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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 17, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 75

                            Headlines

ACAS BUSINESS 2007-1: Moody's Lifts Class D Notes' Rating to Baa2
ACAS CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
ARROYO I: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
ASSET SECURITIZATION: Fitch Keeps 'D' Rating on Class B-2H Certs.
BABSON CLO 2012-II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes

BEAR STEARNS 2002-PBW1: Moody's Cuts Rating on X-1 Certs to Caa3
BLACKROCK SENIOR IV: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Ratings on Class D Certs.
CD 2007-CD4: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two CMBS Classes to 'C'
CGCMT 2010-RR2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class JP-A4B Certs to 'B3'

CGRBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
CHASE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class I Certs.
CIFC FUNDING 2013-I: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
CLOVERIE 2005-56: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR25MM Notes to 'Ba1'
COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. X-5-DB notes to 'Ba3'

COMM 2012-LC4: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E CMBS
COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Class F CMBS
COMMODORE CDO III: Moody's Lifts Cl. A-1C Notes' Rating to 'Ca'
COMSTOCK FUNDING: Moody's Lifts Rating on $14MM Notes to 'Ba2'
CPS AUTO 2013-A: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class E Notes

CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKS4: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating to Class F Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class G Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C2: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class G Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on $7.6MM Securities

FIELDSTONE MORTGAGE 2004-3: Moody's Lowers Cl. M5's Rating to B1
G-STAR 2002-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B1'
GALAXY VIII: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $12.5-Mil. Notes to 'Ba3'
GALAXY XV: S&P Assigns 'BB(sf)' Rating on $25.8MM Class E Notes
GE CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 11 Subprime RMBS Tranches

GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs to 'CCC'
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2000-C1: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 3 CMBS Classes
GOAL CAPITAL: Fitch Keeps 'BB' Ratings on Class C-1 Loan Bonds
GOLDMAN SACHS 2013-G2: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Cl. DM Certs.
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2004-GG1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. O Certs to C

GS MORTGAGE 2005-GG4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Certs. to 'C'
GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class DM Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2013-NYC5: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class F Notes
GUGGENHEIM PRIVATE: Fitch Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating to Class D Notes
HALCYON LOAN: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on $18.25MM Cl. E Notes

JP MORGAN 2000-C9: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Cert. Classes
JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC3: S&P Cuts Rating on Class K Notes to 'D'
JP MORGAN 2003-PM1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on Class P Certs.
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class B Certs to 'C'
JP MORGAN 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class J Certs.

JP MORGAN 2013-C10: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Certs.
JP MORGAN 2013-C10: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes
KINGSLAND II: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$6MM Class D Notes to Ba3
LAREDO HOUSING: S&P Corrects Rating on 1994 Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
LB-UBS 2003-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to 'B-'

MADISON AVENUE II: Moody's Cuts Rating on $22MM Notes to 'Ca'
MCF CLO II: Moody's Rates US$25.5-Mil. Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
MERRILL LYNCH 2002-CANADA 8: Moody's Keeps 'B2' Rating on K Certs
MERRILL LYNCH 2003-E: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 7 RMBS Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH 2003-KEY1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Certs.

MERRILL LYNCH 2003-KEY1: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
MM COMMUNITY IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to 'Baa3'
MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $14.5MM Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2000-LIFE2: Moody's Keeps 'C' Rating on Cl. L Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certs to Ca

MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: S&P Puts 6 Cert. Classes on CreditWatch
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-ALTM: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Cl. E Notes
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: Moody's Lifts Rating on $11MM Notes to 'B1'
NAUTIQUE FUNDING: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class D Notes
PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Class H CMBS

PREFERRED TERM VIII: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class J Certs to 'D'
REALT 2005-2: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating 3 Certificate Classes
RFC CDO 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 6 Cert. Classes
SALOMON BROTHERS 2001-C2: Moody's Cuts Cl. J Certs Rating to Caa2

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs. at 'BB'
SHERIDAN SQUARE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
SOUTH COAST: S&P Lowers Rating on Two Note Classes to 'D'
UNISON GROUND: Fitch to Rate Class 2013-1 B Notes 'BB-(sf)'
VICTORIA FALLS: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $21MM Cl. D Notes

WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C15: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs to 'Csf'
WAMU 2005-AR11: S&P Lowers Rating on Class X Notes to 'CCC'
WF-RBS 2011-C2: Moody's Keeps Class X-B Certs 'Ba3' Rating
WG HORIZONS I: Moody's Hikes Rating on $12MM Class D Notes to Ba3

* Bank TruPS CDOs Default Rate Down to 29% at End Feb., Fitch Says
* U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Reach 3-Year Low, Fitch Reports
* Fitch Lowers Ratings on 2 Structured Finance CDOs to 'Dsf'
* Fitch Lowers Ratings on 2 Structured Finance CDOs to 'Dsf'
* Moody's Reports Stable Outlook on Canadian ABS in 2013

* Moody's Sees Stable 2013 Performance for US ABS Securities
* Moody's Issues 4Q 2012 Update on US CMBS Loss Severities
* Moody's Takes Action on $371.7MM RMBS Issued by Goldman Sachs
* Moody's Takes Action on $318 Million of U.S. Alt-A RMBS
* Moody's Takes Actions on $159.5 Million of Alt-A RMBS



                            *********

ACAS BUSINESS 2007-1: Moody's Lifts Class D Notes' Rating to Baa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1:

US$45,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Asset Backed Notes
Due 2019 (current outstanding balance of $32,260,241.94), Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on the notes is
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class D Notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization of the rated
notes since the rating action in August 2011. Moody's notes that
the Class A, B and C Notes were paid down in full and the Class D
Notes have been paid down by approximately 11% or $3.8 million
since the last rating action. There is currently $82.6 million of
performing assets and principal proceeds supporting $32.3 million
of the Class D Notes.

Additionally, the par collateralization shortfall in the deal, as
reflected in the Additional Principal Amount, has decreased since
the last rating action. The Additional Principal Amount is the
excess of the aggregate outstanding principal balance of the
liabilities over the sum of (1) aggregate outstanding loan balance
of the assets plus (2) principal collections on deposit. This
amount decreases as diversion of excess interest and proceeds from
sales of the defaulted assets are used to amortize the Notes.
Since the last rating action, the Additional Principal Amount of
the transaction has decreased from $31 million to $11 million.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $82.6 million, a
weighted average default probability of 33.97% (implying a WARF of
5388), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 19.54%,
and a diversity score of 7. The default and recovery properties of
the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

ACAS Business Loan Trust 2007-1, issued in April 2007 is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
non-senior secured middle-market loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011. In addition, due to the
low diversity of the collateral pool, Moody's also supplemented
its modeling with individual scenario analysis to assess the
ratings impact of jump-to-default by certain large obligors.

For securities whose default probabilities are assessed through
credit estimates ("CEs"), Moody's applied additional default
probability adjustments. For each CE where the related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
2-notch equivalent assumed downgrade (on the CEs representing in
aggregate the largest 32% of the pool) as described in Moody's
Ratings Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions", October 2009.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (4310)

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (6465)

Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings. Deleveraging may also slow down if any
loans in the portfolio are extended beyond their current
maturities.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the servicer and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal is exposed to a large
number of securities whose default probabilities are assessed
through credit estimates. In the event that Moody's is not
provided the necessary information to update the credit estimates
in a timely fashion, the transaction may be impacted by any
default probability adjustments Moody's may assume in lieu of
updated credit estimates. For concentrated pools if applicable:
Moody's also conducted tests to assess the collateral pool's
concentration risk in obligors bearing a credit estimate that
constitute more than 3% of the collateral pool.

4) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they experience jump to default. Due to
the deal's low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's
supplemented its typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis
with a simulated default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM
software and/or individual scenario analysis.


ACAS CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to ACAS CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-1 LLC's $378.00
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 11,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy-remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the preliminary rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.30%-11.36%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1376.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

ACAS CLO 2013-1 Ltd./ACAS CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A                    AAA (sf)                246.50
B-1                  AA (sf)                  33.00
B-2                  AA (sf)                  20.00
C (deferrable)       A (sf)                   27.00
D (deferrable)       BBB (sf)                 22.00
E (deferrable)       BB (sf)                  18.50
F (deferrable)       B (sf)                   11.00
Subordinated notes   NR                       36.30

NR-Not rated.


ARROYO I: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed two classes of notes
issued by Arroyo I CDO, Ltd.  The rating actions are:

-- $15,579,181 class B notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf',
    Outlook remains Stable;

-- $10,673,643 class C-1 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf';

-- $18,883,867 class C-2 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) for
projecting future default levels for the underlying portfolio.
These default levels were then compared to the breakeven levels
generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the CDO under various
default timing and interest rate stress scenarios, as described in
the report 'Global Criteria for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Fitch
also considered additional qualitative factors in its analysis, as
described below.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade and affirmations are based on the stable performance
of the portfolio combined with the continued amortization of the
notes increasing credit enhancement (CE) levels to all the
classes.

Since Fitch's last rating action in March 2012, the credit quality
of the collateral has remained stable, with approximately 3.6% of
the portfolio downgraded a weighted average of 1.6 notches and
19.1% upgraded a weighted average of 1.3 notches. Approximately
61.6% of the current portfolio has a Fitch derived rating below
investment grade and 36.7% has a rating in the 'CCCsf' rating
category or lower, compared to 64.2% and 34.4%, respectively, at
last review.

The class B notes have received approximately $14.1 million in
principal repayment, or 47.5% of its previous balance, since the
last review, leaving 40.2% of the original balance outstanding.
The upgrade to the class B notes is in line with the breakeven
levels from the cash flow model.

The class C notes are currently receiving their periodic interest
due; however, they still have $673,643 of deferred interest
outstanding. Although the cash flow model indicates the class C
notes pass rating levels higher than 'CCCsf' in all scenarios,
they still rely on the performance of defaulted assets, which
currently represent 36.3% of the portfolio.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative migration and defaults beyond those projected in
the SF PCM as well as increasing concentration in assets of a
weaker credit quality could lead to future downgrades. Likewise, a
buildup of credit enhancement could lead to future upgrades.


ASSET SECURITIZATION: Fitch Keeps 'D' Rating on Class B-2H Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes of Asset Securitization
Corp.'s commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1995-MD IV:

-- $5.8 million class B-1 to 'AAAsf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook to
    Stable from Evolving;

-- Notional class A-CS2 to 'AAAsf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook to Stable
    from Evolving.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

-- $27.9 million class B-2 at 'Dsf'; RE 50%;
-- $769 class B-2H at 'Dsf'; RE 50%.

Classes A-1, A-1P, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and notional A-CS1 have paid
in full. Class A-CS3 was previously withdrawn.

Key Rating Drivers:

The upgrade on class B-1 is due to resolution of a lawsuit against
the trust that has been outstanding for a number of years. Class
A-CS2 is an interest-only class based on the balance of class B-1.
One loan remains in the pool, Columbia Sussex, which has been
fully defeased and has an anticipated repayment date in 2015.
Amortization is expected to pay off classes B-1 and A-CS2 by year-
end 2013.

Rating Sensitivity:

Given that the collateral is fully defeased, and the lawsuit is
resolved, no further rating actions are anticipated for the life
of the deal.

Certain interest-only bondholders filed suit against the former
special servicer, Criimi Mae, based on the special servicer's
handling of the respective resolutions of the Hardage Hotel
Portfolio and Motels of America loans, both of which were resolved
in 2003. The Court granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment dismissing the complaint on Feb. 8, 2011; subsequently
the Plaintiffs filed an appeal on March 9, 2011. On June 5, 2012,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Criimi
Mae's District Court judgment. In September 2012, the Plaintiff
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
certiorari. The Petition was denied on Nov. 13, 2012. There are no
further appeals available to the Plaintiff.


BABSON CLO 2012-II: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Babson
CLO Ltd. 2012-II/Babson CLO 2012-II LLC's $369 million floating-
rate notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Aug. 20, 2012.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to them.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Babson CLO Ltd. 2012-II/Babson CLO 2012-II LLC

Class             Rating        Amount
                               (mil. $)
A-1               AAA (sf)      255.00
A-2               AA (sf)        42.00
B (deferrable)    A (sf)         32.00
C (deferrable)    BBB (sf)       22.00
D (deferrable)    BB (sf)        18.00


BEAR STEARNS 2002-PBW1: Moody's Cuts Rating on X-1 Certs to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes and
downgraded one class of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2002-PBW1 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations are primarily due to realized losses and Moody's
expected loss remaining within a range commensurate with the
current ratings. The affirmations also reflect Moody's concern
about adverse selection and the attendant risk of shortfalls
stemming from poorly-performing assets which may remain in the
pool as the deal approaches the end of its life.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, is downgraded following the
paydown of its highest-rated reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 26% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 4%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses decreased to 4.8% of the total
securitized deal balance -- down from 5.2% at Moody's last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating the Interest-Only Security was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Class X-1.

Since 83% of the pool is in special servicing, Moody's also
utilized a loss and recovery approach in rating the P&I classes in
this deal. In this approach, Moody's determines a probability of
default for each specially serviced loan and determines a most
probable loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions
of value (if available), other information from the special
servicer and available market data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration servicer advances to date
and estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Moody's review incorporated the use of the Excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade underlying ratings is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the underlying rating
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3 compared to a Herf of 31 at Moody's prior
review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 29, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 11, 2012 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $8 million
from $921 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from 17% to
50% of the pool. There are no defeased loans or loans with credit
assessments in the pool.

The single performing conduit loan, the First and Cedar Building
Loan ($1 million -- 17% of the pool), is on the master servicer's
watchlist. Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) metrics for this loan are very
strong, however Moody's analysis considers the significant near-
term lease rollover risk for the property: Leases representing
nearly 60% of the property net rentable area are set to expire
before the end of 2013.

Eleven loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $42 million (70% loss severity).
Currently two loans, representing 83% of the pool, are in special
servicing. The largest specially-serviced loan is the Valencia
Executive Plaza Loan ($4 million -- 50% of the pool). The loan is
secured by a 47,000 square foot office property in Santa Clarita,
California, a northern suburb of Los Angeles. The property was 81%
leased as of August 2012, up sharply from 49% at year-end 2011
reporting, reflecting strong leasing activity and multiple new
leases at the property. The borrower has reportedly identified
financing for the asset and the servicer expects a full loan
payoff before the end of Q1 2013. If a payoff does not occur, the
servicer intends to dual-track workout discussions and
foreclosure.

The second loan is special servicing is the Southfield Commerce
Center Loan ($3 million -- 33% of the pool). The loan is secured
by a 97,000 square foot, 1970s-vintage industrial property in the
Detroit suburb of Southfield, Michigan. The property was 65%
leased as of May 31, 2012, compared to 73% at year-end 2010
reporting. The property is REO, and the servicer has approved the
asset for sale in a March 2013 auction.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $2 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (31% expected loss).


BLACKROCK SENIOR IV: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
CLO notes issued by BlackRock Senior Income Series IV:

US$385,000,000 Class A Senior Notes Due 2019 (current rated
balance of $383,580,036.97), Upgraded to Aaa (sf), previously on
August 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

US$14,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to Aa1
(sf), previously on August 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

US$35,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf), previously on August 30, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes:

US$25,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2019,
Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on August 30, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf);

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower weighted average rating factor
("WARF") and higher spread levels compared to the levels assumed
at the last rating action in August 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF
and WAS of 2681 and 3.66%, respectively, compared to 2827 and
2.68%, respectively, at the time of the last rating action.
Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
overcollateralization ratios are stable since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $483.4 million,
defaulted par of $75,808, a weighted average default probability
of 19.47% (implying a WARF of 2681), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 51.87%, and a diversity score of 70. The
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

BlackRock Senior Income Series IV, issued on January 26, 2007, is
a collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3217)

Class A: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1894)

Class A: 0
Class B: +1
Class C: +1
Class D: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities, which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


CABELA'S CREDIT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Ratings on Class D Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term ratings and Rating
Outlooks assigned to Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust as
follows:

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2010-I:
-- Class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2010-II:
-- Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2011-II:
-- Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2011-IV:
-- Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2012-I:
-- Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2012-II:
-- Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Cabela's Credit Card Master Note Trust Series 2013-I:
-- Class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS:

The affirmation is based on continued positive trust performance.
Gross yield has remained stable since last review due to
increasing interchange revenue and a favorable LIBOR base rate. As
of the February 2013 reporting period, the 12-month average gross
yield was 20.37%, down slightly from the 12-month average of
20.46% at the February 2012 reporting period.

Monthly payment rate (MPR), a measure of how quickly consumers are
paying off their credit card balance, has increased over the past
year. Currently the 12-month average is 43.42%, up slightly from
43.03% at the February 2012 reporting period. Cabela's MPR is well
above the industry average due to the high concentration of
transactors and prime borrowers. The Fitch Prime Credit Card Index
was 24.83% for the February 2013 reporting period.

Gross chargeoffs have continued to improve over the past year.
Currently the 12-month average is 2.19%, down from 2.68% at the
February 2012 reporting period. Year over year, 60+ day
delinquencies are down 13.73% from this point last year. Fitch
expects chargeoff levels to remain stable in the near term given
the high quality of the credit card portfolio.

As a result of a consistent gross yield, lower chargeoffs and
stable trust expenses, the trust has experienced a steady increase
in excess spread. Over the past year, three-month average excess
spread has increased by 15.8% to 14.32% from 12.37%.

Fitch runs cash flow breakeven analysis by applying stress
scenarios to 3-, 6-, and 12-month performance averages to evaluate
the breakeven loss multiples at different rating levels. The
performance variables that Fitch stresses are the gross yield,
monthly payment rate, gross charge-off, and purchase rates.
Fitch's analysis included a comparison of observed performance
trends over the past few months to Fitch's base case expectations
for each outstanding rating category. As part of its ongoing
surveillance efforts, Fitch will continue to monitor the
performance of these trusts. For further information, please
review the U.S. Credit Card ABS Issuance updates published on a
monthly basis.

The affirmations are based on the performance of the trusts in
line with expectations. A Stable Outlook indicates that Fitch
expects the ratings will remain stable for the next two years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

Fitch models three different scenarios when evaluating the rating
sensitivity compared to expected performance for credit card
asset-backed securities transactions: 1) increased defaults; 2) a
reduction in MPR, and 3) a combination stress of higher defaults
and lower MPR. Increasing defaults alone has the least impact on
rating migration even in the most severe scenario of a 75%
increase in defaults. The rating sensitivity to a reduction in MPR
is more pronounced with a moderate stress, of a 25% reduction,
leading to possible downgrades across all classes. The harshest
scenario assumes both stresses occur simultaneously. Similarly,
the ratings would only be downgraded under the moderate stress of
a 40% increase in defaults and 20% reduction in MPR; however, the
severe stress could lead to more drastic downgrades to all
classes. To date, the transactions have exhibited strong
performance with all performance metrics within Fitch's initial
expectations.


CD 2007-CD4: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Two CMBS Classes to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of nine classes
and affirmed 15 classes of CD 2007-CD4 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CD4 as
follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2007 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 16, 2012 Ca (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2011 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. XP, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2007
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. XW, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the principal classes are due to higher base
expected losses and concerns about increased interest shortfalls.
The rating of the IO Classes Class XC and XW are downgraded due to
the decline in the performance of their referenced classes. The IO
Class XP is downgraded due to a change in its reference classes.

The affirmations are due to key parameters, including Moody's loan
to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio  and
the Herfindahl Index, remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on
Moody's current base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels
for the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 17.9% of
the current pooled balance compared to 16% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses have increased to 16.0% of
the original pool balance from 14.7% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000. The methodology used in rating Classes XC, XP and
XW was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-
Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 52, the same as at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 13, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 20% to $5.3 billion
from $6.6 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 333 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 6% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 38%
of the pool. The pool does not currently contain any investment
grade credit assessments or defeased loans.

Eighty-six loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $93.2 million (59% loss severity on
average). Thirty-four loans, representing 20% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
exposure is the Citadel & Arkansas Malls Portfolio Loan ($261.6
million -- 4.9% of the pool), which is secured by two malls
totaling 1,042,000 square feet (SF) located in Colorado Springs,
Colorado and Fayetteville, Arkansas. The loans transferred to
special servicing in October 2009 and are now real estate owned
(REO). Both malls are anchored by Dillard's, JC Penny and Sears.
As of January 2013, 83% of the collateral was leased for Citadel
Mall and 93% for Northwest Arkansas Mall.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Riverton Loan
($225 million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 1,228-
unit Class B, rent stabilized multifamily property located in
Harlem, New York. The loan transferred into special servicing in
August 2008 for imminent monetary default and is now REO.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the 101 Montelago
Boulevard Loan ($117 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 493-unit hotel located in Lake Las Vegas, which is
about 20 miles east of the strip in Henderson, Nevada. The hotel
was converted to a Westin in March 2012 and the receiver took over
property management. Foreclosure took place in May 2012 and the
property is REO.

The remaining 30 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $640 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (60% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 63 poorly
performing loans representing 19% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $208 million loss (21% expected loss based on a 53%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 operating results for 94%
of the pool's non-specially serviced loans. Excluding specially
serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 104%
compared to 111% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed DSCRs are 1.46X and 1.01X, respectively, compared to
1.41X and 0.96X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 15% of the pool. The largest conduit
loan is the Mall of America Loan ($360 million -- 5.8% of the
pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $775 million
loan. The loan is secured by a 2.8 million SF regional
mall/entertainment center located in Bloomington, Minnesota. The
mall is anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom, and Sears, as well as a
variety of entertainment venues. The property was 83% leased as of
September 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 88% and 0.95X at last review.

The second largest loan is the 200 Liberty Street Loan ($257
million -- 4.8% of the pool), which represents the pooled portion
of a $297.5 million first mortgage loan. The junior portion of the
loan is held within the trust and secures the non-pooled, or rake,
Classes WFC-1, WFC-2, WFC-3 and WFC-X. The loan is secured by a
1.6 million SF office building located in the Battery Park office
submarket of Manhattan. The property was 100% leased as of
September 2012, the same at last review. The property's largest
tenant is Cadwalder, Wickersham & Taft, which leases 33% of the
NRA through January 2025. The loan sponsor is Brookfield Financial
Properties, LP. The loan is interest only for its entire ten-year
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 84% and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 91% and 0.98X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Four Seasons Resort Maui A-Note Loan
($205 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
interest in a $425 million loan. The loan is secured by 380 room
luxury resort located along the shoreline of southeastern Maui and
benefits from high barriers to entry due to lack of developable
land. The loan was modified in June 2011 with a $10 million equity
infusion from the borrower, a five year loan extension and a A/B
note split into a $350 million A note and a $75 million B note.
The portfolio's performance has improved since last review, due to
an increase in occupancy and revenue per participating room
(RevPAR). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and 0.8X,
respectively, compared to 152% and 0.73X at last review.


CGCMT 2010-RR2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class JP-A4B Certs to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded ratings of two classes of
Group II Certificates and affirmed the ratings of two classes of
Group I Certificates issued by CGCMT 2010-RR2 Trust,
Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-RR2. The
downgrades are due to negative credit migration of the underlying
collateral as a result of higher expected losses on the underlying
pool of loans of the Group II Underlying Security.

The affirmations of Group I Certificates are due to key
transaction parameters performing within levels commensurate with
the existing ratings levels. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE Non-Pooled ReREMIC)
transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. CS-A3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2010 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. CS-A3B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2010 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. JP-A4A, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. JP-A4B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

CGCMT 2010-RR2 Trust, Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2010-RR2 is a static non-pooled Re-REMIC Pass Through Trust
backed by two "ring-fenced" commercial mortgage backed securities
Certificates: the Group I Certificates are backed by $47.6
million, or 4.0% of the aggregate class principal balance, of the
super senior Class A-3 issued by Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
C5 (the "Group I Underlying Security"); and the Group II
Certificates are backed by $30.0 million, or 8.5% of the aggregate
class principal balance, of the super senior Class A-4 issued by
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-C2 (the "Group II
Underlying Security").

On February 28, 2013, Moody's downgraded certain classes of
certificates issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-C2 due to negative credit migration of the underlying
collateral and higher expected losses for the pool, including the
Group II Underlying Security. Moody's rating action on the Group
II Underlying Certificate reflected a cumulative base expected
loss of 27.2% of the current balance.

Updates to key parameters, including the constant default rate,
constant prepayment rate, weighted average life, and weighted
average recovery rate, did not materially change the expected loss
estimates of Group I Certificates resulting in an affirmation.
However, the downgrades of Group II Certificates (Class JP-A4A and
JP-A4B), were due to deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying collateral.

Within the resecuritization, the weighted average life of the
Group I Underlying Security is 3.4 years assuming a 0%/0% CDR/CPR.
For delinquent loans (30+ days, REO, foreclosure, bankrupt),
Moody's assumes a fixed WARR of 40% while a fixed WARR of 50% for
current loans. Moody's also ran a sensitivity analysis on the
classes assuming a WARR of 40% for current loans. This impacts the
modeled rating of the Group I Certificates by 0 to 3 notches
downward.

Within the resecuritization, the weighted average life of the
Group II Underlying Security is 4.4 years assuming a 0%/0%
CDR/CPR. For delinquent loans (30+ days, REO, foreclosure,
bankrupt), Moody's assumes a fixed WARR of 40% while a fixed WARR
of 50% for current loans. Moody's also ran a sensitivity analysis
on the classes assuming a WARR of 40% for current loans. This
impacts the modeled rating of the Group II Certificates by 0 to 4
notches downward.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

Moody's review incorporated the cash flow model, Structured
Finance Workstation, developed by Moody's Wall Street Analytics.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

The methodological approach used in these ratings is as follows:
Moody's applied ratings-specific cash flow scenarios assuming
different loss timing, recovery and prepayment assumptions on the
underlying pool of mortgages that are the collateral for the
underlying CMBS transaction through Structured Finance
Workstation. The analysis incorporates performance variances
across the different pools and the structural features of the
transaction including priorities of payment distribution among the
different tranches, tranche average life, current tranche balance
and future cash flows under expected and stressed scenarios. In
each scenario, cash flows and losses from the underlying
collateral were analyzed applying different stresses at each
rating level. The resulting ratings specific stressed cash flows
were then input into the structure of the resecuritization to
determine expected losses for each class. The expected losses were
then compared to the idealized expected loss for each class to
gauge the appropriateness of the existing rating. The stressed
assumptions considered, among other factors, the underlying
transaction's collateral attributes, past and current performance,
and Moody's current negative performance outlook for commercial
real estate.

