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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, November 20, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 324

                            Headlines

APIDOS CLO XI: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
APIDOS CLO XXV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D-1 Notes
BBCMS TRUST 2015-SRCH: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Cl. E Notes
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-2: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on D-R Notes
CEDAR FUNDING VI: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes

DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. S Debt
FREDDIE MAC 2015-K721: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class C Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2016-SC02: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. M-2 Debt
GE COMMERCIAL 2002-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class N Debt
GLOBAL LEVERAGED I: Moody's Cuts Class E-1 Notes Rating to B2

GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS4: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on 2 Certs.
HILTON USA 2016-HHV: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on Class F Debt
JP MORGAN 1999-C8: Moody's Hikes Class H Notes Rating to 'Ca'
JP MORGAN 2014-C18: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
JPMBB 2015-C33: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C8: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. N Debt
MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C3: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. IO Notes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-4: Moody's Hikes Cl. AJ Notes Rating to Ba1
MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Class M Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ6: Moody's Hikes Class N Notes Rating to B2

NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2007-1: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Cl. E Notes
NORTHSTAR 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class C Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on Class D Notes
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST CZN-1: Moody's Cuts Certs Rating to B1
RAIT 2014-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Ratings on 2 Tranches

SHACKLETON I CLO: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
SKOPOS AUTO 2015-2: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class D Notes
UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C4: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. E Debt to Bsf
[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 8 Tranches From 2 Transactions

[*] S&P Says 66 Cert. Classes From 47 RMBS Transactions in Default

                            *********

APIDOS CLO XI: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class X, A-R, B-R,
C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from Apidos CLO XI, a U.S. collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by CVC Credit Partners.
S&P withdrew its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, and E
notes from this transaction after they were fully redeemed.

On the Nov. 10, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the new
notes issuances were used to redeem the original notes as outlined
in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew
the ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and assigned ratings to the new notes.

The new notes were issued via a supplemental indenture and a
restated indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of
the replacement notes, also reset the non-call end date,
reinvestment end date, weighted average life test, and legal final
maturity date.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Apidos CLO XI

New class            Rating          Amount (mil $)

X                    AAA (sf)                  4.00
A-R                  AAA (sf)                254.35
B-R                  AA (sf)                  43.75
C-R                  A (sf)                   30.10
D-R                  BBB (sf)                 21.95
E-R                  BB (sf)                  16.50
Subordinate notes    NR                       42.60

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Apidos CLO XI

                           Rating
Original class       To              From

A                    NR              AAA (sf)
B-1                  NR              AA (sf)
B-2                  NR              AA (sf)
C                    NR              A (sf)
D                    NR              BBB (sf)
E                    NR              BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


APIDOS CLO XXV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D-1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
notes issued by Apidos CLO XXV (the "Issuer" or "Apidos CLO XXV").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$451,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$65,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-2A Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$8,500,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
      2028 (the "Class A-2B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$42,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$49,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$14,000,000 Class D-1 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- US$14,000,000 Class D-2 Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2028 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2A Notes, the Class A-2B Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes and the
Class D-2 Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Apidos CLO XXV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing
date.

CVC Credit Partners, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $700,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2884

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.50 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The prinicpal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2884 to 3317)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2A Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2B Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -1

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class D-2 Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2884 to 3749)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2A Notes: -2

   -- Class A-2B Notes: -2

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class D-2 Notes: -1


BBCMS TRUST 2015-SRCH: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Cl. E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of BBCMS Trust 2015-SRCH
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects stable performance of the underlying
collateral since issuance.  The loan is secured by the fee simple
interest in three single-tenant office buildings, totaling 943,056
square feet (sf), leased to Google in Sunnyvale, CA.

Superior Property Quality in Strong Location: The newly constructed
office buildings are located in Sunnyvale, CA, which currently has
an estimated vacancy rate of 5.2% per the appraisal. The three
buildings hold a LEED-Gold designation and will be some of the most
technologically advanced in the area.  The complex also includes a
52,500-square-foot amenities building for the sole use of tenants,
which will include fitness and weight equipment, studios for
classes, full locker rooms and is expected to include an outdoor
pool upon final completion.

Single-Tenant Lease Exposure: The three buildings are leased by a
single tenant, Google, Inc.  Google has accepted delivery of the
three buildings, no outs in its lease, and is expected to invest
approximately $188.6 million ($200 per square foot [psf]) to
complete their buildout.  Google is one of the world's largest
technology companies with an estimated market capitalization of
$515 billion as of November 2015.  It is one of the largest
landlords and occupiers in the Silicon Valley market and has
already leased the next three office buildings in the development
(Phase II), construction of which has already commenced.

Amortization: The loan is interest-only for the first four years
and eight months and then amortizes on a 30-year schedule,
resulting in seven years of amortization.  At maturity, the trust
balloon balance is estimated to be $372.1 million, resulting in an
approximate 13.5% reduction to the initial loan amount.

Reserves: Up-front reserves of approximately $71 million were
funded to address all outstanding landlord obligations, including
tenant improvements, leasing costs and free rent periods.  The loan
includes a cash flow sweep to be used to build reserves to $25 psf
during the final two years of the lease term if Google does not
give notice to renew.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on all classes remain Stable and no rating change is
expected unless there is a material decline in collateral
performance.  At issuance, Fitch found that the 'AAAsf' class could
withstand an approximate 51.7% decrease to the estimated in-place
net cash flow (NCF) prior to experiencing $1 of loss to the 'AAAsf'
rated class.  Fitch performed several stress scenarios in which the
Fitch NCF was stressed.  Fitch determined that a 32.5% reduction in
Fitch's implied NCF would cause the notes to break even at a 1.0x
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), based on the actual debt
service.  Fitch also evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for
class A and found that an 8.1% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would
result in a one-category downgrade, while a 36.8% decline would
result in a downgrade to below investment grade.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $58.0 million class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $202.0 million class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $260.0 million interest-only class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $140.0 million interest-only class X-B* notes at 'BBB-sf';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- $46.0 million class B notes at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $39.0 million class C notes at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55.0 million class D notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $30.0 million class E notes at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.



BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2012-2: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes from BlueMountain CLO 2012-2
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by BlueMountain Capital Management LLC.

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.  Along with the refinancing and amendments to the
capital structure, the transaction will extend its reinvestment
period and stated maturity by four years.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Sept. 30, 2016, trustee report. The
preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.  In
August 2016, S&P assessed one notch upgrades to the original class
B and class C notes.  The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view
that the reset four-year reinvestment period exposes the
transaction to uncertainty with regard to credit performance.

On the Nov. 21, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes, upon which, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings
on the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement
notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm
the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its preliminary
ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P's review of the transaction also relied, in part, upon a
criteria interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third
Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global
Rating Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows S&P to use a
limited number of public ratings from other nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) for the purposes of
assessing the credit quality of assets not rated by S&P Global
Ratings.  The criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of
corporate assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, and the
interpretation outlines treatment of securitized assets.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Table 1

Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest             BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate(%)              (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1-R     382.20   LIBOR plus 1.43   73.65   63.32     10.33
A-2-R      68.10   LIBOR plus 1.95   71.40   55.78     15.62
B-R        48.90   LIBOR plus 2.85   60.92   50.30     10.62
C-R        30.10   LIBOR plus 4.15   54.92   44.50     10.42
D-R        25.25   LIBOR plus 7.50   46.36   37.96      8.41

Table 2

Effective Date
Class     Amount   Interest            BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)            (%)     (%)       (%)
A-1       372.20   LIBOR plus 1.42   69.90   64.04      5.86
A-2        10.00              2.37   69.90   64.04      5.86
B-1        48.10   LIBOR plus 2.06   67.91   56.26      11.65
B-2        20.00              3.64   67.91   56.26      11.65
C          48.90   LIBOR plus 2.75   57.72   50.22      7.50
D          30.10   LIBOR plus 4.10   52.96   44.23      8.73
E          25.25   LIBOR plus 5.10   47.61   37.34      10.27

BDR--Break-even default rate. SDR--Scenario default rate.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2012-2 Ltd.

Replacement class       Rating

A-1-R                   AAA (sf)
A-2-R                   AA (sf)
B-R                     A (sf)
C-R                     BBB (sf)
D-R                     BB (sf)


CEDAR FUNDING VI: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Cedar Funding VI CLO
Ltd./Cedar Funding VI CLO LLC's $460.625 million fixed- and
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transactionn
backed by a revolving pool consisting primarily of broadly
syndicated senior secured loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans (i.e., those rated 'BB+' or lower) that are governed
      by collateral quality tests.  The credit enhancement
      provided through the subordination of cash flows, excess
      spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cedar Funding VI CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding VI CLO LLC

Class                           Rating        Amount (mil. $)
A-1                             AAA (sf)              297.500
A-F                             AAA (sf)               20.000
B                               AA (sf)                66.250
C-1 (deferrable)                A (sf)                  7.369
C-F (deferrable)                A (sf)                 23.881
D-1 (deferrable)                BBB (sf)               19.250
D-2 (deferrable)                BBB- (sf)               7.000
E (deferrable)                  BB- (sf)               19.375
Subordinate notes               NR                     37.850

NR--Not rated.



DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. S Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp., Pass-Through Certificates, Series
1999-CG1 as follows:

   -- Cl. S, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class IO, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. "Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress." Moody's said. Moody's rating action reflects a base
expected loss of 0.0% of the current balance, the same as at last
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.3%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $13.4 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

Both loans are on the master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist
includes loans which meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly
reporting package. As part of our ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could impact performance.

Thirty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $41.5 million (32% loss severity on
average). No loans are currently in special servicing.

The largest loan is the Links at Bixby Loan ($6.9 million -- 50.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 324-unit multifamily property
located in Bixby, Oklahoma. The property was 99% leased as of June
2016 compared to 100% at last review. Financial performance
declined slightly since last review. The loan is fully-amortizing
and has amortized 52.4% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.87X, respectively, compared to 56% and
1.94X at last review.

The other loan is the Shoppes at Longwood Loan ($6.7 million --
49.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 142,000 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. The largest
tenants include TJ Maxx (17% of the NRA; lease expiration in
January 2018) and Staples (13% of the NRA; lease expiration in
November 2017). The property was 65% leased as of June 2016
compared to 100% at last review. The drop in occupancy is
attributed to the September 2015 departure of Super Fresh (32% of
the NRA) due to the July 2015 bankruptcy of its parent company,
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Servicer commentary indicates that
there is strong prospective tenant interest to lease all or a
majority of the vacant space. The loan has amortized 52% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 38% and 2.68X,
respectively, compared to 37% and 2.75X at last review.


FREDDIE MAC 2015-K721: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed six classes of CMBS
securities, issued by FREMF 2015-K721 Mortgage Trust and three
classes of Structured Pass-Through Certificates (SPCs), Series-K721
issued by Freddie Mac as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X2-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

SPCs Classes*

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015
      Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

* Each of the SPC Classes represents a pass-through interest in its
associated underlying CMBS Class. SPC Class A-1 represents a
pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class A-1, SPC Class A-2
represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS A-2, and SPC
Class X1 represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS
Class X1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

The ratings on three SPC classes were affirmed based on the ratings
of the underlying CMBS classes. Each represents a pass-through
interest in an underlying CMBS class. SPC Class A-1 represents a
pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class A-1, SPC Class A-2
represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class A-2 and
SPC Class X1 represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS
Class X1.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.6%.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 26, the same as at securitization.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 25, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by less than 1% to
$1.09 billion from $1.093 billion at securitization. The
certificates are collateralized by 48 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 48% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 1.5% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 85% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 90% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 124.5%, compared
to 124.8% at securitization. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 6.9% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 0.77X,
respectively, compared to 1.46X and 0.77X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Gramercy at Metropolitan Park Loan ($127
million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a 399 unit high
rise apartment complex located in Arlington, VA, approximately 3
miles southwest of Washington D.C. The complex consists of three
buildings and 5% of units are reserved for low or moderate income
households. The property was 98% leased as of June 2016. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 132.4% and 0.65X, respectively, the same
as at securitization.

The second largest loan is the Stewart Village Apartment Homes Loan
($62.8 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a 202 unit
apartment complex located in Sunnyvale, CA, approximately 10 miles
west of the San Jose CBD. The property contains 18 buildings and is
in close proximity to highway 101 and I-85. As of December 2015,
the property was 92% leased. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
123.5% and 0.68X, respectively, compared to 125.7% and 0.67X at
securitization.

The third largest loan is the Abbey at Enclave Loan ($59.3 million
-- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 799 unit apartment
complex in Houston, TX, approximately 18 miles west of the CBD. The
property contains 43 buildings and was 88% leased at June 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 135.3% and 0.74X, respectively,
compared to 137.3% and 0.73X at the last review.


FREDDIE MAC 2016-SC02: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Cl. M-2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned provisional ratings to two
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2016-SC02 (FWLS
2016-SC02). The ratings range from (P)Baa1 (sf) to (P)Ba2 (sf). The
certificates are backed by two pools of fixed-rate super conforming
prime residential mortgage loans. The collateral pools consist of
loans acquired by Freddie Mac from four sellers (Fremont Bank
(37.0%), Caliber Home Loans (28.9%), Wells Fargo (20.0%), and
Quicken Loans (14.2%) pursuant to the terms of the Freddie Mac
Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide. Freddie Mac will serve in a
number of capacities with respect to the Trust. Freddie Mac will be
the Guarantor of the Senior Certificates, Seller, Master Servicer,
Master Document Custodian and Trustee.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Freddie Mac Whole Loan Securities Trust, Series 2016-
   SC02

   -- Cl. M-1, Assigned (P)Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-2, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected loss on pool 1 average 0.45% in a base-case
scenario and reach 6.05% at a stress level consistent with Aaa
rating on the senior classes. Moody's expected losses on pool 2
average 0.85% in a base-case scenario and reach 11.40% at a stress
level consistent with Aaa rating on the senior classes. Moody's
aggregate expected loss on the combined collateral is 0.55%, and
reaches 7.10% at a stress level consistent with Aaa rating. Moody's
said, "We arrived at these expected losses using our MILAN model.
Our Aaa stress loss for pool 1 is consistent with prime jumbo
transactions we have recently rated. The lower FICO scores and
slightly higher CLTV on pool 2 contributed to the higher loss
expectations on the pool. In our analysis, we considered the
observed loss severity trends on Freddie Mac loans. We did not make
any adjustments related to servicers and originators' assessment.
However, we decreased our base case and Aaa loss expectation by 5%
due to the strong representation and warranties provider (Freddie
Mac)."

Collateral Description

The FWLS 2016-SC02 transaction is backed by a total of 866
fixed-rate super conforming prime residential mortgage loans with a
balance of $459,921,310. Pool 1 is backed by 664 loans with a
balance of $349,208,289 and pool 2 is backed by 202 loans with a
balance of $110,713,020. The collateral pools consist of loans
acquired by Freddie Mac from multiple sellers pursuant to the terms
of the Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide. The
weighted average CLTV is 71.8% for the aggregate pool, and 70.9%
and 74.5% for pool 1 and pool 2 loans respectively. The weighted
average FICO is 762 and 742 for pool 1 and pool 2 loans
respectively.

Third-Party Review(TPR)

Clayton conducted a review of credit, property valuations,
regulatory compliance (regulatory compliance was conducted only for
loans in the sample which were in states with assignee liability
laws and or regulations) and data accuracy checks for 222 mortgage
loans (from an initial pool of 885 loans). "We reviewed the TPR
reports and there were no exceptions for credit, property
valuations, and regulatory compliance." Moody's said. The data
accuracy exceptions were minor and did not pose a material risk.

Representations & Warranties (R&Ws)

Freddie Mac will make certain representations and warranties with
respect to the mortgage loans and will be the only party from which
the trust may seek repurchase of a mortgage loan as a result of any
material breach that provides for repurchase as a remedy. Freddie
Mac's Aaa senior ratings are underpinned by strong government
support. "We believe that the US Government will stand behind
obligations of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, meet the baseline set
of credit-neutral R&Ws we have identified for US RMBS." Moody's
said.

Structural considerations

The securitization has a two-pool 'Y' structure that distributes
principal on a pro rata basis between the senior and subordinate
classes subject to performance triggers, and sequentially amongst
the subordinate certificates. The transaction has two distinct
features: recoupment of unpaid interest on stop advance loans and
shifting certain principal payments, subject to limits, to cover
interest shortfalls to the rated subordinate bonds due to interest
rate modifications and extra-ordinary expenses.

In this transaction, Freddie Mac will stop advancing principal and
interest on any real-estate owned (REO) property or loans that are
180 days or more delinquent. This will decrease the amount of
interest remitted to the trust and could result in interest
shortfalls to the bonds. However, interest accrued but not paid on
the stop advance loans will be recovered from the liquidation
proceeds (for liquidated loans), borrower payments, modification or
repurchases and added to the interest remittance amount. This will
result in subsequent recoveries of any interest shortfalls on
subordinates bonds in the order of their payment priority.

Also, in this transaction, the certificates are exposed to interest
shortfalls due to interest rate modifications and extra-ordinary
expenses. If the interest accrued on the class B certificate is
insufficient to absorb the reduction in interest amount caused by
modification and extra-ordinary expenses, and to the extent that
the class B certificate is outstanding, the transaction allows for
certain principal payments (up to subordinate percentage of
scheduled principal) to be re-directed to cover interest shortfall
to the rated bonds, with a corresponding write-down of Class B
principal balance. As a result, before Classes M-1 or M-2 suffer
any unrecoverable interest shortfall, the Class B certificate
balance has to be reduced to zero. The Class B certificate
represents 1% of the collateral.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Downgrade

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Upgrade

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework ," published in
September 2016.


