---

         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

             Sunday, April 27, 2014, Vol. 18, No. 115

                            Headlines

ANTHRACITE CRE 2006-HY3: Moody's Cuts Rating on 3 Notes to 'C'
APIDOS QUATTRO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
ASHFORD CDO I: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-1L Notes to 'Ba2'
AVERY POINT III: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
AVERY POINT IV: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes

BANC OF AMERICA 2004-5: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. J Notes to C
BANC OF AMERICA 2007-BMB1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on L Certs
BATTALION CLO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes' Rating to Ba2
BATTALION CLO V: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR4: Fitch Ups Class H Securities Rating to B

BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Certs to D
CHL MORTGAGE 20014-13: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 4 Tranches to Ba1
CIFC FUNDING 2007-II: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba2
CITIGROUP 2013-GCJ11: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
CLAREGOLD TRUST 2007-2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. L Certs.

COMM 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating to Class F Certs
COMM 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on G Secs
COMM 2013-CCRE7: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Notes
COMM 2014-CCRE17: Fitch to Give BB- Rating to Class F Certs
CONNECTICUT VALLEY: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. C-1 Notes to B1

CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C3: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. D Certs
CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs
CREST 2000-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class D Notes
CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Affirms Rating on Five Note Classes
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG3: Fitch Hikes C. B-4 Certs Rating to B

DRYDEN 30 SENIOR: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
EATON VANCE 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
FIRST UNION 1999-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class L Certs
FIRST UNION 2000-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class K Certs
FORE CLO 2007-I: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $29.5MM Class D Notes

GMAC COMMERCIAL 2002-C3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class L Notes to CC
GOLDENTREE VIII: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $6MM Class F Notes
HAMPTON ROADS: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class III Revenue Bonds to B+
ICE 1: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on Class C Tranches on CreditWatch Neg.
IMPAC CMB 2004-8: S&P Withdraws Rating on 4 Securities Classes

JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Fitch Affirms D Ratings on 6 Note Classes
JP MORGAN 2012-FL2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. X-EXT Certs
JP MORGAN 2014-C19: Fitch to Give BB Rating to Class E Notes
LAKESIDE CDO: Moody's Confirms 'Caa3' Rating on Class A-1 Notes
LANDMARK VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $10MM Class E Notes

LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: Moody's Cuts Rating on 3 Certs to 'C'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C5: Fitch Raises Cl. F Notes Rating to 'BB'
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Certs Rating to B1
LCM X LP: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
LIBERTY TRUST 2014-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes

MAPS CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $16MM Class D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Moody's Cuts Cl. G Certs' Rating to C
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-MKB2: Moody's Hikes Cl. D Certs Rating to Ba3
MERRILL LYNCH 2006-CANADA: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on K Secs.
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP5: Moody's Hikes Cl. M Certs Rating to B1

MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: Moody's Affirms C Rating on J Secs.
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-IQ: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class M Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Class F Notes
MORTGAGEIT 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on C. 2-A-1-3 Secs to Ca
N-STAR REAL VII: Moody's Lowers Rating on 7 Note Classes to 'C'

NEWSTAR COMMERICAL 2014-1: Moody's Rates $14MM Cl. F Notes 'B2'
OZLM VI: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating on Class E Secured Notes
PINNACLE PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $29.4MM Cl. E Notes
PRIMUS CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
PROTECTIVE FINANCE 2007-PL: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on P Secs.

PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms M Secs.' C Rating
PUTNAM CDO 2001-1: Fitch Hikes Class C-2 Notes Rating to 'CCsf'
SDART 2014-2: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
SOLOSO CDO 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2L Notes to 'D'
STANIFORD STREET: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes

TALMAGE STRUCTURED 2006-3: Moody's Ups Class E Notes Rating to B3
TIAA CMBS I 2001-C1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class N Notes
U.S. CAPITAL VI: Moody's Hikes Rating on $375MM Cl. Notes to Ba3
WACHOVIA 2006-WHALE: Fitch Ups Rating on Class H Secs. to 'CCCsf'
WFRBS 2013-C14: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates

* Fitch Reviews U.S. RMBS Alt-A Sector Ratings
* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 SF CDOs From 1999-2004
* Fitch Cuts Ratings on 26 Bonds in 13 CMBS Deals to 'D'
* Moody's Takes Action on $261MM of RMBS Issued From 2003-2006
* Moody's Takes Action on $426MM of RMBS by Various Trusts

* Moody's Takes Action on $428MM of RMBS by Various Trusts
* Moody's Takes Action on $231MM of RMBS by Various Trusts
* Moody's Takes Action on $83MM of RMBS Issued 1998 to 2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $43MM of RMBS Issued From 2003 to 2004
* Moody's Takes Action on $32.78MM of Scratch and Dent RMBS

* S&P Lowers 160 Ratings on 98 U.S. RMBS Deals to D(sf)


                             *********

ANTHRACITE CRE 2006-HY3: Moody's Cuts Rating on 3 Notes to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Anthracite CRE CDO 2006-HY3, Ltd.:

Cl. A, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013
Affirmed Ca (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013
Affirmed Ca (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 10, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of three classes of notes due
to deterioration in the underlying collateral as evidenced by the
occurrence of an event of default, significant remaining balance
of an unpaid swap termination payment, and low expected recovery
to the outstanding notes from the upcoming sale and liquidation of
collateral. Moody's has affirmed the rating of seven classes of
notes because key transaction metrics are commensurate with
existing ratings. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

Anthracite 2006-HY3 is a static cash CRE CDO transaction backed by
a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(63.6% of the collateral pool balance); and ii) fully defeased b-
notes (36.4%). As of the March 18, 2014 note valuation report, the
current par balance of the collateral assets is $67.0 million,
which represents approximate 85.8% under-collateralization to the
transaction, compared to 69.5% under-collateralization at last
review. In addition, there is no outstanding classes of notes
receiving payments of interest due as of the March 2014 payment
cycle, as a material portion of all available interest process and
principal process are directed to pay down the balance of the
outstanding swap termination payment.

As of October 23, 2013 payment date, interest shortfalls from the
underlying collateral resulted in a default in the payment of
interest on the Class B note (non-PIKable), which caused an event
of default ("EOD") on October 29, 2013, pursuant to the governing
transaction documents. On February 3, 2014, the interest rate swap
counterparty delivered the notice designating February 3, 2014 as
the early termination date in the respect of swap transaction as
the result of a failure to pay full swap payment due for the
January 2014 payment period, the occurrence of an EOD and
calculated the termination payment equal to $17.8 million. After
March 24, 2014 payment, the remaining balance of unpaid swap
termination payment is approximately $16.1 million, 24.0% of
collateral pool ending balance as of March 24, 2014.

In addition, on December 13, 2013, the Trustee reported that it
received a direction from the majority of the controlling class
holder to direct the sale and liquidation of the collateral,
pursuant to the governing transaction documents. Under the current
market conditions, Moody's expects that the proceeds from the
upcoming liquidation of the collateral, after paying the remaining
swap termination payment and the trust expenses, would not be
sufficient to pay back all the notes issued, which will result in
a significant loss to the senior most outstanding class and zero
recovery to all the other outstanding classes of notes.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF
of 4940, compared to 5799 at last review. The current ratings on
the Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligation follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 36.4%
compared to 0.0% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 13.8% compared to
5.6% at last review; B1-B3 and 0.0% compared to 37.9% at last
review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 49.8% compared to 56.5% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.5 years, compared to 3.5 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans within the CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 36.4%, compared to 0.6% at last
review. The increase of WARR is mainly due to fully defeased b-
notes.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 2.6%, compared to 28.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
In general, the rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced are sensitive to further changes.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


APIDOS QUATTRO: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Apidos Quattro CDO:

  $21,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due January 20, 2019,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on December 27, 2012 Upgraded
  to Aa1 (sf)

  $16,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Notes Due January 20, 2019,
  Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on December 27, 2012 Upgraded
  to A2 (sf)

  $14,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Notes Due January 20, 2019,
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on December 27, 2012 Upgraded
  to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $262,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes Due January 20, 2019
  (current outstanding rated balance of $159,771,573), Affirmed
  Aaa (sf); previously on August 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  $12,000,000 Class E Floating Rate Notes Due January 20, 2019,
  Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on December 27, 2012 Upgraded to
  Ba2 (sf)

Apidos Quattro CDO, issued in October 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since April 2013. The Class A notes have
been paid down by approximately 39% or $102.2 million since April
2013. Based on the trustee's March 12, 2014 report, the
overcollateralization (OC) ratios for the Class B, D and E notes
are reported at 134.14%, 115.05% and 108.80%, respectively, versus
April 2013 levels of 122.04%, 110.34%, and 106.30%, respectively.
Moody's also notes that the credit quality of the portfolio has
been relatively stable since April 2013.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of errors in
Moody's previous modeling approach. According to Moody's, its
analysis in the December 2012 rating action assumed a shorter
weighted average life horizon to associate with the expected loss
(EL) calculated for the notes, with the result of comparing such
ELs with more conservative maximum EL benchmarks. The Class E
Junior Notes Direct Pay Test, the note payment sequence and
certain fees were also modeled incorrectly in the December 2012
rating action. The errors have now been corrected, and the rating
actions reflect these changes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1982)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2974)

Class A: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $240.7 million, defaulted
par of $2.2 million, a weighted average default probability of
13.82% (implying a WARF of 2478), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 49.7%, a diversity score of 48 and a weighted
average spread of 2.88%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


ASHFORD CDO I: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-1L Notes to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by Ashford CDO I, Ltd.:

  $30,400,000 Class A-1LB Notes Due December 11, 2040 (current
  outstanding balance of $4,670,700), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
  previously on December 10, 2013 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

  $38,000,000 Class A-2L Notes Due December 11, 2040, Upgraded to
  Aa2 (sf); previously on December 10, 2013 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  $27,000,000 Class A-3L Notes Due December 11, 2040, Upgraded to
  Baa1 (sf); previously on December 10, 2013 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class B-1L Notes Due December 11, 2040 (current
  outstanding balance of $16,880,302), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
  previously on December 10, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Ashford CDO I, Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of CLO tranches
originated from 2004 to 2007.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since the last rating action in December
2013. The Class A-1LA notes have paid down in full and Class A-1LB
notes have paid down by approximately 85% or $25.7 million, since
December 2013. Based on the trustee's April 2014 report, the over-
collateralization ratios of Class A and Class B notes are reported
at 147.5% and 113.0%, respectively, versus November 2013 levels of
128.8% and 108.2%, respectively.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: The performance of SF CDOs backed by
CLOs (CLO Squareds) could be negatively affected by 1) uncertainty
about credit conditions in the general economy (macroeconomic
uncertainty), and 2) the large concentration of upcoming
speculative-grade debt maturities, which could make refinancing
difficult for issuers of the loans backing CLO assets.
Additionally, the performance of the CLO assets can also be
affected positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) differences in the legal
interpretation of CLO documentation by different transactional
parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Non-investment grade rated assets notched up by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: +1

Class A-3L: +2

Class B-1L: +2

Moody's Non-investment grade rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches

Class A-1LB: 0

Class A-2L: 0

Class A-3L: -2

Class B-1L: -2


AVERY POINT III: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Avery
Point III CLO Ltd./Avery Point III CLO Corp.'s $464.50 million
floating- and fixed-rate notes following the transaction's
effective date as of March 5, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directingthe trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to cquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This window
of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."  Because
some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets from the
new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may give
collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Avery Point III CLO Ltd./Avery III CLO Corp.

                                      Rating
Class              CUSIP              To                 From
X                  053633AA1          AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)
A                  053633AB9          AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)
B-1                053633AC7          AA (sf)            AA (sf)
B-2                053633AD5          AA (sf)            AA (sf)
C                  053633AE3          A- (sf)            A- (sf)
D                  053633AF0          BBB (sf)           BBB (sf)
E                  05363QAA0          BB (sf)            BB (sf)


AVERY POINT IV: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to Avery
Point IV CLO Ltd./Avery Point IV CLO Corp.'s $665.75 million
floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the overcollateralization, excess spread, and subordination
      of cash flows that are payable to the subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (not counting excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the  rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned  ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.00%-
      12.46%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of excess
      interest proceeds that are available before paying deferred
      management fees, uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated hedge termination payments, portfolio manager
      incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to principal
      proceeds for the purchase of additional collateral assets
      during the reinvestment period.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Avery Point IV CLO Ltd./Avery Point IV CLO Corp.

Class                  Rating                 Amount
                                            (mil. $)
X                      AAA (sf)                 4.00
A                      AAA (sf)               427.00
B-1                    AA (sf)                 66.25
B-2                    AA (sf)                 10.00
C (deferrable)         A (sf)                  66.50
D (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                39.25
E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)                36.75
F (deferrable)         B- (sf)                 16.00
Subordinated notes     NR                      61.75

NR-Not rated.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-5: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. J Notes to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 12 classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes of Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-5 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Downgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A4 through G were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I classes K and L were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss. The ratings on the P&I classes H and J were downgraded due
to anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The ratings on the IO class, Class XC was affirmed based on the
weighted average rating factor of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.1% of
the current balance, compared to 8.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.1% of the
original pooled balance compared 3.8% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26, compared to 30 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the April 10, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 64% to $495.4
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 61 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten non-defeased loans
representing 39% of the pool. Eight loans, representing 19% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by U.S. Government securities.

Ten loans, representing 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

A total of nine loans have been liquidated since securitization
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $5.8 million. The five
loans that liquidated with a loss of greater than 1.0% had an
average loss severity of 23%. Three loans, representing 13% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing.

The largest loan in special servicing, which is also the pool's
largest loan, is the Cheltenham Square Mall Loan ($51.6 million --
10.4% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored mall located
approximately nine miles north of downtown Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Constructed in 1954 and most recently expanded in
2008, the mall has approximately 758,000 square feet (SF) of net
rentable area (NRA). The collateral includes ground leases to
Target, Home Depot, American Signature Furniture and Conway
totaling 351,400 SF. The property is also anchored by Burlington
Coat Factory and ShopRite. The loan transferred to special
servicing for the second time in June 2012 due to imminent
monetary default. A receiver with sales power was appointed by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on July 1, 2013. As of December 2013, the total mall
was 93% leased. The inline space (tenants less than 10,000 SF) was
73% leased. The mall is located along a major commercial corridor
with competing retail properties in the immediate trade area.
There is a Super Wal-mart less than a mile away as well as the
Willow Grove Mall, Montgomery Mall, Plymouth Meeting Mall and
Franklin Mills Mall, within a 12-mile radius. The last scheduled
payment on the loan was made in August 2012 and as of the most
recent remittance statement the loan has accumulated approximately
$4.5 million in cumulative advances and ASERs.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Roswell Village
Loan ($10.4 million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
145,000 SF shopping center located in Roswell, Atlanta. The loan
was transferred to special servicing in August 2012 due to
imminent default as result of low occupancy. The property was 67%
leased as of December 2013, however, accounting for several
tenants that have gone dark, the property is only approximately
45% occupied. The borrower continues to remit scheduled payments.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by an industrial
property located in Worthington, Ohio and represents less than 1%
of the pool. Moody's estimates an aggregate $38.5 million loss for
the specially serviced loans (58% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for six poorly
performing loans representing 7% of the pool and has estimated an
aggregate $5.7 million loss (16% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's was provided with full year 2012 and full or partial year
2013 operating results for 100% and 80%, respectively, of the
pool's non-specially serviced and non-defeased loans. Excluding
specially serviced and troubled loans, Moody's weighted average
LTV is 81% compared to 82% at Moody's prior review. Moody's net
cash flow reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Excluding special serviced and troubled loans, Moody's actual and
stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.32X, respectively, compared
to 1.44X and 1.33X at last review. Moody's actual DSCR is based on
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the loan's actual debt service.
Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed
rate applied to the loan balance.

The largest conduit loan is the L'Oreal Warehouse Loan ($18.5
million -- 3.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 649,250 SF
mixed-use office and warehouse building that is 100% leased to
L'Oreal through October 2019. Built to suit in 2004 for L'Oreal,
the property has 51 overhead doors and 40 trailer parking spots.
The subject has access to I-480 and I-80 and good access to I-76,
I-71 and I-77, all major highways connecting to Cleveland,
Youngstown, Akron, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Performance
remains stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.64X,
respectively, compared to 77% and 1.27X, at last review.

The second largest loan is the Koreatown Galleria Loan ($17.7
million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 132,000 SF
retail property located in Los Angeles, California. As of December
2013, the property was 99% leased, the same as at last review. The
property has over 70 stores and is anchored by the Galleria Market
(30% of the NRA; lease expiration June 2016). The loan is
amortizing on a 30-year schedule and matures in October 2014.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 54% and 1.72X, respectively,
compared to 54% and 1.70X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the James River Towne Center
Loan ($17.5 million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by an
181,600 SF retail property located in Springfield, Missouri. The
property is part of an 80-acre 19-building retail complex. Non-
collateral tenants include Wal-Mart and Kohl's. The collateral
includes several ground leases including Home Depot, Michael's
Arts and Craft and Staples. As of December 2013, the property was
87% leased, the same as at last review. The loan has benefited
from a 20-year amortization schedule and the principal balance has
paid down 33% since securitization. The loan is scheduled to
mature in August 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69% and
1.42X, respectively, compared to 77% and 1.26X at last review.


BANC OF AMERICA 2007-BMB1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on L Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on eleven classes
of Banc of America Large Loan, Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-BMB1.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the interest only (IO) class, Class X, was affirmed
because the weighted average rating factor or WARF of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in defeasance in the pool or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in loan
concentration, an increase in expected losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions,"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2014 payment date, the transaction's
certificate balance remains unchanged from that of the last review
at $301.5 million. The Certificates are collateralized by one
floating-rate loan.

The one remaining loan in the trust is the Stamford Office
Portfolio Loan ($301.5 million) which is secured by seven office
properties totaling 1.7 million square feet located in downtown
Stamford, Connecticut. The loan was modified in 2010 and has a
final maturity date in August 2014. The collateral is encumbered
with additional debt in the form of a $98.5 million subordinate
mortgage and $400 million of mezzanine debt.

As of February 2014, the portfolio was 83% leased with average in-
place base rents of $41.63 per square foot. The portfolio's Net
Cash Flow (NCF) for 2013 is $31.8 million, up from $23.8 million
achieved in 2012. Although Moody's does not expect any losses to
the trust debt amount, the loan has significant leverage held
outside the trust which may hinder its ability to refinance upon
its final maturity date.

Moody's trust LTV is 91% and Moody's stressed DSCR is 1.07X.
Moody's current credit assessment is B2, the same as last review.
The pool has experienced $14 million in losses due to the
liquidation of the Readers Digest loan in February 2012. There are
no interest shortfalls as of the current payment date.


BATTALION CLO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes' Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Battalion CLO 2007-1 Ltd.:

  $31,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  July 14, 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 7,
  2012 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  $32,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes, Due 2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 15,
  2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  $27,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
  2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on July 15, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  $22,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Due
  2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on July 15, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $343,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Due
  2022 (current outstanding balance of $340,544,142), Affirmed
  Aaa (sf); previously on July 15, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Battalion CLO 2007-1 Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end July 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
July 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower WARF, higher
spread and diversity levels compared to the levels during the last
rating review. Moody's modeled a WARF of 2657 compared to 3145, a
spread of 3.39 compared to 3.1 and a diversity of 57 compared to
48. Furthermore, the transaction's reported OC ratios have been
stable since April 2013.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2126)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3188)

Class A: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $476.1 million, defaulted
par of $24.9 million, a weighted average default probability of
17.54% (implying a WARF of 2657), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.6%, a diversity score of 57 and a weighted
average spread of 3.39%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


BATTALION CLO V: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
ratings to Battalion CLO V Ltd./Battalion CLO V LLC's $376.75
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is backed by a revolving pool consisting
primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 23,
2014.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding excess spread), and cash flow structure, which
      can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which consists
      primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The portfolio manager's experienced management team.

   -- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and
      ultimate principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P
      assessed using its cash flow analysis and assumptions
      commensurate with the assigned ratings under various
      interest-rate scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from
      0.2356%-13.8385%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to interest and
      principal proceed diversion to reduce the rated notes'
      outstanding balance.

   -- The transaction's reinvestment overcollateralization test, a
      failure of which will lead to the reclassification of up to
      50% of excess interest proceeds that are available before
      paying uncapped administrative expenses and fees,
      subordinated hedge payments, reserve deposits, portfolio
      manager incentive fees, and subordinated note payments to,
      during the reinvestment period, principal proceeds for the
      purchase of additional collateral assets or, after the
      reinvestment period, pay down the secured notes according to
      the note payment sequence.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Battalion CLO V Ltd./Battalion CLO V LLC

Class                  Rating                 Amount
                                            (mil. $)
A-1                    AAA (sf)               241.50
A-2A                   AA (sf)                 45.00
A-2B                   AA (sf)                  5.00
B (deferrable)         A (sf)                  33.00
C (deferrable)         BBB (sf)                22.00
D (deferrable)         BB (sf)                 19.25
E (deferrable)         B (sf)                  11.00
Subordinated notes     NR                      39.75

NR--Not rated.


