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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 23, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 81

                            Headlines

ABCLO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $12MM Class C Notes
ABERDEEN LOAN: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on $17.25MM Class E Notes
ALESCO PREFERRED VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to Ba1
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-1: DBRS Rates Class E Securities 'BB'
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-1: S&P Rates $18MM Class E Notes 'BB+'

ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 9 Securities Classes
APIDOS CDO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on $11MM Junior Notes to Ba2
ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
ARROYO CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C-2 Notes to 'B3'
BANC OF AMERICA 2001-PB1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on XC Notes

BANC OF AMERICA 2005-3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 5 Certificates
BANC OF AMERICA 2005-MIB1: Fitch Affirms C Rating on Class K Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF1: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class I Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF2: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class L Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP24: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Notes

BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR15: Moody's Rates Class A-JFX Certs 'Caa1'
BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR15: S&P Assigns 'D' Rating on $25MM Certs
C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on $10MM Class Notes to Caa2
CAPITAL TRUST 2004-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
CARLYLE DAYTONA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes

CENTURION CDO 9: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on 2 Note Classes
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2005-EMG: Moody's Cuts X Certs to 'Caa1'
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2005-C3: S&P Cuts Class E Notes' Rating to D
COA SUMIT: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $20MM Class D Notes
COMM MORTGAGE 2005-FL11: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class K Secs.

COMM MORTGAGE 2014-LC15: DBRS Rates Cl. E Certs 'BB(low)(sf)'
CPS AUTO 2014-A: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKN2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. F Certs to Ca
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C2: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Class O Certs
CREST 2002-IG: Fitch Ups $8,059,173 Class D Notes to 'Bsf'

CSFB 1999-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. A-X Certificates
CSFB 2005-4: Moody's Lowers Rating on 6 Class Tranches
EXETER AUTOMOBILE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
FIRST UNION 2001-C1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
GFCM LLC 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Rating to Cl. F Certs to 'Ba3'

GLENEAGLES CLO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2005-GG5: Moody's Cuts Cl. C Certs Rating to C
GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC3: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
JERSEY STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB+'
JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC7: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Certs Rating to B3

JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC8: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Certs Rating to B3
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class D Secs. to 'Dsf'
KATONAH VIII: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
KVK CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF4: Moody's Hikes 2 Notes Rating to Caa3

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C3: S&P Lowers Class G Notes Rating to 'D'
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2006-LLF C5: S&P Cuts Class K Certs Rating to Dsf
LNR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Notes to 'Ba2'
MADISON AVENUE: Moody's Hikes Rating on $21MM Cl. B Notes to B3
MARLBOROUGH STREET: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'

MLMT 2004-MKB1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class P Securities
MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ7: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C15: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs 'BB-sf'
OCP CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XIX: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on F Notes

OFSI FUND VI: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
OMI TRUST 2001-E: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Certs to 'D'
PACIFIC BAY: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'B3'
PPM GRAYHAWK: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on $14.45MM Notes
SASCO 2007-BHC1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class A-1 Notes

SATURN CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $20MM Class D Notes
STEERS HIGH-GRADE 2006: Moody's Affirms Rating on Five CMBS Units
STEERS HIGH-GRADE 2006: Moody's Affirms Rating on 4 CMBS Units
STRATA 2005-19: Moody's Raises Rating on $15MM Notes to 'Ba2'
WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Notes

WAMU MORTGAGE 2004-AR9: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
VENTURE V: Moody's Raises Rating on $11.5MM Class D Notes to 'B2'

* Moody's Takes Action on $45MM of RMBS Issued 2004 to 2005
* Moody's Takes Action on $151MM of Second Lien RMBS by 7 Issuers
* Moody's Raises Ratings on $188MM of RMBS From 2002 to 2004


                             *********

ABCLO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $12MM Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by ABCLO 2007-1, Ltd.:

$26,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

$9,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3
(sf)

$18,250,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 14, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

$12,250,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 14, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$245,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021
(current outstanding balance of $147,743,147), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on June 14, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$11,750,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due April 15, 2021,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on June 14, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

ABCLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in June
2013. The Class A-1a notes have been paid down by approximately
38.2% or $91.3 million since that time. Based on the trustee's
February 2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for
the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes are reported at
130.35%, 118.54%, 111.62% and 105.81%, respectively, versus May
2013 levels of 120.71%, 113.19%, 108.55% and 104.53%,
respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2202)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3304)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: -1

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $229 million, defaulted par
of $11.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 16.39%
(implying a WARF of 2753), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.47%, a diversity score of 41and a weighted average
spread of 3.23%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


ABERDEEN LOAN: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on $17.25MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd.:

$376,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding balance $363,049,707),
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

$29,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due 2018, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

$25,250,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$19,250,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2018, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously
on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

$17,250,000 Class E Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding balance
$11,756,506), Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 15, 2011
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd., issued in March 2008, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in May 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
May 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from a lower weighted
average rating factor (WARF) and a higher weighted average spread
(WAS) compared to their covenant levels. Moody's modeled a WARF of
2687 and a WAS of 3.18% compared to their covenant levels of 2797
and 2.70%, respectively. Moody's also notes that the transaction's
reported overcollateralization ratios are stable.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2150)

Class A: 0

Class B: +3

Class C: +3

Class D: +1

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3224)

Class A: -1

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor (WARF), diversity score and the
WARR, are based on its published methodology and could differ from
the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the collateral pool as having a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $466 million, defaulted par of $11.7 million,
a weighted average default probability of 16.70% (implying a WARF
of 2687), a WARR upon default of 52.64%, a diversity score of 46
and a WAS of 3.18%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


ALESCO PREFERRED VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. A-2 Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding VII Ltd.:

  $177,000,000 Class A-1-B First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $116,670,791.02),
  Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 24, 2010 Downgraded to
  Baa3 (sf)

  $70,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2035, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 24,
  2012 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding VII Ltd., issued in April 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the resumption of
interest payments on their TruPS by two deferring banks included
in the CDO portfolio and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios.

In September 2013 two previously deferring banks, totaling $35
million notional, resumed making interest payments on their TruPS.
The Class A-1 notes' par coverage has thus improved to 165.2% from
143.7% since August 2013, by Moody's calculations. Based on the
trustee's January 2014 report, the over-collateralization ratio of
the Class B notes was 117.0% (limit 120.0%), versus 103.3% in
August 2013, and that of the Class C notes, 78.8% (limit 103.4%),
versus 69.4% August 2013.

Moody's notes that an Event of Default (EoD) was declared in March
2012, due to the transaction's Class A/B overcollateralization
ratio falling below 100%. Subsequently, the controlling party
approved a declaration of acceleration of the transaction in April
2012. In December 2012 the EoD cured, however, the controlling
party did not waive the declaration of acceleration. As a result
the Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest and the use of proceeds from redemptions of any
assets in the collateral pool.

Additionally, in January 2014 $7.2 million of principal was
recovered from a previously defaulted asset and will be used to
repay the Class A-1 notes on the next payment date in March 2014.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs" published in May 2011.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Moody's evaluates the sensitivity of the ratings
of the notes to the volatility of these credit assessments.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool has having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $397.5 million, defaulted/deferring
par of $78.9 million, a weighted average default probability of
28.5% (implying a WARF of 1618), a Moody's Asset Correlation of
16.3%, and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 8.1%.
In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

Moody's modeled the transaction's portfolio using CDOROM(TM)
v.2.10.15 to develop the default distribution from which it
derives the Moody's Asset Correlation parameter. Moody's then used
the parameter as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.
CDOROM(TM) v.2.10.15 is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The portfolio of this CDO contains trust preferred securities
issued by small to medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the
credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public ratings,
Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by
Moody's KMV, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the
credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on
FDIC Q3-2013 financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have
public ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance
team, based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance
firms' annual statutory financial reports.

In addition to the base case, Moody's conducted a number of
sensitivity analyses of the results to certain key factors driving
the ratings. Moody's analyzed the sensitivity of the model results
to changes in the portfolio WARF (representing an improvement or
deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral pool).
Increasing the WARF by 225 points from the base case of 1608
lowers the model-implied rating on the Class A-1 notes by one
notch from the base case result; decreasing the WARF by 110 points
raises the model-implied rating on the Class A-1 notes by one
notch from the base case result.

Moody's also conducted two additional sensitivity analyses, as
described in "Sensitivity Analyses on Deferral Cures and Default
Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs," published in August 2012. In
the first analysis, Moody's gave par credit to banks that are
deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy other credit
criteria and thus are highly likely to resume interest payments;
in this case, Moody's gave par credit to $5.5 million of bank
TruPS.

In the second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative
default-timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood
of a large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on
all of the rated notes (in terms of the difference in the number
of notches versus the current model-implied output, in which a
positive difference corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Sensitivity Analysis 1: Par Credit Given to Deferring Banks

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class C-3: 0

Class C-4: 0

Class C-5: 0

Series I Combination: 0

Sensitivity Analysis 2: Alternative Default Timing Profile

Class A-1A: +1

Class A-1B: +1

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Class C-3: 0

Class C-4: 0

Class C-5: 0

Series I Combination: 0


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-1: DBRS Rates Class E Securities 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to AmeriCredit
Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-1 as listed below:

-- Series 2014-1, Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Series 2014-1, Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2014-1, Class A-3 rated AAA (sf)
-- Series 2014-1, Class B rated AA (high) (sf)
-- Series 2014-1, Class C rated A (high) (sf)
-- Series 2014-1, Class D rated BBB (high) (sf)
-- Series 2014-1, Class E rated BB (high) (sf)


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2014-1: S&P Rates $18MM Class E Notes 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-1's $750 million
automobile receivables-backed notes series 2014-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 42.8%, 37.7%, 31.1%,
      23.3%, and 19.2% credit support for the class A-1, A-2, and
      A-3 (collectively, the class A notes), B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively (based on stressed cash flow scenarios,
      including excess spread), which provide coverage of more
      than 3.50x, 3.25x, 2.55x, 1.95x, and 1.58x our 10.75%-11.25%
      expected cumulative net loss range for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively.  These credit support levels are
      commensurate with the assigned 'A-1+ (sf)' and 'AAA (sf)',
      'AA+ (sf)', 'A+ (sf)', 'BBB+ (sf)', and 'BB+ (sf)' ratings
      on the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', stress
      scenario, its ratings on the notes would not decline by more
      than one rating category from its ratings (all else being
      equal) over a 12-month period.  S&P's ratings stability
      criteria describe the outer bound of credit deterioration
      within one year as one rating category in the case of 'AAA'
      and 'AA' rated securities and two rating categories in the
      case of 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' rated securities.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments made
      under the stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which are
      consistent with the assigned ratings.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
      subprime auto loans.

   -- General Motors Financial Co. Inc.'s (GM Financial, formerly
      known as AmeriCredit Corp.; BB/Positive/--) extensive
      securitization performance history since 1994.  On Sept. 6,
      2013, Standard & Poor's affirmed its long-term counterparty
      credit rating on GM Financial at 'BB' and revised the
      outlook to positive from stable.

   -- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2014-1

Class     Rating          Type           Interest       Amount
                                         rate (%)     (mil. $)
A-1       A-1+ (sf)       Senior             0.21        97.00
A-2       AAA (sf)        Senior             0.57       233.70
A-3       AAA (sf)        Senior             0.90       202.02
B         AA+ (sf)        Subordinate        1.68        57.39
C         A+ (sf)         Subordinate        2.15        71.24
D         BBB+ (sf)       Subordinate        2.54        70.05
E(i)      BB+ (sf)        Subordinate        3.58        18.60

(i) Class E is privately placed and is not included in the public
     offering amount.


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 9 Securities Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes issued of Anthracite 2005-
HY2 Ltd./Corp (Anthracite 2005-HY2).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are due to relatively stable performance of the
remaining collateral.  Since the last rating action in July 2013,
approximately 5.2% of the collateral has been downgraded.
Currently, 86.5% of the portfolio has a Fitch-derived rating below
investment grade with 71.6% having a rating in the 'CCC' category
and below, compared to 86.5% and 67.4%, respectively, at the last
rating action.  Over this period, the class A notes have received
$22.2 million in paydowns.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  The default levels were then
compared to the breakeven levels generated by Fitch's cash flow
model of the CDO under the various default timing and interest
rate stress scenarios, as described in the report 'Global Criteria
for Cash Flow Analysis in CDOs'.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities. Based on this analysis, the class A notes' breakeven
rates are generally consistent with the rating assigned below.

For the class B through G notes, Fitch analyzed the class'
sensitivity to the default of the distressed assets ('CCC' and
below).  Given the high probability of default of the underlying
assets and the expected limited recovery prospects upon default,
the class B notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf', indicating that
default is probable.  Similarly, the class C through G notes have
been affirmed at 'Csf', indicating that default is inevitable.

Rating Sensitivity

Further deterioration of the collateral could lead to downgrades
to the class A and B notes.  Anthracite 2005-HY2 is backed by 42
tranches from 17 obligors.  The transaction closed in July 2005
and is considered a commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
B-piece resecuritization (also referred to as a first loss
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation [CRE CDO])
as it primarily includes junior bonds of CMBS transactions.  The
portfolio is composed of 71% CMBS, 15.3% real estate investment
trust (REIT), and 13.7% commercial real estate loans (CREL)
assets.

Fitch has affirmed the following:

-- $66,757,747 class A at 'CCCsf';
-- $52,593,000 class B at 'CCsf';
-- $25,360,000 class C-FL at 'Csf';
-- $7,000,000 class C-FX at 'Csf';
-- $25,275,000 class D-FL at 'Csf';
-- $13,500,000 class D-FX at 'Csf';
-- $9,376,000 class E at 'Csf';
-- $58,000,000 class F at 'Csf';
-- $64,366,520 class G at 'Csf'.


APIDOS CDO IV: Moody's Raises Rating on $11MM Junior Notes to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Apidos CDO IV:

  $20,000,000 Class B Senior Notes Due 2018, Upgraded to Aaa
  (sf); previously on August 14, 2012 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $16,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2018,
  Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on August 14, 2012 Upgraded to
  A1 (sf)

  $14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2018,
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on August 14, 2012 Upgraded
  to Baa2 (sf)

  $11,000,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Notes Due 2018, Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf); previously on August 14, 2012 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $174,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2018 (current
  outstanding balance of $111,285,360.96), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $87,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due 2018
  (current outstanding balance of $55,802,115.09), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on August 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Apidos CDO IV, issued in September 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October
2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2013. The Class A notes have
been paid down by approximately 35.1% or $90.5 million since March
2013. Based on the trustee's February 2014 report, the senior
over-collateralization, mezzanine over-collateralization and Class
E junior notes direct pay ratios are reported at 132.0%, 113.7%
and 108.2%, respectively, versus March 2013 levels of 122.1%,
110.2% and 106.4%, respectively.

Today's actions also reflect a correction to Moody's modelling of
the Class E junior notes direct pay test. In prior rating actions,
Moody's did not take into account the Class E notes' current
principal balance in determining the Class E junior notes direct
pay test ratio. This error has now been corrected, and today's
rating actions reflect this change.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1907)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2861)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $245.2 million, defaulted
par of $3.98 million, a weighted average default probability of
13.10% (implying a WARF of 2384), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.15%, a diversity score of 49 and a weighted
average spread of 2.94%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


ARBOR REALTY 2004-1: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
A floating-rate notes from Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series
2004-1 Ltd., a U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations (CRE CDO) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on three other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the underlying credit characteristics of
the collateral, using its criteria for global CDOs of pooled
structured finance assets.  The analysis also reflects S&P's
rating methodology and assumptions for U.S. and Canadian
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and our CMBS global
property evaluation methodology criteria.  The upgrade on class A
also reflects the transaction's amortization. Class A had $33.3
million outstanding as of the Jan. 15, 2014, note valuation report
and Feb. 28, 2014, trustee monthly report, down from $182.9
million at issuance.

According to the Feb. 28, 2014, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral, excluding a cash balance of $5.5 million, totaled
$259.9 million while its liabilities totaled $287.4 million, down
from $469.0 million at issuance.  The transaction's current asset
pool includes:

   -- 16 B-notes or junior participation interests ($165.7
      million, 63.8%);

   -- Five preferred equity loans ($43.8 million, 16.8%);

   -- Eight mezzanine loans ($28.6 million, 11.0%); and

   -- Three A-notes or senior participation interests ($21.8
      million, 8.4%).

The February 2014 trustee report noted seven defaulted assets
totaling $36.7 million ($14.1%), consisting of one B-note ($16.0
million), three mezzanine loans ($15.6 million), and three
preferred equity loans ($5.1 million).  The defaulted loans are:

   -- The Bethany Core Portfolio B-note ($16.0 million, 6.2% of
      the total noncash collateral balance);

   -- The Miles Portfolio mezzanine loan ($11.9 million, 4.6%);

   -- The Empirian Highland preferred equity loan ($2.0 million,
      0.8%);

   -- The Chowder Bay Apartments mezzanine loan ($1.9 million,
      0.7%),

   -- The Autumn Woods & Brendonwood Park mezzanine loan ($1.8
      million, 0.7%);

   -- The Empirian Inverness preferred equity loan ($1.7 million;
      0.6%); and

   -- The Empirian Wildewood preferred equity loan ($1.4 million;
      0.5%).

Standard & Poor's estimated no recoveries for the defaulted loans
based on information from the collateral manager, special
servicer, and third-party data providers.

Using loan performance information provided by the collateral
manager, S&P applied asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis
of the performing loans ($223.2 million, 85.9% of the noncash
collateral balance) using its criteria for U.S. and Canadian CMBS
and our CMBS global property evaluation methodology.  S&P did not
apply an asset-specific recovery rate to the Homewood-Tahoe B-note
($16.7 million, 6.4%) because the loan is secured by land in
Homewood, Calif. and has no financial reporting on the underlying
property.  S&P also considered in its analysis qualitative factors
such as the near-term maturities of the loans, refinancing
prospects, and loan modifications.

According to the Feb. 28, 2014, trustee report, the deal passed
all of its overcollateralization and interest coverage tests.

The ratings are consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them and reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the underlying collateral's credit
characteristics.

RATING RAISED

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1 Ltd.
Floating-rate term notes
                  Rating
Class        To           From
A            BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Arbor Realty Mortgage Securities Series 2004-1 Ltd.
Floating-rate term notes
Class        Rating
B            B- (sf)
C            CCC (sf)
D            CCC (sf)


ARROYO CDO I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C-2 Notes to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by ARROYO CDO I LIMITED:

  $38,800,000 Class B Senior Subordinated Floating Rate Notes Due
  2036 (current balance of $4,176,096), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
  previously on March 6, 2014 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
  Possible Upgrade;

  $10,000,000 Class C-1 Subordinated Floating Rate Notes Due 2036,
  Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2014 Caa2 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

  $16,000,000 Class C-2 Subordinated Fixed Rate Notes Due 2036,
  Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2014 Caa2 (sf)
  Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade.

Arroyo CDO I Limited is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a diversified portfolio of corporate assets and
structured finance securities such as RMBS, CMBS and other ABS,
originated from 1998 to 2002.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ("OC") ratios since last review in August 2013.
The Class B notes have been paid down by approximately 69%, or $6
million since August 2013. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC
ratios of the Class B and Class C notes are currently 829.9% and
102.7%, respectively, versus 384.1% and 98.4% in August 2013.
Additionally, the credit quality of the portfolio has been stable
since August 2013.

The deal also benefits from the updates to Moody's SF CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps Moody's apply to deals
experiencing event of default. In taking the foregoing actions,
Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review of its
rating on the issuer's Class B, Class C-1 and Class C-2 notes
announced on March 6, 2014. At that time, Moody's said that it had
placed certain of the issuer's ratings on review for upgrade as a
result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two notches:

Class B:+1

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Ba1 and below ratings notched down by two notches:

Class B: 0

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1


BANC OF AMERICA 2001-PB1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on XC Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on two classes of
Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc., Series 2001-PB1 as
follows:

Cl. M, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the one P&I class was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on the IO class
was affirmed based on the credit performance (or the weighted
average rating factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 25.6% of
the current balance, compared to 31.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three compared to four at last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $9.6 million
from $938.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from 25% to
48% of the pool.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $34.1 million or (25% average loan
loss severity). Currently one loan, constituting 27% of the pool,
is on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes
loans that meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as
part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.
As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency
reviews the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues
that could affect performance.

There is one loan, Pool City Plaza, representing 48% of the pool,
in special servicing. The loan is secured by a 48,000 square foot
retail center in North Fayette Township, Pennsylvania, located
approximately 17 west of downtown Pittsburgh. A consensual
foreclosure was completed in October 2013.

Moody's received full year 2011 and 2012 operating results for
100% of the pool, respectively and partial year 2013 operating
results for 100%. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 67%,
compared to 62% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.8% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.09X and 1.95X,
respectively, compared to 1.15X and 2.66X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest conduit loan is the Coleman Center Loan ($2.6 million
-- 27% of the pool), which is secured by a 65,000 square foot
retail center located in San Marcos, California. The property was
90% leased as of December 2013; the same as at last review. This
loan has amortized 41% since securitization. Moody's current LTV
and stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.54X, respectively, compared to 54%
and 2.17X at last review.

The second-largest loan is the 6403-6405 El Cajon Boulevard Loan
($2.3 million -- 25% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
single-tenant retail property located in San Diego, California.
The tenant is Rite Aid Corporation. The Rite Aid lease is
scheduled to expire in June 2018, ahead of the loan's maturity
date in September 2019. Moody's value is based on a dark-lit
analysis, which considers the risk of losing the single tenant
prior to loan maturity. This loan has amortized 30% since
securitization. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and
1.30X, respectively, compared to 94% and 1.23X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 5 Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
classes and affirmed 15 classes of Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-3 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-2 through A-M were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on Classes AJ through C and G through L were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss. The rating on the IO class, Class X-C, was affirmed based on
the credit performance of the referenced classes.

The ratings on Classes D through F were downgraded due to an
increase in anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans that were higher than Moody's had previously
expected.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.1% of
the current balance compared to 16.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.2% of
the original pooled balance compared to 14.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18 compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 10, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 31% to $1.48
billion from $2.16 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 60% of
the pool. Five loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities. There are no loans
that have investment-grade credit assessments.

Eight loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $66.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 22%). Eleven loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Marley Station Loan ($114.4 million -- 7.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a two-story regional mall located in
Glen Burnie, Maryland. The center is anchored by Sears, J.C.
Penney and Macy's. Boscov's was the fourth anchor, however the
retailer vacated the premise after the company's bankruptcy and
the space is currently dark. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2012 due to imminent monetary default and
became real estate owned (REO) in January 2014. As of October
2013, inline occupancy was 78%, with near term rollover risk. Per
the servicer, the property is in the process of being stabilized.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Fiesta Mall
($84.0 million -- 5.7%), which is secured by 309,092 square foot
(SF) in a 1 million SF regional mall located in Mesa, Arizona. The
property is shadowed anchored by Dillard's Macy's, Sears and Best
Buy. Macy's announced in early 2014 that it will be closing its
store at the end of March 2014, hurting the prospects for the mall
and potentially triggering co-tenancy clauses. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2013 due to imminent
monetary default relating to tenancy issues. Mesa is saturated
with five malls located within a 13 mile radius. This property may
be a potential redevelopment, with the highest and best use not as
a mall.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the FRI Portfolio
($60.1 million -- 4.0%), which was originally secured by two
office buildings, Regions Center and Concourse Towers, located in
Nashville, Tennessee and West Palm Beach, Florida, respectively.
Regions Center was sold in September 2013 for $14.5 million,
paying down the loan about $9.9 million. Concourse Towers is
currently REO. As of January 2014, Concourse East was 72% leased
and Concourse West was 69% leased.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $236.1 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (60% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for nine poorly
performing loans, constituting 4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $9.3 million (an 16% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 73% of the
pool, and partial year 2013 operating results for 76% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97% compared to 102% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 8% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 30% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Woolworth Building Loan ($200.0 million --
13.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 811,791 SF Class B
office building located in the downtown city hall submarket of New
York City. The property is also encumbered by a $50.0 million
junior loan. As of January 2014, the property was 96% leased
compared to 97% as of December 2012. Although occupancy has
stabilized, tenants have renewed leases at lower monthly rents,
which caused a significant drop in net cash flow. Moody's value is
based on a long-term stabilized value. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 112% and 0.82X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Ridgedale Center Loan ($158.7
million -- 10.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 340,800 SF
regional mall located in Minnetonka, Minnesota. The loan is owned
by an affiliate of General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP) and is
anchored by Sears, JC Penney and Macy's. As of September 2013, in-
line shops were 72% leased compared to 74% as of December 2012. As
of the trailing 12-month period ending September 2013, total in-
line sales were $499 per square foot (PSF), a 2% increased from
the prior trailing 12-month period. This loan is subject to a 1%
liquidation fee at maturity because it was previously in special
servicing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.78X,
respectively, compared to 119% and 0.79X at last review.

The third largest loan is the IPC Louisville Portfolio Loan ($92.2
million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by eight properties
located in Louisville, KY (6), Manchester, NH (1) and Worcester,
MA (1). The eight properties are part of a larger 3.5 million SF
portfolio that was purchased by IPC (US), Inc. in May 1998, some
of which are also included in this transaction. As of January
2014, the portfolio was 85% leased compared to 77% leased as of
December 2012. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR 100% and 1.03X,
respectively, compared to 127% and 0.81X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-MIB1: Fitch Affirms C Rating on Class K Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banc of America Large Loan 2005-MIB1
(BALL 2005-MIB1) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are warranted as there has been no material
change in the performance of the remaining asset in the pool,
which is real-estate owned (REO), since Fitch's last rating
action.  In addition, the most junior class, class L, has already
incurred principal losses; interest shortfalls are affecting both
outstanding classes.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the outstanding classes are distressed and both
classes could ultimately experience losses upon disposition of the
remaining REO asset.

The transaction is collateralized by one property: The Shops at
Grand Avenue, an approximately 294,000 square foot (sf) regional
mall located in downtown Milwaukee, WI.  The property includes
major tenants such as TJ Maxx (lease expiration in March 2014) and
Office Max (lease expiration in March 2016).  As of Feb. 2014, the
property reported an overall occupancy of 89%, which includes a
significant number of tenants on short-term leases.  The asset
became REO in October 2012.

Fitch affirms the following class:

-- $5.6 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 65%.

The $15.5 million class L remains at 'Dsf', RE 0% due to realized
losses.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and interest-only classes
X-1A and X-4 have paid in full. Fitch previously withdrew the
ratings of interest-only classes X-1B, X-2, X-3 and X-5.


BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF1: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class I Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five classes of Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2000-WF1.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are the result of expected and already realized
losses to the remaining classes.  The pool is concentrated with
only 18 loans remaining.  Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(60.6% of the pool) are defeased.

Fitch modeled losses of 8.9% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 3.8%, including $33.1
million (3.7% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated three loans (10.8%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which does not include any specially serviced loans.

As of the February 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 99.2% to $6.9 million from
$888.3 million at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes I through M.

The largest contributor to expected losses is secured by a 85,813
square foot (sf) single-tenant building in Old Bridge, New Jersey
(3.9% of the pool).  The building is currently 100% occupied by a
Sears Auto Center, but the lease expires on April 20, 2014 and the
tenant will not be renewing.  Due to the potential for distress
following the imminent lease expiration, Fitch severely
handicapped this property's cash flow for analysis.  The servicer
reported a December 2012 debt service coverage ratio of 1.40x.

Rating Sensitivity

The rating on class H will remain at 'Csf' given the likelihood of
losses to this class. Classes I through L will remain at 'Dsf' as
losses have been realized.

Fitch affirms the following classes but revises REs as indicated:

-- $6.7 million class H at 'Csf', RE 95%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $193,289 class I at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F and G certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class M certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2000-WF2: Fitch Affirms Dsf Rating on Class L Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed three classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2000-WF2.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of class E and the upgrade of class F are the
result of sufficient credit enhancement in light of significant
pool concentration as only 25 loans remain.  The overall pool
performance has been stable with minimal losses since Fitch's last
rating action.

Fitch modeled losses of 1.7% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 2.2%, including $17.7
million (2.1% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated three loans (6.2%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which does not include any specially serviced loans.

As of the February 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95.7% to $35.7 million from
$838.5 million at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, seven
loans (48.9% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes J through N.

Rating Sensitivity

The ratings on classes E and F are expected to remain stable, as
credit enhancement remains high, which offsets the increasing
concentrations and continued risk of adverse selection. In
addition, there is adequate defeased collateral to pay down these
bonds in full at these loans' maturity dates in 2014, 2015 and
2020. Classes L and M will remain at 'Dsf' as losses have been
realized.

Fitch upgrades the following class as indicated:

-- $7.3 million class F to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $942,652 class E at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP24: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of seven classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-TOP24 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the two investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the below investment grade P&I
classes were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.2% of the
current balance compared to 6.4% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, compared to 24 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $1.01
billion from $1.53 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 131 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 18% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
48% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have
investment-grade credit assessments. The pool also includes three
loans, representing 2% of the pool, which are secured by
residential co-ops located in New York and have Aaa credit
assessments. One loan, constituting less than 1.0% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Forty loans, constituting 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $113.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 52%). Four loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$14.8 million loss for specially serviced loans (59% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 15 poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $15.8 million (17% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 74% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101% compared to
100% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased loans, and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 1.08X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Lee Harrison
Center Loan ($15.0 million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 110,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in Arlington,
Virginia. The center was 100% leased as September 2013, the same
as at last review. The property is anchored by the grocer Harris
Teeter, which leases 34% of the net rentable area (NRA) through
February 2022. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3
and 1.96X, respectively, compared to A3 and 1.91X at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 461 Fifth Avenue
Loan ($15.0 million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is secured by a
fee position in a parcel of land located in the Grand Central
submarket of Manhattan. The parcel is improved with a 204,000
square foot office building. Moody's credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are Aaa and 1.51X, respectively, the same as last
review.

The third loan with an investment grade credit assessment is the
City National Bank Building Loan ($9.8 million -- 1.0% of the
pool), which is secured by a 109,000 SF office building located in
North Hollywood, California. The property was 98% leased as of
December 2013 and the largest tenant (52% of the NRA) recently
renewed its leases for five years and now has a lease expiration
of December 2019. The loan is benefitting from amortization and
matures in October 2016. Moody's credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Baa1 and 1.96X, respectively, compared to Baa1 and 1.80X
at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 30% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the US Bancorp Tower Loan ($186.6
million -- 18.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.1 million
square foot office building located in Portland, Oregon. The
property was 88% leased as of December 2013 compared to 93% at
last review. As of December 2013, US Bank National Association
(senior unsecured rating Aa3, stable outlook) leases a combined
43% of the NRA through June 2015, however, the bank recently
announced it will reduce its footprint to approximately 277,000 SF
(25% of the NRA) by October 2014. Approximately 56,000 SF has
already been subleased and the master servicer has indicated the
Borrower is working on leasing up the remainder of the space. The
loan is interest only through the entire term and matures in
August 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and 0.85X,
respectively, compared to 109% and 0.92X.