GE COMMERCIAL 2002-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on Class N Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and upgraded the rating on one class in GE Commercial Mortgage
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-1
as follows:

   -- Cl. M, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed C

      (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class M was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan amortization. The deal has
paid down 30% since Moody's last review. Additionally, one loan
representing 44% of the pool has defeased.

The rating Class N was affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss. Class N has already experienced a 27%
realized loss as result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 24.8% of the
current balance, compared to 17.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.5% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure and property type. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $11.32
million from $1.04 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 44%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Two loans, constituting 56% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $24 million (for an average loss
severity of 19%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

The two remaining non-defeased loans represent 56% of the pool. The
largest loan is the Campus Executive Office Park Loan ($5.1 million
-- 45% of the pool), which is secured by a two-building, 78,000
square foot office property located in Sacramento, California. The
property was fully vacant from September 2009 to June 2015. The
loan transferred to special servicing in November 2011 for imminent
monetary default. A loan modification was executed on September
2014 that included, among other items: (a) an interest pay rate
reduction to 4.91% (from 6.88%), (b) a maturity extension to March
2019 with interest only payments due for the remainder of the term
and (c) the borrower repaid all interest and servicer advances at
the time of the modification. This loan transferred back to the
master servicer in January 2015 but remains on the watchlist due to
low occupancy and DSCR. Moody's identifies this as a troubled loan
and has assumed a moderate loss on this loan.

The second loan is the 15555 Lundy Parkway Loan ($1.2 million --
11% of the pool), which is secured by twin, Class A suburban office
properties, comprising a total 453,000 square feet and located in
Dearborn, Michigan. The property is 100% leased to Ford Motor
Company (Moody's senior unsecured rating Baa2, stable outlook)
through December 2016. The loan is fully amortizing over its term
and Ford's lease expiration of December 31, 2016 falls just beyond
the loan's scheduled maturity date of December 10, 2016. The loan
has amortized 98% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 2% and 4.00X, respectively, compared to 11% and 4.00X at
the last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and
a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


GLOBAL LEVERAGED I: Moody's Cuts Class E-1 Notes Rating to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Global Leveraged Capital Credit
Opportunity Fund I:

   -- US$23,750,000 Class D Fourth Priority Subordinated
      Deferrable Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf);
      previously on December 10, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- US$18,500,000 Class E-1 Fifth Priority Subordinated
      Deferrable Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously
  
      on December 10, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- US$7,750,000 Class E-2 Fifth Priority Subordinated
      Deferrable Notes Due 2018, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously

      on December 10, 2015 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class I Combination Notes Due 2018 (current
      rated balance of $3,077,212), Downgraded to Ca (sf);
      previously on December 10, 2015 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- US$40,500,000 Class C Third Priority Subordinated Deferrable

      Notes Due 2018 (current outstanding balance of $17,219,348),

      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on December 10, 2015 Upgraded
      to Aaa (sf)

Global Leveraged Capital Credit Opportunity Fund I, issued in
December 2006, is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed
primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans, with significant
exposure to small and middle market loans. The collateral pool is
highly concentrated in a small number of obligors and the diversity
score is currently only eight. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in December 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating downgrades are primarily a result of continuing
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio and increasing
uncertainty in the timing and amount of recoveries for defaulted,
nonperforming and other illiquid assets. Based on the trustee's
October 2016 report, $47.5 million of assets have defaulted, and
Moody's treated another $12.4 million of nonperforming assets as
defaulted in its base case. In addition, the deal holds a material
dollar amount of thinly traded loans with weak or uncertain credit
quality, which may pose additional risks, including with respect to
the issuer's ultimate ability or inclination to pursue a
liquidation of such assets if the sales can be transacted only at
heavily discounted price levels.

The rating downgrade on the Class I Combination notes is also a
result of decrease in available excess spread in the deal. The
notes' current rated balance of $3.08 million is collateralized by
$1.49 million of the Class E-2 notes and $3.31 million of the
Preference Shares. For the past seven payment dates, no payments
were made on the Preference Shares component of the notes due to
sizable net swap payments and the subordinated management fee. As a
result, payments from the Class E-2 component have been the only
source of payments used to reduce the rated balance of the notes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization
      of higher than assumed recoveries would positively impact
      the CLO.

   -- Operational risk: The deal contains a large proportion of
      thinly traded loans with weak or uncertain credit quality.
      Repayment of the notes at their maturity could be highly
      dependent on the issuer's ability and willingness to sell or

      realize recoveries on these assets.

   -- Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large
      number of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has

      assessed through credit estimates. Moody's normally updates
      such estimates at least once annually, but if such updates
      do not occur, the transaction could be negatively affected
      by any default probability adjustments Moody's assumes in
      lieu of updated credit estimates.

   -- Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
      portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions

      of a few large obligors Moody's rates Caa1 or lower,
      especially if they jump to default. Because of the deal's
      low diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's
      supplemented its typical Binomial Expansion Technique
      analysis with a simulated default distribution using its
      CDOROMTM software or individual scenario analysis.

   -- The deal has a pay-fixed receive-floating interest rate swap

      that is currently out of the money. If fixed-rate assets
      prepay or default, the mismatch between the swap notional
      and the amount of fixed assets would be more substantial. In

      such cases, payments to hedge counterparties could consume a

      large portion or all of the interest proceeds, leaving the
      transaction, even with respect to the senior notes, with     

      poor interest coverage. Payment timing mismatches between
      assets and liabilities can lead to additional concerns. If
      the deal does not receive sufficient principal proceeds on
      the payment date to supplement the interest proceeds
      shortfall, an interest payment default is much more likely
      to occur. Similarly, using principal proceeds to pay
      interest could lead to the risk of payment default on the
      principal of the notes.

   -- Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak
      liquidity: The presence of assets rated (or deemed to have a

      credit quality equivalent to) Caa3 or below or those with
      the worst Moody's speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating,  
  
      SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional risks if these assets

      default. The historical default rate is higher than average
      for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to such assets,

      which constitute around $31.0 million of par, Moody's ran a
      sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (5900)

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0

   -- Class E-1: +3
  
   -- Class E-2: +3

   -- Class I Combination: 0

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (8850)

   -- Class C: 0

   -- Class D: 0

   -- Class E-1: -3

   -- Class E-2: -3

   -- Class I Combination: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations." In addition,
because of the collateral pool's low diversity, Moody's used
CDOROM(TM) to simulate a default distribution that it then used as
an input in the cash flow model.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $69.5 million, defaulted par of $59.8
million, a weighted average default probability of 43.78% (implying
a WARF of 7375), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
43.83%, a diversity score of 8 and a weighted average spread of
3.52% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, for each credit estimates whose related exposure
constitutes more than 3% of the collateral pool, Moody's applied a
two-notch equivalent assumed downgrade, which totals approximately
13.8% of the pool. Additionally, Moody's assumed an equivalent of
Caa3 for unrated assets, which represent approximately 40.3% of the
collateral pool.


GS MORTGAGE 2016-GS4: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on 2 Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2016-GS4's $214.600 million commercial mortgage
loan-specific pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by 33 loans totaling $1,026.5 million.  S&P will
only be assigning ratings to the loan-specific certificates
referencing the AMA Plaza and 225 Bush Street loans, so S&P did not
analyze the other 31 loans.

The AMA Plaza whole loan has an aggregate outstanding principal
balance of $304.0 million and is secured by the borrower's fee
simple interest in the office portion of AMA Plaza, an office
property located in Chicago, and the leasehold interest in an
adjacent parking garage.

The 225 Bush Street whole loan has an aggregate outstanding
principal balance of $235.0 million and is secured by the
borrower's fee simple interest in 225 Bush Street, an office
property located in San Francisco.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 10,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the AMA Plaza and 225
Bush Street loan collateral's historical and projected performance,
the sponsors' and managers' experience, the trustee-provided
liquidity, the loans' terms, and the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-GS4

Class       Rating(i)            Amount ($)
AMA-A       AA- (sf)             16,118,000
X-AMA       BB- (sf)        101,600,000(ii)
AMA-B       A- (sf)              21,917,000
AMA-C       BBB- (sf)            27,032,000
AMA-D       BB- (sf)             36,533,000
225-A       AA- (sf)             12,964,000
X-225       B- (sf)         113,000,000(ii)
225-B       A- (sf)              18,405,000
225-C       BBB- (sf)            22,576,000
225-D       BB- (sf)             30,673,000
225-E       B- (sf)              28,382,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-225
certificates will be equal to the certificate balance of the class
225-A, 225-B, 225-C, 225-D, and 225-E certificates.  The notional
amount of the class X-AMA certificates will be equal to the
certificate balance of the class AMA-A, AMA-B, AMA-C, and AMA-D
certificates.



HILTON USA 2016-HHV: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to eight
classes of CMBS securities, issued by Hilton USA Trust 2016-HHV,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-HHV:

   -- Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A*, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B*, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage collateralized by one property, the
Hilton Hawaiian Village Waikiki Beach Resort ("Hilton Hawaiian
Village" or the "Property"). The ratings are based on the
collateral and the structure of the transaction.