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR4: Fitch Ups Class H Securities Rating to B
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded six and affirmed eight classes of Bear
Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMSI) commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-PWR4.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades reflect the increased credit enhancement to the notes
from loan paydowns including $71 million in full payoffs from
three weaker performing loans that had been modeled with losses.
There are 19 loans remaining in the pool, two of which are
defeased (35.7% of the pool), including the largest loan in the
pool.  Fitch has designated 10 loans (52.5%) as Fitch Loans of
Concern, which includes two specially serviced assets (3.5%).
Fitch modeled losses of 6.6% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 2.2%, including losses
already incurred.  The pool has experienced $11.3 million (1.2% of
the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.

As of the April 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 84.5% to $148 million from
$954.9 million at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes P and Q.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is secured by
three flex buildings (4.3%) totaling 117,798 square feet (sf)
located in Buffalo Grove, IL.  The occupancy at the property has
been at 56.6% over the past two years as the borrower has been
unable to fill the vacant space.  In addition, there is
significant rollover with 22.6% of the net rentable area expiring
in July 2014 and the remaining 34% of space expiring in October
2015.

The next largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is secured
by a 137,736 sf anchored retail property (5.4%) located in
Charlotte, NC.  At origination, the property was located adjacent
to a Wal-Mart that subsequently closed and relocated four miles
from the subject property.  The relocation has led to a
substantial decrease in traffic to the property and getting
tenants to renew at the property has been difficult.  However,
occupancy was 97.7% as of year-end 2013.  The largest tenants at
the property include Food Lion, It's Fashion Metro, and Ross Dress
for Less.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is secured
by a 116-unit garden apartment and townhome complex (2%) located
in Jonesboro, GA.  The property has suffered as a result of
declining performance of the Atlanta metro. DSCR at the property
dropped to 0.66x at year-end 2013 from 1.04x at year-end 2012
mainly due to an increase in vacancy.

Rating Sensitivities

The ratings on the class A-3 through H notes are expected to be
stable as the credit enhancement remains high.  However, further
upgrades are not anticipated due to the concentration of loans in
secondary and tertiary markets and the anticipation that several
loans will have difficulty refinancing.  The class J through N
notes may be subject to further downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch has taken the following actions as indicated:

-- $48.3 million class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.1 million class B upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $8.4 million class C upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $14.3 million class D affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $9.5 million class E upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $9.5 million class F upgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $8.4 million class G upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative;
-- $10.7 million class H upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; assigns
   Outlook Stable;
-- $3.6 million class J affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $4.8 million class K affirmed at 'CCCsf', RE 100%;
-- $4.8 million class L affirmed at 'CCsf', RE 50%;
-- $2.4 million class M affirmed at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $2.4 million class N affirmed at 'Csf', RE 0%;
-- $1.8 million class P affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate the class Q certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP28: S&P Lowers Rating on Class K Certs to D
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on the class
K commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-TOP28, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities transaction, to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)'.

"We lowered our rating to 'D (sf)' on the class K certificates
following principal losses as detailed in the April 11, 2014,
trustee remittance report.  The principal losses, totaling $2.7
million, resulted primarily from the discounted payoff of the 56-
64 Broad Street loan, which was with the special servicer, C-III
Asset Management LLC.  According to the April 2014 trustee
remittance report, the discounted payoff of the loan resulted in a
loss severity of 61.3% ($2.7 million in principal losses) of its
$4.4 million beginning trust balance at liquidation.
Consequently, class K lost 35.0% of its $2.2 million original
principal balance, while subordinate class L lost 100% of its
beginning balance," S&P said.  S&P previously lowered its rating
on class L to 'D (sf)'.


CHL MORTGAGE 20014-13: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 4 Tranches to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches and downgraded the ratings of three tranches issued by
Countrywide. The tranches are backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans
issued from 2004.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-13

Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-18, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-19, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. PO, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 19, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-5

Cl. 2-A-2, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2013
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-9, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2013
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-10, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2013
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrades for CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-13
reflect the buildup of credit enhancement available to the senior
bonds. The rating actions for CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
2004-5 reflect correction of the calculations of the allocation of
the Class 2-A-5 super senior support amounts used in prior rating
actions. In addition, the rating actions for both deals reflect
updates and corrections to the cash-flow models previously used by
Moody's in rating these transactions. The changes pertain to the
calculations of the senior percentage post subordination depletion
and the loss allocation amounts.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 down from
7.5% in March 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central
range of 6.0% to 7.0% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this
central scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CIFC FUNDING 2007-II: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. D Notes to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by CIFC Funding 2007-II, Ltd.:

$56,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
April 2021, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 14, 2011
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

$35,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due April 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on October 14,
2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by CIFC Funding 2007-II, Ltd.:

$24,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
April 2021, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on October 14, 2011
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$236,000,000 Class A-1-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
April 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 27, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$100,000,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Variable Funding Notes
due April 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 27, 2007
Assigned Aaa (sf)

$84,000,000 Class A-1-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
April 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 16, 2009
Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

$28,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due April 2021, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on October 14, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

CIFC Funding 2007-II, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the end of the deal's
reinvestment period. In light of the reinvestment restrictions
during the amortization period, and therefore the limited ability
of the manager to effect significant changes to the current
collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher
likelihood that the collateral pool characteristics will maintain
a positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower
WARF, higher spread and higher diversity levels compared to the
levels previously assumed in its rating analysis. The deal has
also benefited from a shortening of the portfolio's weighted
average life since March 2013. Furthermore, the transaction's
reported collateral quality and OC ratios have been stable over
the last year.

The rating actions also result in part from a correction to
Moody's modeling of the Overcollateralization Tests. Due to an
input error, the Overcollateralization Ratio Numerator was
understated in previous rating actions. This error has how been
corrected and the rating actions reflect the appropriate modeling
of the transaction.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2260)

Class A-1-S: 0

Class A-1-R: 0

Class A-1-J: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +3

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3390)

Class A-1-S: 0

Class A-1-R: 0

Class A-1-J: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -2

Class C: -1

Class D: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $576.79 million, defaulted
par of $2.44 million, a weighted average default probability of
19.40% (implying a WARF of 2825), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 48.78%, a diversity score of 85 and a weighted
average spread of 3.38%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets
with credit estimates that have not been updated within the last
15 months, which represent approximately 2.08% of the collateral
pool.


CITIGROUP 2013-GCJ11: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2013-GCJ11.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at
the end of this press release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  There have been no delinquent or
specially serviced loans since issuance.  As of the April 2014
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 1.1% to $1.19 billion from $1.21 billion at issuance.
No loans are defeased.

The largest loan in the pool (7.2%), 39 Broadway, is secured by a
448,349 square foot (sf) office building located in the Financial
District of New York City.  As reported by the servicer, the
property's occupancy increased to 100% as of September from 96% as
of February 2013.

The second largest loan (5.9%), Empire Hotel & Retail, is
collateralized by a 423 key hotel located on Manhattan's Upper
West Side.  The property features a lobby bar and lounge, a pool
deck and bar, three meeting places, an indoor/outdoor pool, a
fitness center and a business center.  The retail portion of the
property is leased to five third-party tenants including the
rooftop lounge.  Comparing the year-end 2013 to year-end 2012
financials, the property's occupancy, average daily rate (ADR) and
revenue per available room (RevPAR) all increased to 88.1% versus
86.7%, $251 versus $243 and $224 versus $212, respectively.

The third largest loan (5.5%), Christown Spectrum, is secured by a
1,038,765 sf (850,638 sf of which is collateral) retail center
located in Phoenix, AZ.  The property, which is the oldest
continuously operated shopping mall in Phoenix, was built in
phases from 1961 to 1984 and underwent a $10 million renovation
completed in 2007.  The mall is anchored by Walmart, Costco,
Target (non-collateral), and JC Penney.  The servicer-reported
occupancy increased slightly to 97.8% as of year-end 2013 from
96.2% as of year-end 2012.

The sixth largest loan (4%), 127 West 25th Street, is secured by a
104,000 sf office building in the Chelsea neighborhood of New York
City.  The property is 100% leased by the Bowery Residence
Community (BRC), a non-profit organization providing multiple
charitable services for the homeless.  As mentioned in Fitch's
presale report, a zoning dispute and a pending litigation
regarding the property's land use was a listed concern.  In
October 2010, the Chelsea Flatiron Coalition (CFC) commenced a
proceeding seeking an injunction against the property's conversion
to a homeless shelter and offices and an annulment of a prior
judgment approving such a conversion.  In June 2013, a New York
appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the suit by the CFC
stating the building was a grandfathered shelter.

RATING SENSITIVITY

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks.  Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic
or asset level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.  Additional information on rating sensitivity is
available in the report 'CGCMT 2013-GCJ11' (April 10, 2013).

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $62.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $290.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $236.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $92.9 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $104.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18.1 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $948.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $117.6 million* class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only.
Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


CLAREGOLD TRUST 2007-2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. L Certs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
ClareGold Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-2 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 9, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance, the same as the Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.1% of the original
pooled balance, the same as the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, the same as the last review.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2014 payment date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by approximately 40% to $284.3
million from $475.4 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 12% of the pool. Three loans, constituting 21% of the
pool, have investment-grade credit assessments.

Five loans, representing 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Currently, there are no loans in special servicing. The pool has
not experienced any realized losses to date. Moody's has assumed a
high default probability for three poorly performing loans
representing 2.4% of the pool and has estimated a $1.4 million
loss (20% expected loss based on a 50% probability default) from
these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and a partial or full year 2013 operating results for 15% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 76% compared to
79% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.31X,
respectively, compared to 1.42X and 1.26X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

The largest loan with a credit assessment is the Grosvenor
Building Loan ($27.2 million -- 9.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 21-story 201,700 square foot (SF) Class A office
building located in downtown Vancouver, British Columbia. The
property was 97% leased as of March 2013 compared to 96% at last
review. Performance has improved due to higher revenues. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa1 and 1.73X compared to
Baa3 and 1.39X at last review.

The second largest loan with a credit assessment is the Victoria
Place Shopping Centre Loan ($16.7 million -- 5.9% of the pool),
which is secured by a 139,600 SF community shopping center located
in a busy retail area in London, Ontario. The property was 97%
leased as of March 2013. Performance has been stable. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Baa2 and 1.21X compared to
Baa2 and 1.20X at last review.

The third loan with a credit assessment is the Wonderland Centre
loan ($14.9 million -- 5.3% of the pool), which is secured by
287,000 SF retail center located in London, Ontario. The property
was 85% leased as of March 2013. The loan is on the servicer's
watch due to low DSCR caused by decreasing rental rates. The loan
is benefiting from amortization. It has amortized 40% since
securitization. Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are
Baa2 and 1.71X compared to Baa2 and 1.58X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Complexe University Loan ($34.6 million --
12.2% of the pool), which is secured by two adjacent Class B
office buildings located in downtown Montreal, Quebec. The
properties total 460,700 SF and were 97% and 99% leased as of May
2013, compared to 98% and 100% , respectively, at last review.
Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 64%
and 1.57X compared to 67% and 1.48X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Madison Centre Loan ($14.1
million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery
anchored retail shopping center located in Burnaby, British
Columbia. The property was 98% leased as of April 2014, compared
to 96% at the last review. Performance has been stable. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.08X, compared to 92% and 1.03X
at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Kingspoint Centre Loan
($13.5 million -- 4.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 165,700
SF retail property located in Brampton, Ontario. The property was
99% leased as of April 2013. Performance has declined due to lower
revenues. The loan is benefiting from amortization. It has
amortized 17% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 65% and 1.49X, compared to 58% and 1.67X at last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating to Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of COMM 2012-CCRE1
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch's affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  There are currently no delinquent or
specially serviced loans.  Fitch reviewed servicer-provided year-
end (YE) 2012 and partial YE 2013 financial performance of the
collateral pool in addition to updated rent rolls for the top 15
loans representing 64.5% of the transaction.

As of the April 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 2.2% to $912.6 million from
$932.8 million at issuance.  No loans are defeased. The pool has
experienced no realized losses to date. Fitch has designated one
loan (0.8%) as a Fitch Loan of Concern.

The largest loan in the pool (12.8%) is secured by a portion of a
1.7 million square foot (sf) regional mall (1.3 million-sf of
collateral) located in Albany, NY.  The mall is anchored by Macy's
(non-collateral), J.C.Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods, and Best Buy.
As of year-end (YE) 2013, the occupancy was 92.8% compared to
90.3% at issuance.  The servicer-reported year-end 2013 debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.47x, compared to 1.40x at
issuance.

The second largest loan in the pool (6.0%) is secured by a
227,707-sf office property located in San Leandro, CA.  As of
third quarter 2013 (3Q'13), the occupancy remains at 100% with
limited lease rollover until 2017.  The servicer-reported YTD
(year to date) 3Q'13 DSCR was 1.63x, compared to 1.76x at
issuance.

The third largest loan in the pool (5.9%) is secured by a portion
of a 1.3 million sf (635,769 sf owned) regional mall located in
Grandville, MI, approximately 10 miles southwest of Grand Rapids,
MI.  The mall features five non-collateral anchors, including
Macy's, Younkers, Sears, JC Penney, and Kohls.  The 3Q'13
occupancy was 94.4% compared to 90.6% at issuance.  The servicer-
reported 3Q'13 DSCR was 2.02, compared to 1.77x at issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITY

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks.  Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic
or asset- level event changes the transaction's portfolio-level
metrics.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $34.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $409.2 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95.6 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $728.4 million class X-A* 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.6 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.1 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.2 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the $184.2 million interest-only class X-B, or
the $26.8 million class H.


COMM 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on G Secs
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 13 classes of
COMM Mortgage Trust 2012-CCRE1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE1 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.3% of the
current balance, compared to 2.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was " Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, the same as the last review.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 payment date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by approximately 2% to $913.5
million from $932.8 million at securitization. The Certificates
are collateralized by 54 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 13% of the pool. The pool does not contain any
investment grade credit assessments or defeased loans.

Four loans, representing 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Currently, there are no loans in special servicing. The pool has
not experienced any realized losses to date.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and a partial or full year 2013 operating results for 52% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 90% compared to
95% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.56X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.52X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and
the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Crossgates Mall Loan ($117.1 million -- 12.8%
of the pool), which represents a pari passu interest in a $292.7
million loan. The loan is secured by a two-story, 1.3 million
square foot (SF) super regional mall located in Albany, New York.
The mall is anchored by Macy's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting
Goods, Best Buy and Regal Crossgates. The property was 93% leased
as of December 2013 compared to 95% as of December 2012.
Performance has improved due to higher revenues. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 97% and
0.92X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Creekside Plaza Loan ($55
million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by 228,000 SF Class
A three-building office complex and an above-ground parking
structure located in San Leandro, California. As of September 2013
, the property was 100% leased, the same as last review and
securitization. Performance has remained stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.06X, respectively, compared to 97% and
1.06X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall
Loan ($53.9 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $150.2 million loan. The loan is secured by a
636,000 SF (1.3 million SF total) super regional mall located in
Grandville, Michigan. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Younkers,
Sears, Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods and Celebration
Cinemas. The property was 94% leased as of September 2013 compared
to 92% as of December 2012. Performance has been stable. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.20X, respectively, compared to
80% and 1.18X at last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE7: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of seventeen
classes in COMM 2013-CCRE7, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE7 as follows:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. PEZ**, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Certificates may be exchanged for Class A-3FL of like balance

Reflects Exchangeable Certificates

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

In terms of waterfall structure, the transaction contains a unique
group of exchangeable certificates. Classes A-M (Aaa (sf)), B (Aa3
(sf)) and C (A3 (sf)) may be exchanged for Class PEZ (A1 (sf))
certificates and Class PEZ may be exchanged for the Classes A-M, B
and C. The PEZ certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of
interest distributable on the Classes A-M, B and C certificates
that are exchanged for such PEZ certificates. The initial
certificate balance of the Class PEZ certificates is equal to the
aggregate of the initial certificate balances of the Class A-M, B
and C and represent the maximum certificate balance of the PEZ
certificates that may be issued in an exchange.

Moody's considers the probability of certificate default as well
as the estimated severity of loss when assigning a rating. As a
thick vertical tranche, Class PEZ has the default characteristics
of the lowest rated component certificate, but a very high
estimated recovery rate if a default occurs given the
certificate's thickness. The higher estimated recovery rate
resulted in a A1 (sf) rating, a rating higher than the lowest
rated component certificate.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current balance.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 22 at securitization.

Deal Performance

As of the April 11, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2% to $915 million
from $936 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 58 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 55% of
the pool.

Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in no
realized losses to date. There are no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 62% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 48% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 102%, same as at
securitization. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.64X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.63X and 1.08X at securitization.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Moffet Towers Phase II Loan ($130 million --
14.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 676,598 SF office
property located in Silicon Valley. The property consists of three
separate LEED Gold certified eight-story office buildings. Major
tenants include Hewlett Packard (58% of NRA) and Amazon (33% of
NRA). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.94X,
respectively, same as at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Lakeland Square Mall Loan ($68.8
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 535,937 SF
component of a regional mall located in Lakeland, Florida. The
property is anchored by Dillard's, J.C. Penney, Macy's and Sears.
Only J.C. Penney is collateral for this loan. Junior anchors
include Burlington Coat Factory, Cinemark Movie Theaters and
Sports Authority. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and
1.07X, respectively, compared to 105% and 1.05X at securitization.

The third largest loan is the Larkspur Landing Hotel Portfolio
Loan ($58.9 million -- 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by 11
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted extended-stay hotels
located in San Francisco, Sacramento, Seattle and Portland.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 1.12X, respectively,
compared to 109% and 1.11X at securitization.


COMM 2014-CCRE17: Fitch to Give BB- Rating to Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2014-CCRE17 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as follows:

-- $49,750,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $149,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,376,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69,850,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $333,736,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $900,296,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,584,000b class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,980,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $199,734,000b class PEZ 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,170,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $184,829,000a,c class X-B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,717,000a,c class X-C 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,679,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,906,000c class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,811,000c class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.
(b) Class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
    certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for
    class A-M, B, and C certificates.
(c) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of April 22, 2014.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$62,604,107 interest-only class X-D, the $20,868,000 class G or
the $41,736,107 class H certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in
the trust, primary assets of which are 59 loans secured by 86
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.192 billion, as of the cutoff date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Cantor Commercial Real Estate
Lending, L.P., German American Capital Corporation, Jefferies
LoanCore LLC, and General Electric Capital Corporation.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 80.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.2%, and asset summary reviews
on 85.8% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.19x and
108.3%, respectively, are worse than the 2013 averages of 1.29x
and 101.6%, respectively.  While the pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is
higher than the year-to-date 2014 average of 1.16x, the pool's
Fitch LTV of 108.3% exceeds the year-to-date 2014 average of
101.6%.

Exposure to NY Tristate Market: Three of the 10 largest loans
(25.7% of the pool) are located in the New York tri-state area,
one of the higher performing regions in Fitch's analysis.  There
is one each in Manhattan, The Bronx, and Yonkers.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 10.99%
of the initial pool balance prior to maturity.  The pool's
concentration of partial interest loans (37.1%), which includes
four of the 10 largest loans, is higher than the 2013 average
(34.0%).  The pool's concentration of full-term interest-only
loans (27.7%), including three of the 10 largest loans, also
exceeds the 2013 average (17.1%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 5.8% below
the full-year 2013 NOI (for properties that 2013 NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans, and
could result in potential rating actions on the certificates.
Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to COMM
2014-CCRE17 certificates and found that the transaction displays
slightly above average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  A
downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result if NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF.  In a more
severe scenario, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBBsf' could result if NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's
NCF.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on pages 75 - 76.

The master servicer will be Midland Loan Services, Inc., rated
'CMS1' by Fitch. The special servicer will be Midland Loan
Services Inc., rated 'CSS1'.


CONNECTICUT VALLEY: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. C-1 Notes to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Connecticut Valley
Structured Credit CDO III, Ltd.:

  $35,500,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded to
  Aa1 (sf); previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  $48,000,000 Class A-3A Floating Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded
  to A3 (sf); previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1
  (sf)

  $11,500,000 Class A-3B Fixed Rate Notes Due 2023, Upgraded to
  A3 (sf); previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  $30,000,000 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
  outstanding balance of $26,630,449), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
  previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  $10,000,000 Class B-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
  outstanding balance of $8,835,334), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
  previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  $14,500,000 Class C-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
  outstanding balance of $11,041,448), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
  previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  $2,500,000 Class C-2 Fixed Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
  outstanding balance of $1,881,330), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
  previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

  $225,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2023 (current
  outstanding balance of $47,265,227), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on November 7, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Connecticut Valley Structured Credit CDO III, Ltd., issued in
March 2006, is a collateralized debt obligation backed primarily
by a portfolio of CLO securities, with some exposure to Commercial
Real Estate CDOs, Emerging Market CDOs, and other structured
finance assets originated from 2005 to 2007.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ("OC") ratios since November 2013. The Class A-1
Notes have been paid down by approximately 20%, or $11.6 million
since November 2013.Based on the latest trustee report dated March
24, 2014, the Class A, Class B, and Class C overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 144.4%, 116.3% and 108.6%, respectively,
versus September 2013 levels of 135.5%, 112.8% and 106.4%,
respectively.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1. Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2. Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3. Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's non-investment grade rated assets notched up by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3A: 0

Class A-3B: 0

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +1

Moody's non-investment grade rated assets notched down by 2 rating
notches:

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3A: -2

Class A-3B: -1

Class B-1: -2

Class B-2: -1

Class C-1: -1

Class C-2: -1


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C3: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. D Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed six classes of
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corporation's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-C3

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades and affirmations reflect an increase in credit
enhancement and continued stable collateral performance since
Fitch's last rating action.  Upgrades were limited due to the lack
of progress in resolving the specially serviced assets, none of
which are currently being marketed for sale.  Fitch modeled losses
of 10.5% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original
pool balance total 8.5%, including $89.2 million (5.4% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has
designated 26 loans (26.1%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes 12 specially serviced assets (12.8%).

