TCR_Public/170129.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, January 29, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 28

                            Headlines

ACCESS GROUP 2005-B: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes to B1
ACCESS POINT 2015-A: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class D Notes
AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: Moody's Lowers Class D Notes Rating to B2
ALL SLC 1998: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Senior & Subordinate Notes Rating
ALLEGRO CLO II: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on Class E Notes

AMERIQUEST 2003-11: Moody's Hikes $10MM of Subprime RMBS to Ba3
BAMLL 2016-SS1: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP20: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. H Certs
BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt to Ba2
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2014-1: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes

BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
CAPITALSOURCE REAL 2006-A: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. C Notes to B-
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-2: S&P Assigns Prelim 'B' Rating on Cl. F Notes
CD 2017-CD3: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes at 'B-sf'
CITIGROUP TRUST: Moody's Takes Action on $1.86BB of Subprime RMBS

CITIGROUP: Moody's Hikes $147MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
COMM 2004-LNB4: Moody's Hikes B2 Rating to Class B Certs
COMM 2013-CCRE6: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
COMM MORTGAGE 2004-LNB2: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Cl. K Debt
CPS AUTO 2017-A: DBRS Finalizes BB Ratings on Class E Debt

CPS AUTO 2017-A: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(low) Rating to Cl. E Debt
CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class H Certs
CSFB 1999-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-X Debt to C
CVP CASCADE CLO-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to B-
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes

FRANKLIN CLO VI: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
FREDDIE 2017-K61: Fitch to Rate Class C Certificates 'BB+'
FREMF 2011-K703: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X-2 Certs
GALLERIA CDO V: Moody's Hikes Class A-1 Notes to B1(sf)
GE COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 3 Certs to 'D'

GERMAN AMERICAN 2012-LC4: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. F Certs
GFCM LLC: Moody's Hikes Class F Certs Rating to Ba2
GLG ORE 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG8: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class E Certs

JP MORGAN 2002-C2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class F Debt to Ba1
JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class M Debt
JP MORGAN 2004-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class P Certs to 'D'
LIMEROCK CLO II: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. E Certs to CC

ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Fitch Cuts Class D Notes Rating to 'C'
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certs to 'C
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class N Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-XLF: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. N-RQK Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-PRME: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on E Certs

MORGAN STANLEY: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class G Debt
MULTI SECURITY 2005-RR4: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Notes to BB+
N-STAR IX: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 8 Tranches
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2004-2: Moody's Confirms B1 Rating on B Debt
NEWMARK CAPITAL 2013-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. F Notes to B-

PALMER SQUARE 2014-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D-R Notes
RBSSP RESECURITIZATION 2009-11: Moody's Ups Debt Rating from Ba2
REALT 2006-3: Moody's Hikes Class L Debt Rating to B2
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Hikes Auto Loan ABS Issued 2015-2016
SCHOONER TRUST 2006-6: DBRS Reviews B Rating on Class L Debt

SDART: Moody's Hikes Subprime Auto Loan ABS Issued 2012-2016
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-1: Moody's Rates to Class B-4 Notes 'B1'
SILVERADO CLO 2006-II: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Notes to BB+
SLM PRIVATE 2005-A: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class C Debt
SLM PRIVATE 2007-A: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2 Tranches

SLM STUDENT 2005-10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class A-5 Debt to 'B'
SLM STUDENT 2013-4: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'B'
SOLOSO CDO 2005-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. A-1L Notes Rating to Caa2
STUDENT LOAN 2007-2: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. IO Certs.
UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. F Certs

VENTURE XXVI: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
VITALITY RE V: S&P Raises Rating on Series 2014 Cl. B Notes to BB
WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Lowers Rating on 5 Tranches to 'C'
WELLS FARGO 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C3: Moody's Cuts Class E Debt Rating to Ba3

[*] DBRS Reviews 30 Ratings from 8 US structured Transactions
[*] Moody's Cuts $243MM of FHA/VA RMBS Issued Between 2004-2006
[*] Moody's Hikes $11MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued in 2005
[*] Moody's Hikes $371MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2007
[*] Moody's Hikes $98.5MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004

[*] Moody's Raises $54.7MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $232.9MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $30MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Actions on $1.5BB of Tobacco ABS
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 42 Classes From 11 CDO Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 92 Classes From 13 RMBS

                            *********

ACCESS GROUP 2005-B: Moody's Lowers Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade nine
classes of notes from five Access Group securitizations. The
underlying collateral consists of private student loans that were
extended primarily to graduate and professional students.

Complete rating actions are as follow:

Issuer: Access Group Inc. Private Student Loan asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-B

2005-B Cl. A-3, Aa1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 28, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1

2005-B Cl. B-2, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 28, 2013 Downgraded to B1

Issuer: Access Group, Inc. Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2007-A

2007-A-A-3, Aa2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 28, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2

2007-A-B, Ba3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
on Oct 28, 2013 Downgraded to Ba3

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Federal Student Loan Asset-Backed
Notes, Series 2001

Cl. II A-1 Group II, A2 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 28, 2013 Upgraded to A2

Cl. B, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
Oct 28, 2013 Downgraded to B1

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-A

2005-A-A-3, A3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
on Oct 28, 2013 Upgraded to A3

2005-A-B-1, B3 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
on Oct 28, 2013 Downgraded to B3

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Series 2003-A

Senior Ser. 2003-A Cl. B, B1 Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 28, 2013 Downgraded to B1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of a continued build-up in
overcollateralization as a result of lower than expected defaults.
Additionally, the top-pay senior classes have benefitted from the
rapid deleveraging due to the substantial pay down of the classes
in a sequential-pay structure.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities"
published January 2010.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the ratings up are a decrease in
basis risk and lower net losses on the underlying assets than
Moody's expects.

Down

Among the factors that could drive the ratings down are an increase
in basis risk and higher net losses on the underlying assets than
Moody's expects.


ACCESS POINT 2015-A: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, and D
notes from Access Point Funding I 2015-A LLC.  The affirmations
reflect the notes' ability to withstand S&P's stress tests at the
current rating levels, as well as credit enhancement in the form of
subordination for the class A, B, and C notes and
overcollateralization.  The pool factor is approximately 36%.  The
class A note factor is at 10%, while the other classes remain at
their original note balances.

Access Point Funding I 2015-A LLC is a securitization backed by
loans financing furnishings, fixtures, and equipment in the
hospitality sector.  Access Point Financial Inc. is the master
servicer and originator.  Trimont Real Estate Advisors LLC is the
subservicer and performs many of the primary collection and
administrative aspects of servicing the portfolio.

Per the November and December servicer reports, the transaction
breached its rolling three-month average 91-plus-day past-due
delinquency trigger level of 7.50%. Specifically, this ratio was
10.77% as of the Nov. 15, 2016, servicer report and 9.34% as of the
Dec. 15, 2016, servicer report.  Access Point Financial Inc.
subsequently cured this delinquency breach by repurchasing 4.41% of
the defaulted and delinquent assets.  The maximum allowable
repurchases in the transaction is 10% of the assets.  As of the
Jan. 17, 2017, servicer report, the rolling three-month average
91-plus-day past-due delinquency ratio was 7.34%.  In addition, the
one-month 91-plus-day past-due delinquency ratio is 0.00% as of
Jan. 17, 2017.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as deemed necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Access Point Funding I 2015-A LLC
Class                                   Ratings
A                                       A- (sf)
B                                       BBB (sf)
C                                       BB (sf)
D                                       B (sf)


AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: Moody's Lowers Class D Notes Rating to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd.:

US$20,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due December 20, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on February
19, 2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service also downgraded the rating on the
following notes:

US$19,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
December 20, 2020, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on February
19, 2016 Affirmed B1 (sf)

In addition, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$320,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
December 20, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $8,585,777.41),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 19, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

US$24,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
December 20, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 19,
2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due December 20, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February
19, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans with significant exposure to
CLOs. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade and affirmations are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since June 2016.
The Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 85.1% or
$49.1 million since then. Based on the trustee's December 2016
report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B and Class C Notes
are reported at 289.39%, 165.37% and 122.76%, respectively, versus
June 2016 levels of 178.81%, 137.19% and 115.42%, respectively.

The rating downgrade on the Class D Notes is primarily a result of
deterioration of the credit quality of the portfolio and decrease
in the Class D OC ratio since June 2016. Based on the trustee's
December 2016 report, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is
reported at 2502 compared to 2368 in June 2016. Additionally,
according to trustee's December 2016 report, the OC ratio for the
Class D Notes is reported at 98.86% versus June 2016 level of
100.47%. The Class D OC ratio is currently failing its trigger
level.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. In analyzing the Class C Notes, Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $3.8 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

7) Exposure to structured finance assets: The deal has a
significant investment in securities from CLO issuers. The
performance and characteristic of these investments can be notably
different from corporate debt, and may introduce additional risk.
Currently, 15.7% of the deal's portfolio is composed of CLO notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2181)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3272)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $98.3 million, defaulted par of $2.0
million, a weighted average default probability of 13.41 %
(implying a WARF of 2727), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 45.32%, a diversity score of 19 and a weighted average
spread of 3.3% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.
AIRLIE CLO 2006-II: Moody's Lowers Class D Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's upgrades rating on $20.3 million of notes issued by Airlie
CLO 2006-II Ltd.
Global Credit Research - 19 Jan 2017
Moody's also downgrades the rating on $19 million of notes and
affirms $58.3 million of notes
New York, January 19, 2017 --

Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd.:

US$20,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due December 20, 2020, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on February
19, 2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service also downgraded the rating on the
following notes:

US$19,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
December 20, 2020, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on February
19, 2016 Affirmed B1 (sf)

In addition, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$320,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
December 20, 2020 (current outstanding balance of $8,585,777.41),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 19, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

US$24,750,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
December 20, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 19,
2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due December 20, 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February
19, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Airlie CLO 2006-II Ltd., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans with significant exposure to
CLOs. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade and affirmations are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since June 2016.
The Class A-1 Notes have been paid down by approximately 85.1% or
$49.1 million since then. Based on the trustee's December 2016
report, the OC ratios for the Class A, Class B and Class C Notes
are reported at 289.39%, 165.37% and 122.76%, respectively, versus
June 2016 levels of 178.81%, 137.19% and 115.42%, respectively.

The rating downgrade on the Class D Notes is primarily a result of
deterioration of the credit quality of the portfolio and decrease
in the Class D OC ratio since June 2016. Based on the trustee's
December 2016 report, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is
reported at 2502 compared to 2368 in June 2016. Additionally,
according to trustee's December 2016 report, the OC ratio for the
Class D Notes is reported at 98.86% versus June 2016 level of
100.47%. The Class D OC ratio is currently failing its trigger
level.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. In analyzing the Class C Notes, Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than assumed
recoveries would positively impact the CLO.

6) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $3.8 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

7) Exposure to structured finance assets: The deal has a
significant investment in securities from CLO issuers. The
performance and characteristic of these investments can be notably
different from corporate debt, and may introduce additional risk.
Currently, 15.7% of the deal's portfolio is composed of CLO notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2181)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3272)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $98.3 million, defaulted par of $2.0
million, a weighted average default probability of 13.41 %
(implying a WARF of 2727), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 45.32%, a diversity score of 19 and a weighted average
spread of 3.3% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


ALL SLC 1998: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Senior & Subordinate Notes Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the senior and subordinate notes of the
Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corp - 1998 Master Trust
IV (ALL SLC 1998) at 'B-sf'. The notes have been removed from
Rating Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Rating Outlook. A
detailed list of the rating actions follows at the end of this
press release.

Since the trust is under-collateralized and the majority of the
notes are auction rate notes paying interest at the maximum auction
rate, the notes fail both the Credit and Maturity stress scenarios
with an implied rating 'CCCsf' for all notes. The affirmation of
all the notes at 'B-sf' reflects the long time horizon before the
senior notes are due, the subordination provided by the class C
notes until 2033 and the possibility that some of the senior bonds
to be paid in full before then.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral is comprised of 100% of
Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans. The credit
quality of the trust collateral is high, in Fitch's opinion, based
on the guarantees provided by the transaction's eligible guarantors
and at least 97% reinsurance of principal and accrued interest
provided by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The current U.S.
sovereign rating is 'AAA'/Stable Outlook.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
19.2% and 57.8% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The weighted average claim reject rate is assumed to be
0.39% for the base case and 2.55% for the 'AAAsf' case. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve in its credit stress cash
flow analysis. Trailing twelve month average constant default rate,
utilized in the maturity stresses, is 2.91%. Trailing twelve month
levels of deferment, forbearance, Income-based repayment (before
adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 6.7%, 11.7%, 14.3% and 12.9% respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.27% based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement is provided by
overcollateralization and excess spread and for the class A notes,
subordination provided by the class B notes. As of September 2016,
senior, senior subordinate and total parity was approximately
108.19%, 102.17% and 99.79% respectively. Liquidity support is
provided by a reserve account sized at the greater of 0.75% of the
outstanding notes and $1,000,000. Cash can be released from the
trust provided the senior parity is at least 110.0%;
senior-subordinate parity is at least 106.0% and total parity is at
least 100.0%.

Maturity Risk: The class A notes are not paid in full on or prior
to the legal final maturity dates. If the breach of the senior
classes' maturity date triggers an event of default, interest
payments will be diverted away from the class C notes, causing the
subordinate notes to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day to day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, and Great Lakes Educational Services Inc. In
Fitch's opinion, all servicer are acceptable servicers of student
loans due to their low net claim reject rates and long servicing.

Criteria Variation:
The decision to affirm the notes rather than downgrade is a
criteria variation; however Fitch has considered qualitative
factors such as the long time horizon before the senior notes
mature, subordination provided by the class C notes until 2033 and
the possibility of some of the senior notes that may be paid in
full before then.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class C 'CCCsf'

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Access to Loans for Learning Student Loan Corp - 1998 Master Trust
IV

Senior Class Notes
-- Series 2003-1 class A-8 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook;
-- Series 2003-1 class A-10 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook;
-- Series 2003-2 class A-11 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook;
-- Series 2007 class A-14 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook;
-- Series 2007 class A-15 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook
-- Series 2007 class A-16 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook;
-- Series 2007 class A-17 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook;
-- Series 2007 class A-18 at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook.

Subordinate Class Note
-- Series 1998 class C-1 affirmed at 'B-sf'; Stable Outlook.


ALLEGRO CLO II: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, and C-R replacement notes from Allegro CLO II
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2015 that is managed by AXA Investment Managers Inc.  The class D
and E notes are not being refinanced, and S&P does not expect the
ratings on these classes to be effected.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture and are expected to be issued at a lower
spread over LIBOR than for the original notes.

On the Feb. 10, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on
the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Allegro CLO II Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             244.40
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               48.50
B-R                       A (sf)                32.50
C-R                       BBB- (sf)             24.80

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

Allegro CLO II Ltd.
Class                   Rating
D                       BB- (sf)
E                       B (sf)
Subordinated notes      NR

NR--Not rated.


AMERIQUEST 2003-11: Moody's Hikes $10MM of Subprime RMBS to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche
backed by Subprime RMBS loans, issued by Ameriquest.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-11

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade is primarily due to the overall credit
enhancement available to the tranche.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


BAMLL 2016-SS1: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited on January 18, 2017, confirmed all classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-SS1
issued by BAMLL 2016-SS1 Mortgage Securities Trust as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which remains in line with DBRS's expectations at
issuance. This transaction closed in February 2016 and the
underlying loan is interest-only (IO) for the ten-year term. The
subject loan is secured by the fee and leasehold interests in One
Channel Center, a recently constructed 501,650 sf Class A office
building, and the adjacent Channel Center Garage containing 965
parking spaces, located in the Seaport submarket of Boston.

The office building was constructed in 2014 to house back-office
operations and consolidate employees from other locations for State
Street Corporation (State Street) (rated AA (low) by DBRS). State
Street is the office building's sole tenant, on a lease through
December 2029, just over three years past maturity with no early
termination options available. The nearby parking garage was also
constructed in 2014 and is leased to a third-party parking garage
operator, VPNE Parking Solutions Inc., through December 2018. The
parking garage is conveniently located near the subject property,
with State Street leasing 250 of the total 965 parking spaces. The
servicer's October 2016 site inspection confirmed the collateral to
be in excellent condition with no deferred maintenance noted.

As of Q3 2016 financials, the loan reported an annualized debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.95 times (x), compared to the
DBRS underwritten (UW) DSCR of 2.05x, reflective of a 3.1% decline
in net cash flow (NCF). This slight decline is attributable to
DBRS's long-term credit tenant (LTCT) treatment of State Street,
with no below-the-line deductions underwritten. The annualized net
operating income (NOI) reflected a slight increase of 3.6% over the
DBRS UW figure. According to CoStar, the Seaport submarket remains
strong with Class A office vacancy of 4.4% and availability of
4.2%, as the Boston Redevelopment Authority continues to
incentivize and promote development and re-development activity in
the area.

The loan benefits from low leverage with an original LTV of 51.6%,
a strong sponsorship group controlled by Tishman Speyer, an
experienced global owner, developer and operator of commercial real
estate, as well as an initial $152.7 million of cash equity backing
the transaction.


BEAR STEARNS 2005-TOP20: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. H Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class,
affirmed the ratings on four classes, and downgraded the ratings on
three classes in Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-TOP20 as
follows:

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class, C, was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 22% since Moody's last review.
Additionally, the loan is completely covered by a defeased loan.

The rating on the P&I class, D, was affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the P&I classes, H and J, were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed because the class
does not, nor is expected to receive monthly interest payments.

The ratings on the P&I classes, E, F, and G, were downgraded due
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
are higher than Moody's had previously expected.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 63.4% of the
current balance, compared to 9.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 4.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $114.6
million from $2.07 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 70% of the pool. One loan, constituting 3.5% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $76.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 27%). Two loans, constituting 78% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Lakeforest Mall -- A Note ($80.2 million -- 70.0% of the
pool), which is secured by a 345,000 SF interest in a
super-regional mall located in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The mall
anchors include Sears, Macy's, J.C. Penney, and Lord & Taylor. The
anchor space is not part of the collateral. The loan originally
transferred to special servicing in May 2011 for imminent maturity
default. The loan was modified in August 2012 into an A Note and B
Note. A purchaser assumed the A Note and retired the B Note. The
loan transferred back to special servicing in July 2016 after the
borrower submitted a hardship letter. Rolling 12 month sales as of
September 2016 for tenants less than 10,000 square feet were $341
per square foot (PSF), a 3% decline from the prior period. Moody's
has assumed a large loss for this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Mercado Fiesta
Center ($9.06 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
71,157 SF retail center located in Mesa, Arizona. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2015 due to imminent
maturity default and became real estate owned in July 2016. As of
November 2016 the property was 66% leased; over 49% of the net
rentable area have leases expiring between 2017-2018. The appraisal
from early 2016 was less than half of the 2015 value. Moody's has
assumed a large loss for this loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 75% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 64%, compared to 100% at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 19% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.10X and 1.81X,
respectively, compared to 1.08X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 14% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Hinckley Portfolio Loan ($10.2 million -- 9.0%
of the pool), which represents a 50% participation interest in five
properties totaling 473,975 SF located in Florida (1), Rhode Island
(1), and Maine (3). The sole tenant, Talaria Company, LLC, has a
lease expiration in April 2030, five years after loan maturity of
June 2025. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's stressed the
value of this property utilizing a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 66% and 1.57X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Posthole Office Loan ($2.9 million
-- 2.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 40,650 SF property
located in Las Vegas, Nevada. As of September 2016, the property
was 100% leased. Performance improved in 2015 due to revenue
outpacing expense growth. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and
1.65X, respectively, unchanged from the last review.

The third largest loan is the Weaver Fields Apartments Loan ($2.8
million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 108-unit
multifamily complex located in Memphis, Tennessee. As of September
2016, the property was 92% occupied. Performance dropped in 2015
due to a large increase in real estate taxes. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 86% and
1.1X at the last review.


BEAR STEARNS 2006-TOP22: Moody's Hikes Class F Debt to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and upgraded the ratings on five classes in Bear Stearns Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-TOP22 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I Classes were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 10% since Moody's last review.
Additionally, there has been an increase in defeasance, to 19% of
the current pool balance.