The Hilton Hawaiian Village is one of Hawaii's premier urban resort
destinations, situated on twenty-two beachfront acres overlooking
Waikiki Beach. The Resort features 2,860 guest rooms spread across
five ocean towers offering views of Waikiki Beach, Diamond Head and
Downtown Honolulu. The Property offers a host of resort-style
amenities and services, including 20 food and beverage outlets,
over 150,000 SF of flexible indoor and outdoor function space,
three conference centers, five swimming pools, a saltwater lagoon,
spa grottos, the Mandara Spa and Fitness Center, two chapels and
over 100 retail tenants. The Property also features approximately
130,489 SF of leased retail and restaurant space, which is occupied
by over 100 tenants.

Waikiki is a densely developed retail and restaurant market, and
virtually no vacant land is available within the Waikiki district.
All the prime beachfront locations are currently improved with
large hotels. The Property provides excellent access to all major
demand generators in the market.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both our Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and our IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, we also consider a
range of qualitative issues as well as the transaction's structural
and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $1,275,000,000 represents a Moody's
LTV of 109.0%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 2.17X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 0.98X.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which it uses for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions. The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from our Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type. These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator which references
the following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on
the published methodology: original and current bond ratings and
credit estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up for
losses for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction;
and IO type corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5.0%,
14.3%, and 22.8%, the model-indicated rating for the currently
rated (P) Aaa (sf) classes would be Aaa (sf), Aaa (sf), and Aa2
(sf), respectively. Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time;
rather they are designed to provide a quantitative calculation of
how the initial rating might change if key input parameters used in
the initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the
deal has not aged. Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings
impact of each scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated
standpoint. Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration
in the ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be
assigned in each case could vary from the information presented in
the Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


JP MORGAN 1999-C8: Moody's Hikes Class H Notes Rating to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Commercial Mortgage
Finance Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-C8
as follows:

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class H was upgraded to be consistent with Moody's
anticipated plus realized losses. The class has already realized a
46% expected loss from previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance of the referenced class.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.5%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $3.6 million
from $731.5 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five remaining mortgage loans ranging in size
from 9.2% to 38% of the pool.

Two loans, constituting 47% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $54.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 47%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 91% of the
pool. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average
haircut of 38% to the most recently available net operating income
(NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization
rate of 11.4%.

The top three loans represent 76% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Ridge Terrace Heath Care Ctr. Loan ($1.4 million -- 38%
of the pool), which is secured by a 120-bed heath care center
located in Lantana, Florida. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to low DSCR. Performance has been very weak due to a
significant increase in operating expenses. The property's
valuation is based on a floor value. The loan is fully amortizing
and has amortized 74% since securitization. Moody's LTV is 88%,
compared to 108% at last review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza De Las Palmas Loan ($762,949
-- 21% of the pool), which is secured by a 47,000 SF retail
property in El Cajon, California. As of December 2015, the property
was 85% leased, compared to 79% at last review. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 83% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 12% and 4.00X, respectively, compared to 16%
and 4.00X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Arroyo Grande Mini Storage Loan
($626,966 -- 17% of the pool), which is secured by a 74,800 SF
self-storage facility in Arroyo Grande, California. The property
consists of 549 storage units. As of June 2016, the property was
99% leased, consistent with the prior three years. The loan is
fully amortizing and has amortized 72% since securitization.
Performance has improved annually since 2013. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 10% and 4.00X, respectively, compared to 14% and
4.00X at the last review.



JP MORGAN 2014-C18: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2014-C18.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are the result of stable performance since
issuance.  As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 17.1% to $928.1
million from $1.12 billion at issuance.  No loans are defeased.
There are four loans on the master servicer's watchlist (8.0%), two
of which are due to deferred maintenance, including the fourth
largest loan, Waterstone Retail Portfolio.  All of the watchlist
loans, however, remain current and Fitch has not designated any
loans as Fitch Loans of Concern.

Stable Performance: As of the October 2016 distribution, property
level performance was generally in line with issuance expectations
and there have been no material changes to pool metrics.

Pool Concentration: The 10 largest loans represent 59.2% of the
total pool balance, which is higher than similar vintage
transactions.

High Retail Concentration: The pool has an above-average
concentration of retail properties at 51.2%.  Eight of the top 15
largest assets are retail properties.  The average retail
concentration for transactions issued in 2013 was 33.2%.

The largest loan in the pool, Miami International Mall (10.8%), is
collateralized by a super-regional mall in Miami, FL.  This loan
participation is a $100 million, controlling pari-passu portion of
a $160 million loan.  As of year-end 2015, the property's net
operating income (NOI) was reported to be $21.2 million, which is
an increase of 6.6% from issuance.  The servicer reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the same period was 2.95x, an
improvement from 2.77x at issuance.  Occupancy was reported to be
slightly lower at 90% as of June 2016 compared to 94% at issuance.


                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable due to stable
collateral performance.  Fitch does not foresee positive or
negative ratings migration until a material economic or asset-level
event changes the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed these classes:

   -- $22.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $85.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $87.5 million class A-4A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $87.5 million class A-4A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $267 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $67.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $55.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $695.9 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $69.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $161.6 million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $12 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for a related
amount of class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
exchanged for class A-S, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class NR and X-C certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-B
certificates.



JPMBB 2015-C33: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-C33 (the Certificates), issued by JPMBB
2015-C33 Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D-1 at BBB (sf)

   -- Class D-2 at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the transaction’s current
performance, which remains in line with DBRS’s expectations at
issuance. The collateral consists of 64 fixed-rate loans secured by
89 commercial properties. As of the October 2016 remittance, the
pool had an aggregate outstanding balance of approximately $757.5
million, representing a collateral reduction of 0.6% since issuance
because of scheduled loan amortization. The pool benefits from a
high concentration of loans secured by properties in urban (33.6%
of the current pool) and suburban (50.8% of the current pool)
markets. As of the October 2016 remittance, there are two loans,
comprising 1.3% of the current pool, on the servicer’s watchlist
with no loans in special servicing. Both loans are being monitored
for non-performance-related issues as the servicer has reported
healthy coverage metrics for each loan.

The largest loan in the pool, 32 Avenue of the Americas (Prospectus
ID#1; 16.5% of the current pool), is secured by a 1.1 million
square foot (sf) office property and data center located in the
Tribeca District of Manhattan. The loan is full interest-only for
the entire ten-year term. The subject has averaged a high occupancy
rate of 96.0% from 2005 to 2015. According to the June 2016 rent
roll, the property has an occupancy rate of 99.6% with an average
rental rate of $56.37 per square foot (psf). Only 2.3% of the net
rentable area (NRA) is set to roll in the next 12 months. The
property is occupied by CenturyLink, Inc. (14.2% of NRA), whose
lease expires in August 2020; AMFM Operating Inc. (10.0% of NRA)
with a lease until September 2022; and DENTSU Holdings Inc. (8.5%
of NRA) with a lease until September 2021. The loan is reporting
strong financials with a YE2015 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.87x and a Q2 2016 DSCR of 1.89x.

The New Center One loan (Prospectus ID#9; 2.5% of the current pool)
is secured by a 506,966 sf office located in the New Center
submarket (approximately three miles northwest of the Detroit
central business district), which is considered a hub for
government, health care and education. The property was built in
1980 and purchased in 2003 by the borrower. This property is of
significantly newer vintage than the two adjacent office buildings
(built in 1929 and 1931), which are also owned by the borrower and
are connected to the subject via skywalk. The loan securing the
adjacent properties was transferred to special servicing and the
properties were foreclosed in February 2015, in which the borrower
was also involved. The subject will benefit from the new M-1 Rail
system that is currently under construction and is set to open in
2017, which will connect the New Center Submarket with downtown
Detroit. The subject property will be in close proximity to the
main terminal for the new rail system and, according to the
servicer, this will allow for greater demand for the subject’s
parking lot as it has already increased its parking lot rate to
$80.00 per month in anticipation of the M-1 Rail opening.

The loan is reporting healthy Q2 2016 financials with a DSCR of
1.76x. According to the March 2016 rent roll, the property was
76.6% occupied with an average rental rate of $14.80 psf, which
compares similarly with the July 2015 occupancy rate of 77.1%. The
largest tenant is Henry Ford Health Services, occupying 31.3% of
NRA across multiple leases. Two leases, totaling 11.9% of NRA, are
set to expire in January and April 2017, respectively; however,
according to the servicer, the tenant has renewed both leases with
extensions to January 2020 and April 2022, respectively, with
scheduled rent steps throughout the respective lease terms. A cash
sweep did activate as the lease renewals were not secured by the
mandated period, but funds have since been released back to the
borrower as the leases are now signed.

The rating assigned to Class G materially deviates from the higher
rating implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers a material
deviation to be a rating differential of three or more notches
between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative model that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the rating reflects the sustainability
of loan performance trends not demonstrated and, as such, was
reflected in the rating.



LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2003-C8: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. N Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of two classes in
LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2003-C8 as follows:

   -- Cl. N, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015 Affirmed

      B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-CL, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class N was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with expected recovery of principal and interest from liquidated
and troubled loans. Although Class N is fully covered by a defeased
loan, Moody's is concerned that this class may experience interest
shortfalls caused by the loan in special servicing.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-CL, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 37.7% of the
current balance, compared to 38.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.7% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 51% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $12.7 million
from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans. One loan, constituting 49.2%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $18.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 20.9%).

One loan, constituting 50.8% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. The specially serviced loan is the PGA Commons Loan
($6.45 million -- 50.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 38,700
square foot (SF) retail/office property located in Palm Beach
Gardens, Florida. The property was the first phase of a three-phase
project known as PGA Commons. The loan initially transferred to
special servicing in March 2010 and became REO in November 2012. As
per the June 2016 rent roll the property was 65% leased, compared
to 70% leased in October 2015 and 56% leased in December 2014. The
master servicer has deemed this loan non-recoverable.

As of the October 17, 2016 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $2.95 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.


MERRILL LYNCH 1998-C3: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. IO Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass
Through Certificates, Series 1998-C3 as follows:

   -- Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class IO, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0%
of the current balance, the same as at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.7% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 5 at last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $10.8 million
from $638.4 million at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from 2% to 20%
of the pool. Five loans, representing 34% of the pool have defeased
and are secured by US Government securities.

Two loans, representing 21% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $30 million. Currently, there are no
loans in special servicing.

Excluding defeased loans, Moody's was provided with full year 2015
and partial year 2016 operating results for 45% and 43% of the
pool, respectively. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 33%
compared to 32% at last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans and specially
serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a
weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 3.91X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 4.39X at prior review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 50% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Santa Monica Sav-On Loan ($2.2 million -- 20.4%
of the pool), which is secured by a 27,500 SF retail property
located in West Hollywood, California. The property is 96% leased
to CVS through August 2022. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 55% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 34% and 3.2X, respectively, compared to 40% and 2.70X at last
review.

The second largest loan is the Republic Beverage Building Loan
($1.9 million -- 17.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 385,000
square foot (SF) industrial property located in Grand Prairie,
Texas. The property is 100% leased to Republic Beverage Co., which
is controlled by the borrower. The lease expires in November 2021.
Although the property remains fully leased, the loan is on the
servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR driven in part from
inconsistent expense reimbursement revenue. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 83% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 37% and 2.76X, respectively, compared to 32%
and 3.23X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Willowbrook Apartments Loan ($1.4
million -- 12.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 105-unit
apartment complex in Beaverton, Oregon. The property was 96%
occupied as of September 2016 and has enjoyed sustained occupancy
at or above 96% since 2010. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 53% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 15% and 4.0X, respectively, compared to 19% and 4.0X at prior
review.



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2006-4: Moody's Hikes Cl. AJ Notes Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on five classes,
affirmed the ratings on two classes and downgraded the ratings on
two classes in ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-4 as follows:

   -- Cl. AM, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ-FL, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ-FX, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes (Classes AM through B) were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization and Moody's expectation of
additional credit support increases resulting from the payoff of
loans approaching maturity that are well position to refinance. The
deal has paid down 75% since the last review.

The rating on Classes C and E were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss. Class E has already
experienced a 46% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on Class D was downgraded due to anticipated losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class XC, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.5% of the
current balance compared to 8.6% at last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 11.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24 compared to 54 at last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 12, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 88% to $551.7
million from $4.52 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 54 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 8% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 51% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 5% of the pool, have defeased and
are secured by US government securities.

Thirty-six loans, constituting 67% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool with
fifty-eight of those loan liquidations resulting in an aggregate
realized loss to the Trust of $365 million (for an average loss
severity of 46%).

Twelve loans, constituting 26% of the pool, are in special
servicing based on the October 2016 remittance statement. The
largest specially serviced loan is the Atrium - Marriott University
Park Loan ($38.5 million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by
a 250-room full service hotel located in Tucson, Arizona. The
borrower did not pay off the loan at its original maturity date in
September 2016. The special servicer indicated they are reviewing
the possible strategies for this asset. As of December 2015, the
actual NCF DSCR was 0.88x at 77% occupancy. The typical annual
occupancy rate has ranged from 74% to 76% over the last three
years. Recently, the borrower stated that a heavier marketing
campaign was implemented, which has caused an increase in
expenses.

The remaining eleven specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $62.8 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (44% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 9% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $12.7 million (a 26% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 65% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 102% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.29X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.44X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 21% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Long Beach Marketplace Loan ($46.0 million --
8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 163,005 SF retail property
located in Long Beach, California. The property was 90% leased as
of year-end 2015. Performance has been stable and the loan is on
the servicer's watchlist due to the upcoming loan maturity date in
December 2016.

The second largest loan is the Federal Way Crossings Loan ($37.9
million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 169,460 SF
retail property located in Federal Way, Washington. The property
was 100% leased as of June 2016. Performance has been stable. The
loan is on the servicer's watchlist due to upcoming loan maturity
date in November 2016.

The third largest loan is the Larwin Square Loan ($33.2 million --
6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 195,936 SF retail center
located in Tustin, California. The property was 95% leased as of
March 2016. Performance has been stable. The loan is on the
servicer's watchlist due to upcoming loan maturity date in November
2016.


MORGAN STANLEY 1998-WF2: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Class M Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
1998-WF2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations follow the overall stable performance of the
underlying collateral.  The pool has experienced 96.7% of
collateral reduction since issuance.  Although credit support to
the outstanding bonds is strong, the pool is heavily concentrated
and there are four loans on the servicer's watchlist representing
81.5% of the pool.

Pool Concentration: The pool is extremely concentrated, with the
largest loan representing 73.4% of the pool balance, which is also
considered a Fitch loan of concern.  Should this loan default,
interest shortfalls would likely impact all of the rated classes.
The pool is also concentrated by property quality, as most of the
collateral is considered class B/C, and property type, with loans
representing 7.4% of the pool backed by single-tenant properties.

Vacant Properties: Two loans, representing 73.9% of the pool, are
backed by properties that are completely or nearly vacant.  The
largest loan, 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue is secured by an office
property that is 13.5% occupied following the departure of two
major tenants in the last year.  The second loan is secured by an
industrial property that became completely vacant after the sole
tenant's lease expired in May 2016.  Although both of these loans
have been flagged for the watchlist, there are no servicer comments
available.

Single-tenant Properties: Three loans, representing 7.4% of the
pool, are secured by single-tenant assets.  The largest of these is
a retail property located in Provo, Utah.  The sole tenant is Bed,
Bath & Beyond, with a lease expiration that is concurrent with the
loan's scheduled maturity in 2018.  The property is well located in
a heavily trafficked retail node and is shadow-anchored by many
national retailers.  The tenant has three five-year extension
options remaining.  The next largest single-tenant property is
occupied by Walgreens on a long-term lease that extends beyond loan
maturity.  The final single-tenant property backs a loan that is
fully amortizing.

Low Leverage: Including the largest loan, six loans representing
76.4% of the pool are fully amortizing.  The pool's current
weighted-average debt yield is 34.7%.  Excluding the largest loan,
which Fitch has modeled as a term default given the vacancy
concerns and extended amortization timeline, Fitch's stressed
loan-to-value (LTV) for the pool is 37.5%.  There is also one
defeased loan, representing 9.6% of the pool.

The largest loan (73.4% of the pool) is 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue,
which is secured by an office building located a few blocks from
the White House in Washington, D.C. Covington & Burling, previously
the largest tenant, vacated in 2015 ahead of its August 2016 lease
expiration.  The most recent rent roll, dated June 2016, indicates
several leases in addition to Covington & Burling have expired,
totalling 60.2% of the net rentable area (NRA).  This results in an
occupancy of 13.5%.  The East End submarket reported an average
vacancy rate of 10.6% for office space as of 3Q16, according to
Reis.  Although the subject is nearly vacant, it is well located on
Pennsylvania Avenue between 12th and 13th Streets.  The loan's
leverage point is low given the location, at $58.40 per square
foot, and the debt is fully amortizing.  The loan is not scheduled
to mature until April 2023.  Fitch requested updated leasing
information from the master servicer; however, never received a
response.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for class J has been revised to Stable from
Positive.  The class is partially covered by defeasance and is well
protected from projected loss.  However, there is very little
information available for 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, which
represents 73.4% of the pool and is secured by a property which is
13.5% occupied.  Given this, Fitch applied additional stresses
which resulted in a conservative recoverability view.  Should this
loan default, Fitch's projected loss estimates would increase and
interest shortfalls would likely impact the senior most class.
Therefore, a rating cap of 'A' was applied.  The Rating Outlook for
class L has been revised to Negative from Stable to reflect this
sensitivity.  It is possible that class K could also be downgraded
under such a scenario, while a future upgrade is unlikely given the
propensity for interest shortfalls should a default occur.  The
pool is highly concentrated with 10 loans remaining, and the
remaining collateral is of lower quality. Downgrades would be
possible if any of the outstanding loans are not able to refinance
or if they default prior to maturity.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and assigned Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $6.8 million class J at 'Asf', Outlook revised to Stable
      from Positive;
   -- $8 million class K at 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.9 million class L at 'BBsf', Outlook revised to Negative

      from Stable;
   -- $4.1 million class M at 'Dsf', RE 100%.

The class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, F, G and H certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the class N certificate.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificate.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ6: Moody's Hikes Class N Notes Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on three classes and
upgraded the ratings on six classes in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-IQ6 as follows:

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. L, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. M, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. N, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Affirmed B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 26, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, Class H and Classes J through N
were upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support
resulting from loan paydowns and amortization, as well as an
increase in defeasance. The deal has paid down 16% since Moody's
last review and four loans are defeased, representing 35% of the
pool balance. Additionally, 58% of the pool have investment grade
structured credit assessments.

The rating on the P&I class, Class G was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1 was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-Y was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced loans.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Our ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.9%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the October 17, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $28 million
from $997.8 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 53% of the pool. Seven loans, constituting 58% of the pool,
have investment-grade structured credit assessments. Four loans,
constituting 35% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Four loans, constituting 2% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 55%). There are no loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 79% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 35% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 19.7%, compared
to 21.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.42X and 9.71X,
respectively, compared to 1.28X and 6.47X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 3 Times
Square Loan ($14.7 million -- 52.5% of the pool), which represents
a pari-passu interest in a $71 million A-Note. The loan is
collateralized by the sponsor's leasehold interest in an 880,000
square foot (SF) Class A office tower located in the Times Square
district of Midtown Manhattan. The largest tenant, Thomson Reuters
Corporation, leases 72% of the property's net rentable area (NRA)
through November 2021. The loan is fully amortizing and matures in
October 2021. Moody's current structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 5.83X, the same as at the prior
review.

The remaining six structured credit assessments ($1.7 million --
5.8% of the pool) are associated with multifamily housing
cooperative loans. The current loan exposure is $8,299 per unit.
Moody's current structured credit assessment for these loans is aaa
(sca.pd).

The top three conduit loans represent 5.3% of the pool balance. All
top three conduit loans have amortized at least 49% since
securitization. Moody's LTV for the top three conduit loans ranges
from 12% to 35%. All of the non-defeased performing loans have a
debt yield in excess of 30% based on the most recent annual net
operating income.


NEWSTAR COMMERCIAL 2007-1: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class C and D notes
from NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1, a U.S. middle-market
collateralized loan obligation transaction (CLO) that closed in
June 2007 and is managed by NewStar Financial Inc.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B and E notes from the
same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Sept. 30, 2016, trustee report. The
rating actions also take into account the updated recovery rate
tables in S&P's Corporate Cash Flow and Synthetic Criteria.

The transaction has been in sequential distribution mode since 2009
when a downgrade event occurred on the outstanding notes.  As such,
principal proceeds are paid out to the outstanding note balances
sequentially, with the class A-1 and A-2 notes receiving principal
proceeds pro rata and the class B, C, D, and E notes receiving
principal proceeds sequentially on each distribution date.

S&P also notes that the most recent payment date report, dated Aug.
30, 2016, indicated the class E notes experienced an interest
deferral, as the interest proceeds available after paying the class
D interest were used to pay down the senior note principal as per
the transaction's payment priority.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $87.84 million in collective
paydowns to the notes since our October 2015 rating actions.  These
paydowns have led to increased overcollateralization available to
the notes.

The affirmation of S&P's rating on the class B notes reflects its
view of the credit support available at the tranches' current
rating levels.

Although S&P's cashflows indicated a higher rating for the class E
notes, it affirmed its rating at the current 'B+ (sf)' level
because the class is currently deferring its interest and the
concentration risk of the portfolio is increasing due to
amortization of the portfolio.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  In S&P's
opinion, the results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated that
all of the rated outstanding classes have an adequate credit
enhancement available at the rating levels associated with these
rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether the ratings assigned to the
notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to
support them, and will take rating actions as S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1
                    Rating
Class         To             From
C             AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
D             A+ (sf)        BBB+ (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

NewStar Commercial Loan Trust 2007-1
Class         Rating

B             AAA (sf)
E             B+ (sf)


NORTHSTAR 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to the notes issued by NorthStar 2016-1:

   -- Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
   
   -- Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Class A, Class B and Class C notes address
the expected loss posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

NorthStar 2016-1 is a static cash flow commercial real estate
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CLO). The issued notes are
collateralized by a pool of 13 commercial real estate loan
interests, with $284.2 million in total par amount (including $13.8
million of future funding related to five loan interests and senior
particpations to be held in a trust controlled reserve at closing),
in the form of whole loans and senior participations on 13
properties. The portfolio consists of 100% of floating rate
obligtions with a weighted average spread of 4.748%. The
transaction does not have a reinvestment option nor a ramp option,
and all of the assets will be fully identified as of the
transaction closing date.

The transaction closed on November 9, 2016.

NorthStar Income II Administration Agent, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company and an affiliate of NorthStar Income II, will
administer the CRE CLO. This is the administration agent's fifth
CRE CLO. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association will act as
servicer, and NS Servicing II, LLC will act as special servicer for
the life of the transaction.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CLO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average
recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
We have completed credit assessments for all of the collateral.
Moody's modeled a WARF of 4554.

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 3.9 years as of the closing date.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 56.8%.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 34.1% corresponding to a pair-wise
correlation of 35%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of rated notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. Rated notes
are particularly sensitive to changes in rating factor assumptions
of the underlying collateral. Holding all other key parameters
static, stressing the portfolio WARF to 5087 (approx. 12% change)
would result in no rating movement on the rated notes (e.g. one
notch down implies and a rating movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Stressing
the portfolio WARF to 5572 (approx. 22% change) would result in no
rating movement on the rated notes.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction, moderate job growth and the decreased cost of debt
and equity capital have aided this improvement. However, a
consistent upward trend will not be evident until the volume of
investment activity steadily increases for a significant period
across markets, additional non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession recide.



PALMER SQUARE 2016-3: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Palmer
Square Loan Funding 2016-3 Ltd./Palmer Square Loan Funding 2016-3
LLC's $186.00 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Nov. 10,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans.  The credit enhancement provided through the
      subordination of cash flows, excess spread, and
      overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral servicer's experienced management team.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square Loan Funding 2016-3 Ltd./Palmer Square Loan Funding
2016-3 LLC

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)
A-1                   AAA (sf)        136.00
A-2                   AA (sf)          18.40
B (deferrable)        A (sf)           16.90
C (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)         7.65
D (deferrable)        BB- (sf)          7.05
Subordinated notes    NR               16.60

NR--Not rated.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST CZN-1: Moody's Cuts Certs Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of the following certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust
Series CZN-1:

   -- $34,500,000 PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series CZN-1 Certificates,
      Downgraded to B1; previously on September 8, 2014 Downgraded

      to Ba3

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the change in the rating of 7.05%
Debentures due October 01, 2046 issued by Frontier Communications
Corporation ("Underlying Securities") which was downgraded to B1 on
November 7, 2016.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings will be sensitive to any change in the rating of the
7.05% Debentures due October 01, 2046 issued by Frontier
Communications Corporation.


RAIT 2014-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the rating of one Floating Rate Note (Note)
issued by RAIT 2014-FL3:

   -- Class B to AA (high) (sf) from AA (low) (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the ratings of the following Notes:


   -- Class A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

   -- Class X-1 at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class X-2 at BB (low) (sf)

Furthermore, DBRS has changed the trends on Classes B and C to
Positive from Stable. Trends on the remaining classes remain
Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece, Class G.

The rating upgrade and positive trend changes reflect the increased
credit support to the bonds as a result of successful loan
repayments and the improved performance outlook for a portion of
remaining loans in the pool.

At issuance, the transaction consisted of 21 interest-only,
floating-rate loans secured by 22 transitional properties. As of
the October 2016 remittance report, 11 loans remain in the pool
with a total outstanding trust balance of $115.8 million, as ten
loans have repaid from the trust, resulting in a collateral
reduction of 46.1%. Three of the remaining loans (Prospectus ID#2,
North Orange; Prospectus ID#3, Carolinas Distribution Center; and
Prospectus ID#7, Foster City Medical Pavilion), representing 52.3%
of the pool, have future funding commitments in junior
participation interests that are held outside of the trust and
cumulatively represent 11.6% of the fully funded amounts for those
loans. The servicer reports that those interests have been fully
funded for each loan.

As of the October 2016 remittance report, all loans in the pool are
current and there are no loans on the servicer’s watchlist. The
servicer’s calculated T-12 NOI figure ending June 30, 2016, for
the 11 remaining loans shows a weighted-average (WA) improvement of
30.3% over the DBRS underwritten initial in-place figures for those
loans at issuance. Occupancy as of the most recent rent rolls show
levels up or flat from issuance for all but two loans, with a WA
improvement of 4.2% for the pool. The two loans showing occupancy
declines represent 26.2% of the pool balance and show a range of
decline between -2.5% and -7.7% from the levels at issuance. DBRS
will highlight the larger of the two loans, the Carolinas
Distribution Center loan (20.6% of the pool), in detail further
below. The second loan displaying an occupancy decline since
issuance, the Maritime Square loan (Prospectus ID#12, 5.6% of the
pool), is secured by a 137,340 square foot (sf) Class B office
building located in Newport News, Virginia. Prior ownership
undertook a $1.5 million renovation from 2011 to 2012, and was able
to increase occupancy from roughly 50.0% to 70.0%; however,
occupancy fell to 60.9% as of November 2015 following Huntington
Ingalls’ choice to downsize by 14,000 sf (10.2% of the net
rentable area (NRA). As part of the borrower’s stabilization
plan, $1.8 million was funded into a tenant improvement/leasing
commission (TI/LC) reserve to lease the property to submarket
occupancy. As of Q3 2016, CoStar reported that Class B office
properties in the Downtown Newport News submarket were achieving an
average rental rate of $14.06 per square foot (psf) gross and an
average vacancy rate of 9.5%, compared to the subject properties’
rates of $10.48 psf gross and 35.9%, respectively, as of September
2016. As of October 10, 2016, approximately $1.7 million remained
in the borrower’s TI/LC reserve.

The largest loan in the pool, 20 North Orange (23.3% of the pool)
is secured by a 270,000 sf Class B office property located in
downtown Orlando, Florida. The trust loan financed the sponsor’s
acquisition of the property for a purchase price of $34.8 million.
Including reserves, the sponsor contributed $11.7 million in cash
equity to close with a stabilization plan that included investment
in capital improvements and enhanced marketing for the property to
boost leasing. At issuance, the property was approximately 25.5%
vacant, as compared with a submarket vacancy rate of 21.0% for
Class B properties in downtown Orlando, as reported by CoStar. The
September 2016 rent roll shows occupancy has increased slightly to
78.9%; however, according to CoStar, the property is 85.2% leased.
CoStar further reports a vacancy rate of 15.4% for Class B office
properties in the submarket as of Q3 2016. The servicer reports
that the property is behind in its timeline for completing property
improvements, which include an elevator modernization project,
exterior painting, roof-related repairs/replacements, HVAC upgrades
and bus duct repairs/replacements; however, the subject remains on
track to achieve a stabilized occupancy rate of 85.0% by year
three. The servicer’s reported NOI as of the T-12 ending June
2016 represents an improvement of 2.5% over the initial DBRS
underwritten NCF figure. The junior participation interest in the
amount of approximately $5.8 million has been fully funded,
according to the servicer as of November 2016.

The second-largest loan in the pool, Carolinas Distribution Center,
is secured by a 784,936 sf Class A distribution center located in
Clayton, North Carolina. Whole loan proceeds of $24.5 million were
used to refinance existing debt, return $120,600 of equity to the
borrower, cover closing costs and fund the $650,000 junior
participation interest, which is to be used exclusively for TI/LC
costs. The borrower currently retains $10.6 million cash equity
behind the transaction. At issuance, the property was approximately
37.5% vacant, as compared with the market vacancy rate of 15.1% for
industrial properties in the Johnston County market, as reported by
CoStar. The September 2016 rent roll shows occupancy has decreased
slightly to 60.6%, following the expected departure of Spacenet
Inc. (1.9% of the NRA) in June 2016. As of Q3 2016, Costar showed
an improved vacancy rate for industrial properties within the
Johnston County market of 5.0%. The three remaining tenants at the
property include Coca-Cola Bottling Company (29.7% of the NRA),
LB&B Associates (26.0% of the NRA) and Forward Air (4.8% of the
NRA), with lease expirations in April 2026, June 2021 and August
2017, respectively. The servicer’s reported NOI as of the T-12
ending June 2016 represents an improvement of 11.4% over the DBRS
underwritten NCF figure at issuance. The junior participation
interest in the amount of approximately $650,000 has been fully
funded, according to the servicer as of November 2016. DBRS is
awaiting information from the servicer regarding leasing challenges
and opportunities in the submarket, and whether the subject
competes favorably or unfavorably to its competition.


SHACKLETON I CLO: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-1-R,
B-2-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Shackleton I CLO Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that is managed by Alcentra NY
LLC and was originally issued in 2012.  S&P withdrew its ratings on
the original class A-1, B-1, B-2, C, and D notes following payment
in full on the Nov. 14, 2016, refinancing date. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its rating on the class E notes.

On the Nov. 14, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A-1, B-1, B-2, C, and D notes, as
outlined in the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption and assigned ratings to the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Shackleton I CLO Ltd.

Replacement class          Rating        Amount (mil $)
A-R                        AAA (sf)      201.22
B-1-R                      AA+ (sf)      17.00
B-2-R                      AA+ (sf)      25.00
C-R                        AA- (sf)      24.00
D-R                        BBB+ (sf)     21.00

RATING AFFIRMED

Shackleton I CLO Ltd.

Class          Rating        Amount (mil $)
E              BB (sf)       20.00    

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Shackleton I CLO Ltd.

                           Rating
Original class       To               From
A-1                  NR               AAA (sf)
B-1                  NR               AA (sf)
B-2                  NR               AA (sf)
C                    NR               A (sf)
D                    NR               BBB (sf)

OUTSTANDING RATING

Class          Rating      Amount (mil. $)
Income notes   NR          37.00

NR--Not rated.



SKOPOS AUTO 2015-2: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed Series 2015-2, Class A; Series 2015-2, Class
B; Series 2015-2, Class C; and Series 2015-2, Class D issued by
Skopos Auto Receivables Trust 2015-2 at A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (low)
(sf) and B (sf), respectively. Of these four outstanding publicly
rated classes, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS’s expected losses at their
current respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

   -- The transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form

      and sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
      origination, underwriting and servicing.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
      performance.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C4: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of UBS-Barclays
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C4 as follows:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (sf)

   -- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. As of the October 2016 remittance, the pool has
experienced a collateral reduction of 5.2% since issuance with 88
of the original 89 loans remaining. Based on the 92.4% of the pool
that reported YE2015 financials, the weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield was 2.00 times (x)
and 11.8%, respectively, compared with the DBRS underwritten WA
DSCR and debt yield of 1.90x and 10.7%, respectively. The Top 15
loans exhibited a WA net cash flow growth of 8.2% at YE2015 over
the DBRS underwritten figures with a WA DSCR of 2.01x. The
transaction also benefits from defeasance collateral as five loans,
representing 1.9% of the pool, are fully defeased. At issuance,
DBRS shadow rated the 1000 Harbor Boulevard loan (Prospectus ID#53;
0.5% of the pool) as investment grade. DBRS has today confirmed
that the performance of the loan remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.

As of the October 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and 16 loans on the servicer’s watchlist, representing
15.6% of the pool balance. Two loans in the Top 15 are watchlisted
because of the closure of Sports Authority stores; however, both
have replacement tenants in line to assume the spaces. Three loans
are on the servicer’s watchlist for non-performance related
issues limited to deferred maintenance. Ten other loans are
watchlisted for low occupancy or upcoming tenant rollover; however,
seven of these loans either (1) had tenants execute lease
extensions or (2) have secured a replacement tenant. In August
2016, Macy’s announced that it will be closing stores nationwide
because of declining sales. One loan in the Top 15, Visalia Mall
(5.35% of the pool balance), is anchored by Macy’s and is
discussed below.

The Visalia Mall loan (Prospectus ID#3; 5.35% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 437,954 square foot (sf) regional mall
located in Visalia, California, approximately 40 miles south of
Fresno and 80 miles north of Bakersfield. It is operated by General
Growth Partners, Inc. (GGP). The collateral includes the mall, two
out-parcel buildings and two parking structures. Although Visalia
Mall was not included in an initial list of Macy’s closures, an
August 2016 report suggested that it is included in a group of
malls that are at risk of closing because of below-average sales
reported by their respective Macy’s. According to the trailing 12
(T-12) month ending June 2016 tenant sales report (TSR) provided to
DBRS, Macy’s reported sales of $170.00 per square foot (psf),
which declined from $175.00 psf in the previous year.

As of YE2015, the subject reported a DSCR of 3.59x compared with
the YE2014 figure of 3.35x. According to the June 2016 rent roll,
total in-line occupancy was 90.5% and total property occupancy was
96.4% with tenant rollover limited to six tenants, representing
3.23% of the net rentable area (NRA), expiring in the next six
months. DBRS expects many of these tenants to renew their leases as
Visalia is very well located and the local demographic has limited
retail options. Although the mall is located in a tertiary-based
region, it benefits from its superior product and limited nearby
competition. According to the June 2016 site inspection, the mall
is considered to be the premier and dominant retail center serving
Tulare County. In addition, the nearest Macy’s is located 50
miles north in Fresno. The subject’s closest competitor is
Sequoia Mall, located two miles south of the subject and anchored
by Sears and a Regal Movie Theatre. The mall offers a different
tenant base and lacks the national retailers found at Visalia Mall.
According to CoStar, the Southwest Visalia submarket of California
reports an average triple-net (NNN) rental rate of $13.87 psf with
an average vacancy and availability rate of 9.2% and 9.8%,
respectively. According to the T-12 ending June 2016 TSR, overall
sales at the property have been trending up since last year. Total
in-line tenant year-to-date (YTD) sales have increased by 9.8% over
the previous year, reporting a running 12-month (R-12) sales psf of
$495.00 compared with the previous year’s figure of $474.00 psf.
Although the servicer has confirmed that Macy’s at Visalia Mall
will not be closing, DBRS modelled this loan more conservatively
because of the uncertainty surrounding Macy’s future as it plans
to announce additional mall closures by Q1 2017. Based on issuance
data, there are no co-tenancy clauses associated with Macy’s
specifically if they vacate the subject.

The Newgate Mall loan (Prospectus ID#6; 4.2% of the current pool
balance) is secured by a 497,962 sf portion of a 730,781 sf
single-level regional mall located in Ogden, Utah, approximately 35
miles from the Salt Lake City central business district. The
property is anchored by a Sears, a 14-screen Cinemark Theatre and a
non-collateral Dillard’s. In August 2016, a New York-based
commercial real estate firm, Time Equities Inc. (TEI), assumed the
remaining $58.0 million loan from GGP for a sale price of $69.5
million compared with the issuance appraised value of $83.0
million. TEI is a full-service real estate firm with a portfolio of
22.1 million sf of residential, industrial, office and retail space
in 25 states, four Canadian provinces and Germany.

This loan was placed on the servicer's watchlist after Sports
Authority filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and declared the closure of
all of its stores nationwide. According to the servicer, the
borrower has been in active negotiations with DownEast Home and
Clothing to assume the Sports Authority space and the tenant is
slated to open in Fall 2016. Although the tenant appears to have
come to an agreement with property management, finalized rates and
terms were not available at the time of DBRS's review. As of
YE2015, the loan reports a strong DSCR of 3.08x compared with 3.03x
at YE2014. According to the T-12 ending December 2015 TSR, total
in-line tenant YTD sales had decreased by -5.1% compared with the
previous year. The R-12 sales figure was $333.00 psf compared with
$348.00 psf in the previous year. According to the March 2016 rent
roll, in-line occupancy was 83.9% and total property occupancy was
90.5% with tenant rollover limited to six tenants, representing
1.5% of the NRA, set to expire in the next six months. The
subject's largest tenant, Sears (30% of the NRA), had an original
lease expiry in July 2016, but had extended to July 2021 at the
same rate. According to CoStar, the Davis/Weber submarket of Ogden
reported an average NNN rental rate of $12.82 psf with an average
vacancy and availability rate of 5.5% and 8.3%, respectively.
According to the May 2016 site inspection, the subject benefits
from limited competition in the immediate vicinity with its two
closest direct competitors, Layton Hills Mall and City Creek Mall,
located ten miles and 35 miles away, respectively.

Although loan performance remains strong since issuance, DBRS
modelled this loan with a stressed cash flow to account for the
uncertainty surrounding the future of the subject mall as it
continues to fill vacancies and transitions from one of the largest
operators in the country to new, much less experienced management.


The ratings assigned to Class B, C, D, E and F materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative model that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology; in this case, the sustainability of loan
performance trends were not demonstrated and, as such, was
reflected in the ratings.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Fitch Raises Rating on Cl. E Debt to Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three and affirmed 12 classes of
Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-C25 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades and affirmation to the senior four classes reflect
increasing credit enhancement and expectation of further pay down.
A real estate owned (REO) asset was reportedly liquidated by the
special servicer for $28.9 million in late October.

As of the October 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 93% to $193.4 million from
$2.86 billion at issuance.  The transaction is under collateralized
by approximately $5 million.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes F through S.

Concentration and Adverse Selection: Although the transaction has
experienced significant pay down, the pool is extremely
concentrated with only nine loans or REO assets remaining; seven of
which are currently in special servicing (81% of remaining
collateral).  The largest loan, which is currently in special
servicing, accounts for 33.7% of the total pool balance.

Modeled Losses: Fitch modeled losses of 40.8% of the remaining
pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total 7.9%,
including $225.8 million (5.1% of the original pool balance) in
realized losses to date. There have been no realized losses since
the last rating action.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Eight of the nine remaining loans/REO
assets are considered Fitch Loans of Concern (98.5% of the
remaining collateral), including the seven specially serviced
assets.

The largest contributor to modeled losses is the Hercules Plaza
loan (33.7% of the pool), which was re-transferred to special
servicing in July 2016 due to imminent monetary default.  The loan
is secured by a 517,000 sf office property located in Wilmington,
DE.  As of the October 2016 rent roll, the property was 55%
occupied after the largest tenant vacated the property at its lease
expiration in May 2016.  Property cash flow is insufficient to
cover debt service and operating expenses each month, and
shortfalls have been funded from reserves.  The special servicer is
evaluating potential modification structures.  The loan was
previously modified by the special servicer in 2014, at which time
the loan was extended two years through 2018.

The next largest contributor to modeled losses is the Quantum
Buildings A/B loan (12.3% of the pool), which transferred to
special servicing in February 2016 due to maturity default.  The
loan collateral consists of two office buildings totaling 284,163
sf, which are located in Colorado Springs, CO.  Per the servicer
reporting, the buildings are 100% and 53% leased to a single
tenant, whose lease expires in 2021.  A significant portion of the
space is dark.  The rent payments are current and a hard lockbox is
in place.  The Special Servicer is proceeding with enforcing the
rights and remedies under the loan documents.

The adjacent Quantum Building C loan (4.1% of the pool) is also in
special servicing for maturity default.  The 122,000 sf property is
currently 10% occupied by one tenant.  However, a new lease is
expected to be executed which will increase occupancy to 35%.  The
Special Servicer is also proceeding with enforcing the rights and
remedies under the loan documents for this loan.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes B through E reflect the class's
sufficient credit enhancement and expectation of continued pay
down.  Class B is expected to be paid in full at the next
distribution date.  Upgrades to classes C through E may be limited
due to the increasing concentration of the pool and the potential
for future interest shortfalls.  The distressed classes (those
rated below 'Bsf') may be subject to further downgrades as
additional losses are realized.

Fitch has upgraded these ratings:

   -- $1.7 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- $35.8 million class C to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17.9 million class E to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
      assigned;

Fitch has affirmed these classes as indicated:

   -- $32.2 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.2 million class F at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
   -- $32.2 million class G at 'CCsf'; RE 10%.
   -- $32.2 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $14.2 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-PB1, A-PB2, A-4, A-5.  A-1A, A-M and A-J
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class IO certificates.  Fitch does not
rate the class S certificates.


[*] Moody's Hikes Ratings on 8 Tranches From 2 Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 8 tranches from
two transaction backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued
by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series  
   2007-OA4

   -- Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-4XS

   -- Cl. 1-A4A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A4B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec
      17, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. 1-A5A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug
      11, 2010 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. 1-A5B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2010
      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 3-A5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec
      17, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. 3-M1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015
      Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Today's rating actions on Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust
2005-4XS classes 1-A4A, 1-A4B, 1-A5A and 1-A5B are primarily based
on the correction of errors in the cash-flow model used by Moody's
in rating this transaction. In prior rating actions, the loss was
incorrectly allocated based on realized loss percentage and the
waterfall did not include payment of senior deferred amount to
seniors. The model has now been corrected to allocate loss on
senior tranches based on UC loss percentage, and the payment of
senior deferred amount to seniors has been added to the waterfall.
Today's upgrade actions on the bonds reflect these changes, as well
as the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's
updated loss expectation on the pools.

The rating actions on other bonds are a result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated
loss expectation on the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of
the increase in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in Oct 2016 from 5.0% in Oct
2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Says 66 Cert. Classes From 47 RMBS Transactions in Default
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on 66 classes of mortgage
pass-through certificates from 47 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions issued between 2001 and 2007 to 'D
(sf)'.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate mixed collateral mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.  The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the
principal writedowns' impact on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  All but one of the classes were rated either
'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' before the rating action.  Class B-1 from
Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2002-A13 was previously
rated 'B- (sf)'.

Further, S&P lowered its rating on class 4-A-1, a senior
principal-only (PO) class from Banc of America Funding 2007-4
Trust, to 'D (sf)'.  Senior PO classes receive principal and are
allocated losses the same as all other senior certificates as
determined by their position in the waterfall.

The 66 defaulted classes consist of these:

   -- 24 from prime jumbo transactions (36.36 %);
   -- 15 from subprime transactions (22.73%);
   -- 11 from alternative-A transactions (16.67 %);
   -- 10 from negative amortization transactions (15.15%);
   -- Five from Federal Housing Administration/Veteran Affairs
      transactions 7.58%); and
   -- One from a reperforming transaction (1.52%).

All of the transactions in this review receive credit enhancement
from a combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable).

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal writedowns, and S&P will take rating actions
as it considers appropriate according to its criteria.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/1756178



                            *********

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