As of the March 2014 distribution date, there are 67 loans
remaining from the original 167 loans and the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 70.7% to $479.7 million from
$1.64 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, nine loans
(19.1% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes D through P.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 184,616 square
foot (sf) office property in Danvers, MA, 20 miles north of Boston
(3.6% of the pool).  The original loan matured in April 2009, had
transferred to special servicing in February 2009 upon the
borrower's request for an extension of the maturity date.  In May
2013 the lender took title of the property through foreclosure.
Extensive renovations including the building lobby, parking lot,
gym, and HVAC systems have been completed.  Due to the recent
improvements there is over $10 million in advances outstanding on
the loan. Servicer reported occupancy at the property is 93%,
primarily leased by Copyright Clearance Corporation (55% of net
rentable area [NRA]) with a lease through April 2024.

The next largest contributor to expected losses is a 270 unit
multifamily property in Palm Bay, FL (2.3 % of the pool).  The
loan transferred to the special servicer in December 2008 for
payment default and became real estate owned (REO) in July 2011.
The servicer reported occupancy at 87% in January 2014, down from
92% in February 2013 but a significant increase from October 2011
at 66%.  The servicer is stabilizing the property through
continued lease-up and completion of deferred maintenance items.
The property has not been marketed for sale at this point.

The third largest contributor to expected losses is five
unanchored retail properties totaling 34,930 sf located in
Parkland, FL (1.2% of the pool).  The loan transferred to the
special servicer in May 2009 for payment default and became REO in
March 2013.  The servicer continues to stabilize the property and
market vacant space for lease.

Rating Sensitivity

Rating Outlooks on classes A-5 through C are Stable due to
increasing credit enhancement, continued paydown and expected
payoff from defeasance.  Distressed classes (those rated below
'B') may be subject to downgrades as losses are realized or if
realized losses are greater than Fitch's expectations.  Further
upgrades are not likely until progress is made on resolving the
specially serviced assets.

Fitch upgrades the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

-- $45.1 million class B to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14.3 million class C to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook to
   Stable from Negative.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $264.1 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81.3 million class A-1-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.7 million class D at 'CCCsf'; RE 95%;
-- $16.4 million class E at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.
-- $20.5 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $9.2 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class
A-X and A-SP certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 4 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 14 classes
and upgraded two classes of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Class A-J and B were upgraded due to an increase in
defeasance, to over 9% of the current pool balance from 3% at last
review, as well as Moody's expectation of additional increases in
credit support resulting from the payoff of loans approaching
maturity that are well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid
down by 6% since Moody's last review. In addition, loans
constituting 56% of the pool that have either defeased or have
debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature within the
next 24 months.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. Based on Moody's current base expected loss, the credit
enhancement levels for the affirmed classes are sufficient to
maintain their current ratings.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.5% of the
current balance, compared to 8.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.3% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in
April 2005.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 83, compared to 81 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the April 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 36% to $1.59
billion from $2.50 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 198 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 5% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 22%
of the pool. One loan, constituting 3% of the pool, has an
investment-grade credit assessment. Twelve loans, constituting 9%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Fifty-one loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $56.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 18%). Seven loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Highland Industrial Loan ($33.3 million -- 2.1% of the
pool), which is secured by 18 single-story office/industrial
buildings built between 1993 and 2001 and located in the Ann Arbor
Commerce Park in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The buildings contain
approximately 60% office space and 40% warehouse/flex space.
Performance suffered as occupancy decreased from 86% in 2008 to
70% in 2009 and was at 67% as of October 2013. The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2012 due to imminent
default and the special servicer indicated they are proceeding
with foreclosure.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $49.7 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (46% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 22 poorly
performing loans, constituting 12% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $38.3 million (a 20% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 94% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 93%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.37X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with the credit assessment is the One Madison Avenue Loan
($47.4 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which represents the senior
first mortgage component that is secured by a 13-story office
tower located on Park Avenue along Madison Square Park in
Manhattan, New York. The loan is also encumbered by a $50 million
B-Note and a $482.9 million mezzanine loan. The senior first
mortgage loan is fully amortizing and matures in May 2016. Credit
Suisse (USA) Inc. is the anchor tenant, leasing approximately 97%
of the net rentable area (NRA) through December 2020. Performance
remains stable and the loan is benefitting from amortization.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 10.75X,
respectively, compared to Aaa and 7.15X at last review.

Excluding the credit assessed loans, the top three loans represent
8.7% of the pool. The largest loan is the HGA Alliance
-- Portfolio Loan ($78.9 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is
secured by four multifamily properties totaling 1,030 units. One
of the properties, representing nearly 50% of the allocated loan
amount is located in Las Vegas, Nevada (480 units) and the other
three are located in Florida. As of September 2013, the total
portfolio was 95% leased and the Las Vegas property was 93%
leased, which represents the lowest occupancy of the four
properties. Performance declined from 2011 to 2012 due to both a
decrease in revenue and increase in operating expenses but
rebounded in 2013 due to an increase in rental revenue at all
properties. The loan is on the watchlist and due to its low DSCR
Moody's views this as a troubled loan. The loan is interest only
for its entire term and matures in July 2015. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 164% and 0.55X, respectively, compared to 182%
and 0.50X at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the Ashbrook Commons Loan
($34.3 million -- 2.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 198,600
SF grocery anchored retail center located in Ashburn, Virginia.
The property was 100% leased as of the December 2013, compared to
99% at last review. The property contains a mix of tenants
including beauty and fashion services, retail, restaurants and
recreation. The property's performance has been stable and Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.11X, respectively, the same as
at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the West Oaks I Shopping
Center Loan ($26.0 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 246,000 SF grocery anchored retail center located in Novi,
Michigan. The property was 100% leased as of December 2013 and has
minimal near term rollover with only 12% of the leases expiring by
the end of 2016. The property's anchors include Gander Mountain
(32% of the NRA; lease expiration April 2019); Best Buy (14% of
the NRA; lease expiration January 2021) and Michaels Stores (13%
of the NRA, through May 2021). Performance has been stable over
the past three years and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 105%
and 0.88X, respectively, compared to 102% and 0.90X at last
review.


CREST 2000-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
note issued by Crest 2000-1, Ltd. ("Crest 2000-1"):

Cl. D Fourth Priority Fixed Rate Term Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf);
previously on Jul 24, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-remic) transactions.

The transaction is wholly backed by one commercial mortgage backed
security (CMBS) (100% of the collateral pool). As of the trustee's
February 28, 2014 report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $17.6 million, down
from $500.0 million at issuance.

There are no defaulted assets as of the trustee's February 28,
2014 report.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 1, the
same as that at last review. The current rating on the Moody's-
rated collateral and the assessments of the non- Moody's rated
collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (100.0%, the same as that at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.6 years, compared to 1.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans within the CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.00%, compared to 38.9% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 99.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated note is particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
Increasing the recovery rate of the collateral pool by 10.0% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated note of
zero notches. Increasing the recovery rate of the collateral pool
by 20.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on the
rated note of zero notches.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CRESS 2008-1: Moody's Affirms Rating on Five Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of five class
of notes issued by CRESS 2008-1, Ltd. ("CRESS 2008-1"):

Class A-2 Notes, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 19, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
CLO) transactions.

The transaction is backed by a portfolio of whole loans and a-
notes (67.3% of the pool),b-notes (9.7%), and commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) (23.0%). As of the trustee's February 28,
2014 report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, is $356.5 million, down from $750.0
million at issuance as a result of amortization of the underlying
collateral, recoveries on defaulted collateral as well as failure
of certain par value tests.

The pool contains one asset totaling $10.0 million (6.6% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities
as of the trustee's February 28, 2014 report. This asset (100.0%
of the defaulted balance) is a commercial mortgage backed security
(CMBS).

While there have been limited realized losses on the underlying
collateral to date, Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur
on the defaulted securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5283,
compared to 5331 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (0.0% compared to 9.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (10.9% compared to 1.2% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(1.4% compared to 3.5% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (4.1% compared to
6.6% at last review); B1-B3 (5.8% compared to 2.6% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (77.8%, compared to 76.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.6 years, compared to 5.7 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans and CMBS securities.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 39.9%, compared to 44.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 27.8%, compared to 23.4% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of the collateral
pool by 10.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement
on the rated notes of zero to four notches (e.g. four notches down
implies a ratings moving of A3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery
rate the collateral pool by 10.0% would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to two notches
(e.g., two notches upward implies a ratings movement of Aa2 to
Aaa).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG3: Fitch Hikes C. B-4 Certs Rating to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed five classes of
DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corporation 1999-CG3, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade is a result of stable performance and minimal expected
losses of the loans.  There are five loans remaining, two of which
are defeased (32.7%) and one is in special servicing (5.7%).  The
two performing loans (61.6% of the pool) are low leveraged, fully
amortizing and are expected to pay off in full at maturity.
Despite high credit enhancement and minimal expected losses,
further upgrades are limited given the concentrated nature of the
pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 4.2% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 5.3%, including $47.4
million (5.3% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  As of the March 2014 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 98.6% to $12.4
million from $899.3 million at issuance.

The specially-serviced Whitfield Village Apartments loan (5.7% of
the pool) is secured by a 48-unit, seven-building, two-story
garden-style apartment complex located in Sarasota, FL.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2012 due to monetary
default.  Prior to the trust taking the property into receivership
in March 2013, the borrower filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The
servicer-reported occupancy was 85% as of the second-quarter 2013.

RATING SENSITIVITY

Further upgrades are not expected due to the credit quality of the
remaining pool.

Fitch upgrades the following class and assigns an Outlook as
indicated:

-- $5.8 million class B-4 to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf/RE 0%'; Outlook
Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes and assigns REs as indicated:

-- $6.6 million class B-5 at 'Dsf'; RE 90%;
-- $0 class B-6 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class B-7 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class B-8 at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, B-1, B-2 and B-3
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class D
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class S certificates.


DRYDEN 30 SENIOR: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Dryden
30 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund LLC's $473.15
million floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective
date as of March 7, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund/Dryden 30 Senior Loan Fund LLC

Class                      Rating                       Amount
                                                      (mil. $)
A                          AAA (sf)                     312.15
B                          AA (sf)                       64.75
C (deferrable)             A (sf)                        39.25
D (deferrable)             BBB (sf)                      24.25
E (deferrable)             BB (sf)                       20.75
F (deferrable)             B (sf)                        12.00


EATON VANCE 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Eaton
Vance CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Eaton Vance CLO 2013-1 LLC's $399.1 million
floating-rate notes following the transaction's effective date as
of Jan. 31, 2014.

Most U.S. cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) close
before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level of
portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral manager
typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral within
the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to reach the
target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the CLO
transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted level
of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective date" for
a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on which the
transaction acquires the target level of portfolio collateral, or
the date defined in the transaction documents.  Most transaction
documents contain provisions directing the trustee to request the
rating agencies that have issued ratings upon closing to affirm
the ratings issued on the closing date after reviewing the
effective date portfolio (typically referred to as an "effective
date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's closing
date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of certain
information that we used in our analysis and the results of our
review based on the information presented to us," S&P said.

"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more diverse
portfolio of assets," S&P added.

"For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, our ratings on the
closing date and prior to our effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to us by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect our assumptions about the
transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased," S&P noted.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated U.S. cash flow CLO," S&P added.

On an ongoing basis, after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view, the
current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the credit
quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to support
the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Eaton Vance CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Eaton Vance CLO 2013-1 LLC

Class                     Rating                      Amount
                                                     (mil. $)
A-1                       AAA (sf)                    257.00
A-2                       AA (sf)                      60.10
B (deferrable)            A (sf)                       36.00
C (deferrable)            BBB (sf)                     21.30
D (deferrable)            BB (sf)                      17.20
E (deferrable)            B (sf)                        7.50


FIRST UNION 1999-C2: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class L Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed two classes issued by
First Union National Bank-Chase Manhattan Bank Commercial Mortgage
Trust (FUNC 1999-C2) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 1999-C2.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades reflect that the class J and K notes are covered by
defeased collateral.  The affirmation of the class L notes
reflects increasing concentration and reliance on collateral
backed by single-tenant retail properties.  There are 25 loans
remaining in the pool, 13 of which are defeased (52.5% of the
pool).  Fitch has designated one loan (4.6%) as a Fitch Loan of
Concern.  Fitch modeled losses of 2.4% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 2.1%, including
losses already incurred.  The pool has experienced $23.8 million
(2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.

As of the April 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 96.9% to $35.8 million from
$1.2 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes M and N.

The largest loan in the pool is defeased.  The second largest loan
in the pool is backed by a 250-unit multifamily development (10.2%
of the pool) located in Charlotte, NC.  The property's occupancy
was 86.8% as of year-end 2013 and was covering at a net operating
income debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.34x.

Of the pool, 35.5% represents single-tenant property loans,
including four loans with exposure to Rite Aid (19%; rated 'B',
Outlook Stable by Fitch), four with Walgreens (10.7%; not rated by
Fitch), one with CVS (3.2%), and one with IHOP (2.6%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on the class J and K notes reflects Fitch's
outlook on the rating of the United States of America as the bonds
are covered by defeasance collateral.  The rating on the class L
notes is expected to be stable as the credit enhancement remains
high.  However, an upgrade to the notes is not anticipated due to
the concentration of loans in secondary and tertiary markets and
the reliance on collateral backed by single-tenant retail
properties.

Fitch has taken the following actions as indicated:

-- $3.5 million class J notes upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $11.8 million class K notes upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;

-- $11.8 million class L notes affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $8.7 million class M notes affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 90%.

Fitch does not rate the class NR notes and previously withdrew the
ratings on the IO notes.  Classes A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, and
H have paid in full.


FIRST UNION 2000-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class K Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed five classes of First
Union National Bank Commercial (FUNBC) Mortgage Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2000-C1.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades reflect lower than expected losses from the disposed
specially serviced loan.  The affirmations are the result of
sufficient credit enhancement from continued amortization of the
underlying collateral.  There are 16 loans remaining in the pool,
seven of which are defeased (24.2% of the pool).  Fitch has
designated four loans (47.3%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which
includes one specially serviced asset (13.5%).  Fitch modeled
losses of 14.4% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the
original pool balance total 3.8%, including losses already
incurred.  The pool has experienced $20.8 million (2.7% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date.

As of the April 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 92.5% to $57.9 million from
$776.3 million at issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes L through N.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a specially
serviced (13.5% of the pool) real estate owned (REO) 206,011
square foot (sf) retail center located in Decatur, IL.  The loan
was transferred to special servicing in January 2010 due to the
borrower's request for a discounted payoff.  The trust took title
to the property through Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in July 2011.
The property is currently 83% leased but only 8% occupied.  The
dark tenants continue to pay rent and have leases that run through
2016 and 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings on the class F through J notes are expected to be
stable as the credit enhancement remains high.  The class K may be
subject to downgrades if the performance of the underlying
collateral declines.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes as indicated:

-- $29.1 million class G notes to 'AAsf' from 'A+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;

-- $7.8 million class H notes to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $1.1 million class F notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3.9 million class J notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $7.8 million class K notes at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $5.8 million class L notes at 'CCsf'; RE 5%;
-- $2.5 million class M notes at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Class N, which is not rated by Fitch has been reduced to zero from
$14.6 million at issuance due to realized losses.  Classes A-1, A-
2, B, C, D, and E have paid in full.  Fitch has previously
withdrawn the ratings of the interest-only class IO.


FORE CLO 2007-I: Moody's Upgrades Rating on $29.5MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Fore CLO Ltd. 2007-I:

  $14,500,000 Class B Senior Notes Due July 20, 2019, Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf); previously on November 6, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

  $31,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 20,
  2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on November 6, 2013
  Upgraded to A2 (sf);

  $29,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due July 20,
  2019 (current outstanding balance of $22,799,514), Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf); previously on November 6, 2013 Affirmed Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $246,500,000 Class A-1a Senior Notes Due July 20, 2019 (current
  outstanding balance of $109,367,221), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 6, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$100,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Delayed Draw Notes Due July 20,
2019 (current outstanding balance of $44,368,041), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on November 6, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$38,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Notes Due July 20, 2019, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on November 6, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf).

Fore CLO Ltd. 2007-I , issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in July
2013.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since November 2013. The Class A-1 notes
have been collectively paid down by approximately 9.9% or $16.9
million since November 2013. Based on the trustee's March 2014
report, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B,
Class C, and Class D notes are reported at 138.6%, 120.5% and
110.0%, respectively, versus October 2013 levels of 119.7%, 111.1%
and 105.4%, respectively.

The actions also reflect a correction to Moody's modeling of the
Class D notes direct pay test. When the direct pay test falls
below its required threshold, excess interest proceeds should be
used to pay the Class D principal. However, in prior rating
actions, the test was modeled to pay the Class D interest instead.
This error has now been corrected, and the rating actions reflect
this change.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2108)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3161)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $277.7 million, defaulted
par of $11.1 million, a weighted average default probability of
17.91% (implying a WARF of 2634), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 54.11%, a diversity score of 32 and a weighted
average spread of 2.99%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2002-C3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class L Notes to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five and downgraded two classes of GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., commercial mortgage pass-
through certificates, series 2002-C3 (GMAC 2002-C3).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect an increase in Fitch-modeled losses on the
remaining pool as well as greater than expected realized losses on
the specially serviced loans disposed of since the last rating
action.  The affirmations are due to sufficient credit enhancement
to the remaining classes.  Fitch modeled losses of 36.5% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
4.9%, including $25.1 million of realized losses to date.  Fitch
had modeled losses of 3.7% of the original pool balance at the
last rating action.

As of the April 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 95.3% to $36.4 million from
$777.4 million at issuance.  The pool is extremely concentrated
with eight loans remaining, of which the four largest loans (86.7%
of pool) were in special servicing as of the April 2014 remittance
report.  One loan (4.8%) was defeased.  Cumulative interest
shortfalls totaling $1.58 million are currently affecting classes
J through P.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes L and M reflect the adverse
selection of the remaining pool as well as concerns with the
ultimate workout of the top four loans in the pool, which are all
currently in special servicing.  Distressed classes (those rated
below 'B') may be subject to downgrades as losses are realized or
if realized losses are greater than Fitch's expectations.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the pool's largest
loan, Broadmoor Apartments (28.3% of pool), which is secured by a
284-unit multifamily property located in Tampa, FL.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in July 2012 due to maturity
default.  As of the March 2014 rent roll, the property was 78.7%
occupied.  In April 2013, the borrower filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy.  A court-ordered modification was subsequently granted
in November 2013, whereby terms included an increase in principal,
a reduction in interest rate, a four-year loan extension, and a
modified payment schedule with interest-only payments for the
first 18 months and principal and interest payments for the
remainder of the loan term.  The bankruptcy has since been
dismissed and the special servicer continues to monitor the loan
for timely payments.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is the second
largest loan, Nashville Business Center (25%), which is secured by
an 893,100 square foot (sf) industrial complex located in
Murfreesboro, TN.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in November 2011 for monetary default after a major tenant, Vi-Jon
(a private health care and beauty manufacturer) which initially
occupied 50% of the space, vacated at its May 2010 lease
expiration.  In September 2013, a modification was granted whereby
the loan was bifurcated into an A-note and B-note, the loan was
converted to interest-only for the remaining term, and the
maturity date was extended to July 2014 with two additional one-
year extension options if certain criteria are met.  As of the
December 2013 rent roll, the property was 41.8% occupied by one
sole tenant: Store Opening Solutions, Inc.  Per the rent roll,
approximately 22.4% was leased by the tenant until December 2015,
while 19.4% was being leased on a month-to-month basis.  The
tenant also has the option to lease another 8.2% on an 'as-needed'
basis.  The borrower is aggressively attempting to lease the
remaining vacant space.  According to the special servicer, the
loan was returned to the master servicer on March 28, 2014.

The third largest contributor to modeled losses is the third
largest loan, Lake Park Pointe Shopping Center (20.3%), which is
secured by a 79,945 sf retail property located in Chicago, IL.
The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2012 for
monetary default.  The prior largest tenant, Michael's Fresh
Markets (53% of property square footage), filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy and vacated.  A portion of this space was re-tenanted
by Ross Dress for Less (32%) in November 2013.  The borrower
requested a loan modification and is under negotiation with the
special servicer.  Multiple forbearance agreements were executed,
including prior ones that had expired in December 2012, March
2013, December 2013, and March 2014.  The borrower has requested
an additional 90 - 120 days to allow time to complete financing.

Fitch has downgraded the following classes as indicated:

-- $5.8 million class L to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $4.9 million class M to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $16.8 million class J at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $8.7 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $0.2 million class N at Dsf; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O-1 at Dsf; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O-2 at Dsf; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and
X-2 certificates.