The second largest loan is the Dulles Executive Plaza Loan ($68.8
million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 380,000 SF
office building located in Herndon, Virginia. The property was 92%
leased as of September 2013, the same as at last review. The sole
tenant is Lockheed Martin Corporation (senior unsecured rating
Baa1, stable outlook) with 50% of the NRA leased through May 2016
and 41% of the NRA leased through February 2018. Lockheed Martin
renewed its leases (which originally expired in 2011 & 2013) for
base rents that are more than 20% lower than its previous rent.
The rent reductions were all in place by January 2013, and is
reflected in the year to date September 2013 operating
performance. The loan is interest only throughout its entire term
and matures in September 2016. Due to the single tenancy, Moody's
value incorporates a Lit / Dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 123% and 0.83X, respectively, compared to 119% and 0.86X
at last review.

The third largest loan is the Potomac Place Shopping Center Loan
($44.0 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 80,000
SF retail center located in Potomac, Maryland. The property was
96% leased as of December 2013 compared to 97% at last review. The
property is anchored by Safeway (25% of the NRA; lease expiration
September 2027) and Rite Aid (15% of the NRA; lease expiration
September 2022). The loan is interest only throughout its entire
term and matures in October 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 90% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at last
review.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR15: Moody's Rates Class A-JFX Certs 'Caa1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating to one class of
CMBS securities of Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-PWR15, Series 2007-PWR15 Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates.

  Class A-JFX, $25,000,000, Assigned Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

There has been a partial termination of the Class A-JFL Swap
Agreement, along with an amendment of the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement in order to separately certificate a portion of the
Class A-JFL Certificate Balance to the successor Class A-JFX
Certificate. The rating on the Class A-JFX Certificate reflects
the partial termination of the Class A-JFL Swap Agreement.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC at the date it was prepared and such information
has not been independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be
construed solely as a statement of opinion and not a statement of
fact or an offer, invitation, inducement or recommendation to
purchase, sell or hold any securities or otherwise act in relation
to the issuer or any other entity or in connection with any other
matter. Moody's does not guarantee or make any representation or
warranty as to the correctness of any information, rating or
communication relating to the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable
in contract, tort, statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or
any other third party for any loss, injury or cost caused to the
issuer or any other third party, in whole or in part, including by
any negligence (but excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful
misconduct or any other type of liability that by law cannot be
excluded) on the part of, or any contingency beyond the control
of, Moody's, or any of its employees or agents, including any
losses arising from or in connection with the procurement,
compilation, analysis, interpretation, communication,
dissemination, or delivery of any information or rating relating
to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may
cause an upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns
or amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-PWR15: S&P Assigns 'D' Rating on $25MM Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'D (sf)' rating to
the $25.0 million class A-JFX commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates from Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities
Trust 2007-PWR15, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

S&P assigned its 'D (sf)' rating to the class A-JFX certificates
as they were issued in connection with the partial termination of
the interest rate swap agreement on the class A-JFL certificates.

S&P currently rates the class A-JFL certificates 'D (sf)'.  An
interest rate swap agreement supports the floating-rate interest
payments due on the class A-JFL certificates.  The interest
payments on these certificates are converted to the interest rate
on the underlying class A-JFL real estate mortgage investment
conduit (REMIC) regular interest if the applicable interest rate
swap agreement is terminated or if continuing payment default
exists on the related swap.

On March 19, 2014, the trust elected to partially terminate the
class A-JFL swap agreement for $25.0 million of the class A-JFL
certificates' $125.0 million outstanding, and the $25.0 million
portion has been re-designated as the class A-JFX certificates.
After the partial swap termination, the underlying $125.0 million
class A-JFL regular interest will back two classes: the $100.0
million class A-JFL certificates, which will continue to receive
floating-rate interest payments, and the $25.0 million class A-JFX
certificates, which will receive interest payments as described
above.  As a result of the split, any payments or losses on the
underlying class A-JFL REMIC regular interest that would have
previously been allocable to the class A-JFL certificates in full
will now be allocated to the class A-JFL and A-JFX certificates on
a pro rata basis, as applicable.


C-BASS CBO IX: Moody's Hikes Rating on $10MM Class Notes to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by C-BASS CBO IX Limited:

  $20,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes, Due 2039 (current outstanding balance of
  $4,294,303), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on March 6, 2014
  Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  $10,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
  Notes, Due 2039, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on March 6,
  2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

C-BASS CBO IX, Limited, issued in March 2004, is a collateralized
debt obligation issuance backed by a portfolio of RMBS and ABS,
originated in 2003 and 2004.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class A-2 notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ("OC") ratios since September 2013. The Class A-
2 Notes have been paid down by approximately 57%, or $5.6 million
since September 2013. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios
for the Class A-2 and Class B note are currently at 505.0% and
151.7%, respectively, versus 225.6% and 112.2% in September 2013.

The deal also benefits from the updates to the Moody's SF CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps we apply to deals experiencing
event of default. In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also
announced that it had concluded its review of its ratings on the
issuer's Class A-2 and Class B notes announced on March 6, 2014.
At that time, Moody's said that it had placed the ratings on
review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned methodology
updates.

Despite the benefits of the deleveraging, the credit quality of
the portfolio has deteriorated since September 2013. Based on
Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor is
currently 4334, compared to 3393 in September 2013.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two notches:

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Ba1 and below ratings notched down by two notches:

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: 0

Class D: 0


CAPITAL TRUST 2004-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on the class
C certificates from Capital Trust Re CDO 2004-1 Ltd. (Capital
Trust 2004-1), a commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligations (CRE CDO) transaction.  Concurrently, S&P affirmed its
ratings on two other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the underlying credit characteristics of
the collateral using its global CDOs of pooled structured finance
assets criteria, its rating methodology and assumptions for U.S.
and Canadian commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), and its
CMBS global property evaluation methodology criteria.  Due to the
relative size of the collateral remaining in the trust, the
upgrade of class C primarily reflects the credit characteristics
of the performing loan assets in the transaction as well as
principal amortization.

S&P had previously lowered its ratings on classes F, G, and H to
'D (sf)' based on its expectation that the classes are unlikely to
be repaid in full.

According to the Feb. 18, 2014, trustee report, the transaction's
collateral totaled $58.0 million, while the transaction's
liabilities (including capitalized interest) totaled $245.7
million, down from $324.1 million at issuance.  The transaction's
current asset pool consists of three subordinate B-notes ($57.5
million) and one CMBS tranche ($438,005).  Details on the three
B-notes and CMBS tranche are as follows:

   -- The 1111 Marcus B-note ($27.0 million, 46.6%).

   -- The DRA/Crocker Office Portfolio B-note ($20.0 million,
      34.5%).

   -- The Resorts International Portfolio B-note ($10.5 million,
      18.2%),

   -- GE Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp.'s series 2000-1, class
      G ($438,005, 0.7%).

The February 2014 trustee report reported the CMBS asset and the
Resorts International Portfolio B-note as impaired.  S&P estimated
no recoveries to the impaired Resorts International Portfolio B-
note, primarily using information from the collateral manager.

S&P applied asset-specific recovery rates in its analysis of the
two performing loans--1111 Marcus B-note and DRA/Crocker Office
Portfolio B-note ($47.0 million, 81.1%)--using S&P's criteria for
U.S. and Canadian CMBS and its CMBS global property evaluation
methodology.  S&P also considered qualitative factors, such as the
refinancing prospects and loans modifications in its analysis.
According to the Feb. 18, 2014, trustee report, the deal passed
the C/D/E overcollateralization test and the C/D/E interest
coverage test.

The ratings are consistent with the credit enhancement available
to support them and reflect S&P's analysis of the transaction's
liability structure and the underlying collateral's credit
characteristics.

RATING RAISED

Capital Trust RE CDO 2004-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations

               Rating
Class       To             From
C           BB+ (sf)       CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Capital Trust RE CDO 2004-1 Ltd.
Collateralized debt obligations

Class        Rating
D            CCC- (sf)
E            CCC- (sf)


CARLYLE DAYTONA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Cl. B-2L Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Carlyle Daytona CLO, Ltd.:

  $33,000,000 Class A-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 3, 2013 Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf)

  $33,000,000 Class A-3L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
  Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 3, 2013 Upgraded to A2
  (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $358,000,000 Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021
  (current outstanding balance of $276,787,301.05), Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on June 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Up To U.S.$50,000,000 Class A-1LV Floating Rate Revolving Notes
  Due April 2021 (current outstanding balance of $38,657,444.30),
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 3, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class B-1L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
  Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on June 3, 2013 Upgraded to Baa3
  (sf)

  $21,000,000 Class B-2L Floating Rate Notes Due April 2021,
  Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on June 3, 2013 Upgraded to Ba2
  (sf)

Carlyle Daytona CLO, Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in June
2013. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately
21.3% or $86.8 since June 2013. Based on the trustee's February
2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for Class A-1,
A-2L, A-3L, B-1L and B-2L are 142.68%, 129.17%, 118.00%, 112.12%
and 106.87%, respectively, versus May 2013 levels of 132.61%,
122.56%, 113.92%, 109.25% and 105.02%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt maturities,
which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2072)

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: +3

Class B-1L: +3

Class B-2L: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3108)

Class A-1LV: 0

Class A-1L: 0

Class A-2L: -1

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -1

Class B-2L: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $442.9 million, defaulted
par of $8.6 million, a weighted average default probability of
19.54% (implying a WARF of 2590), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.64%, a diversity score of 61 and a weighted
average spread of 3.19%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


CENTURION CDO 9: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Centurion CDO 9 Limited:

$35,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 20, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf)

$38,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on June 20, 2012 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

$55,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

$5,000,000 Class Q-2 Combination Securities Due July 17, 2019
(current rated balance of $1,909,557), Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
previously on June 20, 2012 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$40,000,000 Class A-1A Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019
(current outstanding balance of $33,624,635), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$586,000,000 Class A-1B Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019
(current outstanding balance of $492,600,909), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on August 19, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$9,500,000 Class D-1 Floating Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019,
Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on June 20, 2012 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

$4,000,000 Class D-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due July 17, 2019, Affirmed
B1 (sf); previously on June 20, 2012 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Centurion CDO 9 Limited, issued in June 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since March 2013. The Class A-1A and
Class A-1B notes have been paid down by approximately 13% or $78.5
million since March 2013. Based on the trustee's February 7, 2014
report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A and
Class B notes are reported at 125.6%, and 117.6%, respectively,
versus March 2013 levels of 123.0%, 116.1%, respectively.

Moody's notes that the transaction holds significant amount of
equity securities which are part of recoveries from defaulted or
restructured issuers. Moody's considered alternative scenarios in
its analysis where a limited amount of credit was given to these
holdings.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's February 2013
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 7.7% of the portfolio versus 1.5% in March 2013.
These investments could expose the Class D notes to market risk in
the event of liquidation when the notes mature. As a result,
Moody's affirmed the Class D notes' ratings.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements
extending maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable
exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to
the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1983)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D-1: +3

Class D-2: +3

Class Q-2: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2975)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Class Q-2: -3

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $693.0 million, defaulted
par of $18.7 million, a weighted average default probability of
14.89% (implying a WARF of 2479), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.01%, a diversity score of 60, and a weighted
average spread of 3.06%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2005-EMG: Moody's Cuts X Certs to 'Caa1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class,
upgraded the rating on one class and downgraded the rating on one
class in Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-EMG as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on Class M was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on Class L was
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support
resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid
down 85% since Moody's last review.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.4% of the
current balance compared to 1.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 0.1% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to a Herf of 7 at Moody's last
review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the February 24, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.5% to $3 million
from $722 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 43% of the pool.

Two loans, constituting 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $183,000 (for an average loss severity
of 1%). Currently there are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 81% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 47% compared to 38%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.13X and 5.53X,
respectively, compared to 2.80X and 5.31X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 98% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 177-179 Forest Avenue Loan ($1.5 million --
43% of the pool), which is secured by a 48,192 square foot (SF)
single tenant retail property leased to Stop & Shop. The loan is
fully amortizing and the tenant lease is concurrent with the loan
expiration date. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.48X,
respectively, compared to 36% and 3.34X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 971 First Avenue Loan ($1.2 million
-- 36% of the pool), which is secured by a mixed use property
composed of both retail and multifamily units. The loan is full
term IO and matures in May 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
55% and 1.67X, respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 122-140 West Post Road Loan ($0.6
million -- 19% of the pool), which is secured by eight retail
properties with a total size of 11,678 SF located in White Plains,
NY. Property was 100% leased as of August 2012. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.71X, respectively, compared to 55% and
2.16X at the last review.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2005-C3: S&P Cuts Class E Notes' Rating to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
E commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)'.  At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on
the class A-3 and A-SB certificates from the same transaction.

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class E certificates
following principal losses detailed in the March 17, 2014 trustee
remittance report.  The principal losses, totaling $28.3 million,
resulted primarily from the liquidation of the Novo Nordisk
Headquarters asset and the Speedway Shopping Center loan, which
were with the special servicer, CWCapital Asset Management LLC.
According to the March 2014 trustee remittance report, the Novo
Nordisk Headquarters asset liquidated at a 41.3% loss severity (or
$19.8 million in principal losses) of its $47.9 million beginning
scheduled trust balance and the Speedway Shopping Center loan
liquidated at a 64.9% loss severity (or $8.3 million in principal
losses) of its $12.9 million beginning scheduled trust balance.
Consequently, class E incurred principal losses totaling $4.3
million, or 23.8% of its $17.9 million original principal balance,
while class F lost 100% of its $19.7 million opening balance and
class G lost 100% of its $4.3 million opening balance," S&P said.
S&P had previously lowered its ratings on classes F and G to 'D
(sf)'.

S&P also withdrew its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-3 and A-SB
certificates, following the classes' full principal repayment, as
reflected in the March 17, 2014 trustee remittance report.

Rating Actions

Rating Lowered

Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C3

Class          To         From

E              D(sf)      CCC-(sf)

Ratings Withdrawn

Class          To         From

A-3            NR         AAA(sf)
A-SB           NR         AAA(sf)

NR-Not rated.


COA SUMIT: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $20MM Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by COA Sumit CLO Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "COA Summit").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$256,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

$50,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2023 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

$22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2023 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

COA Summit is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 5.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans, senior secured floating rate notes and bonds. The
portfolio was expected to be at least 89% ramped as of the closing
date.

3i Debt Management U.S. LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's one year
reinvestment period.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes.

This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


COMM MORTGAGE 2005-FL11: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class K Secs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two pooled classes of COMM Mortgage
Trust 2005-FL11.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations are warranted as the remaining collateral that
secures the final loan: DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio,
continues to stabilize.  The asset is real-estate owned (REO). In
its review, Fitch analyzed servicer-reported rent rolls, most
recent reported property valuations, and recent leasing activity.
Of the remaining 17 properties, the majority have been fully or
partially leased with the latest reported portfolio occupancy of
73%. Three properties remain vacant.

Rating Sensitivities

The Outlook remains Negative on class K pending the ultimate
resolution and recoveries on the DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio.

The REO DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio was originally
collateralized by 35 retail stores, 31 fee and four leasehold,
located in California, Nevada, Arizona and Texas, of which 17
remain.  The collateral was previously 100% occupied by Mervyn's,
which is no longer in operation.  The total debt includes three A
notes: two fixed rate, pari passu notes with an outstanding
balance of approximately $71 million each, and the floating rate
component in this transaction with an outstanding balance of $11.4
million.


Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $2.98 million class K at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

The $8.4 million class L remains at 'Dsf', RE 20% due to realized
losses.

Classes A-1, A-J, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, X-1, X-2-SG, X-3-SG, M-
SHI, M-COP, M-GP, N-GP, O-GP, P-GP, Q-GP, R-GP, S-GP, T-GP, U-GP
and V-GP have paid in full. Classes X-2-CB, X-2-DB, X-3-CB and X-
3-DB were previously withdrawn.


COMM MORTGAGE 2014-LC15: DBRS Rates Cl. E Certs 'BB(low)(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2014-LC15 (the Certificates), to be issued by COMM 2014-LC15
Mortgage Trust.  The trends are Stable.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

Classes D, E, F, X-B and X-C will be privately placed pursuant to
Rule 144A.