The rating on Class B was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Classes H and J were affirmed because the ratings are consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed because it is not
currently, nor expected to, receive monthly interest payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.7% of the
current balance, compared to 5.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 11 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $121 million
from $1.7 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 19 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 73% of
the pool. Two loans, constituting 7% of the pool, have
investment-grade structured credit assessments and four loans,
constituting 19% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $32 million (for an average loss
severity of 47%). One loan, constituting 2% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Country Inn & Suites By Carlson Scottsdale Loan ($2.7 million -- 2%
of the pool), which is secured by a 163-key hotel located in
Scottsdale, AZ, approximately 7 miles northeast of the Central
Business District. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2016 due to the borrower's failure to renew the franchise
agreement. The loan is a fully amortizing loan over its loan term
with a maturity date in January 2026.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 90% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 77%, compared to
74% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
15% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.43X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.43X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The two loans with investment grade structured credit assessment
($8.5 million --7.0% of the pool) are secured by cooperative
multifamily properties located in the New York City area.
Performance at both properties has remained stable. Moody's
structured credit assessment for both cooperative loans are aaa
(sca.pd).

The largest loan is the Sunrise Plaza Loan ($18.5 million -- 15% of
the pool), which is secured by a 119,200 SF retail property located
in San Jose, California. As of September 2016, the property was
100% leased but only 66% occupied due to Sport's Authority vacating
their space in August 2016 as a result of corporate bankruptcy. The
41,000 SF Sports Authority space will be replaced by a Dick's
Sporting Goods. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Hopewell Crossing Shopping Center
Loan ($17.4 million -- 14% of the pool), which is secured by a
109,000 SF grocery anchored shopping center. The center is located
approximately ten miles southeast of Princeton in Pennington, New
Jersey. The property is anchored by a grocer tenant with a lease
through May 2025. As of October 2016, the property was 97%
occupied. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.27X,
respectively, compared to 76% and 1.24X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Webster Square Loan ($9.8 million --
8% of the pool), which is secured by a 230,000 SF anchored retail
center located eleven miles northeast of Rochester in Webster, New
York. Major tenants include a BJ's Wholesale, Kmart and Dollar
Tree. As of September 2016, the property was 100% leased. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 74% and 1.50X, respectively, compared to
55% and 1.72X at the last review.


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO 2014-1: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, and C-R replacement notes from BlueMountain CLO
2014-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2014 that is managed by BlueMountain Capital Management
LLC.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.  The class D, E, and F notes are not part
of this refinancing and S&P expects to affirm the current ratings
on the refinancing date.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  Each of the refinanced notes is being issued with a lower
coupon rate than that of the current notes.

On the Jan. 30, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on
the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

Replacement notes
Class                Amount    Interest        
                   (mil. $)    rate (%)   
A-R                 321.25     LIBOR + 1.26
B-1-R                30.00     LIBOR + 1.60
B-2-R                20.00     3.390
C-R                  41.25     LIBOR + 2.35

Original notes
Class                Amount    Interest
                   (mil. $)    rate (%)   
A                   321.25     LIBOR+ 1.52
B-1                  30.00     LIBOR + 2.00
B-2                  20.00     4.411
C                    41.25     LIBOR + 2.75
D                   26.875     LIBOR + 3.45
E                    21.25     LIBOR + 4.75
F                    15.00     LIBOR + 5.50

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

BlueMountain CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             321.25
B-1-R                     AA+ (sf)              30.00
B-2-R                     AA+ (sf)              20.00
C-R                       A+ (sf)               41.25

OTHER OUTSTANDING CLASSES

BlueMountain CLO 2014-1 Ltd.
Class                 Rating      
D                     BBB (sf)
E                     BB (sf)
F                     B (sf)
Subordinated notes    NR

NR--Not rated.


BRIDGEPORT CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class D Notes to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Bridgeport CLO II Ltd.:

US$26,000,000 Class B Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on September 16, 2016
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2021, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on September 16, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

US$19,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes Due
2021 (current balance of $14,319,673.80), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on September 16, 2016 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$390,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2021
(current balance of $79,864,368.35), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on September 16, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$21,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 16, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Bridgeport CLO II Ltd., issued in June 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
September 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since September 2016. The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 57.6% or $108.7
million since that time. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC
ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class B, Class C and Class D
notes are 224.45%, 177.72%, 141.29%, 120.41% and 109.85%,
respectively, versus September 2016 levels of 153.30%, 137.94%,
122.72%, 112.23% and 106.32%, respectively.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $0.7 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2222)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3332)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $178.8 million, defaulted par of 1.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 16.05% (implying
a WARF of 2777), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
49.12%, a diversity score of 46 and a weighted average spread of
3.43% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


CAPITALSOURCE REAL 2006-A: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. C Notes to B-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B and C
floating-rate notes from CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust
2006-A, a U.S. commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE-CDO) transaction.  At the same time, S&P lowered
its rating on the class J notes and affirmed its ratings on five
other classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Nov. 23, 2016, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $313.12 million in
collective paydowns to the class A-1A, A-1R, A-2A, A-2B, and B
notes since S&P's June 2014 rating actions.  Since then, class
A-1A, A-1R, A-2A, and A-2B have been completely paid down, and the
class B notes have started to receive paydowns.  The class B note
balance is currently at 94.43% of the balance at issuance, down
from 100% during S&P's last review.

The paydowns have improved the reported overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios for the senior classes, but the transaction's defaults have
increased during this period.  According to the November 2016
monthly trustee report, defaults are at
$128.28 million; S&P's June 2014 rating actions considered
$27.58 million in defaults.  The increase in defaults affected the
junior O/C ratios.

The O/C ratios as of the November 2016 trustee report compared with
the May 2014 trustee report, which S&P used for its June 2014
review, were:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was at 396.59%, up from 184.48%.
   -- The class C/D/E O/C ratio was at 154.33%, up from 140.40%.
   -- The class F/G/H O/C ratio was at 106.25% (the minimum
      requirement is 105%), down from 119.30%.

As the deal is currently passing its coverage tests, all the
notes--including class J--are current in their interest payments.
However, based on the November 2016 trustee report balances, the
class J O/C ratio can be inferred to be at 91.41%.

The upgrades are based on the increased credit support following
paydowns.  The downgrade reflects decreased credit support
primarily due to the increase in defaults.  The affirmations
reflect S&P's belief that the credit support available is
commensurate with the current rating levels.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated a higher rating for all
of the classes except class H and J, S&P's rating actions consider
the credit quality of the assets backing the notes and the
break-even default rates' sensitivity to changes in the
amortization.

The application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's criteria, constrains the ratings on
the class F and G notes.  With only 38 performing obligors
currently in the portfolio, the portfolio's obligor concentration
risk has increased.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A
                  Rating
Class         To          From
B             BB+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)
C             B- (sf)     CCC (sf)

RATING LOWERED

CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A
                  Rating
Class         To           From
J             CC (sf)      CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CapitalSource Real Estate Loan Trust 2006-A

Class         Rating

D             CCC- (sf)
E             CCC- (sf)
F             CCC- (sf)
G             CCC- (sf)
H             CCC- (sf)


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-2: S&P Assigns Prelim 'B' Rating on Cl. F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, and C-R replacement notes from Carlyle Global Market
Strategies CLO 2014-2 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in June 2014 and is managed by
Carlyle Investment Management LLC.  The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.  S&P do not expect
the refinancing to have any impact on the outstanding ratings on
the class D, E, and F notes.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  The replacement notes are expected to be issued at a lower
spread over LIBOR than the original notes they replace.

On the Feb. 15, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
Replacement class    Rating                Amount (mil. $)
A-R                  AAA (sf)                      377.00
B-R                  AA (sf)                        80.00
C-R                  A (sf)                         40.00

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

Carlyle Global Market Strategies CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
Class                Rating
D                    BBB (sf)
E                    BB (sf)
F                    B (sf)
Subordinated notes   NR

NR--Not rated.


CD 2017-CD3: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes at 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on CD 2017-CD3 Mortgage
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-CD3.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $29,155,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,347,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $589,293,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54,788,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $78,136,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $989,719,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,857,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,857,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,485,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,485,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,508,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,508,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,812,000ad class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,651,000ad class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:
-- $60,229,959ad class G;
-- $25,222,199ac VRR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 1.9% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 3.1% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 22, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 52 loans secured by 59
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,327,484,158 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by German American Capital Corporation and Citigroup
Global Markets Realty Corp.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.6%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage Higher than 2016 Average: The pool has higher
leverage than other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV for the trust are 1.14x and 108.4%,
respectively, while the 2016 averages are 1.21x and 105.2%,
respectively.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans
representing 10.2% of the pool have investment-grade credit
opinions, which is above the 2016 average of 8.4%. The third
largest loan in the pool, 85 Tenth Avenue (5.7% of the pool), has
an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone
basis. Hilton Hawaiian Village Waikiki Beach Resort (4.5% of the
pool) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis. The implied credit enhancement levels for the
conduit portion of the transaction at 'AAAsf' and 'BBB-sf' are
26.000% and 9.500%, respectively.

Well Below-Average Amortization: Sixteen loans representing 51.1%
of the pool are full-term interest-only and 16 loans representing
27.1% of the pool are partial interest-only. Fitch-rated
transactions in 2016 had an average full-term interest-only
percentage of 33.3% and a partial interest-only percentage of
33.3%. The pool is scheduled to amortize by 6.9% of the initial
pool balance prior to maturity, well below the average of 10.4% for
other Fitch-rated transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI); for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to CD
2017-CD3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


CITIGROUP TRUST: Moody's Takes Action on $1.86BB of Subprime RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 58 tranches,
downgraded the rating of one tranche, and assigned ratings to 25
tranches from 20 Citgroup RMBS transactions, backed by subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2016 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Assigned C (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned C (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 WR (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-7, Assigned C (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-8, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Assigned C (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 12, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE3

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned C (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2016 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AHL3

Cl. M-1, Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned C (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE3

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Assigned C (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-4, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2016 WR (sf)

Cl. M-6, Assigned C (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc. 2006-WMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Assigned C (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2013 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-HE4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 23, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 19, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-5, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2014 WR (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-OPT1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-9, Assigned C (sf); previously on Feb 29, 2016 WR (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the increases in credit
enhancement available to bonds due to the distribution of funds
related to the $1.125 billion Citigroup settlement. The upgrades on
Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE3 Class A-1 and Citigroup
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1 Class A-2C and A-2D are also due to
improvement in related pool performance and Moody's loss
expectation on these pools.

The rating downgrade on Class M-1 in Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust
2005-OPT1 is due to the outstanding unpaid interest shortfall that
is not expected to be recouped.

The assignment of ratings reflect the fact that the prior ratings
had been withdrawn as these tranches were previously written down
due to losses, but the tranches have since been partially written
back due to the settlement proceeds. The assigned ratings reflect
their reinstated balances and expected tranche loss.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CITIGROUP: Moody's Hikes $147MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
issued by two Citigroup transactions backed by "scratch and dent"
RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-SHL1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 20, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-SHL1

Cl. A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the large increase in
credit enhancement available to the bonds due to the distribution
of funds related to the $1.125 billion Citigroup settlement.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


COMM 2004-LNB4: Moody's Hikes B2 Rating to Class B Certs
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded one class and affirmed two
classes of COMM 2004-LNB4 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-LNB4 as follows:

Cl. B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I Class B was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 20% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on the P&I Class C was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-C, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.6% of the
current balance compared to 15.2% at last review. Moody's base plus
realized loss totals 10.2% compared to 10.3% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http:/www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015, and "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit / Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Conduit Loan Herf of 7, compared to 8 at last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $15.5 million
from $1.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22% of the pool. One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, has
defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Three loans, constituting 35% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan, constituting 7.3% of the pool, is currently in special
servicing. The Hampton Park Apartments Loan ($1.13 million -- 7.3%
of the pool), was initially secured by a 128-unit, 17-building
apartment complex in Columbia, South Carolina. The property is
located approximately four miles from both downtown Columbia and
the University of South Carolina. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2013 due to monetary default. Foreclosure was
completed and the special servicer took title in February 2015. The
property is now real estate owned (REO). In October 2015, flood
damage from Hurricane Joaquin impacted six of the 17 buildings at
the property. As a result, 48 units were lost during the flood.
Subsequently, an insurance settlement was filed and the settlement
was received in installments, beginning in May 2016. Excess
settlement funds were used to pay down the principal loan balance
as well as outstanding advances and interest. The insurance
settlement has been paid in full, however the 48 units lost to the
flood will not be rebuilt due to the prohibitive cost and ordinance
issues which would be imposed by the City of Columbia. The property
will be marketed for sale through an auction which is expected to
occur in March 2017. As of November 2016, the property was 34%
leased, the same as at last review.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 68% of the
pool, and partial year 2016 operating results for 55% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 84%, compared to 86% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 0.96X and 1.53X,
respectively, compared to 1.00X and 0.39X, at last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 45% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Eagle Valley Marketplace Loan ($3.4 million --
22% of the pool), which is secured by two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted strip centers totaling approximately 31,000 square
feet (SF). The properties are located in Woodbury, Minnesota,
approximately 20 miles East of Minneapolis, Minnesota. As of
September 2016, Eagle Valley I was 91% leased, up from 90% at last
review, while Eagle Valley II was 78% leased, down from 79% at last
review. Overall, the total portfolio is currently 85% leased versus
86% at last review. The loan has amortized 30% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 105% and 1.09X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Inver Grove Marketplace Loan ($2.1
million -- 13.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 21,200 SF
strip retail center in Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota approximately
10 miles south of St. Paul, Minnesota. The property is currently
82% leased as of June 2016, the same as at last review. The loan
has amortized 30% since securitization. Performance has declined
due to an increase in expenses. The loan is currently on the
watchlist due to low DSCR. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 135%
and 0.84X, respectively, compared to 126% and 0.90X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Bank of America Loan ($1.5 million --
9.9% of the pool), which is secured by a Bank of America bank
branch in the Brentwood neighborhood of Washington, DC. Performance
has been stable and this fully amortizing loan has paid down 37%
since securitization. Moody's accounted for single-tenant risk
exposure through a lit/dark blend value approach. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 78% and 1.24X, respectively, compared to 85% and
1.14X at the last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE6: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited on January 13 upgraded the ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-CCRE6 (the Certificates) issued by COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage
Trust:

-- Class B to AA (high) (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class PEZ to A (high) (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class C to A (high) (sf) from A (sf)

In addition, DBRS has confirmed the remaining classes as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

DBRS has assigned a Positive trend to Class D; all other trends are
Stable. The Class PEZ certificates are exchangeable for the Classes
A-M, B and C certificates (and vice versa).

These rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction with loans in the Top 15, representing approximately
80.0% of the pool balance, generally showing healthy cash flow
growth over the DBRS underwritten (UW) figures and stable occupancy
trends. At issuance, the pool consisted of 48 loans secured by 80
commercial and multifamily properties. The pool has since
experienced a collateral reduction of 3.3% as a result of scheduled
amortization with all of the original 48 loans outstanding. The
pool also benefits from defeasance collateral as one loan in the
Top 15, representing 6.9% of the current pool balance, is fully
defeased. Based on YE2015 financials, the pool reported a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.33
times (x) and a WA debt yield of 12.8%. Comparatively, the YE2014
WA DSCR and WA debt yield were 2.24x and 11.2%, respectively. At
issuance, the WA DBRS UW DSCR and debt yield figures were 1.99x and
10.4%, respectively.

As of the December 2016 remittance, there are five loans,
representing 3.8% of the current pool balance, on the servicer's
watchlist. All of these loans showed a coverage ratio above 1.0x as
of the most recent full-year reporting (YE2015) available. For
additional information on these loans, please see the servicer's
reported data and, for the larger and/or pivotal loans on the
watchlist, DBRS commentary on the DBRS IReports platform at
www.ireports.dbrs.com.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated one loan investment grade:
Prospectus ID #1 Federal Center Plaza, representing 9.0% of the
current pool balance. DBRS's review confirms that the performance
of these loans remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans and for the specially
serviced loan as well as for the largest 15 loans in the pool in
the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.

The ratings assigned to Classes D, E and F materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative model that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology; in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.



COMM MORTGAGE 2004-LNB2: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Cl. K Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed 11 classes of
COMM Mortgage Trust 2004-LNB2 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects stable performance, continued pay down and a
high level of defeasance in the remaining pool. There are five
loans remaining, the largest three of which are defeased (94.5% of
the pool). The three defeased loans mature in December 2018, March
2019, and January 2019, respectively. One loan is in special
servicing (3.1%). The one non-defeased, non-specially serviced loan
(2.4%) continues to perform.

As of the January 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 92.1% to $76.2 million from
$963.8 million at issuance including $23.98 million (2.5% of the
original pool balance) in realized losses to date. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes L and P.

Defeasance: The top three loans in the pool are defeased, which
accounts for $72 million (94.5%) of the deal.

Pool Concentration Risk: A total of five loans remain in the pool,
which includes one specially serviced loan and a single tenant drug
store asset.

The specially-serviced loan is secured by a 59,933 square foot (sf)
retail center located in Fort Worth, TX. The center is occupied by
a mix of predominantly small local tenants with a few national
tenants. The loan transferred to special servicing in January 2014
due to maturity default. Occupancy and DSCR have declined to 60%
and 0.80x, respectively, as of September 2016 (trailing eight-month
reporting). Previously, the borrower filed bankruptcy on Dec. 1,
2014, which postponed a foreclosure sale. More recently, the
foreclosure sale closed and the loan became REO effective Feb. 2,
2016. The special servicer has a value-add strategy for the asset;
there are no current disposition plans, as the asset manager is
working to lease up the vacant space.

The remaining performing loan (2.4% of the pool) is a single-tenant
Walgreens store in College Station, TX. The Walgreens asset is a
fully amortizing loan with a lease that is coterminous with the
April 2028 maturity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on classes C through J are the result of
high credit enhancement due to pay down and defeasance. Downgrades
to these classes are unlikely as they are fully covered by
defeasance. Upgrades to class K above the current rating are
unlikely until there is further certainty of resolution on the
specially serviced loan.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following class:

-- $4.8 million class J to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $5 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.4 million class E at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.6 million class F at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.8 million class G at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.8 million class H at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 90%;
-- $1.3 million class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and B certificates have paid in full.
Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and X-2
certificates.


CPS AUTO 2017-A: DBRS Finalizes BB Ratings on Class E Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on January 18, 2017, finalized its provisional ratings
on the following classes issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust
2017-A (2017-A):

-- $99,120,000 Series 2017-A, Class A rated AAA (sf)
-- $29,920,000 Series 2017-A, Class B rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $32,660,000 Series 2017-A, Class C rated A (sf)
-- $24,570,000 Series 2017-A, Class D rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- $20,050,000 Series 2017-A, Class E rated BB (low) (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:
-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.
-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
    subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
    spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
    the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
    under various stress scenarios.
-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and the payment of principal by the legal final maturity date.
-- The capabilities of Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS)
    with regard to originations, underwriting and servicing.
-- DBRS has performed an operational review of CPS and considers
    the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
    subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
    servicer.
-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and

    a successful track record within the auto finance industry,
    having managed the company through multiple economic cycles.
-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for CPS originations and performance of the CPS auto loan

    portfolio.
-- The May 29, 2014, settlement of the Federal Trade Commission
    (FTC) inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade practices.
-- CPS paid imposed penalties and restitution payments to
    consumers.
-- CPS has made considerable improvements to the collections  
    process, including management changes, upgraded systems and
    software as well as implementation of new policies and
    procedures focused on maintaining compliance.
-- CPS will be subject to ongoing monitoring of certain processes

    by the FTC.
-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that
    the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
    assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
    U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The 2017-A transaction represents the 24th securitization completed
by CPS since 2010 and will offer both senior and subordinate rated
securities. The receivables securitized in 2017-A will be subprime
automobile loan contracts secured primarily by used automobiles,
light-duty trucks, vans and minivans.

The rating on the Class A Note reflects the 53.80% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization (1.75%). The
ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E Notes reflect
39.55%, 24.00%, 12.30% and 2.75% of initial hard credit
enhancement, respectively.


CPS AUTO 2017-A: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(low) Rating to Cl. E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on January 9, 2017, assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes issued by CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2017-A
(2017-A):

-- $99,120,000 Series 2017-A, Class A rated AAA (sf)
-- $29,920,000 Series 2017-A, Class B rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $32,660,000 Series 2017-A, Class C rated A (sf)
-- $24,570,000 Series 2017-A, Class D rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- $20,050,000 Series 2017-A, Class E rated BB (low) (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
    subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
    spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
    the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
    under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and the payment of principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The capabilities of Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS)
    with regard to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of CPS and considers
    the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
    subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
    servicer.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and

    a successful track record within the auto finance industry,
    having managed the company through multiple economic cycles.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for CPS originations and performance of the CPS auto loan

    portfolio.

-- The May 29, 2014, settlement of the Federal Trade Commission
    (FTC) inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade practices.

-- CPS paid imposed penalties and restitution payments to
    consumers.

-- CPS has made considerable improvements to the collections
    process, including management changes, upgraded systems and
    software as well as implementation of new policies and
    procedures focused on maintaining compliance.

-- CPS will be subject to ongoing monitoring of certain processes

    by the FTC.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that
    the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
    assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
    U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The 2017-A transaction represents the 24th securitization completed
by CPS since 2010 and will offer both senior and subordinate rated
securities. The receivables securitized in 2017-A will be subprime
automobile loan contracts secured primarily by used automobiles,
light-duty trucks, vans and minivans.

The rating on the Class A Note reflects the 53.80% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization (1.75%). The
ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E Notes reflect
39.55%, 24.00%, 12.30% and 2.75% of initial hard credit
enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C1: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class H Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class, affirmed eight classes, and
downgraded one class of Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust
(CSMC) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2006-C1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade and Positive Outlook assigned to class G reflect the
increased credit enhancement to the class relative to expected
losses. Fitch modeled losses of 36.7% of the remaining pool;
expected losses on the original pool balance total 4.9%, including
$109.5 million in realized losses to date.

Since the last rating action in January 2016, the pool has paid
down by an additional $188 million with realized losses over the
period of $6.2 million. As of the January 2017 Remittance Report,
the total pool has been reduced 96.5% to $106.7 million from $3
billion at issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently impacting
classes J and below.

Pool Concentration: The pool is very concentrated with only 30
loans or REO assets remaining. Retail properties comprise the
largest percentage of remaining assets at 40.7%, including the
largest remaining loan in the pool, the specially serviced
Arrowhead Mall at 15.2%. Fully amortizing loans, which are
primarily backed by coop properties, comprise 6.7% of the pool;
these loans have scheduled maturity dates between 2017 and 2025.

High Percentage of LOCS and Specially Serviced Loans: Fitch LOCs
account for 74.4% of the pool including six specially serviced
loans/REO assets at 35.7%.

Limited Scheduled Maturities in Near Term: Outside of the specially
serviced loans, there are limited loans scheduled to mature in the
next year. One is a fully amortizing coop loan with a remaining
balance of $124,405 due in December 2017, and the other a $16.7
million loan consisting of a $12 million A-note and a $4.7 million
hope note. This office property secured loan is scheduled to mature
in March 2017, but occupancy is below market and the largest tenant
rolls in February 2017 just prior to the loan's maturity.
Therefore, any significant near-term pay down would likely come
from the disposition of specially serviced loans.

Largest Specially Serviced Asset: The Arrowhead Mall is secured by
a 439,224 sf regional mall located in Muskogee, OK. The mall is
anchored by Dillard's (16.9% of NRA through May 2019), JC Penney
(11.6% of NRA through September 2017), and B&B Theaters (7.4% of
NRA through January 2018). The property's performance declined in
2015 after Sears (17.5% of NRA) vacated upon its December 2014
lease expiration. The servicer-reported occupancy and DSCR were
68.2% and 0.71x, respectively, as of third quarter 2016,

The loan transferred to special servicing in January 2016 due to
imminent maturity default. The borrower was unable to refinance the
loan or sell the property to pay off the loan at maturity in March
2016. A receiver is in place, and foreclosure is in process. The
servicer expects foreclosure to be completed in Q1 2017 with a
possible sale later in the year.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Upgrades to the senior classes were limited due to the concentrated
nature of the transaction and high percentage of Fitch Loans of
Concern and specially serviced assets. The Positive Outlook on
class G reflects the possibility that this class could be upgraded
in the future should loans payoff and/or specially serviced assets
resolve at better than expected recoveries. Class H could also be
subject to future upgrade should resolutions be better than
anticipated.

Class J could be subject to downgrade should further losses be
realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following class:

-- $28.5 million class G to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to
Positive from Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $33.8 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE100%.
-- $14.4 million class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has downgraded the following class:

-- $30 million class J to 'Csf; from 'CCsf'; RE 20%;

The class A-1 through F certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class S or CCA certificates. Fitch previously withdrew
the ratings on the interest-only class A-X and A-Y certificates.


CSFB 1999-C1: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A-X Debt to C
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating on one
interest-only class in CS First Boston (CSFB) Mortgage Securities
Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series
1999-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO Class (Class A-X) was downgraded because the
class is not currently receiving, nor is expected to receive,
interest payments.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, compared to 25.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.7% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 18, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $20 million
from $1.170 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 2 mortgage loans, both of which have defeased and
are secured by US government securities.

Thirty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $90 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%).


CVP CASCADE CLO-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to B-
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class E notes from CVP
Cascade CLO-1 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
managed by Credit Value Partners L.P., which closed in January
2014.  At the same time, S&P removed this rating from CreditWatch,
where we placed it with negative implications on
Oct. 27, 2016.  In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class
A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Jan. 5, 2017, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
January 2018, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

The lowered rating on the class E notes is a result of the decrease
in credit support and increased exposure to assets rated 'CCC+' and
below.  Specifically, the amount of collateral obligations rated
'CCC+' or lower has increased to $26.44 million (6.76% of the
aggregate principal balance) as of the January 2017 trustee report
from $9.10 million (2.27% of the aggregate principal balance) as of
the May 2014 effective date report.

During the same period, the transaction has experienced a
significant par loss, which is largely due to defaults in the
underlying portfolio.  The reported overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios for each of the rated notes have decreased since the May
2014 effective date report as a result of these losses:

   -- The class A O/C ratio decreased to 132.40% from 135.59%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio decreased to 118.57% from 121.43%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 111.48% from 114.17%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 105.97% from 108.53%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 102.84% from 105.32%.

The interest diversion test currently stands at 102.84%, which is
74 basis points above the threshold of 102.10%.  Failure of this
test will divert up to 50% of excess interest proceeds to purchase
additional collateral or pay according to the note payment
sequence.

While the transaction has benefitted from an increase in assets
rated 'B+' and above and a decline in the collateral pool's
reported weighted average life, this has not been enough to offset
the aforementioned risk factors.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class A-2, B, and C notes, S&P considered the amount of cushion
available at the higher rating levels, as well as other stress
tests to allow for volatility in the underlying portfolio given
that the transaction is still in its reinvestment period.  As such,
S&P decided to affirm the ratings on these classes.

On a stand-alone basis, the cash flow results showed that the class
E notes were not passing at the 'B' rating level.  At this time,
the lowered rating is limited to one notch because S&P do not feel
that this class represents our definition of 'CCC' risk. However,
any increase in defaults or par losses could lead to potential
negative rating actions in the future.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATING LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

CVP Cascade CLO-1 Ltd.

                   Rating
Class        To             From
E            B- (sf)        B (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED

CVP Cascade CLO-1 Ltd.

Class        Rating

A-1          AAA (sf)
A-2          AA (sf)
B            A (sf)
C            BBB (sf)
D            BB (sf)


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB- Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Flagship
Credit Auto Trust 2017-1's $301.52 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2017-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 24,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The availability of approximately 50.95%, 41.38%, 32.40%,
      25.29%, and 19.86% credit support (including excess spread)
      for the class A, B, C, D and E notes, respectively, based on

      stressed cash flow scenarios.  These credit support levels
      provide coverage of approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x,
      1.75x, and 1.40x S&P's 13.00%-13.50% expected cumulative net

      loss range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.  These break-even scenarios cover total
      cumulative gross defaults (using a recovery assumption of
      40%) of approximately 85%, 69%, 54%, 42%, and 33,
      respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate
      to the assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, all else being equal, S&P's ratings on the class A

      and B notes would remain within one rating category of S&P's

      preliminary 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' ratings within the
      first year and S&P's ratings on the class C, D, and E notes
      would remain within two rating categories of S&P's
      preliminary 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB- (sf)' ratings,
      respectively, within the first year.  This is within the
      one-category rating tolerance for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated
      securities and two-category rating tolerance for 'A', 'BBB',

      and 'BB' rated securities, as outlined in S&P's credit
      stability criteria.

   -- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
      overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

   -- The characteristics of the collateral pool being
      securitized.  The transaction's payment and legal
      structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-1

Class    Rating       Type            Interest          Amount
                                      rate(i)         (mil. $)
A        AAA (sf)     Senior          Fixed             170.00
B        AA (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed              44.60
C        A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed              36.00
D        BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed              28.66
E        BB- (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed              22.26

(i)The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


FRANKLIN CLO VI: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Franklin CLO VI, Ltd.:

US$38,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2019,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 28, 2016 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

US$18,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2019, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016
Affirmed A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$272,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2019
(current balance of $109,210,919.07), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
on April 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2019, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on April 28, 2016 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

US$11,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due 2019 (current balance of $11,035,647.14), Affirmed B1 (sf);
previously on April 28, 2016 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Franklin CLO VI, Ltd., issued in July 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
August 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since April 2016. The Class A
notes have been paid down by approximately 43% or $80.9 million
since that time. Based on the trustee's December 2016 report, the
OC ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are
reported at 137.88%, 122.85%, 112.63% and 106.13%, respectively,
versus April 2016 levels of 124.23%, 115.14%, 108.53% and 104.13%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the transaction has increased percentage exposure to
securities that mature after the notes do (long-dated assets).
Based on Moody's calculation, the long-dated assets currently make
up approximately 21.6% of the portfolio, or $38.9 million, compared
to 19.0%, or $52.6 million, in April 2016. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature. Despite the increase in the OC ratios of the
Class D and E notes, Moody's affirmed their ratings owing to market
risk stemming from the exposure to these long-dated assets.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. In light of the
deal's sizable exposure to long-dated assets, which increases its
sensitivity to the liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis,
Moody's ran scenarios using a range of liquidation value
assumptions. However, actual long-dated asset exposures and
prevailing market prices and conditions at the CLO's maturity will
drive the deal's actual losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

8) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $4.8 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2219)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Class E: 0

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3329)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -2

Class D: -1

Class E: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $203.2 million, defaulted par of
$171,752, a weighted average default probability of 13.09%
(implying a WARF of 2774), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 52.84%, a diversity score of 29 and a weighted average
spread of 3.41% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


FREDDIE 2017-K61: Fitch to Rate Class C Certificates 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on FREMF 2017-K61
Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates and Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-061.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks
as:

FREMF 2017-K61 Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

   -- $129,287,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $882,737,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72,512,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1,012,024,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72,512,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1,012,024,000a class X2-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $50,444,000 class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $31,527,000 class C 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-061

   -- $129,287,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $882,737,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72,512,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1,012,024,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $72,512,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only
(b) Guaranteed by Freddie Mac. Ratings are based solely on the
underlying collateral and without respect to the Freddie Mac
guarantee.
(c) Classes A-M and XAM could be rated 'AAAsf' if the Freddie Mac
guarantee would be accounted for.

These expected ratings are based on the information provided by the
issuer as of Jan. 17, 2017.  Fitch does not expect to rate the
following classes of FREMF 2017-K61: the $176,553,402 interest-only
class X3, the $249,065,402 interest-only class X2-B or the
$94,582,402 class D.

Additionally, Fitch does not expect to rate the following class of
Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-061: the
$176,553,402 interest-only class X3.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust.  The trust's primary assets are 69 loans secured by 69
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.26 billion as of the cut-off date.  The Freddie
Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-061 (Freddie Mac
SPC K-061) represents a pass-through interest in the corresponding
class of securities issued by FREMF 2017-K61.  Each Freddie Mac SPC
K-061 security has the same designation as its underlying FREMF
2017-K61 class.  All loans were originated specifically for Freddie
Mac by approved Seller Servicers.  The certificates follow a
sequential-pay structure.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 68.2% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 79.0% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.04, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 120.5% and
a Fitch debt yield of 7.2%.  Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 11.29% to issuer cash flows.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Leverage Than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The pool's
Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.04x and 120.5%, respectively.  The
transaction's DSCR is in-line with the Fitch-rated 2016 DSCR for
10-year, K-series Freddie Mac deals of 1.04x, and slightly worse
than the 2015 average of 1.08x.  The transaction's LTV is higher
than the 2016 and 2015 averages of 117.3% and 115.0%, respectively.
In addition, 72.3% of loans in the pool by balance have a Fitch
DSCR lower than 1.00x, which is worse than the 2016 average of
60.3%.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 10.8% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity, slightly above the
Fitch-rated Freddie Mac 10-year 2016 and 2015 averages of 10.6% and
10.2%, respectively.  Seven loans (12.1%) are full-term
interest-only, and 47 loans (74.5%) are partial interest-only.  The
remaining 15 loans (13.4%) are amortizing balloon loans with a term
of 10 years.

Credit Opinion Loan: Park Terrace Gardens represents 1.5% of the
total pool balance and received a credit opinion of 'AAAsf*' on a
stand-alone basis.  The loan is secured by a 394-unit cooperative
development located in the Morningside Heights neighborhood of
Manhattan.  Excluding this loan, the conduit has a Fitch stressed
DSCR and LTV of 1.01x and 121.9%, respectively.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 13.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period).  Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to FREMF
2017-K61 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF.  In a scenario
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result.  In a more severe
scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result.


FREMF 2011-K703: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class X-2 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one CMBS class
and affirmed the ratings on three CMBS classes issued by FREMF
Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-K703
and has affirmed two Structured Pass-Through Certificates ("SPC"),
Series K703, issued by Freddie Mac as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

*SPC Classes:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

*Each of the SPC Classes represents a pass-through interest in its
associated underlying CMBS Class. SPC Class A-2 represents a
pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class A-2 and SPC Class X1
represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class X1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class B was upgraded primarily due to a significant
increase in defeasance, to 30% of the current pool balance from 18%
at the last review.

The rating on Class A-2 was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Class X-1 and X-2, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.2% of the
current balance, compared to 1.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.4% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 27, compared to a Herf of 32 at Moody's last
review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the December 27, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 8% to $1.13 billion
from $1.23 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 69 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 7% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 34% of
the pool. Twenty-four loans, constituting 30% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting less than 0.5% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool and partial year 2016 operating results for 97% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 85%, compared to 86% at
Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.61X and 1.15X,
respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Pavilions Loan ($79.8 million -- 7.1% of the
pool), which is secured by a 932-unit multifamily property located
in Manchester, Connecticut, a suburb of Hartford. The property was
92% leased as of September 2016 compared to 90% leased as of
September 2015 and 97% leased as of March 2014. The loan also
benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 94%
and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 90% and 1.05X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Casoleil Apartments Loan ($48.2
million -- 4.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 346-unit
multifamily property located in San Diego, California. The property
was 95% leased as of September 2016, compared to 96% leased as of
December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and 0.94X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Fairland Gardens Apartments Loan
($40.8 million -- 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 400-unit
multifamily property located in Silver Spring, Maryland. As of June
2016, the property was 97% leased, compared to 94% at
securitization. Property performance has been stable since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.86X,
respectively, compared to 103% and 0.90X at the last review.


GALLERIA CDO V: Moody's Hikes Class A-1 Notes to B1(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on notes issued
by Galleria CDO V, Ltd. (formerly Beacon Hill III):

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Term Notes, due 2037
(current outstanding balance of $8,510,240.35), Upgraded to B1
(sf); previously on September 01, 2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Galleria CDO V, Ltd., issued in August 2002, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of RMBS with some
exposure to CDOs and corporate assets originated in 2001 to 2005.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratio since September 2016. The Class
A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 33.1%, or $4.2
million since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratio
of the Class A-1 Notes is currently 175.47%, versus 142.94% in
September 2016. The paydown of the Class A-1 notes is partially the
result of cash collections from certain assets treated as defaulted
by the trustee in amounts materially exceeding expectations.

The trustee reported that, on June 18, 2008, the transaction
experienced an "Event of Default" as set forth in Section 5.1 (i)
of the indenture dated August 7, 2002. On November 18, 2008,
holders of at least a majority of the controlling class directed
the trustee to declare the notes immediately due and payable. The
Event of Default continues.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any deterioration in either consumer
or commercial credit conditions and in the commercial and
residential real estate property markets. Commercial real estate
property market is subject to uncertainty about general economic
conditions including commercial real estate prices, investment
activities, and economic performances. The residential real estate
property market's uncertainties include housing prices; the pace of
residential mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and
refinancing; the unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries from
defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will continue and at
what pace. Faster than expected deleveraging could have a
significantly positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Amortization profile assumptions: Moody's modeled the
amortization of the underlying collateral portfolio based on its
assumed weighted average life (WAL). Regardless of the WAL
assumption, due to the sensitivity of amortization assumption and
its impact on the amount of principal available to pay down the
notes, Moody's supplemented its analysis with various sensitivity
analysis around the amortization profile of the underlying
collateral assets.

4) Recovery of defaulted assets: The amount of recoveries received
from defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody'
s assumes as having defaulted as well as the timing of these
recoveries create additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed
defaulted assets assuming limited recoveries, and therefore,
realization of any recoveries exceeding Moody's expectation in the
future would positively impact the notes' ratings.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM™ to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge™ cash flow
model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa ratings notched up by two rating notches (2504):

Class A-1: 0

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0

Caa ratings notched down by two notches (3603):

Class A-1: -1

Class B: 0

Class C-1: 0

Class C-2: 0


GE COMMERCIAL 2006-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on 3 Certs to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four classes and affirmed 10 classes
of GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C1 (GECMC 2006-C1).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades to classes C, D and E reflect incurred losses. Class
B has been downgraded as losses to this class are inevitable once
the remaining real estate owned (REO) assets are liquidated.
Although the credit enhancement is high to class A-J, the class was
affirmed at 'Bsf' as recoveries to this class are based on proceeds
from the REO assets.  Fitch modeled losses of 26.3% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
9.8%, including $127.3 million (7.9% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.

As of the December 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 92.9% to $114.9 million from
$1.61 billion at issuance.  No loans are defeased.  Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes D through P.

Concentrated Pool: The pool consists of five assets/loans in
special servicing, which account for 97.9% of the pool's
outstanding balance, and one performing loan.

REO Assets: There are three REO assets within the pool (84.2%), of
which two (James Center and Grand Marc at Riverside) account for
80% of the pool.  These two assets are currently under contract.
The ultimate loss and disposition timing of the other loans/assets
remains uncertain.

33 Washington Loss: The downgrades to classes C, D and E reflect
the losses attributed to the 33 Washington property, which was an
REO asset that was liquidated in December 2016 for a $55.2 million
loss.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for class A-J has been revised to Stable as
proceeds from the two largest REO assets (James Center and Grand
Marc at Riverside) are expected to pay off the class.  A further
downgrade to class B is expected once the losses attributed to the
James Center are passed through the trust.

Fitch downgrades these classes:

   -- $36.2 million class B to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 30%;
   -- $11.5 million class C to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class D to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class E to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms these classes and revises the Rating Outlook as
indicated:

   -- $67.2 million class A-J at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Negative.

Fitch affirms these classes:

   -- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M certificates have
paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.  Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-W
certificates.


GERMAN AMERICAN 2012-LC4: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of German American Capital
Corp.'s COMM 2012-LC4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  Fitch has also revised the Rating Outlook on class F
to Negative from Stable.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance: Overall performance of the pool is
relatively stable with no material changes.  The aggregate YE 2015
NOI of the loans have improved 2.5% from 2014 and 10.9% from NOI at
issuance.  There have been no specially serviced loans since
issuance.  No loans are defeased.  Six loans (11.2%) are on the
servicer watchlist.  Fitch has identified two loans (3.9%) as Fitch
Loans of Concern due to declined performance, including the
Susquehanna Valley Mall loan (3.2%).

High Retail Concentration: The transaction has high retail property
concentration, which represents 55.5% of the total loan balance.
Eight of the top 15 loans are secured by retail properties.

Secondary Locations: This transaction has a higher concentration of
properties located in secondary markets or suburban locations of
primary markets.

Additional Sensitivity Analysis: Fitch has applied additional
sensitivity analysis on the Susquehanna Valley Mall loan due to the
loss of anchors.  JC Penney vacated in November 2015 after its
lease expiration and Sears, a non-collateral anchor, recently
announced it will close in March 2017.  As of September 2016, the
collateral was 79.3% occupied, compared to 93.7% at issuance.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook for class F indicates that a downgrade is
possible if the performance of the Susquehanna Valley Mall loan
continues to deteriorate.  Outlooks for classes A2 through E remain
Stable due to the overall stable performance of the pool and
continued amortization.  Upgrades may occur with improved pool
performance and additional paydown or defeasance.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $10.4 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $115.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $416.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $93 million class A-M at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- Interest-Only class X-A at 'AAA', Outlook Stable;
   -- $44.7 million class B at 'AAsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $32.9 million class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $52.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $15.3 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
   -- $11.8 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook to Negative from
      Stable.

Class A-1 has paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class G and HP
certificates, or the interest-only class X-B.


GFCM LLC: Moody's Hikes Class F Certs Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three classes
and affirmed the ratings on six classes in GFCM LLC, Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-1 as follows:

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 3, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes D, E and F were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 18% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on Classes A-5, B, and C were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges. The ratings on the Classes G and H were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.5% of the
current balance, compared to 1.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 0.7% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to $129 million
from $823 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 54% of the pool.

Twelve loans, constituting 17% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $2.9 million (for an average loss
severity of 9.5%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 42%, compared to 41%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 12.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.94X and 4.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.61X and 3.51X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Gateway Plaza I & II Loan ($19.5 million -- 15%
of the pool), which consists of two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans secured by a 339,310 square foot (SF) power
center located in Patchogue (Suffolk County), New York. Major
tenants include Bob's Furniture Store, Best Buy and Marshall's.
Additionally, Dick's Sporting Goods recently replaced a former
supermarket tenant (representing 15% of the net rentable area) that
vacated in 2014. The property was 100% leased as of December 2015,
compared to 81% leased as of February 2014. The loan benefits from
amortization and has amortized 36% since securitization. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 48% and 2.09X, respectively, compared to
52% and 1.91X at the last review.

The second largest exposure is the Eastover Ridge Apartments and
Brunswick Avenue Medical Office Loans ($9.7 million -- 7.5% of the
pool), which is consists of two cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans. The loans are secured by a 208-unit
apartment complex (Eastover Ridge Apartments) and a 16,000 SF
medical office building (Brunswick Office) located in Charlotte,
North Carolina. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 37%
since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 70% and
1.48X respectively, compared to 71% and 1.45X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Windhaven Plaza Retail Loan ($6.8
million -- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored
retail center located at the northwest corner of Dallas North
Tollway & Parker Road in the West Plano market in Plano, Texas. The
property was 95% leased as of December 2015, compared to 94% as of
December 2014 and 100% in December 2013. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized 41% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 37% and 2.81X, respectively, compared to 44%
and 2.32X at the last review.


GLG ORE 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C-1, C-2, D, E, F, and X-2 notes from GLG Ore Hill CLO 2013-1 Ltd.,
a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed
in June 2013 and is managed by GLG Ore Hill LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 1, 2016, trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
July 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to
4.61 years from 5.30 years.  This seasoning has generally decreased
the overall credit risk profile.  In addition, the number of
obligors in the portfolio has increased during this period, which
resulted in improved portfolio diversification.

However, the transaction's increase in both defaults and assets
rated 'CCC+' and below since the September 2013 trustee report,
which S&P used for its effective date analysis, has offset the
aforementioned improvements in the portfolio seasoning and
diversification.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $1.78 million as of the December 2016 trustee report,
from zero as of the September 2013 effective date trustee report.
The par amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to $35.11
million from zero over the same period.  Due to these increases, as
well as other factors, the overall credit quality of the portfolio
has dropped, as evidenced by a decrease in the weighted average
rating of the portfolio to 'B' from 'B+' since the effective date.

The level of credit support available to all tranches has dropped,
as seen by a decline in the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
reported in the December 2016 trustee report, as compared with the
September 2013 effective date trustee report:

   -- The senior par coverage O/C ratio was 131.22%, down from
      131.90%.
   -- The class C par coverage O/C ratio was 120.71%, down from
      121.34%.
   -- The class D par coverage O/C ratio was 113.35%, down from
      113.94%.
   -- The class E par coverage O/C ratio was 108.13%, down from
      108.70%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

On a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a higher rating on the class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D, and E
notes.  However, due to the transaction's increased exposure to
defaulted and 'CCC' rated collateral obligations and its exposure
to loans from companies in the energy and commodities sectors, S&P
affirmed the ratings to offset future potential credit migration in
the underlying collateral.  S&P believes that the credit support
available to these classes is commensurate with their current
rating levels.

In addition, on a stand-alone basis, the results of the cash flow
analysis indicated a lower rating on the class F notes than the
rating action suggests.  However, S&P believes that as the
transaction enters its amortization period following the end of its
reinvestment period, the transaction may begin to pay down the
rated notes sequentially, starting with the class A notes, which,
all else remaining equal, will begin to increase the O/C levels.
Therefore, S&P believes it is not currently exposed to risks that
would impair the current rating on the notes.  In line with this,
S&P affirmed the rating on the class F notes to remain in line with
our credit stability framework.  However, any further increase in
defaulted and 'CCC' rated collateral obligations and/or par losses
could lead to potential negative rating actions on this class of
notes in the future.

The affirmations of the ratings reflect S&P's belief that the
credit support available is commensurate with the current rating
levels.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches.  We will continue to
review whether, in our view, the ratings assigned to the notes
remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to support
them, and will take rating actions as we deem necessary," S&P
said.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

GLG Ore Hill CLO 2013-1 Ltd.

Class         Rating
A             AAA (sf)
B-1           AA (sf)
B-2           AA (sf)
C-1           A (sf)
C-2           A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B (sf)
X-2           AAA (sf)


GREENWICH CAPITAL 2003-C2: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in Greenwich Capital Commercial Funding Corporation, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-C2 as follows:

Cl. L, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes L and M were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class XC was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 66.8% of the
current balance, compared to 54.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.6% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class and the recovery as a pay
down of principal to the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 9, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.7% to $5.2
million from $1.735 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans, both of which are in special
servicing.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $59 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%). The largest specially serviced loan is the
Alamerica Bank Building Loan ($3.6 million -- 69.0% of the pool),
which is secured by a 32,850 square foot (SF) office building
located in Birmingham, Alabama. The loan was transferred to special
servicing for delinquent payments in April 2013, and is currently
in the process of foreclosure. In June 2015, the property was
appraised for $3.5 million.

The second specially serviced loan is Lake Carolina Building Loan
($1.6 million -- 31.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 17,557
SF office building located in Columbia, South Carolina. The loan
transferred to special servicing in October 2012 for imminent
default, and became REO in April 2014. As of March 2016, the
property was 37% leased, the same as at year-end 2015. In June
2016, the property was appraised for $0.8 million.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $ 3.5 million loss for these
specially serviced loans (67% expected loss on average).


GS MORTGAGE 2006-GG8: Fitch Affirms 'D' Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed 16 classes of GS
Mortgage Securities Corporation II (GSMSC II) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2006-GG8.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Loan Payoffs: The upgrade of class A-M is due to the increase in
credit enhancement from significant paydown in addition to the
class' position as first in priority for principal.  The
affirmations of the other tranches reflect the Fitch's modeled
losses on the specially serviced assets.

Concentrated Pool with Adverse Selection: The pool is highly
concentrated with only eight loans remaining, each of which is in
special servicing.  The loans are all past their scheduled maturity
dates.  Loans backed by office properties represent 76% and retail
is 22.1%.

High Expected Losses: Fitch modeled losses of 30.7% of the
remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance total
13.2%, including $400.3 million (9.4% of the original pool balance)
in realized losses to date.  As of the January 2017 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
87.2% to $542.26 million from $4.24 billion at issuance.  Of the
outstanding classes, interest shortfalls are currently affecting
class E.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class A-M is stable, as it is expected to pay
in full through the disposition of loans. Downgrades on the
distressed classes are possible as losses are realized.

Fitch has upgraded this rating:

   -- $72.7 million class A-M to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook to
      Stable from Positive.

Fitch affirms these ratings:

   -- $302.3 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 95%;
   -- $26.5 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $53 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $37.1 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $29.3 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P and Q are fully depleted and
are affirmed at 'Dsf', RE 0% due to realized losses.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4 and A-1A certificates have paid
in full.  Fitch does not rate the fully depleted class S
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2002-C2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class F Debt to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and upgraded the ratings on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp, Series 2002-C2 as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 92% since Moody's last
review.

The rating on one P&I Class was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class X-1 was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, compared to 0.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the
current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.3%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 7.4% at the last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 12 January, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.8% to $1.9
million from $1.031 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan.

One loan, constituting 100% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Nineteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $75.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 52.3%).

The sole remaining loan is the Seneca Lake Loan ($1.9 million --
100% of the pool), which is secured by a three-building, 151-unit
Class B-/C+ townhouse community located in Broadview Heights, Ohio
approximately 15 miles south of Cleveland. The property was 85%
occupied as of the September 2016 rent roll. The loan is fully
amortizing and has paid down 56% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 53% and 1.96X, respectively, compared to 58%
and 1.76X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2003-CIBC6: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Class M Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes,
upgraded the ratings on three classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp,
Series 2003-CIBC6 as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2016
Affirmed B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 41.2% since Moody's last
review. In addition, the concentration of defeased collateral has
increased to 42.3% of the pool from 26.4% at Moody's last review.

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable ranges. The P&I class
is also fully covered by defeasance.

The ratings on three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class X1 was downgraded due to a decline in
the credit performance of its reference classes resulting from the
paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.7% of the
current balance, compared to 7.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the 12 January, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95.2% to $50.1
million from $1.040 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 26% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 57.3% of the pool. Five loans,
constituting 42.3% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Five loans, constituting 33.8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $21.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 41.9%).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 23% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.8 million (a 24% expected loss based on a
57% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 80%, the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.56X and 1.84X,
respectively, compared to 1.44X and 1.44X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Old Orchard Village East Shopping Center Loan
($5.9 million -- 11.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
grocery-anchored shopping center located in Louisville, TX. The
property which was previously anchored by a Hobby Lobby, is now
anchored by a Winco Foods whose lease extends through May 2040. The
property was 85% occupied as of September 2016, the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 119% and
1.00X, respectively, compared to 120% and 0.99X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Green Bay Manor Apartments Loan
($3.1 million -- 6.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
one-building 75-unit apartment community located in Waukegan,
Illinois approximately 45 miles north of the Chicago CBD. The
property was built in 2002 and is currently on the watchlist due to
low DSCR. The loan benefits from amortization and has paid down 23%
since securitization. The property was 100% occupied as of December
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 110% and 0.83X,
respectively, compared to 97% and 0.95X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the 4 East 70th Street Loan ($2.0 million
-- 4.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 32-unit multifamily
co-op property located between Madison and Fifth Avenues on
Manhattan's Upper East Side. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 31%
and 2.94X, respectively, the same as at Moody's last review.


JP MORGAN 2004-C1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class P Certs to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one, upgraded three and affirmed one
class of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2004-C1
(JPMCC 2004-C1).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects realized losses to class P from the
disposition of two real estate owned assets since Fitch's last
rating action.  The upgrades to classes L, M and N reflect
increased credit enhancement from continued amortization and stable
performance of the remaining pool.

As of the January 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 98.3% to $18.2 million from
$1.04 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class NR.

Defeasance: Four fully amortizing loans (31.6% of the pool) are
defeased, including the second and fifth largest loans.

Strong Amortization: An additional six loans (28.7%) are fully
amortizing.

Pool Concentration: The pool is highly concentrated with only 12 of
the original 118 loans remaining.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated three loans (19.4%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern.  These Loans of Concern are collateralized
by properties located in secondary/tertiary markets with upcoming
tenant rollover concerns.

Loan Maturities: Upcoming loan maturities consist of 45.6% of the
pool maturing in 2018 and 5% in 2019.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes K through N are Stable given the
increasing credit enhancement, continued amortization, defeasance
and overall stable performance of the pool.  The class K balance is
fully covered by defeasance.  The class L balance is covered by
defeased collateral, fully amortizing and low leveraged loans.
Further upgrades to classes M and N were limited due to the
concentrated nature of the pool.  Additional future upgrades are
possible with additional paydown or defeasance and/or positive
leasing progress on the Fitch Loans of Concern.  Downgrades are
possible if pool performance declines significantly.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

   -- $2.4 million class P to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 100%.

Fitch has upgraded these classes and assigned Rating Outlooks:

   -- $3.9 million class L to 'AAAsf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable,
   -- $5.2 million class M to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable,
   -- $2.6 million class N to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
      assigned.

Fitch affirmed this class:

   -- $4 million class K at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-1A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J and X-2
certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X-1 certificates.


LIMEROCK CLO II: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-1-R,
B-2-R, C-1-R, and C-2-R replacement notes from Limerock CLO II
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction
managed by INVESCO Senior Secured Management Inc.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original class A, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 notes from
this transaction after they were fully redeemed.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class D, E, and F notes.

On the Jan. 18, 2017 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuances were used to redeem the original class
A, B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2 notes, as outlined in the transaction
document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew the ratings on the
original notes in line with their full redemption, and assigned
final ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a supplemental
indenture.  The class D, E, and F notes are not affected by the
changes in the supplemental indenture.  S&P believes its rationale
for its November 2016 rating actions on these unaffected notes
still stand.  S&P affirmed its ratings on the class D, E, and F
notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Limerock CLO II Ltd.

Replacement class            Rating          Amount (mil $)
A-R                          AAA (sf)                406.25
B-1-R                        AA (sf)                  59.75
B-2-R                        AA (sf)                  20.00
C-1-R                        A (sf)                   47.00
C-2-R                        A (sf)                    1.50

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Limerock CLO II Ltd.

                           Rating
Original class       To              From

A                    NR              AAA (sf)
B-1                  NR              AA (sf)
B-2                  NR              AA (sf)
C-1                  NR              A (sf)
C-2                  NR              A (sf)

NR--Not rated.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Limerock CLO II Ltd.

Class                      Rating
D                          BBB (sf)
E                          BB (sf)
F                          B- (sf)
Sub Notes                  NR

NR--Not rated.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-KEY2: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. E Certs to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 10 classes of Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2004-KEY2 (MLMT 2004-KEY2).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of class E reflects higher certainty of losses
relating to the two largest real estate owned (REO) assets (56.5%
of the pool) and the deterioration of credit enhancement from three
recent REO dispositions at higher realized losses than previously
modeled at Fitch's last rating action.  The affirmation of the
remaining classes reflects the relatively stable performance and
adverse selection of the remaining pool.

Fitch modeled losses of 50.9% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 8.2%, including $66.6
million (6% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date.  As of the January 2017 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 95.7% to
$48.3 million from $1.12 billion at issuance.  Cumulative interest
shortfalls totaling $5.8 million are currently affecting classes E
through DA.

Concentrated Pool with Adverse Selection: The pool is highly
concentrated with only 14 of the original 117 loans remaining.  The
two largest assets are REO and comprise 56.5% of the current pool
balance.  Four loans (6.7%) are fully defeased and three loans
(13.2%) are fully amortizing.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated five loans (65.9%) as
Fitch Loans of Concern, which includes the two REO assets (56.5%).
The three non-specially serviced Fitch Loans of Concern are
collateralized by properties located in secondary and tertiary
markets and include a vacant retail property previously occupied by
Sports Authority and two industrial properties with tenant rollover
and occupancy concerns.

REO Assets: The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the
West River Shopping Centre asset (33.4% of pool), an anchored
retail center located in Farmington Hills, MI.  The loan was
transferred to special servicing in May 2012 and the asset became
REO in April 2014.  The property, which is anchored by a Target on
a ground lease through January 2020, was 68.5% occupied as of
September 2016.  According to the special servicer, property
management continues to work on leasing the former Kohl's space,
which has remained vacant since the tenant's departure in August
2011.  A marketing effort was launched in August 2016 and the
special servicer continues to market the asset for sale.

The second largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is The Grove
Shopping Center asset (23%), an anchored retail center located in
Downers Grove, IL.  The loan was transferred to special servicing
in April 2014 and the asset became REO in December 2015. Property
occupancy was 56.4% in August 2016, excluding a 30,000 square foot
lease with a seasonal Halloween tenant.  Upcoming lease rollover
includes the largest tenant Michael's (15.7% of net rentable area)
in February 2017 and Ulta (4.3%) in April 2017.  The special
servicer is working to stabilize the asset before liquidation.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on class D reflects the potential for
downgrades if loss expectations on the REO assets increase and if
the resolution timeframe of these assets is prolonged resulting in
increased total exposure amounts.  Fitch performed a sensitivity
analysis for class D whereby the class can withstand a full loss of
the specially serviced assets and loans designated as Fitch Loans
of Concern.  Upgrades are not likely given the concentrated nature
of the pool and the high percentage of specially serviced assets.
The distressed classes are subject to further downgrades as
additional losses are realized or if losses exceed Fitch's
expectations.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

   -- $12.5 million class E to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 65%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $15.5 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to
      Negative from Positive;
   -- $15.3 million class F at 'Csf; RE 0%;
   -- $4.5 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, and C have paid in full. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class XC and
XP certificates.  Fitch does not rate classes Q and DA.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Fitch Cuts Class D Notes Rating to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 and downgraded one distressed class
of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the relatively stable performance of the
pool since Fitch's last rating action and modeled losses remain in
line with previous expectations. Fitch modeled losses of 27.8% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 16.9%, including $60.6 million (2.8% of original pool
balance) in realized losses incurred to date. Modeled losses at the
previous rating action were 18.4% of the original pool balance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-J through Q.
Although loss expectations remain high for the pool, the most
senior classes are expected to benefit from near-term loan
payoffs.

Concentration of 2017 Maturities: Loan maturities are concentrated
in 2017 with all loans but three in the pool maturing within the
first four months of 2017 (excluding real estate owned [REO]
assets).

High Percentage of Interest-Only and Highly Levered Loans: 77% of
the pool is comprised of full-term interest only loans. 85% of the
non-specially serviced loans have a Fitch LTV of 90% or greater.

Concentration of Specially Serviced Loans/Assets: There are 11
specially serviced loans/assets representing 19.7% of the pool,
including seven REO assets (9.5%). The second largest contributor
to expected losses is the specially-serviced Blackpoint Puerto Rico
Retail Portfolio (5.3%), which is secured by six retail properties
located within the greater San Juan, Puerto Rico area. The
portfolio properties range from two to 20 miles from the city of
San Juan, and three of the six properties are supermarket anchored.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in February 2012.
The portfolio was approximately 73% occupied as of YE 2015. The
special servicer is dual-tracking foreclosure and a potential loan
modification.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on the A-4 and A-1A classes reflect the
transaction's concentration and significant upcoming maturities.
Downgrades are possible if a higher amount of loans default at
maturity than are currently expected. The Stable Outlook on class
AM reflects sufficient credit enhancement and continued delevering
of the transaction through amortization and expected repayment of
maturing loans. Fitch will revisit the transaction over the next
several months as adverse selection will continue to be a factor
with higher quality assets paying off at maturity while the lower
quality assets will transfer to special servicing. Distressed
classes are subject to downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch has downgraded the following class:

-- $34.9 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and revised Rating
Outlooks as indicated:

-- $435 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;
-- $66.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;
-- $214.6 million class AM at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $107.4 million class AJ at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
-- $75 million class AJ-FL at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
-- $42.9 million class B at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
-- $16.1 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $18.8 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.1 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.5 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $.713 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-2FL, and A-3 have paid in full. Fitch does not
rate the class Q certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating
on the interest-only class X certificates.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-6: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. D Certs to 'C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 and downgraded one distressed class
of ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2007-6.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the relatively stable performance of the
pool since Fitch's last rating action and modeled losses remain in
line with previous expectations.  Fitch modeled losses of 27.8% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 16.9%, including $60.6 million (2.8% of original pool
balance) in realized losses incurred to date.  Modeled losses at
the previous rating action were 18.4% of the original pool balance.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes A-J through Q.
Although loss expectations remain high for the pool, the most
senior classes are expected to benefit from near-term loan
payoffs.

Concentration of 2017 Maturities: Loan maturities are concentrated
in 2017 with all loans but three in the pool maturing within the
first four months of 2017 (excluding real estate owned [REO]
assets).

High Percentage of Interest-Only and Highly Levered Loans: 77% of
the pool is comprised of full-term interest only loans. 85% of the
non-specially serviced loans have a Fitch LTV of 90% or greater.

Concentration of Specially Serviced Loans/Assets: There are 11
specially serviced loans/assets representing 19.7% of the pool,
including seven REO assets (9.5%).  The second largest contributor
to expected losses is the specially-serviced Blackpoint Puerto Rico
Retail Portfolio (5.3%), which is secured by six retail properties
located within the greater San Juan, Puerto Rico area. The
portfolio properties range from two to 20 miles from the city of
San Juan, and three of the six properties are supermarket anchored.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in February 2012.
The portfolio was approximately 73% occupied as of YE 2015.  The
special servicer is dual-tracking foreclosure and a potential loan
modification.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on the A-4 and A-1A classes reflect the
transaction's concentration and significant upcoming maturities.
Downgrades are possible if a higher amount of loans default at
maturity than are currently expected.  The Stable Outlook on class
AM reflects sufficient credit enhancement and continued delevering
of the transaction through amortization and expected repayment of
maturing loans.  Fitch will revisit the transaction over the next
several months as adverse selection will continue to be a factor
with higher quality assets paying off at maturity while the lower
quality assets will transfer to special servicing.  Distressed
classes are subject to downgrades as losses are realized.

Fitch has downgraded this class:

   -- $34.9 million class D to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $435 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative from
      Stable;
   -- $66.6 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook to Negative
      from Stable;
   -- $214.6 million class AM at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $107.4 million class AJ at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
   -- $75 million class AJ-FL at 'CCCsf'; RE 40%;
   -- $42.9 million class B at 'CCsf', RE 0%;
   -- $16.1 million class C at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $18.8 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $24.1 million class F at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $24.1 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
   -- $24.5 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $.713 million class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-2FL, and A-3 have paid in full.  Fitch does not
rate the class Q certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class N Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.1999-RM1 as follows:

Cl. N, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class N was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance and remains the same since Moody's last review.
Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.7%
of the original pooled balance and remains unchanged since last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure and property type. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.5% to $4.2
million from $859 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five remaining mortgage loans ranging in size
from 6% to 42% of the pool. One loan, constituting 18% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Two loans, constituting 27% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of approximately $14.4
million (for an average loss severity of 24.4%). No loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 42% compared to 39%
at last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.10X and 4.63X,
respectively, compared to 1.13X and 3.70X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans represent 75% of the pool balance. The largest
loan is the Claremont Commons Loan ($1.8 million -- 42.6% of the
pool), which is secured by a 37,000 square feet (SF) retail
property located in Claremont, North Carolina approximately 40
miles northwest of Charlotte. Lowe's Food Store occupies 87% of the
center with a lease expiration in March 2018. As of March 2016, the
property was 100% leased, the same as at last review. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 67%
and 1.54X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Springrove Mobile Home Park Loan
($0.86 million -- 20% of the pool), which is secured by a 424 unit
mobile home park located in Springfield Township, Missouri. As of
June 2016, the property was 68% leased, compared to 62% November
2015 and 60% in December 2014. The loan is fully amortizing and has
a maturity date in September 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 14% and 4.00X, respectively, compared to 22% and 4.00X at the
last review.

The third largest loan is the Northampton Apartments Loan ($0.53
million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a 149-unit
multifamily property located in Akron, Ohio. The loan is fully
amortizing and matures in June 2018. As of June 2016, the property
was 93% occupied compared to 96% in September 2015 and 99% in
September 2014. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 9% and 4.00X,
respectively, compared to 14% and 4.00X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-XLF: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. N-RQK Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-XLF (MSCI
2006-XLF).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Affirmations reflect stabilizing performance of the remaining loan
in the pool.

The remaining loan in the transaction is secured by the Marriott
Kauai at Coconut Beach, formerly known as the ResortQuest Kauai.
The 311-room full-service hotel is located on a fee-simple
beach-front parcel of land in the city of Kapa'a, along the east
coast of the island of Kauai, HI.  The hotel was rebranded as a
Courtyard Marriott subsequent to acquisition by the current
sponsor.

Stabilizing Performance: Hotel performance is stabilizing as
trailing 12 month (TTM) October 2016 revenue per available room
(RevPAR) grew 2% from the prior year.  Although RevPAR increased in
2016, year-to-date (YTD) October 2016 annualized net cash flow
declined 2% from year-end (YE) 2015 due to an increase in expenses.
RevPAR growth is expected to moderate as the hotel approaches
stabilization and faces slowing demand in the hotel sector.

Weak Penetration Rate: According to the October 2016 STR report,
the hotel achieved a penetration rate of 74.8% which is down from
79.2% in the prior year.  The hotel has yet to achieve penetration
rates above 80% in the last five years.

For October 2016, the hotel achieved TTM occupancy, average daily
rate (ADR), and RevPAR of 83%, $140.99, and $117.02, respectively,
compared to the prior year performance of 82.4%, $139.25, and
$114.73.  Despite the improvement, the hotel continues to trail its
competitive set with reported TTM October 2016 occupancy, ADR, and
RevPAR of 75.8%, $206.61 and $156.55.  Also, the hotel has yet to
achieve the underwritten stabilized projections for occupancy, ADR,
and RevPAR of 81.1%, $165 and $134.

Capital Infusion & Renovation: The sponsor contributed an estimated
$13 million in 2012 toward the renovation of the hotel which
included an expansive new lobby, updated meeting space, family
entertainment room and an expanded fitness center.

Loan Modification: The property was sold in October 2010 and the
note assumed for $38 million, which resulted in a $5.2 million
realized loss to the N-RQK non pooled rake bond.  In conjunction
with the sale, the loan was modified with a maturity extension and
the establishment of capex and debt service reserves.  The sponsor
exercised the modified loan's first extension option through May
2017.

Experienced Sponsor: The loan is sponsored by a joint venture
between Behringer Harvard Opportunity REIT II, Inc. and Austin,
Texas-based JMI Realty.  The property is managed by Davidson Hotels
and Resorts.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks are due to stabilizing performance of the hotel
and sufficient credit support from subordinate classes. Downgrades
are possible should performance declines prove sustained in
subsequent periods.  The classes with realized losses will remain
at 'D'.

Fitch affirms the ratings on these pooled certificates and revises
an Outlook:

   -- $22.1 million class J at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $6.8 million class K at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from
      Positive;
   -- $5.1 million class L at 'Dsf; RE 100%;
   -- $0 million class M at 'Dsf; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the ratings on this non-pooled component
certificates:

   -- $4 million class N-RQK at 'Dsf'; RE 100%.

Classes A-1 through H, N-SDF, N-LAF and O-LAF have been paid in
full.  The ratings of interest-only classes X-1 and X-2 were
previously withdrawn.  Class M, currently rated 'Dsf'; RE 0%, is
being affirmed and has been reduced to zero due to realized losses.
Fitch does not rate the class N-W40 certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-PRME: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2017-PRME's $365.0 million commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan with five, one-year extension options totaling $365.0
million, secured by a first-lien mortgage on the borrowers' fee
simple and leasehold interests in five hotel properties.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Jan. 23,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of of the collateral's
historical and projected performance, the sponsor's and managers'
experience, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and
the transaction's structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2017-PRME

Class              Rating(i)          Amount ($)
A                  AAA (sf)          154,090,000
X-CP(ii)           BBB- (sf)     139,650,000(ii)
X-NCP(ii)          BBB- (sf)     139,650,000(ii)
B                  AA- (sf)           47,785,000
C                  A (sf)             22,325,000
D                  BBB- (sf)          69,540,000
E                  BB (sf)            53,010,000
RR interest(iii)   NR                 18,250,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in-line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP and
X-NCP certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the class
B, C, and D certificates.  
(iii)Non-offered vertical
interest certificate.  
NR--Not rated.


MORGAN STANLEY: DBRS Confirms Bsf Rating on Class G Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited, on January 17, 2017, confirmed the ratings on all
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-C7 issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Trust 2013-C7 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class H. The Class PST certificates are exchangeable for the Class
A-S, B and C certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, this transaction consisted of 64
loans secured by 123 properties for a total trust balance of
approximately $1.40 billion. As at the December 2016 remittance
report, the trust balance was $1.25 billion, representing
collateral reduction of 9.8% from scheduled amortization and loan
repayment, as 59 of the original 64 loans remain in the pool. In
the past year, four loans, representing 2.5% of the pool at
issuance, have been repaid in full ahead of their respective
scheduled maturity dates.

Loans representing 98.1% of the current pool balance are reporting
YE2015 figures with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and a WA debt yield of 1.8 times (x) and 11.0%,
respectively. The WA net cash flow growth for the top 15 loans
reporting YE2015 figures was 6.2% over the DBRS UW figures, with a
WA DSCR of 1.90x, as compared with the WA DBRS UW DSCR of 1.77x. In
addition, the WA occupancy for the largest 15 loans in the pool is
healthy at 89.8%.

As at the December 2016 remittance report, there are four loans,
representing 7.2% of the pool, on the servicer's watchlist, and one
loan, representing 1.3% of the pool, in special servicing. Three of
the four loans on the watchlist report healthy DSCR figures and are
being monitored for minor deferred maintenance issues or low
occupancy rates; however, occupancy has since increased. The
remaining loan on the watchlist is being monitored for reporting a
low annualized Q1 2016 DSCR.

DBRS maintains an investment-grade shadow rating on two loans in
the pool, Valley West Mall (Prospectus ID #7; 3.7% of the current
pool balance) and Sunvalley Shopping Center (Prospectus ID #17;
1.8% of the current pool balance). DBRS has today confirmed that
the performance of these loans remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans, as well as for the largest
15 loans in the pool, in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.


MULTI SECURITY 2005-RR4: S&P Raises Rating on 2 Notes to BB+
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class E, F, and G
notes from Multi Security Asset Trust LP 2005-RR4, a U.S.
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE-CDO)
transaction.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class H, J, K, L, and M notes from the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Dec. 30, 2016, trustee report.
Since S&P's November 2014 rating actions, the class A-3, B, C, and
D notes have been paid down in full, and the class E notes have
started receiving paydowns.  Following the Dec. 30, 2016, payment
date, the outstanding balance of class E is about 76.31% of its
original balance.  In addition, the credit quality of the assets
that back the notes has improved since S&P's last rating actions.
Both of these factors improved the credit support to the notes,
resulting in the upgrades.

However, there are only six assets remaining in the transaction,
and this has increased its obligor concentration risk.  The
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test included in S&P's criteria, constrains the ratings on
all classes.

The affirmations reflect S&P's belief that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction relied, in part, upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to our May 8, 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows us to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take further rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Multi Security Asset Trust LP 2005-RR4

Class                 Rating
             To                 From
E            BBB+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)
F            BB+ (sf)           CCC (sf)
G            BB+ (sf)           CCC- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Multi Security Asset Trust LP 2005-RR4

Class                 Rating
             To                 From
H            CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
J            CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
K            CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
L            CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)
M            CCC- (sf)          CCC- (sf)


N-STAR IX: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 8 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the following
notes issued by N-Star Real Estate CDO IX, Ltd:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
While the credit quality of the pool has migrated negatively, as
evidenced by WARF, the amortization and re-direction of funds due
to certain over-collateralization tests offsets this migration. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

N-Star Real Estate CDO IX, Ltd. is a currently static cash
transaction wholly backed by a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS), the majority of which was issued between
2005 and 2008 (59.1%); ii) CRE CDO (34.8%); iii) small business
loans (1.5%); iv) real estate investment trust (REIT) debt (1.1%);
and v) commercial real estate whole loans, b-notes and mezzanine
interests (3.6%). As of the trustee's January 3, 2017 report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction has decreased to $497.9
million from $776.0 million at issuance, with the paydown directed
to the senior most outstanding class of notes, as a result of the
combination of regular amortization, recoveries on defaulted and
high credit risk assets, and interest proceeds re-diverted as
principal due to failure of certain par value tests.

The pool contains fifty six assets totaling $217.7 million (34.3%
of the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's January 3, 2017 report. Forty five
of these assets (73.3% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS; ten
(25.4%) are CMBS; and one (1.3%) is a small business loan. Moody's
does expect moderate/significant losses to occur from these
defaulted securities once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF excluding
defaults of 5363, compared to 4864 at last review. The current
distribution of Moody's rated collateral and assessments for
non-Moody's rated collateral is as follows: Aaa-Aa3 and 7.1%
compared to 7.1% at last review, A1-A3 and 2.4% compared to 0.2% at
last review, Baa1-Baa3 and 5.6% compared to 4.2% at last review,
Ba1-Ba3 and 11.5% compared to 14.3% at last review, B1-B3 and 19.5%
compared to 17.7% at last review, Caa1-Ca/C and 53.8% compared to
56.6% at last review. .

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.6 years, compared to 2.7 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through underlying CMBS loan collateral and CRE CDOs assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 2.3%, compared to 2.0% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.8%, compared to 13.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying collateral and assessments.
Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by +10%
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of zero to two notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2). Decreasing the recovery rate of
100% of the collateral pool to 0% would result in an average
modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero notches (e.g.,
one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2004-2: Moody's Confirms B1 Rating on B Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of 6 classes of
notes and confirmed the ratings of 6 classes of notes in 4 National
Collegiate Student Loan Trust (NCSLT) securitizations backed by
private (i.e. not government-guaranteed) student loans. The loans
are serviced primarily by the Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency (PHEAA) with U.S. Bank, N.A. acting as the
special servicer. The administrator for all securitizations is GSS
Data Services, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Goal Structured
Solutions, Inc.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 B1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-2, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-4, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Aaa (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2013 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. A-5-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-5-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Aa2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2013 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Issuer: NCF Grantor Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-5-1, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The primary rationale for the rating actions is the continued
build-up in credit enhancement supporting the A-class and B-class
notes as a result of the rapid pay down of senior notes in
sequential pay structures. Although the ratios of total assets to
total liabilities have declined to a range of 72%-84% as of
December 2016 from a range of 74%-86% as of December 2015, the
senior class A-tranches have benefitted from rapid deleveraging.
Subordination and overcollateralization supporting senior A-classes
increased to a range of 100%-126% from a range of 98%-119%. Moody's
expected lifetime net collateral losses has decreased to a range of
28.7%-36.1% from a range of 29.1%-37.3%. The rating actions also
reflect Moody's view that the probability of an occurrence of an
event of default (EOD) is low. Therefore, the ratings on the
A-class bonds continue to reflect sequential principal payments and
the resulting differentiation in credit support amongst the senior
tranches. The deleveraging of the A-class notes has also benefited
B-class notes, with subordination and overcollateralization
supporting the B-tranches increasing to a range of 91%-103% from a
range of 90%-100%.

The transactions in rating actions continue to be subject to the
operational and governance risk concerns outlined in Moody's March
24, 2016 rating action. In that action, Moody's placed on review
for downgrade 8 of the 12 classes of notes that are the subject of
rating actions due to the increase in operational and governance
risk brought on by a disputed servicing agreement with Odyssey
Education Resources, LLC. (See, Moody's reviews for downgrade 8
classes of notes in 4 National Collegiate Student Loan Trust
securitizations). The dispute continues to be litigated in the U.S.
District for the District of Delaware. In addition, these
transactions are also subject to a Notice of Servicer Default
claiming that PHEAA failed to comply with the terms of its
servicing agreement applicable to all 15 NCSLT transactions (which
includes the 4 transactions affected by rating action) and a
separate lawsuit brought by the 15 trusts against PHEAA in the
Delaware Court of Chancery. Moody's believes the lawsuits raise
operational and governance risk concerns for the NCSLT transactions
because it creates uncertainty as to which party will service the
loan pools underlying the NCSLT deals. In addition, the lawsuits
give rise to extraordinary fees and expenses that are currently
being paid by trust cash flows to cover legal costs sustained by
the trustees in the NCSLT securitizations.

In rating actions, Moody's considered both the potential negative
impact from extraordinary fees charged to the trusts as well as the
potential deterioration in performance of underlying pools due to
servicer transfer. With regard to extraordinary fees, Moody's
modeled the expenses up to the capped amount for the life of the
transactions. The cap is specified in transaction documents,
limiting all trustee expenses to a maximum of $250,000 per annum.
To account for operational and governance risk, Moody's performed
sensitivity analysis with higher net collateral loss. Moody's
analysis of these cash flow results indicates that the Aaa rated
top-pay A-class notes are expected to pay off within 8 to 12
months, even under Moody's stressed assumptions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities"
published in January 2010.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the ratings up are build up in
credit enhancement and lower net losses on the underlying assets
than Moody's expects, and an elimination in operational and
governance risk concerns.

Down

Among the factors that could drive the ratings down are an decrease
in credit enhancement, higher net losses on the underlying assets
than Moody's expects, and an increase in operational and governance
risk concerns.


NEWMARK CAPITAL 2013-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. F Notes to B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class F notes from
NewMark Capital Funding 2013-1 CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by NewMark Capital LLC, which closed in
July 2013.  At the same time, S&P removed this rating from
CreditWatch, where it had placed it with negative implications on
Oct. 27, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-X, B, C, D, and E notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, using data from the Dec. 21, 2016, trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
June 2017, and S&P anticipates that the manager will continue to
reinvest principal proceeds in line with the transaction
documents.

Since S&P's effective date rating affirmations in January 2014, the
transaction has experienced par loss and credit deterioration in
the underlying collateral portfolio.  The reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each of the rated notes have
decreased since the October 2013 effective date report as a result
of the aforementioned par loss, an increase in defaults, and a
haircut on the excess amount of 'CCC' rated assets in the
underlying portfolio:

   -- The class A-1/A-2/A-3/B O/C ratio decreased to 129.56% from
      131.81%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio decreased to 118.66% from 120.73%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio decreased to 112.26% from 114.21%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio decreased to 106.51% from 108.36%.

In addition, the interest diversion raio has also decreased, for
the same reasons as noted above, to 104.26% from 106.08%.

During this period, the portfolio's credit quality has also
declined.  The par balance of assets with an S&P Global Ratings'
credit rating of 'CCC+' or lower has increased to $26.96 million,
from $13.41 million at the effective date, and defaulted assets
have increased to $1.95 million from zero.

However, this has been offset, to an extent, by the seasoning of
the collateral, as the reported weighted average life decreased to
4.53 years from 5.38 years.  In addition, the number of obligors in
the portfolio has also increased during this period, which
contributed to the portfolio's greater diversification.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis pointed to higher ratings for the
class B, C, D, and E notes, S&P considered the credit deterioration
in the portfolio, cushion at the higher ratings, as well as other
stress tests to allow for volatility in the underlying portfolio
given that the transaction is still in its reinvestment period.
Therefore, S&P affirmed the current rating levels of these
tranches.

The lowered rating on the class F notes is a result of the decrease
in credit support and an overall deterioration of the portfolio's
credit quality.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATING LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

NewMark Capital Funding 2013-1 CLO Ltd.
                    Rating
Class         To             From
F             B- (sf)        B (sf)/Watch Neg

RATINGS AFFIRMED

NewMark Capital Funding 2013-1 CLO Ltd.
Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2         AAA (sf)
A-3         AAA (sf)
A-X         AAA (sf)
B           AA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


PALMER SQUARE 2014-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating on Class D-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Palmer Square CLO 2014-1
Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2014-1 LLC, a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) originally issued in June 2014 that is managed by Palmer
Square Capital Management LLC.  S&P withdrew its ratings on the
original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes following payment in
full on Jan. 17, 2017, refinancing date.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed amended
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also incorporate these:

   -- The replacement class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes
      are expected to be issued at a higher floating-rate spread
      than the original notes.

   -- The stated maturity will be extended by five years, the
      reinvestment period end date will be extended to January
      2019, and the weighted average life test will be extended to

      six years from the refinancing date.

   -- The indenture was amended to incorporate an option by the
      manager to use the formula-based S&P CDO Monitor.

   -- It also incorporated updated S&P Global Ratings industry
      classifications, recoveries, and country groupings for the
      purposes of recoveries.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square CLO 2014-1 Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2014-1 LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             260.00
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               44.00
B-R                       A (sf)                28.15
C-R                       BBB (sf)              19.80
D-R                       BB (sf)               16.20
Subordinated notes        NR                    44.75

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Palmer Square CLO 2014-1 Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2014-1 LLC
                            Rating
Original class         To           From
A-1                    NR           AAA (sf)
A-2                    NR           AA (sf)
B                      NR           A (sf)
C                      NR           BBB (sf)0
D                      NR           BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


RBSSP RESECURITIZATION 2009-11: Moody's Ups Debt Rating from Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class 4-A2
issued by RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-11.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-11

Cl. 4-A2 Certificate, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 15,
2016 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrade on RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-11 Class
4-A2 is primarily due to the recent reversal of past interest
shortfalls, and also relects the overall credit enhancement.

Previously, on August 15th 2016, Moody's placed Class 4-A2 under
review for possible downgrade due to missed interest payments while
seeking clarification from the administrator. The administrator
recently reversed those past shortfalls with a large interest
shortfall reimbursement distribution.

The rating actions reflects recent performance of the transaction
and Moody's updated loss expectation.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


REALT 2006-3: Moody's Hikes Class L Debt Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
and upgraded the ratings on ten classes in Real Estate Asset
Liquidity Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-3 as follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. D-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. D-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. E-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. E-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. XC-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. XC-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on ten P&I classes, Classes D-1 through L, were
upgraded based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting
from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 85%
since Moody's last review.

The rating on the Class C was affirmed because the transaction's
key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes XC-1 and XC-2, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.0% of the
current balance, compared to 1.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the
current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.2%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 0.6% at the last
review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for
conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $25.9 million
from $426 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three remaining mortgage loans.

Two loans, constituting 39% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $680,000. There are currently no loans
in special servicing.

The largest remaining loan is the Park Lane Mall & Terraces Loan
($15.9 million -- 61.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 278,000
square foot (SF), 7-story mixed use office and retail property
located in Halifax, Nova Scotia. As of March 2016, the property was
85% leased. The loan benefits from amortization and matures in
April 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 57.5% and 1.69X,
respectively, compared to 58.4% and 1.67X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 7301 Beaubien Avenue East Loan ($5.9
million -- 22.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 94 unit, 8
story multifamily complex located in Anjou, Quebec (roughly 7 miles
north of the Montreal Central Business District). As of April 2016,
the property was 95% leased. The loan is currently on the master
servicer watchlist after it passed its original maturity date in
November 2016. The loan remains current on its monthly debt service
payments and the servicer indicated that they are following up with
the borrower in regards to a loan payoff.

The other remaining loan is the 121 Richmond St W. Loan ($4.1
million -- 15.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 75,000 SF,
12-story office building located in the Toronto Central Business
District. The property was 97% leased as of February 2016. The loan
is currently on the master servicer watchlist after it passed its
original maturity date in August 2016. A maturity extension through
February 2017 was approved and the loan remains current on its
monthly debt service payments. The servicer indicated that the
Borrower is working on financing to payoff the loan.


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Hikes Auto Loan ABS Issued 2015-2016
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 10 tranches and affirmed
nineteen tranches from the Drive Auto Receivables Trust
transactions issued in 2015 and 2016. The securitizations are
sponsored by Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-A

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-B

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-C

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-D

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-A

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class B Note, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-B

Class A-2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 26, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-C

Class A-1 Notes, Affirmed P-1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades resulted from the build-up of credit enhancement due
to the sequential pay structures and non-declining reserve
accounts. The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectations
remain unchanged at 27.00% since closing for all the outstanding
DRIVE transactions.

The rating actions also reflect expenses not taken into account in
previous ratings for the 2015 DRIVE transactions. Moody's has
learned that for DRIVE securitizations that closed before January
1, 2016, SC did not subtract the cost associated with repossessing
vehicles of defaulted borrowers from the liquidation proceeds
allocated to the trust, and thus did not include the repossession
expenses in its reporting of net loss. SC began including
repossession expenses in its net loss reporting for DRIVE
securitizations that closed after January 1, 2016. Consideration of
the repossession expenses in the net loss calculation had a fairly
small impact on the updated historical static pool loss curves,
resulting in no change to Moody's lifetime CNL expectations for the
transactions. .

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. The US job market and the market for used vehicle are
primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the loans or refinancing
opportunities that result in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and the market for
used vehicle are primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for
worse performance than Moody's expected include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


SCHOONER TRUST 2006-6: DBRS Reviews B Rating on Class L Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on January 13, 2017, placed all classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-6 issued
by Schooner Trust, Series 2006-6 Under Review as follows:

-- Class XC at AAA (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class H at BB (sf), Under Review with Developing Implications

-- Class J at BB (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class K at B (high) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

-- Class L at B (low) (sf), Under Review with Developing
    Implications

DBRS has placed all classes Under Review with Developing
Implications due to the transfer to special servicing of the two
remaining loans in the pool with the January 2017 remittance. The
loans were transferred as the previously extended maturity dates
have passed without repayment and the borrower has requested an
additional 90 days to fulfill the repayment obligations. Although
DBRS believes the remaining rated classes are well insulated, with
the lowest-rated Class L benefiting from a credit enhancement level
of 67.1% and an unrated class with a current balance just under
$5.0 million, the uncertainty with regard to the workout status for
these loans supports the rating actions taken today. Both of the
remaining loans are secured by industrial properties located within
close proximity of one another outside of Montreal, Quebec.


SDART: Moody's Hikes Subprime Auto Loan ABS Issued 2012-2016
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 26 tranches and affirmed an
additional 47 tranches from Santander SDART Auto Receivables Trust
securitizations issued between 2012 and 2016. The securitizations
are sponsored by Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC).

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-4

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-5

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-6

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-A

Class C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-2

Class C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-4

Class C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-5

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2013-A

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-2

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-3

Class B Asset Backed Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul
12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Asset Backed Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul
12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Asset Backed Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul
12, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class E Asset Backed Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul
12, 2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-4

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2014-5

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-2

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-3

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2015-4

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-1

Class A-2-A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-2

Class A-2-A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2016-3

Class A-1 Notes, Affirmed P-1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades resulted from the build-up of credit enhancement due
to the sequential pay structures and non-declining reserve
accounts. The lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL) expectations were
increased to 14.00% from 13.50% for the 2012-4, 2012-A, 2013-2 and
2013-4 transactions, to 14.50% from 14.00% for the 2012-5
transaction, to 11.50% from 11.00% for the 2012-6 transaction, to
13.75% from 13.00% for the 2013-5 transaction, to 13.25% from
13.00% for the 2013-A transaction. The lifetime CNL expectations
were lowered to 15.00% from 16.00% for the 2015-3 and 2015-4
transactions, and to 16.00% from 17.00% for the 2016-1 transaction.
The lifetime CNL expectations for all remaining transactions remain
unchanged and range between 13.00% and 17.00%.

The rating actions also reflect expenses not taken into account in
previous ratings for the transactions issued through the end of
2015. Moody's has learned that for SDART and DRIVE securitizations
that closed before January 1, 2016, SC did not subtract the cost
associated with repossessing vehicles of defaulted borrowers from
the liquidation proceeds allocated to the trust, and thus did not
include the repossession expenses in its reporting of net loss. SC
began including repossession expenses in its net loss reporting for
SDART and DRIVE securitizations that closed after January 1, 2016.
Consideration of the repossession expenses in the net loss
calculation had a fairly small impact on the updated historical
static pool loss curves, resulting in no change to Moody's lifetime
CNL expectations for the transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. The US job market and the market for used vehicle are
primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the loans or refinancing
opportunities that result in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and the market for
used vehicle are primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for
worse performance than Moody's expected include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-1: Moody's Rates to Class B-4 Notes 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-1. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans. The assets
of the trust consist of 460 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans. All loans, except one, have an original term to maturity of
30 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.30% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-1 transaction is a securitization of 460 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $342,929,214. There are 132 originators in the
transaction. 7.79% of the mortgage loans by outstanding principal
balance were originated by Quicken Loans Inc., 5.57% of the
mortgage loans by outstanding principal balance were originated by
First Republic Bank and 12.12% of the mortgage loans by outstanding
principal balance were purchased by Redwood from FHLB Chicago. The
mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from FHLB Chicago were
originated by various participating financial institution investors
who provide R&W to FHLB, who then provides R&W to Redwood. None of
the originators other than Quicken Loans Inc. and First Republic
Bank represents more than 5.0% of the principal balance of the
loans in the pool. The loan-level third party due diligence (TPR)
review encompassed credit underwriting, property value and
regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop
the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of all originators other
than First Republic Bank (5.57% of the outstanding principal
balance of the loans).

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood), which Moody's has assessed as an Above
Average aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages. There have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that closed in
2010 and later, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.50% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 453 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review"). For the remaining seven loans, Redwood
Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include
checks for TRID compliance. The custodian reviewed the mortgage
files and did not find any exceptions.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans (i.e. before the originator cured any
of the errors) from the same originator where a full review was
conducted and extrapolated the results on the limited review loans.
As a result, Moody's increased Moody's Aaa loss to account for this
adjustment.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


SILVERADO CLO 2006-II: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Notes to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2, B, C, and D
notes from Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.  S&P also removed these
ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive
implications on Oct. 27, 2016.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1 and A-1J notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Jan. 4, 2017, monthly trustee and
note valuation reports.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $225.2 million in paydowns
to the class A-1S, A-1, and A-1J notes since our October 2014
rating actions.  These paydowns resulted in improved
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the September 2014 trustee
report, which S&P used for its previous rating actions:

   -- The class A O/C ratio improved to 331.56% from 125.73%.
   -- The class B O/C ratio improved to 186.24% from 116.16%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 135.98% from 109.15%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 114.37% from 104.73%.

The collateral portfolio's credit quality has deteriorated since
S&P's last rating actions.  Collateral obligations with ratings in
the 'CCC' category have increased, with $9.68 million reported as
of the January 2017 trustee report compared with $2.17 million
reported as of the September 2014 trustee report.  Over the same
period, the par amount of defaulted collateral has increased to
$3.58 million from zero.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated a higher rating for the
class D notes, its rating actions consider the increase in 'CCC'
rated and defaulted obligations, which have also contributed to par
loss in the underlying portfolio.  In addition, the rating reflects
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed assets.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.
                  Rating
Class         To          From
A-2           AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B             AAA (sf)    AA- (sf)/Watch Pos
C             AA+ (sf)    BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             BB+ (sf)    BB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1           AAA (sf)
A-1J          AAA (sf)


SLM PRIVATE 2005-A: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class C Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the SLM Private Credit Student Loan
Trust 2005-A class A-3, A-4 and B notes and affirmed class C notes,
as follows:

-- Class A-3 downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AA-sf'; Stable Outlook
-- Class A-4 downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AA-sf'; Stable Outlook
-- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Stable Outlook
-- Class C affirmed at 'BBsf'; Stable Outlook.

The rating downgrades are mostly driven by the transactions' lower
than expected excess spreads and reduced loss coverage commensurate
with the bonds' ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$583.2 million of private student loans. The loans were originated
by Navient Corp (fka SLM Corp) under the Signature Education Loan
Program, LAWLOANS program, MBA Loans program, and MEDLOANS program.
The projected remaining defaults are expected to be at 10.5%% of
the outstanding portfolio balance. A recovery rate of 13% was
applied, which was determined to be appropriate based on data
provided by the issuer.

Credit Enhancement: Transaction credit enhancement (CE) is
sufficient to provide loss coverage for the class A, B, and C notes
at each respective rating category. CE is provided by a combination
of overcollateralization (the excess of the trust's asset balance
over the bond balance), excess spread, and subordination. The total
parity ratio as of the September 2016 distribution is 106.72%.

Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a reserve
account sized at approximately $3.76 million.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated satisfactory servicing
capabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case. This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the bonds and may make certain
bond ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage. Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and
Covered Bonds', Fitch looks to its own ratings in analyzing
counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's creditworthiness.
The definition of permitted investments for this deal allows for
the possibility of using investments not rated by Fitch, which
represents a criteria variation. Since the only available funds to
invest in are those held in the Collection Account and Reserve
Account, and the funds can only be invested for a short duration
given the payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe
such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.



SLM PRIVATE 2007-A: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions SLM Private Credit Student
Loan Trust 2007-A as:

   -- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook revised to Negative
      from Stable;
   -- Class A-3 downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class A-4 downgraded to 'A-sf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class C-1 affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Class C-2 affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Correction: The downgrades on the class A-3, A-4 and B notes are
due to an error during the last annual surveillance review of the
trust.  At that time, the projected excess spread was overestimated
due to a miscalculation of the trust income.  The error has been
corrected, and the ratings are now in line with their respective
loss coverage multiples.

Sequential Pay: The affirmation of the class A-2 notes reflects the
increasing credit enhancement available to the notes following the
sequential payment structure within the class A notes as long as
the trigger on note parity or on cumulative realized losses is not
breached (set at 20% vs. current losses at 18.9%).  The Negative
Outlook reflects the risk of losses unfolding, in the short term,
at a faster pace than expected, which would lead to a breach of the
loss trigger.  Once the loss trigger is breached, the sequential
pay structure among class A notes will be changed to pro rata
payment between A-2, A-3 and A-4 notes.  As such, Fitch will
monitor the quarterly default rates in the next payment dates.

Collateral Quality: The trust is collateralized by approximately
$1.1 billion of private student loans.  The loans were originated
by Navient Corp (fka SLM Corp) under the Signature Education Loan
Program, LAWLOANS program, MBA Loans program, and MEDLOANS program.
The projected remaining defaults are expected at about 13.5% of
the outstanding portfolio balance.  A recovery rate of 13% was
applied, which was determined to be appropriate based on data
provided by the issuer.

Credit Enhancement: Transaction credit enhancement is sufficient to
provide loss coverage for the class A, B, and C notes at each
respective rating category.  CE is provided by a combination of
overcollateralization (the excess of the trust's asset balance over
the bond balance), excess spread, and subordination.  The reported
total parity ratio as of the most recent distribution is 104.67%.

Adequate Liquidity Support: Liquidity support is provided by a
reserve account sized at approximately $5 million.

Servicing Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by Navient
Solutions Inc., which has demonstrated satisfactory servicing
capabilities.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Fitch's base case default proxy is derived primarily from
historical collateral performance, actual performance may differ
from the expected performance, resulting in higher loss levels than
the base case.  This will result in a decline in CE and remaining
loss coverage levels available to the notes and may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.  Fitch will
continue to monitor the performance of the trust.


SLM STUDENT 2005-10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class A-5 Debt to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2005-10:

-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- Class A-5 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from Rating
Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'A+sf'; removed from Rating
Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The trust, at 10.6% pool factor, is nearing its clean-up call
eligibility of 10%. Fitch has observed that Navient has
historically let transactions continue to pay down rather than call
them immediately upon eligibility, and has received no indication
otherwise for SLM 2005-10. As such, Fitch will resolve the Rating
Watch status now rather than extend it further, even though the
notes may be called at any time after pool factor falls below 10%.

Absent any sponsor action, Fitch's base case expectation is that
the class A-5 and B notes will miss their legal final maturity
dates. In downgrading to 'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch
has considered qualitative factors such as Navient's historical
commitment to the performance of its securitizations, the revolving
credit agreement in place for the benefit of the noteholders, and
the eventual full payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
the off notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
16% and a 48% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress scenario,
which is based on actual trust performance. The claim reject rate
is assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.
Fitch applies the standard default timing curve in its credit
stress cash flow analysis. The trailing-12-month (TTM) average
constant default rate, utilized in the maturity stresses, is 5.0%.
TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, income-based repayment (prior
to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 12.4%, 16.1%, 15.5%, and 11.3%, respectively, and
are used as the starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modelled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.01%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread and, for the class A notes, subordination. As of September
2016, total and senior effective parity ratios (including the
reserve) are 100.94% (0.93% CE) and 141.10% (29.13% CE). Liquidity
support is provided by a reserve equal to its floor of $3,002,803.
The transaction will continue to release cash as long as the target
parity ratio of 100% (excluding the reserve, as pool factor is
below 40%) is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's Student Loan ABS (SLABS) cash flow model
indicates that the A-4 notes are paid in full on or prior to the
legal final maturity dates under the 'AAA' rating scenarios. The
class A-5 and B notes, however, do not pay off before their
maturity date in Fitch's base case modelling scenarios.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer, due to its extensive
track record as the largest servicer of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under Fitch's 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and
Covered Bonds', Fitch looks to its own ratings in analyzing
counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's creditworthiness.
The definition of permitted investments for this deal allows for
the possibility of using investments not rated by Fitch, which
represents a criteria variation. Since the only available funds to
invest in are those held in the Collection Account and Reserve
Account, and the funds can only be invested for a short duration
given the payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe
such variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model implied outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'class A 'CCCsf'; class B
'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A class A 'CCCsf'; class B
'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A class A 'CCCsf'; class B
'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'BBsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.


SLM STUDENT 2013-4: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on SLM Student Loan
Trust 2013-4 (SLM 2013-4):

   -- Class A downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
      Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;
   -- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'A+sf'; removed from Rating

      Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The class A notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
of Fitch's credit and maturity base cases.  This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well.  In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching a 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modeling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
the off notes.  Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement.  However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest.  The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
9.75% and a 29.25% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario.  The base case default assumption of 9.75% implies a
constant default rate of 2.9% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.4 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses.  Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve.  The claim reject rate
is assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 10.1%, 15.8%, 16.9% and 13.5%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria.  The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.11%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and, for the class A
notes, subordination of the class B note.  As of November 2016,
total and senior effective parity ratios, respectively, are 101.01%
(1.00% CE) and 105.79% (5.47% CE).  Liquidity support is provided
by a reserve account sized at the greater of 0.25% of the pool
balance and $748,897, currently equal to $1,148,135.97.  The trust
will continue to release cash as long as the target OC amount of
the greater of 1.00% of adjusted pool balance or $1,000,000 is
maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the
class A notes do not pay off before their maturity date in all of
Fitch's modeling scenarios, including the base cases.  If the
breach of the class A maturity date triggers an event of default,
interest payments will be diverted away from the class B notes,
causing them to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer of FFELP student
loans.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED.  Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions.  In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate.  The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'
   -- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B
      'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

   -- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'AAsf'
   -- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
   -- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance.  Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.


SOLOSO CDO 2005-1: Moody's Lowers Cl. A-1L Notes Rating to Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd.:

Class A-1L Floating Rate Notes Due October 2035 (current balance of
$29,804,329), Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on February 12,
2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Class A-1LB Floating Rate Notes Due October 2035 (current balance
of $28,927,731), Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on February
12, 2015 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Class A-2L Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due October 2035 (current
balance including interest shortfall of $47,812,589), Downgraded to
C (sf); previously on May 17, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf).

Soloso CDO 2005-1 Ltd., issued in August 2005, is a collateralized
debt obligation backed mainly by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily the result of increased
uncertainty about the ongoing liquidation of the portfolio's
underlying collateral, which could result in a probability of
repayment and a severity of loss that are inconsistent with the
current ratings on the Class A-1L, A-1LB and A-2L notes.

The transaction declared an Event of Default (EoD) in April 2013
due to missed interest payments on the Class A-1L, A-1LA and A-1LB
notes. In August 2015, the requisite note holders directed the
sales and liquidation of the trust estate. Since then, 45 TruPS
securities have been sold from the portfolio via multiple public
sales and one TruPS security was redeemed in full, resulting in
total principal proceeds of $175.0 million, representing
approximately 58% of par. In December 2016, a partial distribution
of the liquidation proceeds of $150.7 million was made to pay down
the Class A-1L, A-1LA, and A-1LB notes. The Class A-1LA notes were
paid down in full, and the Class A-1L and A-1LB notes were paid
down collectively by 60% or $86.5 million.

Because the collateral were sold at prices significantly below par,
the Class A-1 and A-2L over-collateralization ratios have declined
to 120.3% and 66.3%, respectively, and the notes are supported by
only $45 million of performing collateral par and $46.5 million of
defaulted par. Additionally, the trustee is holding $26.4 million
of funds in reserve in respect of certain pending litigations,
among other things.

Moody's has examined various scenarios assuming different
liquidation values on the collateral and considered the risk of
non-payment on the notes and the approximate expected recoveries
associated with ratings for defaulted or impaired securities, as
detailed in "Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions." The rating
actions also considered the uncertainty of the amount and timing of
the funds in reserve that are potentially available to pay down the
senior notes.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Liquidation of portfolio assets: Fluctuations in the liquidation
value of illiquid TruPS securities can result in volatility in the
probability of repayment and the severity of loss to the rated
notes. Moody's analyzed the portfolio assuming various liquidation
values in order to account for potential volatility. Realization of
higher or lower than assumed liquidation value would positively or
negatively impact the TruPS CDO notes.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's did not model this transaction because the rating outcome
is based on its assessment of various scenarios assuming different
liquidation values on the collateral and the potential impact on
the Class A-1L, A-1LB and A-2L notes.


STUDENT LOAN 2007-2: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on Cl. IO Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of 1 class of
certificates in Credit Suisse ABS Repackaging Trust 2015-A and 2
classes of certificates in Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust,
Series 2007-1, and affirmed the rating of 1 class of certificate in
Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2. US Bank National
Association is the administrator and indenture trustee for Credit
Suisse ABS Repackaging Trust 2015-A and Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas is the administrator and indenture trustee for both
Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust transactions.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Credit Suisse ABS Repackaging Trust 2015-A

Resecuritization Trust Certificates, Series 2015-A Class A,
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1

Cl. 5-A-1, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Cl. 5-A-IO, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-2

Cl. IO, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions for Credit Suisse ABS Repackaging Trust 2015-A,
Class A and Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust 2007-1, Class 5-A-1
and Class 5-A-IO were prompted by the rating confirmations of the
notes underlying the repackaging trusts. The rating of the Credit
Suisse ABS Repackaging Trust 2015-A, Class A certificate is based
on the rating of the underlying Class A-5 note issued in NCF
Grantor Trust 2004-2. The ratings of the Student Loan ABS
Repackaging Trust 2007-1, Class 5-A-1 and Class 5-A-IO certificates
are based on the ratings of the Class A-5-1 and Class A-5-2 notes
issued in the National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1. The
ratings of the underlying notes were confirmed in a separate rating
action on Jan 24, 2017 (See, Press Release: Moody's upgrades 6
classes of notes and confirms 6 classes of notes in 4 National
Collegiate Student Loan Trust securitizations).

The rating of the Class IO in the Student Loan Repackaging Trust,
Series 2007-2 was affirmed based on the weighted average rating of
the underlying IO bonds. The rating of the Student Loan ABS
Repackaging Trust 2007-2, Class IO certificate is based on the
ratings of the Class 2-A-IO, Class 3-A-IO, Class 4-A-IO, Class
5-A-IO, Class 6-A-IO and Class 7-A-IO Certificates issued by
Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust, Series 2007-1.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

In addition, in rating Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust 2007-2,
Class IO Moody's considered the idealized expected loss rate
corresponding to each underlying IO's respective weighted average
remaining life. Then the average idealized loss and remaining
average life for Class A-IO, both weighted by outstanding notional
amount of the tranches multiplied by the IO interest rate, were
used to determine the rating. Moody's idealized expected loss rates
table was published in the methodology report "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs" rating methodology, published on October 2016, and
is available at www.moodys.com.

The methodology used in rating Student Loan ABS Repackaging Trust
2007-1, Class 5-A-IO was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The ratings of the certificates could be downgraded or upgraded if
the underlying securities referenced in the trusts are downgraded
or upgraded.


UBS-BARCLAYS 2013-C5: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of UBS-Barclays Commercial
Mortgage Trust (UBS-BB) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2013-C5.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect overall stable pool performance, with no
material changes since issuance.  There are nine Fitch Loans of
Concern (11.4% of the pool) due to declining performance or
upcoming rollover risk, including one small loan in special
servicing (0.3%).  There are six loans (8.1%) on the master
servicer's watchlist, and each are considered Fitch Loans of
Concern.

Limited Amortization: The pool amortizes by approximately 13.3%
from aggregate cut-off balance to aggregate maturity balance.  The
pool includes four interest-only (IO) loans (31.3%) and five
partial IO loans (14.9%).  The current pool's loans maturity
schedule is as follows: 1.2% (2018), 14.2% (2022) and 84.6% (2023).


Property Type Concentration: Retail properties represent 44.7% of
the pool.

Loan Concentration: The top 10 loans account for 59.5% of the pool.
This represents slightly higher top 10 loan concentration than
most 2012 and early 2013 transactions.

Geographic Concentration: California represents 37.9% of the pool.


                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the overall
stable performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.  Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $14.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $17 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $629.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $110.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $120.7 million class A-S* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $96.5 million class B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $0 class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $57.5 million class C* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $70.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $27.8 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $27.8 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $1,092 million** class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $96.5 million** class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable.

*Class A-S, class B and class C certificates may be exchanged for
class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be exchanged
for class A-S, class B and class C certificates.
**Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


VENTURE XXVI: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Venture XXVI CLO, Limited.
Moody's rating action is as follows:

  US$320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2029 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P) Aaa (sf)

  US$57,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P) Aa2 (sf)

  US$33,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate

  Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P) A2 (sf)

  US$25,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate

  Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P) Baa3 (sf)

  US$24,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P) Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Venture XXVI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 90% ramped
as of the closing date.

MJX Venture Management LLC (the "Manager"), an affiliate of MJX
Asset Management LLC, will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.00%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


VITALITY RE V: S&P Raises Rating on Series 2014 Cl. B Notes to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its rating on Vitality Re
V Ltd. Series 2014 Class B notes by one notch to 'BB(sf)' from
'BB-(sf)' and simultaneously affirmed its ratings on the Vitality
Re V Ltd.  Series 2014 Class A notes and the Vitality Re VI Ltd.
Series 2015 Class A and B notes.

Rationale

On Jan. 27, 2016, S&P lowered the rating on the Vitality Re V Ltd.
Class B notes. The rating action reflects updated information S&P
had received from Milliman Inc. and Aetna Life Insurance Co.
related to the Vitality Re VII Ltd. issuance that closed in Jan.
2016.

The rationale for the rating action is included in the following
article Vitality Re V Ltd., Vitality Re VI Ltd.

The primary driver of the increase in the attachment probabilities
of the affected notes was due to the suspension of the health
insurer fee (HIF).  On Dec. 18, 2015, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016 (CAA) was signed into law.  The CAA amends
certain provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), including a
suspension of the industry-wide health HIF for the calendar year
2017.

While the assumptions in place for the downgrade in 2016 are
essentially the same and the covered exposures have changed, the
primary driver for the rating upgrade was the attachment MBR for
the Vitality Re V class B notes increased from 93.64% to 94.12%.
The result was to decrease the attachment probability of the notes
so it fits within the 'bb' portion of the nat-cat risk factor
table.

The Vitality Re V Ltd. notes mature in 2019.  As currently enacted,
the HIF will be reinstated in 2018, which Milliman expects to lower
the MBR in subsequent years.  If the one year estimated increase of
250 bps. in the MBR for 2017 is followed by a similar decrease in
2018, S&P would expect to raise the ratings on the Vitality Re V
notes back to their initial ratings.  The Vitality Re VI notes
mature in Jan. 2018 so S&P do not expect to take any subsequent
rating actions related to the reinstatement of the HIF.

RATINGS LIST

Rating raised:
                                   
Vitality Re V Ltd.             To            From
  Series 2014 Class B          BB(sf)        BB-(sf)

Ratings affirmed:
                                   
Vitality Re V Ltd.
  Series 2014 Class A          BBB-(sf)

Vitality Re VI Ltd.
  Series 2015 Class A          BBB-(sf)
  Series 2015 Class B          BB-(sf)


WACHOVIA BANK 2007-C30: Fitch Lowers Rating on 5 Tranches to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine and downgraded five distressed
classes of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust's commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-C30.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the relatively stable performance of the
pool since Fitch's last rating action and modeled losses remain in
line with previous expectations.  Fitch modeled losses of 26.2% of
the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool balance
total 13.1%, including $148.6 million (1.9% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses to date.  Modeled losses at the
previous rating action were 13.2% of the original pool balance.

As of the December 2016 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 64.3% to $2.815 billion from
$7.9 billion at issuance.  Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes D through S.

Concentration of Specially Serviced Loans/Assets: There are 36
specially serviced loans/assets representing 35.9% of the pool,
including five REO assets (9.7%).  The largest contributor to
expected losses is the specially-serviced Four Seasons Aviara
Resort - Carlsbad, CA loan (6.6% of the pool), which is secured by
a resort hotel with 329 rooms and an Arnold Palmer designed 18-hole
golf course.  The property is now known as the Park Hyatt Aviara.
The loan transferred to the special servicer in April 2013 for a
second time due to monetary default after originally being modified
and returned to the master servicer in May 2011. The servicer
reported net operating income (NOI) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.80x as of June 2016.  The reported occupancy, ADR, and
RevPAR as of November 2016 was 65%, $249 and $161 respectively
compared to the comp set of 69%, $303, and $209. Hyatt has provided
the borrower with capital budget needed for property upgrades.
Deed in Lieu documents have been delivered to the borrower and the
special servicer continues to evaluate capital investment needs.

Concentration of 2017 Maturities: Loan maturities are concentrated
in 2017 with all loans but one in the pool maturing within the
first three months of 2017 (excluding real estate owned [REO]
assets).

Upcoming Loan Payoffs: The servicer has indicated several loans
will payoff in the next remittance including 485 Lexington Avenue
(11.2% of the pool).

High Percentage of Interest-Only and Highly Levered Loans: 74% of
the pool is comprised of full-term interest only loans.  Fitch
expects many loans to default as there is a large concentration
(77%) of performing loans that are considered highly levered (those
greater than 90% Fitch LTV).

Undercollateralization: The pool is undercollateralized as the
aggregate balance of the certificates is $4.9 million greater than
the aggregate collateral balance.  This disparity of principal
balances is due to the servicer recovering workout-delayed
reimbursement amounts from the transaction's principal
collections.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-5, A-1A, and A-J reflects
sufficient credit enhancement and continued delevering of the
transaction through amortization and paydown of maturing loans. The
Positive Outlooks on classes A-M and A-MFL reflects the expected
increase in credit enhancement from the upcoming loan payoffs and
resolution of specially serviced loans.  Downgrades are possible if
underperforming loans further decline or if highly leveraged loans
fail to refinance.  The distressed classes may be subject to
further downgrades as additional losses are realized.

Fitch has affirmed these classes and revised Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

   -- $492.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $104.2 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $540.3 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $250 million class A-MFL at 'Asf'; Outlook to Positive from
      Stable;
   -- $671.8 million class A-J at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $49.4 million class B at 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;
   -- $79 million class C at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $69.2 million class D at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $79 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has downgraded these classes:

   -- $59.3 million class E to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $69.2 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $98.8 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $79 million class H to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
   -- $88.9 million class J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-PB certificates have paid in
full.  Fitch does not rate the class L, M, N, O, P, Q and S
certificates.  Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-P, X-C and X-W certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2011-C3: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(WFRBS) Commercial Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2011-C3.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the pool
since Fitch's last rating action.  As of the December 2016
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 30.2% to $1.01 billion from $1.45 billion at issuance.
Per servicer reporting, there are no specially serviced loans and
all loans are current.  Additionally, five loans (6.3% of the
current balance) are fully defeased.  Interest shortfalls are
currently affecting class G.

Increased Paydown: Credit enhancement has increased as a result of
recent paydown.  Since Fitch's last review, eight loans totalling
$129.9 million have repaid in full.  One specially serviced loan,
the Campus Habitat loan, was disposed of for a loss to the trust of
$124,963.  The actual loss was less severe than Fitch had modeled
at prior review.

Low Leverage and Moderate NOI Growth: The remaining pool is very
low-levered with a weighted average Fitch LTV of 73.4% for the top
15 loans, which represent 70.8% of the pool's current balance.  The
net operating income (NOI) pool wide has grown 11.8% since
issuance, with the top 15 loans experiencing growth of 10.6% since
issuance.

Retail Concentration: The pool contains a high percentage (56.8% of
the current balance) of loans secured by retail properties. Macy's,
Inc. ('BBB'/Outlook Negative), which has a ground lease
encompassing 135,488 sf with the borrower, has closed their store
at the property securing the third largest retail loan in the pool
(Oakdale Mall loan, 5.17% of the current balance).  The ground
lease with the borrower is set to expire in December 2018.

Long-Dated Loan Maturities: Only 13.3% of the current balance
matures in 2018.  The remaining loans mature in 2020 (1.62% of the
current balance) and 2021 (85% of the current balance), allowing
more time for collateral performance volatility.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes is Stable due to the overall
stable performance of the pool.  The Outlook for class B was
revised to Stable from Positive based on concerns over a decline in
performance at the property securing the Oakdale Mall loan.
Upgrades may occur with continued stable pool performance and
additional paydown or defeasance.  Downgrades to the classes are
possible should overall pool performance decline.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- $112.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $93.2 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $557 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $762.9 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $41.6 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
      from Positive;
   -- $47 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $79.5 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $21.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
   -- $19.9 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

*Notional and interest-only

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full.  Fitch does
not rate the class G and X-B certificates.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C3: Moody's Cuts Class E Debt Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2011-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2011-C3 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl.A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes A-3 through D were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on P&I classes E and F were downgraded due to
anticipated losses from troubled loans, primarily due to concerns
regarding the Oakdale Mall Loan.

The ratings on the IO classes X-A and X-B were affirmed based on
the credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or
WARF) of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.9% of the
current balance, compared to 1.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, compared to 17 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the January 18, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 30% to $1.008
billion from $1.446 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 53 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 60% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Five loans,
constituting 6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Eight loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Three loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $535 thousand (for an average loss
severity of 15%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 6% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $27 million (a 43% expected loss based on a 67%
probability default) these troubled loans.

The largest troubled loan is the Oakdale Mall Loan ($52.1 million
-- 5.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 709,000 square foot
(SF) enclosed regional mall located in Johnson City, NY. The Macy's
at the mall (19.1% of the GLA) is on the store closures list, and
is set to close doors on April 18th, 2017. Macy's is currently on a
ground lease through the end of 2018, expiring two years before
loan maturity. Moody's is concerned about the future performance of
this mall.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 94% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 71% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 77%, compared to
79% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 13% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.60X and 1.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.57X and 1.31X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a credit assessment is the ConEdison Brooklyn-Queens
HQs Loan ($39.0 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
seven-story, Class B office building containing approximately
232,000 square feet (SF). The property is located in downtown
Brooklyn, New York. As of September 2016, the property was 100%
leased to the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Moody's
senior unsecured rating of A2) and has served as the corporate
headquarter since 1972. The tenant is on a net lease through
October 2027. The property is subject to a ground lease with the
City of New York through 2041 with renewal options that could
extend the lease through 2071. At securitization, the loan was
structured with an anticipated repayment date (ARD) in April 2018
and a 16-month interest-only period. The interest-only period has
expired and the loan is currently benefitting from a 30-year
amortization schedule. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are baa1 (sca.pd) and 1.02X, respectively, compared
to baa1 (sca.pd) and 1.01X at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 34% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Village of Merrick Park Loan ($170.3 million --
16.9% of the pool), which is secured by an 858,000 SF mixed-use
property located in Coral Gables, Florida. The property consists of
a three-story, 756,000 SF open-air lifestyle center and a separate
101,000 SF five-story office building. Constructed in 2002 and
renovated in 2008, the property is subject to a ground lease with
City of Coral Gables that expires in April 2099. The total property
was 97% occupied as of December 2015, compared to 93% in December
2014. The retail anchors are Nordstrom (23% of the gross leasable
area (GLA); lease expiration in 2023) and Neiman Marcus (15% of the
GLA; lease expiration in 2023). For the office component, the
largest tenant is Bayview Asset Management (9% of the GLA; lease
expiration in 2018). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and
1.26X, respectively, compared to 78% and 1.14X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Hilton Minneapolis Loan ($88.3
million -- 8.7% of the pool), which is secured by an 821-room,
25-story full-service hotel located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The
property is directly connected to the Minneapolis Convention Center
via the Skyway. The property is subject to a ground lease with the
City of Minneapolis that expires in October 2091. The
borrower/sponsor, Diamond Rock Hospitality, entered into a
pay-in-lieu of taxes (PILOT) program, which includes taxes and
ground rent through 2019. For the remainder of the lease term no
ground rent will be due, only regular taxes. As of December 2015,
the occupancy and revenue per available room (RevPAR), were 78% and
$115.44, respectively, compared to 74% and $107.56 at last review.
The loan is structured on a 25-year amortization schedule. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 90% and 1.29X, respectively, compared to
92% and 1.26X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Park Plaza Loan ($86.5 million --
8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a three-story, 283,000 SF,
enclosed regional mall located in Little Rock, Arkansas. The shadow
anchor is Dillard's, which is not part of the collateral. The
collateral's largest tenants are Forever 21 (9% of the GLA; lease
expiration in 2018), US Bank (8% of the GLA; lease expiration in
2023), and The Gap (6% of the GLA; lease expiration in 2020). As of
September 2016, the mall was 98% leased, compared to 99% in
December 2015. The loan is structured on a 25-year amortization
schedule. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.13X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.10X at last review.


[*] DBRS Reviews 30 Ratings from 8 US structured Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on January 13, 2017, reviewed 30 ratings from eight
U.S. structured finance asset-backed securities transactions. Of
the 30 outstanding publicly rated classes reviewed, DBRS has
confirmed 28 classes and upgraded two classes. For the ratings that
were confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their new
respective rating levels.

The following eight transactions were reviewed:
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2014-1
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2014-2
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-1
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-2
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2015-3
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-1
-- OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2016-2
-- OneMain Financial Warehouse Trust, Asset-Backed Variable Funding
Notes

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:
-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.
-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.
-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A copy of the ratings is available free at:

                      https://is.gd/vLGWbk


[*] Moody's Cuts $243MM of FHA/VA RMBS Issued Between 2004-2006
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 26 tranches
from four transactions. The collateral backing these deals consists
of first-lien fixed and adjustable rate mortgage loans insured by
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the U.S.
Department of Urban Development (HUD) or guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration (VA).

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-1

AX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

PO, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

Cl. 1A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1A5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2016
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. AX, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A1F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A1S, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. AX, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A1F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A1S, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1A4, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: NAAC Reperforming Loan Remic Trust Certificates, Series
2004-R2

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2015
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2015
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2015
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. PT, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2015
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades on the tranches which pay both principal and
interest, and principal only (PO) tranches are primarily due to the
erosion of credit enhancement supporting these bonds, related to
the higher than expected loss severities on liquidated loans.

A FHA guarantee covers 100% of a loan's outstanding principal and a
large portion of its outstanding interest and foreclosure-related
expenses in the event that the loan defaults. A VA guarantee covers
only a portion of the principal based on the lesser of either the
sum of the current loan amount, accrued and unpaid interest, and
foreclosure expenses, or the original loan amount. HUD usually pays
claims on defaulted FHA loans when servicers submit the claims, but
can impose significant penalties on servicers if it finds
irregularities in the claim process later during the servicer
audits. This can prompt servicers to push more expenses to the
trust that they deem reasonably incurred than submit them to HUD
and face significant penalty. The rating actions consider the
portion of a defaulted loan normally not covered by the FHA or VA
guarantee and other servicer expenses they deemed reasonably
incurred and passed on to the trust.

The rating action also includes downgrades on five interest-only
tranches, which are rated in accordance with "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities". Ratings on
interest-only securities whose notional balance is based on a pool
("pool IO") are capped by the highest rating in the structure
relating to that pool. Class A-X from MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust
2005-1, Class A-X from MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-2, and
Class A-X from MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-1 were downgraded
for this reason. Ratings on interest-only securities whose notional
balance is based on a single tranche are rated at the same level as
the linked tranche. Class 1A1S from MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust
2005-2 was downgraded due to the downgrade of its linked bond,
Class 1A1F; Class 1A1S from MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2006-1
was downgraded due to the downgrade of its linked bond, Class
1A1F.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "FHA-VA US RMBS
Methodology" published in November 2013.

The methodology used in rating the interest-only securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $11MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued in 2005
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of eight tranches
backed by Prime Jumbo mortgage loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-6

Cl. 1-A-7, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-7F

Cl. 4A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 4A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 3A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3A-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3A-10, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 7, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade action on Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc.,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-6 Class 1-A-7 is
primarily due to the fact that it benefits from priority of
principal payments. The actions on GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-7F
are primarily the results of a reduction in loss expectations on
the collateral pools and an increase in credit enhancement to the
bonds. The upgrade actions on Class 3A-2, Class 3A-5, Class 3A-10
are also due to the additional support from Class 3A-6, Class
3A-12, Class 3A-11 respectively to protect from future projected
losses. The Class 3A-4 and Class 4A-2 are Interest-Only (IO) bonds
linked to single tranches Class 3A-2 and Class 4A-1, thus ratings
on these IO bonds should carry the same rating subsequent to the
upgrade actions on Class 3A-2 and Class 4A-1. The actions reflect
the recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated
loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

The methodology used in rating the interest-only securities was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $371MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 27 tranches
from 11 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2003-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-OP1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2004-R10

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Corp (Affirmed at A3, Outlook
Stable on Aug 8, 2016)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Asset Backed Securities Corporation, Series 2002-HE1

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-HE1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-C

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2003-8

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-BC4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2013 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-2

Cl. AV-1A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 26, 2013
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AV-1B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $98.5MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2001-2004
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches,
from 11 transactions issued by various issuers backed by Subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Aames Mortgage Trust 2001-4

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2013 Confirmed
at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2003-1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2003-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-NC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2003-HE4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011 Confirmed
at B2 (sf)

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-4

Cl. IM-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2015 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2002-4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FF2

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-FF2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FF6

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Raises $54.7MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2003-2004
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 12 tranches
from two transactions, backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, issued by
Bear and Impac.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-AC5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2004-5 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2004-5

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2013
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2013
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2013
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools. The rating
upgrades are due to the stronger collateral performance of the
underlying pools and the build-up of credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $232.9MM of Alt-A RMBS Issued in 2005
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches
from four transactions, backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, issued by
multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8

Cl. 7-A-2, Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2(sf)

Cl. 7-A-3-2, Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2(sf)

Cl. 7-A-4, Upgraded to B2(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2(sf)

Issuer: Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Trust 2005-HY1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca(sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C(sf)

Cl. 1-A1A, Upgraded to A1(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded
to A3(sf)

Cl. 1-A1B, Upgraded to Baa3(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3(sf)

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to A3(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2(sf)

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-4 Collateralized Asset-Backed
Bonds, Series 2005-4

Cl. 1-A-1A, Upgraded to Baa2(sf); previously on Jun 24, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1(sf)

Cl. 1-A-1B, Upgraded to Baa2(sf); previously on Jun 24, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1(sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Ba3(sf); previously on Jun 24, 2015 Upgraded
to B2(sf)

Issuer: Lehman XS Trust Series 2005-4

Cl. 1-A3, Upgraded to A2(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2(sf)

Cl. 1-A4, Upgraded to Baa2(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2(sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2(sf); previously on Mar 2, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2(sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the buildup of credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $30MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2005
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
and downgraded the ratings of two tranches backed by Prime Jumbo
RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Banc of America Funding Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-7

Cl. 4-A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 24, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-7, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-8, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-L Trust

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-9, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the overall credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are
primarily due to the increased loss expectation on the collateral
pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in November 2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in December 2016 from 5.0% in
December 2015. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Actions on $1.5BB of Tobacco ABS
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 12 tranches
in 10 tobacco settlement revenue securitizations, has downgraded
the ratings of 4 tranches in 3 tobacco settlement revenue
securitizations, and has confirmed the rating of 1 tranche from 1
tobacco settlement revenue securitization.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Buckeye Tobacco Settlement Financing Authority, Tobacco
Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds, Series 2007 (State of Ohio)

Series 2007A-1-12 Senior Current Interest Serial Bonds, Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: California County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Los
Angeles County Securitization Corporation) Series 2006A Convertible
Turbo Bonds

Cl. 2006A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: California County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Merced
County Tobacco Funding Corporation) - Tobacco Settlement
Asset-Backed Refunding Bonds

2005A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Golden State Tobacco Securitization Corporation (2007
Indenture)

TT Bds A-1-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: New York Counties Tobacco Trust I, Series 2000

Flex. Amort. Term Bond 4, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
Feb 20, 2014 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: New York Counties Tobacco Trust II, Series 2001

Super Sinker Term Bond 2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb
20, 2014 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Super Sinker Term Bond 3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb
20, 2014 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: New York Counties Tobacco Trust III, Series 2003

2003 TTB-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014
Confirmed at A3 (sf)

Issuer: Northern Tobacco Securitization Corporation, Series 2006

2006-A-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016 Ba1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Rockland Tobacco Asset Securitization Corporation, Series
2001

Super Sinker Term Bond 2, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
Feb 20, 2014 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Super Sinker Term Bond 3, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb
20, 2014 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Securitization Authority of Northern California
(Sacramento County)

2005A-1-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Securitization Authority of Southern California
(San Diego)

2006A-1-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Tobacco Settlement Authority (Iowa), Series 2005

2005A TNs, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2016 Baa3
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Tobacco Settlement Financing Corporation (New Jersey),
Series 2007-1

2007-1A Term Bond 1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26,
2016 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

2007-1A Term Bond 2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 20,
2014 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Issuer: Ulster Tobacco Asset Securitization Corporation, Series
2001

Term CCA Bond-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are the result of updates to the methodology
that Moody's uses to rate and monitor tobacco settlement revenue
securitizations, and also take into account principal payments made
to bondholders of several deals as of December 2016, as well as the
correction of errors in the model used to analyze the
transactions.

The updates to Moody's methodology for rating tobacco settlement
revenue securitizations take into account the slowing pace of the
arbitration proceedings between the tobacco manufacturers and the
states, as well as the October 2015 settlement between New York
State and certain tobacco companies.

Please see Moody's announcement on the methodology update:

https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-updates-its-approach-to-rating-tobacco-settlement-revenue-securitizations--PR_360474

"To take into account the slowing pace of arbitration proceedings
between the tobacco manufacturers and the states, the updated
methodology increases our recovery lag assumption for all states
except New York to generally 15-20 years from the sales year that
is in dispute, from the current 8-12 year assumption. (New York's
October 2015 settlement reduced the likelihood of future
arbitration proceedings, so the lengthening timeline does not
impact our analysis of New York's securitizations). The slow pace
of the arbitration proceedings between the tobacco manufacturers
and the states is negative for all of the non-New York tobacco
settlement securitizations, but particularly so for non-settling
states. States that settled in 2012 (or in some cases joined the
settlement subsequently) receive partial payments of disputed
amounts each year, whereas non-settling states (such as Alaska and
Iowa) receive no portion of disputed amounts until arbitration
proceedings resolve the dispute years later. This causes
outstanding bonds from non-settling states to be more negatively
impacted by the extension of the recovery lag," Moody's said.

Moody's said, "The second methodology update relates to the October
2015 settlement between New York State and the tobacco
manufacturers. Under the settlement, future annual payments due to
New York from the participating manufacturers pursuant to the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement will be reduced according to a formula
that takes into account the number of packs of tribal cigarettes
sold to non-tribal members ("Tribal NPM pack") on which state
excise tax ("SET") has not been paid. The methodology update takes
into account the settlement and our expectation for the future
volume of non-SET paid Tribal NPM pack sales. While, as part of the
October 2015 settlement, the New York securitizations benefitted
from the receipt of funds previously held in escrow that were
released in April 2016, this benefit was already accounted for in
our previous analysis as we assume that states will ultimately be
found to have been diligent and will therefore recoup these funds
in future years after arbitration has concluded. As a result, the
incremental change in our methodology is negative for New York
securitizations because we now assume that, under the 2015
settlement agreement, New York will not recoup funds withheld by
the tobacco manufacturers including the withholdings associated
with non-SET paid Tribal NPM pack sales. We generally assume that
non-SET paid Tribal NPM pack sales will decline at the same rate as
our national cigarette sales decline assumption."

The actions also reflect corrections to the modeling used to
analyze all of the tobacco settlement transactions. The tobacco
settlement transactions have two distributions per year. In
previous actions, funds set aside during the first distribution
period, typically June, to make interest payments in the following
distribution period, typically December, were not accounted for;
instead the December interest payments were incorrectly deducted
from the reserve accounts in the first modeled year. In addition,
although less impactful to the analysis, operating expenses were
double-counted in the first modeled year. Correction of these
errors impacted all tobacco deals, and resulted in incremental
positive movement in model results; however in many cases this
movement was offset by the incremental negative effect of the
methodology updates.

Lastly, the rating actions on three securitizations (New York
Counties Tobacco Trust II, Series 2001, New York Counties Tobacco
Trust III, Series 2003, and Ulster Tobacco Asset Securitization
Corporation, Series 2001) reflect that certain tranches in the
securitizations were redeemed, in whole or in part, as of their
December 2016 payment dates, thereby decreasing the leverage ratios
of the remaining bonds in these securitizations, in some cases
significantly.

Summary of drivers for rating actions:

The downgrade of one bond from the Alaska Northern Tobacco
Securitization Corporation, Series 2006 securitization largely
reflects the methodology update with respect to the recovery lag
assumptions, which outweighed the positive impact of the error
corrections. The confirmation of one bond from the Iowa Tobacco
Settlement Authority, Series 2005 securitization reflects the
corrected application of funds towards the December 2016 interest
payment, which offset what we expected to be a negative impact from
the increased recovery lag assumptions.

Upgrades to bonds from Golden State Tobacco Securitization
Corporation (2007 Indenture), California County Tobacco
Securitization Agency (Los Angeles County Securitization
Corporation) Series 2006A Convertible Turbo Bonds, California
County Tobacco Securitization Agency (Merced County Tobacco Funding
Corporation) - Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Refunding Bonds,
Tobacco Securitization Authority of Northern California (Sacramento
County), Tobacco Securitization Authority of Southern California
(San Diego), Tobacco Settlement Financing Corporation (New Jersey),
Series 2007-1, and Buckeye Tobacco Settlement Financing Authority,
Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds, Series 2007 (State of Ohio)
largely stem from the corrected application of funds towards the
December 2016 interest payments. For these securitizations by
California, New Jersey and Ohio, all of which settled in 2012, the
correction of the error had greater rating impact than the
methodological change related to the increased recovery lag
assumptions.

Downgrades to bonds from the New York Counties Tobacco Trust I,
Series 2000 and from the Rockland Tobacco Asset Securitization
Corporation, Series 2001 securitizations are a result of the
methodology update incorporating an adjustment for the annual
revenues due to New York based on the number of non-SET paid Tribal
NPM packs sold.

Upgrades to bonds from the New York Counties Tobacco Trust II,
Series 2001, New York Counties Tobacco Trust III, Series 2003 and
the Ulster Tobacco Asset Securitization Corporation, Series 2001
securitizations reflect that certain tranches in the
securitizations were redeemed, in whole or in part, as of December
2016 payment dates, thereby decreasing the leverage ratios of the
remaining bonds in these securitizations, in some cases
significantly.

In addition to the factors discussed above, the rating actions are
generally driven by future projections of cigarette shipment volume
declines, as well as the amount available in the reserve accounts
of the transactions.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Tobacco Settlement Revenue Securitizations"
published in January 2017.

The analysis for the rating actions included cash flow runs to
assess the impact on the bonds of a lag of generally 15-20 years
for the states to receive subsequent recoveries of their withheld
NPM adjustment amounts. In addition, for the New York transactions,
the rating actions included cash flow runs for additional scenarios
to test the resiliency of ratings to stresses to the projections of
future non-SET paid Tribal NPM pack sales. Factors that would lead
to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the ratings if the annual rate of cigarette
consumption decline continues to slow down, if future arbitration
proceedings and subsequent recoveries become more expeditious than
they currently are, if the number of non-SET paid Tribal NPM packs
sold decrease significantly beyond Moody's expectations, or if
there are future settlements of the NPM adjustment disputes between
the tobacco manufacturers and the non-settling states.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if subsequent recoveries from
future arbitration proceedings take longer than the Moody's
assumption of 15-20 years, if an arbitration panel finds that a
state was not diligent in enforcing a certain statute which could
lead to a significant decline in cash flow to that state, if
non-SET paid Tribal NPM sales do not decrease in line with Moody's
expectations, or if the annual rate of decline in the volume of
domestic cigarette shipments increase beyond the 3% to 4% base case
projection.


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 42 Classes From 11 CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 40 classes from nine
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions
and two classes from two CF collateral debt obligations (CDO)
backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- ACA CLO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- Avery Street CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      January 2017.

   -- Burr Ridge CLO Plus Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in

      December 2016.

   -- Gramercy Park CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS):
      senior-most tranche paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- HarbourView CLO 2006-1 (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      December 2016.

   -- Ocean Trails CLO I (CF CLO): optional redemption in January
      2017.

   -- OHA Credit Partners VI Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in

      December 2016.

   -- Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- TIAA Real Estate CDO 2003-1 Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-
      most tranche paid down, other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

ACA CLO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   NR                  BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos
E                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Avery Street CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B fixed             NR                  AAA (sf)
B floating          NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB (sf)
E                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Burr Ridge CLO Plus Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1D                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1T                NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  AA- (sf)
E                   NR                  A- (sf)

Fraser Sullivan CLO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  B+ (sf)

Gramercy Park CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2-R               NR                  AA (sf)/Watch Pos
B-R                 NR                  A (sf)/Watch Pos
C-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
D-R                 NR                  BB (sf)/Watch Pos

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  B (sf)

HarbourView CLO 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A (sf)

Ocean Trails CLO I
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C                   NR                  A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   NR                  B+ (sf)/Watch Pos
Class 1 combo       NR                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

OHA Credit Partners VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1-R               NR                  AA+ (sf)
C-1-R               NR                  AA (sf)
D-R                 NR                  A (sf)
E-1-R               NR                  BB+ (sf)
E-2                 NR                  BB+ (sf)

Silverado CLO 2006-II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1S                NR                  AAA (sf)

TIAA Real Estate CDO 2003-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.


[*] S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 92 Classes From 13 RMBS
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 92 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2004.  The review yielded 18 upgrades, nine
downgrades, and 65 affirmations.  The transactions in this review
are backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo
mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first liens on one-
to four-family residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what it would rate the class
without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not rated, S&P
relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit quality and the
transaction structure to derive the rating on the class.

Of the classes reviewed, these are insured by an insurance provider
that is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings:

   -- Prime Mortgage Trust 2003-3's class A-6 ('AA+ (sf)'),
      insured by MBIA Insurance Corp. ('CCC'); and

   -- RFMSI Series 2003-S20 Trust's class I-A-5 ('AA (sf)'),
      insured by Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. ('AA').

Some of the rating actions reflect the application of S&P's
interest-only (IO) criteria, which provide that S&P will maintain
the current ratings on an IO class until all of the classes that
the IO security references are either lowered to below 'AA- (sf)'
or have been retired--at which time S&P will withdraw the ratings
on these IO classes.  The ratings on each of these classes have
been affected by recent rating actions on the reference classes
upon which their notional balances are based.

A criteria interpretation for the above mentioned criteria was
issued to clarify that when the criteria state "we will maintain
the current ratings," it means that we will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
prior to the release of this criteria.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades reflect improved collateral performance/delinquency
trends, a decrease in the constant prepayment rate (CPR), and/or
increased credit support relative to S&P's projected losses.  The
upgrades include nine ratings that were raised three or more
notches.

The upgrades on class A-1 from Structured Asset Mortgage
Investments Trust 2002-AR2; classes 1-A1, 4-A, and B-1 from
Structured Asset Securities Corp. series 2003-15A; and classes I-A
and III-A from Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust
2004-AR2 reflect a decrease in S&P's projected losses for the
related transactions and its belief that our projected credit
support for the affected classes will be sufficient to cover its
revised projected losses at these rating levels.  S&P has decreased
its projected losses because there have been fewer reported
delinquencies for the associated pools during the most recent
performance periods compared with those reported during previous
reviews.  Structured Asset Mortgage Investments Trust 2002-AR2's
severe delinquencies in collateral group one decreased to 13.2% in
November 2016 from 15.4% in November 2015.  Structured Asset
Securities Corp. series 2003-15A's severe delinquencies decreased
to 4.6% in November 2016 from 10.0% in November 2014. Structured
Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2004-AR2's severe delinquencies
in group one decreased to 6.0% in November 2016 from 12.0% in
November 2014, and group three severe delinquencies decreased to
15.0% in November 2016 from 19.9% in November 2014. Severe
delinquencies referenced above are defined as any loan that is
60-plus days delinquent, in foreclosure or real estate-owned
status, or in bankruptcy.

The upgrades on class A-2 from Structured Asset Mortgage
Investments Trust 2002-AR2, classes B8, B9, B10, and B11 from RESI
Finance Ltd.  Partnership 2003-A, and classes I-A-2, I-A-3,
III-A-1, III-A-2, and III-A-4 from Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed
Securities 2003-N Trust are because of an increase in credit
support available to each class due to a larger allocation of
unscheduled principal to more senior classes than junior classes.
As a result, these classes were able to withstand loss stresses at
higher rating scenarios.

The upgrades on classes A-2B and B-1 from Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors Trust Series MLCC 2004-C reflect a decrease in the
underlying pool's CPR.  The reduced CPR has lowered unscheduled
principal payments to the more subordinate classes in this
transaction, which results in extending their lives and preserving
the projected credit support to the affected senior classes that
may be needed for back-end losses.

S&P raised its rating on class B1 from Structured Asset Securities
Corp. series 2003-15A to 'B (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because S&P
believes this class is no longer vulnerable to default.

                            DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include two ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  S&P lowered its ratings on three classes to
speculative-grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or
higher), while the remaining six downgraded classes already had
speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief
that its projected credit support for the affected classes will be
insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect either
tail risk or principal writedowns.

S&P lowered its ratings on classes II-M-1, II-M-2, II-M-3, and
II-B-1 from RFMSI Series 2003-S20 Trust to 'D (sf)' because of
principal writedowns incurred by these classes in recent remittance
periods.

Tail Risk

RFMSI Series 2003-S20 Trust and First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through
Trust 2004-AR2 are backed by a small remaining pool of mortgage
loans.  S&P believes that pools with less than 100 loans remaining
create an increased risk of credit instability because a
liquidation and subsequent loss on one loan, or a small number of
loans, at the tail end of a transaction's life may have a
disproportionate impact on a given RMBS tranche's remaining credit
support.  S&P refers to this as tail risk.

S&P addressed the tail risk on classes I-A-9 and II-A-1 from RFMSI
Series 2003-S20 Trust and classes III-A-1 and IV-A-1 from First
Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-AR2 by conducting a
loan-level analysis that assesses this risk, as set forth in our
tail risk criteria.  The rating actions on these classes reflect
the application of S&P's tail risk criteria.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Low priority in principal payments.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;
   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                    http://bit.ly/2je6agQ


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
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then-ending.

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