GOLDENTREE VIII: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on $6MM Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by GoldenTree Loan Opportunities VIII, Limited (the
"Issuer" or "GoldenTree VIII").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  $364,800,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $51,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
  (sf)

  $20,300,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $28,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $38,800,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $41,700,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $6,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, Class B-1 Notes, Class B-2 Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

GoldenTree VIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and senior secured notes, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, DIP
collateral obligations, non-senior secured notes and unsecured
loans. The portfolio will be approximately 60% ramped as of the
closing date.

GoldenTree Asset Management LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3162)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


HAMPTON ROADS: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class III Revenue Bonds to B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings on the following classes
of Hampton Roads PPV, LLC military housing taxable revenue bonds
(Hampton Roads Unaccompanied Housing Project), 2007 series A (the
bonds):

-- Approximately $210 million class I to 'A-' from 'A+';
-- Approximately $58 million class II to 'BB' from 'BBB-';
-- Approximately $9 million class III to 'B+' from 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook on the bonds is Negative.

Security
The bonds are special limited obligations of the issuer and are
primarily secured by a first lien on all receipts from the
operation of the unaccompanied housing project known as Hampton
Roads, located at Norfolk Naval Complex.  The absence of a cash
funded debt service reserve fund limits protections afforded
bondholders.

Key Rating Drivers

Decline In Revenue And Projected Coverage: The rating downgrade
and Negative Outlook reflect the anticipation of weaker revenue
and debt service coverage (DSC) in 2014, driven largely by a 5.8%
decline in the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) from 2013 to
2014.  While 2013 DSC ratios of 1.47x, 1.14x and 1.07x,
respectively for each series, are adequate, projected 2014
coverages are not expected to exceed 1.31x, 1.01 and .95x,
respectively.

Project Operation Volatility: The downgraded ratings further
reflect Fitch's expectation that project operations will continue
to exhibit a degree of volatility consistent with historical
operations and higher than initial expectations.

Battleship Leaves Base: The U.S. Navy is in the process of
redistributing ships and plans to move the USS New York from its
Hampton Roads berth to Jacksonville, Florida.  Approximately 3,000
sailors will be impacted in relation to the move.

High Turnover Levels: The project has been experiencing high
turnover levels in January and February 2014 due to the aircraft
carrier USS George Bush deployment which puts negative pressure on
operating expenses.  The project also experienced a dip in
occupancy in early 2014 due to ship deployment with over 900
service member move outs.  The average occupancy for January 2013
- February 2014 was 90.8%, which is down from 96% in late 2013.

Absence Of Cash Reserve: While there are operational and capital
reserves that are available to support the project, the absence of
cash funded debt service reserve fund detracts from bond holder
security for all classes of bonds. Class III bonds are most
vulnerable.

Rating Sensitivities

Bah Revenue: Future annual fluctuations in BAH rates for the
Norfolk area will continue to drive revenues and could impact
DSCRs.  Any weakness attributable to lower BAH rates could be
offset by an increase in the percentage of BAH for the project, as
determined by the Department of Defense.

Decreased Occupancy And/Or Increased Expenses: Management's
ability to maintain high occupancy levels and control operating
expenses could potentially offset the effect of lower revenue.

Unplanned Deployments: Deployments that may occur outside of the
planned schedule may put negative pressure on net operating income
and DSCRs due to high turnover beyond what is normally
experienced.

Credit Profile

Base Information
Hampton Roads/Norfolk Naval Complex (HRNC), located in
Southeastern Virginia about 90 miles from Richmond and 185 miles
from Washington, D.C., is the largest naval base in the world. It
covers approximately 4,631 acres. HRNC consists of a number of
installations primarily located in the Norfolk and Sewells Point
areas and extends to sites in Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Suffolk,
Chesapeake, Portsmouth, Hampton, and Newport News. HRNC is
surrounded by many navy installations such as Naval Weapons
Station Yorktown/Cheatham Annex, Little Creek Naval Amphibious
Base, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Naval Air Station Oceana/Dam Neck
Annex, and Naval Security Group Activity Northwest.

Project Overview
The housing project located on Norfolk Naval Complex base in
Virginia (known as Hampton Roads) is providing apartment
residences for single (i.e., unaccompanied) U.S. Navy enlisted
personnel. Hampton Roads is providing 1,189 two-bedroom, two-bath
apartments, each with a kitchen and living room. In addition to
the new units, existing housing facilities were renovated to
provide another 39 units.

Debt Service Coverage
While the project's 2013 respective debt service coverage ratios
of 1.47x, 1.14x and 1.07x are adequate and in line with management
expectations for the year, projections for 2014 which incorporate
the new BAH amount show coverage not exceeding 1.31x, 1.01 and
.95x, respectively. When reserve and replacement deposits which
are paid after debt service are included those ratios decline
further to 1.27x, .98x and .92x. Debt service, as originally
planned, increased to $19.3 million in 2013 and will remain level
throughout the life of the bonds.

These projected ratios will only be achieved if there are no
increases in aggregate operating expenses and the property
maintains occupancy at a minimum of 92.5% for the remainder of the
year. Property management reports that the project continues to
experience operating expenses that are approximately 20% higher
than what was originally anticipated.

Fitch views unaccompanied military housing projects as having more
risk than military family housing projects given the varied
profile of the respective tenant bases. Unaccompanied housing
projects tend to be subject to higher levels of physical wear and
higher annual turnover which leads to higher operating expenses.
Therefore, Fitch expects that the DSCRs for an unaccompanied
project will be higher than those of military family housing
transactions at the same rating level to account for this dynamic.

Project Occupancy Levels
The project experienced a dip in occupancy during the first two
months of 2014 due to a ship deployment with over 900 service
member move outs. The average occupancy for Jan 2013 - Feb 2014
was 90.8% which is down from 96% in late 2013. Management reports
that occupancy improved in April to 98%.

Additionally, the Navy is in the process of redistributing ships
and plans to move the USS New York from its Hampton Roads berth to
Jacksonville, Florida. Approximately 3,000 sailors will be
impacted in relation to the move.

Fitch believes that project management will continue to be
challenged by the potential for future deployments and the need to
reoccupy units.

BAH Rates
There was a 5.8% decline in BAH rates from 2013 to 2014. This
followed a 5.25% increase in 2013 which followed declines of 1.36%
and 0.81% in 2012 and 2011, respectively. BAH has increased by
8.6%, in aggregate, since the bond origination (2008-2014).
However, original projections assumed a 2% increase annually,
which would have resulted in a 10.3% increase to date. The
difference between the expected 10.3% increase and the actual 8.6%
increase will cause debt service coverage to decline if the BAH
does not increase in the future.

Based on third party REIS data for the Norfolk/Hampton Roads area,
there is uncertainty as to what will be the effect of the U.S.
defense budget cuts on the rental market.

BRAC RISK
The first Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendations
were made in 1988, and U.S. Navy facilities in and around Hampton
Roads were not included in any of the commission's
recommendations. However, since the second BRAC review in 1991 and
recommendations made in 1993, 1995, and 2005, the BRAC Commission
has proposed to relocate Navy activities, ships, personnel,
operations, and infrastructure to HRNC.

It is clear from a review of the Navy's recommendations to the
BRAC Commission and the BRAC Commission's recommendations to the
President since 1988 that the HRNC, including the Naval Shipyard,
Norfolk, Naval Station, Norfolk, Naval Air Station, Oceana, Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown,
and the related operations and infrastructure in around them are
vital to the U.S. Navy. None of these key facilities have been
recommended for closure by the Navy. Consequently, Fitch expects
that HRNC will continue to serve the U.S. Navy and retain its
status as the largest naval complex in the world for the
foreseeable future.

It is unclear if the recent movement of the USS New York is an
indicator for future BRAC recommendations.

Debt Service Reserve Fund
The bonds have a debt service reserve fund whereby AMBAC serves as
the surety bond provider sized at maximum annual debt service.
Fitch does not assign any value to the AMBAC surety bond and does
not rely on its presence in the event of project financial
deterioration. In addition, there is an excess collateral
agreement in place in the amount of $6.5 million which acts as a
line of credit to the project from Merrill Lynch (rated 'A/F1';
Outlook Negative by Fitch) with a wrap from AIG (rated 'A-';
Outlook Stable). At this time the surety bond and excess
collateral agreement providers have had their creditworthiness
downgraded or withdrawn completely since the issuance of the
bonds. As a result, Fitch no longer gives any credit in the
analysis to those agreements.

Project Management

Hampton Roads LLC is managed by American Campus Communities, Inc.
(ACC). ACC has traditionally managed student housing properties
and currently has 53 properties with approximately 32,000 student
housing beds under its management. The Hampton Roads properties
are the first arrangement where ACC is acting as manager for a
military housing project.


ICE 1: S&P Puts BB+ Rating on Class C Tranches on CreditWatch Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on the class
C and D tranches from ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd. (ICE 1), a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction backed primarily by loans and
bonds to emerging market issuers and managed by ICE Canyon LLC, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The overcollateralization levels have declined since S&P's last
rating action in April 2011.  According to the March 2014 trustee
report, the class C and D principal coverage ratios are 112.0% and
106.3% respectively, down from 122.1% and 116.3% in March 2011,
which S&P used for its April 2011 actions.  The class D principal
coverage test as of March 5, 2014, is below its 106.6% minimum
requirement.

The decrease in the principal coverage ratios is primarily due to
an increase in defaulted assets.  The reported balance of the
defaults based on the March 2014 trustee report is $115.4 million,
or about 13.5% of the total assets (excluding cash).  This is up
from $5 million at the time of the last rating action in April
2011.

The transaction has concluded its reinvestment period and is
paying down its class A-1 notes, which are currently about 75% of
their original balance.  Though the class A-3 and B principal
coverage ratios have also declined during this period, the
deleveraging of the more senior notes could mitigate the impact of
the increase in defaults on these classes.  In addition, S&P
understands that the manager is in the process of selling some of
the defaulted positions.  If these sales are at prices higher than
the covenanted recovery rates, all coverage numbers could improve.
Those actions will be considered when S&P do its full cash flow
analysis.

ICE Canyon LLC manages two other Standard & Poor's-rated CLOs: ICE
3: Global Credit CLO Ltd. (ICE 3) and ICE Global Credit CLO Ltd.
S&P affirmed the ratings on ICE 3 in November 2013 when it became
effective.  Although ICE 3 has also experienced a recent decline
in the coverage ratios due to an increase in defaulted assets
since S&P's November 2013 affirmation, it believes that based on
its review, the classes have sufficient credit support at their
current rating levels.  As such, S&P has decided not to place any
of the ICE 3 ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications at
this time.  The ICE Global Credit CLO Ltd. has not experienced any
failure in its coverage test.

S&P will resolve CreditWatch placements after it completes a
comprehensive cash flow analysis and committee review within 90
days.  S&P will continue to monitor the collateralized debt
obligation transactions it rates and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems appropriate.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH NEGATIVE

ICE 1: EM CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg  BB+ (sf)
D                   BB (sf)/Watch Neg   BB (sf)


IMPAC CMB 2004-8: S&P Withdraws Rating on 4 Securities Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on one
class, raised its ratings on two classes, and affirmed its ratings
on two classes from Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-8 and Impac CMB
Trust Series 2005-4, two U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) small balance commercial transactions.  S&P
subsequently withdrew its ratings on the four classes from Impac
CMB Trust Series 2004-8.

These Impac CMB Trust issuances have multiple collateral
structures backed by either multi-family (small balance
commercial) mortgage loans or fixed-rate, second-lien mortgage
loans on one- to four-family residential properties.  Only the
small balance commercial collateral structures are in scope for
this review.  Moreover, although commercial collateral secures
these transactions, the underwriting and transaction structural
features are generally similar to that of U.S. RMBS.

As of the March 2014 remittance period, the small balance
commercial collateral structures in both Impac CMB Trust Series
2004-8 and Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-4 had no delinquencies, so
we did not project any losses under S&P's small balance commercial
criteria.  Typically, when projecting losses for these
transactions, S&P applies the methodology and assumptions outlined
in "Surveillance Methodology And Assumptions For U.S. Small-
Balance Commercial Transactions," published March 1, 2010.  S&P
bases the projected monthly default rates (MDRs) it uses in its
analysis on both the current delinquency pipeline and changes in
60-plus-day delinquency performance throughout the prior six
months.  S&P then applies these MDRs on a period-by-period basis
over a transaction-specific timeframe--up to 120 months following
the transaction's origination, with a 25-month minimum--as
specified in S&P's criteria.  Through this process, S&P determines
whether each class could survive the applicable stress scenario.

When stressing losses, S&P's MDRs and loss severity stresses are
generally proportionate to the scenarios' rating categories.  For
example, S&P applies its base-case MDRs and loss severity
assumptions in a 'B' scenario, whereas it stresss both the base-
case MDR and loss severity assumptions by a 1.225x factor in a
'AAA' scenario.  For each rating category above the 'B' base-case,
the stress factor generally increases by 0.045x for each level.
The stressed MDRs and loss severity assumptions will generally
result in a 'AAA' loss that is close to 1.5x that of the base-case
loss assumption, though it can vary depending on the default and
constant prepayment rate assumptions S&P applies in its analysis.

Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-8's small balance commercial
collateral structure has 21 loans remaining, while that of Impac
CMB Trust Series 2005-4 has 33 loans remaining.  Although there
are no delinquencies in either transaction, there is still an
element of tail risk that S&P addressed in its analysis by
conducting an additional loan-level analysis that stresses the
loan concentration risk within the applicable transactions.  In
this analysis, S&P borrows from the approach used for other pre-
2009 originations as described in the Tail-Risk Analysis section
of "U.S. RMBS Surveillance Credit And Cash Flow Analysis For Pre-
2009 Originations," published Dec. 23, 2013.

S&P lowered its rating on class 3-B from Impac CMB Trust Series
2004-8 to 'B+ (sf)' after applying its tail-risk analysis.  At the
same time, S&P raised its ratings on classes 3-M-1 and 3-M-2 from
this transaction to 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA+ (sf)', respectively,
because there was sufficient credit support to withstand its
projected tail-risk losses at their respective higher rating
categories.  S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on class 3-A from
Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-8 and on class 2-A-1 from Impac CMB
Trust Series 2005-4 based on its criteria, as the projected credit
support for these classes will remain sufficient to cover the
projected losses at this rating level.

S&P subsequently withdrew its ratings on classes 3-A, 3-M-1, 3-M-
2, and 3-B from Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-8 as this transaction
is backed by a collateral pool with a small number of remaining
loans, which, in S&P's opinion, could potentially cause
considerable volatility in performance and thus affect rating
stability.

The classes in these small balance commercial transactions use
subordination, overcollateralization, and excess spread to cover
principal losses and provide credit support.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When analyzing U.S. RMBS collateral pools to determine their
relative credit quality and the potential impact on rated
securities, the degree of remaining losses stems, to a certain
extent, from S&P's outlook regarding the loans' behavior in the
expected economic conditions.  Overall, Standard & Poor's baseline
macroeconomic outlook assumptions for variables that it believes
could affect residential mortgage performance are as follows:

   -- S&P's unemployment rate forecast is 6.4% for 2014, compared
      with the 7.4% rate in 2013.

   -- Home prices will increase 6% in 2014, using the 20-city
      Standard & Poor's/Case-Shiller Home Price Index.

   -- Real GDP growth has been revised downward to a 2.8% rate in
      2014, however still up from the 1.9% rate in 2013.

   -- The 30-year mortgage rate will average 4.6% for 2014.

   -- The inflation rate is now projected to be 1.6% in 2014, up
      slightly from the 1.5% rate in 2013.

Overall, S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views
overall housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS
fundamentals still hinge on additional factors, such as the
ultimate fate of modified loans, the propensity of servicers to
advance on delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve mildly.  However, if a downside
scenario were to occur in the U.S. in line with Standard & Poor's
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario incorporates the following key
assumptions:

   -- Home prices once again decline as a result of higher
      defaults, additional shadow inventory, and less purchase
      activity.

   -- Total unemployment rises to 7.6% in 2014, and job growth
      slows to almost zero.

   -- Downward pressure causes 0.6% GDP growth in 2014, fueled by
      increased unemployment levels.

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate falls back to 4.1% in 2014,
      but limited access to credit and pressure on home prices z
      could hamper consumers in capitalizing on such lower rates.

For more information on S&P's economic outlook and its impact on
its outlook for U.S. RMBS, see the articles listed in the related
research section below.

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-8
                                  Rating
Class      CUSIP         To       Interim          From
3-A        45254NKT3     NR       AAA (sf)         AAA (sf)
3-M-1      45254NKU0     NR       AAA (sf)         AA (sf)
3-M-2      45254NKV8     NR       AA+ (sf)         A (sf)
3-B        45254NKW6     NR       B+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-4

Class      CUSIP         Rating
2-A-1      45254NPE1     AAA (sf)


JP MORGAN 2000-C10: Fitch Affirms D Ratings on 6 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of JP Morgan Commercial
Mortgage Finance Corp., commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2000-C10.  A detailed list of rating actions
follows at the end of this press release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are a result of stable performance of the
underlying collateral and sufficient credit enhancement.  There
are eight loans remaining in the pool, the second largest of which
is defeased (15.4%).  None of the remaining loans are in special
servicing or considered a Fitch Loan of Concern.  Six loans
(77.9%) are secured by retail properties and one is secured by a
self-storage property (6.7%).

As of the April 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 97.7% to $17.1 million from
$738.5 million at issuance.  Fitch modeled losses of 3.8% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
8.5%, including $62.3 million (8.4% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.

The largest loan in the pool is a grocery anchored retail property
in Richardson, TX (32.8%).  The current occupancy at the property
is 93%, with 12.4 % of the leases rolling in 2014 and 10.5%
rolling in 2015.  The loan matures in 2020 and the most recently
reported DSCR is 1.63x as of December 2012.

RATING SENSITIVITY

The Rating Outlook on class F has been revised to Stable from
Negative due to increasing credit enhancement and continued
paydown.  Ratings on the remaining classes are expected to remain
stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes, revises Outlooks and assigns
REs as indicated:

-- $876,909 class E at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.2 million class F at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable from
   Negative;
-- $6 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 100%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, B, C and D have paid in full.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2012-FL2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. X-EXT Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on seven classes of
J.P Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-FL2. Moody's
rating action is as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. X-CP, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. X-EXT, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the interest only (IO) classes were affirmed
because the weighted average rating factor or WARF of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in defeasance in the pool or an improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in loan
concentration, an increase in expected losses from specially
serviced and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower Transactions"
published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model v 8.7. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2014 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance decreased by 8% from that at securitization
due to a loan payoff (the Westin DFW Hotel Loan). The Certificates
are collateralized by five floating rate whole loans. The loans
range in size from 14% to 36% of the pooled balance, with the top
three loans representing approximately 71% of the pooled balance.
All of the loans have additional debt in the form of mezzanine
debt held outside of the trust. The pool's loan level Herfindahl
Index is 4.3, down from 4.9 at last review.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by fee interest in
Carousel Center Loan ($155 million, or 36% of the trust balance).
The loan is secured by a 1.5 million SF super regional mall
located in Syracuse, NY. The property is the dominant mall for
Central New York, and draws customer base from approximately 1.2
million people. The Expansion (850,000 SF that opened in 2012) is
not part of the collateral. There is additional debt in the form
of mezzanine debt outside the trust that is collateralized by
Carousel Center and the Expansion. The loan's Net Cash Flow (NCF)
for year-end 2013 was $27.4 million, down from that of full year
2012, but higher than that of securitization. Moody's LTV is 53%
and Moody's credit assessment is A3, the same as at
securitization.

The Roosevelt Hotel Loan ($75 million, or 17% of trust balance) is
secured by fee interest in an 18-story, 1,015-room, full service
hotel located in midtown Manhattan. This historic hotel covers the
entire block between 45th and 46th Street between Madison Avenue
and Vanderbilt Avenue, and offers 21,000 SF of ground floor retail
space. The loan matures in November 2014. There is additional debt
in the form of mezzanine debt outside the trust. The hotel's NCF
for full year 2013 was $15.6 million, down from $16.4 million
achieved during the trailing twelve month period ending June 2012.
In the trailing twelve month period ending March 2013, the NCF was
$15.4 million. The property's Revenue Per Available Room (RevPAR)
continues to trend upward since securitization but increases in
expenses have offset higher revenues. Moody's NCF is at $12.8
million, slightly lower than that of securitization. Moody's LTV
is 57%, and Moody's credit assessment is Baa1, the same as at
securitization.

The Ashford Hotel Portfolio Loan ($75 million, or 17% of trust
balance) is secured a cross collateralized and cross defaulted
pool of nine hotel properties located in six states. The 1,337-
room key portfolio was acquired by the sponsor in 2007, and has
benefitted from $59 million of capital expenditures. There is
additional debt in the form of mezzanine debt outside the trust.
The portfolio's NCF for year-end 2013 was $14.9 million, up
slightly from $14.4 million achieved during 2012. Moody's LTV for
the trust debt portion is 67%, and Moody's credit assessment is
Ba1, the same as at securitization.

Moody's weighted average pooled trust LTV ratio is 61% compared to
60% at last review. Moody's weighted average stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for pooled trust debt is 1.65X compared to
1.69X at last review. There is an outstanding interest shortfall
($4) to Class E. There are no losses affecting the trust to this
Payment Date.


JP MORGAN 2014-C19: Fitch to Give BB Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust's JPMBB 2014-C19 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Outlooks as
follows:

-- $67,211,000 class A1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $318,698,000 class A2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $112,365,000 class A3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $276,298,000 class A4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $62,128,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,085,370,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89,860,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $98,670,000b class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89,860,000b class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,431,000b class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $251,961,000b class EC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150,000,000cd class A-2FL 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-2FXcd 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65,193,000d class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,715,000d class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,620,000d class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest only.
(b) Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
    for a related amount of class EC certificates, and class EC
    certificates may be exchanged for class A-S, class B, and
    class C certificates.
(c) The aggregate certificate balance of class A-2FL certificates
    and class A-2FX certificates will at all times equal the
    certificate balance of the class A-2FL regular interest.
(d) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of April 17, 2014.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
$56,382,769 non-rated class, the $105,717,769 interest-only class
X-C, and the $21,703,000 class CSQ.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership in the trust,
primary assets of which are 69 loans secured by 100 commercial
properties having an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$1.41 billion as of the cutoff date.  The loans were contributed
to the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association;
Barclays Bank PLC; KeyBank National Association; and Starwood
Mortgage Funding II LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 81.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis on 75.1%, and asset summary reviews
on 75.1% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.32x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 100.9%,
and a Fitch debt yield of 10.2%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 7.7% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Leverage from Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch DSCR
and LTV are 1.32x and 100.9%, respectively, are better than the
2013 and 2014 year-to-date (YTD) averages of 1.29x and 101.6%, and
1.18x and 104.7%, respectively.

Above-Average Property Quality: Fitch assigned property quality
grades of 'A-' or better to three of the 10 largest loans in the
pool, which represent 13.1% of the balance of properties inspected
by Fitch.  Furthermore, property quality grades of 'B+' or better
were assigned to 44.2% of the balance of properties inspected by
Fitch.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 10.62%
of the initial pool balance prior to maturity.  The pool's
concentration of partial interest loans of 29.4% is lower than the
2013 and 2014 YTD averages of 34% and 37.63%, respectively.
However, the pool's concentration of full-term interest-only loans
at 36.4% is higher than the 2013 and 2014 YTD averages of 17.1%
and 15.8%, respectively.  There is one fully amortizing loan,
Centerville Square (2.7%), and Grand Williston Hotel (0.8%) is a
five-year loan amortizing on a 10-year schedule.

Rating Sensitivities

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.26% below
the most recent reported net operating income (NOI) (for
properties that NOI was provided, excluding properties that were
stabilizing during this period).

Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severity on defaulted loans and could
result in potential rating actions on the certificates.  Fitch
evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to JPMBB 2014-
C19 certificates and found that the transaction displays average
sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in which
NCF declined a further 10% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the
junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'AAsf' could result.  In a scenario
in which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade
of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result.  In a
more severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from
Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to
'BBB-sf' could result.

The master servicer will be KeyBank National Association, rated
'CMS1' by Fitch.  The special servicer will be Midland Loan
Services, Inc. rated 'CSS1' by Fitch.


LAKESIDE CDO: Moody's Confirms 'Caa3' Rating on Class A-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating on notes issued
by Lakeside CDO I, Ltd.:

  $624,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
  Rate Notes Due 2038 (current outstanding balance of
  $138,369,354.55), Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on
  March 6, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Upgrade

Lakeside CDO I, Ltd., issued in December 2003, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS originated
from 2001 to 2004.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating action reflects the updates to
Moody's SF CDO methodology described in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" published on March 6, 2014. These updates include:
(i) lowering the resecuritization stress factors for RMBS (US
Prime, Subprime, Manufactured Housing), CDOs exposed to investment
grade corporate assets, and ABS backed by franchise loans or by
mutual fund fees; (ii) using a common table of recovery rates for
all structured finance assets (except for CMBS and SF CDO); and
(iii) providing more guidance on the rating caps Moody's apply to
deals experiencing event of default. In taking the foregoing
actions, Moody's also announced that it had concluded its review
of its rating on the issuer's Class A-1 Notes announced on March
6, 2014. At that time, Moody's said that it had placed the rating
on review for upgrade as a result of the aforementioned
methodology updates.

The action also reflects consideration of deleveraging of Class A-
1 notes since December 2013. The Class A-1 notes have been paid
down by approximately 12%, or $19 million since December 2013.
Despite deleveraging, the transaction's over-collateralization
ratios have decreased due to par deterioration. According to
Moody's calculation, the over-collateralization ratios for the
Class A-1, Class A-2, and Class B notes decreased to 108%, 51%,
and 50%, respectively, versus December 2013 levels of 116%, 59%,
and 57%, respectively. Based on Moody's calculation, the decrease
is primarily due to increase in defaulted securities from $73
million in December 2013 to $84 million in March 2014.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any slowdown in growth in the
current macroeconomic environment and in the residential real
estate property markets. The residential real estate property
market is subject to uncertainty about housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds,
recoveries from defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds
will continue and at what pace. Faster deleveraging than Moody's
expects could have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that
Moody's assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming no recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries in the future would positively
impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then uses the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

B1 and below ratings notched up by two rating notches (735):

Class A-1: 0

B1 and below ratings notched down by two notches (888):

Class A-1: 0


LANDMARK VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $10MM Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Landmark VI CDO Ltd.:

$19,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2018, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on February 14, 2013
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$15,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2018, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on February 14, 2013
Upgraded to A3 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

$222,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2018
(current balance of $62,644,295), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
February 14, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf);

$15,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf);

$10,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2018, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on February 14, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf).

Landmark VI CDO Ltd., issued in January 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2012.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios since April 2013. The Class A notes have
been paid down by approximately 22% or $47.9 million since April
2013. Based on the trustee's April 3, 2014 report, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D
and Class E notes are reported at 161.85%, 132.68%, 116.15% and
107.24%, respectively, versus April 2013 levels of 145.68%,
125.47%, 113.08% and 106.10%, respectively. Moody's notes that the
OC ratios do not reflect a recent payment of $8.75 million made to
the Class A notes on April 14, 2014 .

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen owing to the manager's decision to participate in amend-
to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension of
the actual weighted average life in its analysis. Life extension
can increase the default risk horizon and assumed cumulative
default probability of CLO collateral.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the
ability to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the
covenant levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction
either positively or negatively. Additionally, because the post-
reinvestment period reinvesting criteria do not require that the
reinvestment asset have a Moody's rating equal to or higher than
the rating of the security sold or prepaid, Moody's analyzed the
deal's sensitivity to a portfolio with higher WARF.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2271)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3407)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $137.4 million, defaulted
par of $9.7 million, a weighted average default probability of
16.22% (implying a WARF of 2839), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 50.59%, a diversity score of 45 and a weighted
average spread of 3.38%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: Moody's Cuts Rating on 3 Certs to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed nineteen and downgraded three
the ratings of classes of LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C3 as
follows:

CL. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-MB, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the nine investment-grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the nine below-investment grade P&I classes were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss.

The ratings on P&I classes F, G and H were downgraded due to an
increase in anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The ratings on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed because the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes are consistent with Moody's
expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 13.0% of
the current balance, compared to 12.0% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.8% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 12.0% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the March 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 22% to $2.5 billion
from $3.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 110 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
58% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 2% of the pool, have
investment-grade credit assessments. One loan, constituting less
than 1% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Seventeen loans, constituting 28% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $88.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 41%). Twenty-one loans, constituting 7% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the One Orlando Center ($68.3 million -- 2.7% of the
pool), which is secured by a 355,856 SF office property located in
Orlando, FL. The property was 91% occupied as of December 2012.
The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2012 due to
imminent default. In April 2014, the loan was modified to an A and
B note structure, creating a $16.4 million B note.

The remaining twenty specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $95.6 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for sixteen poorly
performing loans, constituting 24% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $151.5 million (an 25% expected loss based on
a 58% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 94% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 96% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 95%, same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.62X and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.05X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

Currently, there are two loans with investment grade credit
assessments in the pool. The largest loan is the 315 Hudson Street
Loan ($35.0 million -- 1.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
10-story, 446,967 square foot (SF) Class B office property located
in the Hudson Square office submarket in lower Manhattan.
Occupancy increased to 100% as of December 2013 yet financial
performance declined slightly due to higher real estate taxes.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aaa and 2.43X
compared to Aaa and 2.50X, at last review.

The second loan with a credit assessment is the 133 East 58th
Street Loan ($25.0 million -- 1.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a 14-story, 120,737 SF Class B office property with ground-
floor- retail located on East 58th Street and Lexington Avenue in
New York City. The property's leasing performance increased since
last review and financial performance has increased as well.
Moody's credit assessment and stressed DSCR are Aa1 and 2.40X,
respectively, compared to Aa2 and 2.12X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 237 Park Avenue Loan ($419.6 million -- 16.7%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.2 million SF office building
located in the Grand Central office submarket of Midtown
Manhattan. At securitization the loan was also encumbered by a
$255.4 million B Note and $225.0 million in Mezzanine debt. The
loan transferred to special servicing on January 15, 2010 due to
imminent default and has since been returned to the master
servicer and is now current. The loan was modified to allow full
monthly payment on the A Note debt service, building expenses and
partial payment of the B Note debt service to the extent cash is
available. The building was 80% leased as of December 2013
compared to 81% at last review. J. Walter Thompson, Credit Suisse
and JP Morgan each occupy approximately 22% of net rentable area
(NRA), respectively. Based on published news reports, the property
sold for approximately $800 million to RXR Realty Inc. and Walton
Street Capital. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 83% and 1.04X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Rosslyn Portfolio Loan
($310.0 million -- 12.3% of the pool), which is secured by two
office properties, totaling 1.4 million SF, located on Wilson
Boulevard in the Rosslyn/Ballston office submarket of Arlington,
Virginia. The property is also encumbered by a $257.7 million B
note. As of December 2013, the two properties were 70% leased
compared to 86% at last review. The largest tenant is the General
Service Administration (GSA), which leases 19% of NRA. The GSA
renewed the majority of the leases over the last few years. Since
last review, Northrop Grumman vacated its space while other
tenants have either renewed or leased space at the property.
Financial performance has declined since last review. The loan
sponsor is Monday Properties. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
97% and 0.97X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.14X at last
review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Larken Portfolio Loan ($83.0
million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by 19 office,
retail and industrial properties located in central New Jersey.
The loan was modified in June 2012 into an A and B note structure
with the B note totaling $82.5 million. The loan has since been
returned to the master servicer. The portfolio was 86% leased as
of December 2013, the compared to 87% at last review. Moody's A
note LTV and stressed DSCR are 98.4% and 1.09X, respectively,
compared to 104.2% and 1.03X at last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C5: Fitch Raises Cl. F Notes Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 15 classes of LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2005-C5.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade to class A-J is due to its improved credit enhancement
and the expectation that the transaction will continue to delever
as maturing loans repay.  The affirmations reflect the sufficient
credit enhancement for the balance of the classes and the overall
stable performance of the underlying loans.  Fitch modeled losses
of 6.6% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original
pool balance total 5%, including losses already incurred.  The
pool has experienced $29 million (1.2% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  Fitch has designated 20
loans (19.7%) as Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes four
specially serviced assets (8.8%).

As of the March 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 42.8% to $1.3 billion from
$2.3 billion at issuance.  Per the servicer reporting, three loans
(3.2% of the pool) are defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes K through T.

The largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a loan
secured by a 449,443 square foot (sf), four building office
complex located in Germantown, MD (5.2%).  The property
transferred to special servicing in January 2013 due imminent
default.  As of June 2013, the property was 64.1% occupied.  The
loan was modified with an A/B note split and is expected to be
returned to the master servicer after a rehabilitation period.

The next largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a loan
secured by a 99,451 sf shopping center (1.1%) located in Lake in
the Hills, IL.  The loan transferred to the special servicer due
to delinquent payments in May 2011 and subsequently became real
estate owned (REO) in March 2013.  The property's anchor,
Dominick's (72.8% of the property net rentable area), vacated the
property at the end of 2013.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's modeled losses is a loan
secured by a 488-unit apartment complex (2.3%) built in 1987 and
located just west of the strip in Las Vegas.  Property occupancy
at the property has improved to 88% over the past year after
falling into the low to mid 70% range in the prior years.  The
loan remains current as of the most recent remittance date.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings on the class A-4 through N notes are expected to be
stable. The distressed classes (those rated below 'B') are
expected to be subject to further downgrades as losses are
realized.

Fitch has upgraded the following class as indicated:

-- $187.5 million class A-J to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $560.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $105.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $234.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $32.2 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $29.3 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $23.4 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $29.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $26.4 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $23.4 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 50%;
-- $14.7 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $20.5 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.8 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-AB certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P, Q, S and T certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-CL
and X-CP certificates.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C6: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Certs Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 14 classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-C6 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on four investment-grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on 10 below-investment-grade P&I
classes were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 15.0% of
the current balance, compared to 12.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 14.7% of
the original pooled balance, compared to 14.4% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, as compared to 18 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the April 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $1.9 billion
from $3.0 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 147 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 16% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
60% of the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Thirty loans, constituting 34% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $147 million (for an average loss
severity of 56%). Fifty loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. 39 of the loans in special
servicing are cross collateralized and cross defaulted and
constitute the PECO Portfolio loan (for $318 million -- 16% of the
pool), which consists of 39 retail properties totaling 4.3 million
square feet (SF) located across 13 states. The average property
size is 109,000 SF with no individual asset representing more than
6% of the total SF or 7% of the total portfolio balance. Major
tenants include Tops, Bi-Lo, Food Lion, Publix, Staples and Dollar
Tree. The loan transferred to special servicing in August 2012 due
to imminent default. The loan is currently 90+ days delinquent.
The special servicer filed an affidavit and a temporary
restraining order against the borrower in December 2012. The order
required the borrower to turn over all funds in its possession,
set up automatic sweeps into a lender controlled lockbox and enter
into a third party management agreement. In November 2013, the
borrower executed a Deed-In-Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement on 38 of
the 39 properties. The DIL provides for a title transfer of 27 of
the 38 properties by June 30, 2014. The remaining 11 properties
have an additional six months to address the potential
environmental issues and will transfer by December 31, 2014.

The remaining 11 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $161 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (34% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for 18 poorly
performing loans, constituting 20% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $236 million (a 19% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 85% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 98%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 110%, compared to 112% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.24X and 0.88X,
respectively, compared to 1.22X and 0.91X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Potomac Mills Loan ($246 million -- 13% of the
pool), which represents a 60% pari-passu interest in a $410
million first mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.5 million
SF retail center located in Woodbridge, Virginia. Anchor tenants
include Costco (10% of the NRA; lease expiration -- May 2032) and
JC Penney (7% of the NRA; lease expiration -- December 2021). The
property has strong sponsorship from the Simon Property Group. The
property was 93% leased as of January 2014. Performance has
continued to improve since securitization. The loan is interest
only for the full term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108% and
0.85X, respectively, compared to 112% and 0.82X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the 100 Wall Street Loan ($117 million
-- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 482,000 square foot
office building located in New York, NY. The property was 79%
occupied as of February 2014. The property had a significant drop
in NOI due to the departure of its largest tenant in 2013. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 134% and 0.68X, respectively, compared
to 134% and 0.69X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the McCandless Towers Loan ($114 million
-- 6% of the pool), which is secured by two 11 story Class A
office towers totaling 418,000 SF in Santa Clara, CA. The property
was 67% occupied as of year-end 2013. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 155% and 0.63X, respectively, compared to 148% and 0.66X
at the last review.


LCM X LP: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its ratings on the
original class A, B, C, D, and E notes from LCM X L.P., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by LCM
Asset Management, after the notes were redeemed in full.  At the
same time, S&P assigned ratings to the replacement class A-R, B-R,
C-R, D-R, and E-R notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture.
All of the proceeds from the replacement notes were used to redeem
the original notes as outlined in the transaction documents.  The
replacement notes were issued at a lower spread over LIBOR than
the original notes.

S&P's full cash flow analysis resulted in higher cushions for the
senior notes after the refinancing when compared with that at the
spread before the refinancing.

Current date after refinancing

Class       Amount  Interest          BDR      SDR    Cushion
          (mil. $)  rate(%)           (%)      (%)        (%)
A-R        259.00   LIBOR + 1.26    65.53    60.26       5.27
B-R         45.00   LIBOR + 1.90    62.90    52.34      10.57
C-R         29.50   LIBOR + 2.85    52.65    46.23       6.41
D-R         20.00   LIBOR + 3.75    46.56    40.47       6.09
E-R         17.00   LIBOR + 5.50    37.29    33.77       3.52

Effective date
Class       Amount  Interest          BDR      SDR    Cushion
          (mil. $)  rate(%)           (%)      (%)        (%)
A          259.00   LIBOR + 1.48    69.82    64.38       5.44
B           45.00   LIBOR + 2.90    65.69    56.76       8.93
C           29.50   LIBOR + 3.15    55.88    50.64       5.24
D           20.00   LIBOR + 4.60    49.74    44.41       5.33
E           17.00   LIBOR + 5.75    42.57    37.22       5.35

BDR--Break-even default rate. SDR--Scenario default rate.

The supplemental indenture did not make any other substantive
changes to the transaction.
RATINGS WITHDRAWN

LCM X L.P.

Original class         Rating
                   To           From
A                  NR           AAA (sf)
B                  NR           AA (sf)
C                  NR           A (sf)
D                  NR           BBB (sf)
E                  NR           BB (sf)

RATINGS ASSIGNED
Replacement class               Rating
A-R                             AAA (sf)
B-R                             AA (sf)
C-R                             A (sf)
D-R                             BBB (sf)
E-R                             BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.

TRANSACTION INFORMATION
Issuer:               LCM X L.P.
Co-issuer:            LCM X LLC
Collateral manager:   LCM Asset Management LLC
Refinancing arranger: BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
Trustee:              Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas
Transaction type:     Cash flow CLO


LIBERTY TRUST 2014-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to seven
of the eight classes of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) issued by Liberty Funding Pty Ltd. in respect of Liberty
Series 2014-1 Trust.  Liberty Series 2014-1 Trust is a
securitization of nonconforming and prime residential mortgages
originated by Liberty Financial Ltd.

The ratings reflect:

   -- S&P's view of the credit risk of the underlying collateral
      portfolio, including the fact that this is a closed
      portfolio, which means no further loans will be assigned to
      the trust after the closing date.

   -- S&P's view that the credit support is sufficient to
      withstand the stresses it applies.  This credit support
      comprises mortgage insurance for 25.8% of the portfolio,
      which covers 100% of the face value of those loans, their
      accrued interest, and reasonable costs of enforcement, and
      note subordination for the class A1, class A2, class B,
      class C, class D, class E, and class F notes.

   -- S&P's expectation that the various mechanisms to support
      liquidity within the transaction, including an amortizing
      liquidity facility equal to 3.6% of the invested amount of
      class A1, class A2, class B, class C, class D, class E, and
      class F notes and the stated amount of class G notes,
      subject to a floor of A$600,000, and principal draws, are
      sufficient under its stress assumptions to ensure timely
      payment of interest.

   -- The provision of a reserve account established and
      maintained through the trapping of excess spread on each
      payment date.  The reserve account may be utilized to meet
      current loan losses or as liquidity support.

   -- The benefit of a fixed-to-floating interest-rate swap to be
      provided by National Australia Bank Ltd. to hedge the
      mismatch between receipts from any fixed-rate mortgage loans
      and the variable-rate RMBS.

A copy of Standard & Poor's complete report for Liberty Series
2014-1 Trust can be found on RatingsDirect, Standard & Poor's Web-
based credit analysis system, at:

                 http://www.globalcreditportal.com

The issuer has not informed Standard & Poor's (Australia) Pty
Limited whether the issuer is publically disclosing all relevant
information about the structured finance instruments the subject
of this rating report or whether relevant information remains non-
public.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Class       Rating        Amount (mil. A$)
A1          AAA (sf)      210.0
A2          AAA (sf)       41.4
B           AA (sf)        26.4
C           A (sf)         10.8
D           BBB (sf)        4.8
E           BB (sf)         3.0
F           B (sf)          1.6
G           N.R.            2.0

N.R.-Not rated.


MAPS CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on $16MM Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Maps CLO Fund II, Ltd:

  $186,250,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  July 20, 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 12,
  2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $18,750,000 Class A-1J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  July 20, 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on October 12,
  2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  $18,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  July 20, 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on October 12,
  2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due July 20, 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
  October 12, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes Due July 20, 2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
  October 12, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  $50,000,000 Class A-1R Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
  Notes Due July 20, 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July
  27, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $25,000,000 Class A-1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
  July 20, 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 27, 2007
  Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $16,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
  July 20, 2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on October 12,
  2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Maps CLO Fund II, Ltd, issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
July 2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
July 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from lower weighted
average rating factor (WARF) compared to the covenant level.
Moody's modeled a WARF of 2616 compared to the covenant of 3098.
The weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio has also
improved since the last rating review.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2093)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-1S: 0

Class A-1J: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3139)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-1R: 0

Class A-1S: 0

Class A-1J: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $381 million, defaulted par
of $1.9 million, a weighted average default probability of 19.41%
(implying a WARF of 2616), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 51.00%, a diversity score of 61 and a weighted average
spread of 3.02%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Moody's Cuts Cl. G Certs' Rating to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven
classes, upgraded the ratings on two classes and downgraded the
rating on one class in Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-KEY2 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on Classes A-1A, A-4 and B were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on Classes E, F and H were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

The ratings on Classes B and C were upgraded due to an increase in
credit support since Moody's last review resulting from paydowns
and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of additional
increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of loans
approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance. The
pool has paid down by 23% since Moody's last review. In addition,
loans constituting 73% of the pool are defeased.

The rating on one P&I class was downgraded due to an increase in
realized and expected losses from specially serviced and troubled
loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.8% of the
current balance, compared to 6.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.7% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 31, compared to 36 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the April 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 56% to $486.9
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by seventy-nine mortgage loans ranging in size from
less than 1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 35% of the pool. Thirteen loans, constituting 20% of
the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Twenty-two loans, constituting 33% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $49.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 38%). Six loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Castaic Village Shopping Center Loan ($17.4 million --
3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 123,000 square foot (SF)
grocery anchored shopping center located in Castaic, California.
The loan transferred to special servicing in November 2010 due to
imminent payment default due to insufficient cash flow issues. As
of January 2014 the property was 83% leased, the same as last
review. Modification discussions with the borrower were
unsuccessful and a deed-in-lieu was subsequently completed in
March 2012. The anchor tenant, Ralph's (39% of the net rentable
area [NRA]; lease expiration October 2017) has gone dark and
continues to pay contract rent and NNN rents. Efforts are being
made to re-lease their space.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the West River
Shopping Center Loan ($16.6 million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a 291,000 SF retail shopping center located in
Farmington Hills, Michigan. The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2012 due to imminent payment default. The largest
tenants at the property include Target Corporation (36% of the
NRA; lease expiration January 2030) and Dipson's Theatres (11% of
the NRA; lease expiration July 2014). As of March 2014 the
property was 69% leased, compared to 70% at last review.
Modification discussions with the borrower were unsuccessful and a
foreclosure sale was completed in November 2013. The borrower is
in its six month right of redemption but has indicated it would
waive this right. Negotiations continue toward the turnover of
additional sums due under the loan documents. Borrower has agreed
to turn over the amounts in exchange for the waiver. Final
negotiations on the waiver are underway.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $26.4 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (57% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 2% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $2.5 million (a 25% expected loss based on a 50%
probability of default) from this troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2013 operating results for 41% of the
pool, partial year 2013 operating results for 51%, and full year
2012 operating results for 100%. Moody's weighted average conduit
LTV is 81%, compared to 82% at Moody's last review. Moody's
conduit component excludes loans with credit assessments, defeased
and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's
net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to
the most recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.29X
respectively, compared to 1.56X and 1.28X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 16% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 1900 Ocean Apartments Loan ($41.0 million --
8.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 266 unit high-rise
multifamily property located in Long Beach, California. The
property was built in 1966 and renovated in 2004. As of December
2013, the property was 92% leased compared to 96% at the prior
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 0.97X
respectively, compared to 85% and 0.99X at last review.

The second largest loan is the West Chester Commons Loan ($18.4
million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 128 unit off-
campus student housing property located in West Chester,
Pennsylvania. The property was built in 2004 and serves as off-
campus housing for students enrolled at West Chester University.
As of January 2014, the property was 100% leased, the same as the
prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 73% and 1.25X
respectively compared to 76% and 1.21X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Kendall Value Center Loan ($17.3
million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 178,000 SF
BJ's Wholesale Club anchored retail property in the Kendall
submarket of Miami, Florida. The property was built in 1983 and
renovated in 2003. As of February 2014 the property was 92% leased
compared to 97% at the prior review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 80% and 1.22X respectively, compared to 82% and 1.19X at the
last review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-MKB2: Moody's Hikes Cl. D Certs Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded four classes and affirmed
the ratings of nine classes of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-
MKB2 as follows:

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. AJ, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
A2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 25, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes, A-J through D, were upgraded
primarily due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as
Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down by 13% since
Moody's last review. In addition, loans constituting 46% of the
pool that have debt yields exceeding 10.0% are scheduled to mature
within the next 12 months.

The ratings on the P&I classes, A-3, A-1A, A-SB and A-4 were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on the P&I classes, E
through H, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class XC, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.5% of the
current balance, compared to 6.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.9% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 30 compared to 29 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the April 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 46% to $614.6
million from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 63 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 30% of
the pool. Six loans, constituting 34% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities. There are no loans
with investment-grade credit assessments.

Fourteen loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $45.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 32%). Two loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$7.2 million loss for specially serviced loans (45% expected loss
on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $18.3 million (a 52% expected loss based on a
79% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 91% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 93%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 84%, compared to 87% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.49X and 1.27X,
respectively, compared to 1.46X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is 400 Industrial Avenue Loan ($41.1 million -- 6.7%
of the pool). The loan is secured by a one million square foot
(SF) distribution complex comprised of three buildings located in
Cheshire, Connecticut. Bozzuto's, Inc., a wholesale grocery
distributor, is the sole tenant under a triple-net lease that
expires in 2030. Moody's used a Lit/Dark analysis given the single
tenant occupancy and lease renewal uncertainty at this time.
Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.39X,
respectively, compared to 72% and 1.36X at Moody's last full
review.

The second largest loan is the 218 West 40th Street Loan ($27.6
million -- 4.5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 12-story
office building totaling 166,315 SF and located on West 40th
Street between Seventh and Eighth Avenues. The building has both
office and retail space. The property was previously on watchlist
in 2009 when two of the four tenants vacated, dropping the
occupancy to 48%. As of December 2013, the property remains at
100% leased, with the performance improving. The largest tenant,
Career Education Corporation (CEC), has roughly 60% of the NRA,
but subleases most of the space (45,900 SF) to The New School, a
liberal arts university in New York City. The CEC's lease expires
in December 2017. Moody's current LTV and stressed DSCR are 71%
and 1.40X, respectively, compared to 73% and 1.37X at Moody's last
full review.

The third largest loan is the DeSoto Square Mall -- A Note Loan
($21.5 million -- 3.5% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
578,000 SF regional mall located in South Bradenton, Florida,
anchored by Macy's, JC Penney and Sears. Dillard's, one of the
original four anchors, closed its store at the mall in Q4 2009.
The mall was owned by Simon Property Group until 2012, when they
decided to give up the property through a note sale, which
resulted in an assumption of a modified loan. The property was
eventually sold to Mason Asset Management in connection with a
note modification and $19.6 million write down of the unpaid
principal balance of the original note. Mason assumed both the A-
Note of $21.8 million and a B-Note of $20 million, while also
providing $2.8 million of cash to be used to pay down principal at
closing of the loan assumption/modification. The modification also
included a term extension, pushing the maturity out to November
2017, with two 1-year options beyond that. As of September 2013,
total and inline occupancy were 78% and 75%, respectively. Moody's
A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.36X, respectively,
compared to 97% and 1.17X at the last review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2006-CANADA: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on K Secs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has upgraded eight classes of Merrill Lynch Financial
Assets Inc., Series 2006-Canada 20, as follows:

-- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C to AA (high) (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D to A (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E to A (low) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class F to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (high) (sf)
-- Class H to BB (high) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)
-- Class J to BB (sf) from B (high) (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the remaining classes:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class K at B (sf)
-- Class L at B (low) (sf)
-- Class XC at AAA (sf)

All classes have Stable trends.

These rating actions reflect the pool's overall health.  The
pool's weighted-average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.59
times (x) and the weighted-average debt yield is 11.20%, as of the
March 2014 remittance.  The deal has experienced a 36.4%
collateral reduction since issuance as a result of amortization
and repayments.  The transaction closed in 2006 with 66 loans and
since that time, 21 loans have been repaid in full.  There have
been no losses to the trust since issuance.  The transaction is
concentrated by loan size, as the largest 15 loans represent 72.7%
of the current pool balance as of the March 2014 remittance.  Of
the 13 non-defeased loans in the top 15, 12 are reporting YE2011
or YE2012 figures with a weighted-average DSCR of 1.98x and a
weighted-average net cash flow (NCF) growth of 34.2% since
issuance.  In addition, there are six fully defeased loans in the
pool, representing 12.02% of the pool balance.

Since the last surveillance review, one of the original top ten
loans repaid from the trust.  Marriott Pooled Senior Loan
(Prospectus ID#8) was previously in special servicing following
the borrower's request for a modification of the loan while PIP
work was completed.  The loan was repaid with the July 2013
remittance.

Five loans are currently flagged for the servicer's watchlist,
representing 6.14% of the pool, with a weighted-average DSCR of
1.00x and a weighted-average NCF decline from issuance of 21.8%.
The largest loan on the watchlist is Dundee Calgary - Altalink
Place (Prospectus ID#11, 4.0% of the current pool balance).  The
loan is secured by a mid-rise office building in the western
portion of downtown Calgary.  The loan was placed on the watchlist
for a decline in occupancy after the property's largest tenant
vacated in May 2012, leaving the building approximately 30.0%
vacant. A portion of the space has been released, as Compton
Petroleum Corporation took occupancy of 23.7% of the NRA beginning
June 1, 2013, increasing the property's occupancy to 95.5% as of
the August 2013 rent roll.  All in-place leases extend beyond the
loan's scheduled maturity date.

There are two loans shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS in the
pool, representing a 9.07% of the pool combined as of the March
2014 remittance.  The shadow ratings were confirmed as part of the
above-noted rating actions.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP5: Moody's Hikes Cl. M Certs Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes and affirmed the ratings on one class in Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter Capital I Trust 2001-TOP5 as follows:

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 25% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.5% of the
current balance, compared to 1.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.7% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the April 15, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $16 million
from $1.0 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 6 mortgage loans ranging in size from 4% to 48%
of the pool. One loan, constituting 27% of the pool, has defeased
and is secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $7 million (for an average loss
severity of 17%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 100%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 41%, compared to 44% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.90X and 3.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.79X and 2.87X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 64% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Lake Forest Shopping Center loan ($8 million -
- 48% of the pool), which is secured by a 112,601 square foot
shopping center located in Lake Forest, California. The two
largest tenants at the property are Ralphs (39% of the NRA; lease
expiration in 2015) and CVS (12% of the NRA; lease expiration in
2016). As of December 2013, the property was 94% leased, the same
as at last review. Property's performance has been stable since
securitization and the loan benefits from amortization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 47% and 2.18X, respectively, compared to
52% and 1.97X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Walgreens - Van Nuys loan ($1
million -- 9% of the pool), which is secured by a 15,120 square
foot retail building 100% leased to Walgreens. The property is
located in Van Nuys, California. Property performance remains
stable; the loan is fully amortizing and matures in September
2021. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and 2.63X,
respectively, compared to 42% and 2.47X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Walgreens -- Chicago, IL loan ($1
million -- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 13,000 square
foot retail building 100% leased to Walgreens. The property is
located in Chicago, Illinois. Property performance remains stable;
the loan is fully amortizing and matures in August 2021. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 35% and 2.93X, respectively, compared to
37% and 2.79X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: Moody's Affirms C Rating on J Secs.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes and affirmed the ratings on six classes in Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2003-TOP11 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2013 Downgraded to
B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 18% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the investment-grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on the below-investment-grade P&I
classes were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.6% of the
current balance, compared to 8.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Fusion U.S. CMBS Transactions" published in April 2005, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single Borrower
Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description Of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 5 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the April 14, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $114 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 47% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 84% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 47% of the pool, has an
investment-grade credit assessment. Three loans, constituting 3%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21 million (for an average loss
severity of 17%). Four loans, constituting 20% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Bisso Corporate Center Loan (for $13 million -- 11% of
the pool), which is secured by an industrial office property
comprised of two buildings located in Concord, CA. The property
was built in 1982 and renovated in 2000. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2013 due to maturity default. Special
Servicer indicates they are currently seeking foreclosure.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $5 million loss for specially
serviced loans (32% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 96%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 50%, compared to 65% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.46X and 2.73X,
respectively, compared to 1.41X and 2.30X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the Center Tower Loan ($54
million -- 47% of the pool), which is secured by a 462,200 SF
office building located in Costa Mesa, California in Orange
County. As of September 2013, the property was 76% leased, the
same as at Moody's last review. The loan has benefited from
amortization and has paid down 27% since securitization. Moody's
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are A3 and 1.65X,
respectively, compared to A3 and 1.66X at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 12% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 801 Jubilee Loan ($6 million -- 5% of the
pool), which is secured by an industrial property located in
Peabody, Massachusetts. As of September 2013, the property was
100% leased, the same as at last review. The loan is 100% leased
to Higher Linear Foods, which is a Nova Scotia processor and
marketer of frozen seafood's and pasta, until July 2018. Moody's
utilized a Lit/Dark analysis to reflect potential cash flow
volatility due to the single tenant exposure at the property.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.65X, respectively,
compared to 66% and 1.64X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Golden Springs Business Center Loan
($4 million -- 4% of the pool), which is secured by an industrial
property located in Santa Fe Springs, California, in Los Angeles
County. As of December 2013, the property was 100% leased, the
same as at last review. The loan is fully amortizing. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 25% and >4.0X, respectively, compared to 23%
and >4.0X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the All Size Storage Loan ($4 million --
3% of the pool), which is secured by a self storage property with
approximately 658 storage units located in San Clemente,
California, located in Orange County. As of September 2013, the
storage facility had an occupancy of 87%. The loan is benefiting
from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 44% and
2.35X, respectively, compared to 45% and 2.26X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-IQ: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class M Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed two classes of Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Trust (MSDW) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2001-IQ due to stable performance.  A detailed
list of rating actions follows at the end of this press release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are due to the pool's stable performance,
scheduled principal pay down and sufficient credit enhancement to
offset modeled losses.  There are currently four loans remaining
in the pool, all of which are performing and with the master
servicer; there are two office, one retail and one industrial
property.  Upgrades were not warranted due to the lack of
financial reporting for the largest loan in the pool.

As of the March 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.9% to $7.5 million from
$713 million at issuance.  Minimal, if any losses are expected on
the remaining pool; there have been $3.7 million (0.5% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting class O.

The largest loan (58% of the pool) is secured by a 54,714 square
foot (sf) office building located in Charlotte, NC.  As reported
by the master servicer, the borrower has refused to provide
financial statements since 2005.  A rent roll, however, was
received in August 2013 showing 98% occupancy and 45% lease
rollover in 2014.  Due to the lack of operating information and
lease rollover risk, Fitch made conservative estimates of
performance.

The second largest loan (20%) is secured by a 29,025 sf office
building located in Santa Monica, CA.  As of December 2013, the
property is 94% occupied, which is a slight decrease from 100% at
December 2012.  The debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of the
Dec. 31, 2013 operating statement was at 2.19x.  The DSCR for this
property has consistently been above 2.0x since issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITY

Future rating changes are unlikely for the remaining life of the
pool due to the small number of loans remaining and lack of
financial reporting on the largest loan.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $4.1 million class M at 'Bsf', Outlook to Stable from Negative;
-- $1.8 million class N at 'B-sf', Outlook to Stable from
   Negative.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L, and X-2
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class O
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X-1 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2011-C2: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all 12 classes of Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2011-C2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  A detailed list of rating actions follows at the
end of this release.

KEY RATINGS DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the April 2013 remittance,
there have not been any defaulted or specially serviced loans, and
there are no Fitch Loans of Concern.  There are two loans on the
servicer's watchlist (9.0%); however, they are on the watchlist
for borrower update issues and are not considered Fitch Loans of
Concern.

The pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 4.6%
to $1.159 billion from $1.214 billion at issuance.  Based on full
zear financial statements for the 51% of loans that reported, the
pool's overall net operating income (NOI) has improved 9.9% since
issuance.

RATINGS SENSITIVITY

All classes maintain Stable Outlooks.  Due to the recent issuance
of the transaction and the stable performance, Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset level events change the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.  Additional information on rating
sensitivity is available in the report 'Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, 2011-C2' (June 28, 2011).

Fitch is monitoring the leasing on the 12th largest loan of the
pool (1.8%).  The loan is collateralized by Riverside 5, a 121,863
square foot (sf) mid-rise suburban office located in Frederick,
MD.  The subject is located adjacent to the National Cancer
Institute Research Facility and the tenant base consists of
General Services Administration entities and governmental
contractors.  Fitch stressed the subject's net operating income
(NOI) and increased the capitalization rate to account for the
potential for tenant rollover due to the termination rights in the
building's major tenant leases as well as the economic weakness in
the Frederick submarket.  The suburban DC market has a number of
submarkets, including Frederick, with vacancy rates approaching
20%.  Fitch will monitor the building's occupancy rates as federal
entities continue to look for cost savings due to a decrease in
government expenditures.

The largest loan of the pool (12.6%) is secured by Deerbrook Mall,
a 1,203,612 sf regional mall, of which 554,461 sf is collateral
for the loan, located in Humble, TX.  The mall features four non-
collateral anchors, including Dillard's, Macy's, Sears, and JC
Penney.  The subject serves a large trade area that encompasses a
population of more than 500,000 with an average household income
of $68K.  The closest competitor is another regional mall that is
owned by the same sponsor more than 21 miles to the southwest.
The occupancy as of September 2013 was 99% versus 98% at issuance
and the third-quarter 2013 reported debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) was 1.79 times (x).  The sponsor of the loan is General
Growth Properties.  The property's NOI has increased 11.6% since
issuance.  The property's rent roll is stable with only major
tenant lease, AMC Theaters, scheduled to expire in the within the
next two years.

The second largest loan (11.9%) is secured by a 1,125,747 sf
regional mall, Ingram Park Mall, located in San Antonio, TX.  The
mall's anchors, none of which are included in the loan's
collateral, are Dillard's, Dillard's Home Center, Sears, JC
Penney, and Macy's.  The mall benefits from its proximity to the
Lackland Airforce Base and Westover Hills master-planned
community.  The mall's occupancy as of September 2013 was 89% with
a DSCR of 1.69x.  The property continues to perform well and net
operating income has increased 11.9% since issuance.  The tenant
base is stable with no more than 7% of the net rentable area (NRA)
rolling over the course of the next 4 years.  The sponsor of the
loan is Simon Property Group.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

-- $11.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $363.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $439.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.5 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.1 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.9 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.1 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.2 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.1 million class G at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15.2 million class H at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $936 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

Fitch does not rate class J and X-B.


MORTGAGEIT 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on C. 2-A-1-3 Secs to Ca
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches and upgraded the rating of one tranche issued by
MortgageIT Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1 and 2007-2.
The tranches are backed by Alt-A RMBS loans issued in 2007.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MortgageIT Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-1

Cl. 2-A-1-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: MortgageIT Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-2

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations for the pools. The downgrade and
upgrade actions on the Class 2-A-1-3 and Class 2-A-1-4 bonds in
MortgageIT Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1 reflect the
bonds' current pro-rata pay structure after the depletion of the
mezzanine support bonds. The rating actions also reflect the
correction of an error in the Structured Finance Workstation (SFW)
cash flow model previously used by Moody's in rating this
transaction. The cash flow model used in prior rating actions
incorrectly modeled the principal distributions on these two bonds
as sequential instead of pro-rata. The error has now been
corrected, and the rating actions reflect this change.

The downgrade action on the class A-1 of MortgageIT Securities
Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2 reflect increased loss
expecations on the bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


N-STAR REAL VII: Moody's Lowers Rating on 7 Note Classes to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by N-Star Real Estate CDO VII, Ltd.:

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of seven classes of notes due
to the liquidation of the collateral and pending losses to the
outstanding notes. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-
going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC) transactions.

The pool collateral was liquidated pursuant to an event of
default. As of the October 21, 2013 trustee report revised on
February 10, 2014, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, was $288.5 million before distribution
of liquidation proceeds, down from $550.0 million at issuance.
Liquidation proceeds of $81.4 million were distributed resulting
in full payoff of Class A-1 and partial payoff of Class A-2.
Moody's expects full losses to occur on the outstanding classes of
notes once they are recognized. However, there is a non-material
amount remaining in transaction reserve accounts which remains to
be distributed. At the time of distribution, it is expected that
losses to the notes will be realized.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
In general, the rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced are sensitive to further changes.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


NEWSTAR COMMERICAL 2014-1: Moody's Rates $14MM Cl. F Notes 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by NewStar Commerical Loan Funding 2014-1 LLC (the
"Issuer" or "NewStar 2014-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

$202,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa(sf)

$20,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2(sf)

$13,250,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2025
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2(sf)

$30,250,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2(sf)

$23,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3(sf)

$18,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba2(sf)

$14,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B2(sf)

The Class A Notes, Class B-1 Notes, Class B-2 Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

NewStar 2014-1 is a managed cash flow SME CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized by small and medium enterprise and broadly
syndicated loans. At least 97% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments. Up to 3% may
consist of second lien loans. At closing, the portfolio is
approximately 70% ramped. The portfolio is to be 100% ramped
within 4 months thereafter.

NewStar Financial, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, no collateral purchases are allowed.

The transaction incorporates coverage tests, both par and
interest, which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Target Par Amount of $350,000,000

Diversity Score of 36

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3300

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3300 to 3795)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3300 to 4290)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

The underlying assets for this transaction are, primarily, SME
corporate loans, which receive Moody's credit estimates, rather
than publicly rated corporate loans. This distinction is an
important factor in the determination of this transaction's V
Score, since loans publicly rated by Moody's are the basis for the
CLO V Score Report.

