TCR_Public/170226.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, February 26, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 56

                            Headlines

AMERICAN CREDIT 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating to Class E Notes
ARES CLO XXVIII: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
BBCMS MORTGAGE 2017-C1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating to G Debt
BLADE ENGINE 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. 2006-1B Debt to Ca
CAPITAL AUTO 2015-2: Fitch Hikes Cl. E Debt Rating From 'BB-sf'

COMM 2013-CCRE8: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
DT AUTO 2017-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class D Notes
GRIPPEN PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2017-485L: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. HRR Certs

HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
MADISON PARK XV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D-R Sr. Notes
MARATHON CLO IX: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. D Notes
MASTR TRUST 2007-3: Moody's Takes Action on $23.1MM RMBS
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C15: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class H Debt

NEWSTAR 2013-1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating to Class E-N Notes
OAKTREE CLO 2014-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
RACE POINT VIII: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E-R Notes
SDART 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Class E Notes
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-2: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. B-4 Debt

VENTURE XII CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C11: S&P Raises Rating on Class J Certs to B+
[*] DBRS Reviews 448 Classes From 44 US RMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Hikes $52MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2015
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $263.6MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2006

[*] S&P Completes Review on 164 Classes From 13 RMBS Transactions
[*] S&P Lowers Rating on 98 Classes From 65 RMBS Deals to 'D'

                            *********

AMERICAN CREDIT 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to American
Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2017-1's $209.000 million
asset-backed notes series 2017-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 16,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 66.1%, 59.7%, 49.4%,
      40.1%, and 36.7% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D,

      and E notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread), which provide
      coverage of approximately 2.35x, 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.35x, and
      1.25x S&P's 27.50%-28.50% expected net loss range for the
      class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made to the
      preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
      dates under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that

      S&P believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary
      ratings.  The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB')
      stress scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes
      would remain within one rating category of S&P's preliminary

      'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings, the ratings on
      the class D notes would remain within two rating categories
      of S&P's preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating, and the rating on
      the class E notes would also remain within two rating
      categories in the first year, but is expected to default by
      its legal final maturity date with approximately 82%-87%
      repayment.  These potential rating movements are consistent
      with S&P's credit stability criteria, which outline the
      outer bound of credit deterioration equal to a one-rating
      category downgrade within the first year for 'AAA' and 'AA'
      rated securities and a two-rating category downgrade within
      the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated securities under
      moderate stress conditions.  Eventual default for a 'BB'
      rated class under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario is also

      consistent with S&P's credit stability criteria.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile
      loans securitized in this transaction.

   -- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
      (Wells Fargo).

   -- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures.

   -- The transaction's legal structure.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2017-1
Class       Rating       Type            Interest           Amount
                                         rate             (mil. $)
A           AAA (sf)     Senior          Fixed              88.330
B           AA (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed              23.637
C           A (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed              44.786
D           BBB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed              39.810
E           BB (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed              12.437



ARES CLO XXVIII: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A, B-1, B-2,
C-1, C-2, D, E, and F notes from Ares XXVIII CLO Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
2013 and is managed by Ares CLO Management XXVIII L.P.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the January 2017 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

The affirmed ratings reflect the stable portfolio performance and
S&P's belief that the credit support available is commensurate with
the current rating levels.

Since the transaction's effective date in November 2013, the number
of obligors in the portfolio has increased, which contributed to
the portfolio's greater diversification.  At the same time, the
trustee-reported collateral portfolio weighted average life
decreased to 5.0 years from 5.4 years.  This seasoning, combined
with the increased portfolio diversification, has decreased the
overall credit risk profile.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the November 2013 effective
date report.  Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets
increased to $1.98 million as of January 2017, from none at the
effective date.  The level of assets rated 'CCC+' and below
increased to $17.61 million (3.56% of the aggregate principal
balance) from $1.99 million over the same period.

According to the January 2017 trustee report, the
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have exhibited
mild declines since S&P's effective date rating affirmations:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio was 131.04%, down from 133.01%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio was 119.63%, down from 121.43%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio was 112.55%, down from 114.25%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio was 107.13%, down from 108.74%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicated higher ratings for the
class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, and D notes, its rating actions
considered the increase in the 'CCC' rated  assets and the decline
in the O/C ratios, and allowed additional cushion for further
volatility in the underlying portfolio.

Additionally, the cash flow analysis indicated a lower rating on
the class F notes than its current rating level, but S&P's rating
analysis considered the fact that the deal will soon exit its
reinvestment period and start paying down the notes sequentially,
which, all else remaining equal, will begin to increase the O/C
levels.  S&P also considered the "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+',
'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, and hence
did not lower the rating to the level suggested by the cash flow
analysis.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Ares XXVIII CLO Ltd.
Class          Rating
A              AAA (sf)
B-1            AA (sf)
B-2            AA (sf)
C-1            A (sf)
C-2            A (sf)
D              BBB (sf)
E              BB (sf)
F              B (sf)


BBCMS MORTGAGE 2017-C1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating to G Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-C1 (the
Certificates) issued by BBCMS Mortgage Trust 2017-C1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-E at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-F at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-G at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-H at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, X-E, X-F, X-G, X-H, D, E, F and G are being privately
offered.

The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E, X-F and X-G balances are notional.
DBRS ratings on interest-only (IO) certificates address the
likelihood of receiving interest based on the notional amount
outstanding. DBRS considers the IO certificates’ positions within
the transaction payment waterfall when determining the appropriate
ratings.

On January 17, 2017, DBRS requested comment on its proposed
methodology "Rating North American CMBS Interest-Only
Certificates." If this methodology is adopted without changes, DBRS
believes that potential rating actions for IO certificates could be
either downgrades or confirmations. Please refer to the January 17,
2017, DBRS press release for further details on the proposed
methodology.

The collateral consists of 58 fixed-rate loans secured by 75
commercial and multifamily properties. Two of the loans are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into one crossed group.
The DBRS analysis of this transaction incorporates this crossed
group, resulting in a modified loan count of 57, and the loan
number references within this report reflect this total. The
transaction is a sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit
pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting
the long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, three loans, representing 10.4% of the
aggregate loan balance, had a DBRS Term Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance
risk given the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied
its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 24
loans, representing 52.3% of the pool, with refinance DSCRs below
1.00x and 11 loans, representing 32.0% of the pool, with refinance
DSCRs below 0.90x. These credit metrics are based on whole-loan
balances. One of the pool’s loans with a DBRS Refinance (Refi)
DSCR below 0.90x, 1166 Avenue of the Americas, representing 6.6% of
the transaction balance, has pieces of subordinate mortgage debt
outside the trust. Based on A-note balances only, the deal’s
weighted-average DBRS Refi DSCR improves marginally to 1.05x.

Two of the largest 11 loans, Merrill Lynch Drive and State Farm
Data Center, have trust participations that exhibit credit
characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings.
When combined, these loans represent 7.8% of the pool. Merrill
Lynch Drive has credit characteristics consistent with an "A"
shadow rating, while State Farm Data Center exhibits credit
characteristics consistent with a AA shadow rating. Furthermore,
term default risk is low, as indicated by a relatively strong DBRS
Term DSCR of 1.57x, which is based on the whole-loan balances. In
addition, 26 loans, representing 49.6% of the pool, have a DBRS
Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. This includes eight of the largest 12
loans. Ten loans, representing 29.8% of the pool, are located in
urban markets with increased liquidity that benefit from consistent
investor demand, even in times of stress. Urban markets represented
in the deal include New York City; Seattle; Los Angeles; Charlotte,
North Carolina; New Haven, Connecticut; Inglewood, California; and
Rancho Cordova, California. Lastly, five loans, representing 21.2%
of the pool, are secured by properties exhibiting Above Average
quality, while only three loans, representing 5.6% of the pool,
were deemed Below Average. The remaining loans were considered to
be of Average property quality.

