TCR_Public/170402.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 2, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 91

                            Headlines

ALESCO PREFERRED VI: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ba2
ARES CLO XLII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
ARROWPOINT CLO 2014-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on E-R Notes
ASTORIA FINANCIAL: Fitch Keeps 'B' Preferred Stock Rating on RWE
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. H Debt to 'CCsf'

BANC OF AMERICA 2006-4: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Csf
BANK 2017-BNK4: Fitch to Rate $10.77MM Class F Certs 'B-sf'
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL1: Fitch Rates Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL2: Fitch Rates Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR3: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Tranches To D

C-BASS MORTGAGE 2006-MH1: Moody's Hikes Cl. B-1 Debt Rating to Ca
CAPMARK VII: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Ratings on Class C Notes
CARFINANCE CAPITAL 2013-2: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes Rating From B1
CD 2007-CD4: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Class A-J Debt
CGGS 2016-RND: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Cl. E-FX Certs

CIFC FUNDING 2017-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
CITICORP 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class VA-1 Debt to Ba2(sf)
CITIGROUP 2013-375P: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Cl. E Debt
CITIGROUP 2014-GC21: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Debt
CITIGROUP 2017-P7: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes 'B-sf'

COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Debt
COMM 2014-UBS6: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C02: Fitch Rates 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
CSFB MORTGAGE 2001-28: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 Tranches to Caa1
CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Series A-2 Certs.

DBRR 2012-EZ1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba1
DBUBS 2011-LC1: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class G Certs
DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class FX Debt
ETRADE RV 2004-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
FREMF 2017-K63: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf' Rating to Class C Certs

GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. G Debt
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ12: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE 2006-BU1: Moody's Ups 2A-1A Debt Rating to B3
ICG US 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Debt
IMPAC SECURED 2006-5: Moody's Hikes Class 2-B Debt Rating to Ba1

IMSCI 2012-2: DBRS Lowers Class G Debt Rating to B(low)
IMSCI 2013-3: DBRS Cuts Class G Certs Rating to B(low)
IMSCI 2013-4: DBRS Lowers Class G Certs Rating to B(low)
IMSCI 2014-5: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Certificates
JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Csf'

JP MORGAN 2012-CIBX: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class G Certs
JP MORGAN 2017-JP5: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating to Cl. E-RR Debt
JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on F Debt
JPMCC 2012-CIBX: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Debt
LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to B2

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
LCM XXIV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
MARATHON CLO IX: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
MARLBOROUGH STREET: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
MERCER FIELD II: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D-2 Notes

MERRILL LYNCH 2002-CANADA: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 2 Tranches
MERRILL LYNCH 2004-MKB1: Moody's Hikes Class M Debt Rating to Ba3
MERRILL LYNCH 2006-CANADA: Moody's Ups Cl. XC Debt Rating to B1
MILL CITY 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes B(sf) Ratings on Class B2 Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class H Debt

MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C16: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Cl. E Notes
NORTHEAST ENERGY: Laurel Machinery Buying Deere 160D for $64K
OHA LOAN 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2013-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Debt
PREFERRED TERM XVI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to Caa3

REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED 2005-1: Moody's Ups A-2 Debt Rating From B1
RESIX FINANCE 2003-A: Fitch Corrects Feb. 27 Release
SASCO 2004-GEL1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M2 Debt to Ba1
SEAWALL 2006-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba1(sf)
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-3: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. B-4 Debt

SHACKLETON 2017-X: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Debt
SLM STUDENT 2008-7: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
SLM STUDENT 2008-9: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
STRIPS III: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Class N Notes
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 2007-1: S&P Hikes Turbo 2034 Bonds Rating to BB-

TOWD POINT 2015-2: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Cl. 2-B2 Debt
UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
WELLS FARGO 2012-C7: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class G Notes
WELLS FARGO 2015-LC20: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt

WELLS FARGO 2017-RB1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Ratings on 4 Tranches
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes (P)BB Rating on E Debt
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C7: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating Cl. X-B Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Debt
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Certs

[*] DBRS Hikes 3 & Confirms 8 Classes From 8 ABS Transactions
[*] DBRS Reviews 845 Classes From 70 RMBS Transactions
[*] Fitch Lowers 16 Bonds in 8 Transactions to D
[*] Moody's Hikes $45.5MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $835.9MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2007

[*] S&P Completes Review on 18 Classes From 5 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Frontier-Related Securities Series to B+
[*] S&P Discontinues 'D' Ratings on 34 Classes From 24 CMBS Deals

                            *********

ALESCO PREFERRED VI: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by ALESCO Preferred Funding VI, Ltd.:

US$365,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $149,039,601.71), Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf); previously on August 1, 2014 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on August 1,
2014 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class A-3 Second Priority Senior Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2035, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously
on August 1, 2014 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

US$23,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $24,665,325.85, including
deferred interest), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on August 1,
2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Third Priority Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of
$15,277,309.41, including deferred interest), Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);
previously on August 1, 2014 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

ALESCO Preferred Funding VI, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed mainly by a portfolio of bank
and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios since September 2016.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 21.2% or $40.1
million since September 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Moody's notes that two assets with a total par
of $35.0 million have redeemed in full since September 2016. Based
on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A,
and Cass B notes have improved to 236.92%, 161.20%, and 136.34%,
respectively, from September 2016 levels of 205.54%, 150.01%, and
129.98%, respectively. The Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit
from the diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
the redemption of any assets in the collateral pool.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 877)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +1

Class A-3: +1

Class B-1: +1

Class B-2: +1

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1995)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3: -1

Class B-1: -3

Class B-2: -3

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par of $353.1 million,
defaulted and deferring par of $106.0 million, a weighted average
default probability of 14.27% (implying a WARF of 1376), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks, insurance companies that Moody's does
not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS
that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an
econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit
scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank
obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data. For
insurance TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on
the assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial
reports.


ARES CLO XLII: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Ares XLII CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$248,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$46,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes due 2028 (the
"Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$21,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$21,600,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,400,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2028 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes are
referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Ares XLII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments purchased with
principal proceeds, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of
non-senior secured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped
as of the closing date.

Ares CLO Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 4.6 year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2967

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2967 to 3412)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2967 to 3857)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


ARROWPOINT CLO 2014-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the A-R,
B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2014
that is managed by Arrowpoint Asset Management LLC.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.  S&P do not expect the refinancing to have any impact on
the outstanding ratings of the class F notes.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  The replacement notes are expected to be issued at a lower
spread over LIBOR than the original notes they replace.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 24,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 17, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The cash flow analysis demonstrates, in S&P's opinion, that the
replacement notes have adequate credit enhancement available at the
rating levels associated with this rating action.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as S&P deems
necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Arrowpoint CLO 2014-3 Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating          Amount (mil. $)
A-R                  AAA (sf)                 250.00
B-R                  AA (sf)                   48.00
C-R                  A (sf)                    32.40
D-R                  BBB (sf)                  22.00
E-R                  BB (sf)                   17.20


ASTORIA FINANCIAL: Fitch Keeps 'B' Preferred Stock Rating on RWE
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings maintains the Rating Watch Evolving (RWE) on Astoria
Financial Group, Inc.'s (AF) 'BBB-' Long-Term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) and its principal banking subsidiary, Astoria Bank.
On March 7, 2017, AF and Sterling Bancorp (Sterling; not rated)
announced that they entered into a definitive merger agreement in a
stock-for-stock transaction valued at approximately $2.2 billion.

The RWE reflects uncertainty as to the ultimate credit profile of
AF. During the Rating Watch period, Fitch will evaluate Sterling
Bancorp's credit profile on a pro forma basis with Astoria. Fitch
would expect to resolve the Rating Watch upon closing of the
transaction, which is expected to occur in the fourth quarter of
2017 (4Q17).

AF is included in Fitch's annual U.S. Niche Real Estate Bank Peer
Review, which also includes New York Community Bancorp, Inc. (NYCB)
and Dime Community Bancshares, Inc.

While the business models of the U.S. Niche Real Estate Banks vary,
these banks are generally characterized by their limited deposit
franchises and geographic concentrations when compared to larger
U.S. banks. Fitch views these limitations as ratings constraints
across the peer group. The group is composed of banks with total
assets ranging from approximately $5 billion to approximately $50
billion that lend primarily in the New York City metropolitan
residential real estate market.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND VIABILITY RATINGS

In Fitch's opinion, the planned merger would result in an improved
earnings profile, interest rate sensitivity, and a lower loan to
deposit (LTD) ratio. Offsetting this, the pro forma capital ratios
are estimated to be lower than AF's reported ratios at year-end
2016. Other negative aspects to this transaction include possible
execution risks, and an increase in the company's concentration in
commercial real estate (CRE).

On a pro forma basis, the merger is expected to improve AF's return
on tangible assets by about 95bp) through operating expense
savings, loan and securities portfolio repositioning, and interest
expense savings as higher cost borrowings are marked and
refinanced. Further, the merger is expected to result in an asset
sensitive balance sheet, which should benefit from an expected
increase in interest rates. AF has historically been liability
sensitive.

From a funding and liquidity perspective, the merger is expected to
result in a LTD ratio of 95%, an improvement compared to AF's LTD
ratio of 115% at Dec. 31, 2016. The transaction should also result
in a more diversified funding mix, which Fitch views positively.

Although Fitch views the potential for earnings improvement
positively overall, there are several notable aspects to the
transaction that Fitch views negatively. First, the pro forma tier
1 capital ratio is estimated to be approximately 630bps lower than
AF's standalone tier 1 capital ratio at year-end 2016, while the
pro forma TCE ratio is estimated to be approximately 167bps lower.

Fitch also believes there is execution risk, particularly in
operating expense savings assumptions given little branch overlap.
Sterling has completed numerous acquisitions over the past several
years, and Fitch has no visibility into the company's integration
plans at this point. Although AF's balance sheet is non-complex,
Fitch believes execution risks are higher than Sterling's prior
acquisitions given AF's large relative size; Sterling and Astoria
are nearly equal in size.

Given heightened regulatory focus on CRE concentration, Fitch views
the pro forma increase in CRE to roughly 300% of total risk-based
capital from 257% cautiously, especially since capital ratios are
expected to fall considerably upon transaction close.

Banks operating with high CRE concentration are subject to
increased regulatory scrutiny of risk management practices
including underwriting, stress testing, and oversight. Given
Sterling's intention to refocus the loan portfolio on commercial
and industrial (C&I) loans, traditional CRE, and commercial
finance, Fitch expects asset quality to worsen over time relative
to AF's historical performance.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

AF has a SR of '5' and SRFl of 'NF'. In Fitch's view, AF is not
systemically important and therefore, the probability of support is
unlikely. IDRs and VRs do not currently incorporate any support.

HOLDING COMPANY

AF's IDR and VR are equalized with those of its bank subsidiary,
Astoria Bank, reflecting its role as the bank holding company,
which is mandated in the U.S. to act as a source of strength for
its bank subsidiaries. Ratings are also equalized reflecting the
very close correlation between holding company and subsidiary
default probabilities.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

AF's preferred securities are rated five notches below its VR.
Preferred stock is notched two times from the VR for loss severity,
and three times for non-performance. Hybrid securities ratings are
in accordance with Fitch's criteria and assessment of the
instruments' non-performance and loss severity risk profiles.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

AF's uninsured deposit ratings are rated one notch higher than the
company's IDR and senior unsecured debt because U.S. uninsured
deposits benefit from depositor preference. U.S. depositor
preference gives deposit liabilities superior recovery prospects in
the event of default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs and VRS,

Upon further review and evaluation of Sterling Bancorp's credit
profile including its management and strategy as well as its
financial profile, Fitch expects to resolve the Rating Watch
Evolving. The resolution of the Rating Watch may take longer than
six months.

At the conclusion of the review, the ratings could remain
unchanged, be upgraded or downgraded. The ratings could also be
withdrawn if Fitch is unable to fully evaluate Sterling Bancorp's
credit profile pro forma with Astoria.

Closing is expected in 4Q17 and subject to customary closing
conditions, including required regulatory approvals. If the
transaction were not to occur, Fitch would reassess AF's credit
profile in light of a second failed merger transaction. Since late
2015, AF's management team has been focused on preparing for and
ultimately completing a merger, first with New York Community
Bancorp ('BBB+/F2'/Outlook Stable), which was terminated in
December. Fitch believes this has caused some distraction in
running the core and ongoing operations of the bank and retaining
personnel. As such, Fitch would likely view such an event
negatively.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

AF's SR and SRF are sensitive to Fitch's assumption as to capacity
to procure extraordinary support in case of need.

HOLDING COMPANY

Should AF begin to exhibit signs of weakness, demonstrate trouble
accessing the capital markets, or have inadequate cash flow
coverage to meet near-term obligations, there is the potential that
Fitch could notch the holding company IDR and VR from the ratings
of Astoria Bank.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by
AF and its subsidiary are primarily sensitive to any change in AF's
VR.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The ratings of long- and short-term deposits issued by AF and its
subsidiaries are primarily sensitive to any change in AF's long-
and short-term IDRs.

Fitch maintains the following ratings on Rating Watch Evolving:

Astoria Financial Corporation
-- Long-Term IDR 'BBB-';
-- Short-Term IDR 'F3';
-- Senior Debt 'BBB-';
-- Preferred Stock 'B';
-- Viability Rating 'bbb-'.

Astoria Bank (Formerly Astoria Federal Savings and Loan
Association)
-- Long-Term IDR 'BBB-';
-- Short-Term IDR 'F3';
-- Long-term Deposits 'BBB';
-- Short-term Deposits 'F2';
-- Viability Rating 'bbb-'.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Astoria Financial Corporation
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.

Astoria Bank (Formerly Astoria Federal Savings and Loan
Association)
-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'.


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-4: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. H Debt to 'CCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one distressed class and affirmed six
classes of Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc. (BACM 2004-4)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade is due to minimal credit support and outstanding
litigation costs that make the distressed class susceptible to
losses. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 98.9% to $14
million from $1.3 billion at issuance.

Highly Concentrated Pool: Although the remaining loans in the pool
are exhibiting stable performance, the pool is highly concentrated
with three loans remaining, one of which is defeased (17.7% of the
pool). The non-defeased loans have maturity dates in 2018 while the
defeased loan matures in 2019.

Outstanding Litigation Fees: Outstanding litigation fees and
expenses related to a prior liquidated loan may contribute to
interest shortfalls and further erode credit support for the
remaining distressed class.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The remaining distressed class may be downgraded based on realized
losses.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch downgrades the following class:

-- $13.8 million class H to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $0.2 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-1A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
DM-A, DM-B, DM-C, DM-D, DM-E, DM-F and DM-G certificates have paid
in full. Fitch does not rate the class P and BC certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-C and
X-P certificates.


BANC OF AMERICA 2006-4: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Csf
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Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and downgraded the ratings on six classes in Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-4:

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes F and G were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The ratings on Classes A-J, B, C, D and E were downgraded due
realized and anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans as well as continued interest shortfalls.

The rating on the IO Class (Class XC) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 39.7% of the
current balance, compared to 8.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.1% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Banc of America Commercial
Mortgage Inc., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-4.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 89% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified troubled loans
representing 9.5% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's determines
a probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced and troubled loans to the most junior
classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to the most
senior classes.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 90% to $265.2
million from $2.73 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to
33% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $213.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%). Six loans, constituting 89% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Mesa Mall Loan ($87.3 million -- 32.9% of the pool), which
is secured by a 560,000 square foot (SF) regional mall in Grand
Junction, Colorado. The total mall including non-collateral is
873,470 SF. The property is anchored by Sears, JC Penny, Target,
Cabela's and Herberger's. Herberger's and Sears are the only
anchors which are part of the collateral. As of March 2017, the
collateral is approximately 93% occupied. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2016 due to imminent default. The loan had
an original maturity date in 2016 and is currently under a
forbearance agreement which expires in May 2017.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 2000 Corporate
Ridge Road Loan ($60.3 million -- 22.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a 256,022 SF office property located in Tyson's Corner
within McLean, Virginia. The loan transferred to special servicing
in July 2014 after a tenant occupying 85% of the net rentable area
vacated at the end of their lease. The loan became real estate
owned (REO) in November 2015. The property is currently managed by
CBRE. The property was approximately 8% leased as of December 2016,
compared to 10% in December 2015.