In addition, several scores for sub-categories of the V Score
differ from the CLO sector benchmark scores because this is an SME
transaction. The scores for the quality of historical data for
U.S. SME loans and for disclosure of collateral pool
characteristics and collateral performance reflect higher
volatility. This results from lack of a centralized default
database for SME loans, as well as obligor-level information for
SME loans being more limited and less frequently provided to
Moody's than that for publicly rated companies. Moody's assessment
for the alignment of interests is low/medium, which is stronger
than the benchmark transaction. This is a result of the Manager's
strong interest in supporting this transaction since it provides
an important source of funding.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


OZLM VI: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating on Class E Secured Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by OZLM VI, Ltd.:

$375,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$49,500,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class A-2a Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$30,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2026
(the "Class A-2b Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$36,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

$37,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

$27,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

$12,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2a Notes, the
Class A-2b Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes (collectively, the "Rated Notes")
address the expected losses posed to the holders of the Rated
Notes. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

OZLM VI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must be
invested in senior secured loans and eligible investments and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The Issuer's documents require the portfolio to
be at least 66 2/3%ramped as of the closing date.

Och-Ziff Loan Management LP ("Och-Ziff" or the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par
coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal
proceeds to pay down the notes and loans in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash-flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount of $600,000,000

Diversity of 55

WARF of 2600

Weighted Average Spread of 4%

Weighted Average Coupon of 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate of 43%

Weighted Average Life of 8 years

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes an increased
default probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2600 to 2990)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2a Notes: -2

Class A-2b Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2600 to 3380)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2a Notes: -3

Class A-2b Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -2

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling, and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


PINNACLE PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $29.4MM Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Pinnacle Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  $307,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $63,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026
  (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $28,125,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $31,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
  (sf)

  $29,375,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  $5,938,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
  2026 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes,
Class E Notes and Class F Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Pinnacle Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 90 % ramped as
of the closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC, (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage
tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2775 to 3191)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2775 to 3608)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -4

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High. This V Score has
been assigned in a manner similar to the Medium/High V Score
assigned for the global cash flow CLO sector, as described in the
special report titled "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the
Global Cash Flow CLO Sector," dated July 6, 2009 and available on
www.moodys.com.

Moody's V Scores provide a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and the potential variability around
the various inputs to a rating determination. The V Score ranks
transactions by the potential for significant rating changes owing
to uncertainty around the assumptions due to data quality,
historical performance, the level of disclosure, transaction
complexity, the modeling and the transaction governance that
underlie the ratings. V Scores apply to the entire transaction,
rather than individual tranches.


PRIMUS CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Primus CLO II, Ltd.:

$302,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021
(current outstanding balance of $289,231,014.28), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

$8,500,000 Class B Second Priority Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf);

$31,500,000 Class C Third Priority Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);

$10,500,000 Class D Fourth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on September 8,
2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf).

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

U.S. $15,500,000 Class E Fifth Priority Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $14,645,606.22)
Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on September 8, 2011 Upgraded to B1
(sf).

Primus CLO II, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured
loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in July
2014.

Ratings Rationale

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
July 2014. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive
buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular,
Moody's assumed that the deal will benefit from a higher weighted
average spread (WAS), a higher weighted average recovery rate
(WARR), and a higher diversity compared to covenant levels.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology Moody's used in this rating was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in February 2014.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO
documentation by different transactional parties owing to embedded
ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have
adverse consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan
market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the
highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2101)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +3

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3151)

Class A: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations," published in February 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of $363.8 million, defaulted
par of $1.1 million, a weighted average default probability of
19.38% (implying a WARF of 2626), a weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 48.71%, a diversity score of 81 and a weighted
average spread of 3.34%.

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and
market performance and the collateral manager's latitude for
trading the collateral are also factors.


PROTECTIVE FINANCE 2007-PL: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on P Secs.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 21 classes in
Protective Finance Corporation Commercial Mortgage 2007-PL as
follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. O, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. Q, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. IO, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2, 2013 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The ratings on the P&I classes A-3 through O were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes P and Q were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.6% of the
current balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in
September 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 65, compared to 77 at Moody's last review.

Deal Performance

As of the April 16, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 47% to $542 million
from $1.02 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 147 mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 4.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting
30% of the pool. The pool does not contain any defeased loans or
loans with credit assessments.

Two loans have been liquidated at a loss from the pool, resulting
in an aggregate realized loss of $5.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 67%). There is currently one loan, representing less
than 1% of the pool, that is special servicing. The specially
serviced loan is cross collateralized with one other loan in the
pool. The collateral for the loans are adjacent shopping centers
located in Pinehurst, North Carolina. The most recent aggregate
appraised value for the properties is in excess of the loan
amount. The specially serviced loan is over 90 days delinquent and
the borrower is currently seeking a refinance.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for four poorly
performing loans, constituting 4.0% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $5 million (a 21% expected loss based on a
50% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 62%, compared to 67%
at Moody's last review. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.88X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.73X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three exposures represent 13% of the pool balance. The
largest exposure consists of two cross collateralized loans ($25
million -- 4.6% of the pool), which are secured by adjacent
shopping centers located in Beckley, West Virginia. Overall
performance has been stable. The loans have amortized 24% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.45X,
respectively, compared to 73% and 1.41X at last review.

The second largest exposure ($23 million -- 4.3% of the pool)
consists of one loan which is secured by a multi-tenanted office
building located in Birmingham, Alabama. The building is fully
leased as of April 2014, the same as last review. The largest
tenant leases 34% of the net rentable area (NRA) through August
2017 and the second largest tenant leases 34% of the NRA through
June 2016. Property performance has increased due to an increase
in rental revenue. The loan has amortized 12% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.67X,
respectively, compared to 63% and 1.58X at last review.

The third largest exposure ($22 million -- 4.0% of the pool)
consists of one loan which is secured by a retail center located
in Monroe, North Carolina. The property was 82% leased as of
December 2012. The five largest tenants lease a combined 63% of
the NRA and all have lease expirations between January 2015 and
January 2016. The loan has amortized 16% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 75% and 1.29X, respectively,
compared to 88% and 1.10X at last review.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms M Secs.' C Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Prudential Securities
Secured Financing Corp. 1998-C1 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-EC, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating on the investment-grade P&I class was upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The rating on the below-investment-
grade P&I class was affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes are consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.4% of the
current balance, compared to 0.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

Methodology Underlying The Rating Action

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating U.S. CMBS Conduit Transactions" published in September
2000, and "Moody's Approach to Rating CMBS Large Loan/Single
Borrower Transactions" published in July 2000.

Description of Models Used

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model v 2.64,
which it uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Conduit
model results at the Aa2 (sf) level are driven by property type,
Moody's actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality
grade (which reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to
estimate Moody's value). Conduit model results at the B2 (sf)
level are based on a paydown analysis using the individual loan-
level Moody's LTV ratio. Moody's may consider other concentrations
and correlations in its analysis. Based on the model pooled credit
enhancement levels of Aa2 (sf) and B2 (sf), the required credit
enhancement on the remaining conduit classes are either
interpolated between these two data points or determined based on
a multiple or ratio of either of these two data points. For fusion
deals, Moody's merges the credit enhancement for loans with
investment-grade credit assessments with the conduit model credit
enhancement for an overall model result. Moody's incorporates
negative pooling (adding credit enhancement at the credit
assessment level) for loans with similar credit assessments in the
same transaction.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, as compared to 6 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model v 8.7 and then reconciles and weights the results from
the conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

Deal Performance

As of the April 17, 2014 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $19 million
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 15%
of the pool, with the top eight loans excluding defeasance
constituting 51% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 49% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews
the watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that
could affect performance.

Seventeen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $23 million (for an average loss
severity of 41%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2012 operating results for 88% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2013 operating results for 100%.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 50%, compared to 52% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 2.74X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 2.55X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Best Buy Loan ($3 million -- 15% of the pool),
which is secured by a single tenant Best Buy store located in
Crestwood, MO. Best Buy occupies 100% of the NRA. The loan matures
in December 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 57% and 1.91X,
respectively, compared to 58% and 1.86X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Landmark Center Loan ($2 million --
12% of the pool), which is secured by a medical office building
consisting of various tenants including urgent care, physical
therapy, and hospital occupied space. The property was 63% leased
as of December 2013. The loan matures in March 2018. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.65X, respectively, compared to 74%
and 1.53X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Village Plaza Shopping Center loan
($1 million -- 7% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery
anchored retail center located in Hazlehurst, GA. Property
performance has been stable with occupancy around 89% since 2010.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 45% and 2.30X, respectively,
compared to 48% and 2.12X at the last review.


PUTNAM CDO 2001-1: Fitch Hikes Class C-2 Notes Rating to 'CCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four classes of notes issued by Putnam
Structured Product CDO 2001-1, Ltd. (Putnam 2001-1) and maintained
Rating Outlooks, as follows:

-- $29,078,466 class A-2 notes to 'AAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $24,000,000 class B notes to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,758,096 class C-1 notes to 'CCsf' from 'Csf';
-- $10,055,691 class C-2 notes to 'CCsf' from 'Csf'.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are attributed to the increased credit enhancement
(CE) available to the notes as a result of the transaction's
deleveraging over the last year, as well as the notes' robust
performance in Fitch's cash flow model analysis.

Since the last review in May 2013, approximately 6.6% of the
underlying portfolio has been downgraded a weighted average of 3.2
notches and 28% has been upgraded a weighted average of 1.7
notches.  Currently, approximately 35.5% of the portfolio has a
Fitch-derived rating below investment grade and 25.3% has a rating
in the 'CCCsf' rating category or lower, compared to 32.1% and
24.5% respectively, at previous review.

Following the full repayment of principal of the class A-1 notes
in February 2014, the class A-2 notes became the senior-most class
outstanding and since then have received approximately $4.6
million or 13.2% of their initial rated balance, in principal
redemptions.  While the cash flow modeling results vary across
different interest rate and default timing scenarios, the
breakeven rates are generally consistent with the rating levels
that each class is being upgraded to today.

The Stable Outlook on the class A-2 and class B notes reflects
Fitch's view that the transaction will continue to delever and
that each class has sufficient CE to offset potential
deterioration of the underlying collateral going forward.  Fitch
does not assign Outlooks to classes rated 'CCCsf' or below.

The class C-1 and C-2 notes (collectively, class C) are currently
receiving their periodic interest payments.  The CE level of the
notes has increased since Fitch's last review and is currently
above the expected losses from the distressed and defaulted
collateral (rated 'CCsf' or lower) in the underlying portfolio.
These notes, however, are not passing the 'CCCsf' rating stress in
any of the cash flow modeled scenarios.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
report 'Global Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs' using
Fitch's Structured Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) to
project future default levels for the underlying portfolio. These
default levels were then compared to the transaction's breakeven
levels generated by Fitch's cash flow model under various default
timing and interest rate stress scenarios.

Rating Sensitivities

Class A-2 and B notes may experience future downgrades if
significant portfolio deterioration is coupled with a sharp
increase in interest rates during the life of the notes.  Class C
notes have limited rating sensitivity due to their current
distressed rating levels.

Putnam 2001-1 is a cash flow structured finance collateralized
debt obligation (SF CDO) that closed on Nov. 30, 2001.  The
portfolio is monitored by Putnam Advisory Company, LLC and is
composed of 26.8% commercial and residential real estate
investment trusts, 22.7% residential mortgage-backed securities,
15.9% commercial mortgage-backed securities, 16.4% corporate
bonds, 9.5% SF CDOs, 6.9% corporate CDOs, and 1.8% commercial and
consumer asset-backed securities from 1995 through 2006 vintage
transactions.


SDART 2014-2: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to the Santander
Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-2 notes:

-- $330,000,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
-- $275,620,000 class A-2A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125,000,000 class A-2B notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $163,550,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $189,330,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $191,720,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $74,780,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,938,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weaker Credit Quality: 2014-2 is backed by marginally weaker
collateral versus 2014-1 and 2013 pools, with modestly weaker
internal loss forecast credit scores (LFS), and extended term
loans (60+ months) increased to 90%, up from 2014-1 to the highest
level to date.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement and Structure: The cash flow
distribution is a sequential-pay structure.  Initial hard credit
enhancement (CE) for the class A, B, and C notes is unchanged from
2014-1, but increased for the D and E notes.  Hard target CE is
slightly lower for the class A-C notes but increased from the D
and E notes, all versus 2014-1.

Stable Portfolio/Securitization Performance: SCUSA's portfolio and
2010-2012 securitization performance improved since the recession,
with relatively low losses.  However, recent 2013 losses have
risen and are tracking slightly above the 2012 vintage, driven by
marginally weaker collateral underwriting combined with lower
recoveries as used vehicle values softened over the past year.

Stable Corporate Health: SCUSA recorded solid financial results
recently and has been profitable since 2007.  Fitch rates
Santander, majority owner of SCUSA, 'BBB+/F2' with a Stable Rating
Outlook.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: SCUSA demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer as
evidenced by historical portfolio delinquency, loss experience,
and securitization performance.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SCUSA would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SCUSA would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case and could result in potential rating actions on
the notes.  Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings
assigned to SDART 2014-1 to increased credit losses over the life
of the transaction.  Fitch's analysis found that the transaction
displays some sensitivity to increased defaults and credit losses,
showing a potential downgrade of one or two categories under
Fitch's moderate (1.5x base case loss) scenario, especially for
the subordinate bonds.  The notes could experience downgrades of
up to three or more rating categories, under Fitch's severe (2.5x
base case loss) scenario.


SOLOSO CDO 2005-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-2L Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating to 'D (sf)'
from 'CC (sf)' on the class A-2L notes from Soloso CDO 2005-1
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction
collateralized mostly by trust-preferred securities (TruPs) issued
by financial institutions.

According to the note valuation report dated April 14, 2014, the
class A-2L notes were not current on their interest and have
accumulated more than $1 million in unpaid interest shortfalls.
S&P lowered its rating on the class A-2L notes to 'D (sf)' to
reflect its expectation that the noteholders will not receive
their principal and deferred interest in full by the final
maturity date.


STANIFORD STREET: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its ratings to
Staniford Street CLO Ltd./Staniford Street CLO LLC's $370.50
million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior-secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the following:

   -- The credit enhancement provided to the rated notes through
      the subordination of cash flows that are payable to the
      subordinated notes.

   -- The transaction's credit enhancement, which is sufficient to
      withstand the defaults applicable for the supplemental tests
      (excluding the excess spread), and cash flow structure,
      which can withstand the default rate projected by Standard &
      Poor's CDO Evaluator model, as assessed by Standard & Poor's
      using the assumptions and methods outlined in its corporate
      collateralized debt obligation criteria.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P expects to be
      bankruptcy remote.

   -- The diversified collateral portfolio, which primarily
      comprises broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
      secured term loans.

   -- The collateral manager's and back-up collateral manager's
      experienced management teams.

   -- S&P's projections regarding timely interest and ultimate
      principal payments on the rated notes, which S&P assessed
      using its cash flow analysis and assumptions commensurate
      with the assigned ratings under various interest-rate
      scenarios, including LIBOR ranging from 0.2356%-12.5311%.

   -- The transaction's overcollateralization and interest
      coverage tests, a failure of which will lead to the
      diversion of interest and principal proceeds to reduce the
      balance of the rated notes outstanding.

   -- The transaction's interest diversion test, a failure of
      which will lead to the reclassification of excess interest
      proceeds that are available before paying class F note
      interest, subordinated management fees, uncapped
      administrative expenses, incentive management fees, and
      subordinated note payments as principal proceeds to purchase
      additional collateral assets during the reinvestment period.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Staniford Street CLO Ltd./Staniford Street CLO LLC

Class               Rating          Amount
                                  (mil. $)
A                   AAA (sf)        255.00
B                   AA (sf)          45.00
C (deferrable)      A (sf)           30.00
D (deferrable)      BBB (sf)         23.00
E (deferrable)      BB (sf)          17.50
F (deferrable)      NR               12.50
Subordinated notes  NR               31.00

NR-Not rated.


TALMAGE STRUCTURED 2006-3: Moody's Ups Class E Notes Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Talmage Structured Real Estate Funding
2006-3, Ltd.

Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2013 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2013 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2013 Affirmed C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has upgraded the ratings on the transaction due to the
rapid amortisation of a significant percentage of the underlying
collateral pool since last review. Moody's has affirmed the
ratings on the transaction because its key transaction metrics are
commensurate with existing ratings. The actions are the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Talmage Structured Real Estate Funding 2006-3, Ltd. is a currently
static (the re-investment period ended in September, 2011) cash
transaction backed by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS) (23.0% of the pool balance, including
rake bonds); ii) CRE CDOs (18.3%); iii) whole loans (55.7%); and
iv) b-notes (3.0%). As of the March 25, 2014 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction is $128.6 million
compared to $420.5 million at issuance; due to a combination of
amortisation, recoveries from defaulted collateral and principal
resulting from the failure of certain par value and interest
coverage tests.

Five assets with a par balance of $60.2 million (45.3% of the pool
balance) were listed as impaired securities as of the March 25,
2014 Trustee Report. Moody's expects moderate/high losses to occur
on these assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 7133,
compared to 6942 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (10.7% compared to 10.5% at last
review); Baa1-Baa3 (10.4% compared to 0.6% at last review); Ba1-
Ba3 (0.0% compared to 6.3% at last review); B1-B3 (0.0% compared
to 9.5% at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (78.9%, compared to 73.1%
at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.9 years, compared to 2.4 years at last
review. The current WAL is based on assumptions about extensions
on the underlying loans.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 35.1%, compared to 34.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 0.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will
also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. In addition, the rated notes are sensitive to
changes in collateral coupon. Increasing the recovery rates of
collateral pool by 10.0% to 45.1% would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to six notches
upward (e.g., one notch upward implies a ratings movement of Ba1
to Baa3). Decreasing the recovery rates by 10.0% to 25.1% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
0 to 5 notches downward (e.g., one notch downward implies a rating
movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


TIAA CMBS I 2001-C1: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class N Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes of TIAA CMBS I Trust's
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2001-C1.  A
detailed list of rating actions follows at the end of this press
release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades are attributed to an increase in credit enhancement
as a result of continued principal pay down and the stable
collateral performance.  Fitch applied stressed cap rates and cash
flow variances to the most recent servicer reported net operating
income (NOI) to derive the Fitch stressed property values;
additional stresses were applied due to a large percentage of the
pool having not reported financials for greater than 12 months.

As of the March 2014 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 94.8% to $75.2 million from
$1.46 billion at issuance.  Currently, there are 55 loans
remaining in the pool, all of which are fully amortizing; 34.8% of
the pool consists of loans collateralized by single tenant retail
properties that are under credit tenant leases.  Eleven loans
(22.1% of the pool) are defeased, five of which (16.9%) are among
the top 15 loans.  Eight non-defeased loans (13.4%) are scheduled
to mature within the next 12 months, which will further increase
the credit enhancement to the Fitch rated classes.  There have
been no delinquent or special serviced loans and the transaction
has incurred zero losses.

The largest loan in the pool is secured by a 331,130 square foot
(sf) retail property in College Point, NY (13.3% of the pool).  As
of year-end (YE) 2013, the property was 100% occupied by five
tenants.  The largest two tenants are Target (42.3% of the
property) with lease expiring July 2023 and BJ's (36% of the
property) with lease expiring September 2028.  TJ Maxx, which
leases 10% of the property, has extended its lease five years to
November 2018.  The servicer reported YE 2013 debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 2.01 times (x), compared to 1.91x at YE
2012.

The second largest loan in the pool is secured by a 77,036 sf
retail in Matawan, NJ anchored by A&P, which occupies 76% of the
property with a lease ending on March 31, 2023 (7.8% of the pool).
The tenant filed for bankruptcy in December 2010 and emerged from
Chapter 11 protection in March 2012.  The second quarter (2Q) 2013
DSCR was 1.18x, compared to 1.45x at YE 2012.  The decline in DSCR
was primarily due to an increase in operating expenses.  Per the
September 2013 rent roll, the property was 98.4% occupied.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The pool has exhibited stable performance.  The Stable Rating
Outlooks indicate that no rating changes are expected within the
next 12 to 24 months.

Fitch upgrades the following classes with a Stable Outlook as
indicated:

-- $11 million class K to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $14.7 million class L to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class M to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $2.8 million class H at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $14.7 million class J at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $7.3 million class N at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, B, C, D, E, F and G
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class O
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


U.S. CAPITAL VI: Moody's Hikes Rating on $375MM Cl. Notes to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by U.S. Capital Funding VI, Ltd.:

  $375,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2043
  (current balance of $ 203,000,841.06), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
  previously on November 3, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  $60,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2043,
  Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on November 3, 2010
  Downgraded to Ca (sf)

U.S. Capital Funding VI, Ltd., issued on June 28, 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's over-
collateralization ratios and improvement in the credit quality of
the underlying assets in the portfolio since April 2013.

Moody's noticed that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 12.0% or $27.1 million since April 2013 from
diversion of excess interest proceeds and principal proceeds from
prepayments. The par coverage for the Class A-1 notes has slightly
improved to 102.5% from 99.6% since April 2013 by Moody's
calculations. Based on the trustee's April 2014 report, the senior
principal coverage test was 81.4% (limit 122.93%), versus 80.3% in
April 2013, and mezzanine principal coverage test, 49.5% (limit
100.99%), versus 55.7%. Going forward, the Class A-1 Senior Notes
will continue to benefit from the diversion of excess interest and
the proceeds from future redemptions of any assets in the
collateral pool, due to the senior principal coverage failure.

Moody's also observed that the credit quality of the underlying
portfolio has improved significantly. The Weighted Average Rating
Factor has improved by 811 points from 1066 to 711 since April
2013.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of $208 million, defaulted/deferring par of
$242.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 19.4%
(implying a WARF of 771), Moody's Asset Correlation of 23.8%, and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%. In addition
to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of triggering an Event of Default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment, and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TRUP CDOs," published in May 2011.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations could
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the
notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number
of banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant
positive impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios
and the ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or
credit estimates. Moody's evaluates the sensitivity of the ratings
of the notes to the volatility of these credit assessments.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction's portfolio using CDOROM v.2.10.15
to develop the default distribution from which it derives the
Moody's Asset Correlation parameter. Moody's then used the
parameter as an input in a cash flow model using CDOEdge.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's KMV, to derive credit scores. Moody's
evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the
pool relies on FDIC Q3-2013 financial data.

In addition to the base case, Moody's conducted a number of
sensitivity analyses of the results to certain key factors driving
the ratings. Moody's analyzed the sensitivity of the model results
to changes in the portfolio WARF(representing an improvement or
deterioration in the credit quality of the collateral pool).
Increasing the WARF by 79 points from the base case of 771 lowers
the model-implied rating on the Class A-1 by one notch from the
base case result; decreasing the WARF by 221 points raises the
model-implied rating on the Class A-1 notes by one notch from the
base case result.

Moody's also conducted two additional sensitivity analyses, as
described in "Sensitivity Analyses on Deferral Cures and Default
Timing for Monitoring TruPS CDOs," published in August 2012. In
the first analysis, Moody's gave par credit to banks that are
deferring interest on their TruPS but satisfy other credit
criteria and thus are highly likely to resume interest payments;
in this case, Moody's gave par credit to $47.15 million of bank
TruPS.

In the second sensitivity analysis, Moody's ran alternative
default-timing profile scenarios to reflect the lower likelihood
of a large spike in defaults. Below is a summary of the impact on
all of the rated notes (in terms of the difference in the number
of notches versus the current model-implied output, in which a
positive difference corresponds to a lower expected loss):

Sensitivity Analysis 1: Par Credit Given to Deferring Banks

Class A-1: +3

Class A-2: +7

Sensitivity Analysis 2: Alternative Default Timing Profile

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: 0


WACHOVIA 2006-WHALE: Fitch Ups Rating on Class H Secs. to 'CCCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded and removed from Rating Watch Positive
two classes, upgraded one and affirmed five distressed classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-WHALE 7.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrades are the result of the disposition of two properties
for slightly better recoveries than anticipated at Fitch's
previous full review in November 2013.  The Westin Aruba REO was
disposed for approximately $110 million which resulted in a loss
severity of approximately 33%.  While the gross proceeds of the
sale exceeded the former loan amount, there were almost $46
million in fees and expenses that were repaid prior to principal
recovery.  The Colonial Mall Myrtle Beach, now known as the Myrtle
Beach Mall, was paid off as part of a modification and forbearance
agreement executed in December 2010.  Net proceeds were
approximately $15 million and with $160,890 in fees and expenses,
resulted in a loss severity of approximately 46%.

One loan remains in the transaction, The Jameson Hotel Portfolio.
The loan is currently collateralized by approximately 6,600 rooms
in 103 properties across 16 states in the Southeast and Midwest.
The loan was transferred to special servicing due to imminent
maturity default in August 2011.  The current borrower and special
servicer negotiated a modification and forbearance agreement
whereby the loan was paid down by approximately $10 million and
$13.4 million of new equity would be used to convert the Jameson
hotels under Choice and Wyndham flags.  The loan was extended
until December 2014 with an additional one-year extension subject
to a debt yield test and an interest rate increase.  According to
the special servicer, the conversions have been completed and were
slightly under the budgeted $15.4 million conversion estimate.  A
recent appraisal values both the as-is and stabilized value of the
portfolio to be in excess of the securitized debt.  The loan
continues to be categorized as Performing Matured.

The portfolio now operates under mostly Baymont and Quality Inn
flags, with several Howard Johnsons, Comfort Inns, Econolodges and
one Days Inn and Jameson hotel each.  Fitch received a trailing
twelve month operating statement as of September 2013. Performance
has declined since issuance.  Although revenues have been
relatively stable since 2011, expenses grew each reporting period
and do not include the flag conversion expenses.  Although Fitch
recognizes that operations may improve after the flag conversions,
Fitch used the in-place cash flow with a stressed mortgage
constant and capitalization rates in its analysis.  In addition,
Fitch applied standard furniture, fixtures and equipment (FF&E)
expenses of 5% of revenues, as well as an adjustment to the
franchise fees per the asset manager's estimate of actual future
fees.

Rating Sensitivities

The rating Outlook of Class G is Stable as no future rating
changes are expected.  Given the concentration with only one
specially serviced loan remaining, further upgrades are not
expected considering the higher probability of an additional
default. In addition, the current ratings could withstand over a
25% reduction in Fitch net cash flow so downgrades are not
expected unless the loan re-defaults and performance and/or value
declines significantly.

Fitch upgrades the following classes as indicated and removes from
Rating Watch Positive:

-- $43.2 million class G to 'BBBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64.9 million class H to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

The following class is upgraded as follows:

-- $21.9 million class J to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE 100%.

The $5.8 million class K and zero balance classes L, WA, CM, and
BP-2 are affirmed at 'Dsf'/RE 0% based on previously incurred
realized losses.

Pooled classes A-1 through F, interest-only class X-1A and rake
classes KH-1, KH-2, BH-1 through BH-4, BP-1, MB-1 through MB-4 UV
and WB have paid in full. Class X-1B was previously withdrawn.


WFRBS 2013-C14: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certificates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-C14 certificates due to stable performance since
issuance.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral pool.  As of the April distribution, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been paid down by 0.4% to
$1.46 billion from $1.47 billion at issuance.  Based on the
annualized 2013 reported net operating income (NOI) of the 79% of
loans the reported, the pool's overall NOI has improved 2.7% since
issuance.

There are currently no delinquent loans, specially serviced loans
or Fitch Loans of Concern.  There are three loans on the servicer
watchlist for occupancy decreases since issuance.  Fitch will
continue to monitor the loans for new developments as the master
servicer awaits sponsor updates.

RATINGS SENSITIVITY

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable.  Due to the
recent issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset level event changes the transaction's
portfolio-level metrics.

The largest loan of the pool is secured by RHP Properties
Portfolio III (8.8% of the pool), a portfolio of 12 manufactured
housing communities consisting of 3,312 home pads located in five
different states.  The loan is sponsored by a joint venture of RHP
properties and Northstar Realty Finance.  RHP has an extensive
history of managing manufactured housing communities and is the
second largest private owner-operator of the asset class with a
total portfolio value in excess of a $1 billion.  The properties
are primarily located in secondary markets.  The communities
feature a range of amenities that include playgrounds, swimming
pools, and club houses.  Performance of the portfolio has
historically been stable and the occupancy rate increased 100
basis points since issuance to 86%.

The second largest loan is collateralized by two office buildings
consisting of 794,101 square feet (sf) and an adjoining parking
garage located in Atlanta, GA.  The subject is part of a larger
development that serves as the Southeast headquarters for AT&T
Inc. and is solely leased to the investment grade corporate entity
on a triple-net basis.  The buildings are owned by Macfarlan
Capital Partners and Cole Real Estate Investment which are
sophisticated real estate investors with more than 50 million
square feet of combined holdings.  The subject is optimally
located within the Midtown submarket with access to both
Interstate 75 and 85 along with direct access to the North Avenue
MARTA station.  The Midtown submarket continues to experience
development growth and is an established office market with the
additional corporate headquarters of Equifax, Earthlink, Invesco,
and The Coca-Cola Company.

The third largest loan is a retail property, The Plant San Jose,
collateralized by 485,895 sf of a larger 623,695 sf power center
located in San Jose, CA.  The subject was developed in 2008 and is
leased primarily to national and regional tenants.  The loan is
sponsored by Cole Credit Property Trust IV, Inc.  The property's
performance has been strong since opening and is attributable to
the limited competition within the market.  The nearest power
center is located more than four miles from the subject and
features a similar tenant roster.  Although the tenant base
overlaps with the subject, The Plant has a competitive advantage
in site layout and proximity to major roadways.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $54.6 million Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48.2 million Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.0 million Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160.0 million Class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $437.7 million Class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.0 million#, a Class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0.0a million Class A-3FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160.0 million#, a Class A-4FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0.0a million Class A-4FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116.2 million Class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $108.4b million Class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.1* billion Class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9* million Class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9b million Class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.3b million Class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $264.5b million Class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77.2a million Class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.7a million Class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.5 million Class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate class G or the interest-only class X-C.

# Floating rate.
* Notional amount and interest-only.
a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A .
b Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be exchanged for
  Class PEX certificates; and Class PEX certificates may be
  exchanged for Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates.


* Fitch Reviews U.S. RMBS Alt-A Sector Ratings
----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on 10,033 classes
in 658 U.S. Alt-A residential mortgage backed security (RMBS)
transactions.

Rating Action Summary

-- 9,752 classes (97%) affirmed;
-- 91 classes (1%) upgraded;
-- 190 classes (2%) downgraded.

In addition, all classes with a rating of 'Dsf', a balance of 0,
and a projected recovery estimate of 0 had their ratings affirmed
at 'Dsf' and subsequently withdrawn.

A spreadsheet detailing the actions can be found on Fitch's
website by performing a title search for 'U.S. RMBS Rating Actions
for Apr. 16, 2014'.  In addition, a summary of the mortgage pool
and bond analysis can be found by performing a title search for
'RMBS Loss Metrics.'

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral performance has remained stable to slightly positive
since the last review.  Over the past six months, serious
delinquency has improved roughly 1% across vintages.  Performance
continues to benefit from rising home prices.  Prepayment rates
have fallen since the last review driven by higher interest rates
and a smaller population of borrowers able to refinance.

The slight improvement in collateral did not have a material
effect on Fitch's loss assumptions.  On average, projected losses
fell by 1% across all rating stresses from the prior review.
Slight declines in both the probability of default and loss
severity assumptions led to the drop in projected losses.

Despite the improving collateral and decreased loss assumptions,
rating upgrades were limited, making up only 1% of all rating
actions.  Nearly 80% of all upgrades were one rating category.  No
class was upgraded more than two categories.  Additional upgrades
to investment grade were constrained due to extended projected
months to pay off and the increased tail risk associated with it.
The limited number of rating downgrades was concentrated in
classes that previously held distressed ratings.  Out of the 190
classes that were downgraded, 176 were previously rated 'CCCsf' or
below.  Of the small number of investment grade classes
downgraded, all but one was one category.  The only two-category
investment grade downgrade was due to interest shortfall risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

A detailed list of Fitch's updated probability of default, loss
severity, and expected loss can be found by performing a title
search for 'RMBS Loss Metrics'.  The report provides a summary of
base-case and stressed scenario projections.

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'.  The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario.  Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are
increasingly more stressful and less likely to occur.  Although
many variables are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary
driver of the loss scenarios is the home-price forecast
assumption.  In the 'Bsf' scenario, Fitch assumes home prices
decline 10% below their long-term sustainable level.  The home-
price decline assumption is increased by 5% at each higher rating
category up to a 35% decline in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the
cash flow analysis.  Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home-price movements.  Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline further in some regions before reaching a sustainable
level.  While Fitch's ratings reflect this home-price view, the
ratings of outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the
extent actual home-price and mortgage performance trends differ
from those currently projected by Fitch.

The spreadsheet 'U.S. RMBS Rating Actions for Apr. 16, 2014'
provides the contact information for the performance analyst.


* Fitch Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 SF CDOs From 1999-2004
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded eight classes, downgraded one class,
and affirmed 46 classes of notes from 18 structured finance
collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs) with exposure to various
structured finance assets.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade of the class A-1 and A-2 (together, class A) notes
issued by Diversified Asset Securitization Holdings I, L.P/Corp.
is attributed to significant deleveraging of the capital structure
since the transaction's last review.  Receiving $16.5 million over
the last year, the class A notes have benefited from increased
credit enhancement (CE) levels and are now able to withstand
losses at the 'BBsf' rating stress according to Fitch's Structured
Finance Portfolio Credit Model (SF PCM) analysis.

Similarly, the upgrade of the class A notes of Solstice ABS CBO,
Ltd. and the class B notes of NYLIM Stratford CDO 2001-1,
Ltd./Inc. are the result of the continued deleveraging of the
capital structure.  The notes have received $5 million and $6.5
million, respectively, and are able to withstand losses at the
'Bsf' rating stress category.

The downgrade of the non-deferrable class A-2 notes issued by
Oceanview CBO I, Ltd./Inc., to 'Dsf' follows the interest payment
default caused by the transaction's acceleration.

Where CE available to the senior class of notes was exceeded by
losses projected at the 'CCCsf' rating stress under the SF PCM
analysis, Fitch compared each class' credit enhancement level to
the expected losses (EL) from distressed ('CCsf' and below)
collateral of each portfolio.  For three classes, the CE level of
the notes was not exceeded by expected losses and the ratings were
affirmed at 'CCsf'.  Under this framework, Fitch has also upgraded
the class A-1 and A-2 notes of Bleecker Structured Asset Funding,
Ltd. and the class A-1 (Series 1) and A-1 (Series 2) notes of
Orchard Park Ltd./Inc.

For 40 classes where expected losses already exceeded the notes'
CE level, the probability of default was evaluated without
factoring potential further losses from the currently performing
collateral of each portfolio.  In the absence of mitigating
factors, these classes were affirmed at 'Csf'.

Two classes, affirmed at 'Dsf', are non-deferrable classes that
are expected to continue experiencing interest payment shortfalls.
The certificates issued by Blue Heron Funding IX, Ltd. have been
affirmed at their current rating of 'AAAsf' with a Stable Outlook.
The principal of these Certificates is protected by a zero coupon
bond maturing in April 2030, issued by Resolution Funding
Corporation, a U.S. government sponsored agency.

Rating Sensitivities

Negative migration and defaults beyond those projected could lead
to downgrades for the three transactions analyzed under the SF
PCM.  The remaining 15 transactions have limited sensitivity to
further negative migration given their highly distressed rating
levels.  However, there is potential for non-deferrable classes to
be downgraded to 'Dsf' should they experience any interest payment
shortfalls.

This review was conducted under the framework described in the
reports 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria' and 'Global
Rating Criteria for Structured Finance CDOs'.  None of the
transactions have been analyzed within a cash flow model
framework, as the effect of structural features and excess spread
available to amortize the notes were determined to be minimal.
Instead, Fitch compared the CE level of each class to the expected
losses from the distressed assets in the portfolio.  For
transactions where expected losses did not exceed the CE level of
the senior class of notes, Fitch compared potential losses of the
transaction's entire portfolio, projected by the SF PCM, to the CE
levels of the notes.

The individual rating actions are detailed in the report 'Fitch
Takes Various Rating Actions on 18 SF CDOs from 1999-2004
Vintages', dated April 22, 2014.


* Fitch Cuts Ratings on 26 Bonds in 13 CMBS Deals to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various actions on already distressed
bonds.  Fitch downgraded 26 bonds in 13 U.S. commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transactions to 'D', as the bonds have
incurred a principal write-down.  The bonds were all previously
rated 'CC' or 'C' which indicates that Fitch expected a default.
In addition, Fitch has affirmed 71 distressed bonds in 11
transactions; the highest rating in these transactions is 'Csf' or
'Dsf' and losses have occurred or are considered inevitable.
Recovery prospects are very low for the remaining bonds in these
transactions.

Fitch also withdraws four bonds in two transactions where the
remaining classes have been reduced to zero due to pay down and/or
realized losses. All eight bonds were rated 'Dsf'.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades are limited to just the bonds with write-downs. Any
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.  In cases where the last rated tranches of a
transaction are in default and rated 'D', the defaulted ratings
will be automatically withdrawn within 11 months of the date of
the previous rating action.


* Moody's Takes Action on $261MM of RMBS Issued From 2003-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from five subprime RMBS transactions, which are all
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-5

Cl. AV2-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-HE1, Asset-
Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010
Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-AR1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2012 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Issuer: NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2003-2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 7, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
7.5% in March 2013 to 6.7% in March 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.

Any change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these
transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $426MM of RMBS by Various Trusts
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
from eight transactions backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-10

Cl. MV-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-15

Cl. 1-AF-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-AF-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-AF-5, Current Rating A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 6, 2013
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on Feb 10, 2014)

Cl. 1-AF-6, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2-AV-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-17

Cl. 4-AV-2A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-AV-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-AV-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 3, 2014
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2005-AB2

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF3

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2013 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2005-BC2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the uncertainty in
Moody's central macroeconomic forecast and performance volatility
due to servicer-related issues. The unemployment rate fell from
7.5% in March 2013 to 6.7% in March 2014. Moody's forecasts an
unemployment central range of 6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014.
Performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


* Moody's Takes Action on $428MM of RMBS by Various Trusts
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one tranche
and upgraded the ratings of ten tranches from seven transactions
issued by various trusts, backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE11

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-KS10 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2006-KS3 Trust

Cl. A-I-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF2

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-ABF1

Cl. A, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2013
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on Feb 10, 2014)

Ratings Rationale

The actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The upgrades are a result of improving performance of
the related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The downgrade action on Class A
issued by Bear Stearns 2003-ABF1 is driven by the amortization of
the subordinate bond as the deal is passing its performance
triggers, exposing the Class A to tail end losses.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $231MM of RMBS by Various Trusts
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of six tranches
from two transactions issued by various trusts, backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2013
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-WF4

Cl. M2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2012
Confirmed at C (sf)

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions remediate a technical issue with the model run
that led to an incorrect model output being used previously for
these transactions. The rating actions also reflect recent
performance of the pool groups and Moody's updated loss
expectations for the pool groups.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $83MM of RMBS Issued 1998 to 2004
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
tranches from three transactions issued by various issuers. The
collateral backing these deals consists of first-lien fixed and
adjustable rate mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) an agency of the U.S. Department of Urban
Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration
(VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series
2004-R1

Cl. A1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2012
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. PT, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust 2003-R4

Cl. M, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: SASCO FHA/VA, Series 1998-RF2

A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2010 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of FHA-
VA portfolio and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
these pools and the structural nuances of the transactions. The
ratings downgraded are primarily due to the erosion of credit
enhancement supporting some of these bonds and higher projected
future losses. The current delinquent pipeline includes loans that
have been in foreclosure for over four years. Moody's believes the
severity on some of these loans could be much higher than the FHA-
VA expected severity.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and
a large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-
related expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA
guarantee covers only a portion of the principal based on the
lesser of either the sum of the current loan amount, accrued and
unpaid interest, and foreclosure expenses, or the original loan
amount. HUD usually pays claims on defaulted FHA loans when
servicers submit the claims, but can impose significant penalties
on servicers if it finds irregularities in the claim process later
during the servicer audits. This can prompt servicers to push more
expenses to the trust that they deem reasonably incurred than
submit them to HUD and face significant penalty. The rating
actions consider the portion of a defaulted loan normally not
covered by the FHA or VA guarantee and other servicer expenses
they deemed reasonably incurred and passed on to the trust.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US
RMBS Methodology" published in November 2013.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction.


* Moody's Takes Action on $43MM of RMBS Issued From 2003 to 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from three subprime transactions backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-7

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Argent Securities Inc., Series 2004-W10

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade actions are a result of improving performance of the
related pools and/or faster pay-down of the bonds due to high
prepayments/faster liquidations. The actions reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can
impact the performance of these transactions.


* Moody's Takes Action on $32.78MM of Scratch and Dent RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four
tranches issued by two RMBS issuers. The tranches are backed by
Scratch & Dent RMBS loans issued in 2005.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2012
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: RAAC Series 2005-RP2 Trust

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 24, 2013
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools. The ratings upgraded are primarily due to the build-up
in credit enhancement due to sequential pay structure, non-
amortizing subordinate bonds, and availability of excess spread.
Performance has remained generally stable from Moody's
last review.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in March 2014 from 7.5%
in March 2013 . Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
6.5% to 7.5% for the 2014 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance.
Moody's expects house prices to continue to rise in 2014. Lower
increases than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative
rating actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


* S&P Lowers 160 Ratings on 98 U.S. RMBS Deals to D(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 160
classes of mortgage pass-through certificates from 98 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2009 to 'D (sf)'.

The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the principal write-
downs' impact on the affected classes during recent remittance
periods.  Before the rating actions, S&P rated each of these
classes either 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' except for one class, which
we rated 'BB (sf)'.

The 160 defaulted classes consist of the following:

   -- 59 from Alternative-A transactions (36.88%);

   -- 57 from prime jumbo transactions (35.63%);

   -- 29 from subprime transactions (18.13%);

   -- Eight from RMBS negative amortization transactions;

   -- Five from a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit transaction;

   -- One from an outside-the-guidelines transaction; and

   -- One from a document-deficient transaction.

A combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable) provide credit
enhancement for all of the transactions in this review.

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal write-downs, and S&P will adjust its ratings
as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.


                             *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Wednesday's edition of the TCR.  Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com by e-mail.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to the nation's bankruptcy courts.  The
list includes links to freely downloadable of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF documents.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

                           *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200.


                  *** End of Transmission ***