The Class X-A, X-B and X-C balances are notional.  DBRS ratings on
interest-only certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding.  DBRS considers
the interest-only certificates' position within the transaction
payment waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

Up to the full certificate balance of the Class A-M, Class B and
Class C certificates may be exchanged for Class PEZ certificates.
Class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for up to the full
certificate balance of the Class A-M, Class B and Class C
certificates.

The collateral consists of 48 fixed-rate loans secured by 197
commercial properties, comprising a total transaction balance of
$927,464,814.  The DBRS sample included 23 loans, representing
82.6% of the pool.  The pool has a high concentration of
properties located in urban markets (42.9% of the pool), which
benefit from a larger investor, consumer and tenant base, even in
times of stress.  While only one property securing one loan,
representing 3.5% of the DBRS sample, was modeled with Above
Average property quality, no properties were found to have Below
Average or Poor property quality.

The pool is concentrated by loan size as the top ten loans
represent 62.1% of the overall pool balance.  The pool has a
concentration level similar to a pool of 21 equal-sized loans.

However, 12 loans, representing 29.8% of the pool, are secured by
multiple property portfolios, which enhances diversity at the loan
level.  At 55.1% of the pool, the transaction has a high
concentration of 14 loans with DBRS Refinance debt service
coverage ratios (DSCRs) below 1.00 times based on the trust
balance.  However, these DSCRs are based on a weighted-average
stressed refinance constant of 9.7%, which implies an interest
rate of 9.2%, amortizing on a 30-year schedule.  This represents a
significant stress of 4.2% over the weighted-average contractual
interest rate of the loans in the pool.  Six loans, representing
15.9% of the pool, are considered by DBRS to have weak sponsorship
based on prior bankruptcies, foreclosures, other credit events
and/or limited net worth/liquidity.  DBRS increased the
probability of default for loans with identified sponsorship
concerns.


CPS AUTO 2014-A: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to CPS
Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A's $180 million asset-backed notes
series 2014-A.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securitization backed by
subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 44.4%, 37.2%, 31.0%,
      27.7%, and 26.1% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit support
      levels provide coverage of 2.8x, 2.3x, 1.75x, 1.58x, and
      1.17x its 15.0%-15.4% expected cumulative net loss range for
      the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   -- The expectation that, under a moderate stress scenario of
      1.75x S&P's expected net loss level, the rating on the class
      A notes will not decline by more than one rating category
      during the first year, and the ratings on class B through E
      notes will not decline by more than two rating categories
      during the first year, all else being equal.  This is
      consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria, which
      outlines the outer bounds of credit deterioration equal to a
      one-category downgrade within the first year for 'AA' rated
      securities and a two-category downgrade within the first
      year for 'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' rated securities.

   -- The rated notes' underlying credit enhancement, which is in
      the form of subordination, overcollateralization, a reserve
      account, and excess spread for the class A, B, C, D, and E
      notes.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated
      notes under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios,
      which S&P believes is appropriate for the assigned ratings.

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structure,
      which includes a noncurable performance trigger.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2014-A

Class     Rating        Type          Interest          Amount
                                      rate            (mil. $)
A         AA- (sf)      Senior        Fixed            128.700
B         A (sf)        Subordinate   Fixed             20.700
C         BBB (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed             16.650
D         BB+ (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed              9.000
E         B+ (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed              4.950


CREDIT SUISSE 2002-CKN2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. F Certs to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
downgraded one class and affirmed one class of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-CKN2 as follows:

Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 15, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 15, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on May 15, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on Class F was upgraded due to higher recovery than
expected from liquidated loans. Given the remaining collateral in
the pool, Moody's does not expect any additional losses. The
ratings on the IO Class, Class A-X, was downgraded due to a
decline in the weighted average rating factor or WARF of its
referenced class. The rating on the IO Class, Class A-Y, was
affirmed based on the credit quality of its referenced loans.

Moody's rating action reflects base expected loss plus realized
losses is now 8.7% of the original pooled balance compared to 8.6%
at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was " Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of one compared to two at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $5.3 million
from $918.1 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 90%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities. Three loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are secured
by residential co-op loans that have a Aaa credit assessment.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $80.0 million (for an average loss
severity of 53%). There are currently no loans on the servicer's
watchlist or in special servicing.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C2: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Class O Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2004-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

Affirmations reflect stable collateral performance and sufficient
credit enhancement of the remaining classes.  The pool has become
increasingly concentrated with only 23 loans remaining.

Fitch modeled losses of 2.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 1.6%, including $11.5
million (1.2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  Fitch has designated 12 loans (23.8%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes two specially serviced assets (3.5%).

As of the February 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 84% to $154.9 million from
$966.8 million at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, eight
loans (57.5% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes F through P.

The largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is a loan (1.6%)
secured by 174-unit multifamily property located in Phoenix, AZ.
Property cash flow has deteriorated since issuance due to a
decrease in overall effective gross income and an increase in
operating expenses.  As of year-end 2012, the Debt Service
Coverage Ratio, on a net operating income basis, was 0.63x
compared to 1.25x at issuance.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced loan (1.9%), which is secured by 49,700 square foot
retail center located in Houston, TX.  The loan transferred to the
special servicer due to a maturity default.  The borrower has
continued to make payments and a refinance is expected with a
local bank pending an environmental report.  As of year-end 2012,
the Debt Service Coverage Ratio, on a net operating income basis,
was 1.16x.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is a specially-
serviced loan (1.7%), which is secured by secured by a 16,800
square foot retail property located in Puyallup, WA, which is 35
miles south of Seattle.  The loan was transferred back to special
servicing in February 2013 due to payment default.  The loan had
previously been in special servicing in 2009 for payment default,
but was brought current in early 2011 and returned to the master
servicer in mid-2012.  The borrower requested for a short-term
forbearance due to cash flow problems, but has not been responsive
to communication attempts by the special servicer.  The special
servicer is pursuing foreclosure at this time and a foreclosure
date has been set for April 2014.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-1-A through K are Stable due to
increased credit enhancement from paydown of $520 million since
Fitch's last review.  While over half of the remaining pool has
been defeased, significant interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes F through P limiting potential upgrades until
these shortfalls are resolved.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks
and REs as indicated:

-- $10.9 million class H at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $6 million class J at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from Negative;
-- $3.6 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $3.6 million class L at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $2.4 million class N at 'CCsf'; RE 45%.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $33.5 million class A-1-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26.6 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.9 million class C at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.5 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.7 million class E at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.7 million class F at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.7 million class G at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.2 million class O at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class M and P certificates. Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class A-X and A-SP certificates.


CREST 2002-IG: Fitch Ups $8,059,173 Class D Notes to 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class issued by Crest 2002-IG
Ltd./Corp. (Crest 2002-IG) as follows:

-- $8,059,173 class D notes to 'Bsf' from 'CCsf'; Outlook Stable
assigned.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade to the class D notes reflects the significant
delevering of the capital structure.  Since the last rating action
in April 2013, the transaction has received $51.3 million in
paydowns which has resulted in the full repayment of the class B
and C notes and $6.5 million in paydowns to the class D notes.
Over this period, approximately 8.8% of the remaining collateral
has been downgraded and 15.9% has been upgraded.

This transaction was analyzed under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
the Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) for projecting future default
levels for the underlying portfolio.  Fitch also analyzed the
structure's sensitivity to the assets that are distressed,
experiencing interest shortfalls, and those with near-term
maturities.  Additionally, an asset by asset analysis was then
performed for the remaining assets to determine the collateral
coverage for the remaining liabilities.

Crest 2002-IG is a cash flow commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) which closed on May 16, 2002. T he
current collateral is composed of five assets from five obligors
all of which are commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). The
Fitch derived rating for the remaining collateral consists of
34.2% at 'AAA', 15.9% at 'BB-', and 49.9% at 'CCC'.

Rating Sensitivity

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that the notes will
continue to delever.  The upgrade was limited to 'Bsf' due to the
increased risk for an interest shortfall on the notes as a result
of increased concentration and adverse selection.


CSFB 1999-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. A-X Certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of
CSFB 1999-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-X Certificate, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12,
2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating of the IO class, Class A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes The IO class is the
only outstanding Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of
its referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a
lower weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.6. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $33 million
from $1.17 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 46% of the pool. The pool contains no loans that have
investment grade credit assessments. Two loans, representing 76%
of the pool have defeased and are secured by US Government
securities.

One loan, representing less than 1% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized bond loss of $82 million (46% loan loss
severity on average). One loan, representing 22% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan,
formerly known as the IBM Corporate Center ($7 million -- 22% of
the pool), is secured by a 129,000 square foot suburban office
property in Parsippany, New Jersey which is suffering from poor
cash flow. Moody's analysis incorporates a high loss severity for
this specially serviced loan.

The remaining loans (excluding defeased and specially serviced
loans) together represent less than 2% of the pool balance.
Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and full or partial year
2013 operating results for 100% and 50 % of the remaining pool,
respectively. Moody's weighted average LTV for these remaining
loans is 4%. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs for the remaining pool
are 1.68X and 38.39X, respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based
on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate
applied to the loan balance.


CSFB 2005-4: Moody's Lowers Rating on 6 Class Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches issued by CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-4. The tranches are backed by Alt-A RMBS loans issued
in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-4

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-5, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-6, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-7, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed B1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-8, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The actions consider that losses and principal will be
allocated pro-rata after credit support depletion occurs. The
actions also consider that the Class II-A-7 share of losses is
allocated to the Class II-A-9.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.6% in January 2014 from 7.9%
in January 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range
of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


EXETER AUTOMOBILE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on three
classes from Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust's (EART) series
2012-1 and 2012-2.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on 13
classes from EART series 2012-1, 2012-2, 2013-1, and 2013-2.

The collateral pools for the EART transactions consist of auto
loans originated and serviced by Exeter Finance Corp.

The rating actions reflect S&P's analysis-driven view regarding
future collateral performance, as well as each transaction's
structure and credit enhancement level.  In addition, S&P's
analysis incorporated secondary credit factors such as credit
stability, payment priorities under various scenarios, and sector-
and issuer-specific analysis.

While losses are trending higher than S&P's initial expectations
for both series 2012-1 and 2012-2, this is mitigated by the growth
in credit support as a percent of the amortizing collateral
balance, which has been significant enough to warrant rating
affirmations, and in some cases, upgrades.  S&P increased its
lifetime loss expectations for both series 2012-1 and 2012-2 as a
result of the transactions' higher-than-expected default
frequencies and S&P's view of future collateral performance.  In
S&P's opinion, the total credit support, as a percentage of the
amortizing pool balance, compared with our revised expected
remaining losses, is adequate for the raised and affirmed ratings.
The hard credit support for the three classes being upgraded has
increased by 166% (class B from series 2012-1), 178% (class C from
series 2012-1), and 89% (class B from 2012-2) since each
transaction closed.

S&P is maintaining its initial loss expectations for series 2013-1
and 2013-2 pending further collateral performance, given these
transactions' short performance histories.  However, since these
transactions closed, the credit support for each class has also
increased, as a percentage of the amortizing pool balance, and in
our view, is adequate to support the affirmed ratings.

Table 1
Collateral Performance (%)
As of the February 2014 distribution date

               Pool  Current   60+ day    Current
Series  Mo.  factor      CNL   delinq.        CRR
2012-1  24   40.42     10.74      8.06      46.39
2012-2  17   58.57      8.12     10.98      44.42
2013-1   9   79.12      3.50      6.64      43.39
2013-2   5   90.39      1.10      4.76      44.63

CNL-Cumulative net loss.
CRR-Cumulative recovery rate.
Mo.-Month.

Table 2
CNL Expectations (%)
As of the February 2014 distribution month

                  Former             Revised
                lifetime            lifetime
Series           CNL exp.           CNL exp.
2012-1     14.00-15.00(i)        16.50-17.50
2012-2     14.50-15.50(i)        18.00-19.00
2013-1     17.00-18.00(i)                N/A
2013-2     17.00-18.00(i)                N/A

(i) Represents initial lifetime CNL expectation on the underlying
     transaction.
CNL exp.-Cumulative net loss expectations.
N/A-Not applicable.

Each transaction was structured with credit enhancement consisting
of overcollateralization, a non-amortizing reserve account, and
subordination for the more senior tranches.  The credit
enhancement for three of the four transactions is at their
specified enhancement target floor.  For series 2013-2, the target
overcollateralization has not been met yet; however, the
overcollateralization is growing as a percentage of the amortizing
pool balance (see table 3).

Table 3
Hard Credit Support (%)
As of the February 2014 distribution month

                 Total hard      Current total hard
                 credit support      credit support
Series  Class    at issuance(i)   (% of current)(i)
2012-1  A                 32.42               84.01
2012-1  B                 20.91               55.52
2012-1  C                 12.33               34.31
2012-1  D                  4.00               13.70
2012-2  A                 31.77               57.82
2012-2  B                 20.01               37.74
2012-2  C                  9.88               20.45
2012-2  D                  4.00               10.41
2013-1  A                 36.00               50.71
2013-1  B                 25.25               37.12
2013-1  C                 13.00               21.64
2013-1  D                  5.00               11.53
2013-2  A                 41.00               49.28
2013-2  B                 28.00               34.90
2013-2  C                 18.75               24.67
2013-2  D                  6.00               10.56

(i) Calculated as a percent of the total gross receivable pool
     balance, consisting of a reserve account,
     overcollateralization, and, if applicable, subordination.

"Our review of the transactions incorporated cash flow analysis,
which included current and historical performance to estimate
future performance.  Our various cash flow scenarios included
forward-looking assumptions on recoveries, timing of losses, and
voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that we believe are
appropriate given each transaction's performance to date.  The
results demonstrated, in our view, that all of the classes from
these transactions have adequate credit enhancement at their
raised and affirmed rating levels," S&P said.

"Aside from our breakeven cash flow analysis, we also conducted
sensitivity analysis on series 2012-1 and 2012-2 to determine the
impact that a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would have on our
ratings if losses were to begin trending higher than our revised
base-case loss expectation.  Our results show the raised and
affirmed ratings are consistent with our rating stability
criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit deterioration
for any given security under specific, hypothetical stress
scenarios," S&P added.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in our view, to cover our revised cumulative
net loss expectations under our stress scenarios for each of the
rated classes," S&P noted.

RATINGS RAISED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust
                         Rating
Series     Class      To         From
2012-1     B          AA- (sf)   A (sf)
2012-1     C          A+ (sf)    BBB (sf)
2012-2     B          AA- (sf)   A (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust

Series     Class      Rating

2012-1     A          AA (sf)
2012-1     D          BB (sf)

2012-2     A          AA (sf)
2012-2     C          BBB (sf)
2012-2     D          BB (sf)

2013-1     A          AA (sf)
2013-1     B          A (sf)
2013-1     C          BBB (sf)
2013-1     D          BB (sf)

2013-2     A          AA (sf)
2013-2     B          A (sf)
2013-2     C          BBB (sf)
2013-2     D          BB (sf)


FIRST UNION 2001-C1: Moody's Affirms Ratings on 4 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
of First Union National Bank -- Bank of America, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-C1 as follows:

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. IO-I, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. IO-III, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the two P&I classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on the two IO classes were affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 33.0% of
the current balance compared to 47.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.3% of the
original pooled balance compared to 7.6% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 45% of the pool is in
special servicing and the performing conduit loan only represents
55% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected
loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from
specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

Description of Models Used

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2 compared to 3 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $24 million
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

One loan, constituting 45% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loan is the Tripp Industrial
Loan ($11 million), which is secured by a 836,000 square foot (SF)
property comprised of nine warehouse buildings in Greenville,
North Carolina. The property's former lead tenant (occupying
603,000 SF, or 72% of the property net rentable area (NRA)) was in
default and vacated the premises on December 31, 2012. Several new
tenants have signed and the property was 47% occupied as of
December 2013.