The third largest loan in special servicing is the BlueLinx
Portfolio Loan ($58.9 million -- 22.2% of the pool), which
represents a pari passu portion of a $117.8 million mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by 39 industrial properties located across 33
states. The properties are master leased to BlueLinx, a North
American residential and commercial building products distributor.
The loan transferred to special servicing in 2011 and was
subsequently modified. The properties are all master leased to
BlueLinx through June 2026. The Lender and Borrower entered into a
loan modification in March 2016, which, among other items, provides
for up to three years of extensions to July 2019.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by retail
and office property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $99.8
million loss for the specially serviced loans.

As of the March 2017 distribution statement, the top three
non-specially serviced loans represent 9.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Holiday Inn Gaithersburg ($19.9 million --
7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 300 room hotel located in
Gaithersburg, Maryland. Amenities include an indoor pool, exercise
facility, onsite restaurant, shuttle and a car rental service. As
of December 2016, occupancy and ADR were 60.9% and $90,
respectively, compared to 58.5% and $92, respectively in 2015. The
loan is on the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR and
Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the 3200 Samson Way Loan ($5.4 million
-- 2.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 114,012 SF office
property located in Bellevue, Nebraska. As of December 2016, the
property was 84% leased. This loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to a March 2017 maturity date and Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the Quantico Gateway Building Loan ($3.5
million -- 1.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 36,280 SF
office property with four stories. The property is located in
Dumfries, Virginia, and was built in 2006. The loan is currently on
the master servicer's watchlist due to low DSCR. The Borrower is
currently working to expand the space that the 2nd floor tenant
occupies. As of September 2016, the property was 79% leased. The
loan is fully amortizing and matures in September 2026. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.83X, respectively.


BANK 2017-BNK4: Fitch to Rate $10.77MM Class F Certs 'B-sf'
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Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on the BANK 2017-BNK4
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK4.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $33,805,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $88,384,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $235,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $268,432,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,824,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67,045,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $670,445,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $155,639,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,100,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,494,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,270,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,550,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,775,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,270,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,550,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,775,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

-- $43,100,400ab class X-G;
-- $43,100,400b class G;
-- $50,409,442.16bc RR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c)Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5% of the
pool balance (as of the closing date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 28, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 48 loans secured by 64
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,008,188,843 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Bank of America, National Association, Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, and Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 81.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.7%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage Higher than Recent Transactions: The transaction has
higher leverage than other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.14x for the trust is lower
than the YTD 2017 average of 1.25x and 2016 average of 1.21x.
Additionally, the pool's Fitch LTV of 110.1% for the trust is
higher than the YTD 2017 average of 104.0% and the 2016 average of
105.2%.

Pool Diversity: The pool shows diversity with respect to loan size
and property type. The top 10 loans represent 52.5% of the pool,
and the loan concentration index (LCI) is 385; both metrics are
below the respective 2016 averages of 54.8% and 422. Loans secured
by office and mixed-use properties that are predominately office
make up a combined 39.9%, followed by retail at 23.2%, hotel at
19.6% and industrial at 9.4%. Overall, there are 19 retail
properties, consisting of a mix of stand-alone, mixed-use,
unanchored and anchored shopping centers. None of the properties
were regional malls.

Limited Amortization: Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down by only 8.8%, which is below the 2016
average of 10.4%. Thirteen loans (48.7%) are full-term
interest-only and 13 loans (19.2%) are partial interest-only.
Fitch-rated transactions in 2016 had an average full-term,
interest-only percentage of 33.3% and a partial interest-only
percentage of 33.3%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 16.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2017-BNK4 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL1: Fitch Rates Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
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Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Bayview Opportunity Master
Fund IVa Trust 2017-SPL1 (BOMFT 2017-SPL1):

-- $222,332,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $222,332,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $222,332,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $27,661,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,661,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $27,661,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $12,699,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,699,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,312,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,312,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $23,312,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $17,049,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,049,000 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $17,049,000 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $13,918,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $30,966,529.97 class B6 notes;
-- $30,966,529.97 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 5,733 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans of which 92.6% are daily simple-interest
mortgage loans totaling $347.94 million, which excludes $11.7
million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of
the cut-off date. Distributions of principal and interest and loss
allocations are based on a sequential pay, senior subordinate
structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 36.10% subordination provided by the 7.95% class B1, 3.65%
class B2, 6.70% class B3, 4.90% class B4, 4.00% class B5, and 8.90%
class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview
Loan Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 10 years with roughly 95.4% of the pool paying on
time for the past 24 months and 91.6% current for the past three
years. In addition, 39.5% of the pool has been modified due to
performance issues, while the remaining loans were either not
modified (28.6%) or had their interest rates reduced due to an
interest rate reduction rider incorporated at origination (31.9%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$106,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than that
implied by Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were
applied to loans with property values below $100,000, which ranged
from 49%-100%, and increased Fitch 'AAAsf' loss expectation by
roughly 240 basis points (bps).

Daily Simple-Interest Loans (Concern): Approximately 93% of the
pool consists of daily simple-interest loans that accrue interest
on a daily basis from the date of the borrower's last payment.
While the monthly payment is fixed, if a borrower pays earlier than
the due date, less of the payment is applied to interest and more
is applied to principal. If the borrower pays late, more of the
payment is applied to interest and less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds. Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date. In
addition, close to 55% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk. Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial). Given that approximately
94% of the loans were originated and serviced by a single
originator prior to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that the roughly
20% compliance, data integrity and pay history sample is sufficient
to capture the potential risk of incomplete files that could
accompany portfolios traded in the secondary market. A full
custodial file review was conducted on 100% of the pool, and tax
and title search was conducted on over 99% of the pool. In
addition, BAM, with the guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
(BLS; as servicer and rated 'RSS2+'), reconstructed the past three
years of pay histories for 100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps from the interest remittance amount will be used
to pay down principal as well as any excess interest allocation
from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation. The
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions, as
well as the application of excess interest to the notes, is highly
supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in the
absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral and will generally not be repaid
until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Per Fitch's criteria, it may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVa, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued. In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
January 2024. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches
of R&Ws.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated six criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Master Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,' which are described below.

The first variation is the less than 100% TPR due diligence review
for regulatory compliance, data integrity and pay history. Tax and
title review was conducted on over 99% of the pool, and a custodial
file review was conducted on 100% of the pool. The remaining tax
and title review will be performed post close. The less than 100%
TPR review is consistent with Fitch's criteria for seasoned
performing pools. However, because Fitch's criteria states it views
pools as seasoned performing if they consist of loans that were
never modified, a criteria variation was made. Without this
variation, the pool would have had to have 100% compliance, data
integrity and pay history TPR review to achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.

Fitch is comfortable with the reduced due diligence sample because
roughly 94% of the loans were originated by a single lender and the
sample provided is sufficient to provide a reliable indication of
the operational quality of the lender.

The second variation is that 19.8% of the pool, below Fitch's
criteria of 20%, was reviewed for compliance, data integrity and
pay history. Fitch believes the slight variation from criteria is
immaterial as only nine more loans would be needed to meet the 20%
threshold. In addition, as noted above, approximately 94% of the
loans were originated by a single lender.

The third variation is that 36.9% of the tax, title and lien review
was conducted over six months prior to securitization. Of the 5,714
loans that were reviewed prior to closing, 5,691 were reviewed
within 12 months. Twenty-two were conducted between 12-16 months
ago. Fitch considered the robust servicing and ongoing monitoring
from Bayview Loan Servicing, which is a high-touch servicing
platform that specializes in seasoned loans. Given the strength of
the servicer, Fitch considered the impact of slightly seasoned tax,
title and lien reviews to be nonmaterial.

The fourth variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM). Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an AVM
product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors. Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but, rather, an
indexation product. Clear Capital is a reputable third-party vendor
that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set that goes down to the neighborhood level
and incorporates REO sales. Fitch believes the HDI product to be an
adequate alternative to an AVM. The HDI product was only used for
loans that were clean current for the prior 24 months and had an
LTV less than 60% based on the more conservative of the HDI value
and Fitch's indexed value. The impact of using this product is
neutral, as the HDI product is a sufficient alternative to an AVM
product and was only used on loans with an LTV of less than 60%.

The fifth variation is non-application of a default penalty to
income documentation for loans with less than full income
documentation that are over five years seasoned with no missed
payment in the prior three years. Fitch conducted analysis
comparing the performance of full documentation loans to non-full
documentation loans at origination. The analysis showed that after
five years of seasoning, the performance was the same. The impact
on the loss expectations from application of this variation
resulted in lower loss expectations of roughly 2-4 points,
depending on the rating category.

Lastly, an updated broker price opinion (BPO) will not be provided
on 1.3% of the pool. Due to the rural location of the property,
updated BPOs will not be received in time for the transaction. As
such, a 24% haircut was applied to the original appraisal with no
indexation applied, increasing the loss expectations by
approximately 10bps, depending on rating category. These properties
are located in rural areas and have an average original property
value of $62,000. Given the unknown condition of the property and
the rural location, there is a higher probability of decline in
value. The 24% haircut used is based on the median value of
available BPOs with a negative variance to the original appraisal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 36.3% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL2: Fitch Rates Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Bayview Opportunity Master
Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL2 (BOMFT 2017-SPL2):

-- $123,136,000.00 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $123,136,000.00 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $123,136,000.00 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,061,000.00 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,061,000.00 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,061,000.00 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $4,168,000.00 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,168,000.00 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook  
    Stable;
-- $14,587,000.00 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,587,000.00 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $14,587,000.00 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,903,000.00 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,903,000.00 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,903,000.00 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $7,389,000.00 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $16,197,433.00 class B6 notes;
-- $16,197,433.00 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 3,342 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans of which 91.4% are daily simple interest
mortgage loans totaling $189.44 million, which excludes $5.7
million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of
the cutoff date. Distributions of principal and interest and loss
allocations are based on a sequential pay, senior subordinate
structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 35.00% subordination provided by the 7.95% class B1, 2.20%
class B2, 7.70% class B3, 4.70% class B4, 3.90% class B5, and 8.55%
class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 10 years with roughly 96.4% of the pool paying on
time for the past 24 months and 92.4% current for the past three
years. In addition, 36.1% of the pool has been modified due to
performance issues, while the remaining loans were either not
modified (29.6%) or had their interest rates reduced due to an
interest rate reduction rider incorporated at origination (34.3%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$99,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than that
implied by Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were
applied to loans with property values below $99,000, which ranged
from 49%-100%, and increased Fitch 'AAAsf' loss expectation by
roughly 250 basis points (bps).

Daily Simple Interest Loans (Concern): Approximately 91% of the
pool consists of daily simple interest loans that accrue interest
on a daily basis from the date of the borrower's last payment.
While the monthly payment is fixed, if a borrower pays earlier than
the due date, less of the payment is applied to interest and more
is applied to principal. If the borrower pays late, more of the
payment is applied to interest and less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds. Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date. In
addition, close to 46% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk. Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial). Given that roughly 95% of
the loans were originated and serviced by a single originator prior
to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that the approximately 20%
compliance, data integrity and pay history sample is sufficient to
capture the potential risk of incomplete files that could accompany
portfolios traded in the secondary market. A full custodial file
review was conducted on 100% of the pool, and tax and title search
was conducted on over 99% of the pool. In addition, BAM, with the
guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (BLS; as servicer and rated
'RSS2+'), reconstructed the past three years of pay histories for
100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps from the interest remittance amount will be used
to pay down principal as well as any excess interest allocation
from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation. The
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions, as
well as the application of excess interest to the notes, is highly
supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in the
absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower-rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral, and will generally not be repaid
until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Per Fitch's criteria, it may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued. In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
July 2021. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches of R&Ws.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated five criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Master Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,' which are described below.

The first variation is the less than 100% TPR due diligence review
for regulatory compliance, data integrity and pay history. Tax and
title review was conducted on over 99% of the pool, and a custodial
file review was conducted on 100% of the pool. The remaining tax
and title review will be performed post close. The less than 100%
TPR review is consistent with Fitch's criteria for seasoned
performing pools. However, because Fitch's criteria state it views
pools as seasoned performing if they consist of loans that were
never modified, a criteria variation was made. Without this
variation, the pool would have had a 100% compliance, data
integrity and pay history TPR review to achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.

Fitch is comfortable with the reduced due diligence sample because
roughly 95% of the loans were originated by a single lender and the
sample provided is sufficient to provide a reliable indication of
the operational quality of the lender.

The second variation is that 34.2% of the tax, title and lien
review was conducted over six months prior to securitization. Of
the 3,511 loans that were reviewed prior to closing, seven were
reviewed within 12 months. The remaining 3,504 were conducted
between 12-16 months ago. Fitch considered the robust servicing and
ongoing monitoring from Bayview Loan Servicing, which is a
high-touch servicing platform that specializes in seasoned loans.
Given the strength of the servicer, Fitch considered the impact of
slightly seasoned tax, title and lien reviews to be nonmaterial.

The third variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM). Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an AVM
product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors. Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but, rather, an
indexation product. Clear Capital is a reputable third-party vendor
that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set that goes down to the neighborhood level
and incorporates real estate owned (REO) sales. Fitch believes the
HDI product to be an adequate alternative to an AVM. The HDI
product was only used for loans that were clean current for the
prior 24 months and had a loan to value (LTV)


BEAR STEARNS 2004-PWR3: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Tranches To D
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings to 'D (sf)' on four classes
of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR3 and GMAC Commercial
Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2006-C1 Trust, two U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions, due to principal
losses as detailed in the respective March 2017 trustee remittance
reports.

   Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR3

S&P lowered its ratings on classes H, J, and K to 'D (sf)' to
reflect principal losses as detailed in the March 2017 trustee
remittance report.  The reported principal losses on classes H, J,
and K were $2.1 million, $2.8 million, and $5.5 million,
respectively, and resulted primarily from the liquidation of the
Great Northern Mall asset.  The asset was liquidated at a loss
severity of 60.8% of its original pooled trust balance.
Consequently, classes J through P each experienced a 100% loss of
their respective beginning balances, while class H experienced a
loss of 15.3% of its $13.9 beginning balance. Classes L through P
are not rated by S&P Global Ratings.

   GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2006-C1 Trust

S&P lowered its rating on class A-J to 'D (sf)' to reflect
principal loss as detailed in the March 2017 trustee remittance
report.  The reported principal loss to class A-J totaled
$2.4 million and resulted primarily from the liquidation of two
assets: the Newburgh Mall and the Sports Warehouse Fargo.  The two
assets liquidated at loss severities of 88.0% and 69.5%,
respectively, of their original pooled trust balances.
Consequently, class B (not rated by S&P Global Ratings) experienced
a 100% loss of its $28.0 million beginning balance, while class A-J
experienced a loss of 2.2% of its beginning balance.

RATINGS LIST

Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2004-PWR3
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-PWR3
                             Rating
Class                 To              From
H                     D (sf)          BB (sf)
J                     D (sf)          BB- (sf)
K                     D (sf)          CCC- (sf)

GMAC Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. Series 2006-C1 Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C1
                             Rating
Class                 To              From
A-J                   D (sf)          CCC- (sf)



C-BASS MORTGAGE 2006-MH1: Moody's Hikes Cl. B-1 Debt Rating to Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches in five transactions issued between 1995 and 2006. The
collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
manufactured housing units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: Associates Manufactured Housing 1996-1

B-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

Issuer: Associates Manufactured Housing 1997-1

B-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-MH1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CIT Group Securitization Corp II MH 1995-1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2015 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Conseco Finance Securitization Corp. Series 2001-4

Class A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact
the performance of these transactions.


CAPMARK VII: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Ratings on Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by CAPMARK VII - CRE LTD.:

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

Capmark VII - CRE Ltd. is a currently static cash transaction whose
reinvestment period ended in August 2011. The transaction is wholly
backed by a one whole loan on an office property (100% of the
collateral pool balance). As of the March 8, 2017 trustee report,
the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $232.9 million from $386.3 million at last
review, and $1.0 billion at issuance. This is a result of
prepayments, regular amortization, recoveries from defaulted
assets, and interest re-classified as principal due to the failure
of certain par value tests.

No assets had defaulted as of the trustee's March 8, 2017 report.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4770,
compared to 5329 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Caa1-Ca/C (100.0%, same as that at last
review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.1 years, compared to 2.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 55.0%, same as that at last
review.

Moody's did not model a MAC in its analysis as there is only one
asset in the pool. The performance of the notes is directly linked
to the performance of the asset.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other key parameters static, reducing the
recovery rates of 100% of the collateral pool by -10% would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to
one notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement
of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the
collateral pool by +10% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to four notches upward (e.g.,
one notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CARFINANCE CAPITAL 2013-2: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes Rating From B1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded seven tranches issued from
CarFinance 2013-1 and 2013-2 securitizations, originated and
serviced by CarFinance Capital LLC (unrated).

The complete rating actions are as follow:

Issuer: CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-1

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-2

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

Class E Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
Affirmed B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect expenses not taken into account in
previous ratings for these transactions. Moody's has learned that
for CarFinance securitizations CarFinance Capital does not subtract
a small part of the costs associated with repossessing vehicles of
defaulted borrowers from the liquidation proceeds allocated to the
trust, and thus does not include these expenses in its reporting of
net loss. The repossession costs are absorbed into corporate costs
and are not compensated by the trust. Consideration of repossession
expenses in the net loss calculation had a small impact on the
updated historical static pool loss curves resulting in no impact
on the expected lifetime cumulative net loss (CNL).

The lifetime CNL expectations remain unchanged at 12.00% for the
2013-1 and 2013-2 transactions.

The upgrades resulted from the build-up of credit enhancement owing
to sequential pay structures, non-declining reserve accounts as
well as overcollateralization.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the March 2017
distribution date) and credit assumptions for the affected
transactions. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL, expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance.
Performance metrics include pool factor, which is the ratio of the
current collateral balance to the original collateral balance at
closing; total credit enhancement, which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, reserve fund; and excess
spread.

Issuer: CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-1

Lifetime CNL expectation - 12.00%, prior expectation (March 2016)
-- 12.00%

Pool factor --13.41%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class B 103.70%, Class C 62.70%,
Class D 29.16%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 8.3%

Issuer: CarFinance Capital Auto Trust 2013-2

Lifetime CNL expectation - 12.00%, prior expectation (March 2016)
-- 12.00%

Pool factor -- 16.98%

Total Hard credit enhancement - Class B 98.28%, Class C 62.94%,
Class D 42.32%, Class E 18.77%

Excess Spread per annum -- Approximately 6.4%

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance. If
the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit
Ratings on CarFinance subprime auto loan ABS are not expected to be
affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "
Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing
Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the vehicles that secure the obligor's promise of
payment. The US job market and the market for used vehicle are
primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the loans or refinancing
opportunities that result in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and the market for
used vehicle are primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for
worse performance than Moody's expected include poor servicing,
error on the part of transaction parties, lack of transactional
governance and fraud.


CD 2007-CD4: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Class A-J Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on one class and
downgrade the ratings on two classes in CD 2007-CD4 Commercial
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-CD4 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. XW, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-J was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class
A-J has already experienced a 10% realized loss as result of
previously liquidated loans.

The ratings on the two IO Classes were downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of their reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 26.3% of the
current balance, compared to 3.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.5% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC and Cl. XW was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CD 2007-CD4 Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-CD4.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 47% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified an additional troubled
loan representing 2% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and the troubled loan to the
most junior class and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior class.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10, compared to 36 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 13, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 94% to $381 million
from $6.60 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 29 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 47% of the pool. One loan, constituting
40% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US government
securities.

Ten loans, constituting 13% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventy-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $792 million (for an average loss
severity of 60%). Fifteen loans, constituting 47% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the 60 Charles Lindbergh Boulevard ($54.5 million -- 14.3% of
the pool), which is secured by an office property located in
Uniondale, New York. The property is 100% subleased to Nassau
County - Department of Health and Human Services with a lease
expiration in 2021. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2017 due to an imminent monetary default. The special
servicer indicated they are reviewing the loan files to determine
workout strategy going forward.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sunset Mall Loan
($27.8 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a Class B,
enclosed regional mall built in 1979 and located in San Angelo,
Texas, approximately 250 miles west of Dallas. The mall is anchored
by Sears, JC Penney, Dillards-Womens, and Dillards-Mens. The JC
Penney and Dillards-Womens boxes are individually owned. The loan
transferred to special servicing in November 2016 due to imminent
maturity default. The special servicer indicated a loan
modification has been approved and closing is expected in April
2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Westport Shopping
Center Loan ($16.8 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured
by a grocery anchored retail center and located 15 miles southwest
of Chicago CBD. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2017 due to imminent maturity default. In late February
2017, the anchor tenant, Ultra Foods, occupying 49% of the net
rentable area (NRA), notified the Borrower that they would be
closing their store in April 2017. The Borrower has requested a
12-month loan extension to allow time to replace the tenant. he
special servicer indicated third-party reports have been ordered
and they are reviewing the loan files to determine workout strategy
going forward.

The remaining twelve specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $97.2 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (55% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 2% of the pool, and has estimated a
modest loss from the troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 92% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 94% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.34X and 1.35X,
respectively, compared to 1.53X and 1.14X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 8% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Maunakea Marketplace Loan ($10.8 million -- 3%
of the pool), which is secured by an open-air market located within
a fully developed area of Honolulu, the largest city on Oahu, near
the Chinatown District. The loan had an original maturity in
February 2017 and the loan status is currently classified as
performing matured balloon.

The second largest loan is the Fort Hill Centre Loan ($9.7 million
-- 3% of the pool), which is secured by 4-story mid-rise office
property located in Centreville, Virginia, 31 miles west of
downtown Washington DC. The loan has a maturity date in April 2017
and the servicer has indicated the borrower intends to payoff the
loan via refinance.

The third largest loan is the Broomfield Plaza Shopping Center Loan
($8.6 million -- 2% of the pool), which is secured by a 105,064
square foot retail (SF) center constructed in 1979 and renovated in
2005. The property is located in Broomfield, Colorado, between
Denver and Boulder. The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2015 due to imminent default. A 24-month loan extension
was subsequently executed and the loan returned to the master
servicer in February 2017. The servicer indicated that the Borrower
is working to complete a 37,000 SF replacement tenant anchor lease.
Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.


CGGS 2016-RND: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Cl. E-FX Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on five classes in CGGS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-RND, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2016-RND:

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. D-FL, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five fixed-rate principal and interest (P&I) classes
were affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the floating-rate P&I classes, Classes C-FL and
D-FL, were upgraded because of significant paydowns and resulting
lower leverage of the Pool B trust. The rating of the junior P&I
class, Class D-FL, is capped at A1 (sf) as the certificates are
exposed to risk of default in the event that trust expenses not
reimbursable by the borrower are passed through to
certificateholders.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type.
Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any
pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2017 Payment Date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance has decreased by approximately 32.8% to $1.192
billion from $1.773 billion at securitization. The securitization
consists of two componentized loans backing groups of fixed rate
(FX) and floating rate (FL) certificates. The FX Certificates are
collateralized by one fixed rate loan backed by a first lien
commercial mortgage related to a portfolio, Pool A, of 30 life
science office and laboratory properties. The FL Certificates are
collateralized by one floating rate loan backed by a first lien
commercial mortgage related to a portfolio, Pool B, of 23 life
science and laboratory properties.

The fixed-rate Pool A mortgage loan balance is unchanged from
securitization and consists of a $1.115 billion whole loan in the
trust. Outside of the trust there are three mezzanine loan
components. The loan has a term of five years and calls for monthly
fixed interest-only payments during the entire loan term.

The portfolio of properties that serve as collateral for Pool A
were 92% leased as of September 2016, down slightly from 95% at
securitization. The 30 properties are concentrated in the strongest
life science and technology markets, including the Greater Boston
Area, San Francisco Bay Area and San Diego Metro Area. The pool's
net cash flow (NCF) during the first nine months of 2016 was $95.4
million. Moody's stabilized NCF is $116 million and Moody's LTV
ratio on the $1.115 billion mortgage loan is 91%, unchanged from
securitization.

The floating-rate Pool B trust component balance has decreased by
approximately 88% to $76.6 million from $658 million at
securitization. Outside of the trust there exists a companion
B-note and two mezzanine loan components. The loan has an initial
term of two years with three one-year extension options and calls
for monthly interest-only payments during the entire loan term at a
variable rate of LIBOR plus a spread. Pool B has paid down
significantly from securitization due to the release of five
properties, including the four largest (by allocated loan amount)
at securitization.

The remaining 23 properties that serve as collateral for Pool B are
located throughout the United States by major research universities
and institutions, with the top four markets of Washington DC,
Boston, San Diego and Virginia representing 60% of the pool.
Moody's stabilized NCF, excluding the released properties, is $31.5
million and Moody's LTV ratio on the $76.6 million trust portion is
24%.



CIFC FUNDING 2017-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to six
classes of notes to be issued by CIFC Funding 2017-II, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$315,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$33,750,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$28,750,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$22,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

CIFC 2017-II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 75% ramped as of
the closing date.

CIFC CLO Management LLC (the "Manager"), an affiliate of CIFC Asset
Management LLC, will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2870

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2870 to 3301)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2870 to 3731)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


CITICORP 2006-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class VA-1 Debt to Ba2(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of ten tranches
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc. 2006-1

Cl. IA-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. IIA-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 7, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. IIIA-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-PO2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. VA-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2003-AR30

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. V-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on the pools. The
ratings upgraded are due to the overall credit enhancement
available to the bonds from their related group.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


CITIGROUP 2013-375P: Moody's Affirms Ba1(sf) Rating on Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings of six classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-375P:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmations of the principal and interest (P&I) classes are
due to key parameters, including Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio
and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), remaining
within acceptable ranges. The rating of interest-only (IO) Class
X-A was affirmed based on the credit performance of its referenced
class.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan pay downs or amortization, an increase
in defeasance or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series
2013-375P.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review incorporated the use of the excel-based Large Loan
Model. The large loan model derives credit enhancement levels based
on an aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 Distribution Date, the transaction's
certificate balance was approximately $574 million, the same as at
securitization. The certificates are collateralized by a single
loan backed by a first lien commercial mortgage related to 375 Park
Avenue, also known as the Seagram Building, a Class A trophy office
building located in New York City. The building has 38 stories with
a net rentable area (NRA) of approximately 830,928 square feet. The
property was 94% leased as of November 30, 2016.

The loan has a $209 million pari passu portion that was securitized
in COMM 2013-CCRE8. There is also mezzanine debt in the amount of
$217 million. Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratio and Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for the securitized
debt are 87% and 0.87X, respectively. Moody's current structured
credit assessment for this loan is ba1 (sca.pd), the same as the
last review.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC21: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2014-GC21.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations follow the overall stable performance of the
underlying loans. There have been no material changes to the pool
since issuance, therefore the original rating analysis was
considered in affirming the transaction. As of the March 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 2.5% to $1.01 billion from $1.04 billion at issuance.
Per the servicer reporting, three loans (2.2% of the pool) are
defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting class G.

Stable Performance: Property-level performance remains generally in
line with issuance expectations, and there have been no material
changes to the pool metrics.

Limited Lodging Exposure: The pool's hotel concentration (4.8%) is
lower than the 2013 average hotel concentration (14.7%). There are
no hotel properties within the top 25 loans. Hotels have a higher
probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.

Property Type Diversity: The pool is more diverse by property type
than recent transactions, with the largest property type in the
pool being retail properties at 30.1%, followed by multifamily at
20.6%, office at 12.8% and independent living at 9.7% of the pool.
No other property type comprises more than 7.8% of the pool.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 12.8% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity. The pool's
concentration of partial interest loans (32.3%), which includes
four of the 10 largest loans, is slightly lower than the 2013
average (34.0%). However, the pool's concentration of full-term
interest-only loans (20.5%), including two of the 10 largest loans,
is higher than the 2013 average (17.1%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

-- $26 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $240 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $291.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $760.4* million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115.7* million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $174.2 class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.7* million class X-C at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or X-D certificates. Class A-S, B,
and C certificates may be exchanged for a related amount of class
PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for
class A-S, B, and C certificates.



CITIGROUP 2017-P7: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-P7 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $18,129,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $94,881,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $250,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $289,834,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,088,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $773,379,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,124,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,631,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71,447,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,124,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,631,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,659,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57,659,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,576,000ad class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,028,000ad class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated:

-- $41,363,974ad class G;
-- $22,556,995c class VRR

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 2.2% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(d) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 7.7% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 23, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 46 loans secured by 58
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,025,317,969 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp., Citi Real
Estate Funding Inc., Natixis Real Estate Capital LLC, and Principal
Commercial Capital.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 84.5% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 88.8%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Above-Average Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are
slightly worse than those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.17x is
slightly worse than the YTD 2017 average of 1.25x and the 2016
average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of 106.8% is higher than
average when compared with the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 104%
and 105.2%, respectively. Excluding the credit opinion loan, the
pool has a Fitch DSCR of 1.16x and Fitch LTV of 108.2%.

High Office and Low Hotel Concentration: Loans secured by office
properties and mixed-use properties that are predominantly office
make up a combined 61.6% of the pool. The pool's office
concentration is well-above the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 43.1%
and 28.7%, respectively. Hotel properties comprise only 6.5% of the
pool which is below the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of 12.2% and
16%, respectively. Loans secured by office properties have an
average probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower model.
Conversely, hotel properties have the highest probability of
default in Fitch's multiborrower model, all else equal.

Weak Amortization: Eighteen loans (48.2%) are full-term interest
only and 15 loans (36.2%) are partial interest only. Fitch-rated
transactions at 2017 YTD had an average full-term interest-only
percentage of 49.9% and a partial-interest-only percentage of
25.8%. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will
pay down by only 7.7%, which is above the 2017 YTD average of 7%
but significantly below the 2016 average of 10.4%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 11.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CGCMT 2017-P7 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE13 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the majority of
the underlying loans. The Negative Outlooks on the junior classes,
D through F, reflect concern over potential losses related to the
specially serviced loans (3.1%) and other Fitch Loans of Concern
(15.8%).

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the transaction had paid
down by 2.9%. There have been no realized losses to date.
Approximately 5.4% of the pool is currently defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently impacting the non-rated class G.

Low Leverage: At issuance, the transaction was considered to have
lower leverage than other Fitch-rated transactions of similar
vintage. Currently, the three largest loans in the transaction
(29.7%) have low Fitch stressed loan to values (LTVs) ranging from
48.6% to 70.9%. Two of these loans are secured by unique asset
types, including 60 Hudson Street (11.7%) in New York City, which
is one of the world's leading carrier hotels (a specialized
telecommunications data center); and Kalahari Resort and Convention
Center (8.7%), a resort in Sandusky, OH comprising hotel rooms,
villas, condo units, two waterparks, several food and retail
outlets, and a significant amount of meeting space.

Loan Concentration: The top 10 loans represent 62.1% of the pool,
while the largest loan represents 11.7% of the pool.

Property Type Concentrations: The pool has a higher than average
concentration of hotel properties at 20.9%. Two of the top five
loans are secured by hotel properties including the above
mentioned, Kalahari Resort and Convention Center; and the Hilton
Universal Studios (7.5%), a 482-room full-service hotel located
adjacent to Universal Studios Hollywood.

Amortization: Approximately 78% of the pool is fully or partially
amortizing. The largest two loans (21%) and one smaller loan (1.3%)
are the only fully interest-only loans in the pool.

Specially Serviced Loans: There are currently three specially
serviced loans in the pool, the largest (2.2%) of which is secured
by a mixed-use property located in downtown Philadelphia, PA. The
property consists of 40,000 square feet (sf) of ground floor retail
space, 8,000sf of second-floor office space, 14 residential units,
and a 318-space parking garage. The loan transferred in April 2016
due to imminent monetary default after the debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) dropped to a servicer-reported 0.67x. A high-end
specialty grocer, which prior to issuance had signed a lease for
20,000sf, never took possession of the space. Another smaller
retail tenant went dark. Per the special servicer, construction has
begun for a new grocer tenant. Lease negotiations are ongoing for
additional available retail space as well as mezzanine office
space. The special servicer expects to continue to monitor the
construction and leasing progress before returning the loan to the
master servicer.

The two additional specially serviced loans (combined 0.9%) are
secured by multifamily properties located in the Bakken Shale
Region of North Dakota. The loans both transferred in 2016 due to
payment default after deteriorating oil prices resulted in
declining property occupancies and cash flow insufficient to pay
debt service.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Aside from the specially serviced loans,
there are five Fitch Loans of Concern (15.8%), all of which have
occupancy and/or tenant roll issues. For some of these loans, the
master servicer has not provided updates on the status of some of
the larger tenants, and this lack of information has affected
Fitch's analysis and the categorization of these loans as Fitch
Loans of Concern. For example, a loan secured by a retail shopping
center located in Evansville, IN (2.8%) has multiple large tenants
with scheduled lease maturities in February and March 2017. The
servicer has provided limited updates on renewal statuses and Fitch
made conservative assumptions in its analysis of the loan. Another
loan secured by an office property located in Naperville, IL (1.7%)
has a large tenant which had a lease termination option exercisable
in 2016. An update was requested from the servicer, but has not
been received to date. Fitch again made conservative assumptions in
its analysis of this loan.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks assigned to classes D through F primarily
reflect concern over the specially serviced assets and Fitch Loans
of Concern. Should performance continue to decline on these assets
or substantial losses be realized on the specially serviced assets,
these classes could be subject to downgrade.

Rating Outlooks for classes A-1 through C and PEZ remain Stable due
to the pool's otherwise overall stable performance. There are
minimal scheduled loan maturities (16%) prior to 2023. Upgrades to
classes B through C and PEZ may occur with improved pool
performance and additional class paydown or defeasance. Downgrades
to the classes are possible should an asset-level or economic event
cause a decline in pool performance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the ratings and revised Outlooks:

-- $19.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $287.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $105 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class PEZ* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $22.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $9.7 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $846.3 million class X-A** at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $154.8 million class X-B** at 'BBB-sf', Outlook to Negative
    from Stable.

* The class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class
PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for
the class A-M, B and C certificates.

** Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class X-C, G and SLG certificates.


COMM 2014-UBS6: Fitch Affirms 'BB-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of COMM 2014-UBS6
pass-through certificates, which were issued by Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations follow the overall stable performance of the
underlying loans. There have been no material changes to the pool
since issuance, therefore the original rating analysis was
considered in affirming the transaction. As of the March 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 1.6% to $1.26 billion from $1.28 billion at issuance.
There are 15 loans (20.27%) on the master servicer's watch list,
mostly due to occupancy declines, deferred maintenance, and a fire
at one of the properties. Additionally, there are three loans
(2.0%) that are specially serviced.

Specially Serviced Loans: There are currently three loans (2.0%)
with the special servicer. The largest is the Cray Plaza loan
(1.2%), which is secured by a 219,313-sf mixed-use property
(office/retail/parking garage) located in St. Paul, MN. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2017 due to imminent
default as the largest tenant, Cray, Inc. (30% of NRA), exercised a
contractual termination option and will vacate in April 2017. The
servicer is awaiting a loan modification proposal from the borrower
prior to finalizing a workout strategy.

The second largest loan in special servicing is the Black Gold
Suites Hotel Portfolio (0.7%). This loan is secured by two
unflagged hotel properties totaling 189 rooms in Tioga and Stanley,
ND. It was transferred to special servicing in January 2016 due to
imminent monetary default. Both hotels are located in the Bakken
Formation and reflect exposure to the energy industry. Performance
of the portfolio has declined with significant decreases in
occupancy and average daily rates. The servicer and sponsor agreed
to a loan modification in November 2016, and the loan is expected
to return to the master servicer in the next few months.

The third loan in special servicing (0.3%) is secured by a 5,025-sf
mixed-use property (ground-level retail and four residential units)
located in Brooklyn, NY. The loan transferred to the special
servicer in August 2016 due to multiple noncompliance issues.
Foreclosure has been initiated as the borrower has been
unresponsive to numerous requests for current financial
statements.

Limited Amortization: The pool has amortized 1.6% since issuance.
Loans representing 13.9% of the pool are interest-only for the full
term. An additional 55.9% of the pool was structured with partial
interest-only periods at issuance. As of the March 2017 remittance,
24 partial interest-only loans representing 41.9% of the pool had
not yet begun amortizing.

Non-Traditional Properties: The fourth largest loan in the pool
(3.7% of the pool by balance) is secured by a portfolio of
convenience stores and gas stations. There are three loans (6.5%),
including two in the top 15, secured by student housing properties.
Additionally, two loans totaling 0.7% of the pool are secured by
airport parking lots.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for class F remains Negative due to concerns
related to the three loans in special servicing and three loans in
the top 15 on the servicer's watchlist (two for performance issues
and one for deferred maintenance). The rating outlook on class X-D
has been revised to Negative as it references class F. Sustained
underperformance of the specially serviced loans may warrant a
downgrade; conversely, the Rating Outlook may be revised to Stable
should asset-level performance revert to levels seen at issuance.
Rating Outlooks for A-1 through E remain Stable due to the
otherwise stable performance of the pool. Downgrades are possible
with significant performance decline. Upgrades, while not likely in
the near term, are possible with increased credit enhancement and
overall improved pool performance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the rating and revised the Outlook on the
following class:

-- $33.5 million interest-only class X-D at 'BB-sf'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $37.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $103.0 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $275 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $337.7 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $970.3 million interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $97.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $220 million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $65.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $122.8 million interest-only class X-B at 'A-sf', Outlook
    Stable;
-- $60.6 million interest-only class X-C at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $60.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12.8 million class E at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.7 million class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Fitch does not rate the class G, H or X-E certificates. Class A-M,
B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ certificates,
and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for class A-M, B, and C
certificates.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C02: Fitch Rates 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Fannie Mae's risk transfer
transaction, Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2017-C02 (CAS
2017-C02), as follows:

-- $379,890,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2M-2A notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $759,779,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2A-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2B-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $265,923,000 class 2E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2C-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $246,928,000 class 2E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-X4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y1 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y2 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y3 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $512,851,000 class 2-Y4 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $38,388,926,390 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $19,994,649 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $12,997,022 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $13,996,255 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $12,997,023 class 2M-CH reference tranche;
-- $189,945,000 class 2B-1 notes;
-- $9,997,325 class 2B-1H reference tranche;
-- $199,942,325 class 2B-2H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 3.00%
subordination provided by the 0.65% class 1M-2A, the 0.70% class
1M-2B, the 0.65% class 1M-2C, the 0.50% class 1B-1 and their
corresponding reference tranches as well as the 0.50% 1B-2H
reference tranche. The notes are general senior unsecured
obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject to
the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed
MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will consist of mortgage loans with
loan to values (LTVs) greater than 80.01% and less than or equal to
97.00%.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2017-C02 (CAS 2017-C02) is
Fannie Mae's 17th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $39.9 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified, or other credit events occur the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Due to the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the 2M-1,
2M-2A, 2M-2B and 2M-2C notes will be based on the lower of: the
quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement
(CE) available through subordination and on Fannie Mae's Issuer
Default Rating.

The 2M-1, 2M-2A 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from May 2016 through September 2016. In this
transaction, Fannie Mae has only included one group of loans with
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) from 80.01% to 97.00%. Overall, the
reference pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent
CAS transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

ADDITIONAL RATING DRIVERS

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's tenth
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in the pool are covered either by
borrower-paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI).
Fannie Mae will be guaranteeing the mortgage insurance (MI)
coverage amount, which will typically be the MI coverage percentage
multiplied by the sum of the unpaid principal balance as of the
date of the default, up to 36 months of delinquent interest, taxes
and maintenance expenses. While the Fannie Mae guarantee allows for
credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of
BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision as
required by the Homeowners Protection Act when the loan balance is
first scheduled to reach 78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C
and 2B-1 notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. As a
result, any collateral losses on the reference pool that occur
beyond year 12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the
transaction. Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year window in its
default analysis and applied a reduction to its lifetime default
expectations.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
seventh transaction in which Fitch received third-party due
diligence on a loan production basis as opposed to a
transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that production-based
diligence is sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality control
(QC) processes. The sample selection was limited to 6,961 loans
that were previously reviewed as part of Fannie Mae's post-purchase
QC review and met the reference pool's eligibility criteria. Of
those loans, 1,998 were selected for a full review (credit,
property valuation and compliance) by third-party due diligence
providers. Of the 1,998 loans, 416 were part of this transaction's
reference pool. Fitch views the results of the due diligence review
as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an above-average
aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to Fitch's loss
expectations based on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The 2M-1 class strongly
benefits from the sequential pay structure and stable CE provided
by the more junior 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C and 2B-1 classes which are
locked out from receiving any principal until classes with a more
senior payment priority are paid in full. However, available CE for
the junior classes as a percentage of the outstanding reference
pool increases in tandem with the paydown of the 2M-1 class. Given
the size of the 2M-1 class relative to the combined total of all
the junior classes, together with the sequential pay structure, the
class 2M-1 will de-lever and CE as a percentage will build faster
than in a pro rata payment structure.
Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 2A-H senior reference tranches, which has an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as 100%of the first loss 2B-2H
reference tranche, sized at 50 bps. Fannie Mae is also retaining an
approximately 5% vertical slice/interest in the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B,
2M-2C and 2B-1 tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae, and this is reflected in Fannie
Mae's current rating. However, if, at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the ratings of
Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B and 2M-2C
notes' ratings affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 'BBB' sMVD of 23.3% and 'BB' sMVD of 18.5%. It indicates
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 35% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. and American Mortgage Consultants (AMC). The due diligence
focused on credit and compliance reviews, desktop valuation reviews
and data integrity. Adfitech and AMC examined selected loan files
with respect to the presence or absence of relevant documents.
Fitch received certifications indicating that the loan-level due
diligence was conducted in accordance with Fitch's published
standards. The certifications also stated that the company
performed its work in accordance with the independence standards,
per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence analysts
performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum years of
experience. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and
the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.

The offering documents for CAS 2017-C02 do not disclose any
representations, warranties, or enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that
are available to investors and which relate to the underlying asset
pools.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2001-28: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 6 Tranches to Caa1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 tranches
and downgraded 6 tranches from 3 transactions backed by Alt-A
mortgage loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. III-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. IV-A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. V-A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. VI-A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 17, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2001-28

Cl. I-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. I-P, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Cl. I-X, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Confirmed at B2 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-8

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2012
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the improvement of tranche
level credit enhancement and the pay down of senior bonds in the
transactions. The rating downgrades are due to the erosion of
credit enhancement to the bonds.

The actions also reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating CSFB Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-28 Cl. I-X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



CVS CREDIT: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Series A-2 Certs.
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Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating of CVS Credit
Lease Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series A-1 and Series A-2
as follows:

Series A-2, Affirmed Ba1; previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating was affirmed based on the support of the long term
triple net lease guaranteed by CVS Health (Moody's senior unsecured
debt rating Baa1, stable outlook), as well as the residual value
insurance policies provided by the Royal Indemnity Company, which
is unrated by Moody's. The rating on the A-2 Certificate is lower
from CVS's rating due to the size of the loan balance at maturity
relative to the value of the collateral assuming the existing
tenant is no longer in occupancy (the dark value).

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals are primarily based
on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the corporate family
rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate collateral
supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also considered are
Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on the property
being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a recovery rate
upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual insurance
provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an upgrade of the
ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant or
significant loan paydowns or amortization which results in a lower
loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the
ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the corporate tenant
or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease Financings",
published in October 2016.

No model was used in this review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

The Certificate is supported by 96 single-tenant, stand-alone
retail buildings leased to CVS Health (CVS). Each building is
subject to a fully bondable triple net lease guaranteed by CVS. The
properties are located across 17 states. The rated final
distribution date is January 10, 2023.

During the term of the transaction, the A-2 Certificate is
supported by CVS Health Corp. (CVS) lease obligations. The balloon
payment is insured under residual value insurance policies.

CVS Health Corp., headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, is the
only fully integrated pharmacy health care company in the United
States. It fills or manages more than 1 billion prescriptions
annually. It operates more than 9,600 retail pharmacies in the US,
Puerto Rico, and Brazil. In addition, it has a pharmacy benefits
management operation, a mail order and specialty pharmacy division,
an on-line pharmacy, more than 1,100 walk in clinics, and a
dedicated senior pharmacy care business. Revenues are about $172
billion.


DBRR 2012-EZ1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba1
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Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following certificates issued by DBRR 2012-EZ1 Trust:

Cl. C, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2016
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X-5, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 12, 2016
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the ratings on the transaction as a result
of deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying collateral
as evidenced by the weighted average rating factor (WARF) and the
weighted average recovery rate (WARR). The remaining collateral
pool consists of one asset, Class A-4 from LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2004-C1 (Underlying Certificate). The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic)
transactions.

DBRR 2012-EZ1 is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
super-senior commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the current pool balance). As of the February 27, 2017 trustee
report, the aggregate certificate balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $1.8 million, from
$1.4 billion at issuance as a result of amortization of the
underlying collateral.

No assets had defaulted as of the February 27, 2017 trustee
report.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the WARF, the weighted
average life (WAL), and the WARR. Moody's typically models these as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 940,
compared to 269 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: A1-A3 (0% compared to 100.0% at last
review); and Ba1-Ba3 (100%, compared to 0.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.0 year, the same as that at last review.
The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through loan exposure within the underlying collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 45.0%, compared to 65.0% at last
review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Class X-5 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities. If the revised Credit Rating
Methodology is implemented as proposed, ratings of some of the
tranches might change. Please refer to Request for Comment titled
"Moody's Proposes Revised Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities", for further details regarding the
implications of the proposed Credit Rating Methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Because the credit quality of
the certificate resecuritization depends on that of the underlying
CMBS certificate, whose credit quality in turn depends on the
performance of the underlying commercial mortgage pool, any change
to the ratings on the Underlying Certificate could lead to a review
of the ratings of the certificates.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


DBUBS 2011-LC1: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class G Certs
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Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
in DBUBS 2011-LC1 Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-LC1 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.4% of the
current balance, compared to 0.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
anticipates minimal losses from the remaining collateral in the
current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, additional losses may emerge from macro stresses to
the environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's
ratings reflect the potential for future losses under varying
levels of stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses
is now 0.2% of the original pooled balance, compared to 0.5% at the
last review. Moody's provides a current list of base expected
losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of DBUBS 2011-LC1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 9, compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 56.3% to $951.6
million from $2.18 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 81.2% of the pool. One loan, constituting
22.3% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Two loans, constituting 3.4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 0.3% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans that have liquidated from the pool nor are there
any loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 95% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 91.1%, compared to 87.5% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14.6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 1.40X and 1.17X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the Kenwood Towne
Centre Loan ($211.9 million -- 22.3% of the pool), which is secured
by a super-regional mall located in Cincinnati, Ohio. The mall
contains approximately 1.16 million square feet (SF), of which
756,412 square feet (SF) serves as collateral for the loan. Anchor
tenants include Macy's (non-collateral), Dillard's and Nordstrom
(non-collateral). As per the September 2016 rent roll, the mall was
98.8% leased, compared to 99.4% leased as of December 2015. The
loan is sponsored by GGP and The Teachers' Retirement of the State
of Illinois. The loan has amortized 9.6% since securitization and
Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are a1
(sca.pd) and 1.47X, respectively, compared to a2 (sca.pd) and 1.44X
at the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 37.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 7 Hanover Square Loan ($134.3 million --
14.1% of the pool), which is secured by a Class A office building
located within the South Ferry Financial District submarket of New
York City. The property offers 26 stories of rentable space for a
total of approximately 846,415 SF. Guardian Life Insurance Company
of America leases 99.5% of the NRA through September 2019 and has
occupied the building as its headquarters since 1998. Due to the
single tenant concentration, Moody's valuation reflects a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 90.5% and 1.14X,
respectively, compared to 92% and 1.12X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 1200 K Street Loan ($126.5 million
-- 13.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 389,000 square foot
(SF), Class A office building located within the East End submarket
of Washington, DC. The property offers twelve stories of rentable
space retrofitted for single tenant use. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation leases over 97% of the NRA and has occupied the
building since its development. The property is 100% occupied as of
December 2016, the same as at last review. Due to the single tenant
concentration, Moody's valuation reflects a lit/dark analysis.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 104% and 1.01X, respectively,
compared to 99.2% and 1.00X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Marriott Crystal Gateway Loan ($96.4
million -- 10.1% of the pool), which is secured by 697-room, full
service hotel located in the Crystal City area of Arlington County,
Virginia. Hotel amenities include 11 meeting rooms containing
approximately 33,355 SF, indoor/outdoor heated pools, fitness
center, business center, and concierge lounge. The reported
December 2016 trailing twelve month occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were
78.9%, $177.88 and $140.38, respectively. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 103.7% and 1.12X, respectively, compared to 89.6% and
1.30X at the last review.


DBUBS 2011-LC2: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class FX Debt
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DBRS Limited upgraded the ratings on two classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-LC2 issued by DBUBS
2011-LC2 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class C to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D to BBB (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

In addition, the following ratings were confirmed:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-1C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3C at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)
-- Class FX at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool with 43 of the original 67 loans remaining and a collateral
reduction of 34.7% since issuance. The transaction also benefits
from one loan, representing 0.8% of the pool, which is fully
defeased. Performance metrics are healthy with a weighted-average
(WA) in-place debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.65 times (x)
and a WA debt yield of 12.4% based on the most recent year-end
figures reported for the remaining loans in the pool. Those figures
compare well with the DBRS WA Term DSCR and DBRS WA Debt Yield for
those loans at issuance of 1.35x and 9.4%, respectively.

As of the March 2017 remittance, there are seven loans on the
servicer’s watchlist, representing 8.8% of the pool balance, and
one loan in special servicing, representing 0.6% of the pool. The
watchlisted loans report a preceding-year WA DSCR of 1.49x and a WA
debt yield of 11.7%. The loan in special servicing was transferred
in May 2014 when the borrower stopped making payments and has been
real estate owned since April 2015. Given the sharp value decline
for the property since issuance, DBRS anticipates a loss will be
incurred at resolution, currently projected to be contained to the
unrated Class G Certificates.

There is one loan scheduled to mature in the next 12 months,
Prospectus ID#5, 1450 Broadway, representing 7.4% of the pool. The
loan has a relatively low DBRS refinance (Refi) DSCR of 1.1x and
exit debt yield of 8.8%. However, the property’s location in the
highly desirable location of Midtown Manhattan at the Times Square
intersection of 41st Street and Broadway and the relatively low
trust exposure of approximately $270 per square foot mitigates any
concerns with the relatively low credit metrics. DBRS expects a
successful refinance at maturity.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans, the specially serviced
loan and the largest 15 loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS IReports
platform. To view these and future loan-level updates provided as
part of DBRS’s ongoing surveillance for this transaction, please
log into DBRS CMBS IReports at www.ireports.dbrs.com.

The ratings assigned to Classes F and FX materially deviate from
the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. The
deviations are warranted because sustainability of loan trends has
not yet been demonstrated.



ETRADE RV 2004-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3(sf) Rating on Class D Debt
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Moody's Investors Service upgraded two tranches and affirmed one
tranche issued from E*Trade RV and Marine Trust 2004-1, a
transaction backed by recreational vehicle (RV) and marine
installment sales contracts.

The complete rating actions are as follow:

Issuer: E*Trade RV and Marine Trust 2004-1

Cl. B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2016 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 13, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades resulted from the build-up of credit enhancement due
to subordination and stable performance of the underlying
collateral over the past several years. The lifetime cumulative net
loss (CNL) expectation remained unchanged at 10.00% since Moody's
last reviews. The original lifetime cumulative net loss expectation
was 2.25% at closing.

While the build-up of credit enhancement due to the sequential pay
deal structure as well as stable performance supports rating
upgrades for the most senior tranches, cumulative losses on the
underlying collateral have depleted the reserve account and eroded
the credit enhancement available to the securities. The transaction
is currently under-collateralized by approximately $3.6 million or
78% of the unrated Class-E principal balance, which is currently
protecting the remaining tranches from the adverse effects of
under-collateralization. As such, the Caa3 rating of the Class D
notes has been affirmed.

Unlike other vehicle-backed ABS, the impact of the weakened economy
on RV transactions was more severe and long lasting due to the
non-essential nature of the underlying collateral, and the longer
financing terms, which on average range between 170 and 185 months
at closing. As a result, the transaction has experienced an
economic downturn during its life.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the March 2017
distribution date) and credit assumptions for the affected
transactions. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL, expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance, as
well as Moody's lifetime remaining CNL expectation and Moody's Aaa
levels, both expressed as a percentage of the current pool balance.
The Aaa level is the level of credit enhancement that would be
consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for the given asset pool.
Performance metrics include pool factor, which is the ratio of the
current collateral balance to the original collateral balance at
closing; total credit enhancement, which typically consists of
subordination, overcollateralization, reserve fund; and excess
spread.

Issuer: E*Trade RV and Marine Trust 2004-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 10.00%; prior expectation (July 2016)
-- 10.00%

Remaining CNL expectation -- 12.96%

Pool factor -- 6.54%

Total credit enhancement (excluding excess spread): Class B --
69.78%, Class C -- 39.83%, Class D-- 4.89%.

Class E Balance - $4,540,760

Overcollateralization - $(3,552,669)

Excess spread per annum -- Approximately 1.4%

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
Methodology for "Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance". If the revised Methodology is implemented as
proposed, the Credit Ratings on RV and Marine ABS issued from
E*Trade RV and Marine Trust 2004-1 are not expected to be affected.
Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "Moody's
Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks
in Structured Finance," for further details regarding the
implications of the proposed Methodology revisions on certain
Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could lead
to an upgrade of the rating. Moody's current expectations of loss
may be better than its original expectations because of lower
frequency of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in
the value of the recreational vehicles and boats that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and the market for
used recreational vehicles and boats are primary drivers of
performance. Other reasons for better performance than Moody's
expected include changes in servicing practices to maximize
collections on the loans or refinancing opportunities that result
in a prepayment of the loan.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's current expectations of loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the recreational vehicles and boats
that secure the obligor's promise of payment. The US job market and
the market for used recreational vehicles and boats are primary
drivers of performance. Other reasons for worse performance than
Moody's expected include poor servicing, error on the part of
transaction parties, lack of transactional governance and fraud.


FREMF 2017-K63: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf' Rating to Class C Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
FREMF 2017-K63 Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates and
Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063:

FREMF 2017-K63 Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
-- $160,330,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,063,400,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000a class X2-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $60,807,000 class B 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,004,000 class C 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable.

Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063
-- $160,330,000b class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,063,400,000b class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000bc class A-M 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,223,730,000ab class X1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $83,610,000abc class XAM 'Asf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only
(b) Guaranteed by Freddie Mac. Ratings are based solely on the
underlying collateral and without respect to the Freddie Mac
guarantee.
(c) Classes A-M and XAM could be rated 'AAAsf' if the Freddie Mac
guarantee would be accounted for.

These ratings are based on the information provided by the issuer
as of March 22, 2017. Fitch did not rate the following classes of
FREMF 2017-K63: the $212,823,435 interest-only class X3, the
$296,433,435 interest-only class X2-B, and the $114,012,435 class
D.

Additionally, Fitch did not rate the following class of Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063: the
$212,823,435 interest-only class X3.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust. The trust's primary assets are 46 loans secured by 46
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
approximately $1.52 billion as of the cut-off date. The Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-063 (Freddie Mac SPC
K-063) represents a pass-through interest in the corresponding
class of securities issued by FREMF 2017-K63. Each Freddie Mac SPC
K-063 security has the same designation as its underlying FREMF
2017-K63 class. All loans were originated specifically for Freddie
Mac by approved Seller Servicers. The certificates follow a
sequential-pay structure.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 70.5% of the properties
by balance and cash flow analysis of 85.2% of the pool.

The transaction has a Fitch stressed debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.96x, a Fitch stressed loan-to-value (LTV) of 121.7% and
a Fitch debt yield of 6.8%. Fitch's aggregate net cash flow
represents a variance of 8.8% to issuer cash flows.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Leverage Than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The pool's
Fitch stressed DSCR and LTV are 0.96x and 121.7%, respectively.
These metrics identify the pool as having higher leverage than
recent comparable transactions. Fitch-rated 10-year K series
Freddie Mac deals had a 2016 average DSCR and LTV of 1.04x and
117.3%, respectively.

More Concentrated than Recent Freddie Mac Transactions: The average
loan size for the transaction is $33 million, which is much higher
than the Fitch-rated Freddie Mac 10-year 2016 average of $17.3
million. Additionally, the pool's loan concentration index (LCI)
score of 302 is worse than the 2016 Freddie Mac 10-year average of
253.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.6% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI; for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to FREMF
2017-K63 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivity to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more severe
scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's NCF, a
downgrade of the 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf' could result.



GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C1: Fitch Affirms 'Dsf' Rating on Cl. G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of GMAC Commercial Mortgage
Securities, Inc. commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2004-C1 (GMACC 2004-C1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of class F reflects sufficient credit enhancement,
due to a sizable subordinate class, and the stable performance of
the one remaining loan, which is collateralized by a single tenant
retail property. The affirmations of the remaining classes reflect
realized losses. To date, $46.3 million (6.4% of the original pool
balance) in realized losses have been experienced.

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 99% to $7.4 million from
$721.4 million at issuance. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting classes G through P.

One Remaining Loan: The one remaining loan is secured by a 230,000
square foot (sf) retail property located in Lombard, IL, which is
approximately 20 miles west of Chicago. The subject is 100% leased
to Carson Pirie Scott (The Bon-Ton Stores, Inc.) through January
2024, co-terminus with the loan's maturity. The store is part of
the Yorktown Center Mall, which is a 1.5 million sf enclosed
regional shopping mall that is also anchored by Von Maur and JC
Penney. As of year-end (YE) 2015, the servicer reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.39x. The loan is fully
amortizing.

Expected Payoff: Class F is expected to be paid in full in
approximately six months with the amortization from the one
remaining loan.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class F remains Stable. Although the credit
enhancement will increase with continued paydown, Fitch has
concerns with a single event risk. Therefore, a rating cap of
'BBsf' is considered appropriate for this concentrated pool. Fitch
does not foresee negative rating migration unless there is material
economic change to the remaining loan.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $473,235 class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.9 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 90%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-1A, B, C, D and E certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1 and
X-2 certificates.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ12: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2013-GCJ12 commercial mortgage pass through certificates,
series 2013-GCJ12.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the relatively stable performance of
the underlying collateral pool since issuance. As of the March 2017
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 10.2% to $1.075 billion from $1.197 billion at issuance.
Twelve loans (20.3% of the pool) are on the master servicer's watch
list, five of which Fitch considers a Loan of Concern (FLOC;
10.6%). Interest shortfalls are affecting class G.

Stable Performance: The pool has experienced relatively stable
performance since issuance. Based on the most recent full-year
2015/2016 financial statements for reporting loans, the pool's
overall net operating income has increased 3.4% since issuance. The
transaction has no delinquent or specially serviced loans, and no
losses have been incurred to date. No loans are currently
defeased.

Material Amortization: All loans are now amortizing. The
transaction had no full-term interest only (I/O) loans and all
partial I/O loans (33% of the pool) have transitioned into their
amortization periods. The pool is scheduled to pay down 17.9% from
cutoff to maturity, based on the loans' scheduled maturity balances
at issuance. The pool has already paid down 10.7% since issuance,
which was accelerated by the full pre-payment of the $57.0 million
Condyne Industrial Portfolio loan (4.8% of the original pool), the
fourth largest loan at issuance. Per the March 2017 remittance,
current scheduled principal payments are $2.14 million per month.

Loans Of Concern: Five loans (10.6% of the pool) have been
identified as FLOC's, including two (8.1%) of the top 15 loans --
both of which are multifamily properties with fluctuating
performance since issuance ($58.5 million Eagle Ridge Village loan
and $28.5 million Woodhawk Club Apartments loan).

Retail Exposure: The largest property concentration comes from
retail properties (37.3% of the pool), with 14 loans (30.2%)
secured by anchored properties. The largest loan in the pool,
Friendly Center (9.1%), is secured by a regional mall with both
Sears and Macy's as anchor tenants.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks on classes A-2 through D remain Stable due to the
relatively stable performance of the pool and sufficient class C/E,
which is expected to increase from continued amortization. Fitch's
analysis included a sensitivity test reflecting a negative stress
scenario on the Eagle Ridge Village property. The Negative Outlooks
on classes E and F reflect the fluctuating performance of the
property since issuance. Downgrades to the classes may be
considered should the property be unable to achieve long-term,
sustainable improvement. A Stable Outlook may be considered should
the property's performance continue to improve and operations
stabilize, and overall pool performance remains stable.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings as indicated:

-- $97.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $313.8 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $105.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $797.4 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $142.2 million* class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $80.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $86.8 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $12 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

*Notional amount and interest only.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the interest-only class X-C or class G certificates.


HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE 2006-BU1: Moody's Ups 2A-1A Debt Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class 2A-1A
from HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-BU1.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-BU1

Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action primarily results from the correction of errors in the
cash-flow model used by Moody's in rating this transaction. In the
modeling used in prior actions, the cash-flow waterfalls were
allocating an incorrect portion of excess cash-flow and realized
losses to senior bonds. These errors have now been corrected, and
rating action on this bond reflects the appropriate allocation of
excess cash-flow and realized losses, as well as the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on those pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


ICG US 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by ICG US CLO 2017-1, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$46,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

ICG US 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 78% ramped as of the closing
date.

ICG Debt Advisors LLC -- Manager Series (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's
four-and-a-half-year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager
may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales
of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2825

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2825 to 3249)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2825 to 3673)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


IMPAC SECURED 2006-5: Moody's Hikes Class 2-B Debt Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of five tranches
from four transactions, backed by Alt-A mortgage loans, issued by
Impac.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Impac CMB Trust Series 2005-8

Cl. 2-B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-1

Cl. 2-B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2013 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2013
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-5

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 10, 2007
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Impac Secured Assets Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-2

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2009 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2007
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools. The rating
upgrades are due to the stable or improved credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating upgrades on Impac 2006-1 are due
to both the improved collateral performance of the related
underlying pool and the stable credit enhancement available to the
bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



IMSCI 2012-2: DBRS Lowers Class G Debt Rating to B(low)
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following eight classes
of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued by
Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc., 2012-2 (IMSCI
2012-2):

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class XP at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class XC at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. In addition, DBRS has downgraded the
following two classes in the transaction:

-- Class F to BB (low) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class G to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

DBRS has also assigned Negative trends to Classes F and G.

The rating downgrades and Negative trend assignments reflect DBRS's
concerns surrounding the third-largest loan, Lakewood Apartments
(Prospectus ID#3; 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
multifamily property located in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in February 2016 for
imminent default. When the loan transferred, DBRS placed the Class
E, F and G certificates Under Review with Negative Implications and
assigned a Negative trend to the Class D certificates. These
actions were most recently affirmed in December 2016.

The subject property has experienced cash flow declines over the
past few years, driven by general economic difficulty in the Fort
McMurray area. The YE2015 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) was
reported at 0.45 times (x), down from the Issuer's underwritten
figure of 1.42x. The borrower, an affiliate of Lanesborough Real
Estate Investment Trust (LREIT), has been in discussions with the
special servicer regarding stabilization plans and the loan was
brought current as of the October 2016 remittance. The loan was
transferred back to the master servicer in late January 2017 and
has been placed on the servicer's watchlist for monitoring.

In December 2016, DBRS toured the subject property along with the
other LREIT owned multifamily assets located in Fort McMurray.
These assets were also in special servicing at the time and all are
secured across this and three other IMSCI transactions. DBRS and an
Issuer representative met with a representative of the sponsor's
management company and, during those meetings and in discussions
with other area professionals, DBRS gathered information about the
outlook for the local economy and the prospects for improvement,
given the construction that is expected to begin in the spring for
damage resulting from the wildfires that swept the area in May
2016. Overall, the feedback was tepidly optimistic for some
improvement in the near term with the medium- to longer-term
outlook harder to gauge before the energy markets begin to show
signs of significant recovery.

Following the visit in December, the Issuer provided YE2016
analysis with cash flow estimates for the property showing further
decline from the YE2015 figures. The rent roll dated January 2017
showed an occupancy rate of 80.0% with average rental rates up from
the prior year, but still below the averages in place at issuance.
Given the sustained downturn in the Fort McMurray economy and only
moderate recovery forecast for the near to medium term, it is
DBRS's expectation that property cash flows will continue to be
depressed and, as such, a stressed cash flow scenario was applied
in the analysis for these rating actions. The resulting analysis
supports the rating downgrades as well as the Negative trends
assigned to the Class F and G certificates, particularly given the
depressed liquidity in the area and the near-term maturity for the
subject loan, scheduled in August 2017.

The loan benefits from full recourse to LREIT, Shelter Canadian
Properties Limited (SCPL) and SCPL’s parent company, 2668921
Manitoba Ltd. It is noteworthy that, in its YE2016 financial
statements, LREIT noted one forbearance agreement as well as four
other agreements that had been negotiated with lenders for five
outstanding mortgage loans secured by properties in Fort McMurray
to reduce the monthly debt service expense for the balance of the
mortgage terms.

As of the March 2017 remittance, the pool had an aggregate balance
of approximately $204 million, representing a collateral reduction
of 15.1% since issuance as a result of the repayment of two loans
(representing 5.5% of the original pool balance) and scheduled loan
amortization. Five loans, representing 10.2% of the pool, are
secured by fully defeased collateral, which are all scheduled to
mature by YE2017. Prior to YE2017, four non-defeased loans,
representing 21.2% of the pool, have scheduled maturity dates.
These loans include Lakewood Apartments and three other loans that
are generally showing healthy performance metrics, with the
exception of the smallest, Clyde Avenue Industrial (Prospectus
ID#23; 1.51% of the pool), which showed a YE2015 DSCR of 1.03x and
is one of six loans on the servicer's watchlist, collectively
representing 21.8% of the pool.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans as well as for the largest
15 loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.

The rating assigned to Class XC materially deviates from the lower
rating implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviation for the notional class is warranted as
it is less likely to be adversely affected by collateral credit
losses supported by historical performance of Canadian CMBS, in
which total losses in the sector are less than 0.01% since
inception in 1998.


IMSCI 2013-3: DBRS Cuts Class G Certs Rating to B(low)
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following eight classes
of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-3
issued by Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc., Series
2013-3 (IMSCI 2013-3):

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. In addition, DBRS has downgraded the
following two classes in the transaction:

-- Class F to B (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class G to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

DBRS has also assigned a Negative trend to Classes F and G.

The rating downgrades and Negative trend assignments reflect DBRS's
concerns surrounding three loans secured by multifamily properties
in Fort McMurray: Lunar and Whimbrel Apartments (Prospectus ID#10;
3.2% of the pool), Snowbird and Skyview Apartments (Prospectus
ID#11; 3.0% of the pool) and Parkland and Gannet Apartments
(Prospectus ID#17; 2.6% of the pool). These loans collectively
represent 8.8% of the current pool balance and all three were
transferred to special servicing in February 2016 as a result of
imminent default. When the loans transferred, DBRS placed the Class
E, F and G certificates Under Review with Negative Implications, a
status that was most recently affirmed in December 2016.

The collateral properties have been negatively affected by the
sustained downturn in the Fort McMurray economy with the YE2015
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) well below 1.0 times (x) for
each loan. The borrower, an affiliate of Lanesborough Real Estate
Investment Trust (LREIT), has been in discussions with the special
servicer regarding stabilization plans and the loans were brought
current as of the October 2016 remittance. The loans were
transferred back to the master servicer in late January 2017 and
have been placed on the servicer's watchlist for monitoring.

In December 2016, DBRS toured the subject properties along with the
other LREIT owned multifamily assets located in Fort McMurray.
These assets were also in special servicing at the time and all are
secured across this and three other IMSCI transactions. DBRS and an
Issuer representative met with a representative of the sponsor's
management company and, during those meetings and in discussions
with other area professionals, DBRS gathered information about the
outlook for the local economy and the prospects for improvement,
given the construction that is expected to begin in the spring for
damage resulting from the wildfires that swept the area in May
2016. Overall, the feedback was tepidly optimistic for some
improvement in the near term with the medium- to longer-term
outlook harder to gauge before the energy markets begin to show
signs of significant recovery.

Following the visit in December, the Issuer provided YE2016
analysis with cash flow estimates for each property showing further
decline from the YE2015 figures. Occupancy rates as of the January
2017 rent rolls showed a range of 55.6% to 65.3%, relatively flat
from the figures at February 2016. Average rental rates remain well
below the issuance figures at each property. Given the sustained
downturn in the Fort McMurray economy with only moderate recovery
forecast for the near to medium term, it is DBRS's expectation that
property cash flows will continue to be depressed and, as such, a
stressed cash flow scenario was applied in the analysis for these
rating actions. The resulting analysis supports the rating
downgrades and Negative trends assigned to the Class F and G
certificates, particularly given the depressed liquidity in the
area and the relatively near-term maturity for the Fort McMurray
multifamily loans, scheduled in February 2018.

The loans benefit from full recourse to LREIT and a
partial-recourse guarantee (25.0%) to 2668921 Manitoba Ltd. It is
noteworthy that, in its YE2016 financial statements, LREIT noted
one forbearance agreement and four other agreements that had been
negotiated with lenders for five outstanding mortgage loans secured
by properties in Fort McMurray to reduce the monthly debt service
expense for the balance of the mortgage terms.

As of the March 2017 remittance, six loans are on the servicer's
watchlist, representing 20.5% of the pool balance. Three of those
loans are the previously discussed LREIT loans while the other
three loans, representing 11.7% of the pool, are on the watchlist
for occupancy declines at the respective collateral properties. All
three of those loans have full recourse to BTB Real Estate
Investment Trust.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans as well as for the largest
15 loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.  

The ratings assigned to Classes E, F and X materially deviate from
the lower ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. Specifically for Classes E and F, the deviation
is warranted because of the loan-level event risk. As for the
notional class, the deviation is warranted as it is less likely to
be adversely affected by collateral credit losses supported by
historical performance of Canadian CMBS, in which total losses in
the sector are less than 0.01% since inception in 1998.


IMSCI 2013-4: DBRS Lowers Class G Certs Rating to B(low)
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-4 issued by
Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc., Series 2013-4 (IMSCI
2013-4):

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS has also downgraded the following
ratings:

-- Class F to B (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class G to B (low) (sf) from B (sf)

Classes F and G were also assigned Negative trends.

Classes C and D had previously been assigned a Negative trend to
reflect the potential impact of the transfer of the Nelson Ridge
loan (Prospectus ID#4; 7.1% of the pool) to special servicing in
early 2016. The current status of that loan and DBRS's outlook are
discussed below.

These rating actions reflect DBRS's view that the cash flow
declines at the Nelson Ridge property have increased the risk to
the Trust for that loan, which is part of a pari passu whole loan
with an issuance balance of $31.0 million. The subject trust's
portion had an original balance of $23.0 million and the other
note, which had an original balance of $8.0 million, was
contributed to the IMSCI 2014-5 transaction. As of the March 2017
remittance, the whole-loan balance was $26.9 million ($119,402 per
unit). Whereas the subject loan piece represents a relatively
significant portion of the subject trust with 7.1% of the current
pool balance, the other piece represents 2.9% of the current IMSCI
2014-5 pool balance, tempering the risk impact for that Trust with
the collateral property's performance declines in recent years.

In March 2016, following the transfer of the Nelson Ridge loan to
special servicing, DBRS placed the Class E, F and G certificates
Under Review with Negative Implications. That designation had been
maintained and was most recently affirmed in December 2016. The
loan, which is part of a pari passu whole loan secured by a
multifamily property in Fort McMurray, Alberta, was transferred to
the special servicer for imminent default in February 2016. The
loan had previously been monitored on the servicer's watchlist for
occupancy and cash flow declines related to the downturn in the
energy markets that has negatively affected the Fort McMurray and
larger Alberta economy in recent years. The loan showed various
stages of delinquency between March 2016 and September 2016 and was
brought current with the October 2016 payment. The loan was
transferred back to the master servicer in late January 2017. As
occupancy and rental rates have remained depressed compared with
issuance levels over the past several years, DBRS suspects that the
loan was brought current with funds from property sales completed
over the last year or so by the loan sponsor, Lanesborough Real
Estate Investment Trust (LREIT).

In December 2016, DBRS toured the subject property along with the
other LREIT owned multifamily assets located in Fort McMurray.
These assets were also in special servicing at the time and all are
secured across this and three other IMSCI transactions. DBRS and an
Issuer representative met with a representative of the sponsor's
management company and, during those meetings and in discussions
with other area professionals, DBRS gathered information about the
outlook for the local economy and the prospects for improvement,
given the construction that is expected to begin in the spring for
damage resulting from the wildfires that swept the area in May
2016. Overall, the feedback was tepidly optimistic for some
improvement in the near term with the medium- to longer-term
outlook harder to gauge before the energy markets begin to show
signs of significant recovery.

Following the visit in December, the Issuer provided YE2016
analysis that showed an in-place net cash flow estimate below the
YE2015 figure, which showed a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of
1.10 times (x). The January 2017 rent roll showed an occupancy rate
of 79% with an average rental rate of $1,472 per unit.
Comparatively, at issuance, the property was approximately 94%
occupied with an average rental rate of $2,300 per unit. Given the
sustained downturn in the Fort McMurray economy with only moderate
recovery forecast for the near to medium term, it is DBRS's
expectation that property cash flows will continue to be depressed
and, as such, a stressed cash flow scenario was applied in the
analysis for these rating actions.

The resulting analysis supports the ratings downgrades and Negative
trends assigned to the Class F and G certificates, particularly
given the depressed liquidity in the area and the relatively
near-term maturity for the Nelson Ridge loan, scheduled in December
2018. The loan does benefit from full recourse to the sponsor and
guarantors. It is noteworthy that, in its YE2016 financial
statements, LREIT noted one forbearance agreement and four other
agreements that had been negotiated with lenders for five
outstanding mortgage loans secured by properties in Fort McMurray
to reduce the monthly debt service expense for the balance of the
mortgage terms.

As of the March 2017 remittance, there were seven loans,
representing 24.3% of the pool balance, on the servicer's
watchlist. The largest loan on the watchlist is the Nelson Ridge
loan while the second-largest loan on the watchlist is Newbold
Industrial Park (Prospectus ID#7; 4.1% of the pool). It is not
clear why the Newbold loan is on the watchlist as the servicer
reports a January 2017 occupancy rate of 76% and a YE2015 DSCR of
1.49x compared with the issuance occupancy rate of 79% and the
Issuer's underwritten DSCR of 1.44x. The watchlist also includes
another Fort McMurray loan, Franklin Suites (Prospectus ID#12; 3.2%
of the pool). That loan is secured by a full-service hotel and is
scheduled to mature in 2023. The YE2015 DSCR was reported at 0.96x
with cash flows down with the depressed local economy.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans as well as for the largest
15 loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.  

The ratings assigned to Class X materially deviate from the lower
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the deviation is warranted on the
notional class as it is less likely to be adversely affected by
collateral credit losses supported by historical performance of
Canadian CMBS, in which total losses in the sector are less than
0.01% since inception in 1998.


IMSCI 2014-5: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-5 issued
by Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc., Series 2014-5
(IMSCI 2014-5):

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

The Class G certificates have been assigned a Negative trend. All
other trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first-loss piece,
Class H.

In March 2016, following the transfer of the Nelson Ridge loan
(Prospectus ID#17; 2.9% of the pool) to special servicing, DBRS
placed the Class G certificates Under Review with Negative
Implications. That designation had been maintained and was most
recently affirmed in December 2016. The loan, which is part of a
pari passu whole loan secured by a multifamily property in Fort
McMurray, Alberta, was transferred to the special servicer for
imminent default in February 2016. The loan had previously been
monitored on the servicer's watchlist for occupancy and cash flow
declines related to the downturn in the energy markets that has
negatively affected the Fort McMurray and larger Alberta economy in
recent years. The loan showed various stages of delinquency between
March 2016 and September 2016 and was brought current with the
October 2016 payment. The loan was transferred back to the master
servicer in February 2017. As occupancy and rental rates have
remained depressed compared with issuance levels over the past
several years, DBRS suspects that the loan was brought current with
funds from property sales completed over the last year or so by the
loan sponsor, Lanesborough Real Estate Investment Trust (LREIT).

In December 2016, DBRS toured the subject property along with the
other LREIT owned multifamily assets located in Fort McMurray.
These assets were also in special servicing at the time and all are
secured across this and three other IMSCI transactions. DBRS and an
Issuer representative met with a representative of the sponsor's
management company and, during those meetings and in discussions
with other area professionals, DBRS gathered information about the
outlook for the local economy and the prospects for improvement,
given the construction that is expected to begin in the spring for
damage resulting from the wildfires that swept the area in May
2016. Overall, the feedback was tepidly optimistic for some
improvement in the near term with the medium- to longer-term
outlook harder to gauge before the energy markets begin to show
signs of significant recovery.

Following the visit in December, the Issuer provided YE2016
analysis that showed an in-place net cash flow (NCF) estimate below
the YE2015 figure, which showed a debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.10 times (x). The January 2017 rent roll showed an
occupancy rate of 79% with an average rental rate of $1,487 per
unit. Comparatively, at issuance, the property was approximately
94% occupied with an average rental rate of $2,300 per unit. Given
the sustained downturn in the Fort McMurray economy with only
moderate recovery forecast for the near to medium term, it is
DBRS's expectation that property cash flows will continue to be
depressed and, as such, a stressed cash flow scenario was applied
in the analysis for these rating actions. The resulting analysis
supports the Negative trend assigned to the lowest-rated
certificate, Class G, particularly given the depressed liquidity in
the area and the relatively near-term maturity for the loan,
scheduled in December 2018. Although the analyzed probability of
default and loss given default levels showed significant uptick
from the respective issuance metrics for this loan, the overall
impact to the transaction levels was tempered by the subject loan's
relatively small size at 2.9% of the pool compared with the other
piece of the pari passu loan, which represents 7.1% of the
outstanding balance of the IMSCI 2013-4 transaction. The loan also
benefits from full recourse to the sponsor and guarantors. It is
noteworthy that, in its YE2016 financial statements, LREIT noted
one forbearance agreement and four other agreements that had been
negotiated with lenders for five outstanding mortgage loans secured
by properties in Fort McMurray to reduce the monthly debt service
expense for the balance of the mortgage terms.

Additionally, the transaction benefits from collateral reduction of
20.2% because of scheduled amortization and loan repayments. The
weighted-average (WA) DSCR and WA debt yield, as calculated on the
most recently reported year-end cash flows for the underlying loans
in the pool, are 1.50x and 10.6%, respectively. Comparatively, the
DBRS WA DSCR and WA debt yield figures for the pool were 1.40x and
10.0%, respectively, at issuance. Transaction strengths also
include a high concentration of properties located in urban areas
(57.9% of the pool balance), a significant Ontario concentration
with 67.0% of the pool secured by assets in that province and full
or partial recourse to the borrowers for loans representing 84.9%
of the pool.

As of the March 2017 remittance, there are four loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 11.3% of the pool balance. The
largest loan on the watchlist is Fengate Industrial Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#5; 5.8% of the pool), which has been monitored over
the past year for occupancy-related cash flow declines with a
YE2015 DSCR of 1.02x. The second-largest watchlisted loan is the
Nelson Ridge loan, which was previously discussed. Two loans have
upcoming maturity dates scheduled in 2017. Those loans combine for
6.5% of the transaction balance and, based on the most recent
year-end NCF figures, showed a DBRS WA Exit Debt Yield and DBRS
Refinance DSCR of 13.3% and 1.70x, respectively.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans as well as for the largest
loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.

The ratings assigned to Class X materially deviate from the lower
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the deviation is warranted on the
notional class as it is less likely to be adversely affected by
collateral credit losses supported by historical performance of
Canadian CMBS, in which total losses in the sector are less than
0.01% since inception in 1998.

The ratings assigned to Classes C and D materially deviate from the
higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. The deviations
are warranted because sustainability of loan trends has not yet
been demonstrated.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP9: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Csf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four, downgraded two and affirmed 20
classes of JP Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2006-LDP9
(JPMCC 2006-LDP9).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement; Lower Loss Expectations: The upgrades
reflect increased credit enhancement from loan payoffs, scheduled
amortization and resolution of specially serviced loans/assets at
better recoveries than previously modeled. Fitch modeled losses of
42.8% of the remaining pool; expected losses on the original pool
balance total 16.7%, including $409 million (8.4% of original pool
balance) in realized losses incurred to date. Modeled losses at the
last rating action were 18.5% of the original pool balance.

Fitch Loans of Concern; Adverse Selection: The downgrade of classes
A-J and A-JS reflects a greater certainty of loss. Fitch has
designated 31 loans/assets (86% of current pool) as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs), including 28 loans/assets in special servicing
(55.9%). Of the assets in special servicing, 14 of them (20.6%) are
real-estate owned. The non-specially serviced loans identified as
FLOCs are generally due to high leverage (when current cash flow is
considered) or tenancy-related issues. Identified risks include
modified debt, low debt service coverage ratio, near term rollover
and underperforming properties in secondary markets.

Pool Concentrations: The pool is concentrated with only 38 of the
original 253 loans remaining. Office and retail loans/assets
comprise 42% and 33.1% of the current pool, respectively. The
largest loan, 131 South Dearborn, comprises 24.8% of the pool and
was modified into A/B notes. The top five loans represent 62.7% of
the pool and the top 15 loans represent 87.1%. In addition,
interest-only loans account for 76.7% of the pool and partial
interest-only loans represent 16.3%.

Loan Maturities: The loan maturities for the non-specially serviced
loans include 17.1% of the current pool in 2018, 1.3% in 2019,
24.8% in 2020 and 0.9% in 2021. The one loan (1.3%) maturing in
2019 has been defeased.

The largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the specially
serviced Colony IV Portfolio loan (15.2% of pool). The remaining
pool of 20 cross-collateralized industrial and office properties,
which are located across Illinois, Virginia, Massachusetts and New
Jersey, are currently under receivership. The special servicer
indicated the borrower has agreed to foreclosure and documents are
in the process of being finalized.

The next largest contributor to Fitch-modeled losses is the 131
South Dearborn loan (24.8%), which is secured by a 1.5 million
square foot office property located in the Central Loop submarket
of Chicago, IL. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
May 2014 for imminent default. The borrower requested for loan
modification discussions due to the primary tenant at that time,
JPMorgan Chase wanting to downsize, the announcement of another
large tenant, Seyfarth Shaw LLC, planning to vacate in 2017, ahead
of its 2022 lease expiration, and the upcoming expiration of
another large tenant, Citadel, in October 2017.

The loan was modified in July 2016, along with the formation of a
new ownership structure in Angelo Gordon and Hines. Modification
terms included the birfurcation of the trust debt into a $200
million A-note and a $36 million B-note, the extension of loan
maturity for five years through December 2020 and the reduction of
the current pay interest rate on the A-note to 4.50%. In exchange
for the loan modification, the new borrower contributed $27 million
of guaranteed new equity, funded a $7.5 million additional reserve
account for leasing and capital cost, paid $9.8 million in closing
costs and spent $10 million to buyout the prior sponsor.

The loan was returned to the master servicer in November 2016. As
of the January 2017 rent roll, the property was 94.8% occupied.
Recent leasing updates include Constellation Brands signing a new
lease for a portion of the former Seyfarth Shaw space (11% of the
net rentable area [NRA]) commencing in March 2018 and expiring
February 2033; JPMorgan Chase extending its lease on 17% of the NRA
through December 2023, Holland and Knight extending its lease on
6.9% of the NRA through July 2019, Sprout Social entering into a
direct lease on the seventh floor (4.2%) through January 2028 and
Citadel entering into a direct lease on the ninth and 11th floors
(5.7%) through December 2023.

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 80.6% to $951 million from
$4.89 billion at issuance. Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$63.8 million are affecting classes AJ and A-JS through NR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-3SFL and A-3SFX reflect the high
credit enhancement and expected continued paydowns and repayment of
this class within the next few months. The Stable Outlooks on
classes A-M and A-MS reflect the increasing credit enhancement.
Further upgrades were limited and are unlikely due to concerns of
pool concentration and adverse selection. Fitch applied an
additional sensitivity analysis with increased loss expectations to
the specially serviced loans/assets and estimated recoveries are
adequate to cover class A-M and A-MS. Distressed classes (those
rated below 'Bsf') may be subject to further rating actions as
losses are realized.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was reviewed or provided in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:

-- $29.5 million class A-3SFL to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $14.2 million class A-3SFX to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Stable;
-- $224.1 million class A-M to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

-- $121.4 million class A-MS to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

-- $318.5 million class A-J to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 40%;
-- $106.3 million class A-JS to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 40%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $72.8 million class B at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $24.3 million class B-S at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $22.8 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.6 million class C-S at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $7.1 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $2.4 million class D-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1S, A-2, A-2S, A-2SFL, A-2SFX, A-3 and A-1A
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class NR
certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2012-CIBX: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2012-CIBX, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2012-CIBX:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eleven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.3% of the
current balance, compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMCC 2012-CIBX.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, compared to 25 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $943 million
from $1.288 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 45 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 56% of the pool. Five loans, constituting 12% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $157,593 (for a loss severity of less
than 1%). One loan is currently in special servicing. The specially
serviced loan is the Amite Crossing Loan ($6.2 million -- 0.7% of
the pool), which is secured by an unanchored 37,681 square foot
(SF) retail center located in Denham Springs, a suburb of Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. In August 2016, the property received flood
damage from heavy rains. The property is insured for flooding
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the
borrower is currently funding repair costs and operating deficits
until the insurance claim is finalized. Once FEMA has administered
the claim, the loan can then be returned to the master servicer.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 71% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 97%, compared to 90% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.47X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.54X and 1.23X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 24% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is theWit Hotel Loan ($82.5 million -- 8.8% of the
pool), which is secured by a 310 room full-service hotel located in
Chicago, Illinois. The property is a boutique hotel product in the
Hilton Doubletree brand. The December 2016 trailing twelve month
occupancy and revenue per available room (RevPAR) were 83% and
$193, respectively, compared to 79% and $168 at securitization.
Despite the increase in RevPAR, expenses have steadily risen since
securitization causing a drop in net operating income (NOI).
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 1.07X, respectively,
compared to 102% and 1.19X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 100 West Putnam Loan ($74.1 million
-- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 156,000 square foot
class A suburban office building located in Greenwich, Connecticut.
The property is also encumbered by a $16 million B Note. As of
December 2016, the property occupancy decreased to 70%, compared to
100% occupied at the prior review. The decrease in occupancy was
driven partly by the departure of a large tenant from
securitization in the first half of 2016. The property's tenant mix
heavily driven by tenants in the hedge fund industry. Moody's A
Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 127% and 0.81X, respectively,
compared to 101% and 0.96X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Jefferson Mall Loan ($65.7 million --
7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 281,000 SF portion of a
957,000 SF regional mall located in Louisville, Kentucky. The
mall's anchors, which are not part of the collateral, include
Sears, Macy's, Dillard's and J.C. Penney. In January, Macy's
announced they would be closing their store at this location before
the end of 2017. CBL & Associates Properties (CBL), the mall's
sponsor, then purchased the Macy's parcel. Additionally, CBL has
purchased the Sears parcel and leased it back to them on a 10-year
lease with termination options for CBL with 6 months advanced
notice. In-line occupancy and sales per square foot were 100% and
$398, respectively, as of December 2016, compared to 98% and $395
in December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 120% and 0.95X,
respectively, compared to 99% and 1.04X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2017-JP5: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating to Cl. E-RR Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2017-JP5 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2017-JP5:

-- $43,930,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82,828,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $396,306,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69,023,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $836,131,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,917,000b class X-B'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,015,000b class X-C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71,044,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,917,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,015,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,888,000a class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27,325,000ac class D-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,691,000ac class E-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $17,761,000ac class F-RR;
-- $38,254,046ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5% of the fair value of all classes of regular certificates issued
by the issuing entity.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
March 29, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 43 loans secured by 59
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,092,982,047 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association and
Starwood Mortgage Funding VI LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 87.4% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 92.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage: The pool's leverage statistics are slightly
better than those of other recent Fitch-rated, fixed-rate
multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.20x is
slightly more favorable than the YTD 2017 average of 1.17x and
similar to the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of
102.1% is better than average when compared with the YTD 2017 and
2016 averages of 106.1% and 105.2%, respectively.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans
representing 14.6% of the pool have investment-grade credit
options. The proportion of investment-grade credit opinion loans in
this securitization exceeds the YTD 2017 and 2016 average
concentrations of 5.8% and 8.4%, respectively. The two largest
loans in the pool, Hilton Hawaiian Village (7.3% of the pool) and
Moffett Gateway (7.3% of the pool), both have investment-grade
credit opinions of 'BBB-*' on a stand-alone basis. The two loans
have a weighted average Fitch DSCR and Fitch LTV of 1.50x and
64.0%, respectively.

Concentrated Pool by Loan Size: The largest 10 loans account for
56.6% of the pool, which is above the YTD 2017 and 2016 averages of
50.4% and 54.8%, respectively. The pool's loan concentration index
(LCI) is 427, which is above the YTD 2017 average of 348 and the
2016 average of 422.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 13.5% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
JPMCC 2017-JP5 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


JPMBB COMMERCIAL 2014-C21: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C21 (the Certificates),
issued by JPMBB Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C21 as
follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-C at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-D at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class NR.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited by the transaction since issuance in 2014. The collateral
consists of 73 fixed-rate loans secured by 84 commercial
properties. As of the February 2017 remittance, the pool had an
aggregate balance of approximately $1.25 billion, representing a
collateral reduction of 1.4% as a result of scheduled loan
amortization.

The pool is primarily concentrated by four property types, as 20
loans, representing 33.0% of the pool, are secured by retail
properties (four of which are regional malls, representing 19.6% of
the pool); 16 loans (27.7% of the pool) are secured by office
properties; 17 loans (17.8% of the pool) are secured by multifamily
properties; and six loans (14.2% of the pool) are secured by hotel
properties. By geographical location, the pool is relatively
diverse, as the largest concentration by state is California with
seven loans (19.6% of the pool), followed by Virginia with six
loans (14.2% of the pool), Florida with eight loans (9.2% of the
pool) and Texas with eight loans (9.2% of the pool). Six loans
(11.5% of the pool) are structured with full interest-only (IO)
terms, while an additional 18 loans (36.2% of the pool) have
partial IO periods remaining, ranging from two month to 28 months.


To date, 18 loans (19.1% of the pool) have reported YE2016 net cash
flow (NCF) figures, while 68 loans (95.6% of the pool) have
reported partial-year 2016 NCF figures (most being Q3 2016) and 72
loans (99.5% of the pool) have reported YE2015 NCF figures. As
calculated on the YE2015 NCF figures, the transaction had a
weighted-average (WA) amortizing debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and WA debt yield of 1.62 times (x) and 10.6%, respectively,
compared with the DBRS issuance figures of 1.48x and 9.4%,
respectively.

Based on the most recent NCF figures (both partial-year and
YE2016), the Top 15 loans (59.6% of the pool) reported a WA
amortizing DSCR of 1.77x compared with the DBRS issuance figure of
1.58x, which is reflective of a WA NCF growth of 19.0%. There are
two loans (12.5% of the pool) in the Top 15 exhibiting NCF declines
as compared with the DBRS issuance figures, with declines ranging
from 9.4% to 16.8%. These two loans include Showcase Mall
(Prospectus ID#1, 8.3% of the pool) and Westminster Mall
(Prospectus ID#5, 4.2% of the pool). Both loans are secured by
regional malls, both of which have recently experienced vacancy
increases; however, the increase in vacancy at Showcase Mall is
relatively minor, while Westminster Mall has recently seen positive
leasing momentum. DBRS will monitor these loans for developments
through the full year-end reporting.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are three loans (1.4% of
the pool) in special servicing and seven loans (6.2% of the pool)
on the servicer's watchlist. One of the loans in special servicing
was transferred after the borrower refused to fund monthly escrows,
and another loan was transferred when the borrower advised that
debt service shortfalls could no longer be funded out of pocket.
The third loan is expected to be returned to the master servicer in
the near term. Of the seven loans currently on the servicer's
watchlist, one loan (0.8% of the pool) was flagged because of
deferred maintenance, while the remaining six loans (5.4% of the
pool) were flagged because of recent declines in occupancy and/or
near-term tenant rollover. Based on the most recent cash flow
reporting (partial-year 2016 financials), these six loans reported
a WA amortizing DSCR of 1.03x, compared with the DBRS issuance
figure of 2.09x, which is reflective of a WA amortizing NCF decline
of 18.3%.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated both the Miami International Mall
(Prospectus ID#3, 4.8% of the pool) and 307 West 38th Street
(Prospectus ID#12 2.8% of the current pool balance) loans as
investment grade. DBRS confirms that the performance of both loans
remains consistent with investment-grade loan characteristics.


JPMCC 2012-CIBX: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings on the following classes of JPMCC
2012-CIBX Mortgage Trust:

-- Class C to AA (low) (sf) from A (high) (sf)
-- Class D to A (low) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)

DBRS has also confirmed the remaining classes as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4FX at AAA (sf)

DBRS does not rate Class NR, the first-loss piece. All trends are
Stable.

The rating upgrades reflect the overall stable performance of the
pool since issuance with 45 loans remaining of the original 53
loans. Since issuance, there has been a collateral reduction of
26.6%. The transaction also benefits from defeasance collateral as
five loans, representing 12.4% of the pool, including four loans in
the Top 15, are fully defeased. Performance metrics are healthy
with a weighted-average (WA) in-place debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.59 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 11.6% based on the
most recent year-end figures reported for the remaining loans in
the pool. Those figures compare well with the DBRS WA Term DSCR and
DBRS WA Debt Yield for the remaining loans at issuance of 1.40x and
10.1%, respectively, indicating healthy overall cash flow growth
since issuance.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are seven loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 9.6% of the pool balance, and
one loan in special servicing, representing 0.7% of the pool. The
watchlisted loans report a preceding-year WA DSCR of 1.62x and a WA
debt yield of 13.0%. The loan in special servicing was transferred
in September 2016 as a result of flood damage in August 2016 after
heavy rains. The borrower completed repairs to remediate mold
growth and was insured for flood damage; however, the borrower
requested that the loan be transferred to the special servicer to
access reserves. The loan is expected to be returned to the Master
Servicer when payment for the flood damage is received.

There is one loan scheduled to mature in the next 12 months,
representing 2.3% of the pool. The loan, One Upland Road
(Prospectus ID#17), matures in January 2018 and has a strong DBRS
refinance DSCR of 1.66x and an Exit Debt Yield of 13.0% based on
the preceding net cash flow figure.


LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: Moody's Cuts Class X Debt Rating to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
and downgraded the ratings on seven classes in LB Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-C3 as follows:

CL. A-1A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-MB, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable ranges.
The ratings on two P&I classes, Classes F and G, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus
realized losses.

The ratings of six P&I classes were downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's previously expected.

The rating on the IO class, Class X, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or weighted average rating
factor of WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 9.5% of the
current balance, compared to 10.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.0% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/
Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LBCMT 2007-C3.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of six, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 53.7% to $1.5
billion from $3.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 28% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 83.5% of the pool. Seven loans,
constituting 5.4% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Twenty-six loans, constituting 81.3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $229.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 53.5%). Four loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the University Mall Loan ($92.0 million -- 6.1% of the pool),
which is secured by a 610,000 SF enclosed regional mall located in
South Burlington, Vermont. The property is the largest enclosed
mall in Vermont and is anchored by Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Bon-Ton,
Hannaford, and Sears. The property was transferred to the special
servicer in July 2015 due to imminent monetary default.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 50 & 64 Danbury
Loan ($66.6 million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by two
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted Class A suburban office
buildings located in Wilton, Connecticut. The properties total
265,000 square feet. One tenant, D.L. Ryan Companies, Ltd (31% of
combined square footage) announced that they will not be renewing
their lease when it expires in December 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Walgreens
Eastpointe Loan ($5.7 million -- 0.4% of the pool), which is
secured by a stand-alone Walgreens located in Eastpointe, Michigan.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in June 2014 due
to imminent maturity default. Moody's analysis incorporated a
Lit/Dark approach to account for the single-tenant exposure.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $117.7 million loss for specially
serviced loans (72% expected loss on average). Moody's has also
assumed a high default probability for seven poorly performing
loans, constituting 4.4% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $14.4 million (a 22% expected loss based on
average) from these troubled loans.

As of the March 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $41.8 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 and full or partial year 2016
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 85%, compared to 97% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.80X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.06X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 57.2% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 237 Park Avenue Loan ($419.6 million -- 28%
of the pool), which is secured by a 1.2 million SF Class A office
building occupying the whole city block between 45th and 46th
Streets and Lexington and Park Avenues. The property was purchased
in 2013 by a partnership between RXR and Walton Street Capital and
included the assumption of the trust's first-lien position. Major
tenants at the property include JPMorgan (22% of NRA), J Walter
Thompson (16%) and Jennison Associates, LLC (14%). The property was
63% leased as of June 2016 and has an upcoming loan maturity date
in June 2017.

The second largest loan is the Rosslyn Portfolio Loan ($310.0
million -- 21% of the pool), which is secured by the fee interests
in two Class A office buildings, totaling 1.4 million SF, located
in Arlington, Virginia. The portfolio has experienced several major
tenant departures including Northrop Grumman which vacated in 2012
and the County of Arlington. Current major portfolio tenants
include Raytheon, Sinclair Television Stations, and Sands Capital
Management. The portfolio was 65% leased as of September 2016. The
loan has an upcoming maturity date in June 2017.

The third largest loan is the 300 West 6th Street Loan ($127.0
million -- 8.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 447,000 SF
Class A office building built in 2002 and located in the Austin,
Texas CBD. Major tenants include Facebook, Cirrus Logic, Inc.,
McKool Smith, PC. The property was 93% leased as of September 2016
and the loan has an upcoming maturity date in June 2017.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-C3, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-C3:

Cl. C, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2016 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 22, 2016
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with the expected recovery of principal and interest
from specially and troubled loans, as well as concerns regarding
the potential for future interest shortfalls from the special
serviced loans.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-CL) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 37% of the
current balance, compared to 24% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 10.5% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-CL was Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LB-UBS 2006-C3.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 88% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 12% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $67.3
million from $1.70 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four mortgage loans ranging in size from 5.6% to
76.8% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 11.6% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $143 million (for an average loss
severity of 34%). Three loans, constituting 88.4% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is the 1 Allen Bradley Drive
Loan ($51.7 million -- 76.8% of the pool), which is secured by a
462,000 square foot (SF) office property in Mayfield Heights, Ohio.
The property is 100% leased to Rockwell Automation, Inc. through
November 2020. The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2016 due to maturity default as the borrower has been unable to
secure refinancing. Due to the single tenant nature of the
property, Moody's value incorporated a "lit/dark" analysis. The
loan is paid through January 2017.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the New England
Building Loan ($4.03 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured
by a six-story, Class B office building in downtown Topeka, Kansas.
The building was built in 1911 and was renovated in 1922 and again
in 1998. The property has been virtually 100% occupied by various
departments of the State of Kansas. The property is currently
occupied by the Department for Children & Families and the
Department of Aging both of which have a lease expiration date in
January 2018. Due to the tenant concentration at the property,
Moody's value incorporated a "lit/dark" analysis. The loan
transferred to special servicing in February 2016 due to maturity
default. The loan is paid through February 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the CVS -- Nashville
Loan ($3.75 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by a CVS
Health in Nashville, Indiana approximately 45 miles south of
Indianapolis. The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2016 due to maturity default. Monthly tenant rents are being paid
directly to the receiver from the tenant. Two loan extension
requests received from Borrower recently have been declined. Due to
the single tenant nature of this loan, Moody's value incorporated a
"lit/dark" analysis. The loan is paid through November 2016.

The one performing loan is the City Centre Loan ($7.82 million --
11.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 38,970 square foot
unanchored retail center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As of
December 2016, the property was only 56% leased and the largest
tenants at the property include Total Rental Care Inc, and Sardis
Chicken. The loan is on the watchlist for its poor occupancy and
low DSCR. Moody's has identified this loan as a troubled loan.

Moody's has estimated an aggregate loss of $25 million (a 37%
expected loss on average) from the pool of specially serviced and
troubled loans.



LCM XXIV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by LCM XXIV Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$387,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$63,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$33,000,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

LCM XXIV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans that are secured by a valid first priority
perfected security interest and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing
date.

LCM Asset Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's 5.25 year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2795

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2795 to 3214)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2795 to 3634)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


MARATHON CLO IX: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Marathon CLO IX
Ltd./Marathon CLO IX LLC's $575.0 floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by broadly syndicated senior secured term
loans.

The ratings reflect:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated, speculative-grade, senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement, provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Marathon CLO IX Ltd./Marathon CLO IX LLC  

Class                      Rating            Amount (mil. $)
A-1A                       AAA (sf)                  378.125
A-1B                       AAA (sf)                   18.750
A-2                        AA (sf)                    78.125
B (deferrable)             A (sf)                     37.500
C (deferrable)             BBB- (sf)                  33.750
D (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                   28.750
Subordinated notes         NR                         64.900

NR--Not rated.


MARLBOROUGH STREET: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on the class E notes from
Marlborough Street CLO Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) managed by MFS Investment Management.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its rating on the class D notes from the same
transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 16, 2017, trustee report.

The lowered rating reflects the decline in the underlying
portfolio's credit quality, increase in the obligor concentration
risk, and increase in concentration of long-dated assets (assets
that mature after the legal final maturity of the deal).  The
percentage of "non-performing" obligations held in the portfolio
has increased to 4.37% of the aggregate principal balance of
collateral debt obligations as of the February 2016 trustee report
from zero as of the February 2014 trustee report that S&P used for
its last rating action.  The trustee also reported an increase in
the concentration of assets that mature after the legal final
maturity of the deal.  As a percentage of the total portfolio,
long-dated assets increased to approximately 19.36% from 3.80% over
the same time period, although the notional amount decreased to
$4.44 million from $7.08 million.  These assets could expose the
class E notes to market value risk at the tranches' maturity.

Despite the increased risk in the portfolio, S&P did notice that
the transaction experienced an increase in the
overcollateralization (O/C) levels due to paydowns.  Since S&P's
March 2014 rating actions, the class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, B, and C
notes have been paid down in full, and the class D notes have
started receiving paydowns.  Following the Jan. 18, 2017, payment
date, the outstanding balance of class D is about 84.90% of its
original balance.

According to the Feb. 16, 2016, trustee report; the O/C ratios for
each class have increased since the February 2014 trustee report.

   -- The class D O/C ratio is 183.88%, up from 110.31%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio is 107.74%, up from 105.00%.

Though the application of the largest obligor default test, a
supplemental stress test included in S&P's criteria, resulted in a
failure of the class E notes at the 'CCC (sf)' level, S&P
downgraded the notes to 'B+ (sf)' because of the relatively stable
O/C levels.

The affirmed rating reflects adequate credit support at the current
rating level, though any further deterioration in the credit
support available to the notes could results in further ratings
changes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

RATING LOWERED

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.
               Rating
Class     To           From

E         B+ (sf)      BB- (sf)

RATING AFFIRMED

Marlborough Street CLO Ltd.
Class         Rating
D             BBB+ (sf)


MERCER FIELD II: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Mercer Field II CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$560,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$84,100,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Us$50,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D-1 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D-1 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$34,000,000 Class D-2 Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D-1 Notes, and the Class D-2 Notes are
referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Mercer Field II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments purchased with
principal proceeds, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
second lien loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is
approximately 75% ramped as of the closing date.

Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $875,000,000

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3200

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3200 to 3680)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D-1 Notes: 0

Class D-2 Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3200 to 4160)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -2

Class D-1 Notes: -1

Class D-2 Notes: -1


MERRILL LYNCH 2002-CANADA: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and upgraded the ratings on two classes in Merrill Lynch Financial
Assets Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-Canada 8:

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. K, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. X-2, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Class J and K were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 31% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-1 and X-2, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of less than
0.05% of the current balance, compared to 1.1% at Moody's last
review. Moody's anticipates minimal losses from the remaining
collateral in the current environment. However, over the remaining
life of the transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to
the environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's
ratings reflect the potential for future losses under varying
levels of stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 and Cl. X-2
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of MLFA 2002-Canada 8.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, compared to 10 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $12 million
from $468 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 75% of the pool. Four loans, constituting
25% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by Canadian
government securities.

One loan, constituting 7% of the pool, is on the master servicer's
watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio
review guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council
(CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing
monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to
assess which loans have material issues that could affect
performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and there are currently
no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 19%, compared to 31% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.73X and >4.00X,
respectively, compared to 1.49X and >4.00X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 47% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Edmonton Industrial Portfolio Loan (Prospectus
IDs: 29 and 44) ($2.4 million -- 19.7% of the pool), which is
secured by two cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted industrial
properties located in Edmonton, Alberta. The properties total over
183,000 square feet (SF) and are 100% leased to the sole tenant
Purolator. The tenant's leases both expire in March 2020. The loan
is fully amortizing and is full recourse to the sponsor. Due to the
single tenant exposure, Moody's value incorporated a lit/dark
analysis. The loan has amortized approximately 72% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 21% and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to 23% and >4.00X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the CLA-ASC-741024 Loan (Prospectus ID:
23) ($1.9 million -- 15.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
73,550 SF anchored retail/office strip center located in Ancaster,
Ontario. The property was 100% leased as of March 2016, compared to
92% leased in March 2015. The loan is fully amortizing and is full
recourse to the borrower. The loan has amortized approximately 75%
since securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 15% and
>4.00X, respectively, compared to 17% and >4.00X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the CLA-MFAM-758861 Loan (Prospectus ID:
39) ($1.5 million -- 12.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
88-unit multifamily property located in Toronto, Ontario. As of
December 2015, the property was 100% leased, unchanged from the
prior year. The loan is fully amortizing and is full recourse to
the borrower. The loan has amortized approximately 62% since
securitization and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 26% and 3.97X,
respectively, compared to 28% and 3.70X at the last review.


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-MKB1: Moody's Hikes Class M Debt Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on three classes in Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2004-MKB1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-MKB1 as follows:

Cl. L, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes L and M were upgraded based primarily on an
increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 15% since Moody's last
review.

The ratings on the Classes N and P were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Class XC, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.6%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of MLMT 2004-MKB1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 13, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $10.6 million
from $980 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 5% to
51% of the pool.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $15.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 44%). There are currently no loans on the master
servicer's watchlist or in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 79% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 63%, compared to 55% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 24% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.48X and 4.50X,
respectively, compared to 1.65X and 4.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three performing loans represent 89% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Georgetown Medical Plaza Office Building
($5.4 million -- 51% of the pool), which is secured by a 71,000 SF
medical office building located in Indianapolis, Indiana. The loan
has passed its anticipated repayment date of March 2014 and has a
final maturity date in March 2034. The property is master leased to
Clarion Health Partners through July 2018. Clarion subleases the
space to two other medical providers. Due to the tenant
concentration, Moody's value incorporates a lit/dark analysis.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 106% and 1.02X, respectively.

The second and third largest loans are each under $2.5 million and
are fully amortizing. The 24955 Pacific Coast Highway Loan matures
in January 2023 and is secured by a suburban office building in
Malibu, California. The Beaverton Town Square Loan matures in March
2019 and is secured by a shopping center in Beaverton, Oregon. The
financial performance of the properties securing these loans have
been stable. Both loans have a Moody's LTV below 30% and a stressed
DSCR above 3.50X.



MERRILL LYNCH 2006-CANADA: Moody's Ups Cl. XC Debt Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one interest
only class in Merrