of AmeriCredit's portfolio vintage
performance as well as performance of past securitizations, and
current expectations for future economic conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is Low/Medium
versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the Low/Medium
assessment for Governance due to the presence of a highly rated
backup servicer, Wells Fargo (Aa3/stable outlook/P-1), in addition
to the size and strength of AmeriCredit's servicing platform.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 20%, 25% or 35.0%,
the initial model output for the Class A notes might change from
Aaa to Aa1, Aa2, and A3, respectively; Class B notes might change
from Aa1 to A3, Baa3, and below B3, respectively; Class C notes
might change from Aa3 to Ba2, B3, and below B3, respectively;
Class D notes might change from Baa1 to below B3 in all three
scenarios; and Class E notes might change from Ba1 to below B3 in
all three scenarios.

Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE: Moody's Confirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Secs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of 1 tranche,
and confirmed the ratings of 2 tranches from three RMBS
transactions, backed by Scratch and Dent loans, issued by
Ameriquest.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

The downgrade is primarily due to deteriorating collateral
performance.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) bonds that are insured of financial
guarantors.

Loan Modifications

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to the bonds, in addition to the
methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the projected
losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

Bonds Insured by Financial Guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the securities is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2003-X3

Cl. M3, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Quest Trust 2005-X2

Cl. A-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19,
2012 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Quest Trust 2006-X1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19,
2012 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290457

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


APIDOS CLO IX: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB(sf)' Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Apidos CLO IX/Apidos CLO IX LLC's $370.825 million
floating-rate notes. The note issuance is collateralized loan
obligation transaction backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior-secured loans. The
preliminary ratings are based on information as of July 3, 2012.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

Preliminary Ratings Assigned
Apidos CLO IX/Apidos CLO IX LLC

Class                Rating                   Amount
                                            (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)                267.375
B                    AA (sf)                   37.90
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                    26.65
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                  21.50
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                   17.40
Subordinated notes   NR                       38.925

NR--Not rated.


BAYVIEW 2007-CAD1: Moody's Cuts Rating on IO Securities to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the interest-only (IO)
tranche in Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2007-CAD1 and confirmed
the IO tranche in Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2006-CAD1. These
deals are securitizations of Canadian small business loans secured
by small commercial real estate properties.

These actions are in direct accordance with the new methodology
which states that for IO securities referencing a single pool, the
rating will be the minimum of Ba3 (sf), the highest current
tranche rating on bonds that are outstanding backed by the
reference pool, or the rating corresponding to the pool's expected
loss.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2006-CAD1

Cl. IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Bayview Commercial Asset Trust 2007-CAD1

Cl. IO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ratings Rationale

In the case of the two tranches impacted by the actions, the
ratings are primarily driven by the rating corresponding to the
pools' expected losses. For the 2006 and 2007 securitizations, the
expected lifetime net losses are 7.25% and 15.50% of the original
pool balances, respectively. The methodology used to arrive at
these loss projections is outlined below, under "Methodology".

As of the May 2012 distribution date, loans 60 days or more
delinquent (including foreclosure) were 7% and 14% of the
outstanding pool balance for the 2006 and 2007 securitizations,
respectively. Additionally, cumulative net losses to date were
3.8% and 6.5% of the original pool balances for the 2006 and 2007
securitizations, respectively. The loans in both securitizations
primarily have balloon payments that will mature in 2012 through
2014.

The interest-only methodology addresses expected differences in
cash flows to the IO holder that arise from defaults and losses
and maps them to a credit rating. The methodology is the result of
extensive analysis into the meaning of the IO rating and how to
better align IO ratings with Moody's expected loss (EL) ratings
framework. The ratings framework approach is based on the results
of Moody's cash flow analysis. To arrive at the ratings framework,
Moody's tested various types of IOs using a Monte Carlo approach.
Under multiple scenarios Moody's measured the reduction in cash
flow on an IO security relative to base case scenarios that were
run off a matrix of default and recovery assumptions. The base
case scenarios assumed no credit events on the reference tranches.
Simulations stressed defaults and recoveries, but did not stress
prepayments nor extensions. Prepayments are considered non credit
events. Changes to the ratings or credit estimates of the
referenced bonds or assets will directly impact the ratings of the
IO.

IOs reference one or more bonds or assets. As such, the key rating
parameters that influence the ratings on the referenced bonds will
also influence the ratings on the IO. Key rating parameters for US
ABS include lifetime net losses, and are captured in the ratings
and credit estimates of the referenced bonds or assets.

Changes in the key parameters may have rating implications on
certain classes of rated notes that are referenced by the IO. IO
ratings are sensitive to any rating changes within the reference
pool and/or changes in expected loss.

The performance expectations within a given variable indicate
Moody's forward-looking view of the likely range of performance
over the medium to long term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations.

Performance that falls outside the given range may indicate that
the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's
had anticipated when the referenced securities were issued or
assets were securitized. Even so, a deviation from the expected
range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors, including, but not exclusively
limited to, the performance metrics.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities",
published in February 2012.

In addition, the methodology for determining pool losses in the
securitizations is discussed below:

For the 2006 securitization, the expected lifetime net loss is
7.25% of the original pool balance. In projecting the expected
loss, Moody's assumed all the loans 60 days or more past due will
default in the near term with severity of 60%. At the weighted
average balloon maturity date, Moody's assumed that 70% of the
loans will refinance, and the remaining loans will either default
or may be extended and eventually refinance. Moody's projection of
amounts that will default on or after the weighted average balloon
maturity is based on historical levels of loans 60-90 days past
due with the assumption that 30% of these delinquencies will
default each month with a 50% severity.

For the 2007 securitization, the expected lifetime net loss is
15.50% of the original pool balance. The assumptions used in
projecting the expected loss are similar to those of the 2006
deal. However, if loans are modified, the Private Placement
Memorandum states that the maturity dates may not be extended past
that of the loan with the longest maturity date as of closing (in
this case December 2014). As a result, Moody's applied more
stressful assumptions for the 2007 securitization than for the
2006 securitization for loans that cannot be refinanced at their
balloon maturity dates.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the general economic
environment, commercial property values, and the ability of small
businesses to recover from periods of economic downturn. If the
lifetime expected losses used in determining the ratings were
increased by 10%, the Class IO tranches may be downgraded.


BEAR STEARNS: Moody's Takes Action on $428MM of RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 32
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 3 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 6 tranches from 14 RMBS transactions, backed by Scratch
and Dent loans, issued by Bear Stearns.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

The rating action constitute of 3 upgrades as well as 32
downgrades. The upgrades are due to an increase in the available
credit enhancement. The downgrade is primarily due to
deteriorating collateral performance.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

When assigning the final ratings to the bonds, in addition to the
methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the projected
losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD2

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD3

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD4

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-SD1

Cl. I-M-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-M-5, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-3

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2007-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD1

Cl. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-SD3

Cl. A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD1

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2004-SD2

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290452

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


CAPITAL TRUST 2005-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to 'D(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A notes from Capital Trust RE CDO 2005-1 Ltd. (Capital Trust 2005-
1), a commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE
CDO) transaction.

"The downgrade reflects an interest shortfall on the nondeferrable
class A notes, as reported in the June 20, 2012, trustee report,"
S&P said.

Rating Lowered

Capital Trust RE CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations
                  Rating
Class     To                   From
A         D (sf)               CCC- (sf)


CITIGROUP 2009-6: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. 13A2 Certs. to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of class 13A2
issued by Citigroup 2009-6 Trust to Ca (sf) from C (sf).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Resecuritization Trust
Certificates, Series 2009-6

Cl. 13A2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 5, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The action reflects the relative credit enhancement of the bond
compared to the updated loss expectation on the pools of mortgages
backing the underlying certificate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Resecuritized Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities" published in February 2011.

The resecuritization is backed by an underlying bond - Class A-3A
issued by Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC2. The underlying
bond is backed primarily by Subprime loans.

Moody's ratings on the resecuritization notes are based on:

1. The updated expected loss on the pools of loans backing the
underlying certificate and the updated rating on the underlying
certificate,

2. The credit enhancement available to the underlying certificate,
and

3. The structure of the resecuritization transaction.

The principal methodology used in determining the ratings of the
underlying bond is described in the Monitoring and Performance
Review section in "Moody's Approach to Rating US Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in December 2008.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of the underlying transactions and hence
the resecuritizations.

As part of the sensitivity analysis, Moody's stressed the updated
expected loss on the underlying bond by an additional 10% and
found that the implied rating of the resecuritization bond does
not change.

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290222


CITIGROUP MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $228MM U.S. Alt-A RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 29
tranches and confirmed the ratings of 16 tranches from 5 RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by Citigroup.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In its current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.1% in April 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-UP2

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. S-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. IO-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. IO-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2003-UP3

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-4, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-HYB4

Cl. A-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. W-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM1

Cl. IA-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IA-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IA-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IIA-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IIA-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IIA-3, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IIIA-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IIIA-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. IV-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. XS-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XS-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XS-4, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. PO-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NCM2

Cl. PO-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO-3, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. XS-1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XS-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XS-3, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XS-4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290305

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 1998-C2: Fitch Cuts Rating on J Notes to CCsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades one and affirms three classes of
Commercial Mortgage Acceptance Corp. commercial mortgage pass
through certificates, series 1998-C2.

The downgrade to the distressed class is a result of increased
likelihood of losses. The affirmations are due to stable
performance of the pool providing sufficient credit enhancement to
the classes. As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's
certificate balance has paid down 93.2% to $195.8 million from
$2.89 billion at issuance.

There are 76 remaining loans from the original 512 loans at
issuance. Of the remaining loans, eleven loans (21.9%) have
defeased and 30 loans (19.9%) are fully amortizing.

Fitch has identified 11 loans (16%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes one specially serviced loan (1.2%).  The specially
serviced asset (1.2%) is secured by a 72,720 sf light industrial
building in Indianapolis, IN. The single tenant occupying the
building downsized and subsequently the loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2010 for payment default. The property is
REO and is being marketed for sale with an anticipated close later
this year.

Fitch downgrades and assigns a Recovery Estimate to the following
class as indicated:

-- $65 million class J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch affirms and assigns a Recovery Estimate to the following
classes as indicated:

-- $21.7 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36.1 million class H at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.3 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 45%.

Fitch does not rate classes F and M. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C,
D and E have paid in full. Fitch maintains the rating of 'Dsf/RE
0%' on class L. Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating of the
interest only class X (for additional information, see 'Fitch
Revises Practice for Rating IO & Pre-Payment Related Structured
Finance Securities', dated June 23, 2010).


CREDIT SUISSE 2001-CP4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. F Notes to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2001-CP4 (CSFB 2001-CP4).

The downgrades are primarily due to an increase in Fitch expected
losses on the specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled losses of
30.2% of the remaining pool; expected losses of the original pool
are at 9.1%, including losses already incurred to date. Fitch has
identified 10 loans (75.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, including
nine specially serviced loans (72.6%).

As of the June 2011 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 92.8% to $84.4 million from $1.18
billion at issuance. There are 17 loans remaining in the pool,
including one (0.6%) that has fully defeased. Interest shortfalls
totaling $8.6 million are currently affecting classes F through O.

The largest contributor to modeled losses (18.3%) is a 156,776
square feet (SF) office property located in Shelton, CT. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2008 due to monetary
default. The borrower filed bankruptcy protection in August 2009.
The property became a real estate owned asset (REO) in June 2012
after the bankruptcy sale. Servicer reported occupancy rate as of
Dec. 31, 2011 was 57.5%. Fitch expects significant losses upon
liquidation of the asset based on recent property valuations.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses (15.9%) is a
166,594 SF office property located in Raleigh, NC. The loan
transferred to special servicing in December 2009 due to monetary
default. A foreclosure sale was originally scheduled for November
2010 until the borrower filed for bankruptcy which stayed the
foreclosure sale. The court has postponed a confirmation of the
borrower proposed reorganization plan until the value of the
property is determined.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses (15.9%) consists
of two multifamily properties. The first property, containing 200
units, is located in Kansas City, KS and the servicer reported
occupancy rate as of July 2011 was 83.5%. The second property,
containing 180 units, is located in Gladstone, MO and the servicer
reported occupancy rate as of May 2011 was 86.7%. The loan
transferred to the Special Servicer in May 2010 due to payment
default. The loan matured in August 2011. A receiver was appointed
on Dec. 13, 2010 for the Kansas property. The borrower of the
Missouri property filed bankruptcy in February 2012 and a cash
collateral order has been entered.

Fitch has downgraded and assigned Recovery Estimates (RE) as
indicated:

-- $16.2 million class F to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE90%;
-- $11.8 million class G to 'Csf' from 'B-sf'; RE0%.

Fitch has also affirmed the following classes and revised outlooks
as indicated:

-- $5.7 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.1 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $16.2 million class E at 'Asf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
- $12.4 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE0%;

Classes J, K, L, M, and N remain at 'Dsf, RE 0%'. Fitch does not
class O. Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on the
interest-only class A-X.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2001-S6: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on 5 Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings of seven
tranches from three second lien deals issued by CSFB Mortgage
Pass-Through and Green Tree Home Improvement Loan trusts.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Green Tree Home Improvement Loans 1995-C

B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010 Confirmed at Caa1
(sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-S6

Cl. II-P, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. XB-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. XB-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Home Improvement Loans 1996-A

B-2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2010 Confirmed at Caa2
(sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF291065

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating pursuant to published rating
methodologies that allow for the withdrawal of the rating if the
size of the underlying collateral pool at the time of the
withdrawal has fallen below a specified level.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities"
published in December 2008.

Moody's current RMBS surveillance methodologies apply to pools
with at least 40 loans or a pool factor of greater than 5%. As a
result, Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops
below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines to 40 loans
or lower unless specific structural features allow for a
monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).


CUMBERLAND II: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes from 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Cumberland II CLO Ltd.:

U.S. $32,000,000 Class B Second Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due November, 2019, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July
14, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf);

U.S. $16,000,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due November, 2019, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
July 14, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A and an increase
in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since the rating
action in July 2011. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have
been paid down by approximately 38% or $109.9 million since the
last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report dated June
5, 2012, the Class A, Class B and Class C overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 141.72%, 120.37% and 111.95%, respectively,
versus June 2010 levels of 125.01%, 112.6% and 107.28%,
respectively. Moody's also notes that the weighted average rating
factor has been stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $255.9 million,
defaulted par of $2.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.16% (implying a WARF of 2636), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.37%, and a diversity
score of 62. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Cumberland II CLO Ltd., issued in September 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2109)

Class A: 0
Class B: +2
Class C: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3163)

Class A: 0
Class B: -2
Class C: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


CWHEQ 2006-RES: S&P Downgrades Ratings on 10 RMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 10
classes from CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization
Trust's series 2006-RES (CWHEQ 2006-RES), a residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized real estate mortgage
investment conduit (re-REMIC) transaction.  "In addition, we
raised our ratings on 14 classes from CWHEQ 2006-RES and two U.S.
RMBS home-equity line of credit (HELOC) transactions," S&P said.

"We also affirmed our ratings on 34 classes from CWHEQ 2006-RES
and seven other U.S. RMBS HELOC transactions," S&P said.

Each HELOC transaction is backed by two pools of HELOC mortgage
loans secured by second liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

"Among other factors, the upgrades on the HELOC deals reflect our
view of decreased delinquencies within the structures associated
with these classes," S&P said.

This has caused a decrease to the remaining projected losses for
these classes, which are then able to withstand more stressful
scenarios.

"In addition, each of the upgrades reflects our assessment that
the projected credit enhancement for each of the upgraded classes
will be more than sufficient to cover projected losses at the
revised rating levels; however, we are limiting the extent of the
upgrades to reflect our view of the ongoing market risk.  The
upgrades from 'CCC (sf)' reflect our opinion that these classes
are no longer projected to default based on the credit enhancement
available to cover the projected losses," S&P said.

The rating actions on the classes from CWHEQ 2006-RES reflect the
corresponding rating actions on the long-term ratings of the
classes from the related underlying transactions.

"We affirmed our ratings on classes from the HELOC transactions
rated above 'CCC (sf)' to reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement available for the affected classes will be sufficient
to cover our projected losses at the current rating levels," S&P
said.

"The affirmations of 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect our
continued belief that the credit enhancement available for these
classes will remain insufficient to cover our base-case loss
projections," S&P said.

Some classes may also benefit from bond insurance.  In these
cases, the long-term rating reflects the higher of the rating of
the bond insurer and the underlying credit rating on the class
without the benefit of bond insurance.

"In accordance with our published criteria, these rating actions
reflect our view of the recent performance of the collateral
backing these transactions, our current projected losses, the
timing of the projected defaults and losses, and the projected
credit support to cover those losses," S&P said.

"Due to the extended seasoning and longevity of transactions
outstanding that closed in 2004, we reviewed transactions issued
in 2004 in accordance with our criteria in "Methodology and
Assumptions For U.S. RMBS Issued Before 2005, published March 12,
2009, in lieu of the criteria described in "Loss Curve
Applied To U.S. HELOC RMBS Issued In 2004-2007," published May 22,
2008.  As such, we subjected delinquent loans to a 100% default
likelihood distributed evenly over a period of six months.  We
also applied a loss severity (loss given default) of 100%, which
we apply to all transactions backed predominantly by second
liens," S&P said.

"Due to the length of the loss curve we typically apply to 2004-
vintage transactions, in conjunction with transaction seasoning,
we believe that applying the pre-2004 criteria was more
appropriate for our review of the transactions that closed in
2004," S&P said.

"For the remaining HELOC transactions within this review issued in
2005, we used the greater of (i) the losses provided in
"Assumptions: Revised Lifetime Loss Projections For U.S. Closed-
End Second-Lien And HELOC RMBS Transactions Issued In 2005, 2006,
And 2007," published Dec. 21, 2009, (ii) the losses projected in
accordance with the criteria applied for 2004 and prior vintages,
and (iii) the losses projected in accordance with the second-lien
loss curve described in "Loss Curve Applied to U.S. HELOC RMBS
Issued in 2004-2007," published May 22, 2008.  We normally would
use the second-lien loss curve for the timing of losses for
mortgage pools that were seasoned less than 76 months, regardless
of the methodology applied to project the dollar loss," S&P said.

However, the reviewed HELOC transactions are seasoned more than 76
months.   Since the curve only extends over 82 months, we applied
losses for a minimum of six months, distributed evenly.

Extended loan seasoning and updated performance data was a driving
factor in the application of different methodologies for certain
transactions.  "As such, on Dec. 27, 2011, we published "Advance
Notice Of Proposed Criteria Change: Surveillance Methodology And
Assumptions For U.S. RMBS Transactions Backed By Second-Lien
Mortgage Loans," in which we provided notice that we expect to
update our methodology and assumptions to consider the extended
seasoning of these transactions compared with our existing
methodology.  As a result, the application of the forthcoming
criteria update could result in additional ratings changes for
RMBS transactions backed by second-lien loans," S&P said.

"We evaluated all transactions with our "middle" and "low"
interest rate vectors.  In general, the bonds in these
transactions receive interest indexed to one-month LIBOR, while
the underlying loans pay interest indexed to the prime rate.  The
difference between the two indices can result in excess interest,
which can contribute to a considerable portion of the credit
support for these transactions.  Therefore, we use the "low"
interest rate vectors to stress the amount of excess interest
produced, as these vectors have the lowest overall differential
between LIBOR and the prime rate," S&P said.

"In order for a class to maintain a rating higher than 'B', we
assessed whether the class could withstand losses exceeding the
remaining base-case loss assumptions at a percentage specific to
each rating category, up to 150% of remaining losses for an 'AAA'
rating. For example, in general, we would assess whether one class
could withstand approximately 110% of our remainingbase-case loss
assumption to maintain a 'BB' rating, while we would assess
whether a different class could withstand approximately 120% of
our remaining base-case loss assumption to maintain a 'BBB'
rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating can, in our
view, withstand approximately 150% of our remaining base-case loss
assumption under our analysis," S&P said.

Subordination, overcollateralization (prior to its depletion),
excess spread, and bond insurance, when applicable, provide credit
support for the affected HELOC transactions.

CWHEQ 2006-RES is backed by the class 1-A note from 20 underlying
bond-insured  HELOC transactions issued by Countrywide Home Loans
Inc., some of which are in this review.

Each related 1a and 1b class in the re-REMIC transaction receives
interest and principal from the corresponding 1-A class on a pro
rata basis.  "We intend our ratings on the re-REMIC classes to
address the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of
principal.  We reviewed the interest and principal amounts
due on each underlying class, which are then passed through to the
applicable re-REMIC classes.  We applied our loss projections,
incorporating our loss assumptions, to the underlying collateral
to identify the principal and interest amounts that could be
passed through from each underlying class under our rating
scenario stresses.  We stressed our loss projections at various
rating categories to assess whether the re-REMIC classes could
withstand the stressed losses associated with their ratings while
receiving timely payment of interest and principal consistent with
our criteria.  As a result, each re-REMIC class reflects the long-
term rating of the related 1-A class from the underlying
transaction," S&P said.

Rating Actions

CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-F
Series 2004-F
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        126673BS0   B (sf)               CCC (sf)
2-A        126673BT8   B (sf)               CCC (sf)

CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-N
Series 2004-N
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A        126673KM3   B (sf)               CCC (sf)
2-A        126673KN1   B (sf)               CCC (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization Trust
Series 2006-RES
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
04-E-1a    23242YAC9   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
04-E-1b    23242YAD7   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
04-F-1a    23242YAE5   B (sf)               CCC (sf)
04-F-1b    23242YAF2   B (sf)               CCC (sf)
04-K-1a    23242YAG0   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
04-K-1b    23242YAH8   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
04-N-1a    23242YAN5   B (sf)               CCC (sf)
04-N-1b    23242YAP0   B (sf)               CCC (sf)
04-P-1a    23242YAQ8   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
04-P-1b    23242YAR6   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
04-T-1a    23242YAW5   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
04-T-1b    23242YAX3   B- (sf)              CCC (sf)
05-A-1a    23242YBA2   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
05-A-1b    23242YBB0   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
05-C-1a    23242YBE4   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
05-C-1b    23242YBF1   AA- (sf)             AAA (sf)
05-D-1a    23242YBG9   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
05-D-1b    23242YBH7   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
05-E-1a    23242YBJ3   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
05-E-1b    23242YBK0   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-P
Series 2004-P
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        126673LL4   B (sf)
2-A        126673LM2   B (sf)

CWABS Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2004-U
Series 2004-U
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A Notes  126673VD1   CCC (sf)
2-A Notes  126673VE9   CC (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Resecuritization Trust
Series 2006-RES
Class      CUSIP       Rating
04-D-1a    23242YAA3   B (sf)
04-D-1b    23242YAB1   B (sf)
04-L-1a    23242YAJ4   BBB (sf)
04-L-1b    23242YAK1   BBB (sf)
04-M-1a    23242YAL9   BBB (sf)
04-M-1b    23242YAM7   BBB (sf)
04-Q-1a    23242YAS4   BBB (sf)
04-Q-1b    23242YAT2   BBB (sf)
04-R-1a    23242YAU9   BBB (sf)
04-R-1b    23242YAV7   BBB (sf)
04-U-1a    23242YAY1   CCC (sf)
04-U-1b    23242YAZ8   CCC (sf)
05-B-1a    23242YBC8   CC (sf)
05-B-1b    23242YBD6   CC (sf)
05-F-1a    23242YBL8   CCC (sf)
05-F-1b    23242YBM6   CCC (sf)
05-G-1a    23242YBN4   BBB (sf)
05-G-1b    23242YBP9   BBB (sf)
05-H-1a    23242YBQ7   BBB+ (sf)
05-H-1b    23242YBR5   BBB+ (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-A
Series 2005-A
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        761545AC6   B (sf)
2-A        761545AD4   B (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-B
Series 2005-B
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        126685AA4   CC (sf)
2-A        126685AB2   CC (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-C
Series 2005-C
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        126685AC0   AA- (sf)
2-A        126685AD8   AA- (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-D
Series 2005-D
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        126685AE6   AA- (sf)
2-A        126685AF3   AA- (sf)

CWHEQ Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-F
Series
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A        126685AJ5   CCC (sf)
2-A        126685AK2   CC (sf)


DEBORAH HEART: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Outstanding Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B1 rating assigned to
Deborah Heart and Lung's (DHLC) affecting $20.1 million of
outstanding bonds issued by New Jersey Health Care Facilities
Financing Authority. The outlook has been revised to negative from
stable.

Summary Rating Rationale

The B1 rating reflects overall stability in financial performance
over the past three years requiring lower subsidies from The
Deborah Foundation, following a longer-term history of larger
losses and greater subsidies. The revision of the outlook to
negative reflects the growing financial pressures that Moody's
believes may impair future financial performance given DHLC's high
exposure to Medicare and concentration in cardiology services.
These pressures will likely require greater subsidies from The
Deborah Foundation which is endeavoring to change to more
contemporary fundraising strategies during a period of widespread
economic stress.

Strengths

* Improvement in year-to-date financial performance through April
   30, 2012 with an operating cash flow margin of 2.3%, compared
   to 1.3% in the prior year comparable period, due to expense
   management, increase in inpatient admissions and better
   classification of observation stays; management expects to
   exceed its FY 2012 budget which projects an operating loss of
   $6.1 million

* Maintenance of cash position with $25.5 million in unrestricted
   cash and investments (combined for DHLC and the Foundation) at
   the end of FY 2011, slightly down from $27.0 million at the end
   of FY 2010; management reports that cash was up by $1.7 million
   as of April 30, 2012 over April 30, 2011; cash to debt of 98%
   is above average for speculative grade ratings and reflects
   DHLC's low debt burden of 18% debt to revenues (compared to
   national median of 36%)

* Satellite emergency center (opened in FY 2010) has supported
   volume trends and prevented further admission declines

* All fixed rate debt structure; debt service reserve fund
   remains untouched; management reports no near-term plans for
   additional debt

* Irrevocable Subsidy Agreement from the Deborah Hospital
   Foundation that has historically subsidized operating losses at
   the Center

Challenges

* Decline in FY 2011 performance with a very thin 1.3% operating
   cash flow margin, down from a record 4.9% operating cash flow
   margin in FY 2010 and more in line with FY 2009 results (1.7%
   operating cash flow margin), however DHLC's operating cash flow
   margin has improved through April 30, 2012 as noted above; weak
   Moody's-adjusted maximum annual debt service coverage of 2.08
   times when including capital leases in FY 2011

* Decline in liquidity as of March 31, 2012 to $20 million or 52
   days cash on hand which management attributes to cyclicality of
   fundraising; increase in liquidity as of April 30, 2012 over
   April 30, 2011 demonstrates cyclicality

* Material decline in inpatient admissions due to the shift to
   observation and same day care stays in FY 2011; since reversed
   with the engagement of consultants to help more properly
   classify patients; as a result, management reports that through
   April 30, 2012 admissions are up 11.3% over April 30, 2011 and
   4.7% higher than April 30, 2010

* High exposure to Medicare (61%, compared to national average of
   42%) given specialized focus on cardiology

* Increase in pension liability to $20.1 million in FY 2011 due
   to a lower discount rate and asset returns; cash to
   comprehensive debt declines to 55% when including pension
   liability

* Weakened economic conditions hampering fundraising efforts
   which is an integral strategy to grow liquidity and subsidize
   the clinical operations

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects potential for a rating downgrade
over the next twelve to eighteen months if current financial
levels are not maintained or there is a decline in liquidity. The
longer-term credit profile of DHLC, as a B1 credit rating
suggests, still remains a high-risk investment given the center's
small size, concentrated service array, high Medicare exposure and
reliance on fundraising to subsidize losses on clinical
operations.

What Could Change The Rating Up

Material improvement in performance that is sustainable, material
growth in liquidity and fundraising; enterprise growth via volume
increases

What Could Change The Rating Down

Departure from budgeted expectations, decline in liquidity

The principal methodology used in this rating was Not-For-Profit
Healthcare Rating Methodology published in March 2012.


DENALI CAPITAL: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class B-2L Notes to 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Denali Capital CLO VI, Ltd. :

U.S.$27,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to
A1 (sf);

U.S.$24,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2020,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf);

U.S.$19,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2020,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf);

U.S.$14,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2020,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Confirmed at
Caa3 (sf);

U.S.$16,000,000 Class C-1 Combination Notes Due April 2020
(current outstanding rated balance $8,279,241), Upgraded to Aa3
(sf); previously on November 21, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect a correction to Moody's modeling of the Class B-1L
Overcollateralization Test, the Class B-2L Overcollateralization
Test and the Additional Collateral Deposit Requirement. Due to an
input error, the Class B-1L Overcollateralization Test, the Class
B-2L Overcollateralization Test and the Additional Collateral
Deposit Requirement were not modeled properly for previous rating
actions, thereby preventing interest and principal proceeds from
deleveraging the notes upon failure of these ratios in the model.

The rating upgrades are also the result of the benefit of the
short period of time remaining before the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in July 2012. In consideration of the
reinvestment restrictions applicable during the amortization
period, and therefore limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics will continue to maintain a positive "cushion"
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread and diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
November 2011. Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
collateral quality and overcollateralization ratio are stable
since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $473 million,
defaulted par of $5.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.91% (implying a WARF of 2772), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.86%, and a diversity
score of 86. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Denali Capital CLO VI, Ltd., issued in March 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans with significant exposure to senior secured
loans of middle market issuers.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011 and
"Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO Combo-Notes"
published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2218)

Class A-1LR: 0
Class A-1L: 0
Class A-2L: +1
Class A-3L: +3
Class B-1L: +2
Class B-2L: +1
Class C-1: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3327)

Class A-1LR: 0
Class A-1L: 0
Class A-2L: -2
Class A-3L: -1
Class B-1L: -1
Class B-2L: -1
Class C-1: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability stresses Moody's may assume in lieu of updated
credit estimates.


DLJ COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-CF1.

As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's collateral
balance has paid down 98% to $14.6 million from $886.2 million at
issuance, including 3.8% in realized losses. Cumulative interest
shortfalls in the amount of $2.3 million are affecting classes B-5
through D.

The transaction has only two loans remaining. The largest
remaining loan, an office building in Largo, FL, is with the
special servicer. Recent valuations indicate losses upon
disposition. The other remaining loan is a retail center in
Gladwin, MI. The latest year end 2011 servicer reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.36 times (x).

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $1.5 million class B-4 at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $2.2 million class B-5 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $6.6 million class B-6 at 'CCsf'; RE 50%;
-- Class B-7 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- Class B-8 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-2, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2 and B-3 have been paid
in full. Fitch does not rate classes C and D.

Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
classes S.


G-FORCE 2005-RR2: S&P Cuts Rating on A-3FL Notes to 'CCC-(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes from G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust, a U.S. resecuritized real
estate mortgage investment conduit (RE-remic) transaction
and removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where they placed them on March 20, 2012.

"The downgrades reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our criteria for rating global
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of pooled structured
finance assets," S&P said.

"Our criteria for rating global CDOs of pooled structured finance
assets include revisions to our assumptions on correlations,
recovery rates, and the collateral's default patterns and timings.
The criteria also include supplemental stress tests (the largest
obligor default test and the largest industry default test) in our
analysis," S&P said.

According to the June 25, 2012, trustee report, G-Force 2005-RR2
was collateralized by 83 CMBS classes ($500.7 million, 100%) from
23 distinct transactions issued between 1998 and 2002. Classes D
through O have experienced losses that reduced their initial
balances to zero, while the class C balance is $18.6 million, down
from $47.4 million at issuance.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it determines necessary.

Ratings Lowered and Removed From Creditwatch Negative

G-Force 2005-RR2 Trust
                       Rating
Class            To               From
A-2              BBB+ (sf)        A+ (sf)/ Watch Neg
A-3FL            CCC- (sf)        B- (sf)/ Watch Neg


GOAL CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating for Class C-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior, subordinate, and Jr.
subordinate student loan notes issued by Goal Capital Funding
Trust 2007-1 at 'AAAsf', 'AA+sf', and 'BBsf' respectively. The
Rating Outlook for the senior notes, which is tied to the
sovereign rating of the U.S. government, remains Negative. The
Rating Outlook for the subordinate and Jr. subordinate notes
remains Stable.

Fitch affirms the ratings on the notes based on the sufficient
level of credit enhancement to cover the applicable risk factor
stresses. Credit enhancement for the senior, subordinate, and Jr.
subordinate notes consists of any combination of
overcollateralization and projected minimum excess spread, while
the senior and subordinate notes also benefit from subordination
provided by the class C notes.

Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Goal Capital Funding Trust 2007-1:
-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B-1 at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C-1 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.


GTP COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on $155-Mil. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the GTP commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2011-2, as follows:

-- $490,000,000 class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $155,000,000 class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmations are due to the stable performance of the
collateral since issuance.

The certificates represent beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 2,463 wireless communication
sites securing one fixed-rate loan. As of the May 2012
distribution date, the aggregate principal balance of the notes
remains unchanged at $645 million since issuance. The notes are
interest only for the entire five-year period.

As part of its review, Fitch analyzed the financial and site
information provided by the master servicer, Midland Loan
Services. As of May 31, 2012, aggregate annualized run rate net
cash flow increased 7.4% from issuance to $95.86 million. The
Fitch stressed DSCR increased from 1.24 times (x) at issuance to
1.32x as a result of the increase in net cash flow.

The tenant type concentration is stable. As of May 31, 2012, total
revenue contributed by telephony tenants was 90.4% compared to
89.5% at issuance. Lease revenues from telephony tenants have more
stable income characteristics than other tenant types due to the
strong end-use customer demand for wireless services.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE: Moody's Takes Action on $387-Mil. 2004 RMBS
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 44
tranches and confirmed the ratings of two tranches from eight RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM loans, issued by
Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools. The downgrades are a
result of deteriorating performance and/or structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting interest
structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the seniors to
tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority of these
deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal payments,
and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available to the
senior bonds. In its current approach, Moody's captures this risk
by running each individual pool through a variety of loss and
prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall
Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-10

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-2A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-2B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-5

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-8

Cl. 2-A4A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290228

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


JP MORGAN 2012-CIBX: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates 'B2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to fifteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2012-CIBX

Cl. A-1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FX*, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned B2 (sf)

* Represents exchangeable certificates. Certificates may be
   exchanged for Class A-4FL Certificates of like balance.

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 49 fixed rate loans secured
by 59 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.40X is slightly higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.04X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 99.5% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 104.3% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 22.7. which is in-line with other multi-
borrower pools rated by Moody's since 2009. The score is in-line
with previously rated conduit and fusion transactions but higher
than previously rated large loan transactions.

With respect to property level diversity, the pool's property
level Herfindahl score is 23.0. Five loans (6.6% of the pool
balance) are secured by multiple properties. Loans secured by
multiple properties benefit from lower cash flow volatility given
that excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment
another's cash flow to meet debt service requirements. These loans
also benefit from the pooling of equity from each underlying
property.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The weighted
average grade for the pool is 2.2, which is better than the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 4.6%, 13.4%, or 21.4%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1,
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


LBSBC NIM 2007-3: S&P Lowers & Withdraws Ratings on 3 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on six
classes of notes from LBSBC NIM Co.'s series 2006-1 and 2006-2.

"At the same time, we lowered our ratings on three other classes
from LBSBC NIM Co.'s series 2007-3 and then withdrew the ratings.
All of the ratings within the three affected transactions were
'CCC- (sf)' or lower prior to the downgrade and withdrawal
actions," S&P said.

"The rating withdrawals reflect our view that we have insufficient
information to maintain the ratings. In April of this year, we
received notification that the directors of transaction's SPV had
resigned. At this time, we have not received information on the
appointment of new directors or the creation of a new SPV. We are,
therefore, withdrawing the ratings due to inadequate information
as to whether the transactions currently meet Standard & Poor's
criteria requirements," S&P said.

NIM securitizations are transactions backed by excess spread
(class X notes) and prepayment penalty payments (class P notes)
from the corresponding underlying transactions. Because of
increased delinquencies in the collateral backing the underlying
transactions, the underlying transactions continue to hold excess
cash flow instead of passing it on to the NIM trusts. As a result,
the 2007-3 NIM transaction currently relies solely on prepayment
penalties and reserve funds to make their interest payments. It
has received very few prepayment penalties over the past six
months. Currently, the reserve account for series 2007-3 has
insufficient funds to make one full month's interest payment.

"Because of ongoing collateral deterioration within the underlying
transaction, the downgraded classes have, in our view, little
realistic prospects of full principal repayment," S&P said.

Ratings Withdrawn

LBSBC NIM Co. 2006-1
US$26.037 mil LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2006-1

             Rating
Class       To     From
N1          NR     CCC- (sf)
N2          NR     CC (sf)
N3          NR     CC (sf)

LBSBC NIM Co. 2006-2
US$28.455 mil LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2006-2

             Rating
Class       To     From
N1          NR     CCC- (sf)
N2          NR     CC (sf)
N3          NR     CC (sf)

Ratings Lowered and Withdrawn

LBSBC NIM Co. 2007-3
US$39.953 mil LBSBC net interest margin securities series 2007-3
                 Rating
Class       To     Interim    From
N1          NR     CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)
N2          NR     D (sf)     CC (sf)
N3          NR     D (sf)     CC (sf)

NR-Not rated.


LB-UBS COMM. 2001-C7: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 7 CMBS Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes of
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2001-C7, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-C7 as follows:

Cl. K, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2001 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2011 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Sep 8, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
14.5% or $5.2 million of the current balance. At last review,
Moody's cumulative base expected loss was 8.6% or $15.0 of the
then current balance. Realized losses have increased from 0.9% of
the original balance to 1.3% since the prior review. Moody's
provides a current list of base losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions" published in
July 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4 compared to 9 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.4 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated September 8, 2011.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $35.7
million from $1.21 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 3% to
35% of the pool. The pool contains one loan with an investment
grade credit assessment, representing 18% of the pool.

One loan, representing 35% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $16.1 million (37% loss severity on
average). Currently three loans, representing 47% of the pool, are
in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Interstate Office Park Loan ($12.2 million -- 34.1% of the pool)
which is secured by two, three story office buildings located in
the Kearny Mesa submarket of San Diego, California. The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2011 due to maturity
default when the borrower was unable to refinance the debt. The
special servicer recently approved a loan extension to October
2012 giving the borrower sufficient time to refinance the debt.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by retail and
industrial properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $2.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans expected to take a loss (47%
expected loss on average).

Moody's was provided with full year 2010/2011 operating results
for 89% of the pool. Excluding specially serviced and troubled
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 107% compared to 90% at
Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted
average haircut of 21% to the most recently available net
operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 0.96X and 1.02X, respectively, compared to
1.19X and 1.23X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Connell Corporate Center
I Loan ($6.5 million -- 18.1% of the pool) which is secured by a
415,000 SF Class A suburban office building located in Berkeley
Heights, New Jersey. The property is 100% leased to two tenants --
American Home Assurance (87% of net rentable area (NRA); lease
expiration June 2018) and EMC Corporation (13% of the NRA; lease
expiration March 2013). The loan fully amortizes over its 11.75-
year term, maturing in June 2013 and has amortized 11% since last
review. Moody's current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Aaa and 4.0X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The largest conduit loan is the Catonsville Plaza Shopping Center
Loan ($12.4 million -- 34.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
277,400 SF anchored retail center located in Catonsville,
Maryland. The property was 85% leased as of December 2011 compared
to 79% at last review. This loan is currently on the master
servicer's watchlist due to passing its ARD of August 11, 2011.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.13X, respectively,
compared to 100% and 1.0X at last review.


LB-UBS COMM. 2003-C5: Fitch Cuts Rating on $8.8MM Notes to 'CCCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes of LB-UBS commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2003-C5.

The downgrades are a result of a slight increase in Fitch modeled
losses. Fitch modeled losses of 5.12% of the remaining pool;
modeled losses of the original pool are at 2.4%, including losses
already incurred to date. Fitch has identified 14 loans (18%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes three specially serviced
loans (7.65%).

Of the original 80 loans, 54 loans remain outstanding. As of the
June 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate balance has
paid down 59% to $576 million from $1.4 billion at issuance. In
addition 13 loans (15.9%) are fully defeased. Interest shortfalls
totaling $2,517,563 are currently affecting classes J through T.
Class J has an interest shortfall of $8,839 that is expected to be
recovered at the July payment.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a 568,657 square foot
(sf) mall located in Scranton, PA. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in March 2010 due to imminent default. The loan
is performing under a modification agreement which was executed in
April 2011. The modification terms consist of an interest rate
reduction from 6.25% to 3.25% with accrued and unpaid interest
deferred until loan maturity. Servicer reported occupancy has
increased to 87.8% as of December 2011 from 53.6% as of December
2010. Performance of the loan is still being monitored by the
special servicer.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a 506-bed
student housing property located at the University of Kansas in
Lawrence, KS. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
November 2010 due to imminent default. In February 2012, the
lender had obtained title to the property via a deed-in-lieu
(DIL). The special servicer is currently working on increasing
occupancy.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes and assigned Recovery
Estimates (RE) as indicated:

-- $5.3 million class M to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 100%;
-- $3.5 million class N to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 100%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $43.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $328.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.8 million class B at 'AAAsf';Outlook Stable;
-- $24.6 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.8 million class D at 'AAA/sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.8 million class E at 'AAA/sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.8 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.6 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.8 million class H at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $10.5 million class J at 'Asf; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $14 million class K at 'BBB-sf; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $12.3 million class L at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes P, Q, S, and T and classes A-1, A-2
and X-CP have paid in full.

Fitch has previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
class X-CL.


LONGHORN CDO III: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ca'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Longhorn CDO III:

US$18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Senior
Secured Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on January 24,
2012, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);

US$4,500,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Senior
Secured Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on July 26, 2011,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);

US$5,900,000 Class D-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Senior
Secured Participating Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
July 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also downgraded the rating of the following notes:

US$6,600,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Interest Senior
Secured Notes (current outstanding balance of $6,522,914),
Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 26, 2011 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the upgrades of the Class C and D Notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in their overcollateralization ratios since the rating
action in January 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A Notes have
been paid down in full and the Class B Notes have paid down by
approximately 33% or $5.9 million since the last rating action.
Based on the latest trustee report dated May 15, 2012, the Class
B, Class C, and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported
at 370.4%, 148.6%, and 110.4%, respectively, versus December 2011
levels of 190.7%, 128.3%, and 107.9% respectively.

The downgrade on the Class E Notes is primarily a result of the
decrease in the Class E overcollateralization ratio and the Class
D and E interest coverage ratio since January 2012. Based on the
latest trustee report dated May 15, 2012 the Class E
overcollateralization ratio and the Class D and Class E interest
coverage ratios are reported at 97.4%, 105.3% and 23.4%
respectively, versus December 2011 levels of 99.6%, 131.1% and
34.9%, respectively. The Class E Notes are currently deferring
interest payments.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $44.9 million,
defaulted par of $0.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 12.48% (implying a WARF of 2836), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.6%, and a diversity score
of 19. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Longhorn CDO III, Ltd., issued in March 2003, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all
rated notes of various default probabilities. Below is a summary
of the impact of different default probabilities (expressed in
terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2268)

Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D-1: +2
Class D-2: +2
Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3403)

Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D-1: -1
Class D-2: -1
Class E: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors that are rated non investment grade, especially when they
experience jump to default.


LSTAR 2011-1: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on Class F Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes of
LSTAR 2011-1 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Aug 1, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings. This is Moody's
first monitoring review of this transaction since securitization
in August 2011.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
15.1% of the current balance. Moody's provides a current list of
base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255
Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
estimate of a range of factors including, but not exclusively, the
performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the
slowdown in growth in the current macroeconomic environment and
commercial real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property values are beginning to move in a positive
direction, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity increases, distressed properties are
cleared from the pipeline, and job creation rebounds. The hotel
and multifamily sectors continue to show positive signs and
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where unemployment remains above long-term averages and business
confidence remains below long-term averages. Performance in the
retail sector has been mixed with lackluster Holiday sales driven
by sales and promotions. Consumer confidence remains low. Across
all property sectors, the availability of debt capital continues
to improve with increased securitization activity of commercial
real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of low interest
rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario reflects: an
overall downward revision of real growth forecasts since last
quarter, amidst ongoing and policy-induced banking sector
deleveraging leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and
credit contraction; financial market turmoil continuing to
negatively impact consumer and business confidence; persistently
high unemployment levels; and weak housing markets resulting in a
further slowdown in growth.

The methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 79 compared to 92 at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST(R)(Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the June 15, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 17% to $300 million
from $360 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 133 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten representing 24% of
the pool. The pool consists of seasoned loans originated between
1989 and 2008 and does not contain any loans with investment grade
credit assessments.

There are 44 loans, representing 32% of the pool, on the Master
Servicer's Watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated. There are 12 loans in special
servicing, representing 8% of the pool. The largest specially
serviced loan is 3901 Q Street ($5.5 million -- 1.8% of the pool)
which is secured by a 162 unit multifamily property in
Bakersville, California. The loan transferred to special servicing
in October 2011.

The second largest specially serviced loan is 4550 Shelley Court
($4.2 million -- 1.4% of the pool) which is secured by an 86 unit
multifamily property located in Stockton, California. The borrower
has filed for bankruptcy and a court appointed receiver took
control of the property in May of 2012.

The third largest specially serviced loan is 2315 Bel Air Road
($4.1 million -- 1.4% of the pool) which is secured by a mixed use
office and retail property located in Fallston, Maryland.
Foreclosure has been initiated but is currently postponed while
some environmental testing is completed.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $6 million appraisal
reduction for six specially serviced loans while Moody's is
projecting an aggregate $8.2 million loss for all specially
serviced loans.

Moody's has also identified an additional 12 loans as troubled
loans with an aggregate loss of $4.1 million (15% expected loss).

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and full or partial year
2011 operating results for 93% and 54% of the pool, respectively.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 12% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the 5400 Heritage Tree Lane Loan ($16
million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 206 unit
multifamily property known as The Grove at Sunrise on the
outskirts of Sacramento, California. The collateral was 93%
occupied as of year end 2011, the same as at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 113% and 0.83X, respectively,
compared to 107% and 0.88X at securitization.

The second largest loan is the 2000 S. First Street Loan ($10
million -- 3.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 126 unit loft-
style apartment complex located in Waco, Texas. The property is
98% occupied compared to 97% at securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 103%
and 0.92X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the 8530 North 22nd Avenue Loan ($9
million -- 3% of the pool), which is secured by a 285 unit multi-
family property located in Phoenix, Arizona. As of year-end 2011
the portfolio was 87% occupied, compared to 91% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.90X, respectively,
compared to 110% and 0.88X at securitization.


MACH ONE 2005-CDN1: S&P Lowers Rating on 13 CMBS Re-REMIC Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) pass-
through certificates from MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC, a Canadian
resecuritized real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC)
transaction.

"At the same time, we removed our ratings on all the classes from
CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the credit characteristics of the
underlying collateral using our global collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) of pooled structured finance assets criteria,"
S&P said.

"The downgrades also reflect the results of the largest obligor
default test, part of the supplemental stress test. The largest
obligor default test assesses the ability of a rated CDO of pooled
structured finance liability tranche to withstand the default of a
minimum number of the largest credit or obligor exposures within
an asset pool, factoring in the underlying assets' credit
quality," S&P said.

"The global CDOs of pooled structured finance assets criteria
include revisions to our assumptions on correlations, recovery
rates, and the collateral's default patterns and timings. The
criteria also include supplemental stress tests (largest obligor
default test and largest industry default test) in our
analysis," S&P said.

According to the June 21, 2012, trustee report, MACH ONE 2005-
CDN1was  collateralized by 52 CMBS classes ($169.2 million, 100%)
from nine distinct   transactions issued between 2002 and 2005.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings   assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it determines necessary.

Ratings Lowered And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

MACH ONE 2005-CDN1 ULC
Commercial mortgage-backed securities pass-through certificates

                 Rating           Rating
Class            To               From
A                BB+ (sf)         A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B                BB (sf)          BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
C                B+ (sf)          BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
D                B+ (sf)          BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
E                B+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
F                B+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
G                CCC+ (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Neg
H                CCC+ (sf)        BB (sf)/Watch Neg
J                CCC+ (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
K                CCC+ (sf)        B (sf)/Watch Neg
L                CCC+ (sf)        B (sf)/Watch Neg
M                CCC- (sf)        B- (sf)/Watch Neg
N                CCC- (sf)        CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg


MADISON SQUARE: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on two
classes from Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd., a commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO) transaction.

"We also affirmed our ratings on four classes from the same
transaction. We removed all six ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications. The downgrades and affirmations primarily
reflect our analysis of the transaction's liability structure and
the credit characteristics of the underlying collateral, using our
criteria for global collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of
pooled structured finance assets. The downgrades also reflect the
credit characteristics of the collateral pool, 82.5% of which are
credit estimated to be 'D (sf)," S&P said.

"Our criteria for rating global CDOs of pooled structured finance
assets include revisions to our assumptions on correlations,
recovery rates, and the collateral's default patterns and timings.
The criteria also include supplemental stress tests (the largest
obligor default test and the largest industry default test) in our
analysis.  According to the June 25, 2012, trustee report, Madison
Square 2004-1 was collateralized by 18 CMBS classes ($318.3
million, 100%) from six distinct transactions issued between 1997
and 1999," S&P said.

Approximately 82.5% of the collateral is credit estimated to be 'D
(sf)'. Madison Square 2004-1's interest shortfall reserve fund had
a balance of $15 million before the full redemption of the class L
certificates in May 2012. The redemption reduced the balance to
zero.  Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its
view, the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and will take rating
actions as it determines necessary.

Ratings Lowered and Removed From Creditwatch Negative

Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd.
CMBS backed notes series 2004-1
                       Rating
Class            To               From
N                BB+ (sf)         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
O                BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed And Removed From Creditwatch Negative

Madison Square 2004-1 Ltd.
CMBS backed notes series 2004-1
Class            To               From
M                BBB+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
P                CCC (sf)         CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
Q                CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
S                CCC- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-MKB1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 4 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes of Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Trust (MLMT) 2004-MKB1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The downgrades reflect an increase in expected losses across the
pool since Fitch's last review of the transaction. Fitch modeled
losses of 4.12% of the remaining pool. Total expected losses based
on the original pool size are 2.43%, which also reflects 0.72% in
losses already incurred to date. Fitch has designated nine loans
(21.7% or the pool balance) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
include two specially serviced loans (3.8%). Three of the Fitch
Loans of Concern (12.5%) are within the transaction's top 15 loans
by unpaid principal balance.

As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has reduced by 58.58% (including 0.72% of
realized losses) to $406 million from $980 million at issuance.
There are seven defeased loans (26.58%). Interest shortfalls are
affecting classes P and Q.

The largest loan in special servicing is secured by 104,169 square
foot (sf) office property in Columbus, OH (2.05% of the pool). The
property has experienced cash flow issues due to increased
operating expenses as well as recent occupancy declines. The June
2012 rent roll reported occupancy at 59%, compared to servicer
reported occupancy of 85% at year end (YE) December 2011. In
addition, lease rollover of approximately 42% of the net rentable
area (NRA) is scheduled over the next 12 months.

The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2012 for
payment default. The special servicer is enforcing the cash
management provisions of the loan documents, and a lock box is in
place. The servicer has filed for foreclosure and motion to
appoint a receiver.

The second loan in special servicing is secured by an 113,455 sf
office property located in Memphis, TN (1.78%). The property was
previously 100% occupied by a single tenant who vacated in 2009.
The loan transferred to special servicing in April 2009 and the
special servicer foreclosed on the property in October 2009. The
special servicer is actively pursuing lease up opportunities as
well as marketing the property for sale.

Fitch downgrades the following classes, revises the Rating Outlook
on class L, and assigns Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $4.9 million class L to 'Bsf' from 'BB-sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $4.9 million class M to 'CCCsf' from 'B+sf'; RE 90%;
-- $2.5 million class N to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 0%;
-- $3.7 million class P to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating Outlook
on class K:

-- $22.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $169.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26.9 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.7 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11 million class E at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.5 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.2 million class G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11 million class H at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3.7 million class J at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4.9 million class K at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have repaid in full. Fitch does not rate class
Q, which has been reduced to $6.4 million from $13.5 million due
to realized losses.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating on the interest-only
classes X-C and X-P.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-CAM1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratng on Cl. N. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three and upgraded three classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 1999-CAM1 (MS 1999-CAM1).

The upgrades to classes H through K reflect the increasing credit
enhancement levels and stable performance of the remaining pool.
Fitch modeled losses of 3.6% of the remaining pool; modeled losses
of the original pool are at 4.8%, including losses already
incurred to date. The affirmation to class L reflects the
sufficient credit enhancement to offset Fitch modeled losses for
the pool; however, increasing concentration risk on the underlying
loans remains a concern.

As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 95.9% (to $33.4 million from $806.5
million), of which 94.7% were due to paydowns and 1.2% were due to
realized losses. There are no specially serviced loans in the
pool. Interest shortfalls totaling $634,207 million are currently
affecting classes M and N.

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the loans by applying a 5%
reduction to the most recent fiscal year-end net operating income.
Fitch also applied a stressed 10% cap rate to determine value.
Under this analysis only one loan, would take a loss. The
collateral for the loan is an office property located in Columbia,
SC. The loss is due to a sharp decline in occupancy in recent
years.

Fitch upgrades the following classes:

-- $6.4 million class H to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.0 million class J to 'Asf' from 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.0 million class K to 'BBBf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

In addition, Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $6.0 million class L at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.0 million class M at 'CCsf'; RE: 90%;
-- $0.7 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE: 0%.

Classes A-1 through G have paid in full. Fitch does not rate class
O.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating of the interest-only
class X.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ14: Moody's Rates Cl. A-JFX Certs. 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to two
classes of CMBS securities of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-IQ14.

Cl. A-MFX, Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-JFX, Assigned Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

There has been a partial termination of the Class A-JFL Swap
Agreement and a full termination of the Class A-MFL Swap
Agreement, along with an amendment of the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement in order to separately certificate a portion of the
Class A-JFL Certificate Balance to the successor Class A-JFX
Certificate and to fully terminate the certificate of the Class A-
MFL Certificate Balance to issue the successor Class A-MFX
Certificate. The rating on the Class A-JFX Certificate reflects
the partial termination of the Class A-JFL Swap Agreement and the
rating on the Class A-MFX Certificate reflects the full
termination of the Class A-MFL Swap Agreement.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.


NOMURA CRE: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on Seven Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all classes of Notes issued
by Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd. The affirmations are due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. While the key indicators suggest
improved transaction performance, the level of defaulted
securities and their expected severity of loss combined with the
current revolving nature of the transaction is resulting in the
affirmation of all outstanding ratings. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan obligation
(CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. A-R, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1, Affirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed at C (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd. is a revolving CRE loan transaction
backed by a portfolio A-Notes and whole loans (70.7% of the pool
balance), B-Notes (8.5%), commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) (13.3%), CRE CDO (4.4%), mezzanine loans (2.2%), and Rake
bonds (0.9%). As of the May 31, 2012 Trustee report, the aggregate
Note balance of the transaction, including preferred shares and
deferred interest, has decreased to $943.5 million from $950.0
million at issuance, with the paydown directed to the Class A1 and
Class AR Notes, and interest accruing through Class D Notes to
Class O Notes as a result of failing the senior most par value
coverage test.

There are thirteen assets with par balance of $321.1 million
(37.7% of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the May 31, 2012 Trustee report, compared to
twelve defaulted assets with (34.8%) at last review. Moody's does
expect significant losses to occur from these defaulted assets
once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated credit assessments for the non-Moody's rated
collateral. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default
probability within a collateral pool. Moody's modeled a bottom-
dollar WARF of 8,095 compared to 9,360 at last review. The current
distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-
Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (7.2% compared to
0.6% at last review), A1-A3 (0.3% compared to 0.0% at last
review), Baa1-Baa3 (3.8% compared to 0.0% at last review), Ba1-Ba3
(2.7% compared to 3.0% at last review), B1-B3 (1.9% compared to
0.0% at last review), and Caa1-Ca/C (84.1% compared to 96.4% at
last review).

WAL acts to adjust the probability of default of the collateral in
the pool for time. Moody's modeled to a WAL of 4.2 years compared
to 4.8 at last review. The current WAL assumption is based on the
current performing collateral pool and assumption about
extensions, if any.

WARR is the par-weighted average of the mean recovery values for
the collateral assets in the pool. Moody's modeled a fixed 56.0%
WARR compared to 38.5% at last review.

MAC is a single factor that describes the pair-wise asset
correlation to the default distribution among the instruments
within the collateral pool (i.e. the measure of diversity).
Moody's modeled a MAC of 19.9%, compared to 99.9% at last review.
The reduction in MAC is due to the increased credit diversity
within the collateral pool and the small number of names.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM(R) v2.8, one of Moody's CDO
rating models, which was released on January 24, 2011.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge(R) v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all
other key parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption
down from 56.0% to 46.0% or up to 66.0% would result in average
rating movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notch downward and
0 to 1 notch upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and commercial real
estate property markets. While commercial real estate property
values are beginning to move in a positive direction along with a
rise in investment activity and stabilization in core property
type performance, a consistent upward trend will not be evident
until the volume of investment activity steadily increases,
distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline, and job
creation rebounds. The hotel sector is performing strongly and the
multifamily sector continues to show increases in demand. Moderate
improvements in the office sector continue with minimal additions
to supply. However, office demand is closely tied to employment,
where growth remains slow. Performance in the retail sector has
been mixed with lackluster sales driven by discounting and
promotions. However, rising wages and reduced unemployment, along
with increased consumer confidence, is helping to spur consumer
spending. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with increased securitization
activity of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary
policy of low interest rates. Moody's central global macroeconomic
scenario reflects healthier growth in the US and US growth
decoupling from the recessionary trend in the euro zone, while a
mild recession is expected in 2012. Downside risks remain
significant, although they have moderated compared to earlier this
year. Major downside risks include an increase in the potential
magnitude of the euro area recession, the risk of an oil supply
shock weighing negatively on consumer purchasing power and home
prices, ongoing and policy-induced banking sector deleveraging
leading to a tightening of bank lending standards and credit
contraction, financial market turmoil continuing to negatively
impact consumer and business confidence, persistently high
unemployment levels, and weak housing markets, any or all of which
will continue to constrain growth.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


ORIGEN MANUFACTURED: S&P Cuts Ratings on Six Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on six
classes of collateralized notes from Origen Manufactured Housing
Contract Trust's series 2005-B, 2006-A, and 2007-B.

"In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 24 classes from six
Origen Manufactured Housing Contract Trust series.  Our rating on
one other class from one series remains at 'D (sf)," S&P said.

"The collateral pools backing the transactions we reviewed consist
of manufactured housing loans that Origen Financial LLC
originated.

"Green Tree Servicing Inc. is currently servicing the loans.
Based on higher default frequencies and loss severities than
previously expected, we have increased our remaining cumulative
net loss expectation for each series," S&P said.

Table 1
Cumulative Net Loss
As of the June 2012 distribution
Series        Current   Former lifetime   Revised lifetime
              CNL (%)       CNL EXP (%)        CNL EXP (%)
2002-A          23.31       29.50-30.50        32.00-33.00
2004-A           9.53       13.00-14.00        15.00-16.00
2004-B           8.18       11.50-12.50        14.50-15.50
2005-A           7.31       11.50-12.50        14.50-15.50
2005-B           9.25       13.50-14.50        19.50-20.50
2006-A          10.41       15.00-17.00        24.50-25.50
2007-A          10.54       16.00-18.00        26.50-27.50
2007-B          11.88       18.00-20.00        29.50-30.50

CNL-Cumulative net loss.
EXP-Expectation.

"The downgrades reflect our view that the total credit enhancement
available for the classes is no longer sufficient to maintain the
previous ratings in relation to our revised expected net losses.
The affirmations reflect our view that the total credit
enhancement available is sufficient for each of the affirmed
ratings despite our higher loss expectations. In addition, our
rating   on class B-1 from series 2002-A remains at 'D (sf)',
where it has been since April 2011, due to a continued payment
default resulting from an interest shortfall," S&P said.

"Our analysis also incorporated secondary credit factors, such as
credit stability, payment priorities under certain scenarios, and
sector- and issuer-specific analysis,"
S&P said.

"Our increased loss expectations are based on our analysis of each
transaction's current performance and our views of future
performance. Over the past two years, we have witnessed a
significant increase in the net loss-to-liquidation rates for each
transaction," S&P said.

The net loss-to-liquidation rate measures the percent of the pool
amortization that is the result of a net loss, and an increase in
the net loss-to-liquidation rate signifies a quickened pace of
losses and worsening performance.  "As a result, we have increased
our loss expectations for each transaction," S&P said.

Table 2
Collateral Performance
As of the June 2012 distribution
          Months    Pool   NLTL over      NLTL from
           since  Factor     last 24  the 24 months
Series  issuance     (%)  months (%)      prior (%)
2002-A       123   28.67        38.4           32.9
2004-A       100   33.34        22.4           17.4
2004-B        93   36.09        20.3           17.7
2005-A        85   41.01        23.2           16.5
2005-B        78   45.80        33.1           21.0
2006-A        70   50.04        37.3           20.1
2007-A        62   54.26        32.3           26.9
2007-B        56   59.78        40.1           24.0

NLTL -- Net loss-to-liquidation.

Each transaction was initially structured with
overcollateralization and excess spread as credit enhancement,
with additional support in the form of subordination for the
higher-rated tranches. In addition, a bond insurance policy issued
from Ambac Assurance Corp (not rated) insures series 2006-A,
2007-A, and 2007-B. Series 2002-A through 2005-B are structured
with a priority principal payment   structure that pays principal
to each series' class A notes sequentially while paying principal
pro rata to the mezzanine and subordinate tranches.

The principal payments revert to a sequential payment structure if
certain performance tests related to loss performance are not met.
Series 2002-A has been unable to meet its performance tests and is
currently paying principal sequentially. "We expect this to
continue in the future," S&P said.

In addition, the series' overcollateralization amount has been
fully depleted,  and liquidation losses continue to reduce the
class B-1 notes' principal. Despite the revised loss expectations
and the depleted overcollateralization, credit enhancement has
grown significantly as a percentage of the outstanding
collateral balance, as the senior notes' principal has paid down
and the subordinate notes remain at their original face value (see
table 3).   "As such, we affirmed our ratings of the senior and
mezzanine class A, M-1, and M-2 notes," S&P said.

Table 3
Hard Credit Support (%)
As of the June 2012 performance month
                       Total hard         Total hard
                   credit support    credit support*
Series   Class   at issuance* (%)  (as % of current)
2002-A   A                  28.00              80.56
2002-A   M-1                19.50              50.91
2002-A   M-2                11.50              23.01
2002-A   B-1                 4.00               0.00
2004-A   A-4                34.00              63.13
2004-A   M-1                24.00              45.63
2004-A   M-2                16.00              31.63
2004-B   A                  35.50              63.14
2004-B   M-1                26.00              46.52
2004-B   M-2                20.50              36.89
2004-B   B-1                15.50              28.14
2004-B   B-2                13.50              24.64
2005-A   A                  35.25              62.69
2005-A   M-1                26.00              46.50
2005-A   M-2                19.00              34.25
2005-A   B                  13.00              23.75
2005-B   A                  35.25              67.88
2005-B   M-1                26.25              44.26
2005-B   M-2                19.75              35.67
2005-B   B-1                12.75              23.03
2005-B   B-2                10.75              18.83
2006-A   A                  10.50               6.06
2007-A   A                   8.00             (3.66)
2007-B   A                   9.50               2.03

* Hard credit support includes overcollateralization and
  subordination.

It does not include excess spread.

Series 2004-A, 2004-B, and 2005-A have each passed their defined
performance tests, and overcollateralization for each series is at
the target level.

Principal is being paid pro rata, and we expect this to continue
in the future.

"We affirmed our ratings of all classes in series 2004-A, 2004-B,
and   2005-A. Series 2005-B has breached its annualized loss
trigger and is currently paying principal sequentially. In
addition, the overcollateralization is slightly below its target
level. Given that annualized losses tend to be variable, we
cannot determine whether the transaction will continue to pay
sequentially or revert to pro rata payments in the future. Our
analysis examined both payment scenarios. We affirmed the series
2005-B's class A notes and downgraded the class M-1, M-2 and B-1
notes.    Series 2006-A, 2007-A, and 2007-B have each breached
their performance tests and their overcollateralization levels are
significantly below their targets. Series 2006-A is currently
paying sequentially," S&P said.

However, the overcollateralization has been significantly reduced
in the past two years, nearly equalling the pace of the principal
reduction to class A-1. The series 2006-A documents state that the
principal payment priority changes to pro rata once the deal
becomes undercollateralized.

If this was to occur, principal losses would be allocated pro rata
between classes A-1 and A-2, the two   outstanding classes.

"Given the significant reduction in overcollateralization in
recent years, we can not be certain that the class A-1 will be
paid in full before the overcollateralization balance is depleted
and the transaction becomes undercollateralized," S&P said.

"Therefore, we downgraded both classes in series 2006-A to 'CCC
(sf)'. Series 2007-A is undercollateralized and, therefore, pays
principal pro rata   to the class A-1 and A-2 notes. The
overcollateralization for series 2007-B has been reduced
significantly, and we expect it to eventually be fully depleted.
We affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the series 2007-A classes
outstanding and downgraded our rating on class A from series 2007-
B to 'CCC- (sf)'. Our 'CCC- (sf)' ratings for all outstanding
classes from these two series reflect the high probability of
principal defaults at the deal's legal final maturity dates, in
our view," S&P said.

"Our review of these transactions included cash flow analysis, for
which we used current and historical performance to estimate
future performance. Our various cash flow scenarios included
forward-looking assumptions on recoveries, timing of losses, and
voluntary prepayment speeds that we believe are appropriate given
the transactions' current performances. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the affirmed   or lowered rating levels," S&P said.

"Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the performance of
these transactions to assess whether the credit enhancement
remains adequate, in our view, to support the ratings on each
class under various stress scenarios," S&P said.


PROTECTIVE LIFE: Fitch Lowers 3 Certificate Classes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades, assigns Recovery Estimates, and revises
one Rating Outlook on Protective Life 2007-PL, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

The downgrades are attributed to increased expected losses
including a greater certainty surrounding imminent losses. As of
the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's collateral balance has
paid down 26% to $752.9 million from $1.02 billion at issuance.
There are 175 loans remaining from 199 at issuance. One loan
(0.4%) is currently specially serviced.

Fitch modeled losses of 3.15% of the remaining pool; expected
losses of the original pool balance are 2.33% with no realized
losses to date.

The largest contributor to loss (0.6%) is a 45,500 sf retail
property located in Naples, FL which is currently 100% vacant. Per
the master servicer, the borrower has filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy
and they expect to transfer the loan to special servicing shortly.

The second largest contributor to loss (0.4%) was originally
secured by a 53,921 square foot (sf) retail property located in
Clio, MI. The loan transferred into special servicing in August
2010 due to imminent default. The property was dark as a result of
A&P bankruptcy and rejection of the Farmer Jack's lease which was
owned by A&P. Per the special servicer, the loan recently sold out
of REO on June 18, 2012, and losses associated with the loan are
expected to be reflected in the July 2012 remittance.

Fitch downgrades and assigns Recovery Estimates (RE) to the
following classes:

-- $2.5 million class O to 'CCC' from 'B-'; RE 100%;

-- $3.8 million class P to 'CCC' from 'B-'; RE 100%;

-- $2.5 million class Q to 'CCC' from 'B-'; RE 100%.

Fitch also affirms the following classes and revises one Rating
Outlook as indicated:

-- $129.8 million class A-2 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $113.1 million class A-3 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $132.9 billion class A-4 at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73.3 million class A-1A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $101.6 million class A-M at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9 million class A-J at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.1 million class B at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.9 million class C at 'AA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.4 million class D at 'AA-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.6 million class E at 'A+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.4 million class F at 'A'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.9 million class G at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.6 million class H at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.6 million class J at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.9 million class K at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.1 million class L at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.5 million class M at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.5 million class N at 'B-'; Outlook revised to Negative from
    Stable.

Class A-1 paid off on June 15, 2012. Fitch does not rate the $13.9
million class S. Fitch has previously withdrawn the interest-only
class IO class.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on $9.3MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Prudential Securities
Secured Financing Corp.'s (Prudential) commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 1999-NRF1.

As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced 97.69% (which includes 3.10% in realized
losses) to $21.44 million from $928.92 million at issuance. There
are 11 of the original 257 loans remaining in the transaction.
There are no defeased loans. Interest shortfalls are affecting the
unrated classes K, L and M.

The affirmations reflect Fitch expected losses across the pool, as
well as adverse selection among the 11 remaining loans. Fitch
modeled losses of 3.19% of the remaining pool; expected losses of
the original pool are at 3.17%, including losses realized to date.
Fitch has identified six loans as Loans of Concern (64.88% of pool
balance), which include two loans currently in special servicing
(18.44%).

The largest loan in special servicing is secured by a 128,419
square foot (sf) retail center in Batavia, NY (11.58% of the
pool). The subject property is anchored by a Value Home Center
(29% net rentable area [NRA]). The loan, which matured in August
2010, had transferred to special servicing in July 2010 for
impending maturity default. The loan is paid through the February
2012 payment date. The Special Servicer continues to discuss with
trust counsel what options are available to the Noteholder, while
trying to get the Borrower to pay off the loan immediately.

The second loan in special servicing is secured by a 104 unit
multifamily property in Centerline, MI. The loan had transferred
to special servicing in September 2010 for maturity default. A
modification of the loan has been negotiated with the Borrower
with approval to be recommended by the Special Servicer pending
Borrower's delivery of requested certification of the property and
guarantor information. The March 2012 rent roll reported occupancy
at 95%, with year end December 2011 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) at 0.95 times (x).

Fitch stressed the cash flow of the non-specially serviced loans
by applying a minimum 5% reduction to most recent fiscal year-end
2011 net operating income and applying an adjusted market cap rate
between 8% and 11% to determine value.

Similar to Fitch's prospective analysis of recent vintage CMBS,
the non-specially serviced loans also underwent a refinance test
by applying an 8% interest rate and 30-year amortization schedule
based on the stressed cash flow. Based on this refinance
methodology, three of the non-specially serviced loans (37.21%)
would not pay off at maturity, and could not refinance to a DSCR
above 1.25x.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $3.8 million class H at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.3 million class J at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Classes K, L and M are not rated by Fitch. Due to realized losses,
classes L and M have been reduced to zero and class K has been
reduced to $8.37 million from $15.8 million at issuance. Classes
A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F and G have paid in full.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating on the interest only
class A-EC.


RESI FINANCE 2006-B: Fitch Withdraws Junk Rating on 11 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions and subsequently
withdrawn the ratings on 16 classes in RESI Finance Limited
Partnership 2006-B. The transaction was terminated on June 19,
2012. Prior to the termination, the class B1 incurred a principal
loss and as a result, was downgraded to 'Dsf' prior to being
withdrawn. All other classes were affirmed at the current rating
prior to being withdrawn.

Fitch has taken the following actions and withdrawn the following
ratings:

RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2006-B
-- Class A1 (RES0600BA1) affirmed at 'AAAsf'and withdrawn;
-- Class A2 (RES0600BA2) affirmed at 'Asf' and withdrawn;
-- Class A3 (RES0600BA3) affirmed at 'BBBsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class A4 (RES0600BA4) affirmed at 'Bsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class A5 (RES0600BA5) affirmed at 'CCCsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B1 (RES060BB1) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf' and
    withdrawn;
-- Class B2 (RES060BB2) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B3 (76113RAA2) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B4 (76113RAB0) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B5 (76113RAC8) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B6 (76113RAD6) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B7 (76113RAE4) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B8 (76113RAF1) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B9 (76113RAG9) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B10 (76113RAH7) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn;
-- Class B11 (76113RAJ3) affirmed at 'Dsf' and withdrawn.


SANTANDER DRIVE 2012-4: Fitch Rates $47MM Cl. E Notes at 'BBsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns ratings and outlooks to the Santander Drive
Auto Receivables Trust 2012-4 as follows:

  -- $281,000,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
  -- $398,660,000 class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $237,850,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $150,290,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $189,830,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $142,370,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
  -- $47,460,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch's stress and rating sensitivity analysis are discussed in
the presale report titled 'Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust
2012-4', dated June 25, 2012, which is available on Fitch's web
site.


SATURN VENTURES: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on 2 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on notes
issued by Saturn Ventures I, Inc.:

-- $7,415,547 class A-1 notes affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised
    to Stable from Negative;

-- $44,611,659 class A-2 notes downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';

-- $23,198,063 class A-3 notes affirmed at 'Csf';

-- $20,888,248 class B notes affirmed at 'Csf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors in its analysis, as
described below, to conclude the affirmations for the rated notes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in July 2012, the credit quality
of the collateral has deteriorated with approximately 29.2% of the
portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 6.7 notches.
Approximately 52.4% of the portfolio has a Fitch-derived rating
below investment grade and 27.1% is rated in the 'CCC' category or
lower, compared to 41.6% and 23.8%, respectively, at last review.

The class A-1 notes have received approximately $30.8 million, or
80.6% of its previous balance, since the last review. As evidenced
by the increase in the notes' credit enhancement level, these
paydowns effectively offset the deterioration in the portfolio.
Although the current cash flow modeling results indicate that the
notes can pass at higher rating levels, Fitch has affirmed the
notes due to the potential further negative credit migration, with
15.9% of the portfolio currently on Rating Watch Negative, and
9.6% have a Negative Outlook . Additionally, the portfolio is
concentrated, with only 35 assets outstanding, and potential
adverse selection remains a concern as the portfolio continues to
amortize.

The Stable Outlook on the class A-1 notes reflects the cushion
above the class's current rating in all default timing and
interest rate scenarios in the cash flow model results.

The class A-2 notes have also benefited from the deleveraging of
the transaction, although to a lesser extent. However, the notes
are unable to pass at their current rating level in the cash flow
modeling results. The risk of an interest shortfall from a
potential Event of Default (EOD), which may be triggered if the A-
2 overcollateralization (OC) ratio falls below 102%, also remains.
As of the last Trustee report in May 2011, the A-2 OC ratio stood
at 104.2%. If an EOD occurs and the transaction accelerates, the
class A-2 notes may be cut off from future distributions until the
class A-1 notes are paid in full.

Breakeven levels for the class A-3 and class B notes were below SF
PCM's 'CCC' default level, the lowest level of defaults projected
by SF PCM. For these classes, Fitch compared the respective credit
enhancement levels to the expected losses from the distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' or lower). This
comparison indicates that default continues to appear inevitable
for these classes of notes at or prior to maturity.

Saturn I is a static structured finance collateralized debt
obligation (SF CDO) that closed in October 2003. The portfolio is
monitored by Church Tavern Advisors, LLC and the current portfolio
is comprised of commercial mortgage-backed securities (67.9%),
residential mortgage-backed securities (12.8%), SF CDOs (8.3%),
real estate investment trusts (6.9%), consumer asset-backed
securities (4.2%) from 1998 through 2003 vintages.


SHEFFIELD CDO: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on Sheffield CDO Ltd.'s
class S, A-1, A-2, and B notes.  "At the same time, we have
lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative our rating on the
class C notes, affirmed our rating on the class D notes, and
withdrawn our rating on the class A-1D notes," S&P said.

Sheffield CDO is a mezzanine cash flow structured finance
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of a portfolio that mostly
comprises U.S. CDOs and, to a lesser extent, U.S. CDOs of asset-
backed securities (ABS), trust-preferred CDOs, and hybrid CDOs.

"The rating actions follow the application of our 2012 CDO of ABS
criteria, as well as our assessment of the transaction's
performance (see "Global CDOs Of Pooled Structured Finance Assets:
Methodology And Assumptions," published on Feb. 21, 2012).  We
used data from the trustee report (dated April 13, 2012), our cash
flow analysis, and took into account recent transaction
developments.  We also applied our 2012 counterparty criteria and
our 2012 CDO of ABS criteria (see "Counterparty Risk Framework
Methodology And Assumptions," published on May 31, 2012).

"From our analysis, we observed that all par coverage tests are
currently below their trigger levels but also that the overall
portfolio credit quality has increased since our previous review
of the transaction (see "Ratings Affirmed On All Classes In
Sheffield CDO Cash Flow Transaction," published on June 1,
2010).  However, we also observed an increase in the proportion of
defaulted assets (rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], or
'D') since our previous review," S&P said.

The class S and class A-1 notes partially redeemed since the
transaction entered its amortization period.  This caused the
credit enhancement for the class S, A-1, and A-2 notes to
increase, and the credit enhancement for the class B, C, and D
notes to decrease.

"We have subjected the capital structure to our cash flow
analysis, based on the updated methodology and assumptions as
outlined by our criteria analysis, to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR).  We used the reported portfolio balance that
we considered to be performing, the principal cash balance, the
current weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery
rates that we considered to be appropriate.  We incorporated
various cash flow stress scenarios using various default patterns,
levels, and timings for each liability rating category, in
conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios," S&P
said.

"At the same time, we conducted an updated credit analysis, based
on our updated assumptions, to determine the scenario default rate
(SDR) at each rating level, which we then compared with its
respective BDR.  Following the application of our CDO of ABS
criteria, the assumed weighted average recoveries at each rating
category have significantly dropped," S&P said.

"Taking into account our credit and cash flow analyses, we
consider the levels of credit enhancement available to the class
S, A-1, and A-2 notes in this transaction to be commensurate with
the ratings that we previously assigned," S&P said.

Although the levels of credit enhancement available to the class B
and D notes decreased, other factors, including positive rating
migration within the portfolio, counterbalanced this.  "We have
therefore affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative our
ratings on the class B notes and affirmed our rating on the class
D notes.  At the same time, we lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative our rating on the class C notes because the
level of credit enhancement available to these notes has
decreased, and is no longer commensurate with the previously
assigned rating," S&P said.

"Since the class A-1D notes have been consolidated into the class
A-1 notes, we have withdrawn our rating on these notes," S&P said.

"We have analyzed the counterparties' exposure to the transaction
and we have concluded that the counterparties are sufficiently
highly rated to support the assigned rating on all classes of
notes," S&P said.

Ratings List

Class              Rating
            To                 From

Sheffield CDO Ltd.
EUR25.2 Million, US$254.56 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A-1           BBB (sf)               BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2           BB (sf)                BB (sf)/Watch Neg
B             B (sf)                 B (sf)/Watch Neg
S             AAA (sf)               AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

C             CCC- (sf)              CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

D             CCC- (sf)

Rating Withdrawn

A-1D          NR                     BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

NR-Not rated.


SLM STUDENT LOAN 2003-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes at 'AAAsf' and
subordinate notes at 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-
1. The Rating Outlook on the senior notes, which is tied to the
sovereign rating of the U.S. government, remains Negative, while
the Rating Outlook on the subordinate note remains Stable. Fitch
used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', and 'Rating
U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan ABS' to
review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate notes are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement to cover the
applicable risk factor stresses. Credit enhancement for the senior
notes consists of overcollateralization, subordination provided by
the class B note, and projected minimum excess spread, while the
subordinated notes benefit from projected excess spread only.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-1:

-- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5C affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT LOAN 2003-4: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Cl. B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the senior student loan notes at 'AAAsf' and
the subordinate notes at 'BBsf' issued by SLM Student Loan Trust
2003-4. The Rating Outlook on the senior notes, which is tied to
the sovereign rating of the U.S. government, remains Negative,
while the Rating Outlook on the subordinate note remains Stable.
Fitch used its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria', and
'Rating U.S. Federal Family Education Loan Program Student Loan
ABS' to review the ratings.

The ratings on the senior and subordinate notes are affirmed based
on the sufficient level of credit enhancement to cover the
applicable risk factor stresses. Credit enhancement for the senior
notes consists of overcollateralization, subordination provided by
the class B note, and projected minimum excess spread, while the
subordinated notes benefit from projected excess spread only.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-4:

-- Class A-5A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5C affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5D affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5E affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.


STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Tranches to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches and upgraded the ratings of three tranches from the
Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage 2004-19 transaction, backed by
Alt-A and Option ARM loans.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The rating action also reflects a correction to prior analysis on
this transaction. The subordinate tranches for this transaction
have components I and II, with each component supporting seniors
backed by either Pool 1 or Pool 2. Due to these components, the
level of credit enhancement is different for Pool 1 and Pool 2
seniors, based on the component's balance. The prior rating action
for this transaction was based on treatment of the subordinates as
a whole without regard to the different levels of enhancement
provided by the individual components. Moody's has now taken the
varying levels of enhancement into account and corrected the
ratings accordingly.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The downgrades are also a result of deteriorating performance
and/or structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For example, for
shifting interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose
the seniors to tail-end losses. In its current approach, Moody's
captures this risk by running each individual pool through a
variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's
Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural nuances of the transaction

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated by a factor ranging from
0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.1% in April 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-19

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-A2X, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290453

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Takes Action on $642MM Alt-A RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 77
tranches, upgraded the ratings of three tranches, and confirmed
the ratings of five tranches from 15 RMBS transactions, backed by
Alt-A and Option ARM loans, issued by SAMI.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A and
Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools. The rating action
consists of a number of downgrades as well as some upgrades. The
upgrades are due to significant improvement in collateral
performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to
high prepayments.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds. In its current approach, Moody's captures
this risk by running each individual pool through a variety of
loss and prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance
Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's
Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool level analysis
incorporates performance variances across the different pools and
the structural nuances of the transaction.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated by a factor ranging from
0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies , Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

In addition, in the rating action, Moody's has corrected the
ratings on the Cl. X tranches from Structured Asset Mortgage
Investments II Trust 2004-AR1 and Structured Asset Mortgage
Investments II Trust 2004-AR2 pursuant to the methodology
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012. The Cl. X
tranches from these two transactions are interest-only tranches
linked to the multi-tranches. Due to an internal administrative
error, these tranches were initially misclassified and thus not
included in the February 22, 2012 rating action on certain RMBS
interest-only securities.

Assumption Uncertainty

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2003-AR4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2011 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR1

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011 Confirmed
at Aaa (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR2

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR3

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR4

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR6

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. Grantor Trust A-1B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan
31, 2012 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR7

Cl. A-1A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. Grantor Trust A-1B, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan
31, 2012 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR8

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2001-4

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR5

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-AR3

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2003-CL1

Cl. I-F1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-F2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-S1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-S2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-I1, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. I-I2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. I-PO, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-B1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Cl. II-B4, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-B5, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2011
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290309

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


STRUCTURED ASSET: Moody's Takes Action on $1.6-Bil. RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 135
tranches, upgraded the ratings of four tranches and confirmed the
ratings of 17 tranches from 31 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
loans, issued by Structured Asset securities Corporation.

In addition, the rating on Cl. B1-I-X from Structured Asset
Securities Corp Trust 2003-37A has been reinstated after having
been inadvertently withdrawn on May 1, 2009.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. The rating action constitute of a
number of downgrades and some upgrades. The downgrades are a
result of deteriorating performance and/or structural features
resulting in higher expected losses for certain bonds than
previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting interest
structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the seniors to
tail-end losses. In its current approach, Moody's captures this
risk by running each individual pool through a variety of loss and
prepayment scenarios in the Structured Finance Workstation(R)
(SFW), the cash flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street
Analytics. This individual pool level analysis incorporates
performance variances across the different pools and the
structural nuances of the transaction.

The upgrades are due to significant improvement in collateral
performance, and/ or rapid build-up in credit enhancement due to
high prepayments.

Moody's has confirmed the ratings on the Cl. 2-A3 from Structured
Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-38 pursuant to the methodology
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities". This is an interest-only tranche linked
to the Cl. 2-A2. Due to an internal administrative error, the
tranche was initially misclassified and was placed on watch in the
January 31, 2012 rating action.

Moody's has also confirmed the ratings on the Cl. 1-A1 from
Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-25A. This tranche had
been erroneously placed on watch in January 2012 due to cash-flow
modeling inconsistencies. The Pooling and Servicing Agreements for
the deal allows for cross collateralization of funds remaining
after paying down subordinate bonds; however, the modeling used in
the January action with regards to the amount available for
crossing was not coded correctly for this transaction. This has
been corrected and the actions reflect this change.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications 2) small pool volatility and 3) bonds that
financial guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. As such, Moody's
has withdrawn the ratings of Structured Asset Securities Corp
2002-11A. Moody's can choose to continue to rate a transaction
that has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size.

Furthermore, for pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts
its projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility
of such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent
would greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate. To project
losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first
calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on vintage, number
of loans remaining in the pool and the level of current
delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools, Moody's
first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for
2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool
falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for
every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated by a factor ranging from
0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

Bonds Insured by Financial Guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the securities is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-11A

Cl. 1-A1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A2, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A3, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-II, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B2-I, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B2-I-X, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. B2-II, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. B3, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-21A

Cl. 1-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-II, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B2-II, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-22H

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-23XS

Cl. A7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-25A

Cl. 1-A1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-II, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B2-I, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B2-I-X, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B2-II, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2002-5A

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-12XS

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-15A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-20

CL. 1-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

CL. 1-AP, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 3-AP, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

CL. 1-AX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 3-PAX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. AX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-25XS

Cl. A5, Downgraded to B3 (sf) and Remains On Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3 placed on
review for possible downgrade on Dec 19, 2011)

Cl. A6, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3 placed on
review for possible downgrade on Dec 19, 2011)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-3XS

Cl. A8, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-6A

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-22A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-24A

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-28XS

Cl. A4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-31A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A7, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-32

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PAX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-35

Cl. 1-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-AP, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. AX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PAX, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-36XS

Cl. A5, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31,
2012 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (B3 placed on
review for possible downgrade on Dec 19, 2011)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-38

Cl. 2-A3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A4, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-AP, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. PAX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-40A

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-22

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan
Trust 2002-9

Cl. A1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2001-16H

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2001 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2001 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A3, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2001 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. AP, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2001 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. AX, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. BX-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. BX-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2002-4H

Cl. B1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B2, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-2A

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-9A

Cl. 2-A1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A3, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-26A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 7-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-33H

Cl. 1A1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1A-IO, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2A-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1B1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-34A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A3, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A5, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A4, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2003-37A

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A6, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A7, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-A, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 7-A, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8-A1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 8-A2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B1-I-X, Reinstated to C (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290304

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


SYMPHONY VIII: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on $17.2MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on
Symphony CLO VIII L.P./Symphony CLO VIII LLC's $349 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of April 10, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral. On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral. Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached. The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents. Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio.

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date. The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This window
of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period," S&P said.

Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

"For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, our ratings on the
closing date and prior to our effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased," S&P said.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P said.

"On an ongoing basis after we issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we will periodically review whether, in our view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as we deem
necessary," S&P said.

Ratings Affirmed
Symphony CLO VIII L.P./Symphony CLO VIII LLC

Class                  Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A                      AAA (sf)             240.00
B                      AA (sf)               43.75
C                      A (sf)                29.25
D                      BBB (sf)              18.75
E                      BB (sf)               17.25
LP certificates        NR                    39.50

LP-Limited partnership.
NR-Not rated.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C2: Moody's Rates Class G Certificates '(P)B2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
fourteen classes of CMBS securities, issued by UBS-Barclays
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C2, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2012-C2.

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S-EC*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A**, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B**, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-EC*, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

Cl. EC*, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. C-EC*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

* Exchangeable Certificates

** Interest Only Classes

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 54 fixed rate loans secured
by 83 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.48X is slightly higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.02X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 101.9% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%. Moody's Total LTV
ratio, (inclusive of subordinated debt) of 104.6% is also
considered when analyzing various stress scenarios for the rated
debt.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach.

With respect to loan level diversity, the pool's loan level
(includes cross collateralized and cross defaulted loans)
Herfindahl Index is 20.7. which is in-line with other multi-
borrower pools rated by Moody's since 2009. The score is in-line
with previously rated conduit and fusion transactions but higher
than previously rated large loan transactions.

With respect to property level diversity, the pool's property
level Herfindahl score is 22.5. Nine loans (16.4% of the pool
balance) are secured by multiple properties. Loans secured by
multiple properties benefit from lower cash flow volatility given
that excess cash flow from one property can be used to augment
another's cash flow to meet debt service requirements. These loans
also benefit from the pooling of equity from each underlying
property.

Moody's assigned an A3 credit assessment for one loan, 909 Third
Avenue, representing approximately 3.2% of the pool balance. Loans
assigned investment grade credit assessments are not expected to
contribute any loss to a transaction in low stress scenarios, but
are expected to contribute minimal amounts of loss in high stress
scenarios.

Moody's considers the creditworthiness of loans when evaluating
the effects of pooling among portfolio assets. Generally, a loan's
affect on the diversity profile of a portfolio is inversely
correlated with the loan's creditworthiness. As such, high quality
loans only marginally benefit a pool's diversity profile when they
are small, or marginally harm a pool's diversity profile when they
are large. The Herfindahl score for this transaction excluding the
A3 credit assessed loan is 19.8.

Moody's grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to worst) and
considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The weighted average
grade for the pool is 2.39, which is better than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions since 2009.

Five of the eleven largest loan exposures in the pool are
represented by Class B regional malls. The concentration of
regional malls (28.7% of the pool balance) is high compared to
other multi-borrower deals rated by Moody's. Two of these malls,
the Pierre Bossier Mall and the Westgate Mall, individually
contribute less than 5% to the pool balance, while the Crystal
Mall represents the largest exposure at 7.8% of the pool balance.

Moody's Asset Quality Grade for the five malls ranged from a low
of 2.25 (9.00% capitalization rate, Louise Joliet Mall) to 4.25
(11.25% capitalization rate, Westgate Mall). The two malls with
the highest in-line sales are Louise Joliet Mall in Joliet, IL and
Southland Mall in Taylor, MI. Their in-line sales for the most
recent trailing 12-month period were $409 PSF and $373 PSF,
respectively. The two malls with the lowest in-line sales are
Westgate Mall in Spartanburg, SC and Crystal Mall in Waterford,
CT. Their in-line sales for the most recent trailing 12-month
period were $276 PSF and $327 PSF respectively.

For additional information on Moody's approach to analyzing malls
refer special report: "US CMBS: Growing Gap Between Strong and
Weak Malls."

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-S-EC ((P) Aaa), B-EC
((P) Aa2) and C-EC ((P) A2) may be exchanged for Class EC ((P) A1)
certificates and Class EC may be exchanged for the Classes A-S-EC,
B-EC and C-EC. The EC certificates will be entitled to receive the
sum of interest distributable on the classes A-S-EC, B-EC and C-EC
certificates that are exchanged for such EC certificates. The
initial certificate balance of the class EC certificates is equal
to the aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class
A-S-EC, B-EC and C-EC and represent the maximum certificate
balance of the EC certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class EC has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate ((P) A2), but a very
high estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. Considering both probability of default
and recovery, Moody's provisional assessment of expected loss for
the EC certificate is commensurate with an A1 rating.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.61
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator version 1.0 which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5.0%, 14.6%, or 23.4%, the model-indicated rating for the
currently rated junior Aaa class would be Aa1, Aa2, A1,
respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time; rather
they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of how the
initial rating might change if key input parameters used in the
initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the
ratings impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-
indicated standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into
consideration in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that
would be assigned in each case could vary from the information
presented in the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


VERMONT STUDENT: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Various Bonds to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded 26 classes of bonds and
confirmed three classes of bonds issued by Vermont Student
Assistance Corporation under a master indenture established as of
June 16, 1995. The underlying collateral consists of student loans
originated under the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP), which are guaranteed by the U.S. government for a minimum
of 97% of defaulted principal and accrued interest, and student
loans originated under the Corporation's various private loan
programs.

Ratings Rationale

There are two major drivers for the downgrades. First, Moody's
corrected an input error that occurred during the previous rating
action on February 16, 2012. For the taxable auction rate
securities, the coupon rate is defined as the minimum of the 91
day Treasury Bill Rate (T-Bill) plus a spread and a fixed annual
rate. According to the transaction documents, the spread over the
T-Bill rate increases from 1.2% to 1.75% when the ratings of the
bonds are downgraded to less than A3. For the tax-exempt auction
rate securities, the coupon rate is calculated as the product of
the applicable percentage and the S&P Weekly High Grade Index. The
applicable percentage increases from 175% to either 200% or 250%
when the ratings of the bonds are downgraded below A3 and Baa3,
respectively. At the time of the previous rating action, Moody's
did not take this rating trigger into account and continued using
1.20% as the spread over T-Bill and 175% as the applicable
percentage, even though the ratings of the bonds were downgraded
below A3. The current ratings reflect the correct spread and
applicable percentage.

The second driver of the downgrades is the worse than expected
performance of private student loans in the underlying collateral
pool. Moody's increased its lifetime default expectation for the
private student loans originated under most of the Corporation's
private loan programs. Moody's lifetime expected defaults for the
private student loan pool increased from 16% at the time of the
2007 issuance to 26%. Moody's current expected defaults on the
remaining balance of the private student loan pool is 22%.

Moody's confirmed the ratings of three classes of bonds with legal
maturities on December 15, 2012, December 15, 2014 and December
15, 2015. These bonds have earlier maturity dates, and therefore
are relatively senior in the payment priority.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securities Backed by FFELP Student Loans",
published on April 2012.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

The ratings of the bonds with relatively later legal maturity
dates would not be upgraded or downgraded if the spread between
the 3 month LIBOR index on the liability side and the 3 month
financial CP index on the assets is 10 bps lower or 10 bps higher.

To assess rating implications of the higher expected losses, each
individual transaction was run through a variety of stress
scenarios using the Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), a cash
flow model developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Sr Ser. 03FF-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr Ser. 03HH, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr Ser. 03LL, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 1996F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 1996 G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Series 1996 H, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Senior Ser. BB, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Senior Ser. 2002CC, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Senior Ser. 2002DD, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Arcs-Series 1995 A, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Arcs-Series 1995 B, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Arcs-Series 1995 C, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Arcs-Series 1998 K, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Arcs-Series 1998 L, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Arc-Series 1998M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr Ser. 03II, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr Ser. 03JJ, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Sr Ser. 03KK, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2004-MM, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2004-NN, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2004-OO, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2004-PP, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2005-RR, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2005-SS, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2006-UU, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2006-VV, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2007-WW, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2007-XX, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

2007-YY, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C12: Fitch Keeps 'CCC' Rating on 2 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2004-C12 (WBCMT 2004-C12).

The affirmation reflects sufficient credit enhancement to offset
Fitch modeled losses for the pool. Fitch modeled losses of 2.5% of
the remaining pool; modeled losses of the original pool are at
1.9%, including losses already incurred to date. The Negative
Outlook on classes H through L reflects significant upcoming loan
maturities, whereby 89% of the pool balance either has a maturity
date or anticipated repayment date in 2014. Additionally, the
Negative Outlook on classes J through L also reflects the thin
nature of these classes, which make them susceptible to future
downgrades.

As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has been reduced by 33.4% (to $708 million from $1.06
billion), of which 33.2% was due to paydowns and 0.2% was due to
realized losses. Six loans, representing 22.9% of the pool, have
been defeased.

Fitch has designated 29 loans (47.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes five specially-serviced loans (4.9%). Of the
specially serviced loans, one (1.4%) was classified as real-estate
owned, one (1.8%) was classified as in foreclosure, two (1.1%)
were classified as greater than 90 days delinquent, and one (0.6%)
was classified as 30 days delinquent. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting the unrated class P.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is a loan (1%)
secured by a 262,644 square foot (sf) warehouse distribution
property located in Logan Township, NH. The year-end 2010 and 2011
debt service coverage ratio, on a net-operating income basis, were
both negative. The property became vacant after the single tenant,
Linens 'N Things, filed for bankruptcy in 2008 and rejected the
lease. The property currently remains 100% vacant. There has been
no reported new leasing activity.

The second largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
specially serviced loan (0.6%) secured by a 55,594 sf mixed-use
property located in Mesa, AZ. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2010 for imminent monetary default. A
receiver and a leasing group were both appointed in the fourth
quarter of 2011. The special servicer expects to foreclose and
market the property for sale.

The third largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a
specially-serviced loan (1.8%) secured by a 140,006 sf office
property located in Westerville, OH. The loan transferred to
special servicing in April 2011 for imminent maturity default. The
borrower was ultimately unable to payoff the loan at the loan's
June 2011 maturity date. As of the March 2012 rent roll, the
property was 95.5% occupied; however, leases on approximately 90%
of the total property square footage have lease expirations prior
to the end of 2014, including the largest tenants at the property.
The borrower had submitted a loan modification proposal, but was
declined by the special servicer, due to concerns about tenant
rollover risk at the property. The borrower continues to negotiate
lease extensions with the major tenants at the property, but has
not been successful to date. The special servicer commenced
foreclosure proceedings in January 2012.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $58.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $474.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.2 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.3 million class C at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.6 million class D at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.6 million class E at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12 million class F at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12 million class G at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.3 million class H at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $4 million class J at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $2.7 million class K at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $5.3 million class L at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $4 million class M at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $2.7 million class N at 'CCCsf'; RE 70%;
-- $2.7 million class O at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $12.9 million class MAD at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have been paid in full. Fitch does not rated
class P.

Fitch had previously withdrawn the rating of the interest-only
class IO.


WAMU COMMERCIAL 2006-SL1: Fitch Junks Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes of WaMu Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-SL1, small balance commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch expected losses across
the pool.  Fitch modeled losses of 9.3% of the remaining pool.
Fitch has designated 115 loans (31%) of the pool as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes 20 specially serviced loans (5%).

As of the June 2012 distribution date, the pool's certificate
balance has paid down 25.8% to $379.4 million from $511.4 million
at issuance.  There are 362 of the original 443 loans remaining in
the transaction.  There are currently 20 specially serviced loans
(5%) in the deal.  The average loan size for the remaining loans
is $1 million.  To date, the transaction has incurred $18.1
million in losses, representing 3.5% of the original transaction.

The largest contributor to loss (1.2%) is secured by a 73,678
square foot industrial warehouse property located in Santa Ana,
CA.  The decline in performance is a result of increased expenses
and decreased expense reimbursements.  The master servicer has
contacted the borrower for updates on occupancy, asking rents,
marketing efforts, and their plans to increase property cash flow.

The second largest contributor to loss (1%) is currently specially
serviced and in foreclosure.  The loan is secured by a multifamily
property consisting of 169 units located in Chicago, IL.  The
special servicer has rejected a discounted payoff offer submitted
by the borrower and legal counsel is drafting a motion for summary
judgment.  The most recent servicer reported occupancy was 84.6%
as of January 2011.

The third largest contributor to loss (0.3%) is secured by a
retail property located in Bronx, NY which is owner occupied.  The
decline in performance is due to decreased rental rates combined
with increased expenses.  The most recent reported occupancy as of
December 2010 is 100%.  The master servicer has contacted the
borrower for updates on property performance.

Fitch downgrades, and provides Recovery Estimates for the
following classes:

  -- $14.7 million class C to 'CCC' from 'B-'; RE 75%;
  -- $10.2 million class D to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%;
  -- $7 million class E to 'CC' from 'CCC'; RE 0%';
  -- $3.8 million class F to 'C' from 'CC'; RE 0%;
  -- $7.7 million class G to 'C' from 'CC'; RE 0%.

Fitch also affirms, and revises Outlooks on the following classes
as indicated:

  -- $51.2 million class A at 'A'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $273.5 million class A-1A at 'A'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable;
  -- $10.2 million class B at 'BB'; Outlook to Negative from
     Stable.

Classes H, J, K, L and M remain at 'D'; RE 0% due to principal
losses incurred.  Class N is not rated by Fitch. Fitch had
previously withdrawn the rating of the interest-only class X.


WESTBROOK CLO: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-2, B, and C notes from Westbrook CLO Ltd.  "At the same time, we
affirmed the ratings on the class A-1, D, and E notes," S&P said.

Westbrook CLO Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by Shenkman Capital Management.

The transaction's reinvestment period ends in December 2013.  "The
upgrades reflect the improved credit quality of the transaction's
underlying asset portfolio since our March 2010 review.  The
transaction has used proceeds designated for reinvestments to
build additional collateral in the portfolio," S&P said.

"We also note that the amount of 'CCC' rated and defaulted
obligations held in the portfolio have decreased over the same
period. As a result, the class A/B, C, D, and E
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have increased," S&P said.

"The affirmations reflect our opinion that there is sufficient
credit support available at the current rating level," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

Westbrook CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
Class               To           From
A-2                 AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)
B                   AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
C                   A+ (sf)      A (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

Westbrook CLO Ltd.

Class               Rating
A-1                 AAA (sf)
D                   BBB (sf)
E                   BB (sf)


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 201-C7: Moody's Rates 13 CMBS Classes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to thirteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C7.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FL, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-S, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* Represents exchangeable certificates. Certificates may be
  exchanged for Class A-FL Certificates of like balance.

Ratings Rationale

The Certificates are collateralized by 61 fixed rate loans secured
by 80 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 1.66X is greater than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.11X is greater than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

Moody's Trust LTV ratio of 96.4% is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%.

The transaction benefits from one loan representing approximately
3.2% of the pool balance, assigned an A3 credit assessment. Loans
assigned investment grade credit assessments are not expected to
contribute any loss to a transaction in low stress scenarios, but
are expected to contribute minimal amounts of loss in high stress
scenarios.

Moody's considers both loan level diversity and property level
diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to loan
level diversity, the pool's loan level (includes cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans) Herfindahl Index is
17.3. The transaction's loan level diversity is at the lower end
of the band of Herfindahl scores found in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009. With respect to property level
diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl Index is 17.8. The
transaction's property diversity profile is lower than the indices
calculated in most multi-borrower transactions issued since 2009.
Additionally, significant correlations exist when pooling within a
single property type. The concentration of retail properties
(57.3% of the pool balance) is high compared to other multi-
borrower deals rated by Moody's since the financial crisis.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-S to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-S.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to
worst) and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of
debt payment. The factors considered include property age, quality
of construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's
weighted average property quality grade is 2.48, which is higher
than the indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions
since 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.50
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver1.0, which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa Super Senior class would be Aaa, Aaa, and Aa1,
respectively; for the most junior Aaa rated class A-S would be
Aa1, Aa2, and A1, respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time; rather they are designed to provide a quantitative
calculation of how the initial rating might change if key input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. Parameter
Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each scenario
from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint. Qualitative
factors are also taken into consideration in the ratings process,
so the actual ratings that would be assigned in each case could
vary from the information presented in the Parameter Sensitivity
analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


WG HORIZONS: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from WG Horizons CLO I and removed
them from CreditWatch with positive implications.

WG Horizons CLO I is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that is managed by West Gate Horizons Advisors LLC.

The transaction's reinvestment period ends in May 2013. Today's
upgrades reflect the improved credit quality of the transaction's
underlying asset portfolio since our March 2010 review.

"We also note that the amount of 'CCC' rated and defaulted
obligations held in the portfolio have decreased over the same
period.  As a result, the class A, B, C, and D
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios have increased," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the
credit enhancement available to support them and take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

WG Horizons CLO I
                       Rating
Class               To           From
A-1                 AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                 AA (sf)      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                   A- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                   BBB- (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   BB- (sf)     CCC+ (sf)/Watch Pos


* Moody's Takes Action on $653 Million WaMu U.S. Alt A RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 52
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of 22 tranches from 12 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
and Option ARM loans, issued by Washington Mutual from 2002 to
2004.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of Alt-A
and Option ARM pools originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

The rating action constitute of a number of downgrades as well as
an upgrade. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance and/or structural features resulting in higher
expected losses for certain bonds than previously anticipated. For
e.g., for shifting interest structures, back-ended liquidations
could expose the seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds
in the majority of these deals are currently receiving 100% of
their principal payments, and thereby depleting the dollar
enhancement available to the senior bonds. In its current
approach, Moody's captures this risk by running each individual
pool through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R)(SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural nuances of the transaction

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2002-AR6
Trust

Cl. A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR13
Trust

Cl. A-1B2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CB1

Cl. III-A-3, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A-5, Confirmed at A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. VI-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. C-P, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. C-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. V-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CB2

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. C-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. D-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CB3

Cl. I-A, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-P, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-CB4

Cl. I-1-A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-2-A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-1-A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-2-A, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. C-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2002-AR17 Trust

Cl I-A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC 2003-AR4 Trust

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VII-A, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage 2003-AR1 Trust

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A, Confirmed at Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage 2003-AR2 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-3, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-4, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage 2003-AR3 Trust

Cl. I-A, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. III-A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. IV-A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. V-A, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Washington Mutual MSC Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2002-AR3 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. I-A-7, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

CL. II-A, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Aaa
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290308

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256



* Moody's Takes Action on $484-Mil. of GMAC-RFAC Trusts' U.S. RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
and confirmed the ratings of eight tranches from 11 RMBS
transactions, backed by Scratch and Dent loans, issued by GMAC-RFC
trusts.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP1 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 C (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP3 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP1 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP2 Trust

Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP3 Trust

Cl. A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2006-RP4 Trust

Cl. A, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-RP1 Trust

Cl. A, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RAAC Series 2007-RP2 Trust

Cl. A, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RFSC Series 2003-RP2 Trust

M-1, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

M-2, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RFSC Series 2004-RP1 Trust

M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290460

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004



* Moody's Takes Action on $225MM of Goldman Sach's U.S. RMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 7
tranches, upgraded the ratings of 2 tranches, and confirmed the
ratings of 8 tranches from eight RMBS transactions, backed by
Scratch and Dent loans, issued by Goldman Sachs.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance review of
Scratch and Dent pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology for Scratch
and Dent" published in May 2011.

The rating action constitute of two upgrades as well as seven
downgrades. The upgrades are due to an increase in the available
credit enhancement. The downgrade is primarily due to
deteriorating collateral performance.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications and 2) bonds that financial
guarantors insure.

Loan Modifications

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for Moody's current
view on loan modifications. As a result of an extension of the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an
increased use of private modifications, Moody's is extending its
previous view that loan modifications will only occur through the
end of 2012. It is now assuming that the loan modifications will
continue at current levels until the end of 2013.

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

Bonds Insured by Financial Guarantors

The credit quality of RMBS that a financial guarantor insures
reflect the higher of the credit quality of the guarantor or the
RMBS without the benefit of the guarantee. As a result, the rating
on the securities is the higher of 1) the guarantor's financial
strength rating and 2) the current underlying rating, which is
what the rating of the security would be absent consideration of
the guaranty. The principal methodology Moody's uses in
determining the underlying rating is the same methodology for
rating securities that do not have financial guaranty, described
earlier.

When assigning the final ratings to the bonds, in addition to the
methodologies described above, Moody's considered the volatility
of the projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2003-SEA

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 4, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2004-SEA2

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-SEA2

Cl. B-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B-3, Confirmed at Ca (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2006-SD1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2007-SEA1

Cl. A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2003 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-3, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290456

A list of updated estimated pool losses and sensitivity analysis
is being posted on an ongoing basis for the duration of this
review period and may be found at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF247004


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on $376MM of RMBS Issued in 2004
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 27
tranches, upgraded the rating of one tranche, and confirmed the
ratings of 19 tranches from 15 RMBS transactions, backed by Alt-A
and Option ARM loans, issued by IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust,
Residential Asset Securitization Trust, and Terwin Mortgage Trust.

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools. Cl. A-1 from IndyMac INDX Mortgage
Loan Trust 2004-AR3has been upgraded due to stronger than expected
deal performance. The downgrades are a result of deteriorating
performance and/or structural features resulting in higher
expected losses for certain bonds than previously anticipated. For
e.g., for shifting interest structures, back-ended liquidations
could expose the seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds
in the majority of these deals are currently receiving 100% of
their principal payments, and thereby depleting the dollar
enhancement available to the senior bonds. In its current
approach, Moody's captures this risk by running each individual
pool through a variety of loss and prepayment scenarios in the
Structured Finance Workstation(R) (SFW), the cash flow model
developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics. This individual pool
level analysis incorporates performance variances across the
different pools and the structural nuances of the transaction.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies noted above for 1) Moody's
current view on loan modifications 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until the end of 2013.

Small Pool Volatility

The above RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least
40 loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can
withdraw its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the
number of loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If,
however, a transaction has a specific structural feature, such as
a credit enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool
size, Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated above by a factor ranging
from 0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less
than 2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies described above, Moody's considered the
volatility of the projected losses and timeline of the expected
defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's also considered
the current pipeline composition as well as any specific loss
allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in April 2011 to 8.2% in May 2012. Moody's forecasts a
further drop to 7.8% for 2013. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR1

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-X-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR10

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-2B, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR11

Cl. 2-A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR12

Cl. A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-X-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR13

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-2, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. X, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2

Cl. 1-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-X-2, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Caa3
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-X-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR4

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR5

Cl. 2-A-1A, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. 2-A-1B, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012
Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. A-X-2, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Caa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR6

Cl. 1-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR9

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-3, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Ba2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-M-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-A4

Cl. A-X, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-IP2

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 2-A-3, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 A3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 3-A-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 4-A, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Residential Asset Securitization Trust Series 2004-
IndyPort1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-1X, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-13ALT

Cl. 2-P-X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. 2-PA-1, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Jan 31, 2012 B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

A list of these actions including CUSIP identifiers may be found
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF290459

A list of updated estimated pool losses, sensitivity analysis, and
tranche recovery details is being posted on an ongoing basis for
the duration of this review period and may be found at:

  http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF237256


* S&P Downgrades 16 Ratings on 10 U.S. CDO Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 16
tranches from 10 U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions backed by pools of structured financed (SF)
securities.  "The downgraded tranches have a total issuance amount
of $7.05 billion.  In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 76
tranches from 40 U.S. SF CDO transactions.  In all, we removed our
ratings on 61 tranches from CreditWatch negative." S&P said.

"The rating actions reflect general credit deterioration in the
portfolio backing the affected notes.  Some of the SF CDO
transactions' underlying credit quality has weakened, as the
number of defaulted and 'CCC' rated obligations increased since
our last review," S&P said.

"Our analysis of the transactions focused on the par value of
performing assets (and assumption for recovery value of defaulted
assets) compared to the outstanding notes issued by the CDO.  The
tranches below with ratings lowered are undercollateralized and
have a significant likelihood of not being repaid in full," S&P
said.

"In addition, the rating actions reflect our updated criteria for
rating SF CDOs.  The updated criteria include increased
correlation modeling parameters; lower recovery rate parameters
for cash SF assets; a cap on the maturities used in modeling SF
assets based on general prepayment and seasoning history; a
modified supplemental stress test (the largest obligor default
test and the largest industry default test to reflect
characteristic of SF assets); additional default patterns; and
timings of defaults in the analysis to account for potentially
faster and higher levels of defaults," S&P said.

"We affirmed our ratings on the 76 tranches to reflect our opinion
that the current credit support available is commensurate with
current rating levels," S&P said.

Rating and Creditwatch Actions

Acacia CDO 5 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LT-a             CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-b             CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Adirondack 2005-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LT-a             CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-b             CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2                 CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Altius II Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Altius III Fdg Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
S                   CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ayresome CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Bernoulli High Grade CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1B                CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Bluegrass ABS CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1MT-a             CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1MT-b             CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Cascade Funding CDO I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

C-Bass CBO XII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

C-Bass CBO XII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

C-BASS CBO XIII Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Coolidge Funding Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Crest G-Star 2001-1 LP
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Crystal River CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   D (sf)               CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1B2               CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1NV               CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1VA               CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1VB               CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Fort Point CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

G Street Finance Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LT-a             CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1LT-b             CC (sf)              CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Galleria V Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Gemstone CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC+ (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-3                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Gresham Street CDO Funding 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   A+ (sf)              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D                   CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Independence III CDO, Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Ischus CDO I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Kleros Preferred Funding Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Lenox CDO Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1S                CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

MKP CBO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Orchid Structured Finance CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Porter Square CDO I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Reservoir Funding Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-NV              CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1-V               CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Restructured Asset Backed Securities (RABS) 2003-3
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3                 CCC+ (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Revelstoke CDO I Limited
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Solstice ABS CBO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Sorin Real Estate CDO III Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Streeterville ABS CDO Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Summit RMBS CDO I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1S                CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Sunrise CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC+ (sf)            CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1B2               CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1BV               CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Triaxx Prime CDO 2007-1 Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1D                CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
A-1T                CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Vermeer Funding II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Vertical CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   CCC (sf)             CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

West Coast Funding I Ltd
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                CCC- (sf)            CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Whately CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                CCC- (sf)            CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)

Adirondack 2005-2 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   CC (sf)

Altius III Fdg Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1b-1F             CC (sf)

Ayresome CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1b                CC (sf)

Crest G-Star 2001-1 LP
                    Rating
C                   CC (sf)
D                   CC (sf)

G Street Finance Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)

Galleria V Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 CCC- (sf)
B                   CC (sf)

Gemstone CDO II Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   CC (sf)

Gresham Street CDO Funding 2003-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
Pref Shrs           CC (sf)

Independence III CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   CC (sf)

Kleros Preferred Funding Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)

Orchid Structured Finance CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1MM               BB+ (sf)

Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd
                    Rating
B                   CC (sf)

Sorin Real Estate CDO III Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)
B                   CC (sf)

Streeterville ABS CDO Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)

Summit RMBS CDO I Ltd
                    Rating
A-1J                CC (sf)

Sunrise CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   CC (sf)

Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)

Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-2 Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)
B                   CC (sf)
C                   CC (sf)
X                   CC (sf)

Triaxx Prime CDO 2007-1 Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 CC (sf)
B                   CC (sf)
X                   CC (sf)

Vermeer Funding II Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2A                CC (sf)
A-2B                CC (sf)

Vertical CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   CC (sf)

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

Acacia CDO 5 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)

Adirondack 2005-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)

Adirondack 2005-2 Ltd.
                    Rating
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)

Altius II Funding Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Altius III Fdg Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1a                D (sf)
A-1b-1B             D (sf)
A-1b-2              D (sf)
A-1b-3              D (sf)
A-1b-V              D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)

Ayresome CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
Combo Secs          D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Bernoulli High Grade CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1A                D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Bluegrass ABS CDO II Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)
Type I Com          D (sf)

Cascade Funding CDO I Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)

C-Bass CBO XII Ltd.
                    Rating
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

C-BASS CBO XIII Ltd
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Coolidge Funding Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)

Crystal River CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D-1                 D (sf)
D-2                 D (sf)
E                   D (sf)
F                   D (sf)
G                   D (sf)
H                   D (sf)

Duke Funding High Grade III Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1A                D (sf)
A-1B1               D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
B-1                 D (sf)
B-2                 D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
Sub Nts             D (sf)

Dunhill ABS CDO Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)

Fort Point CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2a                D (sf)
A-2b                D (sf)
A-3a                D (sf)
A-3b                D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)

G Street Finance Ltd
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)

Galleria V Ltd
                    Rating
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)
Pref Share          D (sf)

Gemstone CDO II Ltd.
                    Rating
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E                   D (sf)
F                   D (sf)

Independence III CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)

Ischus CDO I Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)
Combo Secs          D (sf)

Kleros Preferred Funding Ltd
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Lenox CDO Ltd
                    Rating
A-1J                D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
B-1                 D (sf)
B-2                 D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
E-1                 D (sf)
E-2                 D (sf)

MKP CBO IV Ltd.
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)

Opus CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A                   D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
Combo Note          D (sf)
D                   D (sf)
Sub Notes           D (sf)

Orchid Structured Finance CDO Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)

Porter Square CDO I Ltd
                    Rating
C                   D (sf)

Reservoir Funding Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Revelstoke CDO I Limited
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)

Solstice ABS CBO III Ltd
                    Rating
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)

Sorin Real Estate CDO III Ltd
                    Rating
C-FL                D (sf)
C-FX                D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Straits Global ABS CDO I Ltd
                    Rating
A Combo             D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
B Combo             D (sf)
B-1                 D (sf)
B-2                 D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)

Streeterville ABS CDO Ltd
                    Rating
B-1                 D (sf)
B-2                 D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)

Summit RMBS CDO I Ltd
                    Rating
A-2                 D (sf)
A-3F                D (sf)
A-3V                D (sf)
BF                  D (sf)
BV                  D (sf)
Comb I              D (sf)
Comb II             D (sf)
Pref Share          D (sf)

Sunrise CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
C                   D (sf)

Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
X                   D (sf)

Triaxx Prime CDO 2007-1 Ltd
                    Rating
C                   D (sf)

Vermeer Funding II Ltd.
                    Rating
B                   D (sf)
C-1                 D (sf)
C-2                 D (sf)
Combo Secs          D (sf)

West Coast Funding I Ltd
                    Rating
A-1b                D (sf)
A-1v                D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)
B                   D (sf)
C                   D (sf)
D                   D (sf)

Whately CDO I Ltd.
                    Rating
A-1BF               D (sf)
A-1BV               D (sf)
A-2                 D (sf)
A-3                 D (sf)
B-F                 D (sf)
B-V                 D (sf)
Combo A             D (sf)


* S&P Cuts Rating on 29 Classes from 9 U.S. RMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 29
classes from nine U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions issued between 1998 and 2010.

"We subsequently withdrew one of the lowered ratings due to the
small number of loans remaining.  Concurrently, we raised our
ratings on nine classes from three of the transactions.
Furthermore, we affirmed our ratings on 62 classes from 10 of the
transactions and subsequently withdrew one of the affirmed
ratings due to the small number of loans remaining.  We also
withdrew our rating on one other class because the class has been
paid in full," S&P said.

The transactions in this review are backed by various types of
mortgage loan collateral issued from 1998 through 2010.

"In accordance with our published criteria, these rating actions
reflect our view of the recent performance of the collateral
backing these transactions, our projected losses, the timing of
the projected defaults and losses, and the projected credit
support to cover those losses.  The actions also reflect our
view of structural features, such as cross-collateralization,
payment allocations, and super-senior/subordinate senior
relationships," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
the projected losses we applied at the applicable rating stresses
and/or, where applicable, the application of our interest
shortfall criteria.  We lowered our ratings on six classes from
one of the transactions based on our interest shortfall criteria,"
S&P said.

"These classes are identified in the list below with an asterisk.
The lowered rating and subsequent withdrawal reflects our opinion
that projected credit support for the affected class will be
insufficient to cover our projected loss at the current rating
level.  In addition, this class is backed by a pool with a small
number of remaining loans.  If any of the remaining loans default,
the resulting loss could have a greater effect on the pool's
performance than if the pool consisted of a larger number of
loans," S&P said.

"Because this performance volatility may have an adverse effect on
our outstanding rating, we withdrew our rating on the related
transaction," S&P said.

"Among other factors, the upgrades reflect our view of decreased
delinquencies within the structures associated with the affected
classes.  The decreased delinquencies have reduced remaining
projected losses for these structures, allowing these classes to
withstand more stressful scenarios.  In addition, each upgrade
reflects our assessment that the projected credit enhancement for
each affected class will be more than sufficient to cover
projected losses at the revised rating levels; however, we are
limiting the extent of the upgrades to reflect our view of ongoing
market risk," S&P said.

With regards to MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-NC1, no
interest payments were made to the outstanding classes in January
2009.  "At that time, we considered the lack of interest payments
to be a default event and lowered our ratings on all of the
outstanding classes to 'D (sf)," S&P said.

"However, we have now raised the ratings pursuant to our March 28,
2012 interest shortfall criteria (see "Methodology For Assessing
The Impact Of Interest Shortfalls On U.S. RMBS").  Specifically,
many classes in RMBS transactions contain provisions in which
interest shortfall amounts are to be paid immediately after the
accrued interest for the applicable period is paid.  However, when
immediate reimbursement provisions are not evident, the criteria
may apply a different approach if the outstanding shortfall amount
accrues interest and other conditions are met.  We revised our
ratings on this transaction based on this updated criteria," S&P
said.

"The affirmations on ratings other than 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)'
reflect our belief that projected credit enhancement available for
the affected classes will be sufficient to cover our projected
losses at the current rating levels," S&P said.

"The affirmed 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' ratings reflect our
assessment that the credit enhancement for these classes will
remain insufficient to cover projected losses," S&P said.

"The affirmed rating and subsequent withdrawal reflects our
opinion that projected credit support for the affected class will
be sufficient to cover our projected loss at the current rating.
In addition, this class is backed by a pool with a small number of
remaining loans.  If any of the remaining loans default, the
resulting loss could have a greater effect on the pool's
performance than if the pool consisted of a larger number of
loans.  Because this performance volatility may have an adverse
effect on our outstanding rating, we withdrew our rating on the
related transaction," S&P said.

"Based on our criteria, the current ratings on the bond-insured
classes reflect the higher of (i) the rating on the respective
bond insurer and (ii) the rating on the classes without giving
benefit to the bond insurance," S&P said.

"For nonprime transactions, in order to maintain a 'B' rating on a
class, we assessed whether, in our view, a class could absorb the
remaining base-case loss assumptions we used in our analysis. In
order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', we assessed whether
the class could withstand approximately 110% of our remaining
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while we
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of our remaining base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating
can, in our view, withstand approximately 150% of our remaining
base-case loss assumptions under our analysis," S&P said.

"For prime transactions, in order to maintain a 'B' rating on a
class, we assessed whether, in our view, a class could absorb the
remaining base-case loss assumptions we used in our analysis. In
order to maintain a rating higher than 'B', we assessed whether
the class could withstand approximately 127% of our remaining
base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating, while we
would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 154% of our remaining base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BBB' rating.  Each class with an affirmed 'AAA' rating
can, in our view, withstand approximately 235% of our remaining
base-case loss assumptions under our analysis," S&P said.

Subordination, overcollateralization, and excess interest
generally provide credit support for the classes within these
transactions.

Rating Actions

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-R2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        03072SPJ8   A (sf)               AA- (sf)
M-3        03072SPK5   BBB (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
M-4        03072SPL3   B (sf)               B+ (sf)
M-5        03072SPM1   CC (sf)              B- (sf)
M-6        03072SPN9   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Equity One ABS, Inc.
Series      1998-1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To      Interim      From
A-1        294751AF9   NR       CC (sf)     CC (sf)
A-2        294751AG7   NR       CC (sf)     BB (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1
Series      2007-CH1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AF-2       46630LAC8   B (sf)               B- (sf)
MF-1       46630LAH7   D (sf)               CCC (sf)*
MF-2       46630LAJ3   D (sf)               CCC (sf)*
MF-3       46630LAK0   D (sf)               CC (sf)*
MF-4       46630LAL8   D (sf)               CC (sf)*
MF-5       46630LAM6   D (sf)               CC (sf)*
MF-6       46630LAN4   D (sf)               CC (sf)*
MV-9       46630LBF0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
MV-10      46630LBG8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WF1
Series      2005-WF1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-3        57643LJY3   A (sf)               A+ (sf)
M-4        57643LJZ0   B+ (sf)              BB (sf)

MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-NC1
Series      2005-NC1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-1        57643LGF7   AA+ (sf)             D (sf)
M-2        57643LGG5   AA (sf)              D (sf)
M-3        57643LGH3   A (sf)               D (sf)
M-4        57643LGJ9   BB (sf)              D (sf)
M-5        57643LGK6   CCC (sf)             D (sf)
M-6        57643LGL4   CC (sf)              D (sf)
M-7        57643LGM2   CC (sf)              D (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE8
Series      2004-HE8
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        61744CHB5   A (sf)               AA (sf)
M-3        61744CHC3   B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
M-4        61744CHD1   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)

Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-B
Series      2006-B
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
AV-2       63860FAB9   AA- (sf)             AA+ (sf)
AV-3       63860FAC7   AA- (sf)             AA (sf)
AV-4       63860FAD5   AA- (sf)             AA (sf)
M3         63860FAG8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series      2004-2
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-2        68389FFH2   B- (sf)              BB+ (sf)
M-3        68389FFJ8   CCC (sf)             B- (sf)
M-4        68389FFK5   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust
Series      2005-RS7
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
A-2        76112BWU0   NR                   A (sf)
M-3        76112BWY2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RASC Series 2003-KS11 Trust
Series      2003-KS11
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
M-I-2      76110WVS2   BBB (sf)             A- (sf)
M-II-2     76110WVW3   CCC (sf)             B+ (sf)
M-I-3      76110WVT0   CCC (sf)             CC (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc.
Series      2004-R2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1A       03072SPX7   AAA (sf)
A-1B       03072SPD1   AAA (sf)
A-4        03072SPG4   AAA (sf)
M-1        03072SPH2   AA+ (sf)
M-7        03072SPP4   CC (sf)
M-8        03072SPQ2   CC (sf)

JPMorgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1
Series      2007-CH1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
AF-3       46630LAD6   CCC (sf)
AF-4       46630LAE4   CCC (sf)
AF-5       46630LAF1   CCC (sf)
AF-6       46630LAG9   CCC (sf)
AV-1       46630LAS3   AAA (sf)
AV-3       46630LAU8   AAA (sf)
AV-4       46630LAV6   AAA (sf)
AV-5       46630LAW4   AA+ (sf)
MV-1       46630LAX2   BBB+ (sf)
MV-2       46630LAY0   BB- (sf)
MV-3       46630LAZ7   B- (sf)
MV-4       46630LBA1   B- (sf)
MV-5       46630LBB9   CCC (sf)
MV-6       46630LBC7   CCC (sf)
MV-7       46630LBD5   CCC (sf)
MV-8       46630LBE3   CCC (sf)

MASTR Asset  Backed Securities Trust 2005-WF1
Series      2005-WF1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1-A      57643LJR8   AAA (sf)
A-2-D      57643LJV9   AAA (sf)
M-1        57643LJW7   AA+ (sf)
M-2        57643LJX5   AA (sf)
M-5        57643LKA3   CCC (sf)
M-6        57643LKB1   CC (sf)
M-7        57643LKC9   CC (sf)
M-8        57643LKD7   CC (sf)

Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE8
Series      2004-HE8
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-4        61744CGW0   AAA (sf)
A-7        61744CGZ3   AAA (sf)
M-1        61744CHA7   AA+ (sf)
M-5        61744CHE9   CCC (sf)
M-6        61744CHF6   CC (sf)
B-1        61744CHG4   CC (sf)
B-2        61744CHH2   CC (sf)
B-3        61744CHJ8   CC (sf)

Nationstar Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-B
Series      2006-B
Class      CUSIP       Rating
M1         63860FAE3   B- (sf)
M2         63860FAF0   CCC (sf)
M4         63860FAH6   CC (sf)
M5         63860FAJ2   CC (sf)
M6         63860FAK9   CC (sf)

Nomura Resecuritization Trust 2010-3R
Series      2010-3R
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A1         65539DAA2   AA (sf)
A2         65539DAB0   B (sf)

Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2
Series      2004-2
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-1A       68389FFB5   AAA (sf)
A-1B       68389FFC3   AAA (sf)
A-4        68389FFF6   AAA (sf)
M-1        68389FFG4   AA+ (sf)
M-5        68389FFL3   CC (sf)
M-6        68389FFM1   CC (sf)

RAMP Series 2005-RS7 Trust
Series      2005-RS7
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-3        76112BWV8   A (sf)
M-1        76112BWW6   B (sf)
M-2        76112BWX4   CCC (sf)
M-4        76112BWZ9   CC (sf)
M-5        76112BXA3   CC (sf)

RASC Series 2003-KS11 Trust
Series      2003-KS11
Class      CUSIP       Rating
A-I-4      76110WVN3   AAA (sf)
A-I-5      76110WVP8   AAA (sf)
A-I-6      76110WVQ6   AAA (sf)
M-I-1      76110WVR4   AA (sf)
M-II-1     76110WVV5   AA (sf)

*Based on application of interest shortfall criteria.


* S&P Cuts 13 Ratings on 4 US CMBS Deals on Interest Shortfalls
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 13
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from four
U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions due
to interest shortfalls. The downgrades reflect current and
potential interest shortfalls.

"We lowered our ratings on 10 of these classes to 'D (sf)' because
we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future. All 10 classes that we
downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for four or more months. The recurring  interest
shortfalls for the respective certificates are primarily due to
one  or more of the following factors:  Standard & Poor's analysis
primarily considered the ASER amounts based on  appraisal
reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using recent Member of the
Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals. We also considered
nonrecoverable advance declarations and special servicing fees
that are likely, in our view, to cause recurring interest
shortfalls," S&P said.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms. Typically,
these terms call for the  automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.

"We primarily considered ASER amounts based on ARAs calculated
from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from the affected
transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)' because ARAs based on a
principal balance haircut are highly subject to change, or even
reversal, once the special servicer obtains the MAI appraisals,"
S&P said.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined. Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance  payments,
and legal expenses.

"We detail the 13 downgraded classes from the four U.S. CMBS
transactions below. COMM 2004-LNB3", S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on the class G, H, and J certificates from
COMM 2004-LNB3. We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on the class H
and J certificates to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for five and 11 months, respectively, resulting from
ASER amounts related to the three assets ($40.8 million, 4.6%)
that are currently with the special servicer,  CWCapital Asset
Management LLC (CWCapital), special servicing fees ($8,509),
workout fees ($1,010), and interest reductions from modifications
for three  loans that were returned to the master servicer
($37,311). We lowered our rating on the class G certificates due
to reduced liquidity support available to this class and the
potential for this class to realize future interest shortfalls
related to the specially serviced assets. As of the June 11, 2012,
trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $21.4 million were in
effect for the three assets, and the reported monthly ASER amount
totaled $145,817. The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$192,662, and the shortfalls have affected all of the classes
subordinate to and including class H," S&P said.

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2001-
CKN5

"We lowered our ratings to 'D (sf)' on the class G and H
certificates from  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp.'s series 2001-CKN5 to reflect accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for four and eight months, respectively,
resulting from ASER amounts related to two ($48.8 million, 40.4%)
of the three assets ($89.2 million, 73.9%) that are currently with
the  special servicer, CWCapital, special servicing fees
($19,217), workout fees ($2,312), and interest not advanced
($268,836) due to a nonrecoverability determination with respect
to one ($40.4 million, 33.5%) of the specially serviced assets,"
S&P said.

According to CWCapital, the second-largest specially serviced
asset, the One Sugar Creek Place asset, for which advances have
been deemed nonrecoverable by the master servicer, is expected to
pay off in July 2012.

"We expect this payoff to reduce the interest shortfalls to the
trust and repay the accumulated interest shortfalls on classes E
and F. If this sale does not materialize, we expect classes E and
F, which currently have accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding for three and four months, respectively, would
continue to experience interest shortfalls which may likely prompt
us to take rating actions on these classes. As of the June 15,
2012, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $34.0 million were
in effect for two of the three assets, and the reported monthly
ASER amount on these two assets was $223,438," S&P said.

The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $511,050, and the
shortfalls have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class E.  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp. Series 2002-CKS4.

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class H certificates
from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CKS4 to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
for seven months. The shortfalls are primarily due to ASER amounts
related to five ($45.3 million, 13.6%) of  the 10 ($59.4 million,
17.8%) assets that are currently with the special servicer, LNR
Partners LLC (LNR), as well as special servicing fees ($13,634),"
S&P said.

As of the June 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling
$24.0 million were in effect for five of the 10 assets and the
total reported  monthly ASER amount on these five assets was
$146,640. The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$153,586, and the shortfalls have affected all of the classes
subordinate to and including class H.   Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2.

"We lowered our ratings on the class A-J, B, C, D, E, F, and G
certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series
2007-C2. We lowered our ratings on classes C, D, E, F, and G to 'D
(sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for
seven months. The shortfalls are primarily  due to ASER amounts
related to 12 ($123.2 million, 4.3%) of the 22 ($715.0  million,
24.7%) assets that are currently with the special servicer,
Torchlight Loan Services LLC, special servicing fees ($248,263),
interest not advanced due to nonrecoverable determinations
($59,164), interest rate  reductions from modifications for three
loans that we anticipate will continue through December 2019 ($1.0
million), and interest deferral from the  modification of the
Alliance SAFD - PJ loan, the largest asset with the  special
servicer ($240,233), that we anticipate to recur through January
2013," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on classes A-J and B due to reduced
liquidity support available to these classes and the potential for
these classes to experience interest shortfalls in the future
relating to the specially serviced assets.  As of the June 15,
2012, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $47.4  million were
in effect for 12 of the 22 specially serviced assets, and the
total monthly ASER amount related to these 12 assets was
$288,470. Including the ASER recovery of $643,992 from the
liquidation of a specially serviced asset in the June reporting
period and other expense recoveries ($162,845), the reported
monthly interest shortfalls totaled $1.1 million, and the
shortfalls have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class C," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered

COMM 2004-LNB3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                           Credit          Reported
         Rating       enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class To        From       (%)      Current    Accumulated
G    CCC- (sf)  B- (sf)    5.18      0          0
H    D (sf)     CCC (sf)   3.87      33,450     165,357
J    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)  2.56      53,805     414,467

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CKN5
                            Credit          Reported
            Rating        enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To       From         (%)     Current  Accumulated
G    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)  59.74     100,874    403,494
H    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)  49.74     63,513     428,931

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4
                           Credit          Reported
           Rating        enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class   To      From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
H     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)    6.23     67,121   316,914

Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                            Credit         Reported
         Rating        enhancement    Interest Shortfalls ($)
Class  To       From          (%)     Current  Accumulated
A-J  CCC (sf)   B- (sf)    10.84     (1,271,186)          0
B    CCC- (sf)  CCC+ (sf)  10.27     (150,475)        6,864
C    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   8.41      259,779     1,134,214
D    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   7.42      139,880       961,963
E    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   6.85       79,934       549,707
F    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   5.85      139,880       961,963
G    D (sf)     CCC- (sf)   4.85      139,880       961,963


* S&P Lowers Ratings on 7 Classes From 3 US CMBS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
three U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions due to current and potential interest shortfalls.

"We lowered our ratings on five of these classes to 'D (sf)'
because we expect the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future.  The five classes that we
downgraded to 'D (sf)' have had accumulated interest shortfalls
outstanding between two and eight months," S&P said.

The recurring interest shortfalls for the respective certificates
are primarily due to one or more of the following factors:

Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts in
effect for specially serviced assets;

The lack of servicer advancing for loans where the servicer has
made nonrecoverable advance declarations; and  Special servicing
fees.

Standard & Poor's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts
based on appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using
recent Member of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  "We
also considered servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations and
special servicing fees that are likely, in our view, to cause
recurring interest shortfalls," S&P said.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each respective transaction's terms. Typically,
these terms call for the automatic implementation of an ARA equal
to 25% of the stated principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60
days past due and an appraisal or other valuation is not available
within a specified timeframe.

"We primarily considered ASER amounts based on ARAs calculated
from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes from the affected
transactions to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  This is because ARAs based
on a principal balance haircut is highly subject to change, or
even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the MAI
appraisals," S&P said.

Servicer nonrecoverable advance declarations can prompt shortfalls
due to a lack of debt service advancing, the recovery of
previously made advances deemed nonrecoverable, or the failure to
advance trust expenses when nonrecoverable declarations have been
determined. Trust expenses may include, but are not limited to,
property operating expenses, property taxes, insurance payments,
and legal expenses.

  Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.   Series 1999-LIFE1

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class J certificate from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.'s series 1999-LIFE1 due to
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for eight months,
primarily due to interest not advanced resulting from
nonrecoverable determinations on two ($6.4 million, 20.1%) of the
three assets ($8.9 million, 27.9%) with the special servicer
($43,900), miscellaneous fees ($3,874), and special servicing fees
($1,919)," S&P said.

As of the June 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, the reported
net monthly interest shortfalls totaled $49,859 and have affected
all of the classes  subordinate to and including class J. Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11

"We lowered our ratings on the class H, J, K, L, and M
certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11. We
lowered our ratings on the class K, L, and M certificates to 'D
(sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
between two and seven months, resulting primarily from interest
not advanced ($38,517), miscellaneous trust expenses ($14,545),
ASER amounts   related to two ($7.8 million; 1.1%) of the six
($35.0 million; 5.1%) assets that are currently with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC, and   special servicing and
workout fees ($9,478)," S&P said.

"We lowered our ratings on classes H and J due to reduced
liquidity support available to these classes and the potential for
these classes to experience interest shortfalls in the future
related to the specially serviced assets. Classes H and J had
accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding for two months. As of
the June 13, 2012, trustee remittance report, ARAs totaling $2.1
million were in effect for two of the six specially serviced
assets. The total reported monthly ASER amount on these two assets
was $10,527. The reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled
$73,066 and have affected all of the classes subordinate to and
including class J. Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-IQ8,"
S&P said.

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class J certificate from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-IQ8 due to accumulated
interest shortfalls   outstanding for seven months, primarily due
to special servicing and workout fees ($3,990) and ASER amount
related to one ($1.3 million, 0.3%) of the three specially
serviced loans ($11.7 million, 2.7%)," S&P said.

As of the June 15, 2012, trustee remittance report, a $274,666 ARA
was in effect for the specially serviced Lyman Lumber Office
Building loan ($1.3 million, 0.3%), and the ASER amount on this
loan was $1,212. The trust had an ASER recovery of $24,815 on
the specially serviced River Rock Business Center loan ($8.6
million, 2.0%) reported for this period.

"Based on information from the special servicer, excluding the
ASER recovery, we expect the ASER and special serving and workout
fees to continue affecting the trust," S&P said.

Ratings Lowered

Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.
Series 1999-LIFE1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                             Reported
          Rating           Credit      Interest shortfalls
Class     To      From     enhcmt(%)  Current  Accumulated
J         D (sf)  CCC- (sf)    26.29   24,839      185,387

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                           Reported
         Rating             Credit     interest shortfalls
Class  To         From      enhcmt(%)   Current Accumulated
H      CCC (sf)   BB- (sf)      2.73    (9,481)     40,605
J      CCC- (sf)  B+ (sf)       2.29    13,237      26,532
K      D (sf)     B (sf)        1.85    13,232      26,523
L      D (sf)     CCC+ (sf)     1.42    13,232      38,157
M      D (sf)     CCC (sf)      0.98    13,232      66,393

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2004-IQ8
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
                                             Reported
          Rating           Credit      Interest shortfalls
Class     To      From     enhcmt(%)  Current  Accumulated
J         D (sf)  CCC- (sf)    0.03  (20,826)      39,267


* S&P Withdraws Ratings on 26 Classes From Nine CDO Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on 26
classes of notes from nine collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions.

The rating withdrawals follow the complete paydown of the notes on
their most recent payment dates.

Ajax Two Ltd. is a U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) backed in part by commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS).  The transaction paid the class A-2A and A-2B notes down
in full on the June 8, 2012, payment date, from outstanding
balances of $8.03 million and $0.59 million, respectively.

Arlington Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd. is a U.S. CDO transaction
backed by corporate bonds that paid the class A-3 notes down in
full on the June 11, 2012, payment date from an outstanding
balance of $18.21 million.

Bernard National Loan Investors Ltd. is a U.S. CLO that paid the
class B notes down in full on the May 31, 2012, payment date from
an outstanding balance of $2.88 million.

BlueOrchard Loans for Development S.A. (Compartment 1) series
2007-1 is a cash flow emerging market CDO.  The transaction paid
the class A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, and B3 notes down in full on the
June 11, 2012, payment date from outstanding balances of GBP5.16
million, Eur1.81 million, USD23.34 million, GBP 1.25
million, Eur1.45 million, and USD12 million, respectively.

Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd. is a U.S. CLO transaction that paid the
class A, B, C, and D notes down in full following a May 29, 2012,
notice of optional redemption.  The notes were paid down on the
June 12, 2012, payment date from outstanding balances of $16.23
million, $19.00 million, $13.00 million, and $10.00 million,
respectively.

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Ltd. is a U.S. cash flow CLO. The
transaction paid the class A and B notes down in full on May 29,
2012, payment date from outstanding balances of $27.38 million and
$10.70 million, respectively.

LCM I Ltd. is a U.S. cash flow CLO that paid the class A-1, A-2,
and B notes down in full on the June 15, 2012, payment date from
outstanding balances of $3.01 million, $0.52 million, and $17.00
million, respectively.

Nob Hill CLO II Ltd. is a U.S. CLO transaction that paid the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes down in full following a May 23,
2012, notice of optional redemption.  The notes were paid down on
the June 12, 2012, payment date, from outstanding balances of
$252.42 million, $29.30 million, $22.00 million, $20.00 million,
$17.00 million, and $15.10 million, respectively.

Valeo Investment Grade CDO II Ltd. is a U.S. CDO transaction
backed by corporate bonds that paid the class A-2 notes down in
full on the June 1, 2012, payment date from an outstanding balance
of $4.54 million.

Ratings Withdrawn

Ajax Two Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2A                NR                  AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A-2B                NR                  AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Arlington Street CDO (Cayman) Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3                 NR                  BB+ (sf)

Bernard National Loan Investors Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

BlueOrchard Loans for Development S.A. (Compartment 1)
Series 2007-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A1                  NR                  A+ (sf)
A2                  NR                  A+ (sf)
A3                  NR                  A+ (sf)
B1                  NR                  BBB+ (sf)
B2                  NR                  BBB+ (sf)
B3                  NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Clydesdale CLO 2003 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
D                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Gulf Stream-Compass CLO 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

LCM I L.P.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Nob Hill CLO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
B                   NR                  A+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A- (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB- (sf)
E                   NR                  BB (sf)

Valeo Investment Grade CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2                 NR                  AA- (sf)

NR-Not rated.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on 38 Classes From 7 US RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 38
classes from seven U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions and two related Cayman Island trusts and
removed four of the ratings on the lowered classes from
CreditWatch with negative implications.

"We also affirmed our ratings on 58 classes from seven
transactions and removed one of them from CreditWatch negative. In
addition, we withdrew our ratings on three classes from two
transactions," S&P said.

Seven of the RMBS transactions in this review are backed by
Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgage loan collateral issued in 2004 and
2006. The two related Cayman Island trusts are backed by two
classes from one of the Alt-A transactions, Deutsche Mortgage
Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-PR1. Deutsche 2006-PR1
also contains a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
conduit (re-REMIC) structure which is backed by two classes from
Countrywide Home Loans Alternative Loan Trust 2005-11CB, which is
backed by Alt-A mortgage loan collateral.

"In accordance with our published criteria, these rating actions
reflect our view of the recent performance of the collateral
backing these transactions, our current projected losses, the
timing of the projected defaults and losses, and the projected
credit support to cover those losses. The actions also reflect our
view of structural features, such as cross collateralization,
payment allocations, and super-senior/subordinate senior
relationships," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect our belief that projected credit
enhancement for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover
the projected losses at the previous rating levels. The
affirmations reflect our belief that projected credit enhancement
available for the affected classes will be sufficient to cover our
projected losses at the current rating levels.  The withdrawals
reflect the application of our interest-only (IO) criteria," S&P
said.

"We intend our ratings on the re-REMIC class to address the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal. We reviewed
the interest and   principal amounts due on the underlying
securities, which are then passed   through to the re-REMIC class.
We applied our loss projections, incorporating our loss
assumptions, to the underlying collateral to identify the
principal and interest amounts that could be passed through from
the underlying securities under our rating scenario stresses. We
stressed our loss projections at various rating categories to
assess whether the re-REMIC class could withstand the stressed
losses associated with their ratings while receiving timely
payment of interest and principal consistent with our
criteria,"S&P said.

"In order to maintain a 'B' rating on a class, we assessed
whether, in our view, a class could absorb the remaining base-case
loss assumptions we used in our analysis. In order to maintain a
rating higher than 'B', we assessed whether the class could
withstand losses exceeding the remaining base-case loss
assumptions at a percentage specific to each rating category, up
to 150%   for an 'AAA' rating. For example, in general, we would
assess whether one class could withstand approximately 110% of our
remaining base-case loss assumptions to maintain a 'BB' rating,
while we would assess whether a different class could withstand
approximately 120% of our remaining base-case loss assumptions to
maintain a 'BBB' rating. Each class with an affirmed 'AAA'
rating can, in our view, withstand approximately 150% of our
remaining   base-case loss assumptions under our analysis," S&P
said.

"Classes rated 'CCC (sf)' and 'CC (sf)' reflect our assessment
that the credit enhancement for these classes will remain
insufficient to cover projected losses," S&P said.

Subordination, overcollateralization, and excess   spread, when
applicable, provide credit support for the affected transactions.

Rating Actions

Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
3-A-1      05948KPN3   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
4-A-2      05948KPR4   A- (sf)              AA+ (sf)
4-A-3      05948KPS2   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
4-A-4      05948KPT0   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
4-A-5      05948KPU7   BBB+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
4-IO       05948KPV5   NR                   AAA (sf)
30-B-IO    05948KQA0   NR                   AAA (sf)
30-B-1     05948KQB8   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-25
Series 2004-25
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-3      12669GKA8   BB (sf)              BBB- (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Cayman Series 2006-C3-PR1
Series 2006C3-PR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
3-A-F-1                B- (sf)              BBB (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Cayman Series 2006C4-PR1
Series 2006C4-PR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
4-A-F-1                B- (sf)              BBB (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-
PR1
Series 2006-PR1
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
2-A-F      25157GAC6   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
2-PO       25157GAE2   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
3-A-1      25157GAH5   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
3-PO       25157GAN2   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
4-A-F-2    25157GAQ5   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
4-A-I-1    25157GAR3   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
4-A-I-2    25157GAS1   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
4-PO       25157GAZ5   B- (sf)              B+ (sf)
B-1A       25157GCU4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-1B       25157GCV2   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
B-2        25157GCY6   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-
4
Series 2004-4
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
III-AR-1   251563EZ1   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)
IV-AR-1    251563FA5   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)
V-AR-1     251563FB3   BB+ (sf)             A- (sf)
VII-AR-1   251563FD9   BBB (sf)             A- (sf)
VII-AR-2   251563FE7   BBB (sf)             AA- (sf)
VII-AR-3   251563FP2   NR                   AA- (sf)
II-MR-1    251563EW8   B- (sf)              BB- (sf)

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR5
Series 2004-AR5
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A-1      45660NS22   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)
2-A-2      45660NS55   BB+ (sf)             A (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2004-9XS
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1-A4A      86359BRB9   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A4B      86359BRH6   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A4C      86359BRJ2   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A4D      86359BRK9   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-A5       86359BRC7   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
1-A6       86359BRD5   A- (sf)              AAA (sf)
2-A1       86359BRE3   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
1-M1       86359BRF0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-AR13 Trust
Series 2006-AR13
                               Rating
Class      CUSIP       To                   From
1A         93363RAA4   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)
2A         93363RAB2   B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
2A-1B      93363RAC0   CC (sf)              CCC (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-4
Series 2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      05948KPH6   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      05948KPM5   AAA (sf)
CB-IO      05948KPP8   AAA (sf)
30-B-2     05948KQC6   CC (sf)
30-B-3     05948KQD4   CC (sf)

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-25
Series 2004-25
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      12669GJY8   AAA (sf)
1-A-2      12669GJZ5   B- (sf)
1-A-4      12669GKB6   B- (sf)
1-A-5      12669GKC4   B- (sf)
1-A-6      12669GKD2   CC (sf)
1-X        12669GKE0   AAA (sf)
2-A-1      12669GKF7   AAA (sf)
2-A-2      12669GKG5   B- (sf)
2-A-3      12669GKH3   B- (sf)
2-A-4      12669GKJ9   CC (sf)
2-X        12669GKK6   AAA (sf)
3-A-1      12669GKL4   CC (sf)
M-1        12669GKY6   CC (sf)
M-2        12669GKZ3   CC (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-
PR1
Series 2006-PR1
Class      CUSIP       Rating
1-A-1      25157GAA0   B- (sf)
3-A-F-1-C  25157GAF9   AA- (sf)
3-A-F-2    25157GAG7   AA- (sf)
4-A-F-1-C  25157GAP7   AA- (sf)
5-A-F-1    25157GBA9   B- (sf)
5-A-F-2    25157GBB7   AA- (sf)
5-A-F-3    25157GBC5   B- (sf)
5-A-F-4    25157GBD3   B- (sf)
5-A-I-1    25157GBE1   B- (sf)
5-A-I-2    25157GBF8   B- (sf)
5-A-I-3    25157GBG6   B- (sf)
5-A-I-4    25157GBH4   B- (sf)
5-PO       25157GCS9   B- (sf)
B-3        25157GDA7   CC (sf)
B-4        25157GDC3   CC (sf)
B-5        25157GDE9   CC (sf)
B-6        25157GDG4   CC (sf)
B-7        25157GDJ8   CC (sf)
B-8        25157GDL3   CC (sf)
B-9        25157GDM1   CC (sf)
CW-A1      25157GCT7   CC (sf)

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-
4
Series 2004-4
Class      CUSIP       Rating
I-A-4      251563EM0   AAA (sf)
I-A-5      251563EN8   AA (sf)
I-A-6      251563EP3   AAA (sf)
II-AR-1    251563EU2   AAA (sf)
II-AR-2    251563EV0   AAA (sf)
VI-AR-1    251563FC1   A (sf)
I-M-1      251563ER9   CCC (sf)
M          251563FK3   CC (sf)
I-M-2      251563ES7   CC (sf)
II-MR-2    251563EX6   CC (sf)
B-1        251563FL1   CC (sf)

IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR5
Series 2004-AR5
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-A-1A     45660NS30   AAA (sf)
2-A-1B     45660NS48   AAA (sf)
A-X-2      45660NS71   AAA (sf)

Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Series 2004-9XS
Class      CUSIP       Rating
2-M1       86359BRP8   B- (sf)
2-M2       86359BRQ6   CC (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-AR13 Trust
Series 2006-AR13
Class      CUSIP       Rating
CA-1C      93363RAD8   CC (sf)


* S&P Raises Ratings on 50 Tranches From 44 CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 50
tranches from 44 corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions and
removed 49 from CreditWatch with positive implications.

"In addition, we lowered 43 ratings from 31 U.S. synthetic CDO
transactions backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities, 11
ratings from eight U.S. synthetic CDO transactions backed by
residential mortgage-backed securities, and two ratings from two
corporate-backed synthetic CDO transactions and removed them
from CreditWatch with negative implications," S&P said.

"Furthermore, we affirmed 23 ratings from 16 corporate-backed
synthetic CDO transactions and 11 ratings from six synthetic CDO
transactions backed by structured finance assets and   removed 16
from CreditWatch negative," S&P said.

"All of the upgraded tranches come from corporate synthetic CDO
transactions we reviewed in connection with our monthly SROC
review process have experienced a combination of upward rating
migration in their underlying reference portfolios, seasoning of
the underlying reference names and an increase in the synthetic
rated overcollateralization (SROC) ratios above 100% at higher
rating levels as of the June review and at our projection of the
SROC ratios   in 90 days assuming no credit migration," S&P said.

Nearly all of the tranches with ratings lowered come from SF asset
synthetic  CDO transactions being reviewed under our updated
criteria for rating SF CDO  transactions (see "Global CDOs Of
Pooled Structured Finance Assets: Methodology And Assumptions,"
published Feb. 21, 2012 and with an implementation date of
March 19, 2012).

The ratings on these transactions were affected by the new
criteria, which included updates to assumptions including
increased correlation modeling parameters, lower recovery rates,
and a modified supplemental stress test to reflect characteristic
of the SF assets referenced by the transactions.

"For some of the tranches that we downgraded significantly, the
'largest obligor test' was the constraining factor in the new
rating assigned. We have split the rating actions into two
sections. The first section lists the rating actions for
corporate-backed synthetic CDOs and the second section lists the
rating actions that reflect the application of our updated
criteria for CDO transactions backed by SF assets," S&P said.

Rating Actions for Corporate-Backed Synthetic CDOS

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR10 mil tranche A Hunter Valley CDO II floating rate notes due
June 30, 2014
series 2007-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche A                BB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR12.5 mil tranche A Hunter Valley CDO II floating-rate notes due
30 June
2107 series 2007-3
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche A                BB- (sf)        BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR150 mil tranche A Hunter Valley CDO II floating-rate notes due
30 June 2017
series 2007-10
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Tranche A                BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR5 mil tranche A Hunter Valley CDO II fixed-rate notes due 30
June 2017
series 2007-8
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche A                BB- (sf)        BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Athenee CDO PLC
EUR7.5 mil tranche B Hunter Valley CDO II floating rate notes due
June 30,
2017 series 2007-5
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche B                B+ (sf)         BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Athenee CDO PLC
US$30 mil tranche B Hunter Valley CDO II floating-rate notes due
30 June 2017
series 2007-12
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche B                B+ (sf)         B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Default Swap
US$10.891 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506494096
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.891 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551445
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.892 bil Swap Risk rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551406
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.892 bil Swap Risk rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551414
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.892 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551423
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546950
                                 Rating
Class                  To             From
Notes                  BBB-srp (sf)   BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546955
                                 Rating
Class                  To             From
Notes                  BBB-srp (sf)   BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506547004
                                 Rating
Class                  To             From
Notes                  BBB-srp (sf)   BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.893 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551442
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.894 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551435
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Sawp Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506551383
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No SDB506494104
                                 Rating
Class                  To             From
Notes                  BBB-srp (sf)   BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546935
                                 Rating
Class                  To             From
Notes                  BBB-srp (sf)   BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546943
                                 Rating
Class                  To             From
Notes                  BBB-srp (sf)   BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506550851
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.895 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref. No.
SDB506551403
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    BB-srp (sf)   B+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$10.896 bil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
SDB506546906
                                 Rating
Class                   To            From
Notes                   BBB-srp (sf)  BB+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Credit Default Swap
US$187.5 mil Swap Risk Rating - Portfolio CDS Ref No.
PYR_8631051_82386545_Vizzavona
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Swap                     AAsrp (sf)    A+srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Echo Funding Pty Ltd. Series 19
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Series 19                CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Echo Funding Pty Ltd. Series 20
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Series 20                CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Greylock Synthetic CDO 2006
Series 2
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A3-$FMS                  BB- (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A3-$LMS                  BB- (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A3A-$FMS                 BB- (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A3B-$LMS                 BB- (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Lorally CDO Limited Series 2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
2006-2                   A (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Lorally CDO Limited Series 2006-4
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
2006-4                   A (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Pos

Magnolia Finance II PLC
Series 2006-7D
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Notes                    B+ (sf)         B (sf)/Watch Pos

Marvel Finance 2007-4 LLC
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IA                       BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2005-8
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Notes                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2005-9
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Notes                    BB+ (sf)        B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-9
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
IA                       B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)
II                       CCC- (sf)           CCC- (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-13
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A                        BBB (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
Series 2006-27
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
Class A                  BB- (sf)            B+ (sf)

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$1 bil Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2007-6
NF8BK
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    A+srp (sf)    A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$500 mil Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2007-6
NF8T1
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    A+srp (sf)    A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$500 mil Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2007-6
NF8BM
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    A+srp (sf)    A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley ACES SPC
US$500 mil Morgan Stanley ACES SPC 2007-6
NF8T4
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Notes                    A+srp (sf)    A-srp (sf)/Watch Pos

Morgan Stanley Managed ACES SPC
Series 2005-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Jr Sup Sr                AA (sf)        AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

Newport Waves CDO
Series 1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-$LS                   B- (sf)             B- (sf)
A3-$LMS                  CCC+ (sf)           CCC+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 5
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-$LMS                  BB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
A3-$LMS                  B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 8
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A3-ELS                   B (sf)              B (sf)

Newport Waves CDO
Series 9
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1-GLS                   BB- (sf)            BB- (sf)

Portfolio CDS Trust 16
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Super Sr.                AA (sf)        AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg


REPACS Trust Series 2006-1 Monte Rosa
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A-1                      B+ (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2                      B (sf)         CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

REVE SPC
EUR50 mil, �3 bil, US$154 mil REVE SPC Dryden XVII Notes Series
2007-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
JSS Ser23                BBB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)
A Series 4               BB (sf)             BB (sf)
A Series 7               BB (sf)             BB (sf)
A Series 9               BB (sf)             BB (sf)
A Series18               B+ (sf)             B+ (sf)

Rutland Rated Investments
Series 2006-2 (28)
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A1-L                     B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Rutland Rated Investments
EUR5 mil, US$197 mil Dryden XII - IG Synthetic CDO 2006-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A3-$LS                   BBB (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A3B-$LS                  BBB (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
A3C-$LS                  BBB (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A1-D1                    B+ (sf)         B (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-3
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
B1-D1                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-4
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
B2-D2                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-5
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A2-D2                    BBB (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-7
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
B1-H1                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-6
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
B1-A1                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Cayman) Ltd.
Series 2006-9
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
B3-D3                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Ireland) PLC
Series 2006-20
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A1-E1                    B+ (sf)         B (sf)/Watch Pos

STARTS (Ireland) PLC
Series 2006-21
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
B1-E1                    B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Steers Credit Linked Trust, ML Tranche
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Sing Tran                B+ (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Pos

Terra CDO SPC Ltd.
Series 2007-2 SEGREGATED PORTFOL
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A1                       CC (sf)             CC (sf)

RATING ACTIONS FOR SF-BACKED SYNTHETIC CDOS

ABACUS 2004-3, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Class A-1                AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Class A-2                AA+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Class B                  A- (sf)        A- (sf)/Watch Neg
Class C                  CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

ABSpoke 2005-IA, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
ABSpoke                  CC (sf)        CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

AMP ABX 2006-1 Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Var Notes                CCC- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

AMP CMBS 2006-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Securd Nts               BB+ (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

AMP CMBS 2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Securd Nts               BB+ (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Calculus ABS Resecuritization Trust Series 2007-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
VarDisTrUn               CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust Series 2006-8
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
TrustUnits               CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust Series 2006-9
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
TrustUnits               CCC- (sf)       B (sf)/Watch Neg

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust Series 2007-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Units                    CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust, Series 2007-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
V Units                  CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$15 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-3 CDO of CMBS Variable Notes due 2049
Series 106/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable
Notes due 2049
Series 94/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Tranche 1                BB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable
Notes due 2049
Series 92/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche 1                BB+ (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$2.5 bil Sonoma Valley 2007-1 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable
Notes due 2049
Series 93/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche 1                BB+ (sf)        BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$23 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-4 Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable
Notes due 2051
Series 115/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)       B- (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$31.5 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-3 CDO of CMBS Variable Notes due
2049
Series 105/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Claris Ltd.
US$20.7 mil Sonoma Valley 2007-4
Series 114/2007
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Default Swap
US$1 bil Credit Default Swap - CRA600016
                                 Rating
Class                    To           From
Swap                     A+srp (sf)   AAAsrp (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Default Swap
US$1 bil Credit Default Swap - CRA600036
                                 Rating
Class                    To           From
Swap                     A+srp (sf)   AAAsrp (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Default Swap
US$1 bil Swap Risk Rating Portfolio -Deutsche Bank AG, New York
Branch - AG
Financial Products, Inc. CDS Reference # N734765N
                                 Rating
Class                    To           From
Swap                     A+srp (sf)   AAAsrp (sf)/Watch Neg

Credit Default Swap
US$950 mil Swap Risk Rating-Portfolio, CDS Reference # 06ML23332A
                                 Rating
Class                 To             From
06ML23332A            CCC+srp (sf)   BBB-srp (sf)/Watch Neg

Halcyon 2005-2, Ltd.
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A                        CCC- (sf)       BB (sf)/Watch Neg

HARBOR SPC
Series 2006-1
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A                        CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
C                        CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
D                        CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

HARBOR SPC
Series 2006-2
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A                        CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
C                        CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
D                        CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

High Grade Structured Credit 2004-1 Limited
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
C                        CC (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D                        CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg
E                        CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Nomura International plc
US$1 bil NSCR 2006-1 Class A-1 Nomura Synthetic CMBS
Resecuritization
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
Tranche                  CCC- (sf)       B (sf)/Watch Neg

Nomura International plc
US$20 mil NSCR 2006-1 Class FL Nomura Synthetic CMBS
Resecuritization
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
First Loss               CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Nomura International plc
US$1 bil NSCR 2006-2 2.75%-7% SCDO
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Tranche                  CCC-srp (sf)  B-srp (sf)/Watch Neg

North Street Referenced Linked Notes, 2003-5 Limited
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
B-1                      BB+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B-2                      BB- (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Obelisk Trust 2007-1-Sonoma Valley
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
A                        CCC+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        CCC+ (sf)     BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg

Portfolio Credit Rating of Unfunded Credit Default Swap involving
Morgan
Stanley Capital Services Inc., and Portfolio CDS Trust 61
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Un Cr Defa               BB+ (sf)       BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rutland Rated Investments
Series 13
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
Series 13                CC (sf)        CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rutland Rated Investments
Series 14
                                 Rating
Class                    To            From
Series 14                CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg

Salisbury International Investments Ltd.
Series 2005-5
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A                        CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Salisbury International Investments Ltd.
Series 2005-6
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A                        CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Salisbury International Investments Ltd.
Series 2005-08
                                 Rating
Class                    To              From
A                        CCC- (sf)       CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Seawall 2006-1 Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A-2                      BBB+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        BBB+ (sf)      AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
C-1                      BBB+ (sf)      A (sf)/Watch Neg

Seawall 2007-2 (AAA Synthetic ReREMIC) Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        BB+ (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Super Sr                 BBB+ (sf)      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        BB+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Seawall 2007-3 (AAA Synthetic ReREMIC) Ltd
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
A                        BB+ (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Super Sr                 BBB+ (sf)      AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        BB+ (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Seawall SPC
US$50 mil Seawall SPC - Series 2006-2 (CMBS Synthetic Reremic)
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A                        D (sf)         CCC+ (sf)/Watch Neg

SPGS SPC
Series 2006-I
                                 Rating
Class                    To             From
A                        CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
B                        CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg
C                        CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

STEERS High-Grade CMBS Resecuritization Trust
Series 2006-1 2 3
                                 Rating
Class                    To                  From
2006-1                   CCC+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
2006-2                   CCC+ (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
2006-3                   CCC+ (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Neg


* S&P Raises Ratings on 18 Tranches From Four CDO Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on 18
tranches from four U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
transactions backed by pools of trust preferred securities
(TruPs).

"We lowered our ratings on five tranches from two U.S. TruPs CDO
transactions. In addition, we affirmed our ratings on 24 tranches
from three U.S. TruPs CDO transactions," S&P said.

The upgrade actions reflect paydowns to the senior notes in the
transactions and increased subordination to the affected notes.
They also reflect improvements in the credit quality of the
insurance companies that issued the TruPs collateralizing these
CDOs. The transactions hold fewer defaulted assets than they did
at the time of the last rating actions.  "We downgraded three
junior notes and two combination notes due to reduced
subordination. The affirmations reflect our view that the affected
tranches have sufficient credit support to maintain the current
rating levels," S&P said.

Standard & Poor's will continue to review whether, in its view,
the ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

Rating Actions

ICONS Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To            From
A                        A- (sf)       BBB (sf)
B                        BBB (sf)      BBB- (sf)
C-1                      B(sf)         CCC+ (sf)
C-2                      B(sf)         CCC+ (sf)
C-3                      B(sf)         CCC+ (sf)
D                        B-(sf)        CCC+ (sf)
I Comp                   A+(sf)        A- (sf)
II Comp                  A-(sf)        BBB (sf)

I-Preferred Term Securities I Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      AA- (sf)      A+ (sf)

I-Preferred Term Securities II Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1-A                    AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
A-2                      AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
A-3                      AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)
B-1                      BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
B-2                      BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
B-3                      BB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
C                        CCC+ (sf)     CCC- (sf)

I-PreTSL II Combination Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To            From
Def Comb                 AA+ (sf)      A- (sf)

I-Preferred Term Securities III Ltd.
                              Rating
Class                    To            From
A-1                      AA (sf)       A+ (sf)
B-1                      CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)
B-2                      CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)
B-3                      CCC+ (sf)     B- (sf)

TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ltd.
                             Rating
Class                    To            From
Series V                 CCC- (sf)     CCC (sf)
Series VI                CCC (sf)      CCC+ (sf)

Rating Affirmations

I-Preferred Term Securities I Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-2                A+ (sf)
A-3                A+ (sf)
B-1                CCC- (sf)
B-2                CCC- (sf)
B-3                CCC- (sf)
C                  CCC- (sf)

I-Preferred Term Securities III Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-2                A+ (sf)
A-3                A+ (sf)
A-4                A+ (sf)
C                  CCC- (sf)

TABERNA Preferred Funding I Ltd.
Class              Rating
A-1A               CCC+ (sf)
A-1B               CCC+ (sf)
A-2                CCC (sf)
B-1                CCC- (sf)
B-2                CCC- (sf)
C-1                CCC- (sf)
C-2                CCC- (sf)
C-3                CCC- (sf)
D                  CC (sf)
E                  CC (sf)
Series I           CCC- (sf)
Series II          CC (sf)
Series III         CC (sf)
Series IV          CC (sf)




                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors" Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland,
USA.  Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Denise
Marie Varquez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R.
Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $775 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Christopher
Beard at 240/629-3300.


                  *** End of Transmission ***