Thirty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $92 million (for an average loss
severity of 30%).

The single conduit loan is the Palisades Apartments Loan ($13
million -- 55% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 280-unit
multifamily property located in the northwest section of Las
Vegas, Nevada. The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2010 due to maturity default. The loan was modified in
December 2012 to extend the maturity date to June 2022 and reduce
the interest rate from 8.1% to 4.7%. Property occupancy was 91% as
of September 2013, down from 95% in December 2012. Partial-year
property NOI for 2013 is above 2012 NOI due to an increase in base
rents. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.78X,
respectively, compared to 138% and 0.74X at last review.


GFCM LLC 2003-1: Moody's Hikes Rating to Cl. F Certs to 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on four classes and
affirmed the ratings on six classes in GFCM LLC, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2003-1 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on four P&I classes were upgraded due to an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 14% since Moody's last review and 72% since
securitization. The ratings on three investment grade P&I classes
were affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index
(Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The ratings on two below
investment grade P&I classes were affirmed because their ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on the IO
class was affirmed based on the credit performance (or the
weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 34 compared to 37 at last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 72% to $227.1
million from $822.6 million at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 92 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool.

Currently nineteen loans, constituting 19% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.9 million or (10% average loan loss
severity). There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 2% of the pool. Moody's has
estimated a $783,400 aggregate loss for the troubled loans (15.0%
expected loss overall).

Moody's received full year 2011 and 2012 operating results for 92%
and 94% of the pool, respectively and partial year 2013 operating
results for 19%. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 45%,
compared to 51% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component
excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10.8% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.54X and 2.90X,
respectively, compared to 1.47X and 2.59X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 22% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Gateway Plaza I & II Loan
($22.6 million -- 10% of the pool), which consists of two cross-
collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by a 339,200
square foot (SF) power center located in Patchogue (Suffolk
County), New York. The loan matures in April 2023 and amortizes on
a 300-month schedule. The retail center is anchored by Bob's, Best
Buy, Marshall's, and Home Goods. The property was 100% leased as
of September 2013; the same as at last review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 46% and 2.19X, respectively, compared to 57% and
1.76X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Maryland Industrial Office
Portfolio Loan ($16.2 million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured
by nine industrial properties and one office building located in
Baltimore, Maryland. The portfolio totals 1.3 million SF and was
93% leased as of December 2012 compared to 80% leased at last
review. The loan matures in February 2018 and fully amortizes on a
180-month schedule. Three of the properties are on the watchlist
due to a decrease in occupancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
32% and 3.77X, respectively, compared to 39% and 3.08X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Eastover Ridge Apartment & Brunswick
Office Loan ($11.3 million -- 5% of the pool), which consists of
two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by a
208-unit apartment complex (Eastover Ridge Apartments) and a
16,000 square feet medical office building (Brunswick Office)
located in Charlotte, North Carolina. The loan matures in
September 2027 and fully amortizes on a 300-month schedule. The
loan is currently on the watchlist due to declining DSCR, a result
of rental concessions offered since 2009. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 81% and 1.27X, respectively, compared to 100% and 1.02X
at last review.


GLENEAGLES CLO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gleneagles CLO, Ltd.:

$60,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable Notes
Due November 1, 2017, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August
23, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

$51,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due November 1, 2017, Upgraded to Baa2
(sf); previously on August 23, 2013 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

$5,000,000 Class 1 Extendable Combination Notes Due November 1,
2017 (current rated balance of $3,289,104), Upgraded to A2 (sf);
previously on August 23, 2013 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$620,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due November 1, 2017 (current outstanding balance of
$208,376,492), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on August 23, 2013
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$28,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due November 1, 2017, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
August 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

$49,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due November 1, 2017 (current
outstanding balance of $28,816,366), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously
on August 23, 2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., issued in October 2005, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
November 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since August 2013. The Class A-1 notes
have been paid down by approximately 26% or $72.8 million since
August 2013. Based on the trustee's February 2014 report, the
over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, and
Class D notes are reported at 135.53%, 115.66%, and 106.81%,
respectively, versus July 2013 levels of 124.28%, 111.61%, and
105.53%, respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since August 2013. The Moody's calculated weighted average rating
factor is currently 2817 compared to the August 2013 value of
2722.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's February 2014
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make
up approximately 10.6% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC ratio of the
Class D notes, Moody's affirmed the rating on the Class D notes
owing to market risk stemming from the exposure to these long-
dated assets.

The rating actions on the Class B and Class 1 Combination notes
also reflect a correction to Moody's modeling of the weighted
average recovery rate. Due to input errors, Moody's understated
the weighted average recovery rate used to model the transaction
in the August 23, 2013 rating action. This error has now been
corrected, and today's rating actions reflect this change.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. If Moody's does not receive the
necessary information to update its credit estimates in a timely
fashion, the transaction could be negatively affected by any
default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated
credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2254)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class 1 Combination Securities: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3380)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Class 1 Combination Securities: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $386.7 million, defaulted
par of $73.8 million, a weighted average default probability of
15.39% (implying a WARF of 2817), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 52.28%, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted
average spread of 3.4%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.

The collateral pool includes some debt obligations whose credit
quality Moody's assesses through credit estimates. Moody's
analysis reflects adjustments with respect to the default
probabilities associated with credit estimates. Specifically,
Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with credit
estimates that have not been updated within the last 15 months,
which represent approximately 3.3% of the collateral pool.


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2005-GG5: Moody's Cuts Cl. C Certs Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings for two
classes, and affirmed 12 classes of Greenwich Capital Commercial
Funding Corp. Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-GG5 as follows:

Cl. A-4-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings for Classes B and C were downgraded due to realized
and anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans
that were higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes, D through H were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class (Class XC) was affirmed because the
weighted average rating factor or WARF of its referenced classes
is consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.4% of
the current balance compared to 11.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.1% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 12.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25, compared to 27 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $2.85
billion from $4.30 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 133 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 48% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
4% of the pool, have investment-grade credit assessments. Ten
loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased and are secured
by US government securities.

Twenty-seven loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $179 million (for an
average loss severity of 34%). Seventeen loans, constituting 16%
of the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest
specially serviced loan -- formerly known as the Schron Industrial
Portfolio ($208 million -- 7% of the pool) -- is secured by a 3.5
million square foot portfolio of 17 industrial REO properties.
Originally a portfolio of 6.2 million square feet of industrial
property located across 14 U.S. states, the servicer has sold a
large portion of the portfolio through the sale of individual REO
assets. Of the 17 remaining properties, seven have occupancy at or
below 40%, and overall financial performance for the remaining
properties is weaker than for the assets which have already been
disposed. Accordingly, Moody's analysis considers adverse
selection in its value estimate for the remaining assets in the
portfolio.

The remaining 16 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $287 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (61% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 17 poorly
performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $39 million (18% expected loss based on a 49%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 62% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, the same as
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 12.1% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.25%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.08X,
respectively, compared to 1.39X and 1.06X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the San Francisco
Centre Loan ($60 million -- 2% of the pool), which represents a
50% participation interest in a $120 million mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by the leasehold interest in a shopping mall in
downtown San Francisco, California. The center is anchored by
Bloomingdale's and Nordstrom. The property was 97% leased as of
September 2013, similar to the number reported at Moody's last
review. Full-year 2013 financials reflect robust NOI improvement,
supported by top line growth driven primarily by increased rental
revenues. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and
1.39X, respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.27X at the last
review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Imperial
Valley Loan ($51 million -- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a
portion of a regional mall in El Centro, California. The mall is
approximately 18 miles north of Mexicali, Mexico. Anchor tenants
include Sears, JC Penney, Dillard's, and Macy's. The property was
98% leased as of June 2013. Financial performance has been stable.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.49X,
respectively, compared to Baa2 and 1.50X at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 731 Lexington Avenue Loan ($320 million -- 11%
of the pool), which is secured by a 147,000 square foot retail
component of the mixed-use Bloomberg Tower building located in
Midtown Manhattan. The property is fully-leased with minimal lease
rollover. Retailers at the property include The Home Depot, H&M,
and The Container Store. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
1.60X, respectively, which is unchanged from Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Lynnhaven Mall Loan ($212 million -
- 7% of the pool). The loan is secured by 776,000 square feet of a
larger regional mall located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. The loan
sponsor is General Growth Properties (GGP). The loan was modified
in 2010 as part of the GGP bankruptcy to include a loan maturity
extension to January 2017. One anchor space, formerly occupied by
Lord & Taylor, has been vacant since securitization. The
remaining, non-collateral anchors include Macy's, Dillard's and JC
Penney. The mall was 83% leased as of March 2013, compared to 90%
leased in September 2012. September 2013 comp inline sales were
$373 per square foot, down slightly from sales reported in 2012
and 2011. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.90X,
respectively, compared to 102% and 0.87X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the JQH Hotel Portfolio A ($181 million
-- 6% of the pool). The loan is secured by a portfolio of eight
full-service hotels. The portfolio benefits from diversity of
location (hotels are located across eight states) and flag
diversity (six hotel flags). Portfolio performance has improved
with the broader economic recovery and the loans benefit from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 117% and, 1.02X,
respectively, compared to 119% and 1.00X at the last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2011-GC3: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on ten classes in
GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-GC3 Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2011-GC3 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.5% of the
current balance compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.4% of the
original pooled balance compared to 1.8% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 22, the same as at last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 4% to $1.34 billion
from $1.40 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 56 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 59% of
the pool. The pool contains one loan, representing less than 1% of
the pool, that has defeased and is secured by U.S. Government
securities. The pool contains three loans with investment-grade
credit assessments that represent 6% of the pool.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool or are in special
servicing. Six loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that
meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of
the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part
of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2011 and 2012 operating results for 99%
and 91% of the pool, respectively and partial year 2013 operating
results for 91% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 82% compared to 88% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL
loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash
flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.6% to the
most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.69X and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Oxford Valley
Mall Loan ($67.4 million -- 5% of the pool), which consists of
three components - a super-regional mall, a retail shopping center
and an office building located in Middletown Township,
Pennsylvania. The total size is approximately 1.6 million square
feet (SF). The Oxford Mall is approximately 1.22 million SF, of
which 860,626 SF is loan collateral. The anchor tenants are
JCPenney, Macy's and Sears. There is also a vacant 168,000 SF
retail box that was formerly leased to Boscov's, which is not part
of the collateral. The space went dark in 2008 after the tenant
filed for bankruptcy. The Lincoln Plaza retail center is
approximately 268,000 SF; the largest tenants are HH Gregg, T.J.
Maxx and Homegoods, Inc. The third property component is a 110,000
SF Class B mid-rise office building located adjacent to the mall.
At securitization, Moody's did not attribute any value to this
portion of the property in it's cash flow analysis. As of
September 2013, the collateral space was 83% leased compared to
79% at last review. The year-to-date September 2013 in-line tenant
sales for stores less than 10,000 SF were $362 per SF compared to
$357 in 2012, $346 in 2011 and $328 in 2010. Performance remains
stable. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A2 and
2.23X, respectively, compared to A2 and 1.95X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Stanley
Hotel Loan ($10.7 million -- 0.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 140-room, full-service destination hotel located in Estes
Park, Colorado. The loan is encumbered with a $4.2 million B-note
held outside the trust and $7.8 million of mezzanine debt. Listed
on the National Register of Historic Places, the hotel is located
two miles from the main entrance to the Rocky Mountain National
Park. The property consists of 11 buildings, 16,000 SF of meeting
space, a spa and a pool. The hotel generates a large percentage of
its revenues from business groups and weddings. As of December
2012, the occupancy rate and revenue per available room (RevPAR)
were 66% and $118.2, respectively, compared to 60% and $108.67 at
last review. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2
and 2.20X, essentially the same as at last review.

The third largest loan with a credit assessment is the 1090 Park
Avenue Corporation Loan ($2.3 million -- 0.2% of the pool.), which
is secured by a 15-story co-op building located between East 88th
Street and East 89th Street on Park Avenue. The collateral
includes 84 residential units and three medical office spaces. The
residential unit breakdown consists of 28 four-bedroom units, 30
three-bedroom units, 24 two-bedroom units and 1 one-bedroom unit.
Performance remains stable. Moody's credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are Aaa and greater the 4.0X, the same as at last review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 25% of the pool
balance. The largest conduit loan is the Arlington Highlands Loan
($120.8 million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 740,000
SF open-air lifestyle center located in Arlington, Texas. The mall
is located in Arlington's premier retail corridor and is across
the street from the 1.6 million SF super regional Parks at
Arlington Mall. As of September 2013, the property was 95% leased,
the same as at last review. Property financial performance has
increased since last review in concert with higher stable
occupancy. The loan has amortized 3.9% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.02X, respectively,
compared to 105% and 0.93X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Lakes on Post Oak Loan ($112.2
million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by three Class A
office buildings located in the Galleria section of Houston,
Texas. The largest tenant is Bechtel Oil Gas & Chemicals, which
leases 47% of the net rentable area (NRA) in a renewal and
expansion lease through 2024. Huntsman Corporation, which leases
8% of the NRA, will vacate upon lease expiration and Bechtel will
expand into a portion of its space. As of September 2013, the
property was 92% leased, the same as at last review. The loan has
amortized approximately 4% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 76% and 1.31X, respectively compared to 93% and
1.08X, at last review.

The third largest loan is the Inland/Centro JV Portfolio 1 Loan
($102.8 million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of nine anchored retail properties located across seven
states. Eight properties are grocery-anchored. As of September
2013, the portfolio was 96% leased, the same as at last review.
The largest tenants are Kroger's, Giant Eagle and Winn Dixie. The
portfolio has rollover exposure with 69% of leased space scheduled
to expire during the loan term and 35% scheduled to expire within
the next three years. Performance remains stable. The loan has
amortized approximately 4% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 82% and 1.26X, respectively, compared to 93% and
1.11X at last review.


Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)


JERSEY STREET: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes From 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A, B, C, and D notes from JerseyStreet CLO Ltd.  At the same time,
S&P removed these ratings from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where they were placed on Jan. 22, 2014.  Jersey
Street CLO Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by MFS Investment Management.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October 2012; since
then, the class A notes have paid down over $161.3 million.  The
upgrades reflect the paydowns to the class A notes, which
increased credit support for the subordinate notes.  The
improvements are also evident in the increased class A/B, C, and D
overcollateralization ratios since our March 2012 rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Jersey Street CLO Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow   Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)   rating
A      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        29.05%   AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)        21.56%   AAA (sf)
C      A (sf)/Watch Pos     AA+ (sf)         4.80%   AA+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)        3.87%   BBB+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which S&P made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation

Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB- (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB (sf)       BBB+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Jersey Street CLO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
A             AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos



JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC7: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Certs Rating to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes,
affirmed eight classes and downgraded one class of J.P. Morgan
Commercial Mortgage Finance Corp. Series 2003-CIBC7 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes D and E were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 78% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the classes A-1A, B, and C were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the classes F through K were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating of the IO Class, Class X-1, was downgraded due to the
decline in credit performance of its reference classes as a result
of principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.2% of the
current balance compared to 3.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.4% of the
original pooled balance compared to 5.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.
Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16 compared to 36 at Moody's last review.

In cases where the Herf falls below 20, Moody's also employs the
large loan/single borrower methodology. This methodology uses the
excel-based Large Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights
the results from the two models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type, and sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further
adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 12, 2014 payment date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by approximately 89% to $157.6
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 46 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool. The pool includes one loan with an
investment-grade credit assessment, representing 13% of the pool.
Six loans, constituting 11% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by U.S. Government securities.

Seven loans, representing 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $48.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 46%). Five loans, constituting 9% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Foster Avenue Industrial Park loan ($4.4 million, 2.8%
of the pool), which is secured by 116,780 square foot industrial
property located in Bensenville, Illinois. The loan is in the
foreclosure process. The servicer has recognized a $1.4 million
appraisal reduction for this loan. The remaining four specially
serviced loans are secured by a mix of property type and three of
them are already real estate owned (REO). Moody's has estimated an
aggregate $7.3 million loss for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 97% of the
pool and partial year 2013 operating results for 34% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 68% compared to 70% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.93X,
respectively, compared to 1.58X and 1.71X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Brown Noltemeyer
Apartments Portfolio ($21.1 million -- 13.4% of the pool), which
is a portfolio of five cross-collateralized loans secured by eight
multifamily properties located in Louisville, Kentucky. The
properties are primarily of 1980s vintage. The portfolio's
performance is stable. The loans are fully amortizing and have
amortized 49% since securitization. Moody's current credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.77X, respectively,
compared to Aa1 and 2.42X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Versailles and Dana Point Apartments Portfolio
Loan ($20.0 million -- 12.7% of the pool), which is secured by two
Class B multifamily properties, with a total 652 units, located in
Dallas, Texas. As of September 2013 the properties were 93% leased
compared to 92% in December 2012. Performance has slightly
improved since last review. The loan had passed its anticipated
repayment date (ARD) in 2008 and was transferred to special
servicer in 2010, then returned to the master servicer in March,
2011. The loan is current but still on the servicer's watchlist.
The actual DSCR is 1.12X as of September 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 129% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 145%
and 0.67X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Crestpointe Corporate
Center II Loan ($8.3 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is
secured by a 122,389 SF office property located in Columbia,
Maryland. The property was 82% leased as of September 2013
compared to 73% at the end of year 2012. The loan is on the
servicer's watchlist. Although, performance has declined since
last review due to lower revenues and higher expenses, it is
expected to improve due to recently signed new lease. The loan is
fully amortizing and has amortized 36% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.54X, respectively,
compared to 50% and 2.05X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Crawfordsville Square Loan
($6.6 million -- 4.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 192,659
SF retail property located in Crawfordsville, Indiana. The
property was 89% leased as of December 2013 compared to 88% at the
end of 2012. Performance has declined since last review due to
higher expenses. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.34X,
respectively, compared to 56% and 1.78X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2004-CIBC8: Moody's Cuts Class X-1 Certs Rating to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
classes, affirmed ten classes, and downgraded one class of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2004-
CIBC8 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 72% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on Classes A1-A, A-4 and E through G were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on Classes H through M were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16% of the
current balance compared to 6.3% at Moody's prior review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.6% of the
original pooled balance compared to 5.3% at the prior review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may
cause an upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns
or amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Methodologies Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6 compared to 26 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to $199 million
from $1.25 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 23 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 36% of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 82% of
the pool. There are no loans in the pool with investment grade
credit assessments. One loan, representing 2% of the pool has
defeased and is secured by US Government securities.

Eight loans, representing 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $25 million (57% loss severity on
average). Three loans, representing 15% of the pool, are in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
Central Bergen Properties Loan ($21 million -- 10% of the pool),
which is secured by a 1.1 million square foot (SF) industrial
complex in Garfield, New Jersey, approximately fifteen miles
outside of New York City. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2012 due to principal and interest default.
Insufficient cashflow has caused the monthly payments to be
chronically late.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by office
and retail properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $6.4 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (21% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans representing 42% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $23.8 million loss (29% expected loss based on a 71%
probability of default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full-year 2012 operating results for 89% of the
pool and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 79% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 64% compared to
80% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.86X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.33X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 49% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Harbor Plaza Loan ($50 million -- 10% of the
pool), secured by six multi-story office buildings totaling
767,000 SF in non-CBD Stamford, Connecticut. The loan was
transferred to special servicing in November 2011 due to a payment
default and the mezzanine lender's UCC foreclosure action. The
loan returned to the Master Servicer in May 2013 following a loan
modification. Major tenants include Encompass, CRT Capital Group
LLC, and Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network. The property
was 37% leased as of December 2013 compared to 44% in September
2012. The loan matures in April 2015. Moody's has identified this
as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 181% and
0.54X, respectively, compared to 180% and 0.54X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Alzina Office Building Loan ($15
million -- 8% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 256,000 SF
office building in Springfield, Illinois. The building's tenants
include the Office of Education, the CMS Bureau of Property
Management, and PNC Bank. The property was 100% leased as of
September 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.52X,
respectively, same as at last review.

The third largest loan is the Canyon Park Loan ($12 million -- 6%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a nine-unit anchored retail
center totaling 157,000 SF located in Twin Falls, Idaho. The
property was 100% leased as of November 2013 and its largest
tenants include Sportman's Warehouse, TJ Maxx, Best Buy, Michaels,
and Old Navy. The loan sponsor is Base Jumper LLC. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.48X, respectively, compared to 68% and
1.42X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP4: DBRS Lowers Rating on Class D Secs. to 'Dsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has downgraded one class of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2005-LDP4 (the Trust), as
follows:

-- Class D to D (sf) from C (sf)

This rating action reflects the most recent losses to the Trust,
resulting from the liquidation of one loan in February 2014.  As
of the February 2014 remittance report, realized losses for this
loan total $4.37 million; to date, 21 loans have liquidated from
the pool resulting in cumulative losses of $214.73 million.

The Ariel Equities Single Tenant Portfolio loan, which was
originally secured by a portfolio of five single-tenant retail
properties in four states, transferred to special servicing in
July 2010 due to imminent payment default.  Three of the
properties in the portfolio were previously sold, with proceeds
used to pay down the loan's outstanding principal balance.
According to the February 2014 remittance report, the remaining
properties were sold for a combined price of approximately $1.25
million, resulting in a realized loss to the Trust on the
portfolio loan of $4.37 million and a loss severity of 54.3%.


KATONAH VIII: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
B and C notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A and D notes
from Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings on the class B, C, and D notes from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where they were placed on Jan. 22, 2014.
Katonah VIII CLO Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in June 2006.

The upgrades reflect paydowns to the class A notes, which
increased credit support for the subordinate notes.  The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in May 2012.  S&P upgraded
all four classes in January 2013 following paydowns to the class A
notes.  Since S&P's January 2013 rating actions, the class A notes
have paid down an additional $181.6 million, reducing the notes to
less than 31% of their original balance.  In addition, the class
A/B, C, and D par value ratios increased since S&P's January 2013
rating actions.

S&P's affirmation on the class D notes is based on its largest
obligor test, a supplemental stress test S&P introduced as part of
its corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria update.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow  Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)  rating
A      AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        37.27%  AAA (sf)
B      AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        20.63%  AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)         8.76%  AA+ (sf)
D      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)         3.63%  B+ (sf)

(i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-even
     default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow
     implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation

Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation  Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase     decrease
       implied    implied    implied      implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating       rating      rating
A      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)   AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)   BB- (sf)   BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)    B+ (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      AA- (sf)      AA+ (sf)
D      BB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      CCC+ (sf)     B+ (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
B             AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
D             B+ (sf)      B+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED
Katonah VIII CLO Ltd.

Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
KVK CLO 2013-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on KVK CLO
2013-2 Ltd./KVK CLO 2013-2 LLC's $372.60 million floating-rate
notes following the transaction's effective date as of Jan. 15,
2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.


In S&P's published effective date report, it discuss its analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to publish an
effective date report each time it issues an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

KVK CLO 2013-2 Ltd./KVK CLO 2013-2 LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                       (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     253.20
B                          AA (sf)                       44.80
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        36.40
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      20.40
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       17.80


LASALLE COMMERCIAL 2006-MF4: Moody's Hikes 2 Notes Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of two classes of
LaSalle Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2006-MF4 as
follows:

Cl. A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Cl. X, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating of Class A, the only remaining P&I class, was upgraded
to reflect Moody's current base expected loss and expected
recovery of principal which is aligned with Moody's general guide
for securities in default. The certificate has already incurred
approximately $23 million in principal loss, 6% of the original
Class A balance.

The rating of Class X, the IO class, was upgraded based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of
approximately 10.9% of the current deal balance compared to 11.5%
at last review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized loss is
now 21.3% of the original balance compared to 22.3% at last
review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration and an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 102 compared to 128 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the February 20, 2014 payment date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by approximately 67%
to $148.4 million from $450.9 million at securitization. The
Certificates are collateralized by 144 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1.0% to 3.1% of the pool, with the top ten
loans representing approximately 18% of the pool. The pool is
characterized by both geographic and property type concentrations.
Approximately 77% of the pool is secured by multi-family
properties and approximately 39% of the pool is located in Texas,
Oklahoma, and Arizona.

Fifty-three loans, representing approximately 34% of the pool, are
on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans
which meet certain portfolio review guidelines established as part
of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As
part of our ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could impact performance.

Ninety-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $80.1 million (68% average loss
severity). There are 13 loans, representing approximately 8% of
the pool, currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an
aggregate loss of $7.1 million (60% expected loss on average) for
the specially serviced loans.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 23 poorly
performing loans, representing approximately 21% of the pool.
Moody's has estimated an aggregate $13.1 million loss (30%
expected loss on a 50% probability of default) from these troubled
loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 67% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93.4% compared to
93.0% at Moody's prior review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of approximately 13% to the
most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Excluding specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual
and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.24X and 1.17X, respectively,
compared to 1.27X and 1.18X at prior review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C3: S&P Lowers Class G Notes Rating to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
G commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'.  At
the same time, S&P withdrew its ratings on the class A-3 and A-AB
certificates.

S&P lowered its rating on the class G certificates to 'D (sf)'
following principal losses detailed in the March 17, 2014, trustee
remittance report.  S&P attributes the principal losses to the
$88.5 million Eastpoint Mall and the $53.0 million Time Hotel
loans' liquidations at a 57.9% total loss severity (totaling $81.9
million in principal losses) of their combined scheduled beginning
balances.  Consequently, the class G certificates incurred $6.7
million in total principal losses, or 28.55% of the class'
original principal balance.  The class H, J, K, L, M, and N
certificates, which S&P previously downgraded to 'D (sf)', also
experienced principal losses that reduced their respective
outstanding principal balances to zero.

S&P withdrew its ratings on the class A-3 and A-AB certificates
from the same transaction following their full principal repayment
noted in the March 17, 2014, trustee report.

RATING ACTIONS

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C3

Class                   Rating
                  To              From
G                 D (sf)          CCC- (sf)
A-3               NR              AAA (sf)
A-AB              NR              AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2006-LLF C5: S&P Cuts Class K Certs Rating to Dsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
K commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Lehman Bros.
Floating-Rate Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-LLF C5, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)'.

The downgrade follows principal losses detailed in the March 17,
2014, trustee remittance report.  The principal losses resulted
from the liquidation of the National Conference Center asset,
which was with the special servicer, TriMont Real Estate Advisor
Inc.  According to the report, the National Conference Center
asset liquidated at a 69.8% loss severity (or $25.5 million in
principal losses) of its beginning trust balance of $36.6 million.
Consequently, class K incurred principal losses totaling $8.7
million, or 25.0% of its $34.9 million original principal balance,
while class L lost 100% of its $16.8 million opening balance.  S&P
previously lowered its rating on class L to 'D (sf)'.


LNR CDO 2003-1: Moody's Raises Rating on 2 Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by LNR CDO 2003-1, Ltd.

Cl. C-FL, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Affirmed B1 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Affirmed B1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings on the transaction due to the
rapid redemption of higher credit risk assets resulting in
material amortization of senior classes of notes which has more
than offset negative credit migration within the underlying pool
of assets. Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction
because its key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing
ratings. The upgrades and affirmations are the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-remic) transactions.

LNR CDO 2003-1, Ltd. is a static cash transaction. The transaction
is backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) (100% of the collateral pool balance). As of the trustee's
February 24, 2014 report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $551.9 million,
compared to $762.7 million at issuance, with partial amortization
of the senior most outstanding class of notes since last review.
The rapid amortization was a product of three primary factors: i)
amortization from high credit risk collateral as a result of
collateral sales; ii) the re-classification of interest received
on defaulted securities as principal; and iii) the failure of
certain par value and interest coverage tests.

Thirty-six assets with a par balance of $186.7 million (61.7% of
the pool balance) were listed as defaulted securities as of the
February 24, 2014 trustee report. Moody's expects significant
losses to occur on these assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7270,
compared to 6438 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 2.6% compared to 0.0% at last
review; A1-A3 and 1.9% compared to 0.0% at last review; Baa1-Baa3
and 3.4% compared to 6.3% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 9.9%
compared to 13.6% at last review; B1-B3 and 9.3% compared to 15.2%
at securitization; and Caa1-Ca/C and 72.9%, compared to 65.0% at
last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.5 years, compared to 1.8 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about loan
extensions on the underlying loans within the CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, compared to 3.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. In addition, the rated notes are sensitive to
changes in collateral coupon. Increasing the recovery rates of
approximately 0.0% of the collateral pool by 5% would result in an
average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to two
notches upward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Ba1). Decreasing the weighted average collateral coupon by
1.5% to 2.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of 0to 2 notches downward (e.g., one notch implies
a rating movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


MADISON AVENUE: Moody's Hikes Rating on $21MM Cl. B Notes to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by Madison Avenue Structured Finance CDO I, Limited:

$21,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current
balance of $13,641,613), Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
March 6, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Madison Avenue Structured Finance CDO I, Limited, issued in
December 2001, is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of RMBS, ABS and CLOs originated from
2000 to 2005.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class B Notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratio since December 2013. The Class B Notes
have been paid down by approximately 22%, or $3.9 million, since
December 2013. Based on Moody's calculation, the over-
collateralization ratio for the Class A/B is currently 132.2%,
versus 123.7% in December 2013.

The deal also benefit from the updates to the Moody's SF CDO
methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps we apply to deals experiencing
event of default. In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also
announced that it had concluded its review of its rating on the
issuer's Class B Notes announced on March 6, 2014. At that time,
Moody's said that it had placed the rating on review for upgrade
as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

The rating action also reflects the strong credit quality of the
performing assets in the current portfolio which includes 43% of
assets that are rated Baa3 and higher.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two notches:

Class B: +1

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Ba1 and below ratings notched down by two notches:

Class B: -2

Class C-1:0

Class C-2: 0


MARLBOROUGH STREET: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2B, B, C, and D notes from Marlborough Street CLO Ltd. and
removed them from CreditWatch with positive implications.  At the
same time, S&P lowered its rating on the class E notes, and
affirmed its rating on the class A-2A notes.  Marlborough Street
CLO Ltd. is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by MFS Investment Management.

The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April 2013.  Since
then, the class A-1 and A-2A notes have received over $212.6
million in combined paydowns.  The deal is structured such that
though the class A-1 and A-2 notes are pari passu, the class A-2A
notes receive paydowns before the class A-2B notes and hence can
be paid down in full before the class A-1 and A-2B notes.

The upgrades reflect the paydowns to the class A-1 and A-2A notes,
which increased credit support for the subordinate notes.  The
improvements are also evident in the increased class A/B, C, and D
overcollateralization ratios since S&P's February 2013 rating
actions.

The downgrade of the class E notes reflects the transaction's
negative exposure to the long-dated assets in the portfolio and
the additional scenario testing of its exposure to a 'CCC- (sf)'
rated entity nearing default.  As of the Feb. 19, 2014, trustee
report, $7.1 million of the remaining portfolio balance are assets
maturing after the transaction's legal final maturity.  Exposure
to these long-dated assets subjects the transaction to potential
market value risk because the manager may have to liquidate these
securities when the transaction matures in order to pay down the
notes on their final maturity date.

The affirmation of the class A-2A notes reflects the sufficient
credit support available to the notes at the current rating level.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further
rating actions as it deems necessary.

CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.

                            Cash flow
       Previous             implied      Cash flow  Final
Class  rating               rating      cushion(i)  rating
A-1    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        14.33%  AAA (sf)
A-2A   AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)        31.50%  AAA (sf)
A-2B   AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos   AAA (sf)        14.33%  AAA (sf)
B      AA (sf)/Watch Pos    AAA (sf)         4.54%  AAA (sf)
C      A+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)         3.55%  AA+ (sf)
D      BBB (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)        7.42%  BBB+ (sf)
E      BB (sf)              BB- (sf)         1.26%  BB- (sf)

  (i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break-
      even default rate above the scenario default rate at the
      cash flow implied rating for a given class of rated notes.

RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY

In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional
scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the
current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each
tranche's weighted average recovery rate

S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and
inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's
sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the
correlation scenarios outlined below.

Correlation

Scenario        Within industry (%)  Between industries (%)
Below base case                15.0                     5.0
Base case                      20.0                     7.5
Above base case                25.0                    10.0

                  Recovery   Correlation Correlation
       Cash flow  decrease   increase    decrease
       implied    implied    implied     implied     Final
Class  rating     rating     rating      rating      rating
A-1    AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2A   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
A-2B   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)   AAA (sf)   AA+ (sf)    AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)   AA (sf)    AA (sf)     AA+ (sf)    AA+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)  BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)   BBB+ (sf)
E      BB- (sf)   B+ (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB- (sf)    BB- (sf)

DEFAULT BIASING SENSITIVITY

To assess whether the current portfolio has sufficient diversity,
S&P biased defaults on the assets in the current collateral pool
with the highest spread and lowest base-case recoveries.

                    Spread        Recovery
       Cash flow    compression   compression
       implied      implied       implied       Final
Class  rating       rating        rating        rating
A-1    AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2A   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
A-2B   AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
B      AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)      AA+ (sf)      AAA (sf)
C      AA+ (sf)     AA+ (sf)      A+ (sf)       AA+ (sf)
D      BBB+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
E      BB- (sf)     B+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)     BB- (sf)

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
A-1           AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
A-2B          AAA (sf)     AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AAA (sf)     AA (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)     A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BBB+ (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING LOWERED

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.

                   Rating
Class         To           From
E             BB- (sf)     BB (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED
Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-2A          AAA (sf)


MLMT 2004-MKB1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class P Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on five classes
and affirmed the ratings on nine classes of MLMT 2004-MKB1 as
follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes E through J were upgraded primarily due to
an increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff
of loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for
refinance. The pool has paid down by 69% since Moody's last
review. In addition, loans constituting 60% of the pool that have
debt yields exceeding 10% are scheduled to mature within the next
three months.

The ratings on the Classes. B through D and Classes K and L were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on the Classes M though P
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. XC, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.0% of the
current balance, compared to 3.5% at Moody's last review. The deal
has amortized 69% since Moody's last review without an increase in
realized losses. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 2.1% of the original pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at
the last review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September 2000
and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of eight compared to 27 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.6 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 12, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $118 million
from $980 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 20%
of the pool, with the top ten loans representing 85% of the pool.
Three loans, representing 34% of the pool, have defeased and are
secured by U.S. Government securities.

Eight loans, representing 61% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Four loans have been liquidated at a loss since securitization
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $10 million (47%
average loss severity). Two loans, representing 11% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Port Columbus IV Loan ($8 million -- 3.6% of the
pool), which is secured by a 104,000 square foot (SF) office
property located in Columbus, Ohio. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2012 and has been real estate owned
(REO) since September 2013. The property is 50% leased as of
December 2013 compared to 59% as of April 2013.

Moody's estimated an aggregate $7.5 million loss (57% average
expected loss) for the two specially serviced loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and partial and full year
2013 operating results for 93% and 88% of the pool's loans,
respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 81% compared
to 80% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
defeased and specially loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects
a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently available
net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted
average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.64X,
respectively, compared to 1.47X and 1.44X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represented 22% of the pool
at the start of Moody's current review. Twelve loans, totaling
$107 million, paid off with the March 12, 2014 distribution. The
Paragon Business Center Loan ($13 million -- 5.8% of the pool) and
the Woodrow Plaza Loan ($12.6 million -- 5.6% of the pool) were
the second and third largest performing conduit loans, but both
paid off during Moody's current review.

The largest remaining conduit loan is the Tucson Spectrum Shopping
Center Loan ($23 million -- 19.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a leasehold interest in a 241,000 SF retail center located in
Tucson, Arizona. The center is shadow-anchored by Home Depot and
Target. The property is 99% leased as of February 2013. The
property was formerly known as Westpoint Crossing Shopping Center.
The loan matures in April 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
90% and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 84% and 1.19X at last
review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2005-HQ7: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 3 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 14 classes
in Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-HQ7 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 28, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A1-A through E were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I classes F through K were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss. The ratings on the IO class X was affirmed based on the
weighted average rating factor of it's referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.7% of the
current balance compared to 8.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.7% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 46 compared to 52 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 28% to $1.400
billion from $1.956 billion at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 224 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
31% of the pool. There are no loans with investment-grade credit
assessments. Thirteen loans, constituting 5% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Sixty-six loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Thirty five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $81.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 48%). Six loans, constituting 8% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Hilltop Mall Loan ($64.3 million -- 4.6% of the pool).
The loan was transferred to special servicing in May 2012 due to
imminent default and matured in July 2012. The loan is secured by
a 1.1 million square foot (SF) regional mall (564,000 SF of
collateral) located in Richmond, California. The collateral's
largest tenants are Walmart and 24 Hour Fitness . The center is
also anchored by Macy's, JC Penny and Sears, which are not part of
the collateral. The loan is now real estate owned. As of October
2013, the property's inline occupancy was 97%, up from 85% at last
review.

The remaining specially serviced loans are retail, office and
hotel properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $47.3 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (45% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $21.9 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
53% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 90% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to
96% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.08X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 16.2% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the 261 Fifth Avenue Loan ($141.0
million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 434,000 SF
Class B office building, comprised of mainly showroom tenants,
located in New York City. The property was 96% leased as of
October 2013 compared to 97% at last review. The loan is interest
only for its entire term and matures in August 2015. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.77X, respectively, compared to
123% and 0.77X at last full review.

The second largest loan is the Quakerbridge Plaza Loan ($47.0
million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by 12 low-rise
Class B office buildings totaling 427,000 SF in Hamilton, New
Jersey, which is just north of Trenton, New Jersey. The property
is one of the largest state-tenanted projects in New Jersey and
benefits from its close proximity to the state's capital. As of
January 2014, the property was 97% leased, the same as at last
review. The loan matures in April 2015. This loan is currently on
the watchlist due to low DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
138% and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 156% and 0.62X at last
review.

The third largest loan is Crown Ridge at Fair Oaks Loan ($38.6
million -- 2.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 191,240 SF
eight story multi-tenant office property located in Fairfax,
Virginia. The loan has been on the watchlist since August 2010 due
to low DSCR and occupancy. The largest tenant AMS (American Mgmt
Systems), originally leasing over 84% of the NRA, vacated in 2011.
The borrower has leased a portion of the space to several smaller
tenants at lower base rents. As of September 2013, the property
was 80% leased compared to 68% at last review. The loan matures in
October 2015. Moody's has identified this loan as a troubled loan.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 202% and 0.50X, respectively,
compared to 206% and 0.49X at last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C15: Fitch to Rate Class F Certs 'BB-sf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Morgan Stanley Bank
of America Merrill Lynch Trust, series 2014-C15 commercial
mortgage trust pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

-- $48,500,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89,500,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $86,600,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $210,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $321,231,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $808,469,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,638,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,982,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $178,160,000b class PST 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,540,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125,522,000ac class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64,786,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,497,000c class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,797,000c class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

(a) Notional amount and interest only.
(b) Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged
     for class PST Certificates, and class PST Certificates may be
     exchanged for class A-S, class B and class C certificates.
(c) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 14, 2014.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$10,798,000 class G, the $18,896,000 class H, the $26,994,197
class J or the $67,485,197 interest-only class X-C.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 48 loans secured by 76 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.080 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC; Bank
of America, National Association; and CIBC Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 77.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 86.6%, and asset summary reviews
on 86.6% of the pool.

Key Ratings Drivers

Improved Leverage from Recent Transactions: The Fitch stressed
DSCR and LTV of 1.31x and 100.1% represent better leverage than
Fitch-rated conduit transactions in the 4th quarter of 2013.
Fitch-rated deals that closed in the 4th quarter of 2013 had
average Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.19x and 102.9%, respectively.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The top 10 loans represent 67.2% of the
pool, which is the highest concentration among all Fitch-rated
transactions between 2012 and 2014.  The average top 10 balance
for Fitch-rated transactions for full years 2012 and 2013 was
54.2% and 54.5%, respectively.  The loan concentration index (LCI)
is 632, among the highest of recent transactions rated by Fitch.

Large Hotel and Multifamily Concentration: At 20.3% and 18.7%,
respectively, these levels are among the highest hotel and
multifamily concentrations for Fitch-rated transactions in 2013
and 2014. Four of the top 10 loans are secured by hotel
properties.

Credit Opinion Loan: The seventh largest loan in the pool, JW
Marriott and Fairfield Inn & Suites (4.6%), has a Fitch credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf' on a stand-alone basis.  The loan is
collateralized by JW Marriott and Fairfield Inn & Suites, which
are situated adjacent to each other in downtown Indianapolis, IN.
This loan participation is a $50 million, non-controlling pari
passu portion of a $125 million loan.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.41% below
the most recent reported net operating income (NOI) (for
properties that NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).

Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severity on defaulted loans and could
result in potential rating actions on the certificates.  Fitch
evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSBAM 2014-
C15 certificates and found that the transaction displays average
sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in which
NCF declined a further 10% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the
junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AA+sf' could result.  In a
scenario in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could
result.  In a more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a
further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf'
certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.  The presale report
includes a detailed explanation of additional stresses and
sensitivities.


OCP CLO 2014-5: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OCP CLO
2014-5 Ltd./OCP CLO 2014-5 Corp.'s $376.75 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      preference shares.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the
      rated notes, which S&P assessed using its cash flow analysis
      and assumptions commensurate with the assigned ratings under
      various interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging
      from 0.2356%-13.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment interest diversion test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of available excess interest proceeds (available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated hedge termination payments, collateral manager
      incentive fees, and preference shares payments) to principal
      proceeds to purchase additional collateral obligations
      during the reinvestment period.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OCP CLO 2014-5 Ltd./OCP CLO 2014-5 Corp.

Class                     Rating                   Amount
                                                 (mil. $)
A-1                       AAA (sf)                242.000
A-2                       AA (sf)                  60.500
B (deferrable)            A (sf)                   25.250
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                 21.750
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)                  18.750
E (deferrable)            B (sf)                    8.500
Combination notes(i)      AA (sf)                 302.500
Preference shares         NR                       43.265

  (i) Combination notes consist of an aggregate amount of up to
      $302,500,000, with the components consisting of up to
      $242,000,000 of the class A-1 notes and $60,500,000 of the
      class A-2 notes.  On the closing date, the issuer has a
      total of $245,750,000 of combination notes outstanding,
      consisting of $196,600,000 of class A-1 notes and
      $49,150,000 of class A-2 notes.  The individual components
      of the combination notes are included in the outstanding
      amount of the related components and will earn interest in
      the same manner as the related components.  The component
      amounts outstanding can vary, subject to conditions as
      described in the indenture.  NR--Not rated.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XIX: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating on F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
seven classes of notes issued by Octagon Investment Partners XIX,
Ltd.

$346,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

$40,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$27,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

$39,250,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

$28,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

$27,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

$7,500,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class
F Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the
expected losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings
reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of
assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics
of the underlying assets.

Octagon XIX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is expected to be approximately
70% ramped as of the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $550,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2550

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2550 to 2933)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2550 to 3315)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -4

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


OFSI FUND VI: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to OFSI
Fund VI Ltd./OFSI Fund VI LLC's $359.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation
securitization backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of
broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P expects to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
     secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced management team.

   -- S&P's projections regarding the timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2429%-13.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OFSI Fund VI Ltd./OFSI Fund VI LLC

Class                      Rating            Amount (mil. $)
A-1                        AAA (sf)                   232.00
A-2                        AA (sf)                     51.00
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                      30.00
C (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                    20.50
D (deferrable)             BB (sf)                     14.00
E (deferrable)             B (sf)                      11.50
Combination securities(i)  AA (sf)                    283.00
Subordinated notes         NR                          41.00

  (i) Comprises $232 million in class A-1 notes and $51 million in
      class A-2 notes.
   NR - Not rated.


OMI TRUST 2001-E: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Certs to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
A-1 certificates from OMI Trust 2001-E, an asset-backed securities
transaction backed by fixed-rate manufactured housing loans
originated by Oakwood Acceptance Corp., to 'D (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)', and removed it from CreditWatch where it was placed with
negative implications on Feb. 12, 2014.  S&P subsequently withdrew
the rating.

The downgrade and withdrawal reflect the nonpayment of full
principal to investors by March 2014, the certificates' stated
final maturity date.  S&P's rating reflects the probability of the
default of full principal and interest by the certificates' stated
final maturity or legal final maturity date.

Because cumulative net losses were higher than initially expected,
the transaction did not generate enough collections each month to
pay the complete scheduled principal amount due to all of the
outstanding class A certificates per the transaction documents.
As such, all of the class A certificates have accumulated an
unpaid principal shortfall of approximately $33.03 million to
date.  According to the transaction documents, the payment
waterfall specifies that before the normal sequential principal
payment distribution, any unpaid principal shortfall amount will
be paid pro rata among all the still-outstanding class A
certificates.  Accordingly, the class A-1 certificates have been
receiving an amount equal to their pro rata share of the available
monthly collections.

As of the March 15, 2014, distribution date, the class A-1
certificates had an outstanding balance of approximately $1.396
million, and therefore were not paid in full by the March 2014
legal final maturity date.


PACIFIC BAY: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A-2 Notes to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by Pacific Bay CDO, Ltd.:

Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
(current outstanding balance of $66,560,963) Due 2038, Upgraded to
B3 (sf); previously on March 6, 2014 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade.

Pacific Bay CDO, Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation backed
primarily by a portfolio of corporate and structured finance
securities, with over 60% of the portfolio consisting of RMBS
originated from 2002 to 2005.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is due primarily to the updates to Moody's SF
CDO methodology described in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs"
published on March 6, 2014. These updates include: (i) lowering
the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US Prime, Subprime,
Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment grade corporate
assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by mutual fund fees;
(ii) using a common table of recovery rates for all structured
finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and (iii) providing
more guidance on the rating caps we apply to deals experiencing
event of default. In taking the foregoing actions, Moody's also
announced that it had concluded its review of its rating on the
issuer's Class A-2 Notes announced on March 6, 2014. At that time,
Moody's said that it had placed the rating on review for upgrade
as a result of the aforementioned methodology updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A-2 Notes also benefit from diversion
of excess interest proceeds as a result of an ongoing Event of
Default and acceleration of the notes. On the payment date in
November 2013, about $1.3 million of interest proceeds were used
to pay the current interest and the deferred interest on Class A-2
Notes. Additionally, the deal currently receives a material amount
of interest and principal proceeds from defaulted securities.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Ba1 and below ratings notched up by two notches:

Class A-2: +1

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Preferred shares: 0

Ba1 and below notched down by two notches:

Class A-2: -3

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Preferred shares: 0


PPM GRAYHAWK: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating on $14.45MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by PPM Grayhawk CLO, Ltd.:

  $64,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding
  balance $61,465,085), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August
  22, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  $50,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa
  (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  $16,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa1
  (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $200,000,000 Class A-2a Senior Notes Due 2021 (current
  outstanding balance of $190,097,990), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on April 30, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf);

  $22,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
  Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to
  Baa1 (sf);

  $14,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021,
  Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1
  (sf);

  $14,450,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2021 (current
  outstanding balance $10,388,091), Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously
  on August 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf).

PPM Grayhawk CLO, Ltd., issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
April 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
April 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower WARF and
higher spread compared to the covenant levels. Moody's modeled a
WARF of 2566 compared to 2665 and a WAS of 3.19% compared to 2.8%.
Furthermore, the transaction's reported OC ratios have been stable
since February 2013.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2053)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class A-3: +1

Class B: +3

Class C: +1

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3079)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: -1

Class A-3: -3

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $375 million, defaulted par
of $98,090, a weighted average default probability of 17.54%
(implying a WARF of 2566), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.26%, a diversity score of 72 and a weighted average
spread of 3.19%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


SASCO 2007-BHC1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class A-1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
certificate issued by SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust, Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-BHC1
("SASCO 2007-BHC1"):

Cl. A-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the rating of one class of certificate
because key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing
rating. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

SASCO 2007-BHC1 is a static, cash CRE CDO transaction backed by a
portfolio of 100% commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). As
of the February 21, 2014 trustee report, the aggregate certificate
balance of the transaction has decreased to $276.2 million from
$501.3 million at issuance. The reduction is due to realized
losses to rated certificates, including full losses to all
outstanding classes, except for the senior-most outstanding class
of certificates.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 9268, compared to 9437 at last review. The current ratings on
the Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligation follow: Ba1-Ba3 and 3.2%
compared to 2.0% at last review; B1-B3 and 2.7% compared to 1.7%
at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 94.1% compared to 96.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.2 years, compared to 4.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans within the CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, compared to 0.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 0.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
In general, the rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the rating and recovery rate of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. However, in light of the performance
indicators noted above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that
the rating announced is sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SATURN CLO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $20MM Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Saturn CLO, Ltd.:

$24,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

$27,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

$25,000,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

$20,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$135,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (current outstanding balance of $133,279,903), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

$208,000,000 Class A-1-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022 (current outstanding balance of $204,198,800), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on June 28, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on August 29, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Saturn CLO, Ltd., issued in May 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in May 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
May 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower WARF.
Moody's modeled a WARF of 2499 compared to the covenant level of
3055. Moody's also notes that the over-collateralization ratios
have been stable over the last year.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively. In particular, Moody's tested for
a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
analysis given that the post-reinvestment period reinvesting
criteria has loose restrictions on the weighted average life of
the portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1999)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1-S: 0

Class A-1-J: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2999)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1-S: 0

Class A-1-J: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $470.5 million, defaulted
par of $0.33 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.43% (implying a WARF of 2499), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 51.04%, a diversity score of 74 and a weighted
average spread of 3.14%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


STEERS HIGH-GRADE 2006: Moody's Affirms Rating on Five CMBS Units
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following trust units issued by STEERS High-Grade CMBS
Resecuritization Trust:

Series 2006-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Series 2006-2, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Series 2006-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Series 2006-4, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Series 2006-5, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's as affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

STEERS High-Grade CMBS Resecuritization Trust is a static
synthetic transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default
swaps referencing 100% commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS). The CMBS reference obligations were securitized in 2004
(5.0%), 2005 (87.5%), and 2006 (7.5%). As of this review, 77.5% of
the reference obligations are publicly rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 238, compared to 218 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 55.0%
compared to 52.5% at last review; A1-A3 and 12.5% compared to
17.5% at last review; Baa1-Baa3 and 22.5% the same as last review;
Ba1-Ba3 and 7.5% compared to 5.0% at last review; and B1-B3 and
2.5% the same as last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.4 years, compared to 2.4 at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR of 27.6%, compared to 51.1% at
last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 29.1%, compared to 27.4% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the reference obligations and credit
assessments Holding all other key parameters static, notching down
the reference obligations by 1 notches would result in one notch
downward rating movement (eg. 1 notch downward implies Baa3 to
Ba1). Holding all other key parameters static, notching up the
reference obligations by 1 notches would result in zero to two
notch upward rating movement (eg. 1 notch upward implies Baa3 to
Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


STEERS HIGH-GRADE 2006: Moody's Affirms Rating on 4 CMBS Units
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the
following trust units issued by STEERS High-Grade CMBS
Resecuritization Trust 2:

Series 2006-6, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Series 2006-8, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Series 2006-10, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Series 2006-11, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's as affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

STEERS High-Grade CMBS Resecuritization Trust 2 is a static
synthetic transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default
swaps referencing 100% commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS). The CMBS reference obligations were securitized in 2004
(5.0%), 2005 (87.5%), and 2006 (7.5%). As of this review, 77.5% of
the reference obligations are publicly rated by Moody's. STEERS
High-Grade CMBS Resecuritization Trust is backed by the portfolio
of credit default swaps.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 238, compared to 218 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 55.0%
compared to 52.5% at last review; A1-A3 and 12.5% compared to
17.5% at last review; Baa1-Baa3 and 22.5% the same as last review;
Ba1-Ba3 and 7.5% compared to 5.0% at last review; and B1-B3 and
2.5% the same as last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.4 years, compared to 2.4 at last
review.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR of 27.6%, compared to 51.1% at
last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 29.1%, compared to 27.4% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the reference obligations and credit
assessments Holding all other key parameters static, notching down
the reference obligations by 1 notches would result in one notch
downward rating movement (eg. 1 notch downward implies Baa3 to
Ba1). Holding all other key parameters static, notching up the
reference obligations by 1 notches would result in zero notch
rating movement.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


STRATA 2005-19: Moody's Raises Rating on $15MM Notes to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced the following rating action on
STRATA 2005-19, Limited:

Issuer: STRATA 2005-19, Limited

  $15,000,000 Floating Rate Notes Due 2015 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2
  (sf); previously on November 12, 2010 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

This transaction is a corporate synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (CSO) referencing a portfolio of corporate senior
secured loans, originally rated in 2005.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade is due to the shortened time to maturity of the CSO
and a sufficient level of credit enhancement remaining in the
transaction. Offsetting these positive factors is the credit
quality of the reference portfolio, which has deteriorated since
the last rating review.

The portfolio's ten-year weighted average rating factor (WARF) is
currently 3041, excluding settled credit events, higher than the
WARF of 2832 in the last review. Moody's rates the majority of the
reference credits speculative-grade, with 19.7% rated Caa (sf) or
lower. In addition, there are three reference credits with a
negative outlook compared to one with a positive outlook; there is
one reference credit whose ratings is on review for downgrade,
compared to none on review for upgrade.

The average gap between MIRs and Moody's senior unsecured ratings
is 1.6 notches for over-concentrated sectors and -0.1 notches for
non-over concentrated sectors. Currently, the over-concentrated
sector is Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals, comprising 13.8% of the
portfolio.

Nine credit events, equivalent to 12% of the portfolio based on
the portfolio's notional value at closing have taken place. Since
inception, the subordination of the rated tranche has declined by
2.6% due to credit events on Accuride Corporation, Charter
Communications Operating LLC, Eddie Bauer Inc., Fairpoint
Communications Inc., Lake at Las Vegas JV, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc., R.H. Donnelley Corporation, Simmons Co., Smurfit-
Stone Container Enterprises, Inc. Furthermore, the portfolio is
exposed to Texas Competitive Electric Holdings Co LLC, which is
not a credit event, but has a lowest senior secured rating of Ca.

The CSO has a remaining life of 1.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic Collateralized Debt
Obligations" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

These transactions are subject to a high level of uncertainty,
primarily because of 1) unexpected volatility in the credit and
macroeconomic environment; 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of documentation by different transactional parties
because of embedded ambiguities; and 3) unexpected changes in the
portfolio composition as a result of the actions of the
transaction parties.

For CSOs, the performance of the credit default swaps can be
affected either positively or negatively by 1) variations over
time in default rates for instruments with a given rating; 2)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics; and 3) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool. Given the tranched nature of CSO liabilities, rating
transitions in the reference pool can have leveraged rating
implications for the ratings of the CSO liabilities that could
lead to a high degree of rating volatility, which is likely to be
higher for the more junior or thinner liabilities.

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also conducted sensitivity analyses. Results are in the form of
the difference in the number of notches from the base case, in
which a higher number of notches corresponds to lower expected
losses, and vice-versa.

Moody's ran a scenario in which it reduced the maturity of the CSO
by six months, keeping all other things equal. The result of this
run was one notch higher than in the base case.

Moody's conducted a sensitivity analysis in which the adverse
selection adjustment is removed. The result of this run was one
notch higher than in the base case.

Moody's generally models reference entities with insufficient
credit information using a Caa2 (sf) rating. In this case, Moody's
replaced the rating of the entities with the average portfolio
rating, which resulted in a model output that is one notch higher.

Moody's conducted a stress analysis in which it defaulted all
entities rated Caa or lower. The result was six notches lower than
in the base case.

In addition to the quantitative factors, Moody's models
explicitly, rating committees also consider qualitative factors in
the rating process. These qualitative factors include a
transaction's structural protections, recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features and the portfolio manager's track record.
All information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, can influence the
final rating decision.


WACHOVIA BANK 2005-C17: Moody's Affirms 'C' Ratings on 4 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes, upgraded the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
ratings on one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage
Securities Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C17 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 4, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A4 and A1A, and D through G were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I classes AJ, B, C
were upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support
resulting from loan paydowns and scheduled amortization and
paydowns from upcoming loan maturities. Approximately 95% of the
pool is scheduled to mature within the next 24 months. The ratings
on the P&I classes H, J, L through O were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss. The rating on
the P&I class K was downgraded due to realized and anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans. The ratings on
the IO class X-C was affirmed based on the weighted average rating
factor of the referenced classes

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.4% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 25, compared to 31 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 34% to $1.798
billion from $2.723 billion at securitization. The certificates
are collateralized by 180 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
34% of the pool. There are no loans with investment grade credit
assessments. Forty two loans, constituting 24% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Twenty four loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $41.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 45%). Seven loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Renaissance West Retail Center Loan ($25.9 million --
1.4% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 170,000 square foot
(SF) retail property located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2010 due to imminent
monetary default. The loan is now real estate owned.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $48.3 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (61% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $11.9 million (a 15% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 91%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 85%, compared to 88% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 8% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.61X and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.63X and 1.30X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the One and Two International Place Loan ($191.3
million -- 10.7% of the pool) which represents a 50% pari passu
interest in a $382.6 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by two Class A office buildings totaling 1.8 million SF
located in the Financial District office submarket of Boston,
Massachusetts. The property was 84% leased as of November 2013
compared to 79% at last review. The loan is currently on the
watchlist. Property performance declined after Ropes & Grey, which
leased 19% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated at its December
2011 lease expiration. The loan has a maturity date of January
2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.09X at last full review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Digital Realty Trust
Portfolio Loan ($132.2 million -- 7.4% of the pool) which is
secured by six office properties located in five states. One of
the properties, the Comverse Office building in Wakefield,
Massachusetts is underperforming the portfolio. The Comverse
Office center was only 68% leased as of September 2013 and is on
the watchlist. The portfolio's weighted average occupancy is 88%
compared to 87% at last review. The loan sponsor is Digital Realty
Trust, a publicly traded REIT. The loan matures in November 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 41% and 2.62X, respectively,
compared to 43% and 2.50X at last full review.

The third largest conduit loan is the loan is the MetroPlace III
&IV Loan ($48.7 million - 2.7% of the pool). The loan is secured
by an office property located in Fairfax, Virginia. The property
is located directly across from the Dunn Loring-Merrifield
Station. In addition to the office buildings, the complex has an
eight-story parking structure and is surrounded by many shopping,
dining and lodging options. As of December 2013, the property was
85% leased compared to 100% at last review. Performance has dipped
due to an increase in vacancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
90% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.51X at last
full review.


WAMU MORTGAGE 2004-AR9: Moody's Hikes Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of three
tranches issued by WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2004-AR9 Trust. The tranches are backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans
issued in 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR9
Trust

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrades are due to improving performance on the
underlying pool and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pool.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.6% in January 2014 down from
7.9% in January 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.0% to 7.0% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House
prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


VENTURE V: Moody's Raises Rating on $11.5MM Class D Notes to 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Venture V CDO Limited:

  $20,500,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2018
  Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 6, 2013
  Confirmed at A1 (sf)

  $13,500,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded
  to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 6, 2013 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

  $11,500,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes, Upgraded
  to B2 (sf); previously on September 6, 2013 Downgraded to B3
  (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class J Blended Securities Due 2018 Notes (current
  rated balance $9,275,784), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
  September 6, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $295,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes
  (current outstanding balance $76,762,068), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on September 6, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  $27,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2018 Notes,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 6, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
  (sf)

Venture V CDO Limited, issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in May 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in September
2013. The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 37%
or $44 million since the last rating action. Based on the
trustee's February 2014 report, the over-collateralization (OC)
ratios for the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D notes are
reported at 142.79%, 122.16%, 111.55%, and 103.86%, versus
September 2013 levels of 135.36%, 118.94%, 110.15%, and 103.62%,
respectively. The February 2014 trustee reported OC ratios do not
reflect the $17 million of payment to the Class A-1 Notes on the
February 24, 2014 distribution date.

Moody's also notes that the number of investments in securities
that mature after the notes do (long dated assets) has decreased
since the last rating action. Based on the trustee's February 2014
report, long dated assets currently make up $14.25 million or 8.3%
of the portfolio, compared to $27.7 million or 13.9% of the
portfolio as of September 2013. The manager has sold a large
proportion of long dated assets at market values higher than
liquidation values assumed in the last rating action, and the
proceeds were used to pay down the Class A-1 notes. Nevertheless,
the presence of long dated assets still exposes the junior notes
to market value risk in the event of liquidation at the time of
the notes' maturity.

Notwithstanding the benefits of deleveraging, the credit quality
of the portfolio has deteriorated since the last rating action in
September 2013. Based on Moody's calculation, the weighted average
rating factor is currently 3244 compared to 3090 in September
2013.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the
lowest priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2595)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class J: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3893)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class J: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $152 million, defaulted par
of $18.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 19.96%
(implying a WARF of 3244), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.73%, a diversity score of 55 and a weighted average
spread of 3.24%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


* Moody's Takes Action on $45MM of RMBS Issued 2004 to 2005
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches and upgraded the ratings of five tranches backed by Prime
Jumbo RMBS loans, issued miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2005-8

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 30-IO, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR2

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrade rating actions are a result of improving
performance of the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the
bonds due to high prepayments/fast liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.6% in January 2014 from 7.9%
in January 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range
of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $151MM of Second Lien RMBS by 7 Issuers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five
tranches and downgraded the ratings of three tranches from seven
transactions. The collateral backing these deals primarily
consists of closed end second lien and home equity line of credit
loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFB

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21,
2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2002-HE1

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21,
2010 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

CL. A-2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 21,
2010 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2006-HLTV1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2006-SL1

Cl. A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL2

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HS2

Cl. A-I-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2010
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 4,
2010 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of second lien
loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations
on these pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the
build-up in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structures,
non-amortizing subordinate bonds, and availability of excess
spread. The ratings downgraded are due to the tranches taking
realized losses due to the lack of excess spread and
overcollateralization in the transaction. Performance has remained
generally stable from our last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.6% in January 2014 from 7.9%
in January 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range
of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction.


* Moody's Raises Ratings on $188MM of RMBS From 2002 to 2004
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 14 tranches
from six transactions, which are all backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2002-HE2 (wholesale;25% fixed/75% ARMs)

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2013
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 2, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2003-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012
Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
our central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility due
to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from 7.9%
in January 2013 to 6.6% in January 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF documents.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
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Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
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