The transaction has a high concentration of loans (43.4% of the
pool) that are backed by office properties. Of the office property
concentration, 13.4% is secured by Merrill Lynch Drive, which DBRS
considers to have credit characteristics consistent with an "A"
shadow rating. Furthermore, the transaction has a moderate
concentration of loans that are secured by assets either fully or
primarily used as retail at 23.3%. The retail sector has generally
underperformed since the Great Recession because of a general
decline in consumer spending power, store closures, chain
bankruptcies and the rapidly growing popularity of e-commerce.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, e-commerce sales represented
7.0% of total retail sales in 2015 compared with 3.9% in 2009. As
the e-commerce share of sales is expected to continue to grow
significantly in the coming years, the retail real estate sector
may continue to be relatively weak. DBRS considers 66.6% of the
retail concentration to be secured by either anchored or regional
mall properties, which are more desirable and have historically
shown lower rates of default. Furthermore, roughly 25.0% of the
retail concentration is backed by The Summit Birmingham, which has
in-line sales in excess of $600.00 psf and is identified by DBRS as
having Above Average property quality

Thirteen loans, representing 47.3% of the pool, including eight of
the largest 11 loans, are structured with IO payments for the full
term. An additional 18 loans, representing 22.6% of the pool, have
partial IO periods remaining that range from 24 months to 60
months. This concentration includes both shadow-rated loans, which
total 7.8% of the pool. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by using
the amortizing debt service obligation, and the DBRS Refi DSCR is
calculated by considering the balloon balance and lack of
amortization when determining refinance risk. DBRS determines
probability of default based on the lower of Term or Refi DSCRs;
therefore, loans that lack amortization will be treated more
punitively. The transaction’s scheduled amortization by maturity
is 7.4%, which is generally worse than recent conduit
securitizations; however, the two shadow-rated loans are both
structured with an anticipated repayment date (ARD). DBRS assumes
the ARD maturity balance is utilized, thereby increasing the
pool’s amortization to 10.1%, which is generally in line with
recent conduit securitizations.

The DBRS sample included 29 loans of the 57 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 33 of the 75 properties in the
portfolio (75.3% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -10.4% from the Issuer’s
NCF and ranged from -32.2% to +1.5%. The average DBRS sampled NCF
haircut compares favorably with more recent transactions by DBRS
where the average DBRS sampled haircut has averaged -8.3%.

The rating assigned to Class F differs from the higher rating
implied by the Large Pool Multi-Borrower Parameters. DBRS considers
this difference to be a material deviation from the methodology,
and in this case, the rating reflects the dispersion of loan-level
cash flows expected to occur post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


BLADE ENGINE 2006-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. 2006-1B Debt to Ca
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of the Class 2006-1A-1,
2006-1A-2, and 2006-1B Notes (notes) issued by Blade Engine
Securitization Ltd. Series 2006-1.

Issuer: Blade Engine Securitization Ltd. Series 2006-1

2006-1A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

2006-1A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

2006-1B, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 26, 2016
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes reflect Moody's expectations about
the prospects for future income from the engine portfolio, which
Moody's has reduced for the following reasons. First, six of 35
engines in the portfolio are currently off lease, and Blade
discloses that it may be unable to re-lease many of these engines
for the foreseeable future, nor many of the further 12 engines
coming off lease in 2017. Second, although engine appraised values,
most recently received for June 2016, continue to indicate that the
Blade assets are worth more than the Class A and Class B note
outstanding balances, over the past year engine sales continued to
be at prices significantly lower than appraised values.

In its analysis, Moody's evaluated lease rates and remaining terms
as well as the revenues and expenses associated with the underlying
leases and aircraft engines, in order to evaluate likely interest
and principal payments to the rated notes.

Quarterly reports for the transaction have indicated that Blade may
not be able to re-lease an increasing number of engines coming off
lease and possibly beyond. The quarterly reports also noted that
Blade may be unable to re-lease many of the engines currently
off-lease for the foreseeable future. Of the engines that were off
lease and subsequently re-leased during 2016, most leases are short
term.

Based on the June 2016 appraisal values, the combined loan-to-value
ratio for Class A notes and Class B notes is around 92% as of
February 2017. However, among the off-lease engines sold in 2016,
most received sale prices considerably lower than their most recent
appraisal values, with lower sales proceeds as a percentage of
appraisal values, compared to 2015.

Current cash collections have not been sufficient to pay the
interest and principal on the Class B notes based on the priority
of payments, and Class B notes have been receiving its interest by
withdrawing from the Junior Cash Account. As a result, Junior Cash
Account balance has declined from $3.0 million as of February 2016
to $2.28 million as of February 2017. However, because sales
proceeds from dispositions of engines have a separate waterfall
from the waterfall that is applied to lease income, the Class B
notes have been receiving principal payments when engines are sold.
If adverse leasing conditions were to continue for these engines,
further disposition of engines will benefit Class B notes because
it would receive principal payments that it would otherwise not
get.

Primary sources of uncertainty include the global economic
environment, aircraft engine lease income generating ability,
engine maintenance and other expenses to the trust, and valuation
for the aircraft engines backing the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Changes to lease rates or aircraft engine values that differ from
historical trends; changes to portion of portfolio currently
off-lease or coming off lease in near future and their re-leasing
or sale prospects.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization" published in
March 1999.

In applying the above methodology to Blade Engine Securitization
Ltd. Series 2006-1, Moody's assumed that engine values start
declining once production for their host aircraft winds down. This
is different from assumptions used in aircraft securitization where
aircraft values are assumed to start declining from their year of
manufacture. For aircraft engines, Moody's typically assumes that
the engine values decline to scrap value over the course of
approximately 20 years after host aircraft production ends.


CAPITAL AUTO 2015-2: Fitch Hikes Cl. E Debt Rating From 'BB-sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, as part of its ongoing surveillance, has taken the
following rating actions on Capital Auto Receivables Asset Trust
(CARAT) 2014-3, 2015-2, 2015-3, and 2016-1 transactions:

2014-3:
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook revised to
    Stable from Positive;
-- Class D upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook maintained
    at Positive.

2015-2:
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B upgrade to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook revised
    to Positive from Stable;
-- Class D upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised
    to Positive from Stable;
-- Class E upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BB-sf'; Outlook maintained
    at Stable.

2015-3:
-- Class A-1a affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-1b affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B upgrade to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Class C upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;
-- Class D upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    revised to Positive from Stable;
-- Class E upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    maintained at Stable.

2016-1:
-- Class A-2a affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-2b affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-4 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B upgrade to 'AAAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Class C affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised to Positive
    from Stable;
-- Class D affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to Positive
    from Stable.

The class E notes in 2014-3 are not rated.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating actions are based on available credit enhancement (CE)
and loss performance to date. The collateral pool continues to
perform within Fitch's expectations. Under the current structure
and CE, the securities are able to withstand stress scenarios
consistent with the assigned ratings and make full payments to
investors in accordance with the terms of the documents.

The initial recommended loss proxies for the 2014-3, 2015-2 and
2015-3 transactions incorporated an additional stress considering
the potential post-revolving worst-case collateral pools. This
approach took into consideration a negative migration of the pools
characteristics assuming the collateral migrates to the maximum
collateral concentration limits during the revolving period.

To date, all of the transactions have exhibited strong performance
with losses within Fitch's initial expectations, with rising loss
coverage and multiple levels consistent with the recommended
ratings. A material deterioration in performance would have to
occur within the asset pool to have potential negative impact on
the outstanding ratings.

Fitch has revised the proxies of the 2014-3, 2015-2, 2015-3 and
2016-1 transactions due to the higher seasoning and lower pool
factors. Should performance continue to be well within initial
expectations, Fitch may also revise the proxies of the transactions
downward in a subsequent review. Based on transaction performance
to date, Fitch has lowered the lifetime base case loss proxies to
2.26%, 3.50%, 3.50% and 4.50% for 2014-3, 2015-2, 2015-3 and
2016-1, respectively.

The upgrades to certain notes reflect the improved loss coverage
and stronger loss multiples produced in cash flow modeling. Fitch
will continue to monitor all four transactions and may take
additional rating actions in the future. The ratings reflect the
quality of Ally Financial Inc.'s (AFIN) retail auto loan
originations, the adequacy of its servicing capabilities, and the
sound financial and legal structure of the transaction.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity could produce loss levels higher than the current
projected base case loss proxies and impact available loss coverage
and multiples levels for the transactions. Lower loss coverage
could affect the ratings and Rating Outlooks depending on the
extent of the decline in coverage.

In the 2015-2 and 2015-3 transactions, the class E notes do exhibit
a slight decline in loss coverage multiples under a back-ended loss
timing scenario. Despite this, the net loss coverage multiples are
still in excess of the recommended multiples for each of the
recommended ratings

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.



COMM 2013-CCRE8: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of COMM 2013-CCRE8
Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SBFL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SBFX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class A-SBFX certificates are exchangeable with the
Class A-SBFL certificates and vice versa.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the pool consisted of 59 fixed-rate
loans secured by 94 commercial properties. As of the January 2017
remittance, there has been collateral reduction of 3.9% since
issuance with all of the original 59 loans outstanding. The current
outstanding trust balance is $1.330 billion. The top 15 loans
reported a weighted-average (WA) YE2015 debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.90 times (x), representative of a WA improvement over
the DBRS original analyzed figures of 16.0% and a WA debt yield of
8.5%. The top 15 loans reported a WA 1.1% improvement in YE2015 net
cash flow compared with YE2014 figures. According to partial-year
2016 reporting, positive cash flow trends are continuing. Since
issuance, five loans representing 8.2% of the pool balance,
including two loans in the top 15, have fully defeased.

As of the January 2017 remittance, there were three loans in
special servicing, representing 1.6% of the pool balance, and three
loans on the servicer's watchlist, representing 3.4% of the pool
balance. Two of the specially serviced loans are expected to be
resolved in the near future, which are expected to cause realized
losses to the trust. The losses are expected to be contained to the
unrated bond, Class G. The third loan recently transferred for
delinquency. One of the three watchlisted loans is secured by a
hotel property, which reported a performance decline below the
1.10x DSCR threshold, but has since seen an improvement in
performance. For additional information on these loans and the
remaining watchlisted loans, please see the servicer's reported
data and DBRS commentary on the DBRS IReports platform at
www.ireports.dbrs.com.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the 375 Park Avenue (Prospectus
ID#1, 15.7% of the pool balance) loan and The Paramount Building
loan (Prospectus ID#6, 4.1% of the pool balance) as investment
grade. DBRS has today confirmed that the performance of these loans
remains consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics.


DT AUTO 2017-1: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to DT Auto Owner Trust
2017-1's $435.54 million asset-backed notes series 2017-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of approximately 67.4%, 62.1%, 52.8%,
      44.0%, and 38.8% credit support for the class A, B, C, D,
      and E notes, respectively, based on stressed break-even cash

      flow scenarios (including excess spread).  These credit
      support levels provide approximately 2.20x, 2.00x, 1.65x,
      1.35x, and 1.20x coverage of our expected net loss range of
      29.50%-30.50% for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
      respectively.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments by the legal
      final maturity dates made under stressed cash flow modeling
      scenarios that S&P deems appropriate for the assigned
      ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would
      remain within one rating category of our 'AAA (sf)',
      'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings, respectively, and the
      ratings on the class D and E notes would remain within two
      rating categories of S&P's 'BBB (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings,

      respectively, during the first year, although class E would
      ultimately default in the moderate ('BBB') stress.  These
      potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
      stability criteria, which outline the outer bound of credit
      deterioration equal to a one-category downgrade within the
      first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities and a two-
      category downgrade within the first year for 'A' through
      'BB' rated securities under moderate stress conditions.

   -- The collateral characteristics of the subprime pool being
      securitized, including a high percentage (over 85%) of
      obligors with higher payment frequencies (more than once a
      month), which S&P expects will result in a somewhat faster
      paydown on the pool.

   -- The transaction's sequential-pay structure, which builds
      credit enhancement (on a percentage-of-receivables basis) as

      the pool amortizes.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

DT Auto Owner Trust 2017-1
                                        Interest        Amount
Class       Rating       Type           rate          (mil. $)
A           AAA (sf)     Senior         Fixed           187.82
B           AA (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed            55.80
C           A (sf)       Subordinate    Fixed            76.22
D           BBB (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed            68.05
E           BB (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed            47.65


EXETER AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by Exeter Automobile Receivables Trust
2017-1 (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The transaction
    benefits from credit enhancement in the form of
    overcollateralization, subordination, amounts held in the
    reserve fund and excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are
    sufficient to support DBRS-projected expected cumulative net
    loss assumptions under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
    address the timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and
    principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- Exeter Finance Corp.’s (Exeter) capabilities with regard to
    originations, underwriting, servicing and ownership by The
    Blackstone Group L.P.; Navigation Capital Partners, Inc.; and
    Goldman Sachs Vintage Fund.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Exeter and
    considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and   
    servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts with an
    acceptable backup servicer.

-- Exeter’s senior management team has considerable experience
    and a successful track record in the auto finance industry.
-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
    Exeter’s auto loan portfolio.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Exeter and
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets, and the consistency with the DBRS methodology
    "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."


GRIPPEN PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Grippen Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$384,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$66,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$26,400,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Grippen Park CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. The Rated Notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of collateral obligations that are
not senior secured loans, cash or eligible investments. Moody's
expects the portfolio to be approximately 70% ramped as of the
closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


GS MORTGAGE 2017-485L: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. HRR Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to GS Mortgage Securities
Corporation Trust 2017-485L's $350.0 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2017-485L.

The certificate issuance is commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $350.0 million mortgage loan secured by a
first lien on the borrower's fee interest in 485 Lexington Avenue,
a 32-story office building totaling 935,452 sq. ft. and located
within the East Side/U.N. office submarket in Midtown Manhattan.

The ratings reflect of the collateral's historic and projected
performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.  S&P determined that the mortgage loan has a beginning
and ending loan-to-value ratio of 79.7%, based on S&P Global
Ratings' value.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

GS Mortgage Securities Corporation Trust 2017-485L
Class              Rating             Amount ($)
A                  AAA (sf)          186,709,000
X-A                AAA (sf)       186,709,000(i)
X-B                AA- (sf)        43,931,000(i)
B                  AA- (sf)           43,931,000
C                  A- (sf)            32,949,000
D                  NR                 63,911,000
HRR                BB- (sf)           22,500,000

(i)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates will be equal to the class A certificate balance, and
the notional amount of the class X-B certificates will be equal to
the class B certificate balance.  NR--Not rated.



HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. on February 10, 2017, confirmed 25 ratings from seven
U.S. structured finance asset-backed securities transactions issued
by Hertz Vehicle Financing II LP. The confirmations are based on
performance trends and credit enhancement levels that are
sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their current
respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A full text copy of the company's list of ratings is available free
at:

                      https://is.gd/6olhiB


MADISON PARK XV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D-R Sr. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to two classes of
notes issued by Madison Park Funding XV, Ltd.:

US$413,200,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
2026 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due 2026 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1-R Notes and the Class D-R Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Rated Notes in connection with the
refinancing of two classes of secured notes (together, the
"Refinanced Notes"), previously issued on December 29, 2014 (the
"Original Closing Date"). The Issuer used the proceeds from the
issuance of the Rated Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Notes
pursuant to this refinancing. On the Original Closing Date, in
addition to the Refinanced Notes, the Issuer issued four other
classes of secured notes, which are also subject to this
refinancing and have been redeemed in full with proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes. The Issuer also issued one class
of subordinated notes on the Original Closing Date, which is not
subject to this refinancing and will remain outstanding.

Madison Park Funding XV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes are collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and senior unsecured loans. The underlying portfolio is
100% ramped as of the closing date of the refinancing.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the transaction's
reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period, which ends in
January 2019, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to
certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par, the
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Total portfolio par and principal proceeds balance: $675,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3277

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.05%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 6.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3277 to 3769)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1-R Notes: 0

Class D-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3277 to 4260)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1-R Notes: 0

Class D-R Notes: -1


MARATHON CLO IX: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Marathon CLO
IX Ltd./Marathon CLO IX LLC's $414.0 floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 17,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Marathon CLO IX Ltd./Marathon CLO IX LLC  

Class                      Rating           Amount (mil. $)
A-1A                       AAA (sf)                  272.25
A-1B                       AAA (sf)                   13.50
A-2                        AA (sf)                    56.25
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                     27.00
C (deferrable)             BBB- (sf)                  24.30
D (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                   20.70
Subordinated notes         NR                         48.30

NR--Not rated.


MASTR TRUST 2007-3: Moody's Takes Action on $23.1MM RMBS
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to three tranches
from MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-3.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-3

Cl. 1-1A2, Assigned A2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2016 Withdrawn
(sf)

Underlying Rating: Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2016
Withdrawn (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on Aug 8, 2016)

Cl. 1-2A2, Assigned A2 (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016 Withdrawn
(sf)

Underlying Rating: Assigned C (sf); previously on Dec 9, 2016
Withdrawn (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on Aug 8, 2016)

Cl. 2-1A2, Assigned A2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2016 Withdrawn
(sf)

Underlying Rating: Assigned C (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2016
Withdrawn (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on Aug 8, 2016)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assignment of ratings reflects the dismissal of the
interpleader action commenced in September 2013 by the Trust
Administrator (Wells Fargo Bank N.A.), and the subsequent revision
of distribution statements and the distribution of the funds
escrowed during this period resulting in an increase in the
balances of these tranches from zero.

The prior ratings had been withdrawn as the balance of these
tranches were previously reflected as zero and assigned ratings
reflect the updated balance, tranche expected loss and the
guarantee from Financial Security Assurance Inc (now Assured
Guaranty Municipal Corp.)

The rating actions also reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C15: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class H Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-C15 (the Certificates), issued by Morgan
Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C15 (the Trust) as
follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class PST at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class J.

The rating confirmations reflect that the transaction's overall
current performance remains stable. The collateral consists of 48
fixed-rate loans secured by 76 commercial properties. As of the
January 2017 remittance, all 48 loans remain in the pool, with an
aggregate outstanding principal balance of approximately $1.05
billion, representing a collateral reduction of 2.4% since issuance
as a result of scheduled loan amortization. The pool is
concentrated by loan size, as the largest loan, Arundel Mills &
Marketplace (Prospectus ID#1), represents 14.1% of the pool, while
the Top 10 loans represent 66.8% of the pool. Four loans (22.5% of
the pool) are structured with full interest-only (IO) terms, while
an additional seven loans (15.9% of the pool) have partial IO
periods remaining, ranging from one month to 37 months. Excluding
the two loans (2.4% of the pool) secured by defeasance collateral,
all loans reported both partial-year 2016 net cash flow (NCF)
figures and YE2015 NCF figures. According to the YE2015 NCF
figures, the transaction had a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 2.07 times (x) and
12.6%, respectively, compared with the DBRS original analyzed
figures of 1.75x and 10.4%, respectively.

Based on the most recent cash flow reporting, the Top 15 loans
reported a WA DSCR of 2.25x, compared with the DBRS original
analyzed figure of 1.87x, which is reflective of a WA amortizing
NCF growth of 20.8%. As of the January 2017 remittance, there is
one loan (1.0% of the pool) in special servicing and three loans
(3.4% of the pool) on the servicer's watchlist.

At issuance, DBRS assigned an investment-grade shadow rating on
both the Arundel Mills & Marketplace and the JW Marriott and
Fairfield Inn & Suites (Prospectus ID#7, 4.7% of the pool) loans.
DBRS confirms that the performance of both loans remains consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics.

The ratings assigned to Classes F, G and H materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the Large Pool Multi-borrower
Parameters. DBRS considers this to be a methodology deviation when
there is a rating differential of three or more notches between the
assigned rating and the rating implied by the Large Pool
Multi-borrower Parameters; in this case, the sustainability of loan
performance trends were not demonstrated and, as such, was
reflected in the ratings.


NEWSTAR 2013-1: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating to Class E-N Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-T-N, A-R-N, B-N, C-N, D-N, and E-N floating-rate replacement
notes from NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2013-1 LLC, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2013 that
is managed by NewStar Financial Inc.  The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed amended and supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 21,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 20, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.  In addition, S&P
anticipates that the issuer name will change to NewStar Commercial
Loan Funding 2017-1 LLC on the refinancing date.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

NewStar Commercial Loan Funding 2013-1 LLC
                                   Amount
Replacement class    Rating      (mil. $)
A-T-N                AAA (sf)      207.00
A-R-N                AAA (sf)       25.00
B-N                  AA (sf)        40.00
C-N                  A (sf)         32.00
D-N                  BBB- (sf)      24.00
E-N                  BB- (sf)       20.00
Subordinated notes   NR             49.25

NR--Not rated.


OAKTREE CLO 2014-2: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1AR, A-1BR, A-2AR, A-2BR, and BR replacement notes from Oaktree
CLO 2014-2 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in November 2014 and is managed by Oaktree
Capital Management LP.  The replacement notes will be issued via a
proposed supplemental indenture.  S&P do not expect the refinancing
to have any impact on the outstanding ratings on the class C and D
notes.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  The replacement notes are expected to be issued at a lower
spread over LIBOR and coupons than the original notes they
replace.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 17,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the March 3, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Oaktree CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
Replacement class    Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A-1AR                AAA (sf)                 280.00
A-1BR                AAA (sf)                  27.00
A-2AR                A (sf)                    61.00
A-2BR                AA (sf)                   17.00
BR                   A (sf)                    27.50

OTHER OUTSTANDING RATINGS

Oaktree CLO 2014-2 Ltd.
Class                Rating
C                    BBB (sf)
D                    BB (sf)
Subordinated notes   NR

NR--Not rated.


RACE POINT VIII: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-R, B-R, C-R,
D-R, and E-R replacement floating-rate notes from Race Point VIII
CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation originally issued in
2013 that is managed by Bain Capital Credit L.P.  S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original class A, B, C, D, and E notes following
payment in full on the Feb. 21, 2017, refinancing date.

On the Feb. 21, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement note issuances were used to
redeem the original class A, B, C, D, and E notes as outlined in
the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P withdrew its
ratings on the original notes in line with their full redemption,
and S&P assigned ratings to the replacement notes.

The replacement notes were issued via a supplemental indenture,
which, in addition to outlining the terms of the replacement notes,
also:

   -- Issued the notes at a higher or lower spread than the
      original notes, depending on the class.
   -- Upsized the transaction target par amount to $700.00
      million, compared with $500.00 million in the original
      transaction.
   -- Extended the stated maturity and reinvestment period by
      approximately five years.
   -- 97.36% of the underlying collateral obligations have credit
      ratings assigned by S&P Global Ratings.
   -- 95.57% of the underlying collateral obligations have
      recovery ratings issued by S&P Global Ratings.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Race Point VIII CLO Ltd./Race Point VIII CLO Corp.
(Refinancing And Extension)
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             427.00
B-R                       AA (sf)              102.30
C-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                40.20
D-R (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              36.70
E-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              37.40
Subordinated notes        NR                    94.05

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Race Point VIII CLO Ltd./Race Point VIII CLO Corp.
                             Rating
Original class            To        From
A                         NR        AAA (sf)
B                         NR        AA (sf)
C (deferrable)            NR        A (sf)
D (deferrable)            NR        BBB (sf)
E (deferrable)            NR        BB- (sf)

NR--Not rated.



SDART 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Santander
Drive Auto Receivables Trust (SDART) 2017-1's $1.077 billion
automobile receivables-backed notes series 2017-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 16,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The availability of 52.97%, 46.12%, 36.81%, 29.44%, and
      25.13% of credit support for the class A (A-1, A-2, A-3), B,

      C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow
      scenarios (including excess spread), which provide coverage
      of approximately 3.30x, 2.85x, 2.25x, 1.70x, and 1.50x S&P's

      15.50%-16.25% expected cumulative net loss.

   -- The timely interest and principal payments made under
      stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
      assigned preliminary ratings.

   -- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
      scenario (1.7x its expected loss level), all else being
      equal, S&P's ratings on the class A and B notes ('AAA (sf)'
      and 'AA (sf)', respectively) will remain within one rating
      category and S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes ('A
      (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)', respectively) will remain within two
      rating categories of the assigned preliminary ratings while
      they are outstanding.  These rating movements are within the

      outer bounds specified by our credit stability criteria.
      These criteria indicate that S&P would not assign 'AAA (sf)'

      and 'AA (sf)' ratings if, under moderate stress conditions,
      the ratings would be lowered by more than one rating
      category within the first year and by more than three rating

      categories over a three year period.  The criteria also
      specify that S&P would not assign 'A (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)'
      ratings if such ratings would fall by more than two
      categories in one year or three categories over three years.

      The class E 'BB (sf)' rated notes will remain within two
      rating categories of the assigned preliminary rating during
      the first year but will eventually default under the 'BBB'
      stress scenario, after having received 61%-78% of their
      principal.  Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC;
      originator/servicer's) long history of originating and
      servicing subprime auto loan receivables.  S&P's analysis of

      nine years of origination static pool data on SC's lending
      programs.

   -- Six years of performance on SCUAS's securitizations since it

      re-entered the asset-backed securities market in 2010.  The
      transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
      structures.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2017-1  

Class       Rating          Type            Interest      Amount
                                            rate        (mil. $)
A-1         A-1+ (sf)       Senior          Fixed         194.00
A-2         AAA (sf)        Senior          Fixed         310.00
A-3         AAA (sf)        Senior          Fixed         111.67
B           AA (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed         129.75
C           A (sf)          Subordinate     Fixed         156.67
D           BBB (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed         126.08
E           BB (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed          48.96


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-2: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. B-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-2. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans. The assets
of the trust consist of 485 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans, substantially all of which have an original term to maturity
of 30 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-2

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.40%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.85% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-2 transaction is a securitization of 485 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $347,384,036. There are 128 originators in the
transaction. 8.30% of the mortgage loans by outstanding principal
balance were originated by Quicken Loans Inc., 4.03% of the
mortgage loans by outstanding principal balance were originated by
First Republic Bank and 6.41% of the mortgage loans by outstanding
principal balance were purchased by Redwood from FHLB Chicago. The
mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from FHLB Chicago were
originated by various participating financial institution investors
who provide R&Ws to FHLB, who then provides R&Ws to Redwood. None
of the originators other than Quicken Loans represents more than
5.00% of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-
level third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit
underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank (4.03% of the outstanding principal balance of the loans).

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood), which Moody's has assessed as an Above
Average aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages. There have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that closed in
2010 and later, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.50% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 478 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review"). For the remaining seven loans, Redwood
Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a
TPR firm check for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
seven limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that
some of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from the same
originator where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-IO1, Cl. A-IO2,
Cl. A-IO3, Cl. A-IO4, Cl. A-IO5, Cl. A- IO6, Cl. A-IO7, Cl. A-IO8,
Cl. A-IO9, Cl. A-IO10, Cl. A-IO11, Cl. A-IO12, Cl. A-IO13, Cl.
A-IO14, Cl. A-IO15, Cl.A-IO16, Cl. A-IO17, Cl. A-IO18, Cl. A-IO19,
Cl. A-IO20, Cl. A-IO21, Cl. A-IO22, Cl. A-IO23, Cl. A-IO24, Cl.
A-IO25, was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies, available to all
registered users of Moody's website, ww.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


VENTURE XII CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Venture XII CLO
Ltd./Venture XII CLO Corp., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2013 that is managed by MJX Asset Management
LLC.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  The replacement class D-R, and E-R notes are expected to
be issued at a higher spread than the original notes.  The
replacement class B-R and C-R notes are expected to be issued at a
lower spread than the original notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Feb. 17,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Feb. 28, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will include changes to some of the
concentration limits and also extend the transaction's non-call end
date, reinvestment end date, weighted average life test, and stated
maturity.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS
Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount   Interest            BDR     SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)   rate (%)            (%)     (%)       (%)
A-R      475.00    LIBOR + 1.23      66.33   57.35      8.98
B-R       70.00    LIBOR + 1.63      63.94   50.37     13.57
C-R       43.00    LIBOR + 2.40      57.66   44.40     13.27
D-R       36.00    LIBOR + 3.70      51.56   39.19     12.37
E-R       42.00    LIBOR + 6.20      38.61   32.98      5.63

BDR--Breakeven default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P's review of this transaction also relied in part upon a
criteria interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria
"CDOs: Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To
Standard & Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a
limited number of public ratings from other nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, and the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Venture XII CLO Ltd./Venture XII CLO Corp.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             475.00
B-R                       AA (sf)               70.00
C-R                       A (sf)                43.00
D-R                       BBB (sf)              36.00
E-R                       BB (sf)               42.00
Subordinated notes        NR                    74.00

NR--Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK 2004-C11: S&P Raises Rating on Class J Certs to B+
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on six classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust series 2004-C11, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.  The raised
ratings further reflect S&P's expectation of the available credit
enhancement for these classes, which S&P believes is greater than
its most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the
respective rating levels.  The upgrades also follow S&P's views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral and the trust balance's significant reduction.

While available credit enhancement levels may suggest further
positive rating movement on the bonds, S&P's analysis also
considered the interest shortfall history and exposure to two loans
on the master servicer's watchlist ($75.6 million, 82.9%), which
are discussed below.

                         TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Jan. 18, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $91.2 million, which is 8.8% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes three loans, two of which
($75.6 million, 82.9%) are on the master servicer's watchlist.  The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported financial
information for the three loans in the pool, of which 87.9% was
year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was partial-year 2016 data.

S&P calculated a 1.27x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 63.9% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 8.33% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $21.2 million in principal
losses, or 2.0% of the original pool trust balance.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the Jan. 18, 2017, trustee remittance report, two loans in
the pool were on the master servicer's watchlist.  The Four Seasons
Town Centre loan ($64.6 million, 70.8%), the largest loan in the
pool, is secured by 928,410 sq. ft. of a 1.14 million-sq.-ft.
retail center in Greensboro, N.C.  The loan was previously modified
in January 2010 when the borrower filed bankruptcy, and its
maturity date was extended by 42 months.  The loan is currently
reported on the master servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy
and is scheduled to mature in June 2017.  As of third-quarter 2016,
the reported DSC on the trust balance and occupancy were 1.72x and
68.6%, respectively.

The Sports Authority Corporate Headquarters loan ($11.0 million,
12.1%) is secured by a 210,207-sq.-ft. office property located in
Englewood, Colo.  The property consists of two office buildings,
which are economically leased by Sports Authority but are
physically vacant.  The loan is currently reported on the master
servicer's watchlist due to low occupancy and DSC.  According to
Wells Fargo Bank N.A., there has been little interest to date in
the space.  The loan is scheduled to mature in January 2019.  As of
third-quarter 2016, reported DSC was 1.26x.  

RATINGS RAISED

Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-C11

              Rating
Class     To          From
D         AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)
E         AA (sf)     A (sf)
F         AA- (sf)    BBB (sf)
G         A+ (sf)     BB+ (sf)
H         BBB+ (sf)   B (sf)
J         B+ (sf)     CCC (sf)


[*] DBRS Reviews 448 Classes From 44 US RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 448 classes from 44 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 448 classes
reviewed, 72 ratings were upgraded, 368 ratings were confirmed,
seven ratings were downgraded and one rating was discontinued.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating levels. The
rating confirmations reflect current asset performance and that
credit support levels have been consistent with the current rating.
The downgrades reflect a combination of the continued erosion of
credit support in these transactions and negative trends in
delinquency and projected loss activity. The discontinued rating is
a result of full principal payment to the bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS applying its updated
"RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology".

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of subprime, Alt-A,
scratch-and-dent, option – adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) and
prime collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect a small collateral loan count
and a dependency on a counterparty's rating as well as structural
features and historical performance that constrain the quantitative
model’s output.

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
    Series 2005-HE2, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
    Series 2005-HE2, Class M4
-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
    Series WMC 2005-HE5, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
    Series WMC 2005-HE5, Class M3
-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
    Series WMC 2005-HE5, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
    Series WMC 2005-HE5, Class M4
-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
    Series NC 2005-HE8, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
    Series NC 2005-HE8, Class M2
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2004-4, Class A-2D
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2004-4, Class A-2C
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-1, Class M-1
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-1, Class M-2
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-1, Class M-3
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-1, Class M-4
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-2, Class M-2
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-2, Class M-3
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-2, Class M-4
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-2, Class M-5
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-2, Class M-6
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-3, Class M-2
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-3, Class M-3
-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,
    Series 2005-3, Class M-4
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R7, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R7, Class M-2
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R7, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R7, Class M-3
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R7, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R7, Class M-4
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R7, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R7, Class M-5
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R7, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R7, Class M-6
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R8, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8, Class M-2
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R9, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R9, Class M-3
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R11, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R11, Class M-1
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R11, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R11, Class M-2
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R11, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R11, Class M-3
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R11, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R11, Class M-4
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2004-R11, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R11, Class M-5
-- Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R2, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificate, Series 2005-R2, Class M-3
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-8,
    Class 7-A-1-1
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-8,
    Class 7-A-1-2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-8, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-8,
    Class 7-A-4
-- Argent Securities Inc. Series 2004-W11, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2004-W11, Class M-2
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., 2005-HE2, Asset-Backed
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-HE2, Class M-2
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., 2005-HE2, Asset-Backed
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-HE2, Class M-3
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Inc., Series 2005-WF1, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WF1, Class A-4
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-12, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-12, Class AF-5
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-12, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-12, Class MV-4
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-12, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-12, Class MV-5
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-BC5, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-BC5, Class M-4
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-BC5, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-BC5, Class M-5
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-BC5, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-BC5, Class M-6
-- Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-4, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2005-4, Class M-2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-4, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-4, Class M-4
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-4, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-4, Class M-5
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-5, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-5, Class M-2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-6, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-6, Class M-2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-6, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-6, Class M-3
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-7, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-7, Class M-1
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-9, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-9, Class M-1
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
   Equity Asset Trust 2006-3, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-3, Class 1-A-1
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2006-3, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-3, Class 2-A-4
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 1-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 3-A-5
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 4-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 5-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 5-A-3
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 6-A-3
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 6-A-7
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 11-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 11-A-3
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A3, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A3, Class 11-A-4
-- MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-3, Mortgage Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, Class 2-2A3
-- Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC2, Mortgage
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC2, Class M-3
-- Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC3, Mortgage
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC3, Class M-4
-- Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC3, Mortgage
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC3, Class M-5
-- Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5, Mortgage  
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC5, Class M-5
-- Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2, Mortgage Pass-  
    Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class M-4
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-1, Class M-1
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-2, Class M-2
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-2, Class M-3
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-3, Class M-3
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-3, Class M-4
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-3, Class M-5
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-4, Class M-2
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2005-4, Class M-3
-- Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series

    2005-HE1, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-HE1, Class M-
    4
-- Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
    2006-WF1, Home Equity Loan Trust Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2006-WF1, Class M-1
-- Park Place Securities Inc., Series 2005-WHQ1, Asset-Backed
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ1, Class M-4
-- Park Place Securities Inc., Series 2005-WHQ1, Asset-Backed
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ1, Class M-5
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-D & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-D, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2003-D, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1 & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-CB1, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
    Securities, Series 2003-CB1, Class A5 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1 & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-CB1, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-CB1, Class B1 Risk Band
-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-CB1 & RESI Finance DE
    Corporation 2003-CB1, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
    Series 2003-CB1, Class B2 Risk Band


[*] Moody's Hikes $52MM of Prime Jumbo RMBS Issued 2015
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of thirteen
tranches backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by various
issuers. Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2015-6

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Oaks Mortgage Trust Series 2015-2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2015-4

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a reduction in Moody's
expected pool losses. The actions are also a result of the recent
performance of the underlying pools which have displayed very low
levels of serious delinquencies and reflect Moody's updated default
projections on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $263.6MM of RMBS Issued 2002-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches from two transactions and upgraded the ratings of 16
tranches from eight transactions issued by various issuers, and
backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABFC 2002-NC1 Trust

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-2, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2013 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12, 2013
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2013 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2002-HE1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-HE3

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 8, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., 2003-AR3

Cl. M-4, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust, Series 2002-BC4

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2002-BC3

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-2

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 1A2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. 2A4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2A5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrades are
primarily due to outstanding interest shortfalls which are not
expected to be reimbursed. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.8% in January 2017 from 4.9% in
January 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 164 Classes From 13 RMBS Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 164 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1998 and 2005.  The review yielded 38 upgrades, 30
downgrades, 84 affirmations, 11 withdrawals, and one
discontinuance.  The transactions in this review are backed by a
mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo and alternative-A
mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first liens on one-
to four-family residential properties.

With respect to insured obligations, where S&P maintains a rating
on the bond insurer that is lower than what S&P would rate the
class without bond insurance, or where the bond insurer is not
rated, S&P relied solely on the underlying collateral's credit
quality and the transaction structure to derive the rating on the
class.  The rating on a bond-insured obligation will be the higher
of the rating on the bond insurer and the rating of the underlying
obligation, without considering the potential credit enhancement
from the bond insurance.

Of the classes reviewed, Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-4's
class 1-A-12 ('BBB+ (sf)') and Banc of America Mortgage Trust
2004-7's class 5-A-16 ('A+ (sf)') are insured by MBIA Insurance
Corp. ('CCC'), which is currently rated by S&P Global Ratings.

The rating actions on interest-only (IO) classes reflect the
application of S&P's IO criteria, which provide that S&P will
maintain the current ratings on an IO class until all of the
classes that the IO security references are either lowered to below
'AA- (sf)' or have been retired--at which time, S&P will withdraw
these IO ratings.  Specifically, S&P will maintain active
surveillance of these IO classes using the methodology applied
before the release of this criteria.

                              ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

The upgrades include 23 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
   -- Rising constant prepayment rates (CPRs);
   -- The class' expected short duration; and/or
   -- Principal-only (PO) criteria.

Of the 23 ratings that were raised three or more notches, four were
due to their expected shorter duration because S&P anticipates the
classes to be paid down within the next 12 months, seven were due
to the improvement of the underlying collateral performance during
the most recent performance periods compared to previous review
dates, six were due to an increase in credit support and the
classes' ability to withstand a higher level of projected losses
than previously anticipated, and six reflect the application of
S&P's criteria for PO classes.

S&P raised its ratings on classes III-A-3, III-A-4, III-A-5, and
IV-P from CSFB Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2004-3 to 'AA+ (sf)'
from 'A+ (sf)'.  The upgrade on class III-A-3 is due to the class'
expected short duration; S&P anticipates the class to be paid down
within the next 12 months.  The upgrades on classes III-A-4 and
III-A-5 reflect an increase in credit support and the classes'
ability to withstand a higher level of projected losses than
previously anticipated.  Credit support for classes III-A-4 and
III-A-5 increased to 34.04% in December 2016 from 32.31% in
December 2015.  The upgrade on class IV-P reflects the application
of S&P's criteria for PO classes.

S&P raised its ratings on classes 1-A-3, 1-A-4, 1-A-7, and 1-A-9
from Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-5.  The upgrade on class
1-A-3 to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' is due to the class' expected
short duration; S&P anticipates the class to be paid down within
the next 12 months.  The upgrades on class 1-A-4 to 'BBB+ (sf)'
from 'BB+ (sf)', class 1-A-7 to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)', and
class 1-A-9 to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)', reflect an increase in
credit support and the classes' ability to withstand a higher level
of projected losses than previously anticipated.  Credit support
for classes 1-A-4, 1-A-7, and 1-A-9 increased to 18.59% in December
2016 from 16.26% in May 2016.

S&P raised its ratings on class 1-A-17 from Banc of America
Mortgage Trust 2004-7 to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' due to the
class' expected short duration; S&P anticipates the class to be
paid down within the next 12 months.  S&P also raised its rating on
class 1-A-18 from Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-7 to
'AA+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' to reflect an increase in credit support
and the classes' ability to withstand a higher level of projected
losses than previously anticipated.  Credit support for class
1-A-18 increased to 36.58% in December 2016 from 24.74% in
September 2015.

"We raised our ratings on classes 2-A-3, 2-A-4, 5-A-1, 5-A-3,
5-A-4, 5-A-5, and 5-A-16 from Banc of America Mortgage Trust
2004-7. The upgrades on classes 5-A-1, 5-A-3, 5-A-4, 5-A-5, and
5-A-16 to 'A+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and on classes 2-A-3 and 2-A-4
to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' reflect a decrease in our projected
losses and our belief that our projected credit support for the
affected classes will be sufficient to cover our revised projected
losses at these rating levels.  We have decreased our projected
losses because there have been fewer reported delinquencies during
the most recent performance periods compared to those reported
during the previous review dates.  Group 5 total delinquencies
decreased to 9.84% at December 2016 from 18.63% at September 2015,
and severe delinquencies decreased to 8.48% at December 2016 from
16.71% at September 2015. Group 2 total delinquencies decreased to
15.13% at December 2016 from 20.23% at September 2015, and severe
delinquencies decreased to 3.05% at December 2016 from 9.65% at
September 2015," S&P noted.

The upgrades on classes 1-X-PO and 5-X-PO to 'A+ (sf)' from 'BBB+
(sf)' and classes 2-X-PO, 4-X-PO, and 4-15-PO to 'BBB+ (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' from Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-7 reflect the
application of S&P's criteria for PO classes.

S&P raised its rating on class I-A-1 from First Horizon Mortgage
Pass Through Trust 2005-AR3 to 'AA (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' due to the
class' expected short duration, S&P anticipates the class to be
paid down within the next 12 months.

                           DOWNGRADES

Of the 30 downgrades, S&P lowered its ratings on three classes to
speculative grade ('BB+' or lower) from investment grade ('BBB-' or
higher).  Another four of the lowered ratings remained at an
investment-grade level, while the remaining 23 downgraded classes
already had speculative-grade ratings.  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that its projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Erosion of credit support;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Tail risk.

The downgrades include 18 ratings that were lowered three or more
notches.  Of these, 12 were due to decreased credit support and the
classes' inability to withstand projected losses at the prior
rating levels, four reflect the increase in our projected losses
due to increased delinquencies, one is based on the application of
S&P's interest shortfall criteria, and one is based on the
application of tail risk.

The downgrades on classes III-A-2 and III-A-3 from Credit Suisse
First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-21 to 'BBB+ (sf)' from
'AA+ (sf)', class II-A-1 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-8 to
'B- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)', and class B-1 from Fannie Mae REMIC
Trust 1998-W4 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' reflect the increase in
S&P's projected losses and its belief that the projected credit
support for the affected classes will be insufficient to cover the
projected losses S&P applied at the previous rating levels.  The
increase in S&P's projected losses is due to higher reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods when
compared to those reported during the previous review dates.  Total
delinquencies and severe delinquencies for group 3 from Credit
Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-21, increased to
7.85% at December 2016 from 3.92% at July 2015.  Total
delinquencies for group 2 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-8,
increased to 19.38% at December 2016 from 12.15% at July 2015, and
severe delinquencies increased to 16.29% at December 2016 from
10.48% at July 2015.  Total delinquencies for Fannie Mae REMIC
Trust 1998-W4 increased to 27.31% at November 2016 from 23.14% at
February 2015, and severe delinquencies increased to 18.60% at
November 2016 from 16.18% at July 2015.

The downgrade on class II-A-1 from Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. 2002-18 to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and
classes I-1-A-1, I-1-A-2, I-1-A-3, and I-4-A-1 from Bear Stearns
ARM Trust 2004-8 to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)', reflect decreased
credit support and the classes' inability to withstand projected
losses at the prior rating levels.  Credit support for
class II-A-1 from Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities
Corp. 2002-18 decreased to 22.20% in December 2016 from 23.98% in
December 2015.  Credit support for classes I-1-A-1, I-1-A-2,
I-1-A-3, and I-4-A-1 from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-8 decreased
to 6.33% in December 2016 from 10.44% in July 2015.

The downgrades on class D-B-1 from Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-8 to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'A (sf)',
class M from CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-49 to 'B (sf)'
from 'BB (sf)', class II-2-A and II-3-A to 'B (sf)' from 'BB+
(sf)', and class II-4-A to 'B (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' from Bear
Stearns ARM Trust 2004-2, class I-A-4 from CSFB Mortgage-Backed
Trust Series 2004-3 to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)', and class 2-A-3
from Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-4 to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'A+
(sf)', are due to erosion of credit support as principal payments
were made to more subordinate classes.

Interest Shortfalls

The downgrade on class I-1-A from Bear Stearns ARM Trust 2004-2 to
'B (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' was based on S&P's assessment of interest
shortfalls to the affected class during recent remittance periods.
Class I-1-A has not received any interest payments since April 2016
and has non de-minimis interest shortfalls outstanding for seven
months.  Class I-1-A is associated with subgroup I-1, which has
only one loan remaining that is currently 90+ days delinquent.
Because of the delinquency status of this loan, no advances on the
delinquent payments have occurred; therefore, S&P do not expect the
class to receive any interest payments in the near future.  S&P has
lowered its rating on this class by applying S&P's interest
shortfall criteria, which designate a maximum potential rating to
this class based on anticipated interest shortfalls.

S&P also lowered its rating on class D-B-1 from CSFB
Mortgage-Backed Trust Series 2004-3 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
based on our assessment of interest shortfalls to the affected
class during recent remittance periods.  It has interest shortfalls
outstanding since August 2015, and the lowered rating also reflects
the application of S&P's interest shortfall criteria.

Tail Risk

Banc of America Mortgage Trust 2004-7 is backed by three separate
small remaining pools of mortgage loans.  S&P believes that pools
with less than 100 loans remaining create an increased risk of
credit instability, because a liquidation and subsequent loss on
one loan, or a small number of loans, at the tail end of a
transaction's life may have a disproportionate impact on a given
RMBS tranche's remaining credit support.  S&P refers to this as
"tail
risk."

S&P addressed the tail risk on the classes from this transaction by
conducting a loan-level analysis that assesses this risk, as set
forth in S&P's tail risk criteria.  S&P lowered its rating on class
3-A-1 to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' to reflect the application of
S&P's tail risk criteria.

                            AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect our view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                            WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on ten classes from Banc of America
Mortgage Trust 2004-4 because the related pool has a small number
of loans remaining.  Once a pool has declined to a de-minimis
amount, S&P believes there is a high degree of credit instability
that is incompatible with any rating level.

S&P withdrew its rating on class III-X from Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. 2003-21 according to S&P's IO
criteria, which states that it will maintain the rating on an IO
class until the ratings on all of the classes that the IO security
references, in the determination of its notional balance, are
either lowered below 'AA-' or have been retired.  The ratings on
the referenced classes III-A-2 and III-A-3 were lowered to
'BBB+ (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' in this review.

                           DISCONTINUANCE

S&P discontinued its rating on class A-7 from CHL Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust 2003-49 as it was paid in full in the January
2017 remittance period.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that it believes could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.9 % in 2016, dipping to
      4.6% in 2017;

   -- Real GDP growth of 1.6 % for 2016 and 2.4% in 2017;

   -- The inflation rate will be 2.2% in both 2016 and 2017; and

   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 3.6 % in
      2016, rising to 4.1% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals positively, it believes RMBS fundamentals
still hinge on additional factors, such as the ultimate fate of
modified loans, the propensity of servicers to advance on
delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to improve.  However, if the U.S. economy were
to become stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, it believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will remain at 4.9% for 2016 and inch
      up to 5.0% in 2017;

   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.5 % in 2016

      and to 1.4% in 2017;

   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and

   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate remains a low 3.6% in
      2016 and 2017, limited access to credit and pressure on home

      prices will largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on
      these rates.


[*] S&P Lowers Rating on 98 Classes From 65 RMBS Deals to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on 98 classes of mortgage
pass-through certificates from 65 U.S. residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions issued between 2003 and 2008 to 'D
(sf)'.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate mixed collateral mortgage loans, which are secured
primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.  The downgrades reflect S&P's assessment of the
principal writedowns' impact on the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.

All of the classes were rated either 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' before
the rating actions.

Class 30-PO from Banc of America Funding 2005-6 Trust, class 3-AP
from Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust Series
2006-RF3, and class S-PO from Banc of America Funding 2007-4 Trust
are principal-only (PO) strip classes.  PO strip classes receive
principal primarily from discount loans within the related
transaction.  When a discount loan takes a loss, the PO strip class
is allocated a loan-specific percentage of that loss.

However, because these PO classes are senior classes in the
waterfall, they are reimbursed from cash flows that would otherwise
be paid to the most junior classes.  Further, S&P do not expect any
future reimbursements from the transaction's cash flow because the
balances of the subordinate classes have been reduced to zero.
Therefore, the PO classes within this review have incurred a loss
on their principal obligation without the likelihood of future
reimbursement.  S&P is lowering the ratings of all three PO classes
within this review to 'D (sf)'.

The 98 defaulted classes consist of these:

   -- 54 from prime jumbo transactions (55.10 %);
   -- 20 from Alternative-A transactions (20.41%);
   -- Seven from subprime transactions (7.14 %);
   -- Seven from negative amortization transactions (7.14%);
   -- Five from Federal Housing Administration/Veteran Affairs
      transactions (5.10%);
   -- Three from risk transfer transactions (3.06%);
   -- One from a resecuritized real estate mortgage investment
      conduit transaction (1.02%); and
   -- One from a reperforming transaction (1.02%).

All of the transactions in this review receive credit enhancement
from a combination of subordination, excess spread, and
overcollateralization (where applicable).

S&P will continue to monitor its ratings on securities that
experience principal write-downs, and S&P will take rating actions
as it considers appropriate according to our criteria.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

              http://bit.ly/2mie4sg



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