The other methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


CGRBS COMMERCIAL: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to CGRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-VNO5TH's
$390.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-VNO5TH.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $390.0 million commercial mortgage loan
secured by the borrower's fee interest in a 38,814-sq.-ft. retail
condominium at 666 Fifth Avenue, a 1.2 million-sq.-ft. class A
high-rise office building located in midtown Manhattan, N.Y.  The
collateral also includes a leasehold interest on 73,846 sq. ft. of
space that the borrower leases from the adjacent office
condominium owner.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 12,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.  S&P determined that the loan has a
beginning and ending loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 76.2% based on
Standard & Poor's value.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1375.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CGRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-VNO5TH

Class    Rating         Amount ($)
A        AAA (sf)      230,700,000
X-A      AAA (sf)   230,700,000(i)
X-B      AA (sf)     38,460,000(i)
B        AA (sf)        38,460,000
C        A (sf)         38,450,000
D        BBB- (sf)      59,980,000
E        BB (sf)        22,410,000

(i) Notional balance.


CHASE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class I Certs.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1998-2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement to the
remaining Fitch rated classes and minimal Fitch expected losses
across the pool. The pool has experienced $10.4 million (0.8% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated four loans (31.9%) as Fitch Loans of Concern; however,
there are currently no specially serviced loans.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 94.5% to $69.2 million from
$1.27 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, three loans
(50.3% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting class J.

The top three largest contributors to expected losses consist of
three restaurant portfolios. Two of the portfolios have six assets
in six markets and the third has four assets in four markets with
properties located in diverse markets throughout the South and
Midwestern United States. Collectively, restaurants include
Chili's, Macaroni Grill, and On the Border. Each of these loans
are current, however, DSCR's are low at 0.54x as of Year End (YE)
2011.

RATING SENSITIVITY

The ratings of investment grade classes F, G, and H are expected
to remain stable. Class I may be subject to rating actions should
realized losses be greater or less than Fitch's expectations.
Fitch remains cautious related to the high concentration of
retail/restaurant assets (50% of the pool).

Fitch affirms these classes:

-- $13 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.7 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.2 million class H at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.5 million class I at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D and E certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class J certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


CIFC FUNDING 2013-I: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to CIFC Funding 2013-I Ltd./CIFC Funding 2013-I LLC's
$470.0 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 8,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the preliminary rated
      notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
      payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The asset manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      preliminary rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash
      flow analysis and assumptions commensurate with the assigned
      preliminary ratings under various interest-rate scenarios,
      including LIBOR ranging from 0.3005%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of excess interest proceeds that are available prior to
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees, collateral
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to
      principal proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral
      assets during the reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1367.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
CIFC Funding 2013-I Ltd./CIFC Funding 2013-I LLC


Class               Rating          Amount
                                  (mil. $)
A-1                 AAA (sf)         310.6
A-2                 AA (sf)           50.5
B (deferrable)      A (sf)            47.6
C (deferrable)      BBB (sf)          28.2
D (deferrable)      BB (sf)           22.8
E (deferrable)      B (sf)            10.3
Subordinated notes  NR                46.6

NR-Not rated.


CLOVERIE 2005-56: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR25MM Notes to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded the rating of one class of Notes issued by
Cloverie 2005-56. The downgrade is due to deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio of reference
obligations, as evidenced by an increase in the weighted average
rating factor (WARF) and expectations of potential future
protection payments to the protection counterparty.

The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance
of commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Series 2005-56 EUR 25,000,000 Class A Secured Floating Rate
Portfolio Credit Linked Notes due 2025, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Cloverie Plc, Series 2005-56 is a static synthetic transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps referencing $983.8
million notional balance of commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS); each equally sized. Since Moody's last review, three
reference obligations (12.3% of the referenced pool) were
downgraded by three or more notches. However, one of the primary
drivers of the downgrades was expectations of interest shortfalls
as opposed to expectations of principal writedowns. As such, the
rating actions are mitigated by expectations of potential future
protection payments to the protection counterparty.

As of the January 22, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate issued
notional balance of the transaction was EUR25.0 million, the same
as that at issuance.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated reference obligations. Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 58 compared to 8 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated referenced collateral and assessments for non-
Moody's rated referenced collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (91.9%
compared to 96.0% at last review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 4.0% at
last review), Baa1-Baa3 (4.1% compared to 0.0% at last review) and
Ba1-Ba3 (4.1% compared to 0.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.6 years, compared to 2.4 years at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR with a mean of 65.0%, compared to
67.0% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 27.3%, compared to 65.1% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. In general, the rated notes are particularly
sensitive to credit changes within the reference obligations.
Holding all other key parameters static, changing the current
ratings and credit assessments of the reference obligations by one
notch downward or by one notch upward affects the model result by
1 notch downward and 2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.


COMM 2007-FL14: Moody's Ups Rating on Cl. X-5-DB notes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 17 CMBS classes
and upgraded one CMBS class of COMM 2007-FL14 Commercial Mortgage
Pass through Certificates, Series 2007-FL14 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. GLB1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. GLB2, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. GLB4, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-3-DB, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-3-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-5-DB, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-5-SG, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio and Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio, remaining within acceptable
ranges. The rating of interest-only Class X-2 is consistent with
the expected performance of its reference classes, and thus is
affirmed. The affirmations of Interest-only classes X-3-SG and X-
5-SG are based on Moody's credit assessment of the New Jersey
Office Portfolio Loan and the Rose Orchard Technology Park Loan.
The affirmation of interest only Class X-3-DB is based on Moody's
credit assessment of the trust principal amount of the Glenborough
Portfolio Loan.

The Class X-5-DB interest-only class in the rating action is
linked to the pooled trust asset principal amount of the
Glenborough Portfolio Loan as provided by the Offering Circular.
When Moody's took action on this IO class in May 2012, the rating
was incorrectly linked to the credit assessment of the trust asset
principal amount instead of the credit assessment of the pooled
trust asset principal amount. In rating IO bonds linked to the
pooled trust asset principal amount of specific loans, Moody's
uses the credit assessment of the pooled balance of the reference
loan. Moody's has corrected the rating on IO Class X-5-DB to
reflect the correct linkage.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Classes X-
2, X-3-DB, X-3-SG, X-5-DB, and X-5-SG was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.5. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations. The model
incorporates the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in
the published methodology. The calculator then returns a
calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point. For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator would provide both a Baa3
(sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the rating
committee.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and
Remittance Statements. On a periodic basis, Moody's also performs
a full transaction review that involves a rating committee and a
press release. Moody's prior transaction review is summarized in a
press release dated May 3, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 Payment Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 81%
to $487.5 million from $2.5 billion at securitization due to the
pay off of nine loans in the trust and principal paydowns. The
certificates are collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in
size from 7% to 78% of the pooled balance. One loan, the
Glenborough Portfolio Loan has been modified. The other two loans,
the New Jersey Office Portfolio Loan and the Rose Orchard
Technology Park Loan, are in special servicing. The New Jersey
Office Park Loan is REO.

Moody's weighted average pooled loan to value ratio is 90%,
compared to 85% at last review. Moody's stressed debt service
coverage is 1.16X, compared to 1.18X at last review.

The Glenborough Portfolio Loan ($324.52 million -- 78% of the
pooled balance) is secured by 14 class A and B office properties
with a total of 2.6 million square feet located in five states,
California, Virginia, Colorado, Nevada and Florida. The properties
range in size from 103,826 square feet to 303,822 square feet with
an average size of 187,031 square feet. Since securitization six
properties totaling 657,114 square feet were released from the
loan collateral. The $507.4 million whole loan includes non-pooled
trust debt of $71.8 million (certificate Classes GLB1, GLB2, GLB3
and GLB4) and a $111.0 million non-trust junior component. The
trust debt has paid down by 8% since securitization due to the
payment of collateral release premiums and a cash collateral pay
down of the loan. There is also approximately $100 million in
mezzanine debt. As of September 2012 the portfolio was
approximately 84% leased, compared to 86% at last review. The loan
was transferred into special servicing on 12/9/11 due to maturity
default. The April 2012 loan modification agreement provides for a
two-year extension of the maturity date to 12/9/13 with the option
to extend for one additional year to 12/9/2014. The borrower will
be required to pay down the loan balance by $25.0 million in order
to exercise the final one-year extension option. Additionally, the
mezzanine lender forgave $225 million of mezzanine debt. Moody's
credit assessment is Ba3.

The New Jersey Office Portfolio Loan ($62.6 million -- 15%) is
secured by six multi-tenanted office buildings and one exhibition
center totaling 1.2 million square feet. The properties are
located in Franklin Township, New Jersey. As of December 2012 the
portfolio was 48% leased, compared to 61% leased at last review.
The loan was transferred into special servicing in January 2011
due to maturity default. The portfolio became REO in April 2012.
There was an appraisal reduction in the amount of $6,872,147 in
July 2012. The special servicer's strategy is to sell the
properties after lease-up. The $81.7 million whole loan includes a
$19.1 million non-trust junior component. Moody's credit
assessment is Caa3.

The Rose Orchard Technology Park Loan ($28.7 million -- 7%) is
secured by a 310,233 square foot five-building office/R&D property
located in San Jose, California. Harris Stratex Networks vacated
133,173 square feet at lease expiration in December 2010. The
space has not yet been re-leased and the property is currently 36%
leased. The loan was transferred into special servicing in January
2012 due to monetary maturity default. A hard cash lock box is in
place and all cash flow is being trapped. There was an appraisal
reduction in the amount of $3,988,806 in November 2012. The $49.4
million whole loan includes a $20.7 million non-trust junior
component. The special servicer is currently working with the
borrower on a loan modification and extension that is expected to
close within the next several weeks. Moody's credit assessment is
Caa3.


COMM 2012-LC4: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E CMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes of
COMM 2012-LC4 Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2012-LC4 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2012 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio  and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings. This is
Moody's first monitoring review of this transaction since
securitization in March 2012.

The rating of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the credit quality of their referenced classes and are thus
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a cumulative base expected loss of
2.2% of the current balance. Depending on the timing of loan
payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for investment grade
classes could decline below the current levels. If future
performance materially declines, the expected level of credit
enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be
insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the ratings of Class X-A and X-B.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.61 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22, the same as at securitization.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $933 million
from $941 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 43 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 60% of
the pool. The pool contains two loans with investment grade credit
assessments, representing 10% of the pool.

One loan, representing 5% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated or are in special servicing. Moody's
did not identify any additional loans as being troubled.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 88% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 93%,
same as at securitization. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 7.4% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCR for the conduit component are
1.48X and 1.16X, respectively, compared to 1.50X and 1.16X at
securitization. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed
DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to
the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Union Square
Retail Loan ($75.0 million -- 8.0% of the pool), which is secured
by 236,000 square feet (SF) of a mixed use building located in
Union Square in New York, New York. The property is 100% leased to
seven tenants, the same as at securitization. The largest tenant
is Regal Cinemas which leases 50% of the property's net rentable
area (NRA). Performance has remained stable. Moody's credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.61X, respectively, the
same as at securitization.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Johnstown
Galleria -- Ground Lease Loan ($13.6 million -- 1.5% of the pool),
which is secured by the fee interest in the land underlying the
Johnstown Galleria, a 712,000 SF regional mall located in
Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Performance has remained stable. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 1.12X,
respectively, same as at securitization.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 23% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Square One Mall Loan ($98.6
million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by 541,000 SF of
NRA contained within a 929,000 SF super regional mall in Saugus,
Massachusetts. The property is anchored by Macy's (non-
collateral), Sears (non-collateral), Dick's, and TJ Maxx. As of
September 2012, the property was 88% leased compared to 89% at
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 78% and 1.29X at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Hartman Portfolio Loan ($55.9
million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by 12 properties of
varying use located in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio, Texas.
Nine properties are Class B office buildings, two properties are
retail properties and one property is an industrial property.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 1.01X, respectively,
compared to 105% and 0.99X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Puerto Rico Retail Portfolio Loan
($57.2 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by 555,000
SF contained within four anchored retail properties located within
various towns of Puerto Rico. As of September 2012, the portfolio
was 90% leased compared to 89% at securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 93% and
1.12X at securitization.


COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Class F CMBS
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to fifteen classes
of CMBS securities, issued by COMM 2013-CCRE6, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE6.

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL*, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-A**, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B**, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. A-M***, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B***, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. PEZ***, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. C***, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

* Certificates may be exchanged for Class A-3FX Certificates of
like balance.

** Reflects Interest Only Classes

*** Reflects Exchangeable Certificates

Ratings Rationale:

The Certificates are collateralized by 48 fixed rate loans secured
by 80 properties. The ratings are based on the collateral and the
structure of the transaction.

Moody's CMBS ratings methodology combines both commercial real
estate and structured finance analysis. Based on commercial real
estate analysis, Moody's determines the credit quality of each
mortgage loan and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific
basis. Under structured finance, the credit enhancement for each
certificate typically depends on the expected frequency, severity,
and timing of future losses. Moody's also considers a range of
qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural and
legal aspects.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors:
1) Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is
largely driven by each loan's DSCR; and 2) Moody's assessment of
the severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by
each loan's LTV ratio.

The Moody's Actual DSCR of 2.06X is higher than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 1.31X. The Moody's Stressed
DSCR of 1.14X is higher than the 2007 conduit/fusion transaction
average of 0.92X.

The pooled Trust loan balance of $1.494 billion represents a
Moody's LTV ratio of 93.7%, which is lower than the 2007
conduit/fusion transaction average of 110.6%.

Moody's considers subordinate financing outside of the Trust when
assigning ratings. Five loans are structured with $103.7 million
of additional financing in the form of subordinate secured or
unsecured debt, raising Moody's Total LTV ratio of 99.3%.

Moody's also considers both loan level diversity and property
level diversity when selecting a ratings approach. With respect to
loan level diversity, the pool's loan level Herfindahl score is
20.0, which is slightly below the average score calculated from
multi-borrower pools by Moody's since 2009. With respect to
property level diversity, the pool's property level Herfindahl
score is 24.0. The transaction's property diversity profile is in
line with the indices calculated in most multi-borrower
transactions issued since 2009.

This deal has a super-senior Aaa class with 30% credit
enhancement. Although the additional enhancement offered to the
senior most certificate holders provides additional protection
against pool loss, the super-senior structure is credit negative
for the certificate that supports the super-senior class. If the
support certificate were to take a loss, the loss would have the
potential to be quite large on a percentage basis. Thin tranches
need more subordination to reduce the probability of default in
recognition that their loss-given default is higher. This
adjustment helps keep expected loss in balance and consistent
across deals. The transaction was structured with additional
subordination at class A-M to mitigate the potential increased
severity to class A-M.

Moody's grades properties on a scale of 1 to 5 (best to worst) and
considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's weighted
average property quality grade is 2.16, which is lower than the
indices calculated in most multi-borrower transactions since 2009.

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-M (Aaa (sf)), B (Aa3
(sf)) and C (A3 (sf)) may be exchanged for Class PEZ (A1 (sf))
certificates and Class PEZ may be exchanged for the Classes A-M, B
and C. The PEZ certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of
interest distributable on the Classes A-M, B and C certificates
that are exchanged for such PEZ certificates. The initial
certificate balance of the Class PEZ certificates is equal to the
aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class A-M, B
and C and represent the maximum certificate balance of the PEZ
certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class PEZ has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate (A3 (sf)), but a very
high estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. The higher estimated recovery rate
resulted in a (A1 (sf)) rating, a rating higher than the lowest
rated component certificate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005. The methodology used in rating Classes X-A and X-B was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's analysis employs the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v2.62
which derives credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of
adjusted loan level proceeds derived from Moody's loan level DSCR
and LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds include
loan structure, property type, sponsorship, and diversity. Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator ver_1.1, which
references the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO
rating based on the published methodology: original and current
bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond
balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

The V Score for this transaction is assessed as Low/Medium, the
same as the V score assigned to the U.S. Conduit and CMBS sector.
This reflects typical volatility with respect to the critical
assumptions used in the rating process as well as an average
disclosure of securitization collateral and ongoing performance.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the
collateral used in determining the initial rating were decreased
by 5%, 14%, and 23%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated Aaa Super Senior class would be (Aaa (sf)), (Aaa (sf)), and
(Aa1(sf)), respectively; for the most junior Aaa rated class A-M
would be (Aa1 (sf)), (Aa2 (sf)), and (A1(sf)), respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating
to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.


COMMODORE CDO III: Moody's Lifts Cl. A-1C Notes' Rating to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Commodore CDO III, Ltd.:

  US$83,300,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2040 (current outstanding balance of
  $712,873.13), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 16, 2010
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);

  US$16,700,000 Class A-1C First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2040 (current outstanding balance of
  $16,584,235), Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on July 16, 2010
  Downgraded to C (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$245,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2040 (current outstanding balance of
  $42,377,843.40), Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on July 16, 2010
  Downgraded to Ca (sf);

  US$63,750,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2040, Affirmed C (sf); previously on October 19,
  2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$50,000,000 Class B Third Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
  Due 2040, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 20, 2009
  Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$21,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Floating Rate Notes
  Due 2040 (current outstanding balance of $22,593,938.42),
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to C
  (sf);

  US$2,250,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
  2040 (current outstanding balance of $3,238,449.31), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on March 20, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1A Notes and
Class A-1B Notes from principal paydowns in the underlying
portfolio since the rating action in July 2010. The rating action
also considered the sensitivity of the notes' ratings to
prepayment assumptions for the underlying portfolio. Moody's notes
that the Class A-1B Notes have been paid down by approximately 94%
or $10.7 million since the last rating action. Based on the
transaction's priority of payments, the Class A-1A Notes and Class
A-1C Notes will be paid pari passu with respect to both interest
and principal if and when the Class A-1B Notes are paid in full.

Commodore CDO III, Ltd., issued in March 2005, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS, CMBS and
SF CDOs originated in 2004 and 2005.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's applied the Monte Carlo simulation framework within
CDOROMv2.8 to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. Within this
framework, defaults are generated so that they occur with the
frequency indicated by the adjusted default probability pool (the
default probability associated with the current rating multiplied
by the Resecuritization Stress) for each credit in the reference.
Specifically, correlated defaults are simulated using a normal (or
"Gaussian") copula model that applies the asset correlation
framework. Recovery rates for defaulted credits are generated by
applying within the simulation the distributional assumptions,
including correlation between recovery values. Together, the
simulated defaults and recoveries across each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the loss distribution for the reference pool.

Once the loss distribution for the collateral has been calculated,
each collateral loss scenario derived through the CDOROM loss
distribution is associated with the interest and principal
received by the rated liability classes via the CDOEdge cash-flow
model. The cash flow model takes into account the following:
collateral cash flows, the transaction covenants, the priority of
payments (waterfall) for interest and principal proceeds received
from portfolio assets, reinvestment assumptions, the timing of
defaults, interest-rate scenarios and foreign exchange risk (if
present). The Expected Loss (EL) for each tranche is the weighted
average of losses to each tranche across all the scenarios, where
the weight is the likelihood of the scenario occurring. Moody's
defines the loss as the shortfall in the present value of cash
flows to the tranche relative to the present value of the promised
cash flows. The present values are calculated using the promised
tranche coupon rate as the discount rate. For floating rate
tranches, the discount rate is based on the promised spread over
Libor and the assumed Libor scenario.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exists a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment and the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. While commercial real
estate property markets are gaining momentum, a consistent upward
trend will not be evident until the volume of transactions
increases, distressed properties are cleared from the pipeline and
job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties in the residential
real estate property market are those surrounding future housing
prices, pace of residential mortgage foreclosures, loan
modification and refinancing, unemployment rate and interest
rates.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Amortizations: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether amortizations will continue and at what
pace. The rate of prepayments in the underlying portfolio may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties.

3) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a small
number of large obligors.


COMSTOCK FUNDING: Moody's Lifts Rating on $14MM Notes to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Comstock Funding Ltd.:

US$22,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

US$19,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf);

US$23,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on September 30,
2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$25,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes Due 2020, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 30,
2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);

US$14,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Subordinate Notes
Due 2020 (current balance of $12,910,503), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$45,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Senior Revolving Notes Due
2020 (current balance of $38,806,387), Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
Previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$280,500,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2020
(current balance of $241,893,148), Affirmed at Aaa (sf);
Previously on September 30, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in May 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher weighted average
recovery rate compared to the levels assumed at the last rating
action in September 2011. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2414 compared
to 2594 at the time of the last rating action. Moody's also
modeled a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.87%
compared to 46.8% at the last rating action. Additionally, the
deal benefited from a reduction in the weighted average life of
the underlying portfolio compared to the last rating action.

Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
overcollateralization ratios have also improved since the last
rating action. The latest trustee report, as of February 2013,
reports Class A, B, C and D Overcollateralization Ratios at
129.62%, 120.98%, 112.81% and 109.01%, respectively, compared to
August 2011 trustee reported levels of 124.49%, 116.20%, 108.35%
and 104.70%.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $418 million,
defaulted par of $6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.47% (implying a WARF of 2414), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.87% and a diversity score
of 48. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Comstock Funding Ltd., issued in June of 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with some exposure to CLO tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1931)

Class A1A: 0
Class A1B: 0
Class A2: 0
Class A3: +1
Class B: +3
Class C: +2
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2897)

Class A1A: 0
Class A1B: 0
Class A2: 0
Class A3: -1
Class B: -2
Class C: -2
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


CPS AUTO 2013-A: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A. This is
the first senior/subordinated transaction of the year for Consumer
Portfolio Services, Inc.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

Class A, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Class B, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Class C, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Class D, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Class E, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said the ratings are based on the quality of the
underlying auto loans and their expected performance, the strength
of the structure, the availability of excess spread over the life
of the transaction, the experience and expertise of CPS as
servicer, and the backup servicing arrangement with Aa3-rated
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the underlying
pool is 13.5%. The loss expectation was based on an analysis of
CPS' portfolio vintage performance as well as performance of past
securitizations, and current expectations for future economic
conditions.

The Assumption Volatility Score for this transaction is
Medium/High versus a Medium for the sector. This is driven by the
Medium/High assessment for Governance due to the unrated
sponsor/servicer.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction
(rather than individual tranches).

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Auto Loan-Backed Securities," published in
May 2011.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the net loss used in
determining the initial rating were changed to 21.5%, 25.0% or
29.5%, the initial model output for the Class A notes might change
from A1 to A2, Baa2, and Ba2, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.0%, 17.0% or
20.0%, the initial model output for the Class B notes might change
from A2 to A3, Baa3, and Ba3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.0%, 17.0%, or
21.5%, the initial model output for the Class C notes might change
from Baa2 to Baa3, Ba3, and B3, respectively. If the net loss used
in determining the initial rating were changed to 14.0%,16.0% or
17.5%, the initial model output for the Class D notes might change
from Ba2 to B1, B3 and output for the Class E notes might change from B2 to B3,
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time, rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKS4: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on the
Class F and Class G commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2002-CKS4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P withdrew its 'BBB (sf)' rating on
Class E from the same transaction due to the class' full principal
repayment.

S&P's affirmations follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the transaction
structure, historical performance of the remaining assets, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

S&P's affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect its expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings on these classes also reflect the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining seven assets in
the pool, six ($39.7 million, 90.2%) of which are with the special
servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR), and are discussed below.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes F and G, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because S&P's analysis also considered its view on
available liquidity support and risks associated with potential
interest shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes this deal is
susceptible to increased interest shortfalls because six of the
remaining seven assets are currently with the special servicer.

S&P withdrew its 'BBB (sf)' rating on the Class E certificate
following the full repayment of the class' principal balance, as
noted in the February 2013 trustee remittance report.

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool had an aggregate trust balance of $44.0 million, down from
$1.2 billion at issuance.  The pool has five loans and two real
estate owned (REO) assets, down from 157 loans at issuance.  To
date, the transaction has experienced losses totaling
$76.0 million or 6.2% of the transaction's original certificate
balance.

The one loan that is not with the special servicer, the Best Buy -
Sandy, UT loan ($4.3 million, 9.8%), has a servicer-reported debt
service coverage (DSC) of 1.40x as of year-end 2012.  The loan has
an anticipated repayment date (ARD) of Sept. 1, 2014.

                      SPECIALLY SERVICED ASSETS

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, two REO assets
($31.7 million, 72.0%) and four loans ($8.0 million, 18.2%) were
with the special servicer, LNR. Details on the three largest
specially serviced assets are as follows:

The Forum at Gateways REO asset ($20.0 million, 44.1%), the
largest asset in the pool, is a 258,322-sq.-ft., Wal-Mart-anchored
shopping center in Sterling Heights, Mich.  The asset has a
reported total exposure of $22.5 million.  Because of the
borrower's inability to repay the loan in full at maturity, the
loan transferred to the special servicer on July 22, 2010, and the
property became REO on Sept. 4, 2011.  According to LNR, it is
actively working on leasing up the property, which reported 61.0%
occupancy as of February 2013.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon
the eventual resolution of this asset.

The Williamsburg Crossing REO asset ($12.3 million, 27.9%), the
second-largest asset in the pool, is a 149,933-sq.-ft., grocery-
anchored shopping center in Williamsburg, Va.  The asset has a
total reported exposure of $13.7 million.  Because of monetary
default, the loan transferred to the special servicer on March 8,
2011, and the property became REO on July 12, 2012.  According to
LNR, the occupancy was in the 60% range at the time the property
became REO.  LNR is currently working on improving the property's
performance.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

The Basswood Manor Apartments loan ($5.4 million, 12.3%), the
third-largest asset in the pool, consists of a 212-unit, garden
style, multifamily complex in Lewisville, Texas, a suburb of
Dallas.   The complex has 13, two-story, buildings that were
constructed in 1970.  The loan has a total reported exposure of
$5.7 million.  Because of the borrower's inability to repay the
loan in full at maturity, the loan transferred to the special
servicer on Oct. 5, 2012.  LNR stated that it is pursuing
foreclosure.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon the eventual
resolution of this asset.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4

Class   Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
F       B+ (sf)                          99.46
G       CCC- (sf)                        64.57

RATING WITHDRAWN
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2002-CKS4
            Rating
Class   To          From
E       NR          BBB (sf)

NR-Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C1: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 10
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2004-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction, including the ratings on the interest-only (IO)
classes.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings also reflect S&P's review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets and the
transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes D, E, F, G, and H, S&P affirmed its
ratings on these classes because its analysis also considered the
volume of nondefeased and near-term loans that are scheduled to
mature through Dec. 31, 2014 (189 loans, $947.5 million, 98.6% of
the trust balance).

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-X and A-Y IO
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C1

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4        AAA (sf)                          19.39
B          AAA (sf)                          14.95
C          AA+ (sf)                          13.13
D          A+ (sf)                            9.50
E          A- (sf)                            7.68
F          BBB+ (sf)                          5.46
G          BB- (sf)                           3.85
H          CCC- (sf)                          2.03
A-X        AAA (sf)                            N/A
A-Y        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C2: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on 14
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s Series
2004-C2, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction structure,
interest shortfalls, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of the principal and interest certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement
for these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary
credit enhancement required for the current outstanding ratings.
The affirmed ratings on these classes also reflect the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans as
well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on several classes, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered its view of
available liquidity support and the risks associated with
potential future interest shortfalls.  S&P believes these
increased interest shortfalls might likely result from any of the
following:

   -- Workout fees associated with the three previously specially
      serviced loans ($102.6 million, 15.1%; details below).

   -- Interest shortfalls from any of the 19 loans that are on the
      master servicer's watchlist ($86.2 million, 12.7%).

   -- Interest shortfalls from any of the 28 nondefeased,
      performing loans ($134.3 million, 19.8%), seven of which are
      also on the master servicer's watchlist ($15.5 million,
      2.3%), that have scheduled maturities through Dec. 31, 2013.

The Valley Hills Mall ($52.1 million, 7.7%), Airport Plaza
($47.9 million, 7.0%), and Meridian Center ($2.6 million, 0.4%)
loans were previously with the special servicer but have been
returned to the master servicer.  According to the transaction
documents, the special servicer is entitled to a work-out fee
equal to 1.00% of all future principal and interest payments on
the corrected loans, provided they continue to perform and remain
with the master servicer.

The affirmation of the Class A-X interest-only (IO) certificate
reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates Series 2004-C2

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-1        AAA (sf)                          17.91
A-1-A      AAA (sf)                          17.91
A-2        AAA (sf)                          17.91
B          AA (sf)                           13.99
C          AA- (sf)                          12.38
D          A (sf)                             9.35
E          A- (sf)                            7.92
F          BBB+ (sf)                          6.50
G          BB+ (sf)                           5.07
H          BB- (sf)                           3.47
J          B (sf)                             2.57
K          B- (sf)                            2.04
L          CCC+ (sf)                          1.51
A-X        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C5: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on seven
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series
2005-C5, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 12 other
classes from the same transaction, including seven 'AAA (sf)'
ratings.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, interest shortfalls, and liquidity available to the
trust.

The downgrades reflect credit support erosion that S&P anticipates
will occur upon the resolution of the transaction's seven
($77.8 million, 3.3%) assets that are with the special servicer,
CW Capital Asset Management (CWCAM), as of the Feb. 15, 2013,
trustee remittance report and one ($38.7 million, 1.7%) loan that
S&P determined to be credit impaired.  Based solely on S&P's
valuation of the specially serviced assets, it expects the trust
to incur losses approximating 1.5% of the original outstanding
trust balance upon the resolution or liquidation of these assets.
To date, the trust has incurred losses totaling $63.8 million, or
2.2% of the original trust balance.  S&P's expected losses from
the assets currently in special servicing and one loan S&P deemed
to be credit impaired could potentially result in principal losses
up to and including the class K certificates.  The special
servicer informed S&P that subsequent to the Feb. 15, 2013,
trustee remittance report, the Chesapeake Park Plaza asset was
liquidated, resulting in a moderate loss to the trust.

S&P's rating actions also considered the monthly interest
shortfalls that are affecting the trust.  S&P lowered its ratings
to 'D (sf)' on the class K, L, M certificates because S&P expects
interest shortfalls to continue and S&P believes the accumulated
interest shortfalls will remain outstanding for the foreseeable
future.  As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
trust experienced monthly interest shortfalls totaling
$131,802 primarily related to appraisal subordinate entitlement
reduction amounts of $110,508 and special servicing fees of
$18,141.  The interest shortfalls affected all classes subordinate
to and including class K.  Classes K through N have experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls between two and 15 months.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the principal and interest
certificates to reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes are within S&P's estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed ratings on these classes also reflect the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining loans, as
well as the transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of S&P's ratings on the interest only (IO) A-X and
A-Y certificates reflect its current criteria for rating IO
securities.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C5
              Rating                        Credit
Class      To          From        enhancement (%)
F          BB (sf)     BB+ (sf)               7.78
G          B (sf)      BB (sf)                6.25
H          B- (sf)     BB- (sf)               5.33
J          CCC+ (sf)   B+ (sf)                3.95
K          D (sf)      CCC+ (sf)              2.57
L          D (sf)      CCC  (sf)              2.26
M          D (sf)      CCC- (sf)              1.65


RATINGS AFFIRMED

Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2005-C5
Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-3        AAA (sf)                          35.50
A-AB       AAA (sf)                          35.50
A-4        AAA (sf)                          35.50
A-1A       AAA (sf)                          35.50
A-M        AAA (sf)                          23.25
A-J        A (sf)                            13.75
B          A- (sf)                           12.70
C          BBB+ (sf)                         10.69
D          BBB (sf)                           9.77
E          BBB-(sf)                           9.00
A-X        AAA (sf)                            N/A
A-Y        AAA (sf)                            N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on $7.6MM Securities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Diversified Global Securities, Limited:

  US$22,250,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes, Due 2014, Upgraded
  to Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ca
  (sf);

  US$8,250,000 Class A-3 Fixed Rate Notes, Due 2014, Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following class of notes:

  US$7,683,000 Class 1 Subordinated Combination Securities, Due
  2014 (current balance of $ 2,485,406), Affirmed Ca (sf);
  previously on September 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the Class A-3
Notes are primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes
since the rating action in September 2009. Moody's notes that the
Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes and the Class A-3 Fixed Rate Notes
have been paid down by approximately 99% or $15.07 million since
the last rating action, and are significantly overcollateralized
with cash collections. Currently the issuer holds $0.89 million in
the principal and interest accounts which will be used to pay down
fees and the Class A-3 Notes' interest and principal due on the
next payment date in June 2013.

Diversified Global Securities, Ltd. is a collateralized debt
obligation backed originally by a portfolio of collateralized loan
obligations. Currently, the portfolio consists of $15.6 million of
defaulted CBO's, of which a majority are from the 2001 vintage.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. However, Moody's
anticipates that the expected losses on the notes will be
insensitive (in terms of implied ratings) to the majority of
stresses and performance uncertainties that the deal is likely to
be subject to until expected repayment of the Class A-3 Notes or
maturity next year, and Moody's did not conduct any sensitivity or
stress testing.


FIELDSTONE MORTGAGE 2004-3: Moody's Lowers Cl. M5's Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of three tranches
and affirmed the rating of two tranches from Fieldstone Mortgage
Investment Trust 2004-3, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Fieldstone Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-3

Cl. M4, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M5, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. M6, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M7, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. M8, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2009 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools. The rating actions constitute a number of downgrades
and affirmations. The downgrades are primarily due to interest
shortfalls.

Ratings on tranches that currently have very small unrecoverable
interest shortfalls are capped at Baa3 (sf). For tranches with
larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009. These rating actions take into account
only credit-related interest shortfall risks.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008 and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels into 2014.

The methodologies only apply to pools with at least 40 loans and a
pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating
when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the
pool declines to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural
features allow for a monitoring of the transaction (such as a
credit enhancement floor).

Other factors used in this rating are described in "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, Moody's
considered the volatility of the projected losses and timeline of
the expected defaults. For bonds backed by small pools, Moody's
also considered the current pipeline composition as well as any
specific loss allocation rules that could preserve or deplete the
overcollateralization available for the senior bonds at different
pace.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


G-STAR 2002-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's upgraded the ratings of three classes of Notes issued by
G-Star 2002-1, Ltd. While Moody's weighted average rating factor
(WARF) has increased (including defaulted assets) and the number
of asset names has decreased, leading to concentration in higher
credit risk assets; the rapid amortization of the notes is
resulting in the upgrade of three classes of notes. The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-REMIC) transactions.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Class BFL Floating Rate Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
previously on Mar 28, 2012 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Class BFX 7.075% Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
on Mar 28, 2012 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Class C 8% Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2012
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

G-Star 2002-1 Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (95.1%
of the pool balance), real estate investment trust (REIT) debt
(3.9%) and asset backed securities (ABS) (1.0%). As of the
February 15, 2013 Trustee report, the aggregate Note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, amortized to $37.5
million from $312 million at issuance, with the current paydown
directed to the Class B notes, as a result of amortization of the
underlying collateral. The Class A notes have been fully
amortized.

There are four assets with a par balance of $18.5 million (29.3%
of the current pool balance) that are considered Defaulted
Securities as of the February 15, 2013 Trustee report. All of
these assets (100% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
These parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for
static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has completed updated assessments for the non-Moody's
rated collateral. The current bottom-dollar WARF (including
defaulted assets) is 3,286 compared to 2,911 at last review.
Moody's modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 511 compared to 1,242 at
last review (excluding defaulted assets). The current distribution
of Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 (31.2% compared to 15.7% at last
review), A1-A3 (1.4% compared to 6.9% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(39.1% compared to 24.9% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (23.1% compared
to 39.9% at last review), B1-B3 (4.9% compared to 4.6% at last
review), and Caa1-C (0.4% compared to 7.9% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.8 years compared to 3.2 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on the profile of the remaining
collateral pool.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR (excluding defaulted assets) of 31.1%
compared to 28.4% at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 47.2% compared to 31.6% at last review.

Moody's review incorporated CDOROM v2.8, one of Moody's CDO rating
models, which was released on March 22, 2012.

The cash flow model, CDOEdge v3.2.1.2, was used to analyze the
cash flow waterfall and its effect on the capital structure of the
deal.

Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress scenarios.

Changes in any one or combination of the key parameters may have
rating implications on certain classes of rated notes. However, in
many instances, a change in key parameter assumptions in certain
stress scenarios may be offset by a change in one or more of the
other key parameters. Rated notes are particularly sensitive to
changes in recovery rate assumptions. Holding all other key
parameters static, changing the recovery rate assumption down from
31.1% to 21.1% or up to 41.1% would result in a modeled rating
movement on the rated tranches of 0 to 2 notches downward and 1 to
2 notches upward, respectively.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Commercial Real Estate CDOs" published in July 2011.


GALAXY VIII: Moody's Hikes Ratings on $12.5-Mil. Notes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Galaxy VIII CLO, Ltd.:

US$372,500,000 Class A Senior Term Notes Due 2019 (current
outstanding balance of $367,414,640), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

US$33,750,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf);

US$24,400,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2019, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf);

US$18,700,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2019, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf);

US$12,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes Due
2019, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on August 1, 2011 Upgraded
to B1 (sf);

US$10,000,000 Class X Combination Notes (current outstanding rated
balance of $3,316,133), Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
August 1, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower WARF and higher spread compared
to the levels assumed at the last rating action in August 2011.
Moody's modeled a WARF and WAS of 2386 and 3.46%, respectively,
compared to 2913 and 2.67%, respectively, at the time of the last
rating action. Moody's also notes that the transaction's reported
overcollateralization ratios are stable since the last rating
action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $466 million,
defaulted par of $12.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 15.59% (implying a WARF of 2386), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.97%, and a diversity
score of 68. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Galaxy VIII CLO, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. The methodology used in rating Class X Combination
Notes was "Using the Structured Note Methodology to Rate CDO
Combo-Notes" published in February 2004.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1909)

Class A: 0
Class B: 0
Class C: 0
Class D: 0
Class E: 0
Class X: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2863)

Class A: 0
Class B: -3
Class C: -3
Class D: -2
Class E: -2
Class X: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


GALAXY XV: S&P Assigns 'BB(sf)' Rating on $25.8MM Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Galaxy
XV CLO Ltd./Galaxy XV CLO LLC's $528.425 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.31% to 12.81%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available prior to paying uncapped
      administrative expenses, incentive management fees, and
      subordinated note payments into principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1378.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Galaxy XV CLO Ltd./Galaxy XV CLO LLC

Class                   Rating            Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A                       AAA (sf)         357.650
B                       AA (sf)           62.675
C (deferrable)          A (sf)            50.600
D (deferrable)          BBB (sf)          31.625
E (deferrable)          BB (sf)           25.875
Subordinated notes      NR                69.575

NR-Not rated.


GE CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 11 Subprime RMBS Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on 6 tranches and
downgraded the rating on 11 tranches from 2 transactions issued by
GE Capital. The collateral backing the transaction are subprime
residential mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GE Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. Series 1998-HE1

A6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

A-7, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

B1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Confirmed at Ca
(sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mortgage Services, Series 1998-HE2

A6, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

A-7, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

S, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

M, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

B1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services Inc 1997-HE4

A6, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

S, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

M, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded to Ca
(sf)

Issuer: GE Capital Mtg Services, Series 1999-HE2

S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

M, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

B1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance reviews of these
transactions and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools.

The rating actions constitute a number of downgrades and
affirmations.

The downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and/or
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated. For e.g., for shifting
interest structures, back-ended liquidations could expose the
seniors to tail-end losses. The subordinate bonds in the majority
of these deals are currently receiving 100% of their principal
payments, and thereby depleting the dollar enhancement available
to the senior bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012, and "Pre-
2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for Moody's current view on loan
modifications. As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of
private modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that
loan modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is
now assuming that the loan modifications will into 2014.

When assigning the final ratings to senior bonds, in addition to
the methodologies, Moody's considered the volatility of the
projected losses and timeline of the expected defaults. For bonds
backed by small pools, Moody's also considered the current
pipeline composition as well as any specific loss allocation rules
that could preserve or deplete the overcollateralization available
for the senior bonds at different pace. The methodology only
applies to pools with at least 40 loans and a pool factor of
greater than 5%. Moody's may withdraw its rating when the pool
factor drops below 5% and the number of loans in the pool declines
to 40 loans or lower unless specific structural features allow for
a monitoring of the transaction (such as a credit enhancement
floor).

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer activity such as modification-related principal
forgiveness and interest rate reductions. Any change resulting
from servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
also impact the performance of these transactions.


GE COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed 16 classes
of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation series 2004-C2 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 4.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.1%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $1.4 million (0.1% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 16 loans (21.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes five specially serviced assets (4.6%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 31.8% to $957.6 million from
$1.4 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 19 loans
(18.6% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting class P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 477,259 sf office
building located in Downtown Columbus, OH. The loan is specially-
serviced (2.5% of the pool). Occupancy was 79.4% as of November
2012. The largest tenant is in negotiation with the special
servicer to downsize their space. In addition, the second largest
tenant has a lease that expires June 2013.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is an 181,338 sf
retail center located in Frisco, TX, north of Dallas, TX (2.9% of
the pool). The property was 78.8% occupied as of December 2012.
Toys R Us (27.7% NRA) is the largest tenant and approximately 49%
of leases roll through to Year End (YE) 2014, including Toys R Us.
The property has not been performing well since 2008 due to drop
in occupancy.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the Princeton
Office loan (5.3% of the pool), which is secured by a leasehold
interest in six 3-story office buildings located in Princeton, NJ.
Occupancy was 87% as of September 2012, which is up from 83% as of
YE 2011. However, net operating income (NOI) for Year-to-Date
(YTD) June 2012 (annualized) is down 17.6% from YE 2011 NOI. Per
the special servicer, concessions are being offered at the
property in the form of free rent.

RATING SENSITIVITY

The ratings of investment grade classes A-1 to F are expected to
remain stable. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to further downgrades as losses are
realized. In addition, classes G, H, and J may be subject to
further rating actions should realized losses be greater or less
than Fitch's expectations. Fitch remains cautious related to the
high concentration of retail assets (41% of the pool).

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns or revises Rating
Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $18.9 million class H to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $10.3 million class J to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $8.6 million class K to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 100%;
-- $6.9 million class L to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 70%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $8.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $574.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $138.5 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.3 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.2 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.8 million class D at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.5 million class E at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.9 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.2 million class G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Negative
    from Stable;
-- $5.2 million class M at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.9 million class PPL-1 at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3 million class PPL-2 at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4.4 million class PPL-3 at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.7 million class PPL-4 at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3.6 million class PPL-5 at 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4.3 million class PPL-6 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class N, O and P certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1 certificates
and the interest-only class X-2 certificates have paid in full.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2000-C1: Moody's Keeps Ratings on 3 CMBS Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three CMBS
classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., Series 2000-
C1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as follows:

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2012 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2006 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the P&I classes are due primarily to Moody's
expected loss remaining within a range commensurate with the
current ratings. Moody's loss/recovery estimates for the Class K
and Class L Certificates hinge largely on the resolution of one
specially-serviced asset -- 2070 Maple Street, which is currently
real estate owned.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 73% of the current deal balance. At last review,
Moody's base expected loss was approximately 46%. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized loss has increased slightly, to 3.6%
of the original securitized pool balance from 3.5% at Moody's last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for investment grade classes could decline below
the current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodological approach used in these ratings is as follows:
Since 86% of the pool is in special servicing and the remaining
pool balance consists of defeased loans, Moody's utilized a loss
and recovery approach in rating the P&I classes in this deal. In
this approach, Moody's determines a probability of default for
each specially serviced loan and determines a most probable loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer and
available market data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration servicer advances to date and estimated
future advances and closing costs. Translating the probability of
default and loss given default into an expected loss estimate,
Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially serviced
loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down
of principal to the most senior class(es).

The methodology used in rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 which
uses the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating
based on the published methodology: original and current bond
ratings and credit estimates; original and current bond balances
grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within
the transaction; and IO type corresponding to an IO type as
defined in the published methodology. The calculator then returns
a calculated IO rating based on both a target and mid-point . For
example, a target rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610
rating factor. The midpoint rating basis for a Baa3 (sf) rating is
775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3 (sf) rating factor of 610
and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If the calculated IO rating
factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator ver1.1 would provide both a
Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for consideration by the
rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 1 compared to a Herf of 2 at Moody's prior
review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 29, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by over 99% to $4
million from $880 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans. One loan, representing
approximately 12% of the pool, is defeased and is collateralized
by U.S. Government securities. The remaining loan is in special
servicing.

Thirty-one loans have liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $28 million (17% average loan loss
severity). The specially-serviced loan is the 2070 Maple Street
Loan ($3.5 million -- 88% of the pool), which is secured by a
230,000 square foot industrial building in Des Plaines, Illinois,
a western suburb of Chicago. The loan matured in January 2010 and
was foreclosed on in January 2011. The property is now REO and is
being marketed by Foresite Realty. The property was listed for
sale for $2.7 million in May 2011. A property sale was scheduled
for Q1 2013, however the prospective buyer canceled the contract
due to concerns about a possible, unresolved environmental issue
at the property. The special servicer is investigating the issue.
The property is 60% leased to one tenant, General Cable
Industries, whose lease is currently scheduled to expire in
September 2013. The lessee is in discussions with the servicer
about a possible lease extension. Moody's assumes a high loss
severity for this loan.


GOAL CAPITAL: Fitch Keeps 'BB' Ratings on Class C-1 Loan Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings currently maintains ratings on student loan bonds
issued by Goal Capital Funding Trust 2005-2, Goal Capital Funding
Trust 2006-1, Goal Capital Funding Trust 2007-1, and Higher
Education Funding Trust I.

Goal has requested that Fitch confirm its existing ratings upon
(i) the execution of the amendment and restatement of the
Administration Agreement for each of the aforementioned trusts
removing Goal Financial, LLC as administrator and appointing Goal
Structured Solutions, Inc. as successor administrator; (ii) the
establishment of a Custodial Agreement for the series 2005-2 and
HEF I trusts; (iii) the removal of The Bank of New York Mellon as
indenture trustee and the appointment of U.S. Bank National
Association as successor indenture trustee; and (iv) the deletion
from the transaction documents of a requirements for (x) a
verification agent and (y) a sub-administrator. Consistent with
its statements on policies regarding rating confirmations in
structured finance transactions (Jan. 13, 2009) and student loan
confirms (May 8, 2009), Fitch is treating this request as a
notification.

Based on the information provided, Fitch has determined that these
amendments will not have an impact on the existing ratings. This
determination only addresses the effect of the amendments on the
current ratings assigned by Fitch to the securities listed below.
This determination does not address whether this change is
permitted by the terms of the documents, nor does it address
whether this change is in the best interests of, or prejudicial
to, some or all of the holders of the securities listed.

Fitch's ratings on the above-mentioned trusts remain unchanged and
are:

Goal Capital Funding Trust 2005-2:
-- Class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Goal Capital Funding Trust 2006-1:
-- Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-6 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B-1 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Goal Capital Funding Trust 2007-1:
-- Class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class B-1 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C-1 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Higher Education Funding Trust I:
-- 2004-1 A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-6 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-9 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-10 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-12 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-13 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-14 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 A-15 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2005-1 A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2005-1 A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2005-1 A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2005-1 A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- 2004-1 B-1 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- 2004-1 B-2 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable.


GOLDMAN SACHS 2013-G2: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Cl. DM Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the Goldman Sachs & Co. GS Mortgage Securities Trust
Series 2013-G1 transaction:

-- $84,172,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $295,683,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $379,855,000* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,045,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,700,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,285,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,080,073** class DM 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Interest-only class; notional balance of classes A-1 and A-2.
** Class DM represents an interest solely in the subordinate
    component of the Deptford Mall Mortgage Loan.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2004-GG1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. O Certs to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades nine classes and affirms seven classes of
Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corp., series 2004-GG1
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are the result of increased loss expectations
primarily from the specially serviced loans. Fitch modeled losses
of 4.54% for the remaining pool; expected losses as a percentage
of the original pool balance are at 3.01%, including losses
already incurred to date (1.14%). Fitch has designated 25 loans
(29.90%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the six
specially serviced loans (10.54%).

Ratings Sensitivity

Concerns of continued deterioration in performance of specially
serviced loans are the contributing factors for the Negative
Outlooks to classes E through J. An increase in expected losses
would quickly erode the transaction's credit enhancement due to
the small size of the subordinate bond classes. Specifically,
Fitch is concerned with the largest specially serviced loan as it
comprises 7.7% of the pool and has occupancy issues. If the
borrower is unable to lease the vacant space and performance does
not improve, further downgrades are possible.

As of the February 2012 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by approximately 48.99% to
$1.31 billion from $2.60 billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls
total $1.91 million and affect class P. Currently 17 loans (36.7%
of the pool) have defeased.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Aegon Center loan
(7.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 35-story, approximately
633,650 square foot (sf) multi-tenant office tower with a 504-
space attached parking garage, located in the Louisville, KY,
central business district. Aegon vacated 200,000 sf of the
building at the Dec. 31, 2012 lease expiration date. The
property's management has been aggressively marketing the space
and has backfilled 80,000 sf of Aegon's space with a new tenant,
Mercer Inc. Fitch assumed losses based on a decline in market
conditions since issuance with lower occupancy and rental rates,
as well as time to re-lease the newly vacant space. The loan
remains current and the special servicer continues to evaluate
workout options.

The second-largest contributor to modeled losses, Victorville
Pavilion (0.43% of the pool), is the specially serviced retail
center comprising 40,754 sf with a restaurant outparcel. The
center is located in Victorville, CA, east of Los Angeles, and is
adjacent to the Mall of Victor Valley. The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on March 13, 2009 based on imminent default.
Circuit City was the anchor and vacated the site in 2009. The
special servicer has worked to re-lease the anchor space and sign
new tenants for the remaining three small inline spaces. An
outparcel was sold in January 2011 and with the completion of the
leasing activity the special servicer continues to evaluate
workout options.

The third-largest contributor to modeled losses, 510 Glenwood
Avenue (0.84% of the pool), is a specially serviced mixed-use
building located in Raleigh, NC. The building is six stories that
consist of privately owned residential condominiums on floors 4
through 6. The collateral is 67,369 sf of office space on floors 2
and 3 with retail residing on the street level first floor. The
occupancy of the building was 88% as of the last servicer provided
inspection report in August 2012. The building was transferred to
the special servicer during November 2011. The sponsor declared
bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure ruling and the special
servicer continues to work through the legal process in order to
secure possession.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises Outlooks as indicated:

-- $32.5 million class F to 'Asf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Positive;
-- $26 million class G to 'BBBsf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Positive;
-- $39 million class H to 'Bsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Negative
    from Stable;
-- $6.5 billion class J to 'Bsf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $13 million class K to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf'; RE 80%;;
-- $13 million class L to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
-- $9.8 million class M to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 0%;
-- $9.8 million class N to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.5 million class O to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $976.8 million class A-7 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61.8 million class B at AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26.0 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.0 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.5 million class E at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative from
    Stable;
-- $9.4 million class OEA-B1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.0 million class OEA-B2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6 have repaid in full.
Fitch does not rate $12.2 million class P. Classes XC and XP were
previously withdrawn.


GS MORTGAGE 2005-GG4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Certs. to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five and affirmed 16 classes of
GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2005-GG4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch-modeled losses across
the pool due to further deterioration of loan performance, most of
which involves higher modeled losses on several of the top 15
loans with continued underperformance. Fitch modeled losses of
10.4% of the remaining pool; modeled losses on the original pool
are 10.4%, including losses incurred to date. The Negative
Outlooks on classes A-J and B reflect the possibility for further
performance declines on the top 15 loans and further valuation
declines on the specially serviced loans.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 31.4% to $2.74 billion from
$4 billion at issuance. Approximately $1.13 billion (28.2%) were
due to principal paydowns and approximately $129.56 million (3.2%)
were due to realized losses. Nine loans (8.6%) have been defeased.
Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $17.7 million are
currently affecting classes G through P.

Fitch has designated 46 loans (32.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern,
which includes 17 specially serviced loans (15.1%). Seven of the
top 15 loans (15.2%) are classified as Fitch Loans of Concern;
three (7.6%) of which are specially serviced. In addition, 10 of
the top 15 loans (33.1%) have Fitch-stressed loan-to-values that
are greater than 90%.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (2.7%) secured
by an 850,476 square foot (sf) office property located in Buffalo,
NY. The property was 96.7% occupied as of year-end (YE) 2012, but
expected to drop below 10% by YE 2013.

The largest tenant, HSBC Bank USA (77% of the property square
footage), and second largest tenant, Phillips Lytle (10% of the
property square footage), have leases that are scheduled to expire
in October 2013 and December 2013, respectively. Both tenants have
indicated they will not be renewing their leases; both are
expected to vacate upon or prior to their lease expirations. The
borrower has been actively marketing the property vacancies, but
there have been no firm commitments or leasing prospects at this
time. Excess cash flow is being trapped; however, there was little
to no excess cash flow in the prior months, according to the
master servicer. There remains ongoing arbitration between the
largest tenant and the borrower. Although the tenant continues to
pay rent, they are not paying other supplemental charges.

In early 2013, the borrower sent the largest tenant a notice
stating it was in default of its lease agreement. The borrower had
designated a period of time for the largest tenant to cure the
default, but no actions were taken and this period to cure the
default has ended. The borrower continues to determine the
appropriate strategy.

According to REIS and as of fourth quarter 2012, the overall
Buffalo metro office market reported a vacancy of 14.6% and the
submarket reported a vacancy of 16.2%. In-place rents are
significantly below market. A dark value analysis was conducted to
estimate an expected recovery given both the largest and second
largest tenants are expected to vacate. Fitch made assumptions for
market rent declines, downtime between leases, carrying costs, and
re-tenanting costs. Fitch will continue to monitor the tenancy and
leasing status of the property.

The second largest contributor to modeled losses is a loan (7.3%)
secured by a 1.21 million sf office property located in Denver,
CO. As of YE 2012, property occupancy has declined to 87% from 88%
and nearly 100% at YE 2011 and YE 2010, respectively. The decline
in occupancy is attributable to multiple tenants at the property
vacating during 2011 at or prior to their scheduled lease
expirations.

According to the December 2012 rent roll, approximately 39% of the
total property square footage rolls prior to the end of 2015; the
loan matures in April 2015. Lease rollovers are concentrated
during 2014, whereby 25% of the property square footage rolls. The
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), on a net operating income
(NOI) basis was 1.59x at YE 2011, gradually declining from the
1.62x, 1.77x, and 1.62x reported at YE 2010, YE 2009, and at
issuance, respectively.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is a specially
serviced asset (1.3%) on a 559,309 sf retail property located in
Temple, TX. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
September 2008 due to imminent default. The asset became real-
estate owned in September 2011 and has an expected three year
disposition date of Dec. 31, 2014, according to the servicer.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings to the super senior classes are expected to remain
stable. Classes A-J and B (rated 'BBsf' and 'Bsf', respectively)
may be subject to a downgrade if there is further deterioration to
the pool's cash flow performance and/or if there is further
decline in the valuations of the specially serviced loans. The
distressed classes (those rated below 'Bsf') are expected to be
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized or if
realized losses to specially serviced loans exceed Fitch's
expectations.

Fitch has downgraded and revised Rating Outlook to these classes
as indicated:

-- $300.1 million class A-J to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    to Negative from Stable;
-- $65 million class B to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative
    from Stable;
-- $35 million class C to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 0%;
-- $75 million class D to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $40 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

-- $2.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87.4 million class A-ABA at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29.6 million class A-ABB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $500 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.17 billion class A-4A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $167.4 million class A-4B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $113.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $45 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $40 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.5 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class P is not rated by Fitch. Classes A-1, A-1P, A-DP, and A-2
have paid in full. The ratings on the interest-only classes X-P
and X-C were previously withdrawn.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-G1: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Class DM Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned ratings to GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2013-G1's $569.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates Series 2013-G1.

The note issuance is a CMBS securitization backed by three
commercial mortgage loans secured by three regional shopping
malls: Great Lakes Crossing Outlets, Deptford Mall, and Katy
Mills.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsors' and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loans' terms, and the
transaction's structure, among other factors.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

       http://www.standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1325.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-G1

Class       Rating                   Amount ($)

A-1         AAA (sf)                 84,172,000
A-2         AAA (sf)                295,683,000
X-A         AAA (sf)                379,855,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)                 76,045,000
C           A- (sf)                  49,700,000
D           BBB- (sf)                38,285,000
DM(ii)      BB- (sf)                 25,080,073

  (i) Notional balance.
  (ii)Loan-specific class.
   NR - Not rated.
   N/A - Not applicable.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-NYC5: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-NYC5's
$410.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one $410.0 million five-year, fixed-rate
commercial mortgage loan secured by the fee simple interests in
five hotels in Manhattan.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 12,
2013.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1374.pdf

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2013-NYC5

Class          Rating            Amount ($)
A              AAA (sf)         172,969,000
XA-1           AAA (sf)      172,969,000(i)
XA-2           AAA (sf)      172,969,000(i)
XB-1           BBB (sf)      121,531,000(i)
XB-2           BBB (sf)      121,531,000(i)
B              AA- (sf)          55,431,000
C              A- (sf)           40,600,000
D              BBB (sf)          25,500,000
E              BBB- (sf)         30,300,000
F              BB (sf)           49,300,000
G              BB- (sf)          35,900,000

(i) Notional balance. The class XA-1 and XA-2 certificates'
     notional amount will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the
     class A certificates.  The class XB-1 and XB-2 certificates'
     notional amount will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
     principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the
     class B, C, and D certificates.


GUGGENHEIM PRIVATE: Fitch Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to Guggenheim
Private Debt Fund Note Issuer, LLC:

-- $90,900,011 class A notes, series A-3, 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15,150,012 class B notes, series B-3, 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable
-- $18,685,011 class C notes, series C-3, 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $12,625,010 class D notes, series D-3, 'Bsf', Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

-- $292,499,994 class A notes, series A-1, at 'Asf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $48,749,993 class B notes, series B-1, at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $60,124,994 class C notes, series C-1, at 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $40,624,994 class D notes, series D-1, at 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $44,999,995 class A notes, series A-2,at 'Asf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $7,499,995 class B notes, series B-2, at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $9,249,995 class C notes, series C-2, at 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;

--$6,249,996 class D notes, series D-2, at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Guggenheim PDFNI is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in July 2012 and had its first and second
funding dates in July 2012 and October 2012, respectively. The
transaction is managed by Guggenheim Partners Investment
Management, LLC (GPIM). Fitch assigned ratings to the new notes
issued commensurate with the third funding that occurred on March
12, 2013 and also affirmed its ratings on the notes that were
issued pursuant to the first and second funding dates.

Pursuant to the third funding date, the issuer has drawn an
additional $202 million of cash from investors and has issued a
commensurate $202 million of new notes, each designated as 'series
3', including approximately $64.6 million of first-loss notes that
are not rated by Fitch. The notes were issued in the same
proportion as the initial capital structure, as was contemplated
at the transaction's closing. All notes from 'series 1,' 'series
2' and 'series 3' are cross-collateralized by the entire
collateral portfolio, which currently consists of approximately
$894 million of broadly syndicated loans and private debt
investments (PDIs) as well as approximately $85.7 million of cash.
The third funding date effectively draws on all outstanding
commitments, resulting in a total note issuance of $952 million
for the transaction.

Key Rating Drivers

In conjunction with the third funding date Fitch analyzed the
current portfolio characteristics, as represented to Fitch by
GPIM, as well as a 'Fitch-Stressed' portfolio that accounted for
many of the worst-case portfolio concentrations permitted by the
indenture (which is further detailed in Fitch's press release
'Fitch Rates Guggenheim Private Debt Fund Note Issuer, LLC' dated
July 12, 2012). Fitch's cash flow modeling analysis of both
portfolios indicated that each class of notes performs in line
with the ratings assigned or affirmed, as applicable. Fitch
therefore assigned the ratings to the 'series 3' notes as
indicated above.

Fitch has affirmed the existing 'series 1' and 'series 2' notes
due to the analysis described above as well as the stable
performance of the transaction thus far. The Feb. 13, 2013 trustee
report indicated that all collateral quality tests, concentration
limitations, and coverage tests were in compliance. All rated
notes received their full interest and commitment fees at the
second payment date on Jan. 15, 2013. Also on this payment date,
approximately $9.1 million of excess spread was redirected to the
principal collection account for investment in future collateral,
increasing the degree of collateral coverage for the notes.

Rating Sensitivities

Standard sensitivity analysis was conducted on the Fitch-stressed
portfolio at close as described in Fitch's corporate CDO criteria,
with the transaction's performance in these scenarios deemed to be
within the expectations of each respective rating. Fitch also
determined that the results of the sensitivity analysis run at
close would be sufficient for upsizes of the transaction and
therefore did not run additional sensitivities for the third
funding date.


HALCYON LOAN: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on $18.25MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Halcyon
Loan Advisors Funding 2012-2 Ltd./Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding
2012-2 LLC's $396.5 million floating-rate notes following the
transaction's effective date as of Jan. 7, 2013.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of S&P's review based on the information presented to them.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P said.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect S&P's assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2012-2 Ltd./
Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2012-2  LLC

Class                              Rating               Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
X                                  AAA (sf)               3.00
A                                  AAA (sf)             278.00
B                                  AA (sf)               39.50
C (deferrable)                     A (sf)                38.25
D (deferrable)                     BBB (sf)              19.50
E (deferrable)                     BB (sf)               18.25
Combination notes (deferrable)(i)  A-p (sf)(NRi)(ii)     10.00

  (i) The combination notes comprise components representing an
      aggregate initial principal amount of $5 million of class C
      notes and $5 million of class D notes.
(ii) The 'p' subscript indicates that the rating addresses only
      the principal portion of the obligation.
'NRi' indicates that the interest is not rated.
SDR - Scenario default rate.
BDR - Break-even default rate.
N/A - Not applicable.


JP MORGAN 2000-C9: Moody's Affirms Ratings on Three Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of three classes of
J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2000-C9 as follows:

  Cl. H, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2002 Downgraded
  to B1 (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2005 Downgraded to
  C (sf)

  Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
  to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to the ratings
being consistent with Moody's expected loss. Based on the current
realized and base expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for
the affirmed classes are sufficient to maintain their current
ratings.

The IO Class, Class X, is affirmed based on the WARF of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.6% of the
current balance compared to 8.3% at last review. Base expected
loss plus realized losses now totals 4.8%, the same as at last
review. Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity
and timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement levels could decline below the current levels. If
future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Class X was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a pay down analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to 3 at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 22, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased 97% to $21.7 million
from $814.4 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 37% of the pool. One loan, representing 42% of the
pool, has defeased and is backed by U.S. Government securities.

There are presently two loans, representing 50% of the pool, on
the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of its ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate $37.4 million loss (37%
loss severity on average). There are no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan representing 37% of the pool and has estimated a
$2.0 million loss (25% expected loss based on a 50% probability of
default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% of the performing pool, respectively.
Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 66% compared to 68% at last review. Moody's
net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.6% to the
most recently available net operating income. Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.14X and 1.78X, respectively,
compared to 1.15X and 1.72X, respectively, at last full review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 55% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Cory Industries Loan ($8.0
million -- 37% of the pool). The loan is secured by 1.0 million
square feet (SF) of industrial warehouse space in four buildings
located in Elizabeth, New Jersey. The property was 100% leased as
of September 2012 to Joseph Cory Holdings. This loan was modified
January 2012 with an interest rate reduction from 8.46% to 6.0%
through November 2014 after which the interest rate reverts back
to 8.46%. The loan originally had an anticipated repayment date of
September 1, 2009 and now matures September 1, 2024. The loan is
on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR following its
transfer back to the master servicer in 2012. Moody's current LTV
and stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.84X, respectively, compared to
132% and 0.82X at last review.

The second largest loan is the K-Mart Baltimore Loan ($2.9 million
-- 14% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 120,000 SF retail
center located in southeast Baltimore, Maryland. The property was
100% leased as of October 2012. The anchor tenant is the Sears
Holdings Corp. (Moody's long term rating B3, stable outlook),
which operates a Kmart store at the property. The Kmart lease is
scheduled to expire in November 2014. This Kmart location is not
on the Sears Holdings Corp. store closings list. Moody's current
LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.34X, respectively, compared to
82% and 1.28X at last review.

The third-largest loan is the Henry Plastics Building Loan
($948,000 -- 4% of the pool). This fully-amortizing loan is
secured by a 34,000 SF industrial property located in Fremont,
California. The property is 100% leased to Henry Plastic Molding,
Inc. through 2019. Property performance remains steady. Moody's
current LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and 2.75X, respectively,
compared to 38% and 2.83X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2001-CIBC3: S&P Cuts Rating on Class K Notes to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
on the Class K commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 's series
2001-CIBC3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

S&P lowered its rating on Class K to 'D (sf)' because it expects
the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.  Class K class has had accumulated interest
shortfalls outstanding for 12 consecutive months.  The recurring
interest shortfall primarily is because of the following factors:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction (ASER) amounts
      in effect for specially serviced assets; and

   -- Special servicing fees.

S&P's analysis primarily considered the ASER amounts based on
appraisal reduction amounts (ARAs) calculated using recent Member
of the Appraisal Institute (MAI) appraisals.  S&P also considered
special servicing fees that it believes is likely to cause
recurring interest shortfalls.

The servicer implements ARAs and resulting ASER amounts in
accordance with each transaction's terms, which typically call for
the automatic implementation of an ARA equal to 25% of the stated
principal balance of a loan when a loan is 60 days past due, and
an appraisal or other valuation is not available within a
specified timeframe.  S&P primarily considered ASER amounts based
on ARAs calculated from MAI appraisals when deciding which classes
from the transaction to downgrade to 'D (sf)'.  This is because
ARAs based on a principal balance haircut are highly subject to
change, or even reversal, once the special servicer obtains the
MAI appraisals.

Specifically, S&P lowered its rating on the Class K certificates
to 'D (sf)' to reflect accumulated interest shortfalls outstanding
of 12 months, because of ASER amounts related to three
($15.1 million; 30.0%) of the six assets ($25.4 million; 50.1%)
that are currently with the special servicer, C-III Asset
Management LLC, and special servicing fees of $5,472.  S&P expects
these accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for
the foreseeable future.

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report,ARAs totaling
$8.7 million were in effect for four of the six specially serviced
assets, and the total reported ASER amount was $44,725.  The net
reported monthly interest shortfalls totaled $50,197, affecting
Class K and all bonds subordinate to it.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available a:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATING LOWERED

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2001-CIBC3

                Rating      Rating
Class           To          From       Credit enchancement (%)
K               D (sf)      CCC- (sf)  4.95


JP MORGAN 2003-PM1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on Class P Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed 13 classes of
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series
2003-PM1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect expected losses from loans in special
servicing including loans in the top 15 with continued
underperformance. The affirmations reflect sufficient credit
enhancement to the remaining Fitch classes after consideration of
expected losses.

Fitch modeled losses of 12.8% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 9.2%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $20.8 million (1.8% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated 22 loans (21.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes eight specially serviced assets (10.8%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 42% to $666.8 million from
$1.2 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 23 loans
(32% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes J through P. The Rating Outlooks on classes A-4
through B remain Stable.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Palm Beach Mall
loan (6.5%). While the loan is no longer secured by any
collateral, an outstanding debt of $43.6 million remains in the
pool. The property was sold in October 2011, but only $5.6 million
was applied to the debt. The special servicer, ORIX, elected not
to make a final recovery determination or write down the remaining
principal balance of the loan until their ongoing litigation with
the loan sponsor, Simon Property Group has been resolved. Proceeds
of the sale were used to repay advances, fund a debt service and
legal expense reserve (expected to keep loan current until April
2013), and pay down a portion of the balance. Remaining reserves
are not allocated to principal repayment of the loan. As such,
Fitch modeled a full loss on the outstanding principal balance.

The next largest contributor to losses (1.8%) is secured by a
127,676 sf office property located in Hauppauge, NY. The loan
transferred to special servicing in September 2009 due to imminent
default. The asset is being marketed for sale.

The third largest contributor to expected losses (3.3%) is an
office complex consisting of four two-story office buildings
located in Carlsbad, CA. The properties have been experiencing a
decline in cash flow due to lower occupancy. Additionally, the
properties face significant tenant rollover risk in the next three
years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the 'AAA' classes are expected to remain stable.
The Negative Outlook on classes C through E reflect the likelihood
of interest shortfalls impacting these classes as the Palm Beach
Mall loan is expected to begin shorting their debt service
starting in May. According to Fitch's global criteria for rating
caps, Fitch will not assign or maintain 'AAsf' ratings for notes
that it considers to have a high level of vulnerability to
interest shortfalls or deferrals, even if permitted under the
terms of the documents ('Criteria for Rating Caps in Global
Structured Finance Transactions', dated Aug. 2, 2012). The
distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are expected to be
subject to further downgrades as losses are realized. Furthermore,
any prolonged workouts may result in increased fees and expenses,
leading to further downgrades.

Fitch downgrades these classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $13 million class E to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $13 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $241.6 million class A1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $244.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.2 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $27.5 million class D at 'BBBsf; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $15.9 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 80%;
-- $18.8 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $15.9 million class J at 'Csf/RE 0%';
-- $7.2 million class K at 'Csf/RE 0%';
-- $8.7 million class L at 'Csf/RE 0%';
-- $7.2 million class M at 'Csf/RE 0%';
-- $4.3 million class N at 'Csf/RE 0%';
-- $2.8 million class P at 'Dsf/RE 0%'.

Fitch does not rate class NR. Classes A-1 through A-3 have paid in
full. Fitch has previously withdrawn the ratings on the interest
only class X-1 and X-2 notes.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class B Certs to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded five classes and affirmed 14 classes
of JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-CIBC15 due to
further pool deterioration, most of which involves increased loss
expectation on the specially serviced loans.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch modeled losses of 16.4% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 21.7%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $171.2 million (8.1% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Realized
losses on several of the specially serviced assets were higher
than expected. Fitch has designated 38 loans (48.3%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes 10 specially serviced assets
(14.9%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 16.9% to $1.76 billion from
$2.12 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(0.3% of the pool) is defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes A-J through NR.

The largest contributor to expected losses is the Warner Building
loan (16.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 616,135 square
foot (sf) office property, designated a historical landmark,
located in Washington, D.C., approximately three blocks from the
White House. In January 2012, the property experienced a
significant decline in occupancy from 99% to 49% as a result of
the bankruptcy and vacancy of the largest tenant, Howrey Simon
Arnold & White (54%). Currently, the largest tenants are Baker
Botts, LLP (26%, lease expiration 2020), Cooley LLP (14%, lease
expiration 2028) recently signed, General Electric Company (8%,
lease exp. 2016), and Live Nation (Warner Theatre) (7%, lease
expiration 2014). As of the January 2013 rent roll, the property
occupancy has increased to 65%. The borrower continues to
aggressively market the vacant space and discussions continues
with a few prospective tenants. The loan is with the master
servicer and remains current.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Scottsdale
Plaza Resort loan (3.4%), which is secured by a 404-key hotel
located in Scottsdale, AZ. The loan remains current as the
borrower continues to fund debt service shortfalls out of pocket.
The property's performance continues to lag its competitive set in
terms of occupancy, average daily rate (ADR), and revenue per
available room (RevPAR). According to the January 2013 STR Global
(STR) report, the property's occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR were 55%,
$123.82, and $68.16, respectively, compared to the competitive
set's performance of 65.1%, $214.42, and $139.49. The most recent
servicer reported debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for year-end
(YE) 2011 was 0.64x, stable with last year but down significantly
from the 1.93x reported at issuance.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is the specially-
serviced US Bank Center (2.2%), a 362,031 sf office property
located in St. Paul, MN, two blocks from the State Capital
building. The loan was transferred to special servicing back in
June 2009 for imminent default due to the second largest tenant
(at issuance) vacating at lease expiration. The trust acquired the
property in October 2012 through a foreclosure sale. Occupancy at
the property has increased from 63% to 74% with the addition of
two new leases.

Rating Sensitivities:

The 'AAA' rated classes are expected to remain stable as they are
first in priority for payment. The 'AA' rated classes may be
subject to further rating actions should the performance of the
larger performing loans deteriorate or loss expectations increase.
Additionally, three of the loans in the top 15 are leased to
single tenants. The lower distressed classes are subject to
further rating actions as losses are realized.

Fitch downgrades the following classes and assigns or revises
Rating Outlooks and Recovery Estimates (REs) as indicated:

-- $1 billion class A-4 to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- $219.4 million class A-1A to 'AAsf' from 'AAAsf', Outlook
    to Negative from Stable;
-- $211.8 million class A-M to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf', RE 85%;
-- $164.2 million class A-J to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf', RE 0%;
-- $37.1 million class B to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes as indicated:

-- $13.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $62.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $15.9 million class C at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $31.8 million class D at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $3.7 million class E at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings
on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class J Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. 2011-C3 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool. There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance. Fitch reviewed the most
recently available quarterly financial performance of the pool as
well as updated rent rolls for the top 15 loans, which represent
75.1% of the transaction.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1.7% to $1.48 billion from
$1.50 billion at issuance.

Rating Sensitivity

All classes maintain Stable Rating Outlooks. No rating actions are
expected unless there are material changes to property occupancies
or cash flows, delinquencies, or loans transferred to special
servicing. The pool has maintained performance consistent with
issuance. Additional information on rating sensitivity is
available in the report 'J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2011-C3' (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
www.fitchratings.com.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a 1,556,382 square feet
(sf) regional mall located in Holyoke, MA (14.7% of the pool). The
mall is anchored by Macy's, Sears, Target, and J.C. Penney. The
total collateral size is 1,356,382 sf, as Macy's owns both the
store and land. As of year-end 2012, the occupancy at the property
remains at 91%.

The second largest loan is secured by a portfolio of 32
geographically diversified Alberston's grocery retail properties.
The properties are located across five states, primarily in the
Southwest. As of year-end 2012, the occupancy of the portfolio
remains at 100%.

Fitch affirms these classes and maintains the Stable Outlook:

-- $56.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $318.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $253.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $485.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.3 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.5 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.3 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.8 million class H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3.7 million class J at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class F, NR and interest-only class X-B
certificates.


JP MORGAN 2013-C10: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned these ratings to J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C10, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C10:

-- $63,440,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $87,164,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,445,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $185,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $430,080,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $106,694,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $107,059,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,001,882,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,689,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55,926,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,937,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,360,000a class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,783,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch does not rate the $44,741,391 non-rated class or the
$276,436,391 class X-B.


JP MORGAN 2013-C10: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C10's
$1.28 billion commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2013-C10.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 50 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $1,278.3 million, secured by the
fee and leasehold interests in 101 properties across 28 states.

The ratings are based on information as of March 14, 2013.

The ratings reflect the credit support provided by the transaction
structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's economics,
the trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's relative
diversity, and S&P's overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.  Standard & Poor's determined that the collateral
pool has, on a weighted average basis, debt service coverage of
1.70x and beginning and ending loan-to-value ratios of 85.7% and
74.0%, respectively, based on Standard & Poor's values.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1328.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-C10

Class         Rating(i)           Amount ($)
A-1           AAA (sf)            63,440,000
A-2           AAA (sf)            87,164,000
A-3           AAA (sf)            22,445,000
A-4           AAA (sf)           185,000,000
A-5           AAA (sf)           430,080,000
A-SB          AAA (sf)           106,694,000
A-S           AAA (sf)           107,059,000
X-A           AAA (sf)         1,001,882,000(iii)
X-B(ii)       NR                 276,436,391(iii)
B             AA- (sf)            84,689,000
C             A- (sf)             55,926,000
D             BBB- (sf)           47,937,000
E(ii)         BB (sf)             30,360,000
F(ii)         BB- (sf)            12,783,000
NR(ii)        NR                  44,741,391

   (i)The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
      buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
  (ii)Nonoffered certificates.
(iii)Notional balance.
   NR - Not rated.


KINGSLAND II: Moody's Lifts Rating on US$6MM Class D Notes to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Kingsland II, Ltd:

US$50,000,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
Notes (current balance of $49,732,228), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Downgraded to A3,
Outlook Stable on 17 Jan 2013)

US$205,150,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
(current balance of $204,051,332), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Downgraded to A3,
Outlook Stable on 17 Jan 2013)

US$62,000,000 Class A-1c Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
(current balance of $61,667,963), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

US$8,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf);

US$29,200,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);

US$27,525,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

US$6,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on September 1, 2011 Upgraded to
B1 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from lower weighted average rating factor
("WARF") and higher spread levels compared to the levels assumed
at the last rating action in September 2011. Moody's modeled a
WARF of 2484 and a weighted average spread ("WAS") of 3.48%,
compared to 2817 and 2.85%, respectively, at the time of the last
rating action. In addition, based on Moody's calculation, the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios are stable since the
last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $401 million,
defaulted par of $19.7 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.88% (implying a WARF of 2484), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.54%, and a diversity
score of 62. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Kingsland II, Ltd., issued in April 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans
with a material exposure to corporate bonds and some exposure to
structured finance securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF +20% (2981)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (1987)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-1c: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +3

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


LAREDO HOUSING: S&P Corrects Rating on 1994 Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on Laredo
Housing Finance Corp., Texas's series 1994 single-family mortgage
revenue bonds (Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae mortgage-backed
securities) to 'BB' from 'AA+'.  The outlook is negative.


LB-UBS 2003-C1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class N Notes to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-
UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P lowered
its rating on class N and affirmed its ratings on three other
classes from the same transaction.  In addition, S&P withdrew its
ratings on four other classes following the full repayment of
these classes' principal balances.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions.  S&P's analysis included a review of the credit
characteristics of all of the remaining loans in the pool, the
transaction structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The upgrade of the class H, J, and K certificates reflect S&P's
expected available credit enhancement for these classes, which S&P
believes are greater than its most recent estimate of necessary
credit enhancement for the most recent rating level, as well as
S&P's reviews regarding the current and future performance of the
collateral supporting the transaction.

The downgrade of the class N certificate reflects reduced
liquidity support available for this class as well as its
susceptibility to potential additional future interest shortfalls
from two ($9.7 million, 10.8%) of the three ($20.3 million, 22.6%)
loans that remain with the special servicer.  As of the Feb. 15,
2013, trustee remittance report, the trust experienced interest
shortfalls totaling $76,132, primarily related to the master
servicer recouping prior advances totaling $43,333 and interest
not advanced totaling $28,569.  Both of these amounts are related
to the specially serviced Springfield Industrial loan, which S&P
discussed below.  Interest shortfalls for this period affected all
classes subordinate to and including the class P certificate.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the principal and interest
certificates reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within S&P's estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  S&P affirmed its ratings on these classes to also
reflect the credit characteristics and performance of the
remaining assets, as well as the transaction-level changes.

Although available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on classes L and M, S&P affirmed its ratings on
these classes because its analysis also considered available
liquidity support and risks associated with potential interest
shortfalls in the future.  S&P believes increased interest
shortfalls could potentially result from two ($9.7 million, 10.8%)
of the remaining three loans ($20.3 million, 22.6%) that are with
the special servicer.

The affirmation of the class X-CL interest-only (IO) certificates
reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO securities.

S&P withdrew its ratings on the class D, E, F, and G principal-
and interest-paying certificates following the full repayment of
these classes' principal balances due, as noted in the February
2013 trustee remittance report.

Using servicer-provided financial information, S&P calculated a
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.21x and a Standard & Poor's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 76.0%
for 15 of the 18 remaining loans in the pool.  The DSCR and LTV
calculations exclude the three loans ($20.3 million, 22.6%) that
are with the special servicer (details below).  As of the Feb. 15,
2013, trustee remittance report, the collateral pool had an
aggregate trust balance of $89.7 million, down from $1.4 billion
at issuance.  The pool comprises 18 loans, down from 114 loans at
issuance.  To date, the transaction has experienced losses
totaling $9.6 million or 0.7% of the transaction's original
certificate balance.  Three ($20.3 million, 22.6%) of the
remaining 18 loans are with the special servicer, which S&P
discusses below; 10 other loans ($36.4 million, 40.6%) are on the
master servicer's watch-list.  Nine ($34.6 million, 38.6%) of the
10 loans on the master servicer's watch-list matured in January or
February 2013.  According to the master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank
N.A. (Wells Fargo), the aforementioned nine loans were each
subject to a forbearance agreement, granting the respective
borrowers additional time to secure refinancing proceeds.  The
forbearance agreements were reached in accordance with the
transaction's pooling and servicing agreement and with approval
from the controlling class representative.  Excluding the three
specially serviced loans, two ($12.5 million, 14.0%) loans had a
reported DSCR of below 1.00x.  Details on the largest loan in the
pool are as follows:

The Frankford Crossing Shopping Center loan ($14.0 million,
15.6%), the largest loan in the pool, is secured by a 136,181-
sq.-ft. anchored retail center in Dallas and has an anticipated
repayment date on Dec. 11, 2017.  Wells Fargo reported a DSCR of
1.26x for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2012 and occupancy was
91.5% according to the October 2012 rent roll.

                     SPECIALLY SERVICED LOANS

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, three loans
($20.3 million, 22.6%) were with the special servicer, CWCapital
Asset Management LLC (CWCapital).  As of the February 2013 trustee
remittance report, the reported payment status of the specially
serviced loans is as follows: one ($5.6 million, 6.2%) is in the
process of foreclosure, one ($4.1 million, 4.6%) is a
nonperforming matured balloon loan and one ($10.6 million, 11.8%)
is a performing matured balloon loan.  Details on the three loans
are below.

The Paoli Office Park loan ($10.6 million, 11.8%), the largest
loan with the special servicer, is secured by a 99,203 sq. ft.
office property in Willistown, Pa.  The loan was transferred to
the special servicer on Oct. 4, 2012, because of its imminent
maturity.  The loan matured on Jan. 11, 2013.  According to
CWCapital, the loan paid off in full on Feb. 22, 2013.

The Springfield Industrial loan, the second-largest loan with the
special servicer, is secured by a 552,485-sq.-ft. industrial
warehouse property in West Springfield, Mass.  The loan has a
trust balance of $5.6 million (6.2%) and a reported total exposure
of $6.7 million.  The loan was transferred to CWCapital on
Aug. 12, 2009, because of monetary default.  CWCapital stated that
it is currently pursuing foreclosure with closing expected in
August 2013.  The master servicer has deemed this loan
nonrecoverable.  S&P expects a significant loss upon the eventual
resolution of this loan.

The Office Court Technical Center loan, the third-largest loan
with the special servicer, is secured by a 45,000-sq.-ft. office
property in Santa Fe, N.M.  The loan has a trust balance of
$4.1 million (4.6%) and a reported total exposure of $4.2 million.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer on Nov. 11, 2012,
for maturity default.  The loan matured on Nov. 15, 2012.
CWCapital has indicated that it is pursuing foreclosure.  S&P
expects a minimal loss upon the eventual resolution of this loan.

As it relates to the above asset resolutions, S&P considered
minimal loss to be less than 25%, moderate loss to be between 26%
and 59%, and significant loss to be 60% or greater.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS RAISED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
               Rating
Class       To            From     Credit enhancement (%)
H           AAA (sf)      A (sf)                    88.71
J           AA (sf)       BBB+ (sf)                 75.34
K           A- (sf)      BBB (sf)                  63.87

RATING LOWERED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
               Rating
Class       To            From     Credit enhancement (%)
N           B- (sf)       BB- (sf)                  27.57

RATINGS AFFIRMED

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating      Credit enhancement (%)
L           BB+ (sf)                    42.86
M           BB (sf)                    35.21
X-CL        AAA (sf)                      N/A

RATINGS WITHDRAWN FOLLOWING REPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL BALANCE

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class       To            From     Credit enhancement (%)
D           NR            AAA (sf)                   N/A
E           NR            AA+ (sf)                   N/A
F           NR            AA(sf)                   N/A
G           NR            A+ (sf)                   N/A

N/A-Not applicable.
NR-Not rated.


MADISON AVENUE II: Moody's Cuts Rating on $22MM Notes to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of the following
notes issued by Madison Avenue CDO II, Limited:

  US$31,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due March 24, 2014
  (current outstanding balance of $21,570,137), Downgraded to Ca
  (sf); previously on May 27, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$23,000,000 Class C1 Floating Rate Notes Due March 24, 2014
  (current outstanding balance of $34,457,602), Affirmed C (sf);
  previously on May 27, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$12,000,000 Class C2 Floating Rate Notes Due March 24, 2014
  (current outstanding balance of $23,818,115), Affirmed C (sf);
  previously on May 27, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions are primarily a result of
insufficient par coverage which makes it unlikely that the notes
will be repaid in full at their maturity in March 2014. Based on
the latest trustee report dated February 15, 2013, the Class A/B
and Class C overcollateralization ratios are reported at 84.1% and
22.7%, respectively. In addition, the Class C1 Notes and Class C2
Notes are deferring interest and are not expected to receive any
future payments of interest or principal.

Moody's also notes that the transaction has been negatively
impacted by an out-of-the-money pay-fixed, receive-floating
interest rate swap whose notional amount exceeds the current
portfolio par. Due to this mismatch between the swap notional and
the asset par, payments to the swap counterparty have absorbed a
large portion of the excess spread in the deal. The swap is
scheduled to terminate this month, however.

Madison Avenue CDO II, Limited, issued in March 2001, is a
collateralized bond obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior unsecured bonds. Based on the latest trustee report, the
collateral pool has a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $18.1 million, a diversity score of 2.4, a weighted
average rating factor of 610 and a weighted average life of 0.34
years.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. This publication incorporates rating criteria that
apply to both collateralized loan obligations and collateralized
bond obligations.

Due to the deal's low diversity score and lack of granularity,
Moody's did not use a cash flow model to analyze the default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool. Instead, Moody's
analyzed the transaction by assessing the ratings impact of, and
the deal's sensitivity to, jump-to-default by certain large
obligors. Additionally, in consideration of the significant
undercollateralization of the notes, Moody's anticipates that the
expected losses on the notes will be insensitive (in terms of
implied ratings) to the majority of stresses and performance
uncertainties that the deal is likely to be subject to until
maturity next year, and Moody's did not conduct any sensitivity or
stress testing.


MCF CLO II: Moody's Rates US$25.5-Mil. Class E Notes '(P)Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by MCF CLO II LLC:

US$172,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$24,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$13,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

US$25,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

US$9,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's provisional ratings of the Class A Notes, Class B Notes,
Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes
(collectively, the "Notes") address the expected losses posed to
noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

MCF CLO II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized substantially by small to medium enterprise first-
lien senior secured corporate loans. 100% of the portfolio must be
invested in first-lien senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments. The underlying portfolio will be approximately 75%
ramped up as of the closing date.

MCF Capital Management LLC (the "Manager" or "MCF Capital"), a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Madison Capital Funding LLC, will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's three-year
reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period, no investing
is permitted.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Target Par Amount: $300,000,000

Diversity Score: 35

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3350

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years.

The Notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The Notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the Notes' performance.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
additional sensitivity analyses which were an important component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Notes. These
sensitivity analyses include increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Notes (shown in terms of
the number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- WARF + 15% (from 3350 to 3853)

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: 0

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class F Notes: -2

Percentage Change in WARF -- WARF + 30% (from 3350 to 4355)

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class A Notes: -1

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class B Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class C Notes: -3

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class D Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class E Notes: -2

Impact in Rating Notches -- Class F Notes: -3

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," (the "CLO V Score Report") dated
July 6, 2009. The underlying assets for this transaction are SME
corporate loans, which receive Moody's credit estimates, rather
than publicly rated corporate loans. This distinction is an
important factor in the determination of this transaction's V
Score, since loans publicly rated by Moody's are the basis for the
CLO V Score Report.

Moody's has assessed the sub-category, "Experience of,
Arrangements Among and Oversight of Transaction Parties," as
Medium for this transaction, instead of Low/Medium for the
benchmark CLO. The score of Medium reflects that this transaction
will be MCF Capital's second CLO transaction. This higher score
for "Experience of, Arrangements Among and Oversight of the
Transaction Parties" does not, however, cause this transaction's
overall composite V Score of Medium/High to differ from that of
the CLO sector benchmark.

In addition, several scores for sub-categories of the V Score
differ from the CLO sector benchmark scores because this is an SME
transaction. The scores for the quality of historical data for
U.S. SME loans and for disclosure of collateral pool
characteristics and collateral performance reflect higher
volatility. This results from lack of a centralized default
database for SME loans, as well as obligor-level information for
SME loans being more limited and less frequently provided to
Moody's than that for publicly rated companies.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the rating. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations," published in
June 2011.


MERRILL LYNCH 2002-CANADA 8: Moody's Keeps 'B2' Rating on K Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of five classes and
affirmed four classes of Merrill Lynch Financial Assets Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-Canada
8 as follows:

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2002 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades are due to increased credit enhancement due to
scheduled amortization and paydowns.

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio  and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Classes X-1 and X-2 are affirmed
based on the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.6% of the
current balance compared to 1.5% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 0.1% of the securitized
balance, down from 0.8% at last review. Depending on the timing of
loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from specially
serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for rated classes
could decline below the current levels. If future performance
materially declines, the expected level of credit enhancement and
the priority in the cash flow waterfall may be insufficient for
the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May
2000 and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology
used in rating Interest-Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of Classes X-1 and X-2.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 21 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $38.8
million from $468.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 25 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing
75% of the pool. Two loans, representing 4% of the pool, have
defeased and are collateralized with Canadian Government
securities. There are no loans with credit assessments.

Four loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

The pool has not experienced any losses since securitization and
currently there are no delinquent or specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and 2011 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average LTV is 40%
compared to 62% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.64X and 3.43X,
respectively, compared to 1.50X and 1.90X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 36% of the pool
balance. The largest exposure consists of the Prospectus numbers
29 and 44 Loans ($4.9 million -- 12.7% of the pool), which are
secured by two cross collateralized and cross defaulted industrial
buildings totaling 183,500 square feet (SF) located in Edmonton,
Alberta. The properties were 100% leased as of December 2011, the
same as at last review. The loans are fully amortizing. The loans
are full recourse to the sponsor, Courier Edmonton North Portfolio
Inc. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and 2.61X,
respectively, compared to 44% and 2.31X at last full review.

The second largest exposure consists of the Prospectus numbers 39,
54 and 64 Loans ($4.9 million -- 12.6% of the pool), which are
secured by three cross collateralized and cross defaulted
multifamily properties in Toronto, Ontario totaling 216 units. The
properties were 100% leased as of December 2011, the same as at
last review. The loans are fully amortizing. The loans are full
recourse to the sponsor, The Wynn Family Trust. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 42% and 2.43X, respectively, compared to 46% and
2.23X at last full review.

The third largest loan is the Prospectus number 23 Loan ($4.1
million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 73,600 SF
anchored retail/office strip center located in Ancaster, Ontario.
The property was 100% leased as of December 2011, the same as at
last review. The loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 31% and 3.46X, respectively, compared to 35% and
3.07X at last full review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2003-E: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 7 RMBS Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven tranches
and affirmed the ratings of two tranches issued by Merrill Lynch
in 2003. The collateral backing this deal primarily consists of
first-lien, adjustable-rate prime Jumbo residential mortgages. The
actions impact approximately $86.3 million of RMBS issued in 2003.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-E

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-5, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. X-A-2, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The
downgrades are a result of deteriorating performance and
structural features resulting in higher expected losses for
certain bonds than previously anticipated.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
interest-only securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies or 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program to 2013 and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

To project losses on prime jumbo pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For prime jumbo pools
originated before 2005, Moody's first applies a baseline
delinquency rate of 3.0%. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a pool with 75 loans, the
adjusted rate of new delinquency would be 3.03%. In addition, if
current delinquency levels in a small pool is low, future
delinquencies are expected to reflect this trend. To account for
that, the rate calculated is multiplied by a factor ranging from
0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies ranging from less than 2.5%
to greater than 10% respectively. Delinquencies for subsequent
years and ultimate expected losses are projected using the
approach described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


MERRILL LYNCH 2003-KEY1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 7 Certs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 14 classes of
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2003-KEY1.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade reflects Fitch expected losses across the pool, with
greater certainty of expected losses on the specially serviced
loan due to updated valuations and information on the disposition
strategy obtained from the special servicer. Fitch modeled losses
of 7.4% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original
pool balance total 4.8%, including losses already incurred. The
pool has experienced $4.1 million (0.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has designated 12 loans
(19.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes one specially
serviced asset (5.7%).

Rating Sensitivities

The revision of the Rating Outlooks to Stable from Positive on
classes B and C reflect the concentration risk of loans
representing 77% of the pool balance schedule to mature over the
next 12 months. The Negative Outlook on class F reflects the
potential for further rating actions should realized losses be
greater than Fitch's expectations. The distressed classes (those
rated below 'B') are expected to be subject to further downgrades
as losses are realized.

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 38.6% to $661.3 million from
$1.08 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, 12 loans
(20.2% of the pool) have defeased since issuance. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through Q.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a manufactured
housing community in Fair Haven, MI (5.7% of the pool), the third
largest loan in the pool and the only specially serviced asset as
of the February 2013 distribution date. The property experienced
cash flow issues due to severe occupancy declines, and transferred
to special servicing in January 2010 due to monetary default. The
foreclosure sale took place in May 2012, and the property became
lender REO in June 2012. The property is listed for sale with the
special servicer.

Fitch downgrades these class:

-- $7.9 million class G to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $382.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $110.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.3 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $15.8 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $25.1 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.6 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $10.6 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 50%;
-- $5.3 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.3 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.6 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.6 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $1.3 million class P at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate class Q. Fitch also does not rate classes WW-
1, WW-2, WW-3, and interest only (IO) class WW-X, which represent
the B-note rakes of 77 West Wacker Drive. The A-note for the
property is the largest loan (20.2%) in the pooled portion of the
trust. Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and the interest-only class XP have
repaid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class XC certificates.


MERRILL LYNCH 2003-KEY1: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on nine
pooled classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2003-KEY1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P
affirmed its ratings on three nonpooled 'WW' certificate classes
from the same transaction.  In addition, S&P withdrew its 'AAA
(sf)' rating on the class A-3 certificate.

The affirmations follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

The affirmations of S&P's ratings on the pooled principal and
interest certificates reflect its expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate
of the necessary credit enhancement required for the current
outstanding ratings.  The affirmed ratings also reflect its review
of the credit characteristics and performance of the remaining
assets as well as the transaction-level changes.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest positive
rating movement on the classes, S&P affirmed its ratings because
its analysis also considered the volume of nondefeased, performing
loans that are scheduled to mature through Dec. 31, 2014 (46
loans, $472.6 million, 73.6% of the pooled trust balance), and
liquidity support available to these classes following the
resolution of the specially serviced Anchor Bay asset.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the nonpooled 'WW' rake certificates
to reflect its analysis of the 77 West Wacker Drive loan.  The
raked certificates derive 100% of their cash flow from the office
property securing the loan.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class XC interest-only
(IO) certificate based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

In addition, S&P withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-3
principal and interest certificate following full repayment of the
class' principal balance as detailed in the Feb. 12, 2013, trustee
remittance report.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS AFFIRMED - POOLED CERTIFICATES

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2003-KEY1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4        AAA (sf)                          23.19
A-1A       AAA (sf)                          23.19
B          A+ (sf)                           17.85
C          A (sf)                            15.39
D          BBB+ (sf)                         11.49
E          BB+ (sf)                           9.84
F          B+ (sf)                            7.99
G          CCC- (sf)                          6.76
XC         AAA (sf)                            N/A


N/A--Not applicable.

RATINGS AFFIRMED - NONPOOLED CERTIFICATES

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2003-KEY1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating
WW-1       BB (sf)
WW-2       BB- (sf)
WW-3       B- (sf)

RATING WITHDRAWN

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2003-KEY1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

Class      Rating           From
A-3        NR               AAA (sf)

NR-Not rated.


MM COMMUNITY IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to 'Baa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by MM Community Funding IX, Ltd.:

US$126,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2033
(current balance $ 39,054,872.31), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on August 18, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2033,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Downgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued by
MM Community Funding IX, Ltd.:

US$50,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Senior Subordinate Notes due
2033, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on August 12, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed/Floating Rate Senior Subordinate
Notes due 2033, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on August 12, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of the improvement in the credit quality of the
underlying portfolio, deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the last rating action in August 2011.

Moody's notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor improved to 1024
compared to 1327 as of the last rating action date. The total par
amount that Moody's treated as defaulted or deferring declined to
$94.25 million compared to $121.25 million as of the last rating
action date.

Moody's noticed that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 38% or $24 million since the last rating action, due
to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions and sales of underlying
assets. As a result of this deleveraging, the Class A1 Notes' par
coverage improved to 314.94% from 187.37% since the last rating
action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest trustee
report dated January 25, 2013, the Senior Principal Coverage Test
and Senior Subordinate Coverage Test are reported at 146.14%
(limit 125.00%) and 65.3% (limit 104.85%), respectively, versus
July 26, 2011 levels of 110.73% and 55.84%, respectively.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in Moody's rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par of $123 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$94.25 million, a weighted average default probability of 20.82%
(implying a WARF of 1024), Moody's Asset Correlation of 24.18%,
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In
addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

MM Community Funding IX, Ltd., issued on April 2003, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q3-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 200 points from the
base case of 1024, the model-implied rating of the senior notes is
one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if the WARF
is decreased by 104 points, the model-implied rating of the senior
notes is one notch better than the base case result.

In addition, Moody's also performed one additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. Moody's ran alternative default-timing
profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a large spike
in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis:

Class A-1 Notes: +1

Class A-2 Notes: +2

Class B-1 Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as Moody's outlook on the banking
sector remains negative, although there have been some recent
signs of stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues
to decline in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the
previously deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their
trust preferred securities.


MORGAN STANLEY: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $14.5MM Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Morgan Stanley Investment Management Croton, Ltd.:

US$4,000,000 Class B Fixed Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$14,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$175,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balance of $100,863,417.39), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 (current
outstanding balance of $28,818,119.24), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$14,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2
(sf)

US$4,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018,
Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on September 6, 2011 Confirmed at
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in September 2011. Moody's notes that the Class
A Notes have been paid down by approximately 41% or $88.9 million
since the last rating action. Based on the latest trustee report
dated February 5, 2013, the Senior Overcollateralization and
Mezzanine Overcollateralization tests are reported at 128.15% and
106.21%, respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 117.8% and
104.3%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio includes a number of
investments in securities that mature after the maturity date of
the notes. Based on the February 2013 trustee report, securities
that mature after the maturity date of the notes currently make up
approximately 15% of the underlying portfolio. These investments
potentially expose the notes to market risk in the event of
liquidation at the time of the notes' maturity.

Moody's notes that these actions also reflect a correction to
Moody's modeling of assets that mature after the CLO's legal
maturity. Due to an input error, at the time of the September 2011
rating action Moody's modeled asset exposure at 2.4% rather than
12.1%. The modeling has now been corrected.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $186.5 million,
defaulted par of $7.8 million, a weighted average default
probability of 16.81% (implying a WARF of 2581), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.81%, and a diversity
score of 52. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Morgan Stanley Investment Management Croton, Ltd issued in
December 2005, is a collateralized loan obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2065)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: 0

Class B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: 0

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3097)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: 0

Class B: -1

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value.


MORGAN STANLEY 2000-LIFE2: Moody's Keeps 'C' Rating on Cl. L Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes and
affirmed two classes of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Trust
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-LIFE2
as follows:

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrades of Classes J and K are based on the performance of
the single remaining loan in the pool.

The rating of Class L is based on realized losses the class has
experienced from liquidation of specially serviced loans and thus
is affirmed. The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent
with the expected credit performance of its referenced classes and
thus is affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss plus realized
losses decrease to 2.4% of the original pooled balance from 3.1%
at last review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000. The methodology used in rating Class X was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 1 compared to 2 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 15, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $19.5
million from $765.3 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by one mortgage loan.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $17.9 million (22% loss severity on
average).

The sole loan in the pool is the 825 Seventh Avenue Loan ($19.5
million -- 100% of the pool), which is secured by a 165,000 square
foot (SF) office building located in Midtown Manhattan. The
building is 100% leased to two tenants, Young Rubicam Inc. (82% of
the net rentable area (NRA); lease expiration in April 2015) and
International Merchandising Corporation (18% of the NRA; lease
expiration in November 2013). Young & Rubicam Inc. will take over
Merchandising Corporation's lease in December 2013, having already
extended the lease to April 2015. Due to the tenant concentration
risk and near-term loan maturity, Moody's analysis incorporates a
lit/dark approach. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 33% and
3.15X, respectively, compared to 36% and 2.84X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. F Certs to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of two classes,
affirmed three classes and downgraded the ratings of three classes
of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-TOP3 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2001 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 9, 2007 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. D, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2012 B3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Ratings Rationale:

On December 14, 2012, Moody's placed three classes on review for
possible downgrade. Classes C and D were placed on watch due to
the concern that these investment-grade classes could be exposed
to a spike in interest shortfalls caused by the Master Servicer
clawing back principal and interest advances from a specially
serviced loan that had been deemed non-recoverable. In the same
rating action, Class X-1, the IO tranche, was placed on watch due
the potential that a rating action would affect the WARF of the
referenced tranches.

This review concludes the action.

The confirmations and affirmations are due to key parameters,
including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio  and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges. The Master Servicer has indicated that at this
time it does not anticipate clawing back advances on any specially
serviced loans, which could cause interest shortfalls to
potentially increase beyond Class F. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The downgrades of Classes E and F are due to higher than
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans. The downgrade of
Class X-1, the IO tranche, is due to a decrease in the credit
quality of its referenced tranches.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.4% of
the current balance. At last review, Moody's base expected loss
was 11.3%. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
5.9% of the original pooled balance compared to 5.5% at last
review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit support
for the principal classes could decline below their current
levels. If future performance materially declines, credit support
may be insufficient to support the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X-1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, the same as at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated December 14, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $123.5
million from $1.03 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 39% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 84% of the pool. Three loans, representing 3% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Seven loans, representing 16% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated since securitization,
generating an aggregate loss of $42.7 million (34% average loss
severity). Currently, there are three loans in special servicing,
representing approximately 14% of the pool balance. The largest
specially serviced loan is the Gwynedd Corporate Center Buildings
1& 2 Loan ($7.98 million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by
two suburban offices totaling 80,000 square feet (SF) in North
Wales, Pennsylvania. The loan was transferred to special servicing
January 2012 for imminent monetary default. The Borrower was not
able to secure re-financing prior to the March 2012 maturity date.
Per the special servicer, the current occupancy is 47%.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the NexPak Duluth
Loan ($6.78 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
221,000 SF industrial property in Duluth, Georgia. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in January 2010 for payment
default, became real estate owned (REO) in March 2011 and was
deemed non-recoverable in July 2012. The property is 100% vacant.

The remaining specially serviced loan, representing 2.3% of the
pool, is also REO. As of the February 2013 remittance statement,
the master servicer has recognized an aggregate $7.32 million
appraisal reduction for all of the specially serviced loans.
Moody's estimates an aggregate loss of $12.5 million (71% expected
loss) for all three loans in specially servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, representing 6% of the pool, and has estimated a
$2.4 million loss (30% expected loss based on a 75% probability
default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 96% and 86% of the pool's non-specially
serviced and non-defeased loans, respectively. Excluding defeased,
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 77% compared to 78% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 30% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Excluding defeased, specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCRs are 1.19X and 1.65X, essentially the
same at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net
cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.

Based on the most recent remittance statement, Classes F through N
have experienced $3.77 million in cumulative interest shortfalls
compared to $3.56 million at last review. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, ASERs and extraordinary trust expenses.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 54% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 140 Kendrick Street Loan ($47.7
million -- 38.4% of the pool), which is secured by three Class A
suburban office buildings located in Needham, Massachusetts. The
sponsors are Boston Properties and New York State Common
Retirement Fund. The buildings total 381,000 SF. As of January
2013, the collateral was 84% leased to Parametric Technology
Corporation through November 2022. Due to tenant concentration
risk, Moody's valuation reflects a lit/dark analysis. The loan
matures in July 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and
1.15X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.14X at Moody's last
review.

The second largest loan is the Omnicom Building Loan ($10.7
million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by 111,000 SF
office building located in Marina Del Ray, California. The
building is 100% leased to Omnicom Group, Inc (senior unsecured
rating Baa1, stable outlook) through June 2015. Omnicom is a
global adverting and corporate communications firm. Due to tenant
concentration risk, Moody's valuation reflects a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64% and 1.64X,
essentially the same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Page Avenue Loan ($7.9 million --
6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a two-building industrial
property, totaling 99,000 SF, located in Fremont, California. As
of June 2012, the properties were 50% leased. Gemfire, which
leased 50% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated at its lease
expiration in April 2011. The largest tenant, Bradley Nameplate
Corporation, which leases 28% of NRA, is currently on a month-to-
month basis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 201% and 0.54X,
respectively, compared to 203% and 0.53X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ13: S&P Puts 6 Cert. Classes on CreditWatch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on six
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13 on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
is a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

The negative CreditWatch placements reflect S&P's expectations
that these classes will likely experience additional interest
shortfalls because the master servicer intends to increase its
recovery of outstanding servicer advances on The Pier at Caesars
real estate owned (REO) asset.  On Aug. 24, 2012, the master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo), determined that
future advances on this asset would be nonrecoverable.  According
to the master servicer, the current outstanding advances total
approximately $11.0 million.

It is S&P's understanding that Wells Fargo expects to increase its
recovery of outstanding servicer advances as early as next month.
According to Wells Fargo, after discussions with the special
servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC (C-III), the increased
recoveries follow an unexpected, significant decline in the value
of the asset compared with the reported June 7, 2012, appraised
value.  Standard & Poor's believes that there will likely be a
significant increase in interest shortfalls and an eventual loss
to the trust upon the liquidation of the asset due to this
valuation decline.

As of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance report, the
transaction collateral comprised 65 mortgage loans and one REO
asset.  Based on information received from C-III, there are seven
($165.9 million, 22.3%) assets with the special servicer,
including The Pier at Caesars asset.

The Pier at Caesars asset is the largest asset in the pool and has
a trust balance of $80.5 million (10.8%).  The total reported
exposure as of the Feb. 15, 2013, trustee remittance was
$91.5 million, which includes $11.0 million of servicer advances.
The asset consists of a leasehold interest in a 294,611-sq.-ft.
retail and entertainment center in Atlantic City, N.J.  The loan
was transferred to the special servicer on Oct. 15, 2009, due to
imminent payment default and the property became REO on October
28, 2011.  According to the Dec. 31, 2012, rent roll, the property
was 58.5% occupied. C-III reported that net operating income was
not sufficient to cover debt service for the year ended Dec. 31,
2011.

S&P will resolve its CreditWatch negative placements after further
discussions with the master and special servicers, and as more
information regarding this asset becomes available.  If S&P
subsequently lower its rating on class A-2 below 'AA- (sf)', it
will withdraw its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates in accordance with S&P's IO criteria.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2007-HQ13
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates

       Rating               Rating
Class  To                   From      Credit enhancement (%)
A-1A   A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)          32.22
A-2    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA(sf)          32.22
A-3    A+ (sf)/Watch Neg    A+ (sf)          32.22
A-M    BB- (sf)/Watch Neg   BB- (sf)         18.23
A-J    CCC (sf)/Watch Neg   CCC (sf)          8.44
B      CCC- (sf)/Watch Neg  CCC- (sf)         6.00


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-ALTM: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2013-ALTM's $160.0 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-ALTM.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one 12-year, $160 million commercial
mortgage loan secured by the fee interest in Altamonte Mall and
the accompanying leases, rent, and other income.  Altamonte Mall
is a 1.16 million-sq.-ft regional mall located in Altamonte
Springs, Fla.  Of the total mall square footage, 636,566 sq. ft.
will serve as the loan's collateral.

The ratings are based on information as of March 14, 2013.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the
transaction's structure.  Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has
determined that the loan has a beginning and ending loan-to-value
ratio of 76.3% and 65.7%, respectively, based on Standard & Poor's
value.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1355.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2013-ALTM

Class         Rating(i)            Amount (mil. $)
A-1           AAA (sf)                        22.5
A-2           AAA (sf)                        74.4
X-A           AAA (sf)                    96.9(ii)
B             AA- (sf)                        21.0
C             A- (sf)                         15.7
D             BBB- (sf)                       19.3
E             BB+ (sf)                         7.1

  (i)  The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
       institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the
       Securities Act of 1933.
(ii)  Notional balance.
NR - Not rated.
N/A - Not applicable.


MOUNTAIN CAPITAL VI: Moody's Lifts Rating on $11MM Notes to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd.:

US$301,500,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Notes Due April 25,
2019, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 23, 2011
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

US$24,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Notes Due April 25,
2019, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on September 23, 2011
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

US$18,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due
April 25, 2019, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 23,
2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

US$11,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Junior Notes Due
April 25, 2019, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on September 23,
2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$15,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due
April 25, 2019, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on September 23,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread compared to the levels
assumed at the last rating action in September 2011. Moody's
modeled a spread of 3.80% compared to 2.61% at the time of the
last rating action. Moody's also notes that the deal has benefited
from improvements in the weighted average recovery rate of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in September
2011. In February 2013 the trustee reported a weighted average
recovery rate of 51.12% versus 50.18% in August 2011.

Notwithstanding the improvement in the weighted average spread and
weighted average recovery rate, Moody's notes that the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio has deteriorated since the
last rating action. Based on the February 2013 trustee report, the
weighted average rating factor is currently 2705 compared to 2567
in August 2011. In addition, Moody's notes that the underlying
portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the maturity date of the notes. Based on the February
2013 trustee report, securities that mature after the maturity
date of the notes currently make up approximately 5.89% of the
underlying portfolio. These investments potentially expose the
notes to market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $378.8 million,
defaulted par of $2.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.51% (implying a WARF of 2839), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 51.01%, and a diversity
score of 67. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Mountain Capital CLO VI Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2271)

Class A: 0

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3407)

Class A: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: 0

Class E: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes an asset's terminal value upon
liquidation at maturity to be equal to the lower of an assumed
liquidation value (depending on the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities) and the asset's current
market value. However, actual long-dated asset exposure and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the extent of the deal's realized losses, if any, from long-
dated assets.


NAUTIQUE FUNDING: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Nautique Funding Ltd.:

US$7,500,000 Class A-2B Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 14, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf);

US$23,000,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 14, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf).

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$310,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020
(current balance of $298,311,966), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on September 14, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$40,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020
(current balance of $38,491,867), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 14, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$67,500,000 Class A-2A Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2020
(current balance of $64,672,250), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
September 14, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$20,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinate Notes due 2020, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on
September 14, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$10,000,000 Class B-2 Floating Rate Deferrable Senior
Subordinate Notes due 2020, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on
September 14, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

US$31,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes due 2020, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on September 14,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

US$12,700,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Senior Subordinate
Notes due 2020, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on September 14, 2011
Upgraded to B1 (sf);

US$12,500,000 Class P Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Baa2 (sf);
previously on June 22, 2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in April 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread and diversity levels
compared to the levels assumed at the last rating action in
September 2011. The modeled spread was assumed to be 3.89% versus
2.81% at the last rating action. The diversity score was assumed
to be 82 versus 70 at the last rating action. Moody's also notes
that the transaction's reported overcollateralization ratios and
credit quality metrics are stable since the last rating action.

The affirmation on the Class P Notes reflects the rating of the
underlying Class P EMTN Component, which consists of $12.5 million
in face value of Citigroup Funding Inc. zero coupon Euro Medium
Term Notes due April 29, 2016, currently rated Baa2.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $520.9 million,
defaulted par of $21.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 20.14% (implying a WARF of 2658), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 49.65%, and a diversity
score of 82. The default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Nautique Funding Ltd., issued in April 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2126)

Class A-1A: 0
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2A: 0
Class A-2B: 0
Class A-3: +1
Class B-1: +2
Class B-2: +2
Class C: +1
Class D: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3190)

Class A-1A: 0
Class A-1B: 0
Class A-2A: 0
Class A-2B: -1
Class A-3: -2
Class B-1: -1
Class B-2: -1
Class C: -1
Class D: -2

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


PNC MORTGAGE 2000-C1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Class H CMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the rating of one class and
affirmed three classes of PNC Mortgage Acceptance Corporation
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2000-C1 as
follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Confirmed
at A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations for the two principal bonds are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index (Herf), remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The upgrade for the one principal bond is due to increased credit
subordination resulting from payoffs and amortization.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.2% of the
current pooled balance compared to 28.3% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.7% of the
original pooled balance compared to 6.2% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Interest-Only Security was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February
2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the rating of
Class X.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score (Herf), a measure of loan level diversity, is a
primary determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater
impact on senior certificates. Other concentrations and
correlations may be considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the
model pooled credit enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf),
the remaining conduit classes are either interpolated between
these two data points or determined based on a multiple or ratio
of either of these two data points. For fusion deals, the credit
enhancement for loans with investment-grade credit assessments is
melded with the conduit model credit enhancement into an overall
model result. Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the
credit assessment of the loan which corresponds to a range of
credit enhancement levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels
are selected based on loan level diversity, pool leverage and
other concentrations and correlations within the pool. Negative
pooling, or adding credit enhancement at the credit assessment
level, is incorporated for loans with similar credit assessments
in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10, the same as at last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 15, 2012.

Deal Performance

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $23.2
million from $801 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 74% of
the pool. Four loans, representing 16% of the pool, have been
defeased and are collateralized with U.S. Government Securities.

Three loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Forty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $52 million (36% average loss
severity). There are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 27% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.3 million aggregate loss from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 80% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 38% compared to 67% at
last review. The conduit portion of the pool excludes troubled and
defeased loans. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average
haircut of 16% to the most recently available net operating
income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 10.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.61X and 3.18X,
respectively, compared to 1.23X and 2.01X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 36% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Hampton Inn Maple Grove Loan
($2.9 million-13% of the pool), which is secured by a 120-key
limited service hotel located in Maple Grove, Minnesota. Occupancy
and revenue per available room (RevPAR) as of December 2012 were
65% and $68.98, respectively, compared to 68% and $68.86 as of
December 2011. The loan amortizes over a 25-year schedule. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 47% and 2.78X, respectively, compared to
46% and 2.58X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Las Lomas Apartments
Loan ($2.9 million-12% of the pool), which is secured by a 231
unit apartment complex located in Dallas, Texas. The property was
73% occupied as of December 2012. Property performance has
struggled due to low occupancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
188% and 0.6X, respectively compared to 202% and 0.5X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Quality Inn Sports Complex Loan
($2.5 million-11% of the pool), which is secured by a 142-key
limited service hotel located in Lyndhurst, New Jersey. The
property incurred major damage from Hurricane Sandy. The property
has struggled to perform due to low occupancy.

Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 135% and 0.45X.


PREFERRED TERM VIII: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securites VIII, Ltd.:

  US$225,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due January
  3, 2033 (current balance of $45,101,721), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
  previously on May 23, 2012 Upgraded to A3 (sf);

  US$100,800,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due January
  3, 2033, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2012
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

  US$58,000,000 Floating Rate Class B-1 Mezzanine Notes due
  January 3, 2033 (current balance of $63,779,628), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on December 22, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$30,700,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-2 Mezzanine Notes due
  January 3, 2033 (current balance of $33,356,637), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on December 22, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf);

  US$75,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class B-3 Mezzanine Notes due
  January 3, 2033 (current balance of $81,490,155), Affirmed C
  (sf); previously on December 22, 2009 Downgraded to C (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of Class A-1 Senior Notes and
an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios
since the last rating action in May 2012.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 Senior Notes have been paid down
by approximately 56% or $58 million since the last rating action,
due to diversion of excess interest proceeds and disbursement of
principal proceeds from redemptions of underlying assets. As a
result of this deleveraging, the Class A-1 Senior Notes' par
coverage improved to 371.60% from 194.28% since the last rating
action, as calculated by Moody's. Based on the latest trustee
report dated December 28, 2012, the Senior Principal Coverage Test
and the Class B Mezzanine Principal Coverage Test are reported at
113.25% (limit 128.00%), and 52.53% (limit 103.00%), respectively,
versus March 28, 2012 levels of 97.72% and 52.65%, respectively.
Going forward, the Class A-1 Senior Notes will continue to benefit
from the diversion of excess interest and the proceeds from future
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

Moody's also notes that the deal benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's
calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to
937 compared to 997 as of the last rating action date. The total
par amount that Moody's treated as defaulted or deferring declined
to $197.0 million compared to $214.5 million as of the last rating
action date.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in its rating methodology, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, Moody's Asset Correlation, and weighted average recovery
rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its
base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have
a performing par and principal proceeds balance of $167.6 million,
defaulted/deferring par of $197.0 million, a weighted average
default probability of 19.50% (implying a WARF of 937), Moody's
Asset Correlation of 27.72%, and a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 10%. In addition to the quantitative factors that
are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating
committee considerations. Moody's considers the structural
protections in the transaction, the risk of triggering an Event of
Default, recent deal performance under current market conditions,
the legal environment, and specific documentation features. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Preferred Term Securities VIII, Ltd issued on December 2002, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities.

The portfolio of this CDO is mainly comprised of trust preferred
securities (TruPS) issued by small to medium sized U.S. community
banks that are generally not publicly rated by Moody's. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS without public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc model, an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive their credit scores. Moody's evaluation of
the credit risk for a majority of bank obligors in the pool relies
on FDIC financial data reported as of Q3-2012.

Moody's also evaluates the sensitivity of the rated transaction to
the volatility of the credit estimates, as described in Moody's
Rating Implementation Guidance "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

The transaction's portfolio was modeled using CDOROM v.2.8 to
develop the default distribution from which the Moody's Asset
Correlation parameter was obtained. This parameter was then used
as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

Moody's performed a number of sensitivity analyses of the results
to certain key factors driving the ratings. Moody's analyzed the
sensitivity of the model results to changes in the portfolio WARF
(representing an improvement or a deterioration in the credit
quality of the collateral pool), assuming that all other factors
are held equal. If the WARF is increased by 166 points from the
base case of 937, the model-implied rating of the Class A-1 Senior
Notes is one notch worse than the base case result. Similarly, if
the WARF is decreased by 106 points, the model-implied rating of
the Class A-1 Senior Notes is one notch better than the base case
result.

In addition, Moody's also performed two additional sensitivity
analyses as described in the Special Comment "Sensitivity Analyses
on Deferral Cures and Default Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs"
published in August 2012. In the first, Moody's gave par credit to
banks that are deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy
specific credit criteria and thus have a strong likelihood of
resuming interest payments. Under this sensitivity analysis,
Moody's gave par credit to $15 million of bank TruPS. In the
second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative default-
timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood of a
large spike in defaults.

Summary of the impact on all rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notches' difference versus the current model output,
where a positive difference corresponds to lower expected loss),
assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Sensitivity Analysis 1:

Class A-1: +2
Class A-2: +3
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class B-3: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2:

Class A-1: +1
Class A-2: +1
Class B-1: 0
Class B-2: 0
Class B-2: 0

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as its outlook on the banking sector
remains negative, although there have been some recent signs of
stabilization. The pace of FDIC bank failures continues to decline
in 2013 compared to the last few years, and some of the previously
deferring banks have resumed interest payment on their trust
preferred securities.


PRUDENTIAL COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Class J Certs to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three classes and affirmed seven
classes of Prudential Commercial Mortgage Trust 2003-PWR1
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are a result of losses incurred and the increased
likelihood of losses to the already distressed classes. The
affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancements that offset
increasing loan concentrations and adverse selection with only
seven loans remaining.

Fitch modeled losses of 22.3% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.4%, including losses
already incurred. The pool has experienced $37.6 million (3.9% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Fitch has
designated six loans (94.4%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes five specially serviced assets (47.2%).

As of the February 2013 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93.4% to $63.4 million from
$960 million at issuance. No loans are currently defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes H through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-serviced
loan (22.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 112,861-sf
anchored retail center located in Bolingbrook, IL. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2012 due to monetary
default after its largest tenant, Borders (22.2%), vacated the
property in April 2011. The special servicer has appointed a
receiver and reports the property will be marketed for sale in
late March 2013.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is the Brandywine
Office Building & Garage loan (47.2%), which is secured by a
405,844-sf office building with a 660 parking space garage located
in Wilmington, DE. The modified loan included a $15.1 million
write-off of principal; an interest rate reduction with periodic
rate increases until December 2015; and interest-only payments
until maturity. The property has continued to suffer from poor
performance due to low occupancy and deteriorating cash flows. The
servicer reported the property's debt service coverage ratio was
0.78x as of third-quarter 2012. As per the property's rent roll,
and reported vacancies and renewals from the servicer, the
expected occupancy at the end of first-quarter 2013 is
approximately 40%.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a real estate
owned asset (10.6%), which is secured by a 107,259-sf office
building located in Spokane, WA. The loan transferred to special
servicing in June 2011 for monetary default. The special servicer
reports that the property is 70% occupied and 88% leased. The
property has legal issues involving to several adjacent buildings
regarding parking at the site. The special servicer reports that
the parking issues must be resolved before marketing it for sale.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook of the remaining investment grade class is
Stable. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to downgrades as losses are realized. The
Outlook for the 'BB' rated class F remains Negative due to the
high volume of specially serviced assets in a highly concentrated
pool where prolonged workouts and expenses may result in a
downgrade.

Fitch downgrades these classes and assigns or revises Recovery
Estimates (REs):

-- $12 million class G to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 100%;
-- $16.8 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 30%;
-- $3.1 million class J to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes:

-- $11.1 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.6 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.8 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C and X-2 certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1 certificates.


REALT 2005-2: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating 3 Certificate Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 16 classes of
Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-1, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2005 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio  and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The ratings of the IO Classes, Classes XC-1 and XC-2 are
consistent with the expected credit performance of their
referenced classes and thus are affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance compared to 2.3% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is 1.3% of the securitized
balance, down from 1.6% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Canadian CMBS" published in May 2000.
The methodology used in rating Interest-Only Securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the ratings of Classes XC-1 and XC-2.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 26 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 12, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 42% to $363.1
million from $622.0 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 61 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 54%
of the pool. Six loans, representing 3% of the pool, have defeased
and are collateralized with Canadian Government securities. Three
loans, representing 9% of the pool, have investment grade credit
assessments.

Twelve loans, representing 19% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization,
resulting in an aggregate $145,000 loss (7% loss severity on
average). There are currently no loans in special servicing.
Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans representing 3% of the pool and has estimated a
$1.6 million loss (15% expected loss based on a 50% probability
default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2010 and 2011 operating
results for 88% and 95% of the performing pool respectively.
Excluding troubled loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 78%
compared to 84% at last full review. Moody's net cash flow
reflects a weighted average haircut of 7% to the most recently
available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Excluding troubled loans, Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs are
1.48X and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.28X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Toronto Congress
Centre Loan ($15.9 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a 500,000 square foot (SF) convention center located in
Mississauga, Ontario. The property is 100% leased to an affiliate
of the borrower through December 2018. Property performance has
improved since last review. The loan is full recourse to sponsor
Sofinco Properties Inc. Moody's current credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Aa3 and 1.74X, respectively, compared to Aa3 and
1.65X at Moody's last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 1849 Yonge Street
Loan ($12.9 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
97,100 SF office building located in downtown Toronto, Ontario.
The property's tenant roster predominantly consists of medical
office tenants and was 92% leased as of July 2012, the same as at
last review. Property performance has remained stable. The loan is
full recourse to sponsor Healthcare Properties Holdings. Moody's
current credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.54X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.50X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Jutland Road Loan
($5.4 million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is secured by an 87,900
SF office building located in Victoria, British Columbia. Ninety
percent of the net rentable area (NRA) is leased to agencies of
the Canadian government through 2014-2017. As of December 2011,
the property was 100% leased, the same as at last review. The loan
is full recourse to sponsor Jawl Holdings. The loan is benefiting
from stable performance and loan amortization. Moody's current
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 2.15X,
respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.87X at Moody's last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the AMEC Building Loan ($31.5 million --
8.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 222,300 SF Class A office
building located in downtown Vancouver, British Columbia. AMEC, a
project management/consulting firm, leases 65% of the net rentable
area (NRA) and extended its lease maturity from 2015 to 2020. As
of February 2012, the property was 100% leased, the same as at
last review. Property performance has improved due to scheduled
amortization. The loan is full recourse to sponsor Morguard REIT.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.61X, respectively,
compared to 65% and 1.42X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Kitchener Portfolio Loan ($26.7
million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by two office
properties totaling 400,200 SF and located in Kitchener, Ontario.
As of December 2011, the properties were 96% leased compared to
93% at last review. The loan is benefiting from amortization and
is full recourse to sponsor The Cora Group. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 56% and 1.83X, respectively, compared to 65% and
1.57X at last review.

The third largest loan is the InnVest Portfolio Loan ($26.6
million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by four Radisson
hotels totaling 707 rooms and located in four distinct markets.
The loans Radisson Suites Toronto and Radisson London are on the
master servicer's watchlist due to DSCR falling below CREFC's
threshold as a result of declining revenue from low occupancy.
However, performance has improved slightly since last review. The
hotel's occupancy rate and revenue per available room (RevPAR) for
calendar year 2011 were 61% and $66, respectively, compared to 56%
and $61 for 2010. The loans are full recourse to the sponsor
Invest REIT. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and 1.15X,
respectively, compared to 111% and 1.12X at last review.


RFC CDO 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on 6 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of RFC CDO 2006-1, Ltd./LLC
reflecting Fitch's base case loss expectation of 66.8%. Fitch's
performance expectation incorporates prospective views regarding
commercial real estate market value and cash flow declines, and
factors in concerns regarding the outsourced third party
collateral management of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO).
Further, the proposed termination of the CDO's two swaps would not
adversely impact the ratings of the transaction.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect portfolio performance consistent with
Fitch's expectation at the last rating action in September 2012,
sufficient credit enhancement relative to Fitch-modeled losses,
and cash flow model results consistent with the assigned ratings.
Since Fitch's last rating action in September 2012, the CDO
liabilities have paid down by an additional $8.8 million; total
paydown since issuance is $356.3 million (59% of the original
transaction balance). The recent paydowns were due to the
repayment of one loan, the amortization of several other assets,
and the diversion of interest proceeds as a result of all
overcollateralization (OC) and interest coverage test failures.

In February 2013, the collateral asset manager notified Fitch of a
proposal to fully terminate the two remaining swaps in the
transaction. The swaps have current notional balances of $43.7
million and $26.95 million, and mature in 2018 and 2016,
respectively.

The proposed termination of both swaps would lower the risk of the
transaction entering an Event of Default (EOD) caused by an
inability to pay timely interest on the class A-1, A-2, and B
notes. Due to the significant out-of-the money hedge payment
liability from the two swaps and the high percentage of defaulted
and credit-impaired collateral, the CDO had insufficient interest
proceeds to pay the full hedge payment liability as of the
February 2013 distribution date. As a result, principal proceeds
were applied to pay the balance of the hedge payment liability and
the interest due on the timely classes. Further, due to the
concentrated and adversely selected nature of the remaining
collateral, the margin of available total monthly proceeds over
the amount needed to pay the swap payments and the timely interest
payments is thin. Any further reduction or disruption in interest
or principal amounts received by the CDO could result in an EOD.
The termination of the swaps would eliminate the swap payments and
thereby allow more proceeds to be available for the timely
interest due.

The current inflow of interest and principal proceeds is
insufficient to pay the estimated proposed swap termination
amount. The collateral asset manager has proposed to use proceeds
from the discounted payoff (DPO) of one loan (10.4% of pool),
which is expected to close by the end of month. The collateral
asset manager has provided a 'good faith' estimate of the
termination amount as the actual amount is dependent upon market
conditions at the time of execution. As a result of using DPO
proceeds to terminate the swap rather than principal distribution
proceeds, the class A-1 could remain outstanding longer, but the
credit expectation for the class would not be impaired. Fitch
therefore concludes that the proposed swap terminations would not
result in the downgrade of any class of notes.

Fitch is not a party to the transaction and therefore does not
provide consent or approval, as that remains the sole preserve of
the transaction parties. Fitch expects to be notified by the
trustee when or if the proposed swap terminations are completed.

As of the February 2013 trustee report and per Fitch
categorizations, the CDO was substantially invested as follows:
whole loans (43.4%), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS:
31.7%), commercial real estate (CRE) mezzanine debt (24.8%), and
principal cash (0.1%). Defaulted assets and Fitch Loans of
Concern, combined, currently comprise 76.8% of the pool compared
to 67.4% at Fitch's last rating action. Further, the trustee
classifies 70% of the collateral pool as impaired. The weighted
average rating of the CMBS bonds remain at 'CCC+/CCC'.

Under Fitch's methodology, approximately 81.1% of the portfolio is
modeled to default in the base case stress scenario, defined as
the 'B' stress. In this scenario, the modeled average cash flow
decline is 7% from, generally, year-end 2012. Fitch estimates that
average recoveries will be low at 17.6% due to the concentration
of defaulted assets, subordinate debt positions, and speculative
grade-rated CMBS bonds.

The largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is the
modeled loss on the CMBS portion of the collateral (31.7%) where
the majority of the ratings are speculative grade.

The second largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a whole loan (16.4%) secured by a 72-room boutique hotel
located in the Times Square area of New York City. In 2012, the
loan was restructured whereby the loan maturity was extended to
2019 and the loan was bifurcated into an A-Note, B-Note, and Hope
Note. Current property cash flows remain significantly below
issuance expectations. Planned hotel upgrades, which are expected
to help bolster property cash flow, have been delayed until April
2013, according to the collateral asset manager. Fitch modeled a
substantial loss in its base case scenario.

The third largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation
is a mezzanine loan (9.9%) secured by an interest in a 575-room
full-service hotel located in Tucson, Arizona. Fitch modeled a
full loss on this highly leveraged position in its base case
scenario.

This transaction was analyzed according to the 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs and CMBS Large Loan Floating-Rate
Transactions', which applies stresses to property cash flows and
debt service coverage ratio tests to project future default levels
for the underlying portfolio. Recoveries for the loan assets are
based on stressed cash flows and Fitch's long-term capitalization
rates. Defaults and recoveries for the CMBS assets were analyzed
in Fitch's Portfolio Credit Model, as described in the report,
'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. The blended
default levels of the loan and CMBS assets were then compared to
the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow model of the
CDO under the various default timing and interest rate stress
scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria for Cash
Flow Analysis in CDOs'. Based on this analysis, the breakeven
rates for class A-1 are generally consistent with the rating
assigned below. A Stable Outlook was assigned based on the class'
senior position in the structure and cushion in the modeling.

The 'CCC' and below ratings assigned to classes A-2 through K are
based on a deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case
loss expectation for the pool and the current percentage of
defaulted assets and Fitch Loans of Concern factoring in
anticipated recoveries relative to each classes credit
enhancement, as well as the likelihood for OC tests to cure.

RFC 2006-1 is a commercial real estate CDO. The transaction exited
its reinvestment period in April 2011. The CDO's asset manager is
Realty Finance Corp. (RFC). As stated in a public press release in
February 2011, RFC entered into an agreement to outsource its
asset management functions for the CDO to Waldron H. Rand &
Company, P.C. (Waldron). Waldron is an accounting firm with real
estate experience and its capabilities are consistent with the
current ratings assigned to the notes of the transaction. The
transaction was formerly known as CBRE Realty Finance CDO 2006-1,
Ltd./LLC.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

If the CDO collateral recoveries are better than expected, Fitch
may consider upgrades to the senior classes, with upgrades limited
due to the risk of adverse selection. While Fitch has modeled
conservative loss expectations on the pool, unanticipated
increases in defaulted loans and/or loss severity could result in
downgrades.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

-- $18.7 million class A-1 at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33 million class A-2 at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $34.5 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 30%;
-- $15 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $13.5 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $9 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $10.5 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $13.5 million class G a at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.5 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $20.3 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.


SALOMON BROTHERS 2001-C2: Moody's Cuts Cl. J Certs Rating to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four classes
of Salomon Brothers Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2001-C2 as follows:

  Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
  Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 9, 2010
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
  Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades of the principal classes are due to higher than
expected losses from the loans in special servicing. The downgrade
of the interest only class, Class X-1, is due to a decline in the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 35% of the
current balance compared to 41% at prior review. Realized losses
have increased to 5.0% of the current balance compared to 3.1% at
the prior review.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. The
decision to take (or not take) a rating action is dependent on an
assessment of a range of factors including, but not exclusively,
the performance metrics.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GPD
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in
February 2012. The Interest-Only Methodology was used for the
rating of X-1.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5 compared to 10 at prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated April 11, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 13, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $26.0
million from $864.7 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 2% to 25% of the pool. One loan, representing 6% of the
pool, has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government securities.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $43.3 million (49% loss severity on
average). Based on the most recent remittance statement, five
loans, representing 68% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan, the Remington
Apartments and Winslow Glen Apartments Portfolio ($6.4 million --
25% of the pool), paid off subsequent to the most recent
reporting. The payoff is reflected in Moody's analysis.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sunrise Trade
Center Loan ($4.8 million -- 19% of the pool), which is secured by
a 71,749 square foot (SF) anchored retail property located in
Rancho Cordova, California. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in September 2011 due to maturity default and became
real estate owned (REO) in April 2012. The property was marketed
in a July 2012 auction, but failed to transact at the reserve
price. The special servicer will market the property again once
stabilization of the property is achieved.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the 550 Airport Road
Hotel Loan ($3.7 million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by
a 150-room hotel located in Fletcher, North Carolina. The hotel is
currently flagged as a Clarion. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2010 for a technical default and then
later in August for maturity default. A receiver was appointed in
September 2011 and performed immediate repairs to the property.
According to the special servicer, the property needs a complete
renovation in order to maintain its flag as a Clarion.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $9.1 million loss for specially
serviced loans (35% expected loss on average).

As of the most recent remittance date, the pool has experienced
cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $2.2 million. Moody's
anticipates that the pool will continue to experience interest
shortfalls caused by specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal subordinate entitlement reductions
(ASERs), extraordinary trust expenses and nonadvancing by the
master servicer based on a determination of non-recoverability.
The servicer has made a determination of non-recoverability for
two of the specially serviced loans.

There are two remaining conduit loans that represent 27% of the
pool. Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and 2012 operating
results for both of these loans. Moody's weighted average LTV for
the performing loans is 27% compared to 32% at Moody's prior
review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut
of 13% to the most recently available net operating income.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCRs for the performing loans are
1.14X and 4.06X, respectively, compared to 1.31X and 3.49X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest performing loan is the Marketplace at Palmdale Loan
($6.4 million -- 25% of the pool), which is secured by a 216,381
SF anchored retail shopping center located in Palmdale,
California. This property is currently 98% leased as of September
2012, the same as prior review. The loan is fully amortizing and
matures in July 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 26% and
4.00X, respectively, compared to 32% and 3.33X at prior review.

The second largest performing loan is the Stanley Court Apartments
Loan ($446,237 --1.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 44-unit
multifamily complex located in Bloomington, Minnesota. This
property is currently 93% leased as of August 2012. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 33% and 3.1X, respectively, compared to 47%
and 2.18X at prior review.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE: Fitch to Rate Class B-4 Certs. at 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2013-4 (SEMT
2013-4) as follows:

-- $220,204,000 class A-1 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220,204,000 class A-2 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $78,897,000 class A-3 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,103,000 class A-4 certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $540,408,000 class A-IO1 notional certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $78,897,000 class A-IO2 notional certificate 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $10,952,000 class B-1 certificate 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,511,000 class B-2 certificate 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,340,000 class B-3 certificate 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,170,000 non-offered class B-4 certificate 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable.

The $6,054,465 non-offered class B-5 certificate will not be rated
by Fitch.

Key Rating Drivers

High-Quality Mortgage Pool: The collateral pool consists primarily
of 30-year fixed-rate fully documented loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles, low leverage, and substantial liquid
reserves. The majority of the loans are fully amortizing, with
only nine loans (2.2% of the pool) having a 10-year interest-only
(IO) period. Third-party loan-level due diligence was conducted on
approximately 92% of the overall pool, and Fitch believes the
results of the review generally indicate strong underwriting
controls.

Originators with Limited Performance History: Approximately 89% of
the pool was originated by lenders with limited non-agency
performance history. While the significant contribution of loans
from these originators is a concern, Fitch believes the lack of
performance history is partially mitigated by the 100% third-party
diligence conducted on these loans that resulted in immaterial
findings. Fitch also considers the credit enhancement (CE) on this
transaction sufficient to mitigate the originator risk.

Geographically Diverse Pool: The overall geographic diversity is
in line with other SEMT transactions. The percentage of the top
three metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) is 25%, the second
lowest concentration to date. The agency applied a 1.05x default
penalty to the pool to account for the geographic concentration
risk.

Transaction Provisions Enhance Performance: As in other recent
SEMT transactions rated by Fitch, SEMT 2013-4 contains binding
arbitration provisions that may serve to provide timely resolution
to representation and warranty disputes. In addition, all loans
that become 120 days or more delinquent will be reviewed for
breaches of representations and warranties.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines
(MVDs) than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) and national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are
only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become
exposed to or be considered in the surveillance of the
transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis on areas where the model
projected lower home price declines than that of the overall
collateral pool. The model currently projects sustainable MVDs
(sMVDs) at the MSA level. For one of the top 10 regions, Fitch's
sustainable home price (SHP) model does not project declines in
home prices and for another, the projected decline is less than
2.00%. These regions are Chicago-Joliet-Naperville in Illinois
(4.2%) and Cambridge-Newton-Framingham in Massachusetts (4.6%).
Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis assuming sMVDs of 10%, 15%,
and 20% compared with those projected by Fitch's SHP model for
these regions. The sensitivity analysis indicated no impact on
ratings for all bonds in each scenario.

Another sensitivity analysis was focused on determining how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 13% for this pool. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.


SHERIDAN SQUARE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Sheridan Square CLO Ltd./Sheridan Square CLO LLC's $661.5 million
floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.3950%-13.8391%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available prior to paying
      uncapped administrative expenses and fees; subordinated
      hedge termination payments; portfolio manager incentive
      fees; and subordinated note payments to principal proceeds
      for the purchase of additional collateral assets during the
      reinvestment period and to reduce the balance of the rated
      notes outstanding, sequentially, after the reinvestment
      period.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1371.pdf

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Sheridan Square CLO Ltd./Sheridan Square CLO LLC

Class                  Rating        Amount (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                  2.8
A-1                    AAA (sf)                  265
A-2                    AAA (sf)                185.8
B-1                    AA (sf)                  39.9
B-2                    AA (sf)                  39.9
C                      A (sf)                  50.05
D                      BBB (sf)                35.35
E                      BB (sf)                  30.8
F                      B (sf)                   11.9
Subordinated notes     NR                     65.834

NR-Not rated.


SOUTH COAST: S&P Lowers Rating on Two Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)'on the class A-2 and A-3 notes from South Coast
Funding V Ltd., a U.S. cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction backed by mezzanine structured finance
securities.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class A-1 notes.

The transaction went into acceleration on Jan. 10, 2013.
Acceleration diverts all available proceeds in the waterfall below
the class A-1 notes' interest to pay down the class A-1 notes
principal.  As a result, the nondeferrable class A-2 and A-3 notes
did not receive their interest due.  Therefore, S&P lowered its
ratings on the class A-2 and A-3 notes to 'D (sf)' according to
its criteria.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class A-1 notes to reflect its
belief that the credit support available is commensurate with the
current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them and take rating actions as
it deem necessary.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

South Coast Funding V Ltd.
                Rating
Class       To          From
A-2         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)
A-3         D (sf)      CCC- (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

South Coast Funding V Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         A (sf)

OTHER RATINGS OUTSTANDING

South Coast Funding V Ltd.

Class       Rating
B           D (sf)
C-1         D (sf)
C-2         D (sf)


UNISON GROUND: Fitch to Rate Class 2013-1 B Notes 'BB-(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Unison Ground Lease Funding Notes
series 2013-1 and 2013-2 and assign Rating Outlooks as follows:

-- $98,000,000 class 2013-1 A 'Asf'; Outlook Stable,
-- $31,000,000 class 2013-1 B 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has issued a presale report on the transaction.

The following classes are being issued but are not rated by Fitch:

-- $13,600,000 class 2013-2 A
-- $4,400,000 class 2013-2 B

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 6, 2013.

The $147 million Unison Ground Lease Funding notes are backed by
612 cellular tower sites with 642 structures leased to 784
cellular tower tenants. The notes are interest only until the
anticipated repayment date (ARD). Security for the notes includes
mortgage liens on sites representing approximately 95% of the
annualized run rate net cash flow (NCF) and a pledge and first-
priority perfected security interest in 100% of the equity
interest of the issuer and the asset entities and is guaranteed by
the direct parent of Unison Holdings, LLC (Unison).

The ownership interest in the cellular sites consists of perpetual
easements, long-term easements, prepaid leases, and fee interests
in land, rooftops, or other structures on which site space is
allocated for placement of tower and wireless communication
equipment.

Key Rating Drivers

High Leverage: Fitch Ratings' NCF on the pool is $11.15 million,
implying a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.22x. The debt multiple relative to Fitch's NCF is 8.60x, which
equates to a debt yield of 11.6%.

Long-Term Easements: The ownership interests in the sites consist
of 92.5% perpetual/long- term (30+ years) easements, 5.7% limited
term easements (less than 30 years), and 1.9% fee.

Prefunding: On the closing date, approximately 24% of the rated
proceeds were deposited into a site acquisition account to be used
by Unison to acquire additional cellular sites during the 12-month
acquisition period. Prefunding introduces uncertainty as to final
collateral characteristics. Fitch accounted for prefunding by
stressing the NCF of the prefunding component to reflect the most
conservative prefunding pool composition tests. Fitch also
performed an originator review to gain comfort with Unison's
origination practices. Additionally, the servicer of this
transaction will be performing certain recalculation of prefunding
requirements outlined in the documents.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch performed several stress scenarios in which Fitch Ratings'
NCF was stressed. Fitch determined that a 55.8% reduction in Fitch
Ratings' NCF would cause the notes to break even at 1.0x DSCR on
an interest-only basis.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the class 2013-1 A ratings and
a 9% decline in NCF would result in a one category downgrade to
'BBBsf', while a 22% decline would result in a downgrade to below
investment-grade. Rating sensitivity was also performed for the
class 2013-1 B notes and an 8% decline in NCF would result in a
one category downgrade to 'B-sf', while a 9% decline would result
in a downgrade below 'CCCsf'. The Rating Sensitivity section in
the presale report includes a detailed explanation of additional
stresses and sensitivities.


VICTORIA FALLS: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on $21MM Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Victoria Falls CLO Ltd.:

US$18,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due February
17, 2017, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 15, 2012
Upgraded to A3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$28,600,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due February 17, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $26,830,855), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on June 15, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$75,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due February 17, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $14,072,126), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$10,000,000 Class A-3 Fixed Rate Notes Due February 17, 2017
(current outstanding balance of $1,876,284), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 11, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf);

US$8,500,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due February 17, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 15, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

US$2,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due February 17, 2017,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 15, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

US$21,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due February
17, 2017 (current outstanding balance of $19,031,190), Affirmed
Ba2 (sf); previously on June 15, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of deleveraging of the senior notes and an
increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios since
the rating action in June 2012. Moody's notes that the Class A-1A
Notes were completely paid down, and the Class A-1B notes were
paid down by approximately 6.2% or $1.8 million, since the last
rating action. Additionally, the Class A-2 and Class A-3 Notes
were collectively paid down by approximately 61.9% or $26 million.
Based on the latest trustee report dated February 11, 2013, the
Class A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 153.8%, 124.3%, and 103.3%, respectively, versus May
2012 levels of 127.7%, 114.0% and 102.4%, respectively. Moody's
notes the reported February overcollateralization ratios do not
reflect the February 19, 2013 payment of $22.5 million to the
Class A Notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par balance of $92.1 million, defaulted par of $3.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 13.35%
(implying a WARF of 2678), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.81%, and a diversity score of 25. The default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

Victoria Falls CLO Ltd., issued in February 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
senior secured loans.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2142)

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3214)

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B-1: 0

Class B-2: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


WACHOVIA BANK 2003-C9: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on five
classes of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's series 2003-C9, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the
same time, S&P removed these ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications, where it placed them on Dec. 26, 2012.
Concurrently, S&P affirmed its 'AAA' ratings on two other classes
from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S and Canadian CMBS.
S&P's analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of
all of the assets in the pool, the transaction structure, and the
liquidity available to the trust.

The downgrades reflect the reduced amount of liquidity support
available to the lowered classes and our expectation that these
classes are susceptible to future interest shortfalls given the
fact that 99.0% of the remaining pool balance matures in 2013.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the principal and interest
certificates to reflect its expectation that the available credit
enhancement for this class will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current outstanding
ratings.  The affirmed rating on this class also reflects the
credit characteristics and performance of the remaining loans, as
well as the transaction-level changes.

The affirmation of our rating on the interest-only (IO)
certificates reflects S&P's current criteria for rating IO
securities.

         STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17-g7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LOWERED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C9

           Rating
Class    To        From              Credit enhancement (%)
B        AA+ (sf)  AAA (sf)/Watch Neg       15.57
C        AA (sf)   AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg       12.68
D        BBB+ (sf) A (sf)/Watch Neg          7.15
E        BB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg        4.74
F        CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         2.09

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-C9

Class    Rating           Credit enhancement (%)
A-4      AAA (sf)                 21.34
X-C      AAA (sf)                   N/A

N/A-Not applicable.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C15: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Certs to 'Csf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven classes
and affirmed nine pooled classes, five non-pooled rake classes and
one interest-only class of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-C15 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 21, 2004
Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2012 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. 175WJ-A, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2007
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 175WJ-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2007
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 175WJ-C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2007
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 175WJ-D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2007
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 175WJ-E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 27, 2007
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrades are due to an increase in expected losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The affirmations of the nine principal bonds are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed DSCR and the Herfindahl Index, remaining within
acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss,
the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are
sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The affirmations of the five rake bonds are due to stable
performance of the underlying collateral, the 175 West Jackson
Loan.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-C, is consistent with the
expected credit performance of its referenced classes and thus is
affirmed.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.0% of the
current pooled balance compared to 4.4% at last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.5% of the
original pooled balance compared to 3.7% at last review.

Depending on the timing of loan payoffs and the severity and
timing of losses from specially serviced loans, the credit
enhancement level for the rated classes could decline below the
current levels. If future performance materially declines, the
expected level of credit enhancement and the priority in the cash
flow waterfall may be insufficient for the current ratings of
these classes.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan payoffs or a decline in subordination due to
realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000. The methodology used in
rating Class X-C was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

CMBS Conduit Model v 2.62 includes an IO calculator, which uses
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19 compared to 16 at Moody's prior review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel based Large Loan Model v 8.5 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through a review
utilizing MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) Reports and a
proprietary program that highlights significant credit changes
that have occurred in the last month as well as cumulative changes
since the last full transaction review. On a periodic basis,
Moody's also performs a full transaction review that involves a
rating committee and a press release. Moody's prior transaction
review is summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $750
million from $1.2 billion at securitization. The total deal
balance is $801 million due to $51 million of rake bonds that are
secured by the B-note on the 175 West Jackson Loan. The
Certificates are collateralized by 71 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans
representing 53% of the pool. Three loans, representing 3% of the
pool, have been defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government Securities. One loan, representing 11% of the pool, has
an investment grade credit assessment.

Twleve loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Three loans have been liquidated at a loss, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $7 million (42% average loss severity).
Two loans, representing less than 3% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Penn's Purchase II Loan ($13M -- 1.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 110,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in
Buckingham Township, Pennsylvania. The property is also encumbered
by a $969 thousand B-Note, which is held outside of the trust. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2009 and has been
in receivership since August 2009. The property was 61% leased as
of December 2012. The servicer's strategy is to stabilize the
property and market it for sale near the end of 2013. The servicer
has recognized a $9 million appraisal reduction for this loan.

The servicer has recognized an aggregate $20 million appraisal
reduction for both specially serviced loans, while Moody's has
estimated a $21 million loss (88% average expected loss severity).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans representing 9% of the pool and has estimated a
$9 million aggregate loss (21% expected loss based on a 50%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial or full year
2012 operating results for 98% and 93% of the pool's non-defeased
loans, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 90%
compared to 94% at Moody's prior review. The conduit portion of
the pool excludes specially serviced, troubled and defeased loans
as well as the loan with a credit assessment. Moody's net cash
flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.26X and 1.06X at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's
actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF
and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Coastal Grand Mall Loan
($79 million -- 10.6% of the pool), which is secured by the
borrower's interest in a 1 million SF regional mall located in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The property is anchored by JC
Penney, Dillard's, Sears and Belk. The property is the dominant
mall in its trade area. As of December 2012, the total mall and
in-line space are 99% and 98% leased, respectively, which is
similar to last review. Moody's credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Baa1 and 1.48X, respectively, which is the same as at
last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the 175 West Jackson Loan ($104 million --
13.9% of the pool), which represents a 50% participation interest
in a $209 million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
1.5 million SF Class A office building located in Chicago's CBD.
The building is also encumbered by a $51 million B-Note, which
serves as collateral for non-pooled Classes 175WJ-A, 175WJ-B,
175WJ-C, 175WJ-D and 175WJ-E. The property was 88% leased as of
January 2013 compared to 95% at last review. Moody's A-Note LTV
and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 69%
and 1.12X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the New Jersey Portfolio Loan
($69 million -- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by four
suburban office properties totaling 575,000 SF located in northern
New Jersey. The portfolio was 83% leased as of 2012 YE compared to
82% at last review. The loan has been on the master servicer's
watchlist since September 2010 due primarily to the
underperformance of one of the properties. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.87X, respectively, compared to 105%
and 0.98X at last review.

The third largest conduit exposure is the ADG Portfolio Loan ($38
million -- 5.1% of the pool), which consists of four cross
collateralized and cross defaulted loans secured by 25
manufactured housing communities located in Wisconsin and
Maryland. There portfolio is also encumbered by a $2 million B-
Note held outside of the trust. The portfolio was 85% leased as of
September 2012, which is the same as at last review. Moody's A-
note LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.23X, respectively,
compared to 83% and 1.13X at last review.


WAMU 2005-AR11: S&P Lowers Rating on Class X Notes to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on Class
X from WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR11
Trust and WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR13
Trust by lowering them to 'CCC (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)'.  In
addition, S&P corrected its rating on Class X from WaMu Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR19 Trust by lowering it
to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)'.

On Feb. 16, 2010, July 15, 2011, and Sept. 4, 2012, S&P
incorrectly reviewed its ratings on Class X from WaMu Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR11 Trust in a manner
consistent with an interest-only class in accordance with S&P's
interest-only criteria.  However, this class contains both
interest-only and principal-only components.  Therefore, the
rating on this class should be consistent with that of a
principal-only class, in which the rating on the class would
generally be the rating on the lowest-rated senior class in the
same structure.  On Feb. 16, 2010, July 15, 2011, and Sept. 4,
2012, the lowest ratings among the senior classes were 'A (sf)',
'BBB- (sf)' and 'CCC (sf)', respectively.  Class X from this
transaction should have reflected these same ratings during those
periods.

On May 18, 2009, July 24, 2009, Feb. 16, 2010, Aug. 11, 2011, and
Sept. 4, 2012, S&P incorrectly reviewed its rating on Class X from
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR13 Trust in
a manner consistent with an interest-only class in accordance with
S&P's interest-only criteria.  However, this class contains both
interest-only and principal-only components.  Therefore, the
rating on this class should be consistent with that of a
principal-only class, in which the rating on the class would
generally match the rating on the lowest-rated senior class in the
same structure.  On May 18, 2009, July 24, 2009, Feb. 16, 2010,
Aug. 11, 2011, and Sept. 4, 2012, the lowest ratings among the
senior classes were 'BB (sf)', 'BB (sf)', 'BB (sf)', 'B- (sf)',
and 'CCC (sf)', respectively. Class X from this transaction should
have reflected these same ratings during those periods.

On April 9, 2009, July 24, 2009, Feb. 16, 2010, July 15, 2011, and
Nov. 9, 2012, S&P incorrectly reviewed its rating on Class X from
WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR19 Trust in
a manner consistent with an interest-only class in accordance with
S&P's interest-only criteria.  However, this class contains both
interest-only and principal-only components.  Therefore, the
rating on this class should be consistent with that of a
principal-only class, in which the rating of the class would
generally match the rating of the lowest-rated senior class in the
same structure.  On Apr. 9, 2009, July 24, 2009, Feb. 16, 2010,
July 15, 2011, and Nov. 9, 2012, the lowest ratings among the
senior classes were 'A (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', 'BBB- (sf)'
and 'CCC (sf)', respectively.  Class X from this transaction
should have reflected these same ratings during those periods.

The underlying collateral for these transactions consist of
negatively amortizing Alternative-A (Alt-A) mortgage loans.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS CORRECTED

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR11 Trust

              Rating
Class    CUSIP          To            From
X        92922F2Q0      CCC (sf)      AA+ (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2005-AR13 Trust
                              Rating
Class    CUSIP          To            From
X        92922F4X3      CCC (sf)      AA+ (sf)

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR19 Trust
                              Rating
Class    CUSIP          To            From
X        92925CBK7      CCC (sf)      BB+ (sf)


WF-RBS 2011-C2: Moody's Keeps Class X-B Certs 'Ba3' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 11 classes of
WF-RBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2011 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmations of the principal classes are due to key
parameters, including Moody's loan to value ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio and the Herfindahl Index,
remaining within acceptable ranges. Based on Moody's current base
expected loss, the credit enhancement levels for the affirmed
classes are sufficient to maintain their current ratings.

The rating of the IO Classes, Class X-A and X-B, are consistent
with the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of $22.4
million or 1.8% of the current balance. At last review, Moody's
base expected loss was $21.8 million or 1.7%. Depending on the
timing of loan payoffs and the severity and timing of losses from
specially serviced loans, the credit enhancement level for
investment grade classes could decline below the current levels.
If future performance materially declines, the expected level of
credit enhancement and the priority in the cash flow waterfall may
be insufficient for the current ratings of these classes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and commercial real estate property markets. Commercial
real estate property values are continuing to move in a modestly
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, a consistent upward trend will not be evident until the
volume of investment activity steadily increases for a significant
period, non-performing properties are cleared from the pipeline,
and fears of a Euro area recession are abated.

The hotel sector is performing strongly with nine straight
quarters of growth and the multifamily sector continues to show
increases in demand with a growing renter base and declining home
ownership. Recovery in the office sector continues at a measured
pace with minimal additions to supply. However, office demand is
closely tied to employment, where growth remains slow and
employers are considering decreases in the leased space per
employee. Also, primary urban markets are outperforming secondary
suburban markets. Performance in the retail sector continues to be
mixed with retail rents declining for the past four years, weak
demand for new space and lackluster sales driven by internet sales
growth. Across all property sectors, the availability of debt
capital continues to improve with robust securitization activity
of commercial real estate loans supported by a monetary policy of
low interest rates.

Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario calls for US GDP
growth for 2013 that is likely to remain close to 2% as the
greater impetus from the US private sector is likely to broadly
offset the drag on activity from more restrictive fiscal policy.
Thereafter, Moody's expects the US economy to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than is likely this year, closer to its long-run
average pace of growth. Risks to Moody's forecasts remain skewed
to the downside despite recent positive developments. Moody's
believes that the three most immediate risks are: i) the risk of a
deeper than currently expected recession in the euro area
accompanied by deeper credit contraction, potentially triggered by
a further intensification of the sovereign debt crisis; ii)
slower-than-expected recovery in major emerging markets following
the recent slowdown; and iii) an escalation of geopolitical
tensions, resulting in adverse economic developments.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in February 2012. The Interest-Only
Methodology was used for the ratings of Class X-A and X-B.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based CMBS
Conduit Model v 2.62 which is used for both conduit and fusion
transactions. Conduit model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are
driven by property type, Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and
Moody's property quality grade (which reflects the capitalization
rate used by Moody's to estimate Moody's value). Conduit model
results at the B2 (sf) level are driven by a paydown analysis
based on the individual loan level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's
Herfindahl score, a measure of loan level diversity, is a primary
determinant of pool level diversity and has a greater impact on
senior certificates. Other concentrations and correlations may be
considered in Moody's analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels at Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the remaining conduit
classes are either interpolated between these two data points or
determined based on a multiple or ratio of either of these two
data points. For fusion deals, the credit enhancement for loans
with investment-grade credit assessments is melded with the
conduit model credit enhancement into an overall model result.
Fusion loan credit enhancement is based on the credit assessment
of the loan which corresponds to a range of credit enhancement
levels. Actual fusion credit enhancement levels are selected based
on loan level diversity, pool leverage and other concentrations
and correlations within the pool. Negative pooling, or adding
credit enhancement at the credit assessment level, is incorporated
for loans with similar credit assessments in the same transaction.

The conduit model includes an IO calculator, which uses the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit assessments; original and current bond balances grossed up
for losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the
transaction; and IO type as defined in the published methodology.
The calculator then returns a calculated IO rating based on both a
target and mid-point. For example, a target rating basis for a
Baa3 (sf) rating is a 610 rating factor. The midpoint rating basis
for a Baa3 (sf) rating is 775 (i.e. the simple average of a Baa3
(sf) rating factor of 610 and a Ba1 (sf) rating factor of 940). If
the calculated IO rating factor is 700, the CMBS IO calculator
would provide both a Baa3 (sf) and Ba1 (sf) IO indication for
consideration by the rating committee.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22, the same as at Moody's prior review.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

The rating action is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial mortgage backed securities transactions. Moody's
monitors transactions on a monthly basis through two sets of
quantitative tools -- MOST (Moody's Surveillance Trends) and CMM
(Commercial Mortgage Metrics) on Trepp -- and on a periodic basis
through a comprehensive review. Moody's prior full review is
summarized in a press release dated March 8, 2012.

Deal Performance:

As of the February 15, 2013 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $1.27 billion
from $1.30 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 50 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 57% of
the pool. The pool contains five loans with investment grade
credit assessments, representing 15% of the pool.

Two loans, representing 7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of its
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

No loans have been liquidated or are in special servicing. Moody's
did not identify any additional loans as being troubled.

Moody's was provided with full year 2011 and partial year 2012
operating results for 100% and 96% of the pool, respectively.
Moody's weighted average LTV for the conduit component is 83%
compared to 89% at last review. Moody's net cash flow reflects a
weighted average haircut of 8.8% to the most recently available
net operating income. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed DSCR for the conduit component are
1.63X and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 1.51X and 1.14X at last
review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Borgata Ground
Leases Loan ($60.0 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured
by five parcels of land underlying portions of the Borgata Hotel
Casino & Spa Complex in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The property is
leased pursuant to four separate ground leases, all of which
expire in December 2070. Performance has remained stable. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.03X,
respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Westfield
Westland Mall Loan ($55.3 million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is
secured by 225,000 square feet (SF) of net rentable area (NRA)
contained within a 829,000 SF super regional mall located in
Hialeah, Florida. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Sears and JC
Penney, all of which are owned by the respective tenants and not
included in the collateral. Occupancy as of September 2012 was
97%, the same as at last review. Performance has remained stable.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.47X at last review.

The third largest loan with a credit assessment is the Port
Charlotte Town Center Loan ($38.8 million -- 3.1% of the pool),
which is secured by 490,000 SF of NRA contained within a 774,000
SF super regional mall in Port Charlotte, Florida. The mall
contains five anchors and a movie theater. The property is located
along Tamiami Trail (US 141). Occupancy as of September 2012 was
88% compared to 92% at last review and securitization. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa3 and 1.42X,
respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.51X at last review.

The fourth largest loan with a credit assessment is the Showcase
Mall Phase II Loan ($22.5 million -- 1.8% of the pool), which is
secured by 42,000 SF of the Showcase Mall, a 332,000 SF retail
project fronting Las Vegas Boulevard and adjacent to the MGM. The
property is leased to two tenants (Grand Canyon Shops and Adidas)
as well as a kiosk leased to Vegas.com. Performance has remained
stable. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and
1.65X, respectively, compared to Baa3 and 1.58X at last review.

The fifth largest loan with a credit assessment is the Hilton
Garden Inn -- Mountain View Loan ($10.3 million -- 0.8% of the
pool), which is secured by a 160-room, full service hotel located
off of Camino Real, the main commercial thoroughfare connecting
San Jose and the San Francisco peninsula. The borrower developed
the property in 1999 for $14.2 million, excluding the value of the
land which the family has owned since 1952. Moody's credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are A2 and 2.62X, respectively,
compared to A2 and 2.24X at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 26% of the pool.
The largest conduit loan is the Hollywood & Highland Loan ($163.7
million -- 12.9% of the pool), which is secured by three five-
story multi-tenant retail buildings and one six-story theater
located on Hollywood Blvd in Los Angeles, California. Tenants
include 50 retail shops, 25 restaurants/eateries, two nightclubs,
one multi-screen cinema, a grand ballroom, a bowling alley, and a
large event theater. Cirque du Soleil signed an agreement for 10
years that began in July 2011 and will produce 368 annual shows.
As of September 2012, the property was 89% leased as compared to
92% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 62% and
1.48X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.18X at last review.

The second largest loan is The Arboretum Loan ($88.7 million --
7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a Wal-Mart anchored retail
center totaling 563,000 SF located in Charlotte, North Carolina.
The property consists of 12 single-story buildings, five pad
sites, and a 16-screen movie theater. As of September 2012, the
property was 99% leased compared to 100% at last review. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 0.95X, respectively, compared
to 98% and 0.99X at last review.

The third largest loan is the 1412 Broadway Loan ($82.4 million --
6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 24-story, Class B office
building located at the northeast corner of 39th Street and
Broadway in the Garment District of Manhattan in New York City.
The property was purchased by the borrower, Harbor Group
International, in December 2010 for $150 million. Of 412,000 SF of
leasable area, 24,000 SF (6%) is retail and 388,000 SF (94%) is
office with total occupancy of 95% as of September 2012, compared
to 92% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 111% and
0.86X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.93x at last review.


WG HORIZONS I: Moody's Hikes Rating on $12MM Class D Notes to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Services upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by WG Horizons CLO I:

US$24,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to A1
(sf);

US$21,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due May 24,
2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf);

US$16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2019, Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);

US$12,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019,
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to B1
(sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

US$296,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due May 24, 2019,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf).

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect the benefit of the short period of time remaining before
the end of the deal's reinvestment period in May 2013. In
consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during
the amortization period, and therefore limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral
pool characteristics will continue to maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, the deal
is assumed to benefit from higher spread levels compared to the
levels assumed at the last rating action in July 2011. Moody's
modeled a spread of 3.39% compared to 2.73% at the time of the
last rating action. Moody's also notes that the transaction's
reported collateral quality and overcollateralization ratios are
stable since the last rating action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating
factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may
be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of $378.9 million,
defaulted par of $14.0 million a weighted average default
probability of 16.37% (implying a WARF of 2403), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50.4%, and a diversity score
of 69. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool
are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also factors.

WG Horizons CLO I, issued on May 24, 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans, with some exposure to structured finance securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
rating methodology published in June 2011

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses to test the impact on all rated notes of
various default probabilities.

Summary of the impact of different default probabilities
(expressed in terms of WARF levels) on all rated notes (shown in
terms of the number of notches' difference versus the current
model output, where a positive difference corresponds to lower
expected loss), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1922)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: +1
Class B: +3
Class C: +3
Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2884)

Class A-1: 0
Class A-2: -2
Class B: -2
Class C: -1
Class D: -1

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of
CLO documentation by different transactional parties due to
embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or
collateral sales by the manager, which may have significant impact
on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted
recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery
rate in order to account for potential volatility in market
prices.


* Bank TruPS CDOs Default Rate Down to 29% at End Feb., Fitch Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the latest indicators, combined defaults and
deferrals for U.S. bank TruPS CDOs have further decreased to 29%
at the end of Feb from 29.2% at the end of previous month.

There have been no new deferrals year-to-date through the end of
February, compared to four new deferrals over a comparable period
in 2012. New defaults are also trending lower, with only one new
default year to date compared to four last year. Cures continued
to trend higher, with 10 cures year to date compared to seven last
year.

At the end of February, 216 bank issuers were in default,
representing approximately $6.4 billion held across 79 TruPS CDOs.
Additionally, 329 deferring bank issuers were affecting interest
payments on $4.5 billion of collateral held by 78 TruPS CDOs.


* U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Reach 3-Year Low, Fitch Reports
---------------------------------------------------------
Two large loan modifications helped drive U.S. CMBS delinquencies
lower for a ninth straight month, according to the latest index
results from Fitch Ratings.

CMBS late-pays declined 30 basis points (bps) in February to 7.61%
from 7.91% a month earlier. In addition, the dollar balance of
delinquent loans fell below the $30 billion mark for the first
time since February 2010.

The sharp drop was fueled by the impending resolution of two high-
profile loans and their removal from Fitch's index: the $195.1
million Babcock & Brown FX 3 portfolio (CSMC 2006-C4) and the $190
million One Congress Street (WBCMT 2007-C30), both of which are
being modified.

The drop in the delinquency rate was also helped by the largest
month for new CMBS issuance in over five years. Seven Fitch-rated
transactions totaling $6.62 billion closed in February. This
topped the previous post-recession high of $6.57 billion that
closed in November of last year.

Industrial catapulted into the number one delinquency spot due to
the addition of the $148.8 million StratReal Industrial Portfolio
II (JPMCC 2007-LDP10) to the index. Rates for all other property
types improved month-over-month. Current and previous delinquency
rates are:

-- Industrial: 9.61% (from 8.69% in January);
-- Multifamily: 9.14% (from 9.73%);
-- Hotel: 8.32% (from 8.76%);
-- Office: 8.18% (from 8.33%);
-- Retail: 7.35% (from 7.43%).


* Fitch Lowers Ratings on 2 Structured Finance CDOs to 'Dsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 196 classes and downgraded two classes
from 34 structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF
CDOs) with exposure to various structured finance assets.

The rating action report, titled 'Fitch Takes Various Rating
Actions on 34 SF CDOs', dated March 8, 2013, details the
individual rating actions for each rated CDO. It can be found on
Fitch's website at 'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title
search or by using the link below. For further information and
transaction research, please refer to 'www.fitchratings.com'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. None of the reviewed
transactions have been analyzed within a cash flow model
framework, as the impact of structural features and excess spread,
or conversely, principal proceeds being used to pay CDO
liabilities and hedge payments, was determined to be minimal in
the context of these CDO ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

For transactions where expected losses from distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' and lower) already
significantly exceed the credit enhancement (CE) level of the most
senior class of notes, Fitch believes that the probability of
default for all classes can be evaluated without factoring in
potential further losses from the remaining portion of the
portfolios. Therefore, these transactions were not modeled using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM).

The two classes downgraded to 'Dsf' and 55 classes affirmed at
'Dsf' are non-deferrable classes that have experienced and are
expected to continue experiencing interest payment shortfalls.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

These transactions have limited sensitivity to further negative
migration given the highly distressed rating levels of the
outstanding notes. However, there is potential for non-deferrable
classes to be downgraded to 'Dsf' should they experience any
interest payment shortfalls.


* Fitch Lowers Ratings on 2 Structured Finance CDOs to 'Dsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 196 classes and downgraded two classes
from 34 structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF
CDOs) with exposure to various structured finance assets.

The rating action report, titled 'Fitch Takes Various Rating
Actions on 34 SF CDOs', dated March 8, 2013, details the
individual rating actions for each rated CDO. It can be found on
Fitch's website at 'www.fitchratings.com' by performing a title
search or by using the link below. For further information and
transaction research, please refer to 'www.fitchratings.com'.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'. None of the reviewed
transactions have been analyzed within a cash flow model
framework, as the impact of structural features and excess spread,
or conversely, principal proceeds being used to pay CDO
liabilities and hedge payments, was determined to be minimal in
the context of these CDO ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

For transactions where expected losses from distressed and
defaulted assets in the portfolio (rated 'CCsf' and lower) already
significantly exceed the credit enhancement (CE) level of the most
senior class of notes, Fitch believes that the probability of
default for all classes can be evaluated without factoring in
potential further losses from the remaining portion of the
portfolios. Therefore, these transactions were not modeled using
the Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM).

The two classes downgraded to 'Dsf' and 55 classes affirmed at
'Dsf' are non-deferrable classes that have experienced and are
expected to continue experiencing interest payment shortfalls.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

These transactions have limited sensitivity to further negative
migration given the highly distressed rating levels of the
outstanding notes. However, there is potential for non-deferrable
classes to be downgraded to 'Dsf' should they experience any
interest payment shortfalls.


* Moody's Reports Stable Outlook on Canadian ABS in 2013
--------------------------------------------------------
The outlook remains stable for the Canadian auto and credit card
asset-backed securities and for Canada's seven covered bond
programs, says Moody's Investors Service in its annual outlook
report for the sectors. The stable outlook reflects very strong
collateral attributes in both credit card and auto ABS in Canada.

Neither sector will likely be able to match their strong 2012
levels of issuance. Auto ABS issuance is expected to be lower in
2013 than it was in 2012 while credit card issuance will not reach
the historical high that was set in 2012, according to Moody's.

"Although originators of auto loans continue to increase the
concentration of loans with extended terms in new transactions of
up to 84 months, borrower quality as measured by credit scores
remains consistent for both older and more recent vintages," said
Moody's VP -- Senior Credit Officer Michael Buzanis, author of the
report, "Canadian ABS and Covered Bond: 2013 Outlook."

"While we expect stable and strong auto ABS performance, a period
of economic weakness or consumer credit stress would result in
higher default and loss levels on loans that have extended terms,"
said Buzanis. "Weak-but-positive growth in the Canadian economy
and stable unemployment rates will keep auto loan defaults at
current low levels through this year."

The long-term ratings of bank sponsors of credit card ABS remain
high, which supports a stable outlook for their related credit
card-backed ABS. Card collateral comprises highly seasoned
accounts from prime quality obligors, which points to continued
strong performance. However, the sector will face a stable-but-
weak economic outlook and a Canadian unemployment rate that is not
likely to decline so performance will not improve much further.

The credit quality of all seven Canadian covered bond programs is
stable based on the strong financial standing of the sponsors and
the high quality of the residential mortgage collateral, says the
Moody's report. Canadian covered bond issuers' ratings were
downgraded by the rating agency in 2012 but are stable at Aa3 or
better levels and so the credit quality of their covered bonds
will remain stable.

As for Canadian issuance, the auto and card sectors accounted for
95% of issuance in 2012 with an issuance record of CAD9.5 billion
for credit cards.

"Cards will again dominate issuance in 2013 and the majority of
that issuance will be in the US 144A market," said Buzanis.
"Modest auto ABS issuance by Ford Credit Canada and equipment ABS
issued by CNH Capital Canada and CIT will round out total 2013
issuance."

Attractive alternative funding options and the purchase by Royal
Bank of Canada of auto ABS sponsor Ally Credit Canada will dampen
auto ABS issuance in 2013, which, at about CAD1.5 billion, will be
lower than the 2012 level, says Moody's. Credit card issuance will
again be assisted by the attractiveness of cross-border issuance,
but will not equal the CAD9.5 billion for 2012 and be in the CAD8
billion range.


* Moody's Sees Stable 2013 Performance for US ABS Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of asset classes backing US commercial and
esoteric asset-backed securities will be stable in 2013, according
to a new report from Moody's Investors Service, "US Commercial &
Esoteric ABS: 2013 Outlook - Performance Will Be Stable as Macro
Event Risk, While High, Recedes."

"With event risk in general declining, most of the kinds of risk
we have to watch out for now are idiosyncratic, that is, risks
specific to an issuer or asset class," says Michael McDermitt, a
Moody's Senior Credit Officer and one of the authors of the
report. "This would include, for instance, the adverse effects of
a food-borne illness event on a quick service restaurant whole
business securitization or of severe drought on agricultural
equipment loans and leases."

Credit quality of new transactions will be similar to that of past
transactions. With credit stabilizing, both credit enhancement and
structures will be similar to those of 2012 transactions. One
potential risk is a rise in both the risk appetite of obligors and
the risk tolerance of originators/sponsors, as a result of which
collateral characteristics could weaken, albeit marginally, and
deal structures could become less credit-protective.

Issuance will be backed predominantly by familiar assets, albeit
with a few new sponsors entering the market or new asset classes
emerging. New sponsors by definition lack the securitization
experience that anchors expectations for new deal performance. New
asset classes, such as renewable energy-related assets, are
starting to emerge, but won't constitute a significant portion of
issuance volume.

Regardless, transaction structures will be similar to those of the
past, given the success of existing structures so far, and will
incorporate operational risk mitigants such as backup servicers
and control party mechanisms.

The report provides Moody's outlook for a number of asset classes:
aircraft leases, cell towers, container leases, equipment loans
and leases, fleet leases, rental cars, small business loans,
timeshare loans, utility cost recovery assets, and whole business
securitizations. It also provides a review of sector issuance in
2012.


* Moody's Issues 4Q 2012 Update on US CMBS Loss Severities
----------------------------------------------------------
The weighted average loss severity for all loans backing
commercial mortgage-backed securities in the US that liquidated at
a loss was 40.8% in the fourth quarter of 2012, the same as the
prior quarter, says Moody's Investors Service in "US CMBS Loss
Severities, Q4 2012 Update."

From January 1 to December 15, 2012, $15.8 billion of CMBS loans
liquidated, consistent with the same period from the previous
year, says Moody's.

The weighted average loss severity for all liquidated loans,
excluding those with losses of less than 2%, was 53.1%, a slight
increase from 52.7% in the third quarter. Loans with losses of
less than 2% account for 23.6% of Moody's sample size by balance.

"Loans backed by manufactured housing and mobile home properties
had the highest weighted average loss severity, at 48.3%, while
loans backed by self-storage properties had the lowest weighted
average loss severity, at 33.6%," said Moody's Vice President and
Senior Credit Officer Keith Banhazl.

The three vintages with the highest loss severities are 2006, at
50.6%, 2008, at 47.5%, and 2003, at 43.1%. As of December, these
vintages constitute 30.7% of CMBS collateral and 31.4% of
delinquent loans.

"For the 2005, 2006, and 2007 vintages, we expect aggregate
conduit losses -- inclusive of realized losses -- of 7.7%, 11.2%
and 13.4%, respectively, of the total balance at issuance, with
most of the losses yet to be realized," said Banhazl. "The
aggregate realized loss for those vintages is currently 2.6%."

Of the 10 metropolitan statistical areas or MSAs with the highest
dollar losses, New York had the lowest severity, at 21.4%, and
Detroit had the highest, at 58.7%.

Two notable liquidations took place during the quarter, that of
the City View Portfolio I, and the Babcock & Brown FX 1 Portfolio,
both multifamily portfolios. The City View Portfolio I loan
liquidated with a $65.3 million loss for a loss severity of 94.6%
and the Babcock & Brown FX 1 Portfolio liquidated with a $61.3
million loss for a loss severity of 77.3%.

Moody's quarterly loss severities report for US CMBS tracks loan
loss severities upon liquidation and cumulative deal losses in US
commercial mortgage backed securities conduit and fusion
transactions. The latest quarterly report details loss severities
across the 1998 through 2008 vintages based on liquidations that
took place from January 1, 2000 to December 15, 2012.


* Moody's Takes Action on $371.7MM RMBS Issued by Goldman Sachs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded six tranches, downgraded five
tranches, and affirmed 39 tranches from two RMBS transactions
issued by Goldman Sachs in 2005. The collateral backing these
deals primarily consist of first-lien, fixed Jumbo residential
mortgages. The actions impact approximately $371.7 million of RMBS
issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3F

Cl. 1A-3, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A-6, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-7, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A-9, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-14, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-15, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-16, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2010
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-3, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A-4, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2010 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2A-5, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5F

Cl. 1A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1A-2, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2A-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-8, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-19, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3A-1, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3A-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-4, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-5, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-6, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3A-7, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4A-1, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4A-2, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4A-3, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4A-4, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4A-5, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4A-6, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 4A-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4A-8, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 5A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 6A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7A-2, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-2, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2012 Confirmed
at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-3, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-4, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-5, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2012 Confirmed
at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-6, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-7, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-8, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. 8A-9, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 8A-10, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-P, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

These actions primarily reflect recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The actions also reflect correction of two errors in the
Structured Finance Workstation cash flow model used by Moody's in
rating these transactions previously. The first error relates to
how the model handled interest shortfall allocation among
different sub-pools in transactions with a double-ratio strip.

Double-ratio strip transactions are deals where a pool of
collateral with a variable weighted average net mortgage rate
supports two (or more) groups of senior bonds with fixed coupon
rates, one with a high coupon rate and one with a low coupon rate.
To support this feature, the pool is divided into subgroups. All
underlying loans with rates at or below the bond with the lower
coupon are placed in one subgroup and all loans with rates higher
than the bond with the higher coupon are placed in another
subgroup. Loans with a net loan rate between the two rates are
hypothetically split and allocated in different proportions to the
two sub-pools so that the weighted average rate of each sub-pool
matches the rate on the respective bonds.

In the past, Moody's model commingled the principal and interest
collections from these sub-pools before allocating funds to the
respective senior bonds, first as interest and then as principal.
Under normal circumstances, this simplifying assumption works
fine. However, in the current environment of large rate
modifications, the interest and principal collections are not
enough to pay the scheduled interest and principal on the senior
bonds. Therefore, interest is first being paid in full to all
senior bonds and the remaining funds are distributed as principal,
resulting in a principal shortfall. Commingling funds results in
allocating the principal shortfall pro-rata to the bonds. This
pro-rata allocation is inaccurate because the underlying loans
that were modified were not split pro-rata into the sub-pools.
Higher rate loans, which are more prone to rate modification, by
design back the sub-pools with higher target rates. Allocating the
principal shortfall pro-rata is thus detrimental to bonds backed
by the lower target-rate sub-pool and excessively beneficial to
bonds backed by the higher target-rate sub-pool. Moody's updated
modeling first allocates interest shortfalls by scaling the actual
interest collected compared to the target interest that is to be
received under normal circumstances, before distributing the
available funds. This approach thus keeps track of the level of
principal shortfall resulting from each sub-pool, and
discriminates between the bonds backed by the different net rate
sub-pools.

The second error relates to principal waterfall after the credit
support depletion date. The SFW model used in previous rating
actions incorrectly assumed that the principal payment would be
allocated pro rata after the credit support depletion date, as is
typical in Jumbo transactions. However, because the pooling and
servicing agreement for these two transactions is silent on this
issue, the waterfall after the credit support depletion date
should have remained the same as before the credit support
depletion date. This has now been updated and Moody's current
rating action reflects this.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "2005 -- 2008 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in July 2011. The methodology used in rating Interest-
Only Securities was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The approach is also adjusted slightly when estimating losses on
pools left with a small number of loans to account for the
volatile nature of small pools. Even if a few loans in a small
pool become delinquent, there could be a large increase in the
overall pool delinquency level due to the concentration risk. To
project losses on pools with fewer than 100 loans, Moody's first
estimates a "baseline" average rate of new delinquencies for the
pool that varies from 3% to 10% on average. The baseline rates are
higher than the average rate of new delinquencies for larger pools
for the respective vintages.

Once the baseline rate is set, further adjustments are made based
on 1) the number of loans remaining in the pool and 2) the level
of current delinquencies in the pool. The volatility of pool
performance increases as the number of loans remaining in the pool
decreases. Once the loan count in a pool falls below 75, the rate
of delinquency is increased by 1% for every loan less than 75. For
example, for a pool with 74 loans with a base rate of new
delinquency of 3.00%, the adjusted rate of new delinquency would
be 3.03%. In addition, if current delinquency levels in a small
pool are low, future delinquencies are expected to reflect this
trend. To account for that, the rate calculated is multiplied by a
factor ranging from 0.75 to 2.5 for current delinquencies ranging
from less than 2.5% to greater than 10% respectively.
Delinquencies for subsequent years and ultimate expected losses
are projected using the approach described in the "2005 -- 2008 US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" publication.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.7% in February 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $318 Million of U.S. Alt-A RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 23 tranches
and affirmed the ratings of 30 tranches from six RMBS
transactions, backed by Alt-A loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of the recent performance of Alt-A pools
originated before 2005 and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2012. The methodology used in rating
Interest-Only Securities is "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in February 2012.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) and an increased use of private modifications,
Moody's is extending its previous view that loan modifications
will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now assuming that
the loan modifications will continue at current levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and a pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw
its rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of
loans in the deal declines to 40 loans or lower. If, however, a
transaction has a specific structural feature, such as a credit
enhancement floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size,
Moody's can choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A and Option Arm pools,
Moody's first applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004,
5% for 2003 and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a
pool falls below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1%
for every loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75
loans, the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to
account for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool,
Moody's multiplies the rate calculated by a factor ranging from
0.50 to 2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than
2.5% to greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this
final adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies
and losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
9.0% in September 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts
a further drop to 7.5% by 2014. Moody's expects house prices to
drop another 1% from their 4Q2011 levels before gradually rising
towards the end of 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain
highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-10

Cl. 5-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-3, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 15-B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 15-B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 15-IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-11

Cl. 1-A-1, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. CB-IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 30-B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 3-IO, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-4

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-6, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-WIO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-PO, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-9

Cl. 1-CB-1, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-CB-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-CB-3, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-CB-4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-CB-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-CB-WIO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-NC-1, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. PO, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-NC-2, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-NC-WIO, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-WIO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-10

Cl. II-1-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-2-A-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-3-A-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-B-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 13, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-B-3, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. II-B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Alternative Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. 1-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012 Confirmed
at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-X-1, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. PO-1, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2012 Downgraded
to A1 (sf)


* Moody's Takes Actions on $159.5 Million of Alt-A RMBS
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the rating of two tranches,
downgraded the rating of four tranches, and affirmed the rating of
13 tranches from five transactions, backed by Alt-A loans.

Ratings Rationale:

The actions are a result of recent performance of these deals and
reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The
downgrades are primarily due to the weak interest shortfall
reimbursement mechanism on the bonds. The tranches downgraded to
A3 (sf) do not have interest shortfalls but in the event of an
interest shortfall, structural limitations in the transactions
will prevent recoupment of interest shortfalls even if funds are
available in subsequent periods. Missed interest payments on these
mezzanine tranches can only be made up from excess interest and
after the overcollateralization is built to a target amount. In
these transactions since overcollateralization is already below
target due to poor performance, any missed interest payments to
mezzanine tranches are unlikely to be paid. Moody's caps the
ratings of such tranches with weak interest shortfall
reimbursement at A3 (sf) as long as they have not experienced any
shortfall.

Moody's also caps the ratings on tranches that currently have very
small unrecoverable interest shortfalls at Baa3 (sf). For tranches
with larger outstanding interest shortfalls, Moody's applies
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" published in November 2009. These approaches take into
account only credit-related interest shortfall risks. The rating
for Class M-2 from MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-1
was downgraded to B1 (sf) as it has an outstanding interest
shortfall of 0.10% of its original balance which is unlikely to be
reimbursed.

The ratings for Class M-1 from Soundview Home Loan Trust 2003-2
and Class M-1 from Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-2 were
confirmed. Previously, these tranches were placed on review for
ratings downgrade due to interest shortfall risk. These tranches
have not experienced any interest shortfall to date and the
reimbursement mechanism in the event of interest shortfalls for
these tranches allows for shortfalls to be recouped only if the
overcollateralization amount for the deal is at target. Since the
overcollateralization amount on these deals is at target, the
interest shortfall risk is mitigated which is reflected in Moody's
current rating action.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating US Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities" published in
December 2008, and "Pre-2005 US RMBS Surveillance Methodology "
published in January 2012. Other factors used in these ratings are
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" published in November 2009.

Moody's adjusts the methodologies for 1) Moody's current view on
loan modifications and 2) small pool volatility.

Loan Modifications

As a result of an extension of the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) to 2013 and an increased use of private
modifications, Moody's is extending its previous view that loan
modifications will only occur through the end of 2012. It is now
assuming that the loan modifications will continue at current
levels until 2014.

Small Pool Volatility

The RMBS approach only applies to structures with at least 40
loans and pool factor of greater than 5%. Moody's can withdraw its
rating when the pool factor drops below 5% and the number of loans
in the deal declines to lower than 40. If, however, a transaction
has a specific structural feature, such as a credit enhancement
floor, that mitigates the risks of small pool size, Moody's can
choose to continue to rate the transaction.

For pools with loans less than 100, Moody's adjusts its
projections of loss to account for the higher loss volatility of
such pools. For small pools, a few loans becoming delinquent would
greatly increase the pools' delinquency rate.

To project losses on Alt-A pools with fewer than 100 loans,
Moody's first calculates an annualized delinquency rate based on
vintage, number of loans remaining in the pool and the level of
current delinquencies in the pool. For Alt-A pools, Moody's first
applies a baseline delinquency rate of 10% for 2004, 5% for 2003
and 3% for 2002 and prior. Once the loan count in a pool falls
below 76, this rate of delinquency is increased by 1% for every
loan fewer than 76. For example, for a 2004 pool with 75 loans,
the adjusted rate of new delinquency is 10.1%. Further, to account
for the actual rate of delinquencies in a small pool, Moody's
multiplies the rate calculated by a factor ranging from 0.50 to
2.0 for current delinquencies that range from less than 2.5% to
greater than 30% respectively. Moody's then uses this final
adjusted rate of new delinquency to project delinquencies and
losses for the remaining life of the pool under the approach
described in the methodology publication.

The primary sources of assumption uncertainty are Moody's central
macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility as a result of
servicer-related activity such as modifications. The unemployment
rate fell from 8.5% in December 2011 to 7.9% in January 2013.
Moody's forecasts a unemployment central range of 7.0% to 8.0% for
the 2013 year. Moody's expects housing prices to continue to rise
in 2013. Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR1

Cl. VI-M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013
Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. VI-M-2, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-14

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 2, 2012 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2004-7

Cl. 6-M-1, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 6-M-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 6-B-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. 6-B-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2003-2

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2012 Downgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2003-2

Cl. A, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2012 Downgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2013 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. M-2, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2012 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers"
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com/

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

For copies of court documents filed in the District of Delaware,
please contact Vito at Parcels, Inc., at 302-658-9911.  For
bankruptcy documents filed in cases pending outside the District
of Delaware, contact Ken Troubh at Nationwide Research &
Consulting at 207/791-2852.

                           *********

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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Howard C. Tolentino, Joseph Medel C. Martirez, Carmel
Paderog, Meriam Fernandez, Ronald C. Sy, Joel Anthony G. Lopez,
Cecil R. Villacampa, Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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