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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, December 18, 2016, Vol. 20, No. 352

                            Headlines

ACCESS GROUP TRUST: Fitch Cuts Subordinated Notes Rating to 'CCsf'
AJAX TWO: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class C Notes
ALM VII (R)-2: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class D-R Notes
ANSONIA CDO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class A-FL Notes
ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class E Notes

BANC OF AMERICA 2005-6: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. G Debt to Ba3
BARINGS CLO 2016-III: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
BATTALION CLO X: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. M Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: Fitch Affirms CC Ratings on 2 Tranches

BRISTOL PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
CALLIDUS ABL 2016-1: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Loans
CANYON CAPITAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba2
CARLYLE CLO 2016-4: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
CHL MORTGAGE 2004-4: Moody's Confirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. A-4 Debt

COLONY MORTGAGE 2014-FL1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to BB+
COLT 2016-3: Moody's Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class B-1 Certs
COLT MORTGAGE 2016-3: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. B-2 Certs 'Bsf'
COMM 2005-FL11: Moody's Cuts Class X-3-DB Debt Rating to C
CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C2: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Cert. Classes to D

CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C3: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Caa3
CREDIT SUISSE 2016-NXSR: Fitch to Rate 2 Class F Certs 'B-sf'
CSFB COMMERCIAL 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. F Certs
CSFB MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on A-X Notes
CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class H Notes

CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Ratings on 2 Tranches
CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 7 Tranches
FIRST UNION-LEHMAN: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class IO Notes
FORTRESS CREDIT III: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
GERMAN AMERICAN 2016-COR1: Fitch Gives BB-sf Rating on 2 Tranches

GS MORTGAGE 2012-GC6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
GTP CELLULAR 2012-2: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Class C Notes
HONOR AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on C Notes
IMSCI 2013-4: DBRS' BB Rating on Class G Certs Still on Review
IMSCI 2014-5: DBRS' B Rating on Class G Certs Still on Review

JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC11: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certs
JP MORGAN 2005-LDP5: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class F Notes
JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class F Notes
JP MORGAN 2016-ASH: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Certs
LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. IO Notes

LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B-
MIDOCEAN CREDIT I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-5: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on AJ Notes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. AM Debt
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-8: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on 8 Tranches

MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ10: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on A-J Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: Moody's Lowers Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba2
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C4: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C4: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS12: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates 'B-sf'

MORTGAGE CAPITAL 1998-MC2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on X Debt
MOUNTAIN VIEW 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class E Notes 'Ba3'
NCSLT: Moody's Puts on Review 12 Classes in 9 Securitizations
NELNET STUDENT 2005-4: Fitch Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to BBsf
NELNET STUDENT 2006-2: Fitch Cuts Cl. B Debt Rating to 'BBsf'

OHA CREDIT: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
OHA LOAN 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
PRIMA CAPITAL 2016-MRND: Moody's Rates Class 1-A2 Certs 'B1'
SASCO 2007-BHC1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class A-1 Notes
SELKIRK 2013-1: DBRS Hikes Class E Notes Rating to 'BB'

SELKIRK 2013-2: DBRS Hikes Class F Notes Rating to 'BB'
SELKIRK 2014-3A: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
SELKIRK 2014-3V: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
SPRINGLEAF FUNDING 2016-A: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Class D Notes
SPRINGLEAF FUNDING 2016-A: Moody's Rates Class C Notes 'Ba2'

TICP CLO VI 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
VNDO TRUST 2016-350P: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on Class E Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-P2: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
WELLS FARGO 2016-LC25: Moody’s Assigns BB Rating on Class F Notes
[*] Moody's Hikes Rating on $325MM of Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS Deals

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $64MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $64MM of Alt-A RMBS Loans Issued 2004
[*] S&P Completes Review of 34 Classes From 6 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 92 Classes From 14 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 10K+ Classes From 3,209 RMBS Deals


                            *********

ACCESS GROUP TRUST: Fitch Cuts Subordinated Notes Rating to 'CCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the senior notes of the Access Group,
Inc. 2002 Indenture of Trust to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf' and the
subordinate notes to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'. The senior notes are
assigned a Stable Outlook and removed from Rating Watch Negative. A
recovery estimate of 10% is assigned to all class B notes.

The class A notes pass the Credit stress but fails the Maturity
stress. Although the trust is under-collateralized, it is
performing as expected from a credit perspective; however, over 60%
of the notes are auction rate notes paying interest at the maximum
auction rate which impacts liquidity. In addition, in scenarios of
high interest rates, there is insufficient cash to make interest
payments due to the timing mismatch between quarterly SAP payments
and monthly note interest payments. Over time, the capitalized
interest fund is insufficient to cover such mismatch. The notes
however are paid in full by their final maturity date.

The class B notes fail both the Credit and Maturity stress
scenarios with principal shortfalls and are not paid in full by the
final maturity date in most Fitch cash flow scenarios. Fitch
calculates Recovery Estimates (REs) for distressed structured
finance securities of 'CCCsf' or lower. REs reflect remaining
recoveries expected to be received by the security and applied as
principal proceeds from the point that the RE is calculated until
legal final maturity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral is comprised of 100% of
Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans. The credit
quality of the trust collateral is high, in Fitch's opinion, based
on the guarantees provided by the transaction's eligible guarantors
and at least 97% reinsurance of principal and accrued interest
provided by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The current U.S.
sovereign rating is at 'AAA' with a Stable Outlook.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
8% and a 24% default rate under the AAA credit stress scenario. The
claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.25% for the base case and 2%
for the 'AAAsf' case. Fitch applies the standard default timing
curve in its credit stress cash flow analysis. Trailing 12 month
average constant default rate, utilized in the maturity stresses,
is 5.35%. Trailing 12 month levels of deferment, forbearance, IBR
(before adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 2%, 2.5%, 3.5% and 3.7% respectively which are
used as the starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modelled as per criteria.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement is provided by excess spread
and overcollateralization. Additionally the class A notes benefit
from subordination provided by the class B notes. As of October
2016, the senior and total parity levels are 107.07% and 98.10%,
respectively. No cash is currently being released from the trust
given the trust has not reached its release level threshold of 101%
total parity. Liquidity support is provided by a capitalized
interest fund where the balance is determined as the greater of
0.25% of the outstanding notes and $2,862,081 (0.15% of the
original total note balance).

Maturity Risk: Fitch's Student Loan ABS (SLABS) cash flow model
indicates that all class A notes are paid in full prior to the
legal final maturity dates under all rating scenarios, but ratings
are constrained from a liquidity perspective. The class B notes do
not pay off before their maturity date in most modelling scenarios,
including the base cases. If the breach of the senior classes'
maturity date triggers an event of default, interest payments will
be diverted away from the class B notes, causing the subordinate
notes to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day to day servicing is provided by Xerox
Education Services. Fitch considers Xerox to be an acceptable
servicer of FFELP loans due to its long servicing history.

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated July 18, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of eligible investments for this
deal does not include Fitch's rating for debt instruments with a
term of one year or less. This represents a criteria variation.
Fitch doesn't believe such variation has a measurable impact upon
the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

   -- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'BBsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

   -- CPR increase 100%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'CCCsf'

   -- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

   -- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch takes the following rating actions:

Access Group, Inc. 2002 Indenture of Trust:

   Senior Notes

   -- 2002-1 A-3 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2002-1 A-4 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2003-1 A-3 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2003-1 A-4 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;
    
   -- 2003-1 A-5 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2003-1 A-6 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2004-1 A-2 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2004-1 A-3 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from  
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2004-1 A-4 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook;

   -- 2004-1 A-5 downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook.

   Subordinate Notes

   -- 2002-1 B downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 10%;

   -- 2003-1 B downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 10%;

   -- 2004-1 B downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'B-sf'; RE 10%


AJAX TWO: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of the following
notes issued by Ajax Two Limited:

   -- Class C Floating Rate Notes, Due 2032, Affirmed Caa3 (sf);
      previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing rating. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

Ajax Two Limited is a static cash transaction wholly backed by a
portfolio of: i) asset backed securities (ABS), primarily in the
form of aircraft ABS, (64.3% of collateral pool balance); and ii)
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (35.7%). As of the
trustee's October 31, 2016 report, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction has decreased to $22.4 million from $383.9 million
at issuance, with the paydown directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes, as a result of the combination of
regular amortization, recoveries on defaulted and high credit risk
assets, and interest proceeds re-diverted as principal due to
failure of certain par value tests.

The pool contains ten assets totaling $18.1 million (100.0% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's October 31, 2016 report. Eight of these assets
(64.3% of the defaulted balance) are ABS; and two (35.7%) are CMBS.
Moody's does expect moderate/significant losses to occur from these
defaulted securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9777,
compared to 9783 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Caa1-Ca/C and 100.0%, the same as at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.2 years, compared to 2.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying ABS and CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying collateral and assessments.
Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by +10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ALM VII (R)-2: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class D-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-X, A-1-R,
A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from ALM VII(R)-2 Ltd.,
a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2013
that is managed by Apollo Credit Management (CLO) LLC.  S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E
notes following payment in full on the Dec. 2, 2016, refinancing
date.

On the Dec. 2, 2016 refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-X, A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuance were
used to redeem the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions. Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and assigned ratings to the replacement notes.

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

   -- The replacement class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes
      were issued at higher spreads than the corresponding
      original notes.  Class A-X is a new floating-rate tranche
      issued at three-month LIBOR plus 1.25%.

   -- The reinvestment period and the stated maturity were
      extended to July 2021 and October 2027, respectively.

   -- The overcollateralization levels were amended.  The
      transaction incorporates the formula version of Standard &
      Poor's CDO Monitor tool.  The transaction incorporates the
      recovery rate methodology and updated industry
      classifications as outlined in S&P's August 2016 CLO
      criteria update.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ALM VII(R)-2 Ltd./ALM VII(R)-2 LLC
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-X                  AAA (sf)       5.500
A-1-R                AAA (sf)     555.000
A-2-R                AA (sf)      108.000
B-R                  A (sf)        80.000
C-R                  BBB- (sf)     46.000
D-R                  BB- (sf)      42.000


RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ALM VII(R)-2 Ltd./ALM VII(R)-2 LLC
                           Rating
Original class       To              From
A-1                  NR              AAA (sf)
A-2                  NR              AA (sf)
B                    NR              A (sf)
C                    NR              BBB- (sf)
D                    NR              BB- (sf)
E                    NR              B (sf)

NR--Not rated.


ANSONIA CDO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class A-FL Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Ansonia CDO 2006-1 Ltd.:

   -- Cl. A-FL Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 20,
      2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-FX Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 20,
      2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. B Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. C Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. D Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. E Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. F Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. G Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- Cl. H Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

Ansonia CDO 2006-1 Ltd. is a static cash CRE CDO transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). As
of the October 28, 2016 payment date, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$594.4 million from $806.7 million at issuance, with the pay-down
now directed to the senior most outstanding classes of notes, as a
result of full and partial amortization of the underlying
collateral, and interest proceeds being reclassified as principal
proceeds on credit impaired securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5455,
compared to 5680 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's rated collateral and assessments for non-Moody's rated
collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 and 12.8% compared to 10.9% at
last review, A1-A3 and 1.9% compared to 0.0% at last review,
Baa1-Baa3 and 7.0% compared to 12.6% at last review, Ba1-Ba3 and
6.4% compared to 8.4% at last review, B1-B3 and 20.4% compared to
8.0% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 51.5% compared to 60.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.8 years, compared to 2.6 years at last
review The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, compared to 1.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 15.8%, compared to 11.3% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to a upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral
pool by 10.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated notes of zero notch upward (e.g., one notch up implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ARCAP 2003-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
note issued by ARCap 2003-1 Resecuritization Trust Collateralized
Debt Obligation Certificates, Series 2003-1. ("ARCap 2003-1"):

   -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Upgraded

      to A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 10, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the rating on one class of notes due to: (i)
improvement in the intra-rating distribution; primarily within the
investment grade rated assets; and (ii) forward looking
expectations on the amortization profile of the transaction. While
the overall credit profile of the transaction has decreased, as
evidenced by WARF, the expected amortization profile offsets this.
The affirmations are due to the key transaction metrics performing
within levels commensurate with existing ratings. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-REMIC)
transactions.

ARCap 2003-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS), primarily junior
positions, (100% of the pool balance) issued between 1999 and 2003.
As of the October 20, 2016 report, the aggregate note balance of
the transaction, including preferred shares, is $304.8 million,
compared to $414.4 million at issuance with the paydown directed to
the senior most outstanding class of notes, as a result of full and
partial amortization of the underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4989,
compared to 4039 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (23.5% compared to 4.5% at last
review); A1-A3 (0% compared to 14.7% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(11.3% compared to 11.6% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (1.0% compared to
15.9% at last review; B1-B3 (14.7% compared to 7.6% at last review;
and Caa1-Ca/C (49.5%, compared to 41.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.4 years, the same as that at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 9.2%, compared to 9.6% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings recovery rates of the underlying collateral and
credit assessments. Increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the
collateral pool by +5% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to two notches upward (e.g.,
one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


BANC OF AMERICA 2005-6: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. G Debt to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on four classes and downgraded the ratings on
two classes in Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-6 as:

  Cl. G, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Affirmed B1 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Affirmed

   Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Downgraded
   to C (sf)

  Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. XW, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 17, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the Class G was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization.  The deal has paid down 38% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the Classes H, K, L and M were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the Class J was downgraded due to realized and higher
anticipated losses from specially serviced loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class XW, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 57.9% of the
current balance, compared to 33.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 80% of the pool is in
special servicing.  In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data.  The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs.  Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class (es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class (es).

                      DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 8 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                          DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 10, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $125.0
million from $2.74 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
35% of the pool.  There are no loans on the master servicer's
watchlist.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $73.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 33%).  Five loans, constituting 80% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the One Old Country Road Loan ($43.8 million -- 35.0% of
the pool).  The loan is secured by a 320,400 square foot (SF)
suburban office property located in Carle Place Long Island, New
York.  The property serves as the headquarters for 1-800-Flowers.
The loan transferred to special servicing in November 2010 due to
imminent default.  A September 2015 appraisal valued the property
at $15.0 million and the servicer has recognized a $43.3 million
appraisal reduction on this loan.  The loan has been deemed
non-recoverable.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Flagstaff Mall
($37.0 million -- 29.6% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a
portion of a two-story 388,550 SF enclosed regional mall located in
Flagstaff, Arizona.  The loan collateral is 216,840 SF.  The
property serves as the major mall in Flagstaff.  Anchors at the
mall are Dillard's (not part of the collateral), JC Penny and Sears
(not part of the collateral).  The loan transferred to special
servicing in July 2015 due to imminent default and the borrower
failed to pay the loan off at the November 2015 maturity date.  The
property was 89% leased as of March 2016, the same as at last
review.  The property was included in the October 2016 General II
auction held on Oct. 19, 2016.

The third large st specially serviced loan is the 1301 Virginia
Drive Loan ($11.2 million -- 9.0% of the pool).  The loan is
secured by a four story 104,430 SF suburban Class B office building
located in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania.  The property is part of
a 2 million SF office park, with adjacent Pennsylvania Turnpike
access.  The loan transferred to special servicing in September
2015 due to imminent default and the borrower failed to pay the
loan off at the October 2015 maturity date.  The property was 60%
leased by two tenants, as of June 2016.  The special servicer was
the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale in October 2016.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by an office
and retail property.  Moody's estimates an aggregate
$72.4 million loss for the specially serviced loans (73% expected
loss on average).

As of the November 2016 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $12.8 million.  Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

The three remaining performing loans represent 20% of the pool
balance.  The largest performing loan is the California Culinary
Office Loan ($19.4 million -- 15.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 125,050 SF Class A Office property located in the Potrero Hill
District in San Francisco, California.  The property was 100%
leased as of June 2016, the same as at last review.  The largest
tenant is the California Culinary Academy, an affiliate of Le
Cordon Bleu College of Culinary Arts.  Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 66% and 1.64X, respectively, compared to 67% and 1.61X at
the last review.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and
a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The second largest performing loan is the Pacheco Park Loan ($4.4
million -- 3.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 46,500 SF
office park located in Santa Fe, New Mexico.  The property was 95%
leased as of September 2016, the same as at last review.  Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.39X, respectively, compared to
90% and 1.20X at the last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Greenbrier Village
Condominium Apartments Loan ($1.4 million -- 1.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 98 unit multifamily property located in
Elsmere, Delaware.  The property is located 13 miles west of
Wilmington, Delaware.  The property was 99% leased as of June 2016,
the same as at last review.  The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 65% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 31% and 3.19X, respectively, compared to 37% and 2.63X at the
last review.



BARINGS CLO 2016-III: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to five classes of notes
issued by Barings CLO Ltd. 2016-III (the "Issuer" or "Barings
2016-III").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$310,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$62,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2028 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aa1 (sf)

   -- US$42,325,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating
      Rate Notes due 2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are referred to herein as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Barings 2016-III is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments representing
principal proceeds, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is
approximately 84% ramped as of the closing date.

Barings LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $500,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 65

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.75%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B Notes: -4

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


BATTALION CLO X: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Battalion CLO X Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Battalion
CLO X").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$260,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$38,200,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$22,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$22,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Battalion CLO X is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 95.0% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
5.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of
the closing date.

Brigade Capital Management, LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.2 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3019

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3019 to 3472)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3019 to 3925)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: -1

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B Notes: -4

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR4: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. M Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and upgraded the ratings on three classes in Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR4, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-PWR4 as:

  Cl. E, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Affirmed
    Aaa (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Upgraded
   to Aaa (sf)

  Cl. J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. K, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Affirmed

   B1 (sf)

  Cl. L, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Affirmed

   Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to C (sf)

  Cl. X, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016, Downgraded
   to B2 (sf)

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes J, K and L were upgraded due to a
significant increase in defeasance as well as an increase in credit
support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.  The deal
has paid down 13% since last review and defeasance has increased to
93.4% of the current pool balance compared to 83% at the last
review.

The ratings on Classes E, F, G and H were at Aaa (sf) because these
classes are fully covered by defeased loans.  The rating on Class M
was affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected plus realized loss.  Class M has already experienced a 43%
realized loss as result of previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.7% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
anticipates minimal losses from the remaining collateral in the
current environment.  However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance.  Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.  Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
1.7% of the original pooled balance, compared to 1.8% at the last
review.  Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses
for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                           DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 14, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to
$51.3 million from $955.0 million at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by three remaining mortgage loans.
The largest loan, which is 93% of the pool, has defeased and is
secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 6% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet certain
portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance
Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of Moody's
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $16.5 million.  There are currently no
loans in special servicing.

The two remaining non-defeased loans represent 7% of the pool
balance.  The largest non-defeased loan is the Baring Village Loan
($3.0 million -- 5.9% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a
92,000 square foot (SF) retail property located in Sparks, Nevada,
approximately eight miles from downtown Reno.  The property was 87%
leased as of Sept. 2016, compared to 85% at the prior review. The
property's actual net cash flow DSCR has remained below 1.00X since
2010 and the loan is on the watchlist due to the low DSCR. The loan
is fully amortizing and has amortized 52% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.31X, respectively,
compared to 88% and 1.17X at the last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Don Wilson Office Building
Loan ($349,200 -- 0.7% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a
26,000 SF office property located in Torrance, California.  As of
December 2015, the property was 100% leased.  The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 77% since securitization.  Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 12% and >4.0X, respectively, compared to
14% and >4.0X at the last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: Fitch Affirms CC Ratings on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed 16 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (BSCMS)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-Top26.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of class A-M reflects higher modeled losses on both
the specially serviced loans, as well as several of the largest
loans remaining in the trust.  Fitch has affirmed classes A-4 and
A-1A based off high credit enhancement resulting from continued
paydown and the classes' position within the credit stack.
Additionally Fitch has affirmed distressed classes A-J through O,
as loss expectations for these classes have not improved.  Fitch
modeled losses of 16.64% on the remaining pool.  Expected losses on
the original pool balance total 16.54%, which is inclusive of
$81,369,502 (3.86% of the original balance) realized to date.

As of the November 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 47% to $1.2 billion from $2.1
billion at issuance.  Per servicer reporting, 13 loans are fully
defeased (11.5% of the current balance).  There are five loans (2%)
with the special servicer.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes E, F, J, K, L, N, O, and P.

Stable Performance: The pool has exhibited relatively stable
performance since last Fitch's last rating action with credit
enhancement levels for the top classes, A-4 and A-1A, increasing as
a result of 40 loans, totalling $202,840,641, repaying in full.

High Percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated 17
loans (26.9%) as Loans of Concern, including the five loans (2%)
that are currently with the special servicer.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern is the One AT&T Center loan
(10.1%), which is secured by a 1.46 million square foot (sf) office
building located in St. Louis, MO.  The property is fully-occupied
by AT&T (rated 'A-' by Fitch) through a triple-net (NNN) lease that
expires in September 2017.  Starting in 2013, several news sources
reported that AT&T intends to fully vacate the property upon their
lease expiration in September 2017 and has begun to move workers
out of the building.  According to the master servicer, AT&T has
not provided the borrower with any indication of whether or not
they will renew their lease.  The loan has an Anticipated Repayment
Date (ARD) of January 2017.  As of year-end 2015, the servicer
reported a net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) for the property of 2.64x.  Fitch will continue to monitor
the loan for leasing updates, as well as any decline in
performance.

The second largest Fitch Loan of Concern is the Viad Corporate
Center loan (5%), which is secured by a 474.424 sf office building
located in Phoenix, AZ.  Originally developed as the headquarters
for Viad Corp. in 1991, the property was converted to multi-tenant
use in 1998.  The largest tenants at the property include Dickinson
Wright PLLC, accounting for 9.6% of the net rentable area (NRA)
with a lease that expires in May 2026, Cavanagh Law Firm (8% of
NRA, expiry April 2026), and Stitson Morrison Hecker LLP (7% of
NRA, expiry September 2023).  The loan was previously modified in
May 2011, which included a $9 million write-down of principal.  Per
the December 2015 rent roll the property was 72% occupied, and the
servicer-reported NOI DSCR was 0.97x as of YE 2015.  As of the
third quarter of 2016, REIS reported a vacancy rate of 25.5% for
the Uptown submarket of Phoenix, AZ.  The borrower has not yet
provided the master servicer with an update with regard to
repayment.  The loan matured on Dec. 1, 2016.

Refinance Risk: There are 99 loans, comprising 70% of the pool's
current balance, that are scheduled to mature in the first quarter
of 2017.

Secondary and Tertiary Market Risk: Out of the top 15 loans, one
(2.7%) is secured by an asset located in a secondary market and
eight (30.2%) are located in tertiary markets.  Both the secondary
and tertiary markets exhibit high vacancy rates and minimal leasing
velocity.

High Percentage of Interest-Only Loans: Full term interest-only
loans account for 57.8% of the pool's current balance.

Office and Retail Concentrations: Of the remaining pool, 53.2% are
office loans and 24.1% are retail loans.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes A-4 and A-1A remain Stable.  The
Rating Outlook for class A-M remains Negative as further downgrades
are possible as the potential for outsized losses on the One AT&T
Center loan and the Viad Corporate Center loan are possible, as
their repayment is uncertain.  Further downgrades to the distressed
classes are likely as losses are realized.  Upgrades are not
likely.

   USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded this rating:

   -- $210.6 million class A-M to 'Asf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Negative.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $582.2 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $46.4 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $160.5 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE to 65% from 95%;
   -- $42.1 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $18.4 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $28.9 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $15.8 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $10.8 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 million class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB certificates have all paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch previously
withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


BRISTOL PARK: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Bristol Park CLO, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Bristol
Park").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$357,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$60,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   
      2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2  
      (sf)

   -- US$33,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      A2 (sf)

   -- US$33,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$23,375,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes

      due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Bristol Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is at least 90% ramped as of the closing
date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $550,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2824

-- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.8%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2824 to 3248)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2824 to 3671)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -4

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


CALLIDUS ABL 2016-1: DBRS Assigns BB Rating on Class E Loans
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following ratings to the loans
(collectively, the Series 2016-1 Loans) issued by Callidus ABL
Corporation (the Borrower):

   -- $51,250,000 Series 2016-1 Class A Loans due November 2021
      rated AAA (sf)

   -- $11,500,000 Series 2016-1 Class B Loans due November 2021
      rated AA (sf)

   -- $7,000,000 Series 2016-1 Class C Loans due November 2021
      rated A (sf)

   -- $5,250,000 Series 2016-1 Class D Loans due November 2021
      rated BBB (sf)

   -- $11,750,000 Series 2016-1 Class E Loans due November 2021
      rated BB (low) (sf)

The Series 2016-1 Loans were issued pursuant to the Loan Financing
and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2016, among
Callidus ABL Corporation, as Borrower; Callidus Capital
Corporation, as Equityholder and Collateral Manager; Deutsche Bank
Trust Company Americas, as Administrative Agent, Collateral
Custodian and Securities Intermediary; the Agents party there to;
and the Lenders from time to time party thereto.

Callidus ABL Corporation is a cash flow securitization, which will
be collateralized by a portfolio of middle market U.S. and Canadian
asset-backed corporate loans. The closing portfolio will include
collateral loans with an aggregate par balance of $125,000,000.
Callidus Capital Corporation will act as the Collateral Manager of
the Borrower. The Borrower is a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the Province of Ontario.

The ratings reflect the following:

   -- The Loan Financing and Servicing Agreement dated December 1,

      2016.

   -- The integrity of the transaction structure.

   -- DBRS’s assessment of the portfolio quality.

   -- Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected
      collateral loss rates under various cash flow stress
      scenarios.

   -- DBRS's assessment of the origination, servicing and
      collateralized loan obligation management capabilities of
      Callidus Capital Corporation.

To assess portfolio credit quality, DBRS provides a credit estimate
or internal assessment for each non-financial corporate obligor in
the portfolio, not rated by DBRS. Credit estimates are not ratings;
rather, they represent a primarily model-driven default probability
for each obligor that is used in assigning a rating to the
facility.

The DBRS ratings on the Series 2016-1 Class A Loans and the Series
2016-1 Class B Loans address the Borrower's ability to make timely
payments of interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before
the Maturity Date (as defined in the Loan Financing and Servicing
Agreement referred to above). The DBRS ratings on the Series 2016-1
Class C Loans, the Series 2016-1 Class D Loans and the Series
2016-1 Class E Loans address the Borrower’s ability to make
ultimate payments of interest and principal on or before the
Maturity Date.



CANYON CAPITAL 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Canyon Capital CLO 2006-1 Ltd.:

   -- $22,800,000 Class D Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,

      Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 18, 2015 Upgraded
      to Baa1 (sf)

   -- $13,300,000 Class E Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,

      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 18, 2015 Affirmed

      Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

   -- $226,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2020
      (current outstanding balance of $188,810,027), Affirmed Aaa
      (sf); previously on August 18, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- $40,000,0000 Class A-2 Senior Variable Funding Floating Rate

      Notes Due 2020 (current outstanding balance of $33,417,704),

      Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously August 18, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
      (sf)

   -- $15,200,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed
      Aaa (sf); previously on August 18, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- $22,800,000 Class C Floating Rate Deferrable Notes Due 2020,

      Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on August 18, 2015 Upgraded to

      Aa1 (sf)

Canyon Capital CLO 2006-1 Ltd., issued in August 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in September 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since November 2015. The Class
A-1 and A-2 notes have been collectively paid down by approximately
7.1% or $17.0 million since then. Based on the trustee's November
2016 report, the OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E notes are reported at 133.05%, 121.39%, 111.62% and
106.61%, respectively, versus November 2015 levels of 130.65%,
119.91%, 110.80% and 106.09%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

   -- Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
      uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy
      and b) the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade

      debt maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for
      issuers.

   -- Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected
      positively or negatively by a) the manager's investment
      strategy and behavior and b) differences in the legal
      interpretation of CLO documentation by different
      transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

   -- Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better

      credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
      collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current
      expectations, can lead to positive CLO performance.
      Conversely, a negative shift in credit quality or
      performance of the collateral can have adverse consequences
      for CLO performance.

   -- Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
      transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled
      principal proceeds will continue and at what pace.
      Deleveraging of the CLO could accelerate owing to high
      prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales

      by the manager, which could have a significant impact on the

      notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than Moody's

      current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
      CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment
      priority.

   -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market
      value of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those
      that Moody's assumes as having defaulted could result in
      volatility in the deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of
      recoveries and whether a manager decides to work out or sell

      defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Moody's
      analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
      market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
      potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher

      than assumed recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

   -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after
      the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
      liquidation risk on those assets. This risk is borne first
      by investors with the lowest priority in the capital
      structure. Moody's assumes that the terminal value of an
      asset upon liquidation at maturity will be equal to the
      lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on the
      extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
      liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

   -- Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
      the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which

      could lengthen owing to the manager's decision to reinvest
      into new issue loans or loans with longer maturities, or
      participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for

      a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in
      its analysis. Life extension can increase the default risk
      horizon and assumed cumulative default probability of CLO
      collateral.

   -- Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
      requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after
      the end of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager
      has the ability to erode some of the collateral quality
      metrics to the covenant levels. Such reinvestment could  
      affect the transaction either positively or negatively. In
      particular, Moody's tested for a possible extension of the
      actual weighted average life in its analysis given that the
      post-reinvestment period reinvesting criteria has loose
      restrictions on the weighted average life of the portfolio.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

   Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (1890)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: +1

   -- Class D: +2

   -- Class E: +1

   Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (2835)

   -- Class A-1: 0

   -- Class A-2: 0

   -- Class B: 0

   -- Class C: -2

   -- Class D: -2

   -- Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $316.8 million, defaulted par of $1.4
million, a weighted average default probability of 13.26% (implying
a WARF of 2362), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
50.91%, a diversity score of 40 and a weighted average spread of
2.97% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


CARLYLE CLO 2016-4: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned ratings to six classes of notes
issued by Carlyle US CLO 2016-4, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "Carlyle
2016-4").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$302,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$72,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aa1 (sf)

   -- US$25,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive
      Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$13,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate

      Notes due 2027 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating
      Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$27,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$20,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Carlyle 2016-4 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 74% ramped as
of the closing date.

Carlyle GMS CLO Management L.L.C. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.75 year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $500,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -1

   -- Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class A-1 Notes: 0

   -- Class A-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -4

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -4

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1


CHL MORTGAGE 2004-4: Moody's Confirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. A-4 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of one tranche
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by Countrywide.  The
tranche was placed on review for upgrade on July 22nd, 2016, due to
the distribution of funds related to the $8.5 billion settlement
regarding Countrywide's pre-crisis servicing practices and alleged
breaches of representations and warranties between Bank of America
N.A. parent of Countrywide, and Bank of New York Mellon as
trustee.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-4

  Cl. A-4, Current Rating A3 (sf); previously on April 1, 2015,
   Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  Cl. A-4, Underlying Rating: Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on

   July 22, 2016, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
   Upgrade

  Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Affirmed at A3,
   Outlook Stable on Aug 8, 2016)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action considers the recent performance of the
underlying pool and reflects Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pool together with the change in tranche level credit
enhancement.

The rating confirmation primarily reflects Moody's updated loss
expectation on the bond and related pool, and bond specific credit
enhancement in the transaction.

This action concludes the review of the bond, which was previously
placed on review for upgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


COLONY MORTGAGE 2014-FL1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B through E
floating-rate notes from Colony Mortgage Capital Series 2014-FL1
Ltd., a transaction secured by five commercial mortgage loans and
one real estate-owned (REO) asset.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its rating on the class A and F floating-rate notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, in which S&P re-evaluated the collateral securing the
transaction, and reviewed the deal structure and liquidity
available to the trust.

The raised ratings on classes B through E reflect the reduced pool
trust balance; S&P's expectation of the credit enhancement
available to the classes, which S&P believes is greater than its
estimates of credit enhancement necessary at the most recent rating
levels; and S&P's view of the current and future performance of the
remaining transaction’s collateral.

The affirmations reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of
the necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings,
and S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of the
performing loans and the ultimate resolution of the specially
serviced assets.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Nov. 1, 2016, trustee remittance report, with a payment
date as of Nov. 8, 2016, the trust consisted of five floating-rate
loans indexed to one-month LIBOR, and one REO asset backed by
transitional assets with an aggregate pooled trust asset balance of
$121.9 million, which is approximately 64% of the pool balance at
issuance.  The aggregate liability balance was $122.1 million due
to paid-in-kind on the income notes, and there were no losses to
date.

Excluding the specially serviced assets, S&P calculated an 0.97x
S&P Global Ratings' weighted average debt service coverage (DSC)
and 98.1% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average loan-to-value (LTV)
using a 8.69% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization
rate.  S&P's DSC is based on the maximum LIBOR rate, per each
loan's interest cap agreement, if applicable, including the
corresponding spread.

S&P based its analysis, in part, on a review of the borrower's
operating statements for the years ended Dec. 31, 2015, 2014, 2013,
and 2012.  In addition, S&P reviewed the available Smith Travel
Research (STR) reports for the lodging properties and the March
2016 and May 2016 rent rolls for the retail properties.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS:

As of the Nov. 1, 2016, trustee remittance report, two assets in
the pool ($23.3 million, 19.1%) were with the special servicer,
Colony AMC OPCO LLC (Colony AMC).  Details on the two assets are
discussed below:

   -- The Hyatt House loan is the largest asset with Colony AMC,
      and the fifth-largest asset in the pool, with a $12.0
      million (9.84%) pool trust balance and a $12.8 million
      reported total exposure.  The loan is secured by a first
      mortgage lien on the fee interest in a recently constructed,

      130-key, limited-service, extended-stay Hyatt House hotel
      located in  Minot, N.D.  The property was developed and
      completed in May 2013.  The loan transferred to special
      servicing on Jan. 25, 2016, due to imminent default as the
      cash management account contained insufficient funds to
      satisfy the  Jan. 1, 2016, debt service.  The reported DSC
      and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 0.79x and 68.9%,
      respectively.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
      $3.0 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P expects a

      moderate loss upon this asset's eventual resolution.

   -- Atrium Medical Offices' REO asset is the second-largest
      asset with Colony AMC and the sixth-largest asset in the
      pool, with an $11.3 million (9.27%) pool trust balance and a

      $11.9 million reported total exposure.  The asset is a
      medical office complex comprised of two, three-story
      buildings with a total of 102,705 sq. ft. located in
      Chattanooga, Tenn.  The loan was transferred to special
      servicing on Dec. 1, 2014, after the borrower provided a
      written notice of its inability to pay the loan payments.  
      Foreclosure sale was conducted, and the property became REO
      on Oct. 30, 2015.  A listing agreement was signed with
      Sperry Van Ness to openly market the asset for sale.  As of
      August 2016, the asset was approximately 42.3% occupied.  An

      ARA of $1.4 million is in effect against this asset.  S&P
      expects a significant loss (60% or greater) upon this
      asset's eventual resolution.

RATINGS LIST

Colony Mortgage Capital Series 2014-FL1 Ltd.
Floating-rate notes series 2014-FL1
                           Rating
Class      Identifier      To             From
A                          AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
B                          AAA (sf)       AA- (sf)
C          19624GAE0       A+ (sf)        A- (sf)
D                          BBB+ (sf)      BBB- (sf)
E          19624JAA2       BB+ (sf)       BB (sf)
F          19624JAC8       B (sf)         B (sf)



COLT 2016-3: Moody's Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class B-1 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-3 (the
Certificates) issued by COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust (the
Trust):

   -- $129.9 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- $26.8 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)

   -- $37.1 million Class A-3 at A (sf)

   -- $9.8 million Class M-1 at BBB (sf)

   -- $7.2 million Class B-1 at BB (sf)

   -- $7.1 million Class B-2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 42.45% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 30.60%, 14.15%, 9.80%, 6.60% and 3.45% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of fixed- and
adjustable-rate, prime and non-prime, first-lien residential
mortgages. The Certificates are backed by 474 loans with a total
principal balance of $225,745,589 as of the Cut-Off Date (December
1, 2016).

Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (Caliber) is the originator and servicer
for 71.2% of the portfolio. The Caliber mortgages were originated
under the following five programs:

   -- Jumbo Alternative (31.2%) – Generally made to borrowers
with
      unblemished credit who do not meet strict prime jumbo or
      agency/government guidelines. These loans may have interest-
      only (IO) features, higher debt-to-income (DTI) and loan-to-
      value (LTV) ratios, or lower credit scores as compared with
      those in traditional prime jumbo securitizations.

   -- Homeowner's Access (29.8%) – Made to borrowers who do not
      qualify for agency or prime jumbo mortgages for various
      reasons, such as loan size in excess of government limits,
      alternative or insufficient credit, or prior derogatory
      credit events that occurred more than two years prior to
      origination.

   -- Fresh Start (8.8%) – Made to borrowers with lower credit
and
      significant recent credit events within the past 24 months.

   -- Investor (1.3%) – Made to borrowers who finance investor
      properties where the mortgage loan would not meet agency or
      government guidelines because of such factors as property
      type, number of financed properties, lower borrower credit
      score or a seasoned credit event.

   -- Foreign National (0.2%) – Made to non-resident borrowers
      holding certain types of visas who may not have a credit
      score.

Sterling Bank and Trust, FSB (Sterling) is the originator and
servicer for 22.3% of the portfolio. The Sterling mortgages were
originated under Sterling's Advantage Home Ownership Program
(Advantage), which focuses on high-quality borrowers with clean
mortgage payment histories and substantial equity in their
properties who seek alternative income documentation products.
LendSure Mortgage Corp. (LendSure) originated approximately 6.5% of
the pool through its wholesale lending network, all of which is
serviced by Caliber.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will act as the Master
Servicer, Securities Administrator and Certificate Registrar. U.S.
Bank National Association will serve as Trustee.

Although the mortgage loans were originated to satisfy the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) ability-to-repay (ATR) rules,
they were made to borrowers who generally do not qualify for
agency, government or private-label, non-agency prime jumbo
products for the various reasons described above. In accordance
with the CFPB Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 0.7% of the loans are
designated as QM Safe Harbor, 31.1% as QM Rebuttable Presumption
and 61.7% as non-QM. Approximately 6.5% of the loans are not
subject to the QM rules.

The servicers will generally fund advances of delinquent principal
and interest on any mortgage until such loan becomes 180 days
delinquent, and they are obligated to make advances in respect of
taxes, insurance premiums and reasonable costs incurred in the
course of servicing and disposing of properties.

On or after the two-year anniversary of the Closing Date, the
Depositor has the option to purchase all of the outstanding
certificates at a price equal to the outstanding class balance plus
accrued and unpaid interest, including any cap carryover amounts.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure with a
pro rata principal distribution among the senior tranches.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Certificates as the outstanding senior Certificates are paid in
full.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include the
following:

   -- ATR Rules and Appendix Q Compliance: All of the mortgage
      loans were underwritten in accordance with the eight
      underwriting factors of the ATR rules. In addition,      
      Caliber's underwriting standards comply with the Standards
      for Determining Monthly Debt and Income as set forth in
      Appendix Q of Regulation Z with respect to income
      verification and the calculation of DTI ratios. All but one
      of the LendSure-originated loans are Appendix Q-compliant as

      well.

   -- Strong Underwriting Standards: Whether for prime or non-
      prime mortgages, underwriting standards have improved
      significantly from the pre-crisis era. The Caliber loans
      were underwritten to a full documentation standard with
      respect to verification of income (generally through two
      years of W-2s or tax returns), employment and asset.
      Generally, fully executed 4506-Ts are obtained, and tax  
      returns are verified with IRS transcripts if applicable.
      Although loans in the Sterling Advantage program were
      underwritten to limited documentation standards, borrowers
      are required to have strong credit profiles, substantial
      equity in their properties and generally no delinquencies in

      the past 12 months. The Sterling loans were all originated
      through the retail channel and have a weighted-average  
      original combined LTV (CLTV) of 61.7%.

   -- Robust Loan Attributes and Pool Composition:

      -- The mortgage loans in this portfolio generally have
         robust loan attributes as reflected in CLTV ratios,
         borrower household income and liquid reserves, including
         the loans in Homeowner's Access and Fresh Start, the two
         programs with weaker borrower credit.

      -- The pool contains low proportions of cash-out and
         investor properties.

      -- LTVs gradually reduce as the programs move down the
         credit spectrum, suggesting the consideration of
         compensating factors for riskier pools.

      -- The pool comprises 25.7% fixed-rate mortgages, which have

         the lowest default risk due to the stability of monthly
         payments. The pool comprises 68.5% hybrid adjustable-rate

         mortgages (ARMs) with an initial fixed period of five to
         seven years, allowing borrowers sufficient time to credit

         cure before rates reset. Only 5.8% of the pool are hybrid

         ARMs with an initial fixed period of three years.

   -- Satisfactory Third-Party Due Diligence Review: A third-party

      due diligence firm conducted property valuation, credit and
      compliance reviews on 100.0% of the loans in the pool. Data
      integrity checks were also performed on the pool.

   -- Satisfactory Loan Performance to Date (Albeit Short): Of the

      approximately 1,621 mortgages originated to date, only 32
      were ever 30 days delinquent, which generally self-cured
      shortly after. Four loans have been 60 days delinquent, and
      two loans have been 90 days delinquent. Sterling's Advantage

      portfolio has experienced no delinquencies since October
      2011, and Sterling's servicing portfolio maintains low
      delinquency rates of 0.06% as of October 2016. In addition,
      voluntary prepayment rates have been relatively high, as
      these borrowers tend to credit cure and refinance into
      lower-cost mortgages.

The transaction also includes the following challenges and
mitigating factors:

   -- Representations and Warranties (R&W) Framework and Provider:

      The R&W framework is considerably weaker compared with that
      of a post-crisis prime jumbo securitization. Instead of an
      automatic review when a loan becomes seriously delinquent,
      this transaction employs an optional review only when
      realized losses occur (unless the alleged breach relates to
      an ATR or TRID violation). In addition, rather than engaging

      a third-party due diligence firm to perform the R&W review,
      the Controlling Holder (initially the Sponsor or a majority-
      owned affiliate of the Sponsor) has the option to perform
      the review in house or use a third-party reviewer. Finally,
      the R&W providers (the originators) are unrated entities,
      have limited performance history of non-prime, non-QM
      securitizations and may potentially experience financial
      stress that could result in the inability to fulfill
      repurchase obligations. DBRS notes the following mitigating
      factors:

      -- The holders of Certificates representing 25.0% interest
         in the Certificates may direct the Trustee to commence a
         separate review of the related mortgage loan, to the
         extent that they disagree with the Controlling Holder's
         determination of a breach.

      -- Third-party due diligence was conducted on 100.0% of the
         loans included in the pool. A comprehensive due diligence

         review mitigates the risk of future R&W violations.

      -- DBRS conducted on-site originator (and servicer) reviews
         of Caliber and Sterling and deems them to be
         operationally sound.

      -- The Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor will retain
         the Class B-2, Class B-3 and Class X Certificates, which
         represent at least 5.0% of the fair value of all the
         Certificates, aligning Sponsor and investor interest in
         the capital structure.

      -- Notwithstanding the above, DBRS adjusted the originator
         scores downward to account for the potential inability to

         fulfill repurchase obligations, the lack of performance
         history as well as the weaker R&W framework. A lower
         originator score results in increased default and loss
         assumptions and provides additional cushions for the
         rated securities.

   -- Non-Prime, QM-Rebuttable Presumption or Non-QM Loans:
      Compared with post-crisis prime jumbo transactions, this
      portfolio contains some mortgages originated to borrowers
      with weaker credit and prior derogatory credit events as
      well as QM-rebuttable presumption or non-QM loans.

   -- All loans were originated to meet the eight underwriting
      factors as required by the ATR rules. The Caliber loans were

      also underwritten to comply with the standards set forth in
      Appendix Q. All but one of the LendSure-originated loans are

      Appendix Q-compliant as well.

   -- Underwriting standards have improved substantially since the

      pre-crisis era.

   -- DBRS RMBS Insight Model incorporates loss severity penalties

      for non-QM and QM Rebuttable Presumption loans as explained
      in the Key Loss Severity Drivers section of the related
      report.

   -- For loans in this portfolio that were originated through the

      Homeowner's Access and Fresh Start programs, borrower credit

      events had generally happened 42 months and 26 months,
      respectively, prior to origination, on average. In its
      analysis, DBRS applies additional penalties for borrowers
      with recent credit events within the past two years.

   -- Servicer Advances of Delinquent Principal and Interest
      (P&I): The servicers will advance scheduled P&I on
      delinquent mortgages until such loans become 180 days
      delinquent. This will likely result in lower loss severities

      to the transaction because advanced P&I will not have to be
      reimbursed from the trust upon the liquidation of the
      mortgages, but will increase the possibility of periodic
      interest shortfalls to the Certificateholders. Mitigating
      factors include that principal proceeds can be used to pay
      interest shortfalls to the Certificates as the outstanding
      senior Certificates are paid in full as well as the fact
      that subordination levels are greater than expected losses,

      which may provide for payment of interest to the
      Certificates. DBRS ran cash flow scenarios that incorporated

      P&I advancing up to 180 days for delinquent loans; the cash
      flow scenarios are discussed in more detail in the Cash Flow

      Analysis section of the related report.

   -- Servicers' Financial Capability: In this transaction, the
      servicers, Caliber and Sterling, are responsible for funding

      advances to the extent required. The servicers are unrated
      entities and may face financial difficulties in fulfilling
      its servicing advance obligation in the future.
      Consequently, the transaction employs Wells Fargo, rated AA
      (high) by DBRS, as the Master Servicer. If a servicer fails
      in its obligation to make advances, Wells Fargo will be
      obligated to fund such servicing advances.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal (excluding IO classes) by
the legal final maturity date in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the related Certificates. The DBRS ratings of A (sf),
BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of
interest and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity
date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the related
Certificates.




COLT MORTGAGE 2016-3: Fitch Expects to Rate Cl. B-2 Certs 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust (COLT
2016-3) as:

   -- $129,916,000 class A-1 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $26,751,000 class A-2 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $37,135,000 class A-3 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $9,820,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,224,000 class B-1 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $7,111,000 class B-2 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating these certificates:

   -- $7,788,589 class B-3 certificates.

This is the third Fitch-rated RMBS transaction issued post-crisis
that consists primarily of newly originated, non-prime mortgage
loans.

This is the first COLT transaction with a 'AAAsf' rating.  Over the
past year, Fitch has become more comfortable with the operational
risk of the issuer through extensive due diligence results,
multiple on-site visits and early performance trends.  The rating
also reflects the significant initial credit enhancement and
modified sequential payment priority.

The most notable collateral difference between COLT 2016-3 and COLT
2016-2 (which closed September 2016) is a further increase in the
percentage of loans that are not originated by Caliber Home Loans,
Inc. and that were originated to a bank statement program. Caliber
originated just over 70% of the loans with the remaining split
between Sterling Bank and Trust, FSB (Sterling) at about 22% and
Lendsure Mortgage Corp. (Lendsure) at almost 7%.  From a structural
perspective, this transaction has a more conservative cumulative
loss trigger than 2016-2 which redirects all principal to the most
senior bond under Fitch's stresses faster than in the prior deals,
and makes payments to the bonds from total available funds.

Fitch also introduced a favorable change in the model treatment for
the mortgage pool that adjusts default probability based on the
relationship of the loan's property value to the area's median
property value.  This is a variable that is already incorporated
into the Prime model but this is the first time it has been used in
the Alt-A model.  The rating committee applied the adjustment due
to the relatively high property values of the assets.  The average
property value of the assets in this pool is larger than the
average property value in the legacy Prime historical dataset.

                       TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is collateralized with 62% non-QM mortgages as
defined by the ATR rule while 31% is designated as HPQM and the
remainder either meets the criteria for Safe Harbor QM or ATR does
not apply.

The certificates are supported by a pool of 474 mortgage loans with
credit scores (712) similar to legacy Alt-A collateral. However,
unlike legacy originations, many of the loans were underwritten to
comprehensive Appendix Q documentation standards and 100% due
diligence was performed confirming adherence to the guidelines.
The weighted average loan-to value ratio is roughly 73% and many of
the borrowers have significant liquid reserves. The transaction
also benefits from an alignment of interest as LSRMF Acquisitions
I, LLC (LSRMF) or a majority owned affiliate, will be retaining a
horizontal interest in the transaction equal to not less than 5% of
the aggregate fair market value of all the certificates in the
transaction.

Fitch applied a default penalty to 39% of the pool to account for
borrowers with a mortgage derogatory as recent as two years prior
to obtaining the new mortgage and increased its non-QM loss
severity penalty on lower credit quality loans to account for
potentially greater number of challenges to the ATR Rule.  Fitch
also increased default expectations by 358 basis points at the
'AAAsf' rating category to reflect variances from a full
representation and warranty (R&W) framework.

Initial credit enhancement for the class A-1 certificates of 42.45%
is substantially above Fitch's 'AAAsf' rating stress loss of
24.75%.  The additional initial credit enhancement is primarily
driven by the pro rata principal distribution between the A-1, A-2
and A-3 certificates, which will result in a significant reduction
of the class A-1 subordination over time through principal payments
to the A-2 and A-3.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Non-Prime Credit Quality (concern): The pool's weighted average
credit score of 712 is lower than the weighted average credit score
of 736 for legacy Prime loans.  The pool was analyzed using Fitch's
Alt-A legacy model with positive adjustments made to account for
the improved operational quality for recent originations, due
diligence review, larger property-values and presence of liquid
reserves.  Negative adjustments were made to reflect the inclusion
of borrowers (39%) with recent credit events, increased risk of ATR
challenges and loans with TILA RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID)
exceptions.

Bank Statement Loans Included (concern): 112 of the non-QM loans
included in this pool were underwritten to a bank statement program
in accordance with either Sterling's or Lendsure's guidelines,
where a one-month or 12-month (respectively) bank statement was
used to verify income, which is not consistent with Appendix Q
standards and Fitch's view of a full documentation program.  While
employment and assets are fully verified, the limited income
verification resulted in application of a probability of default
(PD) penalty of approximately 1.4x for the bank statement loans.
Additionally, the assumed probability of ATR claims was doubled.

Operational and Data Quality (positive): Fitch reviewed Caliber's,
Sterling's, Lendsure's, and Hudson's origination and acquisition
platforms and found them to have sound underwriting and operational
control environments, reflecting industry improvements following
the financial crisis that are expected to reduce risk related to
misrepresentation and data quality.  All loans in the mortgage pool
were reviewed by a third-party due diligence firm and the results
indicated strong underwriting and property valuation controls.

Alignment of Interests (positive): The transaction benefits from an
alignment of interests between the issuer and investors.  LSRMF
Acquisition I, LLC (LSRMF), as sponsor and securitizer, or an
affiliate will retain a horizontal interest in the transaction
equal to not less than 5% of the aggregate fair market value of all
certificates in the transaction.  As part of its focus on investing
in residential mortgage credit, as of the closing date, LSRMF or an
affiliate, will retain the class B2, B3 and X certificates, which
represent 6.60% of the transaction.  Lastly, for the 347
Caliber-originated loans, the representations and warranties are
provided by Caliber, which is owned by LSRMF affiliates and
therefore, also aligns the interest of the investors with those of
LSRMF to maintain high quality origination standards and sound
performance, as Caliber will be obligated to repurchase loans due
to rep breaches.

Modified Sequential Payment Structure (mixed): The structure
distributes collected principal pro rata among the class A notes
while shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until both
classes have been reduced to zero.  To the extent that either the
cumulative loss trigger event or the credit enhancement trigger
event occurs in a given period, principal will be distributed
sequentially to the class A1, A2, and A3 bonds until they are
reduced to zero.  The loss and credit enhancement triggers for this
transaction are tighter than in previous COLT deals, which provide
for 100% redirection of principal to class A-1 should losses as a
percentage of the cut-off date balance exceed certain thresholds.

R&W Framework (concern): As originators Caliber, Lendsure, and
Sterling will be providing loan-level representations and
warranties to the trust.  While the reps for this transaction are
substantively consistent with those listed in Fitch's published
criteria and provide a solid alignment of interest, Fitch added 358
bps to the projected defaults at the 'AAAsf' rating category to
reflect the non-investment-grade counterparty risk of the providers
and the lack of an automatic review of defaulted loans. The lack of
an automatic review is mitigated by the ability of holders of 25%
of the total outstanding aggregate class balance to initiate a
review.

Performance Triggers (mixed): Credit enhancement and loan loss
triggers convert principal distribution to a straight sequential
payment priority in the event of poor asset performance.  The loss
triggers in 2016-3 are relatively low (notably lower than 2016-2),
which benefits the most senior classes.  The COLT transactions do
not incorporate a delinquency trigger, which increases the risk
that a delay in loan liquidations will allow performance triggers
to pass longer than they would otherwise.  The initial credit
enhancement of the A-1 class considers a back-loaded loss timing
assumption consistent with delayed losses.  Also, the risk is
mitigated by a lock-out of all principal distribution to the M-1
class and below until the more senior classes are paid in full,
regardless of performance trigger status.

Servicing and Master Servicer (positive): Servicing will be
performed on 78% of the loans by Caliber and on 22% of the loans by
Sterling.  Fitch rates Caliber 'RPS2-' with a Negative Rating
Outlook due to its fast-growing portfolio and regulatory scrutiny
and reviewed Sterling to be acceptable.  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(Wells Fargo), rated 'RMS1' with a Stable Outlook, will act as
master servicer and securities administrator.  Advances required
but not paid by Caliber and Sterling will be paid by Wells Fargo.

                        CRITERIA APPLICATION

A variation was made to Fitch's 'U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria' in regards to treatment of loans with prior credit
events.  Historical data suggests that borrowers with similar
credit scores as those in the pool are nearly 20% more likely to
default on a future mortgage, as compared to all outstanding
borrowers, if they had a prior mortgage related credit event.  This
adjustment was applied to the roughly 39% of the pool that had a
prior mortgage related credit event, resulting in approximately an
8% increase to the pool's probability of default at each rating
category.

Due to the structural features of the transaction, Fitch analyzed
the collateral with a customized version of one of its loss models.
Fitch's Alt-A Loan Loss Model was altered to include three
additional inputs; due diligence percentage, operational quality
and liquid reserves.  These variables were not common in legacy
Alt-A loans and were excluded in the derivation of Fitch's Alt-A
model.  Given the improvement in the underwriting over legacy
standards, these aspects were taken into consideration and a net
credit was applied to the pool.

A final variation was made as an outside of the model adjustment to
account for the higher than average property values of the mortgage
loans and its impact on the probability of default. Fitch's
analysis showed that loans associated with property values
significantly below the median exhibited higher default rates
relative to those at or above the median value and larger
properties are generally associated with higher income borrowers
who may be less sensitive to income shocks than lower income
borrowers.  Less desirable, low-value properties may also increase
the default risk if the borrower has more difficulty selling the
home.  The average property value for this pool was over $625k and
there is a large distribution of loans with very high property
values relative to those in the Alt-A model's data set.  Because
this variable is not considered in the Alt-A model, PDs are higher
for these loans than what the data suggests.

The aggregate impact of these adjustments resulted in losses
approximately 2 notches lower than unadjusted legacy Alt-A model
output.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at the MSA level.  The implied rating sensitivities
are only an indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not
consider other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed
to or may be considered in the surveillance of the transaction.
Two sets of sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and
national levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject
pool.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level.  The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model projected 6.4%.  The analysis indicates that there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.



COMM 2005-FL11: Moody's Cuts Class X-3-DB Debt Rating to C
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating on one IO class and
downgraded the rating on one IO class of Deutsche Mortgage & Asset
Receiving Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
COMM 2005-FL11.  Moody's rating action is:

  Cl. X-2-DB, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2016,
   Affirmed C (sf)

  Cl X-3-DB, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb. 4, 2016,
   Affirmed Ca (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one IO class, Class X-2-DB, was affirmed.  The rating
on Class X-2-DB references the Structured Credit Assessment (SCA)
of the only remaining loan in the pool, the DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's
Portfolio Loan.  The SCA for the loan remains at c (sca.pd), the
same as the last review.  This interest only (IO) class does not
receive interest distribution.  The rating on the other IO class,
Class X-3-DB, was downgraded.  The rating on Class X-3-DB also
references the SCA of the DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio Loan.
However, this IO received interest distribution based on the
positive difference between the LIBOR rate determined in accordance
with the related Mortgage Loan documents and LIBOR applicable to
the Certificates.  However, as of September 2016, and post
appraisal reduction neither of the classes have received interest.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes or a specified set of loans.  An IO class may be
upgraded based on a lower weighted average rating factor or WARF
due to an overall improvement in the credit quality of its
reference classes or a change in the credit profile of the
referenced set of loans.  An IO class may be downgraded based on a
higher WARF due to a decline in the credit quality of its reference
classes, paydowns of higher quality reference classes, credit
decline of referenced loans or non-payment of interest. Classes
that have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation.  Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS," published in October 2015.

                    DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels
based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived
from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type.  Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 15, 2016, Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance decreased slightly to approximately
$5.6 million, from $6.9 million at the prior review.  The only loan
remaining in the pool, the DDR/Macquarie Mervyn's Portfolio Loan,
is an REO loan.  This loan represents a pari-passu interest in a
$75.2 million first mortgage loan.  The pari-passu interests are
securitized in two transactions, GECMC 2005-C4 and GMACC 2006-C1.

The loan was originally secured by 35 single tenant buildings
leased to Mervyn's.  Currently Folsom Square, CA is the only
property remaining in the pool.  Mervyn's filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection in July 2008, closed all its stores, and
rejected the leases on all the properties in this portfolio.  The
loan was transferred to special servicing in October 2008 due to
Mervyn's filing for bankruptcy protection.  Moody's loan to value
(LTV) ratio is over 140% and Moody's current Structured Credit
Assessment is c (sca.pd), the same as last review.

Moody's does not rate the remaining principal classes, Class L.
Class L has experienced losses of $248,070 as of the current
Payment Date.  In addition, there are interest shortfalls totaling
$18,001 outstanding.


CREDIT SUISSE 2004-C2: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Cert. Classes to D
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed eight classes
of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C2.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations of classes D through K reflect full coverage of
these classes by defeased collateral.  The downgrades of class N
and O reflect realized losses.  As of the November 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 93.5% to $63 million from $966.8 million at issuance.
The pool has experienced $16.7 million (1.7% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting classes K through P.

Defeased Collateral: There are two defeased loans accounting for
91.7% of the pool.

Pool Concentration: The pool is concentrated with two defeased
loans, one performing loan (1.3%) and two real estate owned (REO)
assets (7.0%) with the special servicer.

Specially Serviced Assets: The downgrades of class N and O reflect
experienced losses from a specially serviced asset that was
liquidated in October 2016.  Losses from the 119,061-square foot
(sf) suburban medical office building located in Evergreen Park, IL
were higher than expected.

The largest contributor to expected losses is a 64 unit
multi-family property located in Wayne, MI, roughly 20 miles from
Detroit.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer in
September 2014 for imminent default and foreclosure was filed.  The
servicer obtained title to the property and became REO in October
2016.  There is no disposition timeline at this time as the
servicer is working on stabilizing the asset and addressing
deferred maintenance.  The property is 83% occupied according to
the June 2016 rent roll.

The second largest contributor to expected losses is 16,800-sf
retail property located in Puyallup, WA, approximately 36 miles
south of Seattle.  The loan was transferred to special servicer in
February 2013 due to payment default.  The loan had previously been
in special servicing in 2009 for payment default, but was brought
current in early 2011 and returned to the master servicer in
mid-2012.  A forbearance agreement could not be reached with the
borrower and foreclosure was completed in May 2014.  The property
is now REO, but there are no immediate disposition plans at this
time.  Per the servicer, the asset is currently in a value-add
strategy as tenants are sought to lease the vacant space and the
servicer addresses deferred maintenance issues.  As of October
2016, the property was reported to be 61% occupied.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Outlooks on classes D through H remain Stable due to increasing
credit enhancement and continued paydown.  The balance of these
classes is covered by the defeased collateral.  The outlook for
Class J has been revised to Negative from Stable as a downgrade may
be possible if interest shortfalls affect this class.  The Class K
has been revised to Stable from Negative and is fully covered by
defeased collateral, but a rating cap of 'Asf' has been applied due
to interest shortfalls currently affecting the class. Class L has
also been revised to Stable from Negative.  However, although the
class is nearly covered by defeased collateral, future upgrades are
unlikely given the interest shortfalls, thin subordinate class and
reliance on disposition of specially serviced assets to repay the
class in full.

Fitch downgrades these classes:

   -- $0 class N to 'Dsf' from 'Csf', RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $6 million class J at 'AAAsf', Outlook revised to Negative
      from Stable;
   -- $3.6 million class K at 'Asf', Outlook revised to Stable
      from Positive;
   -- $3.6 million class L at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
      from Positive.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $4.7 million class D at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.7 million class E at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.7 million class F at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $9.7 million class G at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $10.9 million class H at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-1-A, A-2, B and C certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class M and P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class A-X and
A-SP certificates.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C3: Moody's Cuts Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on one class
and affirmed the rating on one class in Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-C3 as:

  Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2015,
   Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec. 16, 2015,
   Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-J was downgraded to be consistent with
Moody's Base Expected Loss plus realized losses.  Class A-J has
already experienced a 5.5% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class A-X, was affirmed at Ca (sf)
because it is no longer receiving, nor expected to receive
scheduled monthly interest payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 51.5% of the
current balance, compared to 4.0% at Moody's last review.  The deal
has paid down 95% since the last review and Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 14.8% of the original pooled
balance, compared to 15.7% at the last review.  Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

              METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 4, compared to 7 at Moody's last review.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 11, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to
$56.5 million from $1.93 billion at securitization.  The
certificates are collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in
size from 1% to 45% of the pool.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $256.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 71%).  Eight loans, constituting 96.7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the CheckFree Corporation Loan ($25.4 million -- 45% of the
pool), which is secured by a 220,675 square foot (SF) office
property located in Norcross, Georgia.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2015 due to imminent default.  The single
tenant, Fiserv Inc, which occupied 100% of the building, vacated at
the end of its lease on Dec. 31, 2015. Moody's anticipates a
significant loss for this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Hennepin Business
Center Loan ($11.2 million -- 20% of the pool), which is secured by
a 140,000 SF office property located in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
The property is 87% occupied as of September 2016. Wells Fargo, the
largest tenant, makes up 68% of the net rentable area with a lease
expiration in 2021.  The loan transferred to special servicing in
August 2016 due to maturity default after the loan passed its
initial maturity date of July 2016.

The remaining six specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $29.1 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (53% expected loss on average).

The two performing loans represent 3.3% of the pool balance.  The
largest performing loan is the Gardens at Duncan Apartments Loan
($1.2 million -- 2.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 90-unit
garden style, low-income multifamily property in Duncan, Oklahoma,
approximately 85 miles northeast of Oklahoma City. The property is
96% occupied as of year-end 2015, compared to 99% at year-end 2014
and 80% at year-end 2013.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60%
and 1.63X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.38X at the last
review.

The second largest performing loan is the Poway Garden Self Storage
Loan ($649,236 —1.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 51,600
SF, 414-unit self-storage facility in Poway, California, roughly 25
miles northeast of San Diego.  The property is 76% occupied as of
September 2016, down from 90% as of December 2014. However,
performance has improved over the same time period due to higher in
place rents.  The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 59%
since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 18% and
about 4.00X, respectively, compared to 23% and about 4.00X at the
last review.



CREDIT SUISSE 2016-NXSR: Fitch to Rate 2 Class F Certs 'B-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass
Through Certificates, Series 2016-NXSR.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

   -- $22,779,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $85,980,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $115,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $174,907,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $26,116,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $455,124,000(b) class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $30,324,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $455,124,000(c) class V1-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40,961,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40,961,000(b) class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40,961,000(c) class V-1B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,100,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,100,000(c) class V-1C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,100,000(a) class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,100,000(a)(c) class V1-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18,963,000(a)(b) class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,827,000(a)(b) class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $18,963,000(a) class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6,827,000(a) class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  (a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
  (b) Notional amount and interest-only.
  (c) Exchangeable certificates

These expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Dec. 6, 2016.

Fitch does not expect to rate the $22,757,039(a) class NR,
$22,757,039(a)(b) class X-NR, $48,547,039(a)(c) class V-1E, and
$606,832,040(a)(c) class V-2 certificates.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 33 loans secured by 54
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $606.8 million as of the cut-off date.  The loans
were contributed to the trust by Column Financial, Inc., Natixis
Real Estate Capital LLC, and UBS AG, New York Branch.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral including site inspections on 76.7% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 86.6%, and asset summary reviews on
86.6% of the pool.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The transaction has similar leverage to other
recent Fitch-rated transactions.  The Fitch LTV for the trust of
106.8% is slightly higher than the YTD 2016 average of 105.3%.  The
Fitch DSCR for the trust of 1.23x is slightly higher than the YTD
2016 average of 1.20x.  However, the Fitch leverage is lower when
compared to the YTD 2016 average Fitch DSCR and LTV for Fitch-rated
deals excluding credit-opinion loans at 1.12x and 111.2%.  The
current transaction does not include any credit-opinion loans.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The pool size is relatively smaller by
balance and loan count at $606.8 million and 33, respectively.  The
top 10 loans comprise 66.2% of the pool, which is greater than the
recent averages of 54.9% for YTD 2016 and 49.3% for 2015.
Additionally, the loan concentration index (LCI) and sponsor
concentration index (SCI) are 561 and 709, respectively, greater
than the respective YTD 2016 averages of 423 and 495.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down by only 9.3%, which is below the YTD 2016
average of 10.5%.  Nine loans, representing 47.7% of the pool, are
full-term interest-only (including four loans comprising 21.9% of
the pool which have an anticipated repayment date [ARD] structure
following the interest-only term), and eight loans, representing
10.8% of the pool, are partial interest only.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.6% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period.  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CSMC
2016-NXSR certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'Asf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation
of additional stresses and sensitivities.



CSFB COMMERCIAL 2005-C6: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
in CSFB Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-C6 as:

  Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Upgraded
   to B1 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Affirmed
   Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Downgraded
   to Ca (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan. 8, 2016,
   Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the six P&I Classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with expected recovery of principal and
interest from liquidated and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 62.2% of the
current balance, compared to 40% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

             METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing.  In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data.  The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs.  Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior classes and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior classes.

                     DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model.  The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type.  Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

                           DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $105 million
from $2.5 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from 4% to
27% of the pool.

Thirty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $70 million (for an average loss
severity of 20%).  All eight remaining loans are currently in
special servicing.  The largest specially serviced loan is the
Highland Industrial Loan ($28 million -- 27% of the pool), which is
secured by a portfolio of office/industrial buildings in Ann Arbor,
MI.  There were originally 18 buildings in the portfolio but 10
have been sold with the proceeds used to pay back advances and pay
down principal.  The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2012 and became REO in April 2014.  The special servicer plans to
sell off single buildings while continuing to lease up the
remaining properties.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Mckinley
Crossroads Loan ($26.1 million -- 25% of the pool), which is
secured by a 201,000 SF retail property in Corona, CA.  The loan
transferred to special servicing in March 2012 and became REO in
October 2014.  The property was 69% leased as of October 2016.  A
new lease was recently signed with a grocery tenant for 21,000 SF
and the store opened for business in the third quarter of 2016. The
special servicer indicated they are working to lease up the vacant
space.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the City Center West A
Loan ($18.9 million -- 18% of the pool), which is secured by a
106,000 SF office property in Las Vegas, NV.  The loan transferred
to special servicing in March 2011 and became REO in October 2014.
As of August 2016, the property was 41% leased.  The master
servicer has deemed this loan non recoverable.  The special
servicer indicated they are in the process of negotiating a
possible sale of the asset.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $65.4 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (62% expected loss on average).

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $15.4 million.  Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans.  Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.


CSFB MORTGAGE 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on A-X Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of
CS First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp 1998-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.5% of the
current balance, compared to 12.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.2% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were " Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and " Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant
Lease and Comparable Lease Financings" published in October 2016.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity,
other concentrations and correlations.

Moody's currently uses a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its
public CDO rating model CDOROM to generate a portfolio loss
distribution to assess the credit risk of the Credit Tenant Lease
(CTL) component.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $91 million
from $2.48 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 48 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool. Fourteen loans, representing 18% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US Government securities.
The pool includes a credit tenant lease (CTL) component consisting
of 29 loans, totaling 73% of the pool. The non-defeased and non-CTL
component represents only 9% of the pool.

Nine loans, representing 20% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of our
ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the watchlist
to assess which loans have material issues that could impact
performance.

Forty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $89.7 million (37% loss severity on
average). No loans are currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool's non-defeased and non-CTL loans.

The largest non-defeased and non-CTL loan is the Peachtree Corners
Shopping Center Loan ($5.5 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is
secured by a fitness center anchored retail property located 20
miles northeast of Atlanta, Georgia. As of June 2016 the property
was 90% leased compared to 80% at the last review. The largest
tenant is L.A. Fitness occupying 44% of NRA with the lease
expiration in September 2017. The loan is on the servicer's
watchlist due to a low DSCR. The loan matures in May 2018 and has
amortized 31% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 118% and 0.96X, respectively, compared to 103% and 1.1X at the
last review.

The second largest non-defeased and non-CTL loan is the Christmas
Tree Shops Plaza Loan ($1.8 million -- 2.0% of the pool), which is
secured by an anchored retail located 5 miles west of West Haven,
Connecticut. As of September 2016, the property was 97% leased
compared to 99% at the last review. The loan is fully amortizing
and has amortized 86% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 17% and greater than 4.00X, respectively,
compared to 24% and greater than 4.00X at the last review.

The CTL component consists of 29 loans secured by properties leased
to nine tenants. The largest exposure is Best Buy Co., Inc. ($21.4
million -- 24% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: Baa1 -- stable
outlook). The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF)
for this pool is 4,262 compared to 3,176 at the last review. WARF
is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse credits.
The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of the default probability
within the pool.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2004-C1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class H Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on three classes of CSFB Mortgage Securities
Corp. Commercial Mtge Pass-Through Ctfs. 2004-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. G, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016
      Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016
      Downgraded to Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-Y, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class G was upgraded due to an increase in
defeasance, to 24% of the current pool balance from 17% at the last
review. The deal has paid down 99% since securitization.

The rating on Class H was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on one IO class, Class A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

The rating on one IO class, Class A-Y, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, compared to 22.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.3% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's does not
anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Our ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 4 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $21.5 million
from $1.62 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by ten mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 37%
of the pool. Two loans, constituting 8.7% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments. Two loans,
constituting 24.2% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Two loans, constituting 38.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $70.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 59%). No loans are currently in special servicing.

The structured credit assessments are associated with two
residential cooperative loans which represent $1.9 million in total
loan balance, or a 8.7% share of the overall pool balance. Moody's
credit assessment for these loans is aaa (sca.pd), the same as at
last review.

The top three performing loans represent 58% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Irving Towne Center Loan ($8.1 million --
37% of the pool), which is secured by a Target shadow-anchored
retail center located in Irving, Texas. Major tenants include
Tuesday Morning, Anna's Linens, Chili's and Anytime Fitness. The
property was 77% leased as of September 2016, compared to 82%
leased as of June 2015. The loan is fully amortizing and has
amortized 31% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 70% and 1.51X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.49X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Chapel Ridge of Stillwater Phase I
Loan ($2.8 million -- 13% of the pool), which is secured by a
120-unit multifamily property located approximately 70 miles north
of Oklahoma City. The property was 98% leased as of December 2015,
compared to 94% leased at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 65% and 1.50X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.49X at
the last review.

The third largest loan is the Amistad Apartments Loan ($1.6 million
-- 7.5% of the pool), which is by a 76-unit multifamily property in
Donna, Texas, about 250 miles south of San Antonio and less than
ten miles north of the US-Mexico border. The property was 93%
leased as of September 2016, compared to 96% at the prior review.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and 1.43X, respectively,
compared to 71% and 1.42X at the last review.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C2: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Ratings on 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
in CSFB Mortgage Securities Corp. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, 2005-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016
      Affirmed Ca (sf)

   -- Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.9% of the
current balance, compared to 13.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 16.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 16.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, unchanged from Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $127.6
million from $1.61 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight remaining mortgage loans ranging in size
from less than 1% to 72% of the pool. One loan, constituting 2.1%
of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

One loan, constituting 0.4% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $248.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 61%). Five loans, constituting 96% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the 390 Park Avenue Loan ($91.7 million -- 72% of the pool),
which is secured by a leasehold interest in a 21-story, 260,000
square foot (SF) Class A office building located in Midtown
Manhattan. The loan transferred to special servicing in December
2014 due to imminent monetary default in regards to the inability
to refinance regarding a rent re-set of the underlying ground
lease. The loan has passed its original maturity date in March
2015. The loan is currently able to cover its debt service payments
with an actual NOI DSCR of 1.70X as of December 2015. However, the
ground lease contains a fair market value-based reset provision in
2023 that may significantly increase the ground lease payments. As
of September 2016, the property was 87% leased, compared to 100% at
year-end 2015.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Southlake
Pavilion I & II Loan ($17.1 million -- 13.4% of the pool), which is
secured by 218,000 SF retail shopping center located south of
Atlanta in Morrow, Georgia. The property transferred to special
servicing in February 2014 due to imminent monetary default and
became real estate owned (REO) in September 2014. As of September
2016, the property was 74% leased to nine tenants, with 58% of the
net rentable area (NRA) rolling within the next 12 months. The
special servicer indicated they plan to lease up and stabilize the
property prior to listing it for sale.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Alexandria Power
Center Loan ($7.8 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by
a 313,600 SF retail property located in Alexandria, Louisiana. The
loan transferred to special servicing in February 2014 due to
imminent monetary default and became REO in September 2015. As of
September 2016, the property was 63% leased, down 69% at yearend
2015. The special servicer indicated they plan to stabilize the
property prior to listing it for sale.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $15.2 million loss
for the specially serviced loans.

The two performing non-defeased loans represent 2.1% of the pool
balance. The largest performing loan is the Plymouth Industrial
Center Loan ($2.2 million -- 1.7% of the pool), which is secured by
a 484,600 SF industrial building complex just west of Detroit in
Plymouth, Michigan. As of June 2016, the property was 65% leased,
which is within the 60% to 70%historical occupancy range for the
property. Approximately 60% of the leases are month-to-month. The
loan has amortized 72% since securitization and matures in
September 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 26% and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to 36% and 2.83X at the last
review.

The other performing loan is the Park Square Apartments Loan ($0.46
million -- 0.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 38-unit low
income multifamily property in Detroit, Michigan. The loan has been
on the watchlist since 2009 for low occupancy and DSCR. As of June
2016, the property was 74% leased, compared to 82% at year-end
2015. The loan has amortized 17% since securitization and matures
in October 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.86X,
respectively.


CWCAPITAL COBALT: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 7 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by CWCapital Cobalt Vr Ltd.:

   -- CL. A-2, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016
      Affirmed C (sf)

   -- CL. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- CL. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- CL. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- CL. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- CL. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- CL. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on seven classes of note because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

CWCapital Cobalt Vr Ltd. is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of: i) CRE CDOs (62.9% of the current pool balance); and
ii) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (37.1%). As of the
November 28, 2016 trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to $2.8
billion from $3.45 billion at issuance, as a result of
reclassification of interest proceeds received from impaired
securities as principal proceeds and regular amortization of the
underlying collateral.

All of the assets totaling $904.1 million (100% of the collateral
pool balance) are listed as impaired securities as of the November
26, 2016 trustee report. While there have been realized losses on
the underlying collateral to date, Moody's does expect significant
losses to occur on the impaired securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 9709,
compared to 9297 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Ba1-Ba3 (0.2% compared to 0.7% at last
review), B1-B3 (1.4% compared to 1.1% at last review) and Caa1-Ca/C
(98.4% compared to 98.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.6 years, compared to 2.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral look-through CMBS loan exposure.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the rating
announced today is sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.



FIRST UNION-LEHMAN: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class IO Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the
interest-only class in First Union-Lehman Brothers Commercial
Mortgage Trust II, Series 1997-C2 as follows:

   -- Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.5% of the
current balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant
Lease and Comparable Lease Financings" published in October 2016.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

In evaluating the Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component, Moody's used
a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating
model CDOROM to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $34 million
from $2.20 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 36% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 66% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 32% of the pool, has defeased and
is secured by US government securities.

Five loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $65 million (for an average loss
severity of 46%). There are no loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 95% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 46%, compared to 52% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 3.41X,
respectively, compared to 1.25X and 2.69X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Preston Luther Center Loan ($1.8 million -- 5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 39,200 square foot (SF)
mixed-use facility in Preston Center, an upscale Commercial
District on the North side of Dallas, TX. The property has high-end
retail space on the ground level and class A office space on the
upper floors. As of September 2016, the subject was 100% occupied,
the same as the previous five years. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 32% and 3.68X, respectively, compared to 35% and 3.44X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Mountain Park Square Loan ($1.7
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 23,900 SF retail
strip center comprised of one standalone, single tenant building
and a multi-tenant strip building, located in Phoenix, AZ. As of
September 2016, the subject was 89% occupied, compared to 77% at
year-end 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.62X,
respectively, compared to 62% and 1.92X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Moberly Manor Loan ($1.7 million --
5% of the pool), which is secured by a 144-unit multifamily
property located in Bentonville, Arizona. As of September 2016, the
subject was 99% occupied, compared to 100% at year-end 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 34% and 3.05X, respectively,
compared to 38% and 2.71X at the last review.

The CTL component consists of seven loans, constituting 44% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to threee tenants. The two
largest exposures are Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. ($12.5
million -- 36.4% of the pool; senior unsecured rating: A2 --
negative outlook) and Rite-Aid Corporation ($2.5 million -- 7.4% of
the pool; senior unsecured rating: B3/Caa1 -- rating on review for
possible upgrade). The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor
(WARF) for this pool is 895, compared to 1088 at the last review.
WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of diverse
credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.


FORTRESS CREDIT III: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, C, and
D notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A-1T, A-1R, A-2T, and
E notes from Fortress Credit Opportunities III CLO L.P., a U.S.
middle-market collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
closed in April 2014 and is managed by Fortress Investment Group
LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Oct. 24, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
Oct. 28, 2017.  The review also takes into account the updated
recovery rate tables in our Corporate Cash Flow and Synthetic
Criteria.  The upgrades primarily reflect a substantial level of
credit support as well as seasoning of the underlying collateral.

The transaction has benefited from collateral seasoning, with the
reported weighted average life decreasing to 3.38 years from 3.94
years as of the September 2014 effective date.  This seasoning has
decreased the overall credit risk profile, which, in turn, provided
more cushion to the tranche ratings.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C, D, and E notes, its rating actions considered
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries, the relative credit quality
migration since S&P's effective date affirmations, and volatility
in the underlying portfolio because the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period.

The affirmations of the ratings on the class A-1T, A-1R, A-2T, and
E notes reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Fortress Credit Opportunities III CLO L.P.
                    Rating
Class         To          From
B-1           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
B-2           AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)
C             A+ (sf)     A (sf)
D             BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Fortress Credit Opportunities III CLO L.P.
Class         Rating
A-1T          AAA (sf)
A-1R          AAA (sf)
A-2T          AAA (sf)
E             BB (sf)


GERMAN AMERICAN 2016-COR1: Fitch Gives BB-sf Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings on German American
Capital Corp.'s COMM Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-COR1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

   -- $30,136,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $64,857,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $48,044,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $215,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $265,440,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $676,918,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $53,441,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $54,554,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $41,194,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $54,554,000ab class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $46,761,000ab* class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22,267,000ab class X-E ' BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $10,020,000ab class X-F ' B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $46,761,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22,267,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   
   -- $10,020,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

   -- $38,967,985ab class X-G;

   -- $38,967,985a class G.

a)Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b)Notional amount and interest-only.

* Class X-C interest only certificates were previously calculated
by reference to a notional amount equal to the sum of the
certificate balances of class C and class D. Since the publishing
of the presale, class X-C certificates have changed to calculate by
reference to the notional amount of class D only. This did not
result in a change in Fitch's ratings.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Oct. 20, 2016.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 42 loans secured by 50
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$890,681,986 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by German American Capital Corporation and Jefferies
LoanCore LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.8% of the properties
by balance and asset summary reviews and cash flow analysis of
84.2% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage: The transaction has slightly lower leverage than
other recent Fitch-rated transactions. The Fitch debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) for the trust of 1.21x is better than both
the year-to-date (YTD) 2016 average of 1.18x and the 2015 average
of 1.18x. The Fitch loan to value (LTV) for the trust of 106.3% is
similar to the YTD 2016 average of 106.2% and lower than the 2015
average of 109.3%. Excluding the credit opinion loans (4.6% of the
pool), the Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.19x and 108.8%, respectively.

Limited Amortization: Fifteen loans, representing, 51.8% of the
pool, are full interest-only. This is higher than the average of
23.3% for 2015 and 30.9% for YTD 2016 for other Fitch-rated U.S.
multiborrower deals. Additionally, 14 loans comprising 24.3% of the
pool are partial interest only; this share is lower than the
average of 43.1% for 2015 and 37.6% for YTD 2016 of other
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals. Overall, the pool is
scheduled to pay down by only 9.4% compared with the averages of
11.7% for 2015 and 10.3% YTD for 2016 for other Fitch-rated U.S.
deals.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans, representing 4.6%
of the pool, have investment-grade credit opinions on a stand-alone
basis; this is below the YTD 2016 average of 7.2% credit opinion
loans. Westfield San Francisco Centre (2.64% of the pool), the 12th
largest loan in the pool, has an investment grade credit opinion of
'Asf'* on a stand-alone basis. Further, Grant and Geary Center
(loan #20; 1.94% of the pool), has an investment-grade credit
opinion of 'A+sf*' on a stand-alone basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 5.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to COMM
2016-COR1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BB+sf'
could result. The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 10.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information from
KPMG, LLP. The third-party due diligence information was provided
on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis. A
copy of the ABS Due Diligence Form-15E received by Fitch in
connection with this transaction may be obtained through the link
contained on the bottom of the related rating action commentary.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under 'Related Research'
below. The appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to
those Fitch considers typical for the asset class as detailed in
the Special Report titled 'Representations, Warranties and
Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions,'
dated May 31, 2016.




GS MORTGAGE 2012-GC6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in GS Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-GC6 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015 Affirmed

      A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.1% of the
current balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.6% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 14, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 13% to $1.01 billion
from $1.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 68 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 57% of
the pool. One loan, constituting just under 10% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Six loans,
constituting 5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Fifteen loans, constituting 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in a minimal
realized loss of less than $50,000 (for an average loss severity of
1.5%). No loans are currently in special servicing and Moody's did
not identify any troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 86% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 18% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.55X and 1.26X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.31X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the ELS Portfolio
($95.3 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which consists of 12
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted loans secured by
manufactured housing communities and recreational vehicle (RV)
parks. The properties are located across six states and consist of
a total of 5,225 pads. As of June 2016 the portfolio was
approximately 76% leased compared to 88% at last review and 94% at
securitization. Financial performance remains stable. The loan's
partial interest-only term has expired and the loan has amortized
5% since securitization. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are a2 (sca.pd) and 1.47X, respectively.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Meadowood Mall Loan ($116.7 million -- 11.6% of
the pool), which is secured by 405,000 square feet (SF) of mall
space that is part of a 878,000 SF regional mall in Reno, Nevada.
Mall anchors include J.C. Penney, Sears, Macy's and Macy's Men's
and Home store. As of June 2016, the mall was approximately 91%
leased compared to 90% at last review and 86% at securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.08X, respectively,
compared to 91% and 1.10X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the SunTrust International Center Loan
($58.7 million -- 5.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 31-story
office building in downtown Miami, Florida. As of September 2016,
the property was approximately 46% leased compared to 79% at last
review. The property recently experienced a $15 million renovation.
The largest tenant at securitization, Akerman, Senterfitt and
Edison (28% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacated in January
2016. The loan's partial term interest-only period has expired and
the loan has amortized approximately 5% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.88X, respectively,
compared to 119% and 0.89X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the LHG Hotel Portfolio Loan ($54.3
million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a portfolio of 12
limited service hotels, comprised of 852 rooms across six states.
The hotel flags are Fairfield Inn, Fairfield Inn & Suites,
Courtyard by Marriot and Country Inn & Suites. Financial
performance has declined since last review and the loan has
amortized approximately 9% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.43X, respectively, compared to 81% and
1.52X at the last review.


GTP CELLULAR 2012-2: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Class C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of GTP Cellular Sites, LLC
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, 2012-2 as follows:

   -- $106 million 2012-2 class A at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $41 million 2012-2 class B at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;

   -- $27 million 2012-2 class C at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable.

Class A of GTP 2012-1 has paid in full.

The affirmations are due to the stable performance of the
collateral since issuance. The Stable Outlook reflects the limited
prospect for upgrades given the provision to issue additional
notes.

As part of its review, Fitch analyzed the financial and site
information provided by the master servicer, Midland Loan
Services.

The certificates represent beneficial ownership interest in the
cellular sites, primary assets of which are 697 wireless
communication sites leased to 1,047 cellular tower tenants. As of
the November 2016 distribution date, the aggregate principal
balance of the notes has been reduced by 38.3% to $174 million from
$282 million at issuance.

The series 2012-2 class A notes were interest-only for the first
year and have commenced amortization as expected. Series 2012-1
class A paid off in June of 2016 along with a partial release of
collateral. Aside from scheduled amortization on series 2012-2
class A, no other principal will be required to be paid prior to
the anticipated repayment date of March 2019 for the remaining
classes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Cash Flow and Leverage: As of November 2016, Fitch stressed
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.41x which compares with
approximately 1.20x at last review. The debt multiple relative to
Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) is 7.49x, which equates to a debt yield
of 13.4%.

Leases to Strong Tower Tenants: There are 1,047 wireless tenant
leases. Telephony tenants represent 98.9% of the leases on the
cellular sites, and 31.3% of this run-rate revenue is from
investment-grade tenants. T-Mobile is the largest tenant,
representing approximately 30.7% of run-rate revenue.

Additional Notes: The borrower has the ability to issue additional
notes in the future that will rank senior to, pari passu with, or
subordinate to the rated notes. These may be issued without the
benefit of additional collateral, provided the post-issuance DSCR
is not less than 1.75x. The possibility of upgrades may be limited
due to this provision.

Risk of Technological Obsolescence: The notes have a rated final
payment date in 2042, and the long-term tenor of the notes
increases the risk that an alternative technology rendering
obsolete the current transmission of wireless signals through
cellular sites will be developed. Currently, WSPs depend on towers
to transmit their signals and continue to invest in this
technology.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook on the series 2012-2 notes reflect the stable
performance of the portfolio. Upgrades are limited based on the
provision to issue additional notes. Downgrades are unlikely based
on continued cash flow growth due to annual rent escalations and
automatic renewal clauses resulting in higher debt service coverage
ratios since issuance.


HONOR AUTOMOBILE 2016-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on C Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Honor
Automobile Trust Securitization 2016-1's $100 million automobile
receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 6,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 43.9%, 34.3%, and 27.2%
      credit support (including excess spread) for the class A, B,

      and C notes, respectively, based on S&P's stressed cash flow

      scenarios.  These credit support levels provide coverage of
      approximately 2.05x, 1.55x, and 1.18x S&P's 20.50%-21.50%
      expected cumulative net loss range for the class A, B, and
      C notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that S&P
      believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, the ratings on the class A,
      B, and C notes will remain within two rating categories of
      S&P's assigned preliminary ratings during the first year.
      These potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's
      credit stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of
      credit deterioration as a two-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB- (sf)' rated
      securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The characteristics of the collateral pool securitized in
      this transaction--which has a weighted average seasoning of
      11 months and a weighted average remaining term of 36
      months— S&P's view of the inherent credit risk in the
      collateral loan pool based on the collateral
      characteristics, historical performance, and S&P's forward-
      looking view of the economy.

   -- The transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics,
      and legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Honor Automobile Trust Securitization 2016-1  

Class       Rating          Type            Interest        Amount
                                            rate          (mil. $)
A           A (sf)          Senior          Fixed            76.48
B           BBB (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed            14.66
C           BB- (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed             8.86



IMSCI 2013-4: DBRS' BB Rating on Class G Certs Still on Review
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS has maintained the Under Review with Negative Implications
status on the following classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2013-4 issued by Institutional Mortgage
Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series 2013-4:

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf), Under Review with Negative
      Implications

   -- Class F at BB (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

   -- Class G at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

The ratings for Classes E, F and G do not carry trends.

DBRS has maintained Classes E, F and G Under Review with Negative
Implications because of concerns surrounding the Nelson Ridge loan
(Prospectus ID #4, 7.0% of the pool). The loan represents the A-1
portion of a pari passu loan, which had an original aggregate
balance of $31.0 million. The A-2 piece, which had an original
balance of $8.0 million, was included in the IMSCI 2014-5
transaction. The loan was transferred to the special servicer
because the borrower advised that debt service obligations could no
longer be met, given the cash flow declines at the property, driven
by general economic difficulty in the Fort McMurray, Alberta, area.
As of the November 2016 remittance report, the loan was brought
current after typically running between 30 and 60 days delinquent.
DBRS received the borrower's October 2016 year-to-date unaudited
financial statements from the servicer, which reported an operating
loss of $1.8 million. The reported loss suggests that the borrower
was able to bring the loan current through funds derived from
alternative sources; DBRS has requested further confirmation from
the special servicer.

Prior to the loan's transfer to special servicing, the loan was
being monitored for property performance declines related to the
downturn in the oil industry over the past few years. Following the
May 2016 wildfire, which, according to the special servicer, only
caused incidental damage to the subject property, occupancy has
improved as of the November 2016 rent roll to 80.9%, up from the
July 2016 occupancy rate of 72.9%. However, rental rates declined
from $2,088 per unit in July to $1,526 per unit in November.
According to the Canada Mortgage Housing Corporation, as of October
2015, the Wood Buffalo Municipal Region reported an average vacancy
rate of 29.4%; the average rental rate for all unit types was
reported at $1,761 per unit.

There has not been an updated appraisal for the property since
issuance, as the special servicer declined to order new files until
the loan reached 90 days delinquency (which has not occurred to
date), in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
(PSA). While this approach is in line with the guidelines set forth
in the PSA, DBRS believes it is uncommon for a servicer to delay
ordering an appraisal when existing loan performance issues have
the potential to be long term, which DBRS believes to be the case
with this loan. The appraised value of the property at issuance was
$68.8 million. DBRS expects the values to have declined
significantly since that time, given the property's performance
decline in recent years and the general economic difficulty in the
area.

The loan has full recourse to Lanesborough Real Estate Investment
Trust (LREIT), 2668921 Manitoba Ltd. and Shelter Canadian
Properties Limited. LREIT's assets are heavily concentrated in
Alberta, and the portfolio has been significantly affected by the
downturn in the oil industry. In its Q3 2016 financial statements,
LREIT reported total assets of $262 million and total liabilities
of $263 million, resulting in a deficit of $1.1 million. In
addition, LREIT reported a loss before discontinued operations of
$10.6 million for the three months ending September 30, 2016, but
reported an income of $2.3 million for the nine months ending
September 30, 2016. In conjunction with the subject loan's transfer
to special servicing, seven other assets located in Fort McMurray
and secured by DBRS-rated commercial mortgage-backed security
(CMBS) loans in LREIT's portfolio were also transferred to special
servicing for similar issues. All of these loans are current as of
the November 2016 remittance. According to LREIT's Q3 2016
financial statements, LREIT sold three properties in 2016,
including Beck Court, Willowdale Gardens and Elgin Lodge, all of
which are apartment buildings or retirement homes respectively
located in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories; Brandon, Manitoba;
and Port Elgin, Ontario. With these sales, LREIT's portfolio is
almost entirely located in Fort McMurray. The narrative in the
financial statement states that the property sales were completed
to reduce LREIT's liabilities and fulfill debt obligations. During
Q1 2016, 12 mortgages secured by 13 LREIT-owned properties in Fort
McMurray were in default but as per the Q3 2016 financial
statement, LREIT was able to reduce and/or defer the debt service
payments, as well as to negotiate with lenders to modify the loan
terms and/or forbearance agreements. LREIT notes that it will
continue to rely on its lenders to provide breathing room in the
environment of sustained economic difficulty for the area.

Although the subject loan and other CMBS were recently brought
current, with the special servicers indicating that the loans are
expected to transfer back to the master servicer following a
monitoring period in early 2017, the general outlook for these
assets is significantly depressed, particularly given the upcoming
maturity for most of LREIT's CMBS book in the next 18 to 24 months.
As the lending environment is essentially frozen in the area, given
the general economic decline and no room for significant
improvement in sight for the near term, and given LREIT's generally
difficult economic position, finding replacement loans for these
properties will be challenging to say the least. As such, it is
likely the special servicer will see these and the other CMBS loans
again and loan modifications could be necessary. As such, DBRS
maintains the bond as previously listed Under Review with Negative
Implications to reflect the increased risk and general uncertainty
surrounding these loans. Given the general lack of concrete
information on the status of the loan's workout and the current
financial performance for the collateral property, DBRS has
coordinated a trip to Fort McMurray with the special servicer to
tour this and other properties secured by DBRS-rated CMBS debt and
to gather information about the current performance outlook for
both these assets and the market in general. These tours will take
place in mid-December, and shortly following that visit, DBRS will
bring this and the other related CMBS transactions back up for
review to incorporate the information gathered as part of the
visit.


IMSCI 2014-5: DBRS' B Rating on Class G Certs Still on Review
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. maintained the Under Review with Negative Implications
status on the following class of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates Series 2014-5 issued by Institutional Mortgage
Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series 2014-5:

   -- Class G at B (sf), Under Review with Negative Implications

The rating for Class G does not carry a trend.

DBRS has maintained Class G Under Review with Negative Implications
because of concerns surrounding the Nelson Ridge loan (Prospectus
ID #17, 2.9% of the pool). The loan represents the A-2 portion of a
pari passu loan, which had an original aggregate balance of $31.0
million. The A-1 piece, which had an original balance of $23.0
million, was included in the IMSCI 2014-5 transaction. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer because the borrower advised
that debt service obligations could no longer be met, given the
cash flow declines at the property, driven by general economic
difficulty in the Fort McMurray, Alberta, area. As of the November
2016 remittance report, the loan was brought current after
typically running between 30 and 60 days delinquent. DBRS received
the borrower's October 2016 year-to-date unaudited financial
statements from the servicer, which reported an operating loss of
$1.8 million. The reported loss suggests that the borrower was able
to bring the loan current through funds derived from alternative
sources; DBRS has requested further confirmation from the special
servicer.

Prior to the loan's transfer to special servicing, the loan was
being monitored for property performance declines related to the
downturn in the oil industry over the past few years. Following the
May 2016 wildfire, which, according to the special servicer, only
caused incidental damage to the subject property, occupancy has
improved as of the November 2016 rent roll to 80.9%, up from the
July 2016 occupancy rate of 72.9%. However, rental rates declined
during that period from $2,088 per unit in July to $1,526 per unit
in November. According to the Canada Mortgage Housing Corporation,
as of October 2015, the Wood Buffalo Municipal Region reported an
average vacancy rate of 29.4%; the average rental rate for all unit
types was reported at $1,761 per unit.

There has not been an updated appraisal for the property since
issuance, as the special servicer declined to order new files until
the loan reached 90 days delinquency (which has not occurred to
date), in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement
(PSA). While this approach is in line with the guidelines set forth
in the PSA, DBRS believes it is uncommon for a servicer to delay
ordering an appraisal when existing loan performance issues have
the potential to be long term, which DBRS believes to be the case
with this loan. The appraised value of the property at issuance was
$68.8 million. DBRS expects the values to have declined
significantly since that time, given the property’s performance
decline in recent years and the general economic difficulty in the
area.

The loan has full recourse to Lanesborough Real Estate Investment
Trust (LREIT), 2668921 Manitoba Ltd. and Shelter Canadian
Properties Limited. LREIT's assets are heavily concentrated in
Alberta, and the portfolio has been significantly affected by the
downturn in the oil industry. In its Q3 2016 financial statements,
LREIT reported total assets of $262 million and total liabilities
of $263 million, resulting in a deficit of $1.1 million. In
addition, LREIT reported a loss before discontinued operations of
$10.6 million for the three months ending September 30, 2016, but
reported an income of $2.3 million for the nine months ending
September 30, 2016. In conjunction with the subject loan's transfer
to special servicing, seven other assets located in Fort McMurray
and secured by DBRS-rated commercial mortgage-backed security
(CMBS) loans in LREIT's portfolio were also transferred to special
servicing for similar issues. All of these loans are current as of
the November 2016 remittance. According to LREIT's Q3 2016
financial statements, LREIT sold three properties in 2016,
including Beck Court, Willowdale Gardens and Elgin Lodge, all of
which are apartment buildings or retirement homes respectively
located in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories; Brandon, Manitoba;
and Port Elgin, Ontario. With these sales, LREIT's portfolio is
almost entirely located in Fort McMurray. The narrative in the
financial statement states that property sales were completed to
reduce LREIT's liabilities and fulfill debt obligations. During Q1
2016, 12 mortgages secured by 13 LREIT-owned properties in Fort
McMurray were in default, but as per the Q3 2016 financial
statement, LREIT was able to reduce and/or defer the debt service
payments, as well as to negotiate with lenders to modify the loan
terms and/or forbearance agreements. LREIT notes that it will
continue to rely on its lenders to provide breathing room in the
environment of sustained economic difficulty for the area.

Although the subject loan and other CMBS were recently brought
current, with the special servicers indicating that the loans are
expected to transfer back to the master servicer following a
monitoring period in early 2017, the general outlook for these
assets is significantly depressed, particularly given the upcoming
maturity for most of LREIT's CMBS book in the next 18 to 24 months.
As the lending environment is essentially frozen in the area, given
the general economic decline and no room for significant
improvement in sight for the near term, and given LREIT's generally
difficult economic position, finding replacement loans for these
properties will be challenging to say the least. As such, it is
likely the special servicer will see these and the other CMBS loans
again and loan modifications could be necessary. As such, DBRS
maintains the bond as previously listed Under Review with Negative
Implications to reflect the increased risk and general uncertainty
surrounding the subject loan. Given the general lack of concrete
information on the status of the loan's workout and the current
financial performance for the collateral property, DBRS has
coordinated a trip to Fort McMurray with the special servicer to
tour this and other properties secured by DBRS-rated CMBS debt and
to gather information about the current performance outlook for
both these assets and the market in general. These tours will take
place in mid-December, and shortly following that visit, DBRS will
bring this and the other related CMBS transactions back up for
review to incorporate the information gathered as part of the
visit.

Notes: All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.

The applicable methodologies are the North American CMBS Rating
Methodology (March 2016) and CMBS North American Surveillance
(October 2016), which can be found on our website under
Methodologies.

This rating is endorsed by DBRS Ratings Limited for use in the
European Union.

RATINGS

Issuer           Debt Rated            Rating Action        Rating
------           ----------            -------------        ------
Institutional    Commercial Mortgage      UR-Neg.           B (sf)
Mortgage         Pass-Through
Securities       Certificates,
Canada Inc.,     Series 2014-5,
Series 2014-5    Class G


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC11: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CIBC11 as follows:

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015

      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes, Classes B, C, D, E and F, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges. The ratings on three P&I classes, Classes
G, H and K, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on Class J was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
are higher than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO Class, class X-1, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.6% of the
current balance, compared to 6.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 4 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 14, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $176.6
million from $1.8 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 52.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 93.1%
of the pool. Two loans, constituting 3% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Five loans, constituting 14.9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $52.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 40%). Two loans, constituting 13.6% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Shoppes at IV Loan ($15.9 million -- 9.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 134,000 square foot (SF) retail center in
Paramus, New Jersey. The property is anchored by Macy's Furniture
with a lease expiration in January 2021. As per the September 2016
rent roll the property was 88% leased, the same as in February
2015. The loan transferred to special servicing in February 2015
for maturity default. The note holder has filed its foreclosure
documents as it continues to dual track recovery.

The other loan in specially servicing is the Waterside Center Loan
($8.1 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 52,000
square foot (SF) multi-tenant retail center located approximately
40 miles from Chicago, Illinois. The loan transferred to special
servicing in March 2009 due to the downsizing of major tenants. A
modification agreement allowing 24 months of interest only payments
was closed in May 2010 and the loan subsequently transferred back
to the Master Servicer. However, the loan transferred back to
special servicing in August 2014 for imminent balloon
payment/maturity default. Title transferred to the Trust in January
2016 and the asset is now real estate owned ("REO"). As per the
June 2016 rent roll the property was 69% occupied, compared to 82%
leased in June 2014.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 7.4% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $11.7 million (a 32% expected loss on average)
from these specially serviced and troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 92% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 70% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 65.8%, compared to 66.4% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.8% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.51X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.51X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 68% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Airport Industrial Park Loan ($92.4 million
-- 52.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 826,390 square foot
(SF) multi-level warehouse and office complex located in Honolulu,
Hawaii. As per the July 2016 rent roll the property was 98% leased,
compared to 94% leased in September 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 66.6% and 1.38X, respectively, compared to 64.7% and 1.42X
at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arbor Trace Apartments Loan ($16.6
million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 384-unit
multifamily property located in Charlotte, North Carolina. As per
the June 2016 rent roll the property was 95% occupied, compared to
96% leased as of September 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
70.5% and 1.38X, respectively, compared to 82.7% and 1.18X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Doctors Pavillion -- A Note Loan ($11
million -- 6.2% of the pool), which is secured by a two-story
medical office building in Las Vegas, Nevada. Occupancy
deteriorated in 2013 due to the Veterans Administration
(approximately 40% of the NRA); vacating upon lease expiration. The
original loan transferred into special servicing in March 2015 due
to maturity default. A loan modification was executed in January
2016 that included a note split into a $11 million A-Note and a
$2.2 million B-Note. The maturity date was also extended by two
years to October 2017. The loan returned from special servicing in
April 2016 and is performing under the modified terms. Moody's has
identified both notes as troubled loans.


JP MORGAN 2005-LDP5: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. Series 2005-LDP5 as follows:

   -- Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Upgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016    
      Affirmed B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. J, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016

      Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes C, D and E were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 36% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on Classes F and G were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The rating on the Class K was affirmed because the rating
is consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on Classes H and J were downgraded due to anticipated
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans as well as an
increase in realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-1, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 29.6% of the
current balance, compared to 39.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $316
million from $4.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 20 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 25% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 91% of
the pool.

Two loans, constituting 0.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $151.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 55%). Five loans, constituting 39% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Atlantic Development Portfolio Loan ($80 million -- 25% of
the pool), which was originally secured by six office and two
industrial buildings located in Warren and Somerset, New Jersey.
The loan originally transferred to special servicing in 2010 for
imminent monetary default and the loan was subsequently modified to
allow the sale of one property. The proceeds were used to pay down
the principal balance and the loan returned to the master servicer
in 2011. The loan transferred back to special servicing in July
2015 due to imminent monetary default. Cash flow was significantly
impacted by the vacancy of two tenants in 2015 totaling
approximately 153,000 square foot (SF) which reduced the
portfolio's occupancy to 52%. As of June 2016, the remaining seven
properties have an overall occupancy of 67%.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $63.8 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (52% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 11.5% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $27.2 million (a 75% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 65% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 54% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96%, compared to
85% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.41X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.62X and 1.21X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 41% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the DRA - CRT Portfolio II -- A note Loan ($79
million -- 25% of the pool), which is secured by 27 office
properties located throughout Memphis, TN and Orlando, FL. There
were 30 properties at securitization but three buildings in
Jacksonville, FL have been sold and the proceeds were used to pay
down the A-note. The original loan was modified in June 2013. The
modification included (among other items) a bifurcation of the loan
into an $111 million A-note and a $25.6 million B-note and a
maturity date extension to November 2019. The portfolio was
collectively 78% occupied as of July 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR on the A-note are 97% and 1.03X, respectively. Moody's has
identified the B-note portion as a troubled loan and aniticpates a
significant loss.

The second largest loan is the Mellon Trust Center Loan ($43.5
million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by a 384,000 SF
suburban office building located in Everett, Massachusetts (5 miles
north of the Boston CBD). The property is fully leased to BNY
Mellon through April 30, 2019. Due to the single tenant exposure
Moody's utilized a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 115% and 0.82X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Precise Technology, Inc. - Buffalo
Grove, IL Loan ($6.3 million -- 2% of the pool), which is secured
by a 265,000 SF industrial building located in Buffalo Grove,
Illinois (33 miles north west of the Chicago CBD). The property is
fully leased to Berry Plastics Group through January 31, 2025. The
loan is fully-amortizing and has amortized 40% since
securitization. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's utilized
a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 52% and
1.99X, respectively, compared to 47% and 2.18X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2012-C6: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust,
Series 2012-C6 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016   
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016 Affirmed

      A1 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016 Affirmed

      A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016 Affirmed

      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on eleven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes X-A and X-B were affirmed based on
the credit performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.4% of the
current balance, compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, compared to 21 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 18 November, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14.7% to $967.6
million from $1.134 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 44 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 54.4% of the pool.

Nine loans, constituting 10.1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, constituting 0.7% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the 317 6th
Avenue Loan ($7.0 million -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by
a Class B office building located in downtown Des Moines, Iowa. The
loan transferred to the special servicer in May 2016 due to
imminent default. The property was 40% occupied as of September
2016, compared to 75% in December 2015.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $3.9 million loss for specially
serviced loans (55.3% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 97% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 89%, the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 15.6% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.69X and 1.21X,
respectively, the same as at the last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the
agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 31.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 200 Public Square Loan ($122.1 million --
12.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.27 million SF, Class A,
office tower in downtown Cleveland, Ohio. The property is situated
on Public Square and is the third-tallest building in Cleveland.
The property, which was built in 1985 includes an eight-story
atrium, conference facilities, a fitness center, retail, and dining
options. As of the September 2016 rent roll, the property was 78%
occupied, compared to 81% at last review. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 99% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 100% and 1.00X at
the last review.

The second largest loan is the Arbor Place Mall Loan ($113.8
million -- 11.8% of the pool), which is secured by 546,000 SF
component of a 1.16 million SF super-regional mall located in
Douglasville, Georgia. The property, which was built in 1999, is
anchored by Dillard's, Belk, Macy's, J.C. Penney, and Sears. All
anchors except for J.C. Penney are owned by the tenant and are not
part of the collateral. As of the September 2016 rent roll, the
property was 99% occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102%
and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 104% and 0.99X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Northwoods Mall Loan ($67.9 million
-- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 404,000 SF component of
a 792,000 SF regional mall located in North Charleston, South
Carolina. The property was built in 1972 and renovated by the
sponsor in 2004. The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Sears,
Dillard's, and Belk. All anchors except for J.C. Penney are owned
by the tenant and are not part of the collateral. As of the
September 2016 rent roll, the property was 98% occupied. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to
86% and 1.22X at the last review.



JP MORGAN 2016-ASH: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to seven
classes of commercial mortgage backed securities, issued by J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-ASH,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-ASH.:

  Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)
  Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)
  Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)
  Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)
  Cl. X-CP*, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)
  * Interest Only Certificate

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien mortgages on a portfolio of 18 hotel properties in the
full-service, select-service, and extended-stay segments.  The
Borrowers are comprised on 18 bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
entities, each of which is a Delaware limited partnerships owned by
the Sponsor, Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc.

Moody's ratings are based on the collateral and the structure of
the transaction.

Single Borrower Rating Approach: Moody's approach to rating this
transaction involved the application of both Moody's Single
Borrower methodology and Moody's IO Rating methodology.  The rating
approach for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit
risk inherent in the underlying property with the credit protection
offered by the structure.  The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels.  In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $415,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 109.2% which is below other standalone property loans that have
previously been assigned comparable underlying ratings by Moody's.
The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 2.12X and Moody's First
Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.09X.  The financing is subject
to a mezzanine loan totaling $35,000,000.  The Moody's Total Debt
LTV (inclusive of the mezzanine loan) is 118.4%, while Moody's
First Total Debt Actual DSCR is 1.81X, and Moody's Total Debt
Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.01X.

The collateral under the mortgage loan is comprised of a pool of 18
hotel properties diversified across full-service (6 hotels, 44.1%
of ALA), select-service (8 hotels, 38.1% of ALA) and extended-stay
(4 hotels, 17.8% of ALA) chain scale segments.  The portfolio is
geographically diversified across 7 states and 10 MSA, with no
single state representing more than 41.9% (California) of the
allocated loan amount and no single MSA representing more than
32.5% (San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA) of the allocated mortgage
loan amount.  The loan's property-level Herfindal Index score is
13.1 based on allocated loan amount.

As of September 30, 2016, the portfolio's overall occupancy rate
for the trailing twelve months was 76.7%, ADR (average daily rate)
was $151.21, and RevPAR (revenue per available room) was $116.02.
Additionally, the portfolio's Occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR
penetration for the trailing twelve months was 104.0%, 115.0% and
119.6% respectively.

The transaction also contains non-sequential prepayment provisions.
So long as there is no event of default under the Mortgage Loan or
Mezzanine Loan, principal prepayments attributable to the Mortgage
Loan will be allocated pro rata among the outstanding principal
balance of each of the Loan Components of the Mortgage Loan until
30% of the initial loan amount of the Mortgage Loan has been
prepaid in the aggregate.  As such, principal prepayments
attributable to the Mortgage Loan would be applied pro-rata to
Certificates A through F until 30% of the initial loan balance has
been prepaid.

Moody's rating approach considers sequential pay in connection with
a prepayment or collateral release as a credit neutral benchmark.
Although the loan's release premium mitigates the risk of a ratings
downgrade due to adverse selection, the pro rata payment structure
limits ratings upgrade potential as mezzanine classes are prevented
from building enhancement.  The benefit received from pooling
through cross-collateralization is also reduced.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model, which it uses for single borrower and large loan
multi-borrower transactions.  The large loan model derives credit
enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan level
proceeds derived from Moody's loan level LTV ratios.  Major
adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure, and property type.  These aggregated proceeds are then
further adjusted for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity, other concentrations and correlations.  Moody's
analysis also uses the CMBS IO calculator which references the
following inputs to calculate the proposed IO rating based on the
published methodology: original and current bond ratings and credit
estimates; original and current bond balances grossed up for losses
for all bonds the IO(s) reference(s) within the transaction; and IO
type corresponding to an IO type as defined in the published
methodology.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If Moody's value of the collateral
used in determining the initial rating were decreased by 5%, 14%,
or 22%, the model-indicated rating for the currently rated Aaa (sf)
class would be Aa1 (sf), Aa2 (sf), or Aa3 (sf), respectively.
Parameter Sensitivities are not intended to measure how the rating
of the security might migrate over time; rather they are designed
to provide a quantitative calculation of how the initial rating
might change if key input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed.  The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.
Parameter Sensitivities only reflect the ratings impact of each
scenario from a quantitative/model-indicated standpoint.
Qualitative factors are also taken into consideration in the
ratings process, so the actual ratings that would be assigned in
each case could vary from the information presented in the
Parameter Sensitivity analysis.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's and (b) must be construed solely
as a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter.  Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer.  Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated.  Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan paydowns or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance.  Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. IO Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the rating of one interest-only
class in LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 1998-C1, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1998-C1 as follows:

   -- Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO Class, Class IO, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 4 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $17.3 million
from $1.7 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by 13 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 44% of the pool. Six loans, representing 20% of the pool have
defeased and are secured by US Government securities.

Two loans, representing 67% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans which meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, Moody's reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
impact performance.

Twenty one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $53.4 million (43% loss severity on
average). No loans are currently in special servicing and Moody's
did not identify any troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 and partial year 2016 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 37% compared to 36% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
10.6% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 4.68X,
respectively, compared to 1.63X and 5.01X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's net cash flow (NCF) and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 74% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Imperial Palms Apartments Loan ($7.6
million -- 44.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 638-unit
senior rental community located in Largo, Florida. The property was
94% leased as of June 2016 compared to 93% at last review. The
property performance is stable and the loan benefits from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 39% and 2.52X,
respectively, compared to 41% and 2.40X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 1526 Charles Boulevard Loan ($4.0
million -- 23.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 144-unit (528
bed) student housing complex located in Greenville, North Carolina.
All of the property's floor plans consists of either three or four
bedrooms units. As of June 2016, the property was 97% occupied and
remains unchanged since last review. The loan is fully amortizing
and matures in December 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 51%
and 1.89X, respectively, compared to 68% and 1.44X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Perimeter Station Shopping Center
Loan ($1.1 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
83,500 square foot (SF) anchored retail property located in the
Chamblee/Dunwoody submarket of Atlanta, GA. The property is 100%
leased, the same as at last review. Major tenants at the property
include Barnes & Noble and the Container Store. The loan matures in
November 2017 and has amortized 90% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 6% and greater than 4.00X, respectively,
compared to 10% and greater than 4.00X at last review.


LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. A-J Certs to B-
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-C3, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P lowered its
ratings on two classes and affirmed its ratings on six other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes A-4, A-4B, and A-1A to reflect
its expectation of the available credit enhancement for these
classes, which S&P believes is greater than its most recent
estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating
levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views regarding the current
and future performance of the transaction's collateral, available
liquidity support, and the reduced trust balance.

The downgrades on classes A-J and A-JFL reflect credit support
erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the three assets ($164.7 million, 8.5%) with the
special servicer (discussed below), reflecting 50 Danbury Road and
64 Danbury Road as one crossed loan, as well as reduced liquidity
support available because of ongoing interest shortfalls.

According to the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $300,119 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $214,407; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $34,409.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class C.  Class B had an outstanding cumulative interest
shortfall that was partially repaid in November.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.  The affirmations
also reflect S&P's views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the transaction
structure, and liquidity support available to the classes.

S&P's affirmation on class A-4FL further reflects the bond's
dependency on the performance of an interest rate swap
counterparty, Goldman Sachs Mitsui Marine Derivative Products L.P.
('AA-/Stable'), which was analyzed in accordance with S&P's
counterparty criteria, "Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology And
Assumptions," published June 25, 2013.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class X interest-only
(IO) certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO
securities.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $1.93 billion, which is 59.7% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 52 loans and one real
estate-owned (REO) asset (reflecting crossed loans), down from 90
loans at issuance.  Three of these assets (reflecting crossed
loans) are with the special servicer, seven ($70.6 million, 3.7%)
are defeased, and 11 ($839.3 million, 43.4%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate
Capital, reported financial information for 99.7% of the
nondefeased loans in the pool,of which 78.8% was year-end 2015 data
and the remainder was partial-year 2016 data.

S&P calculated a 1.46x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and an 87.0% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 6.96% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the three specially
serviced assets and seven defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased
loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of
$1.32 billion (68.5%).  Using adjusted servicer-reported numbers,
S&P calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV
of 1.40x and 87.6%, respectively, for eight of the top 10
nondefeased loans.  The remaining two loans are specially serviced
and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $229.5 million in
principal losses, or 7.1% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 9.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the three specially serviced assets.

                           CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Nov. 18, 2016, trustee remittance report, three assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC. Details
of the two largest specially serviced assets, both of which are top
10 nondefeased loans, follow:

The University Mall REO asset ($92.0 million, 4.8%) is the
fourth-largest nondefeased asset in the pool and has a total
reported exposure of $92.9 million.  The asset is a retail property
totaling 609,493 sq. ft. in South Burlington, Vt.  The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on July 6, 2015, because of
imminent default.  The property became REO on Oct. 31, 2016.
The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2015 were 1.02x and
98.0%, respectively.  A $51.2 million appraisal reduction amount is
in effect against this loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
asset's eventual resolution.

The crossed loans of 50 Danbury Road and 64 Danbury Road ($67.0
million, 3.5%) have a total reported exposure of $67.4 million. The
loans are secured by two office properties totaling 265,142 sq. ft.
in Wilton, Conn.  The loans were transferred to the special
servicer in February 2015 because of imminent default. 50 Danbury
Road's reported DSC and occupancy as of March 31, 2016,
were 1.20x and 100.0%, respectively.  64 Danbury Road's reported
DSC and occupancy as of March 31, 2016, were 1.43x and 93.4%,
respectively.  S&P expects a minimal loss upon each property's
eventual resolution.

The remaining asset with the special servicer represents 0.3% of
the total pool trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the three
specially serviced assets, arriving at a weighted average loss
severity of 42.3%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25% and a moderate loss is 26%-59%.

RATINGS LIST

LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-C3
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To           From
A-4              50177AAE9             AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
A-1A             50177AAF6             AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
A-M              50177AAG4             BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
A-J              50177AAH2             B- (sf)      B (sf)
B                50177AAJ8             CCC (sf)     CCC (sf)
X                50177AAP4             AAA (sf)     AAA (sf)
A-4B             50177AAS8             AA+ (sf)     AA (sf)
A-MB             50177AAR0             BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
A-4FL            50177AAT6             AA (sf)      AA (sf)
A-MFL            50177AAU3             BBB- (sf)    BBB- (sf)
A-JFL            50177AAV1             B- (sf)      B (sf)


MIDOCEAN CREDIT I: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from MidOcean
Credit CLO I, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2013 that is managed by MidOcean Credit Fund Management
L.P.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed amended
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the Dec. 15, 2016, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

MidOcean Credit CLO I/MidOcean Credit CLO I LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             210.50
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               39.00
B-R                       A (sf)                22.00
C-R                       BBB (sf)              13.50
D-R                       BB (sf)               11.40
Subordinated notes        NR                 54.51807

NR--Not rated.



ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-5: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on AJ Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the ratings on eight classes and downgraded the rating on
one class of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, 2007-5 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. AM, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. AM-FL, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ-FL, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes A-M and AM-FL were upgraded primarily due to
an increase in credit support since Moody's last review resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 53%
since Moody's last review.

The ratings on Classes A-1A, A-4 and A-4FL were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges. The ratings on Classes AJ, AJ-FL, B, C, and D
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded based on the
decline in credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its reference classes from the principal paydown
of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 16.2% of the
current balance compared to 8.6% at last review. The deal has paid
down 53% since last review and 74% since securitization. Moody's
base plus realized loss totals 11.1% of the original pooled balance
compared to 12.9% at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit / Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Conduit Loan Herf of 26 compared to 70 at last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 74% to $1.13 billion
from $4.42 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 105 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to just under 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 37% of the pool. Ten loans, constituting 22% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Sixty-nine loans, constituting 54% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $308.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 57%). Twenty loans, constituting 22% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loans are
secured by a mix of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$159.1 million loss for the specially serviced loans (64% expected
loss on average). Moody's has assumed a high default probability
for ten poorly performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and
has estimated an aggregate loss of $12.8 million (a 15% expected
loss on average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 79% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, essentially the same
as at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.27X and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 1.32X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 18% of the pool balance. The
largest conduit loan is the Hotel Gansevoort Loan ($110.4 million
-- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 187-key full service
boutique hotel located in the Meatpacking District in Manhattan,
New York. Occupancy as of June 2016 was 87%, consistent with prior
year results. The loan has amortized 12% since securitization and
matures in March 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and
0.97X, respectively, compared to 116% and 0.95X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Medical Center of Santa
Monica Loan ($62.0 million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured
by a 204,747 square foot medical office building located in Santa
Monica, California. Property performance has been steady for
several years with the most recent occupancy reported at 93% in the
second quarter of 2016. The loan is interest-only throughout the
entire term and matures in January 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 81% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.22X at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the is the Spectrum Commerce
Center Loan ($33.0 million -- 2.9% of the pool), which is secured
by a 289,595 SF office building located in Eagan, Minnesota. The
Property was 92% leased as of year-end 2015. Wells Fargo occupies
66% of the NRA with a lease expiration in October 2020. The loan
has amortized 11% since securitization and matures in January 2017.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.90X, respectively.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. AM Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the ratings on five classes in ML-CFC Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-6 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. AM, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. AJ-FL, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28,
      2016 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Downgraded to C (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2016
      Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes A-1A, A-4 and A-M were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on classes D, E, F, G and H were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on four P&I classes, Classes AJ, AJ-FL, B and C, were
downgraded due to anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 21.9% the
current balance, compared to 19.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is 17.0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 24, compared to a Herf of 30 at Moody's last
review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 36% to $1.38 billion
from $2.15 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 103 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 11% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 51% of
the pool. Five loans, constituting 4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Fifty loans, constituting 36% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $60.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 60%). Ten loans, constituting 15% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Blackpoint Puerto Rico Retail Loan ($84.7 million -- 6.1% of
the pool), which is secured by six retail properties located
throughout Puerto Rico. The properties range in size from 59,000 to
306,000 square feet (SF) and total 855,000 SF. The loan transferred
to special servicing in February 2012 due to imminent maturity
default when the borrower expressed an inability to pay off the
loan at maturity.

The remaining nine specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $119 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (58% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans, constituting 17% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $148 million (a 63% expected loss on average)
from these troubled loans.

As of the November 2016 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $48.8 million, which have caused shortfalls up to
the AJ and AJ-FL classes. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls
will continue because of the exposure to specially serviced loans
and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and
extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 98% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 82% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 107%, compared to 101% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.45X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the South Park Mall Loan ($150.0 million -- 10.8%
of the pool), which is secured by an 887,000 SF portion of a 1.6
million SF regional mall in Strongsville, Ohio. The loan was
formally known as Westfield Southpark but a majority interest in
the property was acquired by Starwood Capital Group as part of a
portfolio sale in 2012. Non-owned anchors include Dillard's,
Macy's, Sears and JC Penney. As of June 2015, the collateral
portion was 97% leased. The loan is interest-only throughout its
term. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.14X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the A-1 Note related to the MSKP Retail
Portfolio -- A Loan ($129.5 million -- 9.4% of the pool), which is
secured by eight retail properties located throughout four separate
markets in Florida. The properties range in size from 63,000 to
230,000 SF and total 1.28 million SF. The loan transferred to
special servicing in March 2011 due to imminent monetary default
and a loan modification was executed in March 2012. Terms of the
modification included a bifurcation of the original loan into a
$130.3 million A-1 Note and $93.1 million subordinate A-2 Note
(Hope Note) along with an extension of the maturity date of two
years to March 2019. The subordinate A-2 Note has a 0% pay rate and
has created ongoing interest shortfalls to the trust in the amount
of approximately $435,000 per month. The loan returned to the
master servicer in November 2012 and is performing under the
modified terms. The portfolio was 78% leased as of September 2016.
Moody's considers the $93.1 million subordinate A-2 Note a troubled
loan and recognized a significant loss against it. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR on the A-1 Note are 126% and 0.79X, respectively,
compared to 120% and 0.83X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Steuart Industrial Portfolio Loan
($63.6 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is secured by ten
industrial buildings located in three industrial parks. Nine of the
buildings are located in northern Virginia (eight of which are in
the Woodbridge submarket) and one in Maryland. The portfolio was
96% leased as of June 2016 compared to 87% as of December 2015 and
69% in December 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 134% and
0.72X, respectively, compared to 141% and 0.69X at the last review.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-8: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on 8 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 21 classes of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage
Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-8
(ML-CFC 2007-8).

Fitch has issued a focus report on this transaction.  The report
provides a detailed and up-to-date perspective on key credit
characteristics of the ML-CFC 2007-8 transaction and property-level
performance of the related trust loans.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Relatively Stable Performance: The affirmations reflect the
relatively stable performance of the pool since Fitch's last rating
action and modeled losses remain in line with previous
expectations.  Fitch modeled losses of 20.3% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 18.5%, including
$117 million (4.8% of original pool balance) in realized losses
incurred to date.  Modeled losses at the last rating action were
18.1% of the original pool balance.  As of the November 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 32.2% to $1.65 billion from $2.44 billion at issuance.
Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling $59.8 million are affecting
classes AJ and AJ-A through T.

Defeasance: According to servicer reporting and as of November
2016, 10.8% of the pool has been defeased, which includes 22 fully
defeased loans (10.7%) and one partially defeased loan (defeased
portion accounts for 0.1% of pool).

Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated 49 loans (45.6%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern, which includes 13 specially serviced loans/assets
(29.4%).

Prolonged REO Workouts: Of the seven REO assets comprising 7.2% of
the pool, two (3.1%) have been REO since 2012, two (2.4%) since
2013, two since 2014 (0.3%) and one since 2015 (1.4%).  Three of
the assets in the top 15 are REO, including the two largest, Towers
at University Town Center (2.9%) and Douglas Corporate Center I &
II (2.2%), which have been REO since 2012 and 2013, respectively.

Loan Concentration: The largest loan, Spring Gate - A/B Notes,
comprises 18.3% of the pool, and remains the largest contributor to
Fitch modeled loss expectations.  The loan remains in special
servicing and was previously modified into A/B notes in 2015.

Maturity Concentration: Loan maturities are concentrated in 2017
(91% of pool, excluding REO assets).

Undercollateralization: The pool is undercollateralized as the
aggregate balance of the certificates is $217,986 greater than the
aggregate collateral balance, as of the November 2016 remittance
report.  This disparity of principal balances is due to the
servicer recovering workout-delayed reimbursement amounts from the
transaction's principal collections.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on classes A-3, A-1A, AM and AM-A reflects the
uncertainty surrounding the workout and ultimate disposition of the
specially serviced loans/assets and the possibility of negative
rating migration should performing loans, many of which are highly
leveraged, not refinance at maturity as expected.  The distressed
classes may be subject to further downgrades as additional losses
are realized.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Rating Outlooks for these classes:

   -- $625.4 million class A-3 at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Negative from

      Stable;
   -- $413.2 million class A-1A at 'AAsf'; Outlook to Negative
      from Stable;
   -- $126.9 million class AM at 'Bsfsf'; Outlook to Negative from

      Stable;
   -- $116.6 million class AM-A at 'Bsfsf'; Outlook to Negative
      from Stable;
   -- $109.4 million class AJ at 'Csf'; RE 20%;
   -- $100.6 million class AJ-A at 'Csf'; RE 20%;
   -- $12.2 million class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $39.6 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $27.4 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $9.1 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $18.3 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $21.3 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $32.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%

The class A-1, A-2 and A-SB certificates have paid in full.  Fitch
does not rate class T.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-HQ10: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on A-J Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
and downgraded the rating on one class of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2006-HQ10, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-HQ10 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016
      Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016
      Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed
      C (sf)

   -- Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016

      Downgraded to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the six remaining P&I classes were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes. The deal has paid down 74% since last review.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 27.1% of the
current balance, compared to 11.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan size,
where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 10 at last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 15, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 89% to $163.6
million from $1.5 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 59% of the pool.

Two loans, constituting 5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $87.6 million (for an
average loss severity of 39%). Eleven loans, constituting 89% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan and largest loan in the pool is the PPG Portfolio
loan ($97.2 million -- 59.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of seven medical office properties totaling 435,000
square feet. The properties are located in Colorado (4 properties),
Indiana (2) and Arizona (1). The loan transferred to special
servicing in May 2016 due to imminent maturity default. The loan
was scheduled to mature in October 2016. The properties face
significant tenant rollover in 2017, which impeded the borrower's
ability to refinance.

The four remaining loans in special servicing represent 29% of the
pool. Moody's estimates an aggregate $44.2 million loss for the
specially serviced loans (30% expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2015 and partial year 2016 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 80.3%. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 15% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.30X,
respectively, compared to 1.33X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 11.2% of the pool.
The largest loan is the Copperwood Apartments Loan ($10.3 million
-- 6.3% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 300-unit apartment
complex located in The Woodlands, Texas. Built in 1982 and
renovated in 2006, this property has had sustained occupancy at or
above 99% since securitization. This loan has amortized 10% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.51X,
respectively, essentially the same as at last review.

The second largest performing loan is the 8 Progress Drive Loan
($4.3 million -- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 63,500
square foot office property located in Shelton, Connecticut. The
property was 83% occupied as of June 2016, the same as at last
review. The loan has amortized 15% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.22X, respectively, essentially
the same as at last review.

The third largest performing loan is the Dick's Sporting Goods Loan
($3.8 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
freestanding store in Akron, Ohio fully leased to Dick's Sporting
Goods. The loan has passed its anticipated repayment date in
October 2016. The loan remains current and has a final maturity
date in October 2036. Given the single tenant exposure, Moody's
anlysis includes a lit/dark approach. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 121% and 0.85X, respectively.



MORGAN STANLEY 2007-HQ11: Moody's Lowers Cl. A-J Debt Rating to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of seven
classes and affirmed the ratings of nine classes in Morgan Stanley
Capital I Inc. 2007-HQ11 as:

  Cl. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 3, 2016, Affirmed

   Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-4-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on June 3, 2016, Affirmed

   Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

  Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

  Cl. B, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

  Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed B2 (sf)

  Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

  Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  Cl. F, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016, Downgraded z
   to C (sf)

  Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 3, 2016, Affirmed
   C (sf)

  Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on June 3, 2016,
   Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes were downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's had previously expected, as well as
increased exposure to interest shortfalls.

The ratings on five investment grade P&I classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.  The ratings on Classes G, H, J, and K
were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's
expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 27% of the
current balance compared to 13% at Moody's last review.  Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term.  Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

                 METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published on October 2015.

                        DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions.  Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value).  Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity.  Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances.  The credit neutral Herf score is 40.  The
pool has a Herf of 10, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation.  The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.  Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type.  Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

                         DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the Nov. 15, 2016, distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 70% to $730 million
from $2.42 billion at securitization.  The certificates are
collateralized by 68 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 19% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 66% of the pool.  The pool contains no
loans with investment-grade structured credit assessments.  Twelve
loans, constituting 6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured
by US government securities.

Forty-eight loans, constituting 40% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist.  The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package.  As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $97 million (for an average loss
severity of 24%).  Six loans, constituting 36% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.  The largest specially serviced
loan is the Galleria at Pittsburgh Mills Loan ($133 million -- 18%
of the pool), which is secured by an 880,000 square foot collateral
portion of a super-regional mall located in Tarentum, Pennsylvania.
The mall's financial performance has declined sharply in recent
years, largely mirroring a decline in overall occupancy.  The
departure of anchor tenant Sears in late 2015 triggered co-tenancy
clauses at the property causing several inline tenant leases to
become percentage leases, further contributing to the decline in
performance.  The mall is currently 57% occupied, down from 88% as
recently as December 2014.  The servicer is pursuing foreclosure
and expects the property to become REO.

The second loan in special servicing is the 950 L'Enfant Plaza Loan
($90 million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a 272,000
square foot office property located in downtown Washington, DC, in
the Southwest quadrant.  The property is primarily leased to the US
Government.  The largest occupier (US Department of Education)
recently extended its leases at the property for ten years.  The
second largest lease, also a US Government lease, is set to expire
in October 2018.  The loan is set to mature on December 31, 2016,
and the loan transferred to special servicing due to the upcoming
maturity, significant lease rollover in 2018, plus the borrower's
request for a loan restructure.  The property was 88% leased as of
March 2016.  The property is well-located near other federal
offices and sits atop a retail mall with direct access to the
Washington Metro subway system.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types.  Moody's estimates an aggregate $164 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (63% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for seven poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $10 million (a 22% expected loss on average) from
these troubled loans.

As of the November 2016 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $18.7 million and hit up to Class B.  Moody's
anticipates interest shortfalls will continue because of the
exposure to specially serviced loans and/or modified loans.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including
workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions
(ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 88% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 72% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 96% at
Moody's last review.  Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans.  Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 13.1% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI).  Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.39X and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.  Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 25% of the pool
balance.  The largest loan is the 485 Lexington Avenue Loan ($135
million -- 19% of the pool), which represents a participation
interest in a $450 million senior mortgage loan.  The loan is
secured by a 915,000 square foot Class A office property located in
Midtown Manhattan.  The loan sponsor is a major, New York
City-based commercial property Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT).
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.74X, respectively,
unchanged from the prior review.

The second largest loan is the Westin -- Palo Alto Loan ($27
million -- 4% of the pool).  The loan is secured by a 184-unit
full-service hotel property in Palo Alto, California.  The hotel
was 85% occupied in 2015.  The loan has amortized 22% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 50% and 2.51X,
respectively, compared to 49% and 2.56X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Jade Pig / Michigan Retail Loan ($21
million -- 3% of the pool), which represents four
cross-collateralized loans secured by anchored retail properties
located in Michigan.  The loans benefit from amortization and has
amortized 16% since securitization.  Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 72% and, 1.38X, respectively, compared to 73% and 1.38X at the
last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C4: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of 12 classes in
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2012-C4, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-C4 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed

      Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed
      A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed

      Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed
      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes is consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current balance compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS " published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17 compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $832 million
from $1.10 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 33 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 65% of the pool. One loan, constituting 7%
of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit assessment.
The pool contains no defeased loans.

Five loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

To date, no loans have liquidated from the pool. One loan is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Independence Place -- Fort Campbell Loan ($19 million -- 2% of the
pool), which is secured by a 228-unit (628 bed) apartment complex
located in Clarksville, Tennessee, near the US Army installation at
Fort Campbell. The property is now REO after initially transferring
to the special servicer for payment default. The property is
currently 82% occupied as of December 1, 2016. In late 2015 the
property went under contract for sale, however, the sale was not
completed after the buyer was unable to secure financing. The
property then failed to trade at a May 2016 auction due to the
reserve pricing not being met. The special servicer engaged a 3rd
party broker to market the property for sale in early October 2016
and a buyer has been identified.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 91% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 90% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the ELS Portfolio
($61 million -- 7% of the pool), which represents eight
cross-collateralized loans secured by seven manufactured housing
communities plus one recreational vehicle park located across six
states. The portfolio was 92% occupied as of June 2016, compared to
90% occupied at Moody's last review. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and 1.78X,
respectively, compared to aa2 (sca.pd) and 1.70X at the last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 29% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Shoppes at Buckland Hills Loan
($121 million -- 15% of the pool), which is secured by a 535,000
square foot collateral portion of an approximately 1 million square
foot regional mall located in Manchester, Connecticut,
approximately 10 miles east of downtown Hartford. The mall's
non-collateral anchors include Macy's, Sears, JC Penney and Dick's
Sporting Goods. As of June 2016, the entire mall was approximately
96% occupied, while the inline space was approximately 80%
occupied. The mall's net operating income (NOI) has trended
downward in recent years, dropping approximately 7% from 2013 to
2015. The loan benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 105% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.98X
at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Capital City Mall Loan ($61 million
-- 7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a collateral portion of
a regional mall located in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, a suburb of
Harrisburg. The mall is anchored by JC Penney, Sears, and Macy's.
Macy's is not part of the loan collateral. The total mall was 94%
occupied as of June 2016, compared to 97% at Moody's prior review.
The inline space was approximately 92% occupied as of June 2016.
The loan metrics benefit from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 94% and
1.07X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the GPB Portfolio 1 Loan ($58 million --
7% of the pool). The loan is secured by 11 retail properties
geographically concentrated primarily in the greater Boston,
Massachusetts area. The portfolio was 98% occupied as of June 2016,
unchanged from the last review. The loan benefits from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and, 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.23X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C4: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of 12 classes in
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2012-C4, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-C4 as follows:

   -- Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed

      Aa2 (sf)

   -- Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed
      A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed

      Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016 Affirmed
      B2 (sf)

   -- Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed because the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes is consistent with Moody's expectations.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current balance compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS " published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17 compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 24% to $832 million
from $1.10 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 33 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 65% of the pool. One loan, constituting 7%
of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit assessment.
The pool contains no defeased loans.

Five loans, constituting 10% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

To date, no loans have liquidated from the pool. One loan is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Independence Place -- Fort Campbell Loan ($19 million -- 2% of the
pool), which is secured by a 228-unit (628 bed) apartment complex
located in Clarksville, Tennessee, near the US Army installation at
Fort Campbell. The property is now REO after initially transferring
to the special servicer for payment default. The property is
currently 82% occupied as of December 1, 2016. In late 2015 the
property went under contract for sale, however, the sale was not
completed after the buyer was unable to secure financing. The
property then failed to trade at a May 2016 auction due to the
reserve pricing not being met. The special servicer engaged a 3rd
party broker to market the property for sale in early October 2016
and a buyer has been identified.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 91% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 90% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.53X and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.22X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the ELS Portfolio
($61 million -- 7% of the pool), which represents eight
cross-collateralized loans secured by seven manufactured housing
communities plus one recreational vehicle park located across six
states. The portfolio was 92% occupied as of June 2016, compared to
90% occupied at Moody's last review. Moody's structured credit
assessment and stressed DSCR are aa2 (sca.pd) and 1.78X,
respectively, compared to aa2 (sca.pd) and 1.70X at the last
review.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 29% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Shoppes at Buckland Hills Loan
($121 million -- 15% of the pool), which is secured by a 535,000
square foot collateral portion of an approximately 1 million square
foot regional mall located in Manchester, Connecticut,
approximately 10 miles east of downtown Hartford. The mall's
non-collateral anchors include Macy's, Sears, JC Penney and Dick's
Sporting Goods. As of June 2016, the entire mall was approximately
96% occupied, while the inline space was approximately 80%
occupied. The mall's net operating income (NOI) has trended
downward in recent years, dropping approximately 7% from 2013 to
2015. The loan benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 105% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to 103% and 0.98X
at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Capital City Mall Loan ($61 million
-- 7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a collateral portion of
a regional mall located in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, a suburb of
Harrisburg. The mall is anchored by JC Penney, Sears, and Macy's.
Macy's is not part of the loan collateral. The total mall was 94%
occupied as of June 2016, compared to 97% at Moody's prior review.
The inline space was approximately 92% occupied as of June 2016.
The loan metrics benefit from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 94% and
1.07X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the GPB Portfolio 1 Loan ($58 million --
7% of the pool). The loan is secured by 11 retail properties
geographically concentrated primarily in the greater Boston,
Massachusetts area. The portfolio was 98% occupied as of June 2016,
unchanged from the last review. The loan benefits from
amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and, 1.19X,
respectively, compared to 74% and 1.23X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS12: Fitch Rates Class F Certificates 'B-sf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to the Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2016-UBS12 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The top 10 loans comprise 62.4% of
the pool, which is worse than the 2015 and year-to-date (YTD) 2016
averages of 49.3% and 54.5%, respectively.  The pool's loan
concentration index (LCI) is 507, which is above the 2015 and YTD
2016 averages of 367 and 418, respectively.  For this transaction,
the losses estimated by Fitch's deterministic test at 'AAAsf'
exceeded Fitch's base modeled loss estimate; therefore, Fitch's
concluded loss estimate at 'AAAsf' is based on Fitch's
deterministic test.

Average Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are in line
with those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate multiborrower
transactions.  The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.24x is slightly better than the YTD 2016 average Fitch DSCR of
1.20x.  The pool's Fitch loan to value (LTV) of 106.6% is slightly
worse than the YTD 2016 average Fitch LTV of 105.7%.

Property Quality: The pool's collateral exhibited above-average
quality with 74.4% of Fitch-inspected properties (62% of the pool)
receiving property quality grades of 'B+' or better, compared to
2016 YTD levels of 50.1%.  Four properties, representing 31.7% of
the Fitch site inspection sample and 26.4% of the pool, received a
property quality grade of 'A-' or better, compared to 2016 YTD
levels of 18.4%.  Two properties, accounting for 0.8% of
Fitch-inspected properties, received a property quality grade of
'C'.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.1% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to MSC
2016-UBS12 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result.  In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result.  The presale report includes a detailed explanation of
additional stresses and sensitivities on page 12.

                       DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Deloitte &
Touche LLP.  The due diligence focused on a comparison and
re-computation of certain characteristics with respect to each of
the mortgage loans.  Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on our analysis.

        REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool is available
by accessing the appendix referenced under "Related Research"
below.  The appendix also contains a comparison of these RW&Es to
those Fitch considers typical for the asset class as detailed in
the Special Report titled 'Representations, Warranties and
Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance Transactions,'
dated May 31, 2016.

Fitch has assigned these ratings and Rating Outlooks:

   -- $38,800,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $54,700,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $56,000,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $190,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $237,609,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $577,109,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $132,941,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,497,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $40,191,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $42,253,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49,466,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,703,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,306,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49,466,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $23,703,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $10,306,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate these classes:

   -- $30,916,736ab class X-G 'NR';
   -- $30,916,736a class G 'NR'.

  a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
  b) Notional amount and interest-only.


MORTGAGE CAPITAL 1998-MC2: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on X Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of one class of
Mortgage Capital Funding Inc. 1998-MC2 as follows:

   -- CL. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2016
      Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's rating
action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the current
balance, the same as at last review. Moody's base expected loss
plus realized losses is now 1.5% of the original pooled balance,
the same as at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property type, and
sponsorship. These aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted
for any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity,
other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the November 18, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $942.2
million from $1.0 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two remaining mortgage loans.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $15.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 29%). Currently, there are no loans in special
servicing nor on the master servicer's watchlist.

The largest loan is the Hampton Inn Loan ($0.6 million -- 63.8% of
the pool), which is secured by a 74-key limited service hotel
located in Hopewell, Virginia. Performance has been stable. The
loan is fully amortizing and matures in April 2018. The loan has
amortized 83% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 13% and greater than 4.00X, respectively, compared to 19% and
greater than 4.00X at the last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to
the loan balance.

The other remaining loan is the Courtesy Town Center Loan ($0.3
million -- 36.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 35,200 SF
retail center located in Newport, North Carolina. Performance has
been stable. The property was 95% leased as of September 2016
compared to 94% as of September 2015. The loan is fully amortizing
and matures in February 2018. The loan has amortized 86% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 17% and greater
than 4.00X, respectively, compared to 24% and greater than 4.00X at
the last review.



MOUNTAIN VIEW 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class E Notes 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes to be issued by Mountain View CLO 2016-1 Ltd. (the "Issuer"
or "Mountain View 2016-1").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$1,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
      2029 (the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$193,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2029 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- US$34,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due

2029 e "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- US$18,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes Due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- US$15,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

   -- US$15,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes Due 2029 (the "Class E Notes") , Assigned Ba3
      (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Mountain View 2016-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans and up to 7.5% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans and non-senior secured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing
date.

Seix CLO Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 4 year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest collateral principal
collections constituting unscheduled principal payments or the sale
proceeds of credit risk obligations in additional collateral debt
obligations, subject to certain conditions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $300,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 60

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.85%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2700 to 3105)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A Notes: 0

   -- Class B Notes: -2

   -- Class C Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2700 to 3510)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B Notes: -3

   -- Class C Notes: -4

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


NCSLT: Moody's Puts on Review 12 Classes in 9 Securitizations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed under review for upgrade the
ratings of 12 classes of notes in 9 National Collegiate Student
Loan Trust (NCSLT) securitizations backed by private (i.e. not
government-guaranteed) student loans. The loans are serviced
primarily by the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency
(PHEAA) with U.S. Bank, N.A. acting as the special servicer. The
administrator for all securitizations is GSS Data Services, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Goal Structured Solutions, Inc.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: The National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust I
   (2001 Indenture)

   -- NCT-2003AR-11, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Jun 20, 2014 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1

   -- Cl. A-4, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Dec 18, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-2

   -- Cl. A-3, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

      previously on Jun 20, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-3

   -- Cl. A-3, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Jun 20, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-4, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

      previously on Dec 18, 2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4

   -- Cl. A-2, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Jun 20, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

      previously on Dec 18, 2015 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-1

   -- Cl. A-3, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

      previously on Dec 18, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2

   -- Cl. A-2, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
      previously on Jun 20, 2014 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A-3, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

      previously on Jun 20, 2014 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3

   -- Cl. A-3-AR-1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Jun 3, 2013 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

   Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4

   -- Cl. A-3-AR-1, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade; previously on Jun 3, 2013 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The primary rationale for the rating actions is the continued
build-up in credit enhancement supporting the affected classes as a
result of the substantial pay down of the top senior bonds as a
result of the sequential pay structure of these transactions.
Although the ratios of total assets to total liabilities have
declined to a range of 57%-75% as of October 2016 from a range of
62%-77% as of August 2015, the top-pay senior classes have
benefitted from rapid deleveraging. Subordination and
overcollateralization supporting the 12 classes of notes on review
for upgrade increased to a range of 53%-100% as of October 2016
from a range of 39%-85% as of August 2015. The rating actions also
reflect our view that the probability of an occurrence of an event
of default (EOD) is currently low. Therefore, the ratings on senior
bonds continue to reflect sequential principal payments and the
resulting differentiation in credit support amongst the senior
tranches.

The transactions in today's rating actions are not subject to the
operational risk concerns outlined in our March 2016 rating action.
In that rating action, Moody's placed on review for downgrade 8
classes of notes in 4 different NCSLT transactions due to the
increase in operational risk brought on by a disputed servicing
agreement with Odyssey Education Resources, LLC. (See, Moody's
reviews for downgrade 8 classes of notes in 4 National Collegiate
Student Loan Trust securitizations). Since the transactions in
today's rating actions are not subject to a similar disputed
servicing arrangement with Odyssey, the operational risk concerns
arising from that disputed arrangement do not affect these deals.
These transactions, however, are subject to a Notice of Servicer
Default claiming that PHEAA failed to comply with the terms of its
servicing agreement applicable to all 15 NCSLT transactions (which
includes the 9 transactions affected by today's rating actions) and
to a lawsuit brought by the 15 trusts against PHEAA. Although this
litigation could increase extraordinary expenses charged to the
trusts, we believe that, with respect to the senior bonds in
today's rating actions, this risk is mitigated by the build-up in
credit enhancement resulting from the structural features of the
transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities"
published in Janauary 2010.

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change
these expectations. Performance that falls outside the given range
may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance
within expectations preclude such actions. The decision to take (or
not take) a rating action is dependent on an assessment of a range
of factors including, but not exclusively, the performance
metrics.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the ratings up are a decrease in
basis risk and lower net losses on the underlying assets than
Moody's expects.

Down

Among the factors that could drive the ratings down are an increase
in basis risk and higher net losses on the underlying assets than
Moody's expects.


NELNET STUDENT 2005-4: Fitch Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to BBsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on Nelnet Student Loan
Trust 2005-4:

   -- Class A-3 notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-4L downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Class A-4AR-1 downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Class A-4AR-2 downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

All classes have been removed from Rating Watch Negative.

The decision to downgrade the class A-4L, A-4AR-1, A-4AR-2 and B
notes to 'BBsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below is a criteria
variation.  The class A-4 notes miss the credit and maturity stress
base case scenarios by 0.25-1.00 years.  Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Nelnet's ability to call the notes upon
reaching 10% pool factor, the long time horizon until the A-4 and B
maturity dates, and the class A-4 under the base case scenarios
miss the legal final maturity date within a year's timeframe with
the maturity date still being over 15 years away.

The class A-4L, A-4AR-1 and A-4AR-2 notes hit an event of default
under the base cases, class B suffers an interest shortfall, as all
class B interest post-EOD is diverted to pay class A principal.  As
a result, the class B notes fail the base cases as well.  The
post-EOD waterfall run is the primary scenario, given that the
pre-EOD waterfall will not take into account the class B interest
disruption.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties provided by
eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued
interest.  Fitch's U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Outlook
Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
15.75% and a 47.00% default rate under the 'AAAsf' credit stress
scenario.  The base case default assumption of 15.75% implies a
constant default rate of 3% (assuming a weighted average life of
15.6 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses.  Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve.  The claim reject rate
is assumed to be 0.25% in the base case and 2% in the 'AAAsf'
case.

The trailing 12 month average of deferment, forbearance,
Income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) and constant
prepayment rate (voluntary and involuntary) are 5.4%, 7%, 12% and
8.8%, respectively, which are used as the starting point in cash
flow modeling.  Subsequent declines or increases are modeled as per
criteria.  The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.20%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Total credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization and excess spread and the class A notes
benefit from subordination provided by the class B note.  As of the
August 2016 distribution report, effective senior and total parity
is 105.51% (5.22% CE) and 100.57% (0.57% CE).  Liquidity support
for the 2005-4 notes is provided by a Reserve Account which is at
$2,841,887.45 with a floor of $2,841,887.45.  Cash is being
released from the trust given that $1.1 million of OC (excluding
the reserve, as pool factor is below 40%) is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model indicates
that the class A-3 notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal
final maturity dates under the 'AAA' stress scenarios.  The A-4
notes do not pay off before their maturity date in Fitch's
modelling scenarios, including the base cases.  If the breach of
the class A-4 maturity date triggers an event of default, interest
payments will be diverted away from the class B notes, causing them
to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day to day servicing is provided by
Nelnet and ACS.  Fitch believes both are acceptable at this time
due to its long servicing history.

Criteria Variation
Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness.  The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation.  Since the only
available funds to invest are those held in the Collection Account,
and the funds can only be invested for a short duration given the
payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

Rating Tolerance

The decision to downgrade the A-4L, A-4AR-1, A-4AR-2 and B notes to
'BBsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below is a criteria variation. Fitch
has considered qualitative factors such as Nelnet's ability to call
the notes upon reaching 10% pool factor, the long time horizon
until the A-4 and B maturity dates, and the eventual full payment
of principal in modeling in its analysis to support this decision.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED.  Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions.  In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate.  The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
   -- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'
   -- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
   -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- CPR increase 100%: class A 'Asf'; class B 'Asf'
   -- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance.  Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.


NELNET STUDENT 2006-2: Fitch Cuts Cl. B Debt Rating to 'BBsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on Nelnet Student Loan
Trust 2006-2:

   -- Class A-5 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-6 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-7 downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; removed from Rating

      Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

Fitch modeled the failed remarketing rate of LIBOR + 0.75% on the
class A-6 and class A-7 reset rates notes, which limits excess
spread and drives the downgrades above.

                      KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral is comprised of 100%
Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with
guaranties provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided
by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of
principal and accrued interest.  The U.S. sovereign rating is
currently 'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
16.8% and a 50.3% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario, which is based on actual trust performance.  The claim
reject rate is assumed to be 0.25% in the base case and 2% in the
'AAA' case.  Fitch applies the standard default timing curve in its
credit stress cash flow analysis.  The trailing-12-month (TTM)
average constant default rate, utilized in the maturity stresses,
is 2.6%.  TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, income-based
repayment (prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate
(voluntary and involuntary) are 6.6%, 7.5%, 12.6%, and 9.0%,
respectively, and are used as the starting point in cash flow
modeling.  Subsequent declines or increases are modelled as per
criteria.  The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.23%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and, for the class A
notes, subordination.  As of September 2016, total and senior
effective parity ratios are 100.10% (0.10% CE) and 104.64% (4.43%
CE).  Liquidity support is provided by a reserve equal to its floor
of $3,055,686.  The transaction is releasing cash.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the
notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal final maturity
dates under the commensurate rating scenario.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Nelnet Inc.  Fitch believes Nelnet Inc. to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as a servicer of FFELP
loans.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED.  Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions.  In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate.  The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
   -- Default increase 25%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'
   -- Default increase 50%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'
   -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'

   -- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
   -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'
   -- CPR increase 100%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'
   -- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'
   -- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance.  Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.


OHA CREDIT: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by OHA Credit Partners XIII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

   -- US$2,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2030 (the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
      (sf)

   -- US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2030 (the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
      Aaa (sf)

   -- US$7,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2030 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$36,750,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2030 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned

      Aa2 (sf)

   -- US$18,500,000 Class C-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed
      Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class C-1 Notes"), Definitive
      Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- US$11,000,000 Class C-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed
      Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class C-2 Notes"), Definitive
      Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

   -- US$16,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- US$22,250,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating

      Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C-1 Notes, the Class C-2 Notes, the
Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

OHA Credit Partners XIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 50%
ramped as of the closing date.

Oak Hill Advisors, L.P. (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

   -- Par amount: $400,000,000

   -- Diversity Score: 55

   -- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2830

   -- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

   -- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

   -- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

   -- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2830 to 3255)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -2

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -2

   -- Class D Notes: -1

   -- Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2830 to 3679)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

   -- Class X Notes: 0

   -- Class A Notes: -1

   -- Class B-1 Notes: -3

   -- Class B-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class C-1 Notes: -3

   -- Class C-2 Notes: -3

   -- Class D Notes: -2

   -- Class E Notes: -1


OHA LOAN 2016-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OHA Loan Funding 2016-1
Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 LLC's $551.0 floating- and fixed-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 Ltd./OHA Loan Funding 2016-1 LLC

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. $)

A                     AAA (sf)        370.00
B-1                   AA (sf)          60.00
B-2                   AA (sf)          24.00
C (deferrable)        A (sf)           36.00
D (deferrable)        BBB (sf)         33.00
E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)         28.00
Subordinated notes    NR               58.00

NR--Not rated.



PRIMA CAPITAL 2016-MRND: Moody's Rates Class 1-A2 Certs 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to the notes and certificates issued by PRIMA
Capital CRE Securitization 2016-MRND Trust ("Prima 2016-MRND"):

   -- Cl. 1-A1 Notes, Assigned Ba1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 1-A2 Certificates, Assigned B1 (sf)

   -- Cl. 2-A1 Notes, Assigned Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Class 1-A1 notes, Class 2-A1 notes, and
Class 1-A2 certificates address the expected loss posed to
noteholders and certificateholders. The ratings reflect the risks
due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Prima 2016-MRND is a static cash flow commercial real estate
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CLO). Class 1-A1 notes and
Class 1-A2 ("Group 1") certificates are collateralized by six
collateral interests (five names) in the form of single
asset/single borrower commercial real estate bonds (CMBS) -- 100%
secured by CBD office properties. Class 2-A1 ("Group 2") is a
resecuritization of one single asset/single borrower CMBS bond
issued in 2016 secured primarily by science office and laboratory
properties. Both underlying collateral groups are fixed rate with a
weighted average coupon of 5.656% for Group 1 and 3.968% for Group
2. The transaction does not have a reinvestment option nor a ramp
option, and all of the assets are closed as of the closing date.

PR Capital Debt Private Limited is collateral seller of all the
assets in the pool. Prima Capital Advisors LLC will act as trust
advisor pursuant to the indenture and will perform certain
reporting duties for the benefit of the noteholders. As the
transaction is static, unscheduled principal payments and sale
proceeds of credit risk and defaulted assets will be used to pay
down the notes per the transaction waterfall.

The transaction closed on December 7, 2016.

GROUP 1

Moody's has identified the key parameters, including the constant
default rate (CDR), the constant prepayment rate (CPR), the
weighted average life (WAL), and the weighted average recovery rate
(WARR).

The WAL of Group 1 is 4.2 years, assuming a CDR of 0% and CPR of
0%. For delinquent loans (30-plus days, REO, foreclosure,
bankrupt), Moody's assumes a fixed WARR of 40%, and for current
loans, 50%. Moody's also ran a sensitivity analysis using a fixed
WARR of 40% for current loans. There is no impact to the modeled
ratings.

GROUP 2

Group 2 incorporates both par value and interest coverage tests at
the Moody's rated notes. If one or more is triggered, they act to
divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down their respective
senior classes of notes.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CLO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), weighted average life (WAL), weighted average
recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC). These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
We have completed credit assessments for all of the collateral.
Moody's modeled a WARF of 1848.

Moody's modeled to a WAL of 6.4 years.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 31%.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 36.7% corresponding to a pair-wise
correlation of 35%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

GROUP 1

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

GROUP 2

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Group 1

Because the credit quality of the resecuritization depends on that
of the underlying CMBS certificate, whose credit quality in turn
depends on the performance of the underlying commercial mortgage
pool, any change to the ratings on the underlying securities could
lead to a review of the ratings of the certificates.

Group 2

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of rated notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. Rated notes
are particularly sensitive to changes in rating factor assumptions
of the underlying collateral. Holding all other key parameters
static, stressing the portfolio WARF to 2109 (approx. 14.2% change)
would result in no rating movement on the rated notes. Stressing
the portfolio WARF to 2447 (approx. 32.4% change) would result in a
one notch rating movement on the rated notes (e.g. one notch down
implies and a rating movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment given the weak pace of
recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values are continuing to move in a
positive direction along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction, moderate job growth and the decreased cost of debt
and equity capital have aided this improvement. However, a
consistent upward trend will not be evident until the volume of
investment activity steadily increases for a significant period
across markets, additional non-performing properties are cleared
from the pipeline, and fears of a Euro area recession recede.


SASCO 2007-BHC1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class A-1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
certificates issued by SASCO 2007-BHC1 Trust, Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securities Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-BHC1 ("SASCO 2007-BHC1):

   -- Cl. A-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 7, 2016 Affirmed

      C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-REMIC) transactions.

SASCO 2007-BHC1 is a static cash re-REMIC transaction solely backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS). As
of the November 23, 2016 payment date, the aggregate certificate
balance of the transaction has decreased to $79.8 million from
$501.3 million at issuance, as a result of the realized losses from
the underlying CMBS collateral applied to the certificates.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8097,
compared to 8300 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: A1-A3 (3.2% compared to 5.5% at last
review); Ba1-Ba3 (10.9% compared to 8.3% at last review); and
Caa1-Ca/C (85.9% compared to 86.2% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.1 years, compared to 1.2 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan exposure.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. However, in light of the
performance indicators noted above, Moody's believes that it is
unlikely that the rating announced today is sensitive to further
change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SELKIRK 2013-1: DBRS Hikes Class E Notes Rating to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of the following classes of
Asset-Backed Notes (the Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2013-1 as
listed below:

   -- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C to A (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E to BB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed the rating of two classes as follows:

   -- Class A2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. In addition, Class IO has been discontinued,
as the class repaid in full with the August 2016 remittance.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment and the overall improved performance of the pool since
issuance. In the last 12 months, eight loans have been repaid from
the Trust, contributing $169.2 million in principal reduction to
senior bonds. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 55 seasoned,
fixed-rate loans secured by 67 commercial and multifamily
properties. As of the November 2016 remittance, 43 loans remain in
the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal balance of $617.3
million. The top 15 loans continue to exhibit stable performance
with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.83 times (x) and 13.3%, respectively, based on
YE2015 reporting. The top 15 loans have experienced healthy WA net
cash flow growth of 27.1% over the DBRS underwritten (UW) figures.
In addition, eight loans, representing 24.5% of the current pool
balance, are scheduled to mature by November 2017. Based on YE2015
financials, these loans are reporting a WA DSCR and exit debt yield
of 1.57x and 11.1%, respectively, metrics indicative of a higher
likelihood of being able to refinance at maturity. As of the
November 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special servicing
and no loans on the servicer’s watchlist. The second-largest loan
in the pool is highlighted below.

The Mission Towers II loan (Prospectus ID#2, representing 6.6% of
the current pool balance) is secured by a Class A office property
located in Santa Clara, California. The loan was previously on the
watchlist because of the largest tenant, WebEx, which represented
57.3% of the net rentable area (NRA), vacating its space upon lease
expiration in December 2014. As a result of the tenant’s
departure, the YE2015 DSCR declined to 0.43x compared with the DBRS
UW DSCR of 1.33x and the issuance occupancy rate of 98.3%.
According to the February 2016 rent roll, property occupancy
improved to 67.8%, as the borrower was able to execute 60,000
square feet (sf) in new leases signed in 2015, including
Malwarebytes and Connor Group, which both have lease expirations in
September 2022. Both leases commenced in October 2015; Malwarebytes
assumed space on the 11th and 12th floors, which are a portion of
the space previously leased to WebEx. As of November 2016, CoStar
is showing that Malwarebytes assumed additional space on the tenth
floor in May 2016, with the tenant cumulatively representing 25.9%
of the NRA. In addition, Connor Group, representing 4.5% of the
NRA, has occupied the entire seventh floor. As a result of the
recent leasing activity, property occupancy has rebounded to
issuance levels at 95.8%, with the remaining space being marketed
as available for lease, according to CoStar. Despite the elevated
vacancy levels following the departure of WebEx, the loan continued
to remain current. As of November 2016, CoStar reports that
comparable office properties within a 0.5-mile radius of the
subject are reporting rental and vacancy rates of $43.57 psf and
8.1%, respectively, compared with the subject’s asking rental
rate of $42.00 psf. According to the March 2016 site inspection,
the property was noted to be in overall good condition, with no
deferred maintenance noted. DBRS expects the performance to
stabilize, given the recent leasing momentum and the asset’s
desirable location in Silicon Valley.

The ratings assigned to the Class C, D, E and F Certificates
materially deviate from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative model. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative model that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology; in this case, the
rating reflects the sustainability of loan performance trends not
demonstrated.


SELKIRK 2013-2: DBRS Hikes Class F Notes Rating to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings of the following classes of
Asset-Backed Notes (the Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2013-2 as
listed below:

   -- Class B to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C to AA (sf) from A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D to A (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F to BB (high) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

   -- Class G to BB (low) (sf) from CCC (high) (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed the rating of one class as follows:

   -- Class A2 at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the increased credit support to the
bonds as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment and the overall improved performance of the pool since
issuance. In the last 12 months, eight loans have been repaid from
the Trust, contributing $96.7 million in principal reduction to
senior bonds. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 40 seasoned,
fixed-rate loans secured by 57 commercial and multifamily
properties. As of the November 2016 remittance, 22 loans remain in
the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal balance of $199.2
million. The top 15 loans continue to exhibit stable performance
with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and
debt yield of 1.69 times (x) and 14.4%, respectively, based on the
YE2015 reporting. The top 15 loans have experienced WA net cash
flow growth of 9.3% over the DBRS underwritten figures. In
addition, five loans, representing 33.5% of the current pool
balance, are scheduled to mature by August 2017. Based on YE2015
financials, these loans reported a WA DSCR and WA exit debt yield
of 1.41x and 11.4%, respectively, metrics indicative of a higher
likelihood of being able to refinance at maturity. As of the
November 2016 remittance, there are no loans in special servicing
and no loans on the servicer’s watchlist. However, three loans in
the top 15 have considerable tenant rollover risk within the next
12 months, including the sixth-largest loan in the pool,
representing 4.8% of the current pool balance. DBRS accounted for
the elevated vacancies in its analysis for these loans, with the
sixth-largest loan in the pool highlighted below.

The Oak Hollow Square loan (Prospectus ID#16, representing 4.8% of
the current pool balance) is secured by a retail shopping center
located in High Point, North Carolina. According to the December
2015 rent roll, the property was 98.0% occupied, with two tenants,
representing 35.4% of the net rentable area (NRA), scheduled to
expire through August 2017, including the second-largest tenant,
Stein Mart, Inc., which represents 26.0% of the NRA. As of November
2016, CoStar was reporting vacancy rates of 1.8% and average asking
rental rates of $16.76 per square foot (psf) for comparable retail
properties within a 0.5-mile radius of the subject in the Guilford
Country submarket, which is above the subject’s average rental
rate of $9.96 psf. Although a leasing update has not yet been
provided for Stein Mart, Inc., the tenant has been in occupancy of
its space since September 1999. Despite the elevated risk
associated with the upcoming tenant rollover, the subject’s
occupancy has remained historically above 95.0% since issuance, and
the loan benefits from an experienced sponsor. As of YE2015
reporting, the DSCR improved to 1.55x compared with the DBRS
underwritten DSCR of 1.15x, and the property remains in overall
good condition, with no deferred maintenance noted, according to
the March 2016 site inspection. DBRS modeled the loan with a
stressed net cash flow figure to reflect the upcoming tenant
rollover risk.

The ratings assigned to the Class D, E, F and G Certificates
materially deviate from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative model. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative model that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology; in this case, the
rating reflects the sustainability of loan performance trends not
demonstrated.


SELKIRK 2014-3A: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Asset-Backed Notes (the
Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2014-3A as listed below:

   -- Class A2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Positive with the exception of Class A2, which
carries a Stable trend. In addition, Class IO has been
discontinued, as the class repaid in full with the May 2016
remittance.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stability of the pool
as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment, and that the performance of the outstanding loans has
remained in line with expectations at issuance. Furthermore, the
significant 17.1% increase in collateral reduction over the last 12
months has prompted DBRS to assign a Positive trend to Classes B
through F, given the strong credit enhancement and the increase in
subordination to the bonds. At issuance, the collateral consisted
of 62 seasoned, fixed-rate loans secured by 65 commercial and
multifamily properties. As of the November 2016 remittance, 50
loans remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal
balance of $552.3 million. The top 15 loans continue to exhibit
stable performance with a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.79 times (x) and 15.2%,
respectively, based on the most recent year-end (YE) reporting
available for the individual loans. Also, the top 15 loans have
experienced healthy WA net cash flow growth of 35.1% over the DBRS
underwritten figures. As of the November 2016 remittance, there are
no loans in special servicing and no loans on the servicer's
watchlist. One of the loans in the top 15 is highlighted below.

The Town & Country Plaza loan (Prospectus ID#12, representing 2.6%
of the current pool balance) is secured by a retail property
located in Miami, Florida. According to the March 2016 rent roll,
the property was 100.0% occupied, with the largest tenant, Sedano's
Supermarkets (Sedano's), representing approximately 23.9% of the
net rentable area (NRA). Sedano's lease was scheduled to expire in
July 2016; however, its lease automatically renewed for an
additional five years because Sedano's did not notify the borrower
that it would vacate the property at least nine months prior to its
lease expiration. With the renewal of Sedano's, tenant rollover
risk is limited to approximately 5.3% of the NRA within the next
six months. As of November 2016, CoStar was reporting vacancy rates
of 1.9% and average asking rental rates of $33.71 per square foot
(psf) for comparable retail properties within a one-mile radius of
the subject, which is above the subject's average rental rate of
$21.20 psf. As of YE2015 reporting, the DSCR improved to 1.83x
compared with the DBRS underwritten figure of 1.22x, and the
property remains in overall good condition, with minor deferred
maintenance limited to asphalt deterioration, according to the
March 2016 site inspection.

The ratings assigned to the Class B, C, D, E and F Certificates
materially deviate from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative model. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative model that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology; in this case, the
rating reflects the sustainability of loan performance trends not
demonstrated.


SELKIRK 2014-3V: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Asset-Backed Notes (the
Certificates) issued by Selkirk 2014-3V as listed below:

   -- Class A2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (low) (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Positive with the exception of Class A2, which
carries a Stable trend. In addition, Class IO has been
discontinued, as the class repaid in full with the May 2016
remittance.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stability of the pool
as a result of scheduled loan amortization, successful loan
repayment, and that the performance of the outstanding loans has
remained in line with expectations at issuance. Furthermore, the
significant 17.1% increase in collateral reduction over the last 12
months has prompted DBRS to assign a Positive trend to Classes B
through F, given the strong credit enhancement and the increase in
subordination to the bonds. At issuance, the collateral consisted
of 62 seasoned, fixed-rate loans secured by 65 commercial and
multifamily properties. As of the November 2016 remittance, 50
loans remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal
balance of $552.3 million. The top 15 loans continue to exhibit
stable performance with a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.79 times (x) and 15.2%,
respectively, based on the most recent year-end (YE) reporting
available for the individual loans. Also, the top 15 loans have
experienced healthy WA net cash flow growth of 35.1% over the DBRS
underwritten figures. As of the November 2016 remittance, there are
no loans in special servicing and no loans on the servicer's
watchlist. One of the loans in the top 15 is highlighted below.

The Town & Country Plaza loan (Prospectus ID#12, representing 2.6%
of the current pool balance) is secured by a retail property
located in Miami, Florida. According to the March 2016 rent roll,
the property was 100.0% occupied, with the largest tenant, Sedano's
Supermarkets (Sedano's), representing approximately 23.9% of the
net rentable area (NRA). Sedano's lease was scheduled to expire in
July 2016; however, its lease automatically renewed for an
additional five years because Sedano's did not notify the borrower
that it would vacate the property at least nine months prior to its
lease expiration. With the renewal of Sedano's, tenant rollover
risk is limited to approximately 5.3% of the NRA within the next
six months. As of November 2016, CoStar was reporting vacancy rates
of 1.9% and average asking rental rates of $33.71 per square foot
(psf) for comparable retail properties within a one-mile radius of
the subject, which is above the subject's average rental rate of
$21.20 psf. As of YE2015 reporting, the DSCR improved to 1.83x
compared with the DBRS underwritten figure of 1.22x, and the
property remains in overall good condition, with minor deferred
maintenance limited to asphalt deterioration, according to the
March 2016 site inspection.

The ratings assigned to the Class B, C, D, E and F Certificates
materially deviate from the higher ratings implied by the
quantitative model. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative model that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology; in this case, the
rating reflects the sustainability of loan performance trends not
demonstrated.


SPRINGLEAF FUNDING 2016-A: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following notes
issued by Springleaf Funding Trust 2016-A (Series 2016-A):

   -- $337,170,000 Series 2016-A Notes, Class A rated AA (sf)

   -- $36,350,000 Series 2016-A Notes, Class B rated A (sf)

   -- $25,200,000 Series 2016-A Notes, Class C rated BBB (sf)

   -- $25,870,000 Series 2016-A Notes, Class D rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and

      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
      flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
      under which they have invested. For this transaction, the
      ratings address the payment of timely interest on a monthly
      basis and principal by the legal final maturity date.

   -- OneMain Financial Group LLC’s (OneMain) capabilities with
      regards to originations, underwriting and servicing.

   -- Acquisition of OneMain by Springleaf Holdings, Inc.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
      OneMain’s legacy Springleaf consumer loan portfolio (the
      Springleaf portfolio). DBRS used a hybrid approach in
      analyzing the Springleaf portfolio that incorporates
      elements of static pool analysis, employed for assets such
      as consumer loans, and revolving asset analysis, employed
      for such assets as credit card master trusts.

   -- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
      address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
      consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Springleaf

      Finance Corporation (SFC) and that the trust has a valid
      first-priority security interest in the assets and is
      consistent with DBRS’s “Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured
      Finance” methodology.

DBRS has assigned ratings to Series 2016-A as listed above. The
Series 2016-A transaction represents the sixth securitization of a
portfolio of non-prime and subprime personal loans originated
through OneMain’s legacy branch network of SFC.

Credit enhancement in the transaction consists of
overcollateralization, subordination, excess spread and a reserve
account. The rating on the Class A Notes reflects 25.40% of initial
hard credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the
pool, the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization
(4.80%). The ratings on the Class B, Class C and Class D Notes
reflect 17.25%, 11.60% and 5.80% of initial hard credit
enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.


SPRINGLEAF FUNDING 2016-A: Moody's Rates Class C Notes 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Springleaf Funding Trust 2016-A (SLFT 2016-A). This
is the sixth personal loan transaction issued by Springleaf Finance
Corporation (SFC; B3 Positive) and the first SLFT transaction rated
by Moody's. The notes are backed by a pool of personal loans
primarily originated by regional subsidiaries of SFC, who is also
the servicer and administrator for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Springleaf Funding Trust 2016-A

   -- Class A Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A1
      (sf)

   -- Class B Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

   -- Class C Asset-Backed Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
      (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of SFC as the
servicer.

Moody's cumulative net loss expectation for the SFLT 2016-A pool is
18.0%. Moody's based its cumulative net loss expectation on an
analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the
historical performance of similar collateral, including
securitization performance and managed portfolio performance; the
reinvestment criteria stipulated in the transaction document during
the revolving period; the ability of SFC to perform the servicing
functions; and current expectations for the macroeconomic
environment during the life of the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes and Class C notes
benefit from 25.40%, 17.25% and 11.60% of hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the notes consists of a
combination of non-declining overcollateralization, non-declining
reserve account and subordination. The notes will also benefit from
excess spread, which is estimated to be at least 14.5% per annum.

The transaction has an initial revolving period of two years during
which cash in the principal distribution account will be used to
purchase additional loans instead of paying down the notes. An
early amortization event can terminate the revolving period and
cause amortization of the notes before the end of the revolving
period. An early amortization event means any one of the following
events: (a) the average of the monthly net loss percentages and the
two immediately preceding monthly determination dates exceeds
17.00%; or (b) any reinvestment criteria event exists on the prior
two consecutive payment dates and the a reinvestment criteria event
will exist as of the current payment date, provided, that such
early amortization event shall be deemed to occur, and the
revolving period shall terminate; or (c) a servicer default
occurs.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in September
2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings of the notes if losses accumulate
below its original expectations as a result of better composition
of the collateral type and risk level than the reinvestment
criteria, better than expected improvements in the economy, changes
to servicing practices that enhance collections or refinancing
opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings of the notes if pool losses
exceed its expectations. Losses may increase, for example, due to
performance deterioration stemming from a downturn in the US
economy, deficient servicing, errors on the part of transaction
parties, inadequate transaction governance and fraud.


TICP CLO VI 2016-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by TICP CLO VI 2016-2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

  $248,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  $52,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029,

   Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  $26,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  $22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  $20,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders.  The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

TICP CLO VI 2016-2 is a managed cash flow CLO.  The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans.  At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans.  The portfolio is at least 80%
ramped as of the closing date.

TICP CLO VI 2016-2 Management, LLC (the "Manager") and TPG Global,
LLC and its subsidiaries, including TPG Institutional Credit
Partners, LLC (pursuant to the terms of a services agreement with
the Manager) will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition
of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the transaction's
four year reinvestment period.  Thereafter, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used these base-case assumptions:

  Par amount: $400,000,000
  Diversity Score: 60
  Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2785
  Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%
  Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%
  Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%
  Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty.  The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

  Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2785 to 3203)
  Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A Notes: 0
  Class B Notes: -1
  Class C Notes: -2
  Class D Notes: -1
  Class E Notes: -1

  Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2785 to 3621)
  Rating Impact in Rating Notches
  Class A Notes: -1
  Class B Notes: -3
  Class C Notes: -4
  Class D Notes: -2
  Class E Notes: -1


VNDO TRUST 2016-350P: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to VNDO Trust
2016-350P's $233.33 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2016-350P.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a portion of a whole loan with an aggregate
cut-off date principal balance of $233.33 million.  The trust loan
is part of a pari passu, split loan structure in the aggregate
principal amount of $400.0 million.  The whole loan is secured by,
among other things, the borrower's fee simple interest in 350 Park
Ave., a 570,784-sq.-ft. 30-story class A office building in
Manhattan's Park Avenue submarket.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Dec. 7,
2016.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

VNDO Trust 2016-350P

Class       Rating(i)       Amount ($)
A           AAA (sf)        94,018,000
X-A(ii)     AAA (sf)        94,018,000
X-B(ii)     AA- (sf)        20,893,000
B           AA- (sf)        20,893,000
C           A- (sf)         14,409,000
D           BBB- (sf)       46,879,000
E           BB- (sf)        57,133,000

(i)The certificates will be issued to qualified institutional
buyers according to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933.
(ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-A and

X-B certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
realized losses allocated to the class A and B certificates,
respectively.



WELLS FARGO 2015-P2: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-P2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2015-P2.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect overall stable performance of the pool
since issuance. Pool loss expectations remain in line with expected
losses from issuance. As of the November 2016 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.3% to
$999 million from $1 billion at issuance.

High Fitch Leverage: The transaction has higher leverage than other
recent Fitch-rated fixed rate multiborrower transactions. At
issuance the pool's Fitch LTV of 111.2% was above both the
year-to-date 2015 average of 109.4% and the 2014 average of
106.2%.

Below Average Amortization: At issuance the pool was scheduled to
pay down by only 9.1% of the initial pool balance prior to
maturity, which is below historical averages. There are 19
full-term interest-only loans (28.4%); 27 loans (48.0%) are partial
interest only, and 25 loans (23.6%) are balloon loans.

Property Type Diversity: The pool's largest property type is retail
with an exposure of 25.7% of the pool balance, followed by
multifamily at 19.1%. At issuance, the industrial property type
exposure was higher than recent CMBS transactions at 11.0%; hotel
exposure was higher than average at 17.0%.

The 14 largest loan, the Westgate Shopping Center, had an upcoming
lease expiration for the largest tenant at issuance. The TJ Maxx
lease was extended from January 2017 to January 2027 according to
the September 2016 rent roll.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes as indicated:

   -- $25.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $70 million class A-2A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $82.5 million class A-2B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $209 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $253.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $57.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $47.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $745,942,790* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61,385,000* class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $61.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $50.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $56,373,000* class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $56.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $22.6 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

   -- $11.3 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2016-LC25: Moody’s Assigns BB Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2016-LC25 (the Certificates) issued by Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-LC25:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-B at AAA (sf)

   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)

   -- Class X-D at AAA (sf)

   -- Class B at AA (sf)

   -- Class C at A (low) (sf)

   -- Class D at BBB (sf)

   -- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

   -- Class F at BB (high) (sf)

   -- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, D, E, F and G have been privately placed.

The X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional. DBRS ratings on
interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers
the IO certificates’ position within the transaction payment
waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral consists of 80 fixed-rate loans secured by 135
commercial properties and multifamily properties, comprising a
total transaction balance of $954,965,554. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. One loan, representing 5.2%
of the pool, is shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS. Proceeds for
the shadow-rated loan are floored at its respective rating within
the pool. When 5.2% of the pool has no proceeds assigned below the
rating floor, the resulting pool subordination is diluted or
reduced below that rated floor. The conduit pool was analyzed to
determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term
probability of loan default within the term and its liquidity at
maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, four loans, representing 5.8% of the total pool, had a
DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x),
a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 36 loans, representing 57.3%
of the pool, having a DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCR below 1.00x;
however, the DBRS Refi DSCRs for the loans are based on a
weighted-average (WA) stressed refinance constant of 10.23%, which
implies an interest rate of 9.66%, amortizing on a 30-year
schedule. This represents a significant stress of 4.46% over the
WA contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool. The loans’
probability of default (POD) is based on the more constraining of
the DBRS Term or Refi DSCR.

One loan exhibits credit characteristics consistent with an
investment-grade shadow rating: 9 West 57th Street, the largest
loan in the pool, represents 5.2% of the pool and has credit
characteristics consistent with a AAA shadow rating. Additionally,
13 loans, representing 6.7% of the pool, are secured by cooperative
properties and are very low-leverage, with minimal term and
refinance default risk. Overall, the pool exhibits a relatively
strong DBRS WA Term DSCR of 1.61x based on the whole loan balance,
which indicates moderate term default risk. Even with the exclusion
of 9 West 57th Street and the 13 loans secured by cooperative
properties, the deal exhibits a favorable DBRS Term DSCR of 1.40x.
Furthermore, only 12 loans, representing 8.5% of the pool, are
secured by properties that either fully or primarily leased to a
single tenant. Loans secured by properties occupied by single
tenants have been found to suffer from higher loss severities in
the event of default. As such, DBRS modeled single-tenant
properties with a higher POD and cash flow volatility compared with
multi-tenant properties. The pool is relatively diverse based on
loan size, with a concentration profile equivalent to that of a
pool of 43 equal-sized loans. Diversity is further enhanced by four
loans, representing 11.1% of the pool, that are secured by multiple
properties (59 in total). Increased pool diversity insulates the
higher-rated classes from event risk.

The transaction’s WA DBRS Refi DSCR, excluding the 13 NCB loans,
is 1.00x, indicating a higher refinance risk on an overall pool
level. Furthermore, 12 loans, representing 11.3% of the pool,
including one of the largest ten loans, are structured with
full-term IO payments. An additional 31 loans, comprising 52.8% of
the pool, have partial IO periods ranging from 12 months to 60
months. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by using the amortizing
debt service obligation and the DBRS Refi DSCR is calculated
considering the balloon balance and lack of amortization when
determining refinance risk. DBRS determines the POD based on the
lower of Term or Refi DSCR, so loans that lack amortization will be
treated more punitively. Twenty-eight properties, comprising 33.7%
of the pool, are secured by properties located in tertiary or rural
markets. Properties located in tertiary and rural markets are
modeled with significantly higher loss severities than those
located in urban and suburban markets.

The DBRS sample included 29 of the 80 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 41 of 135 properties in the portfolio
(62.4% of the pool by allocated loan balance). DBRS conducted
meetings with the on-site property manager, listing agent or a
representative of the borrowing entity for 44.3% of the pool. The
DBRS sample had an average NCF variance of -8.9%, ranging from
-21.7% to -1.0%. DBRS identified eight loans, representing 7.3% of
the pool, with unfavorable sponsor strength, including one of the
top ten loans. DBRS increased the POD for the loans with identified
sponsorship concerns.

The rating assigned to Class G differs from the higher rating
implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this difference
to be a material deviation, and in this case, the ratings reflect
the dispersion of loan-level cash flows expected to occur
post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance that could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.



[*] Moody's Hikes Rating on $325MM of Alt-A & Option ARM RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 16 tranches
from four transactions, backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-1
  Cl. 1-A3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A4 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A1 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to A2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A2 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to A3 (sf)
  Cl. M1 Certificate, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
   Sept. 3, 2010, Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-3
  Cl. 1-A3 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to A1 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A4 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-6XS
  Cl. M1 Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb. 23,
   2016, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR2
  Cl. 1-A-1A Certificate, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to B3 (sf)
  Cl. 1-A-1B Certificate, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
   Feb. 11, 2016, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1A Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
   July 26, 2013, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-1B Certificate, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
   June 20, 2014, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2A1 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   June 20, 2014, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2A3 Certificate, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   June 20, 2014, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-2B Certificate, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
   June 20, 2014, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)
  Cl. 2-A-3 Certificate, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
   June 20, 2014, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools.  The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.9% in October 2016 from 5.0% in
October 2015.  Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year.  Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016.  Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.  Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $64MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2004
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from three transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-3

   -- Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015
      Upgraded to B2 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-16XS

   -- Cl. A3A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
      Confirmed at B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A3B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2016
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May
      14, 2012 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

   -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed to

      Caa1, Outlook Developing on Dec 02, 2016)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-17XS

   -- Cl. A3A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan
      25, 2016 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. A3B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A4A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan
      25, 2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. A4B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $64MM of Alt-A RMBS Loans Issued 2004
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from three transactions, backed by Alt-A RMBS loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

   Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2004-3
  
   -- Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016
      Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2015
      Upgraded to B2 (sf)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-16XS

   -- Cl. A3A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 14, 2012
      Confirmed at B3 (sf)

   -- Cl. A3B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jan 19, 2016
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May
      14, 2012 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

   -- Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed to

      Caa1, Outlook Developing on Dec 02, 2016)

   Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-17XS

   -- Cl. A3A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan
      25, 2016 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. A3B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- Cl. A4A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

   -- Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan
      25, 2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)*

   -- Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated

      Account - Unrated)

   -- Cl. A4B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 25, 2016
      Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in November 2016 from 5.0% in
November 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2016 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2016. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] S&P Completes Review of 34 Classes From 6 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 34 classes from six U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1997 and 2005.  The review yielded four upgrades and 30
affirmations.  The transactions in this review are backed by a mix
of fixed- and adjustable-rate subprime mortgage loans, which are
secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                               ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

Of the four ratings S&P raised in this review, one moved from
speculative grade ('BB+' or lower) to investment grade ('BBB-' or
higher).  The other three ratings S&P raised remain at
investment-grade levels.

The raised ratings were due to an increase in credit support for
each class.  The credit support for classes M-3 and M-4 from
NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2005-1 increased to 92.33%
and 64.01%, from 71.63% and 50.40%, respectively, between March
2014 and November 2016.  During the same time period, the credit
support for classes M-3 and M-4 from MASTR Asset Backed Securities
Trust 2005-WMC1 increased to 77.64% and 48.89%, from 60.11% and
38.42%, respectively.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 13 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remained relatively
consistent with its prior projections and is sufficient to cover
our projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Bond performance projection remains stable; and/or
   -- Interest shortfall criteria.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                http://bit.ly/2hU9iiv


[*] S&P Completes Review on 92 Classes From 14 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 92 classes from 14 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2007.  The review yielded eight upgrades, 12
downgrades, and 72 affirmations.  The transactions in this review
are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo,
subprime, re-performing, and Federal Housing Administration/
Veterans Affairs mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by
first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, Soundview Home Loan Trust
2007-WMC1's class II-A-1 is insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal
Corp., currently rated 'AA' by S&P Global Ratings.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

The upgrades include five ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect improved collateral
performance/delinquency trends and /or increased credit support
relative to S&P's projected losses.

The five upgrades that were raised three or more notches were due
to increased credit support, which was enough to cover projected
losses at a higher rating stress.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include two ratings that were lowered by three
notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on four of the 12 downgraded
classes to speculative grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade
('BBB-' or higher).  Of the remaining eight lowered ratings, three
remained at an investment-grade level while five already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at higher rating levels.

The downgrades on class 2-A from Structured Asset Investment Loan
Trust 2003-BC9 and on classes A2 and A4 from Structured Asset
Investment Loan Trust 2004-BNC1 reflect the erosion of projected
credit support.  These transactions' payment allocation triggers
are passing, allowing principal payments to be made to more
subordinate classes, thereby eroding projected credit support for
the affected senior classes.

The downgrades on classes 1A1, 1A2, 1A3, and 2A1 from Structured
Asset Securities Corp.'s 2004-13 also reflect the erosion of
projected credit support.  Although this transaction's payment
allocation triggers are failing, principal payments continue to be
made to the remaining subordinate class, thereby eroding projected
credit support for these senior classes.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on 48 classes in the 'AAA' through 'B'
rating categories.  These affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that
its projected credit support on these classes remained relatively
consistent with S&P's prior projections and is sufficient to cover
its projected losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Interest shortfall criteria;
   -- Imputed promises criteria;
   -- Bond performance projection remains stable; and/or
   -- Principal-only criteria.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                           ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.8% in 2016;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.5% for 2016;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in 2016; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.7% in
      2016.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- Total unemployment will tick up to 4.9% for 2016;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.4% in 2016;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016, limited access to credit and pressure on home prices
      will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these
      rates.

A list of the Affected ratings is available at:

             http://bit.ly/2hHDxpW



[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 10K+ Classes From 3,209 RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on 10,292
classes from 3,209 U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions.

The affected transactions were issued between 1995 and 2010 and are
backed by a mix of adjustable- and fixed-rate loans secured
primarily by first- and second-liens on one- to four-family
residential properties.

S&P discontinued these ratings according to S&P Global Ratings
surveillance and withdrawal policy.  S&P had previously lowered the
ratings to 'D (sf)' due to principal writedowns.  S&P views a
subsequent upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely
under the relevant criteria for the classes within this review.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

             http://bit.ly/2gJFuDl


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
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trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
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then-ending.

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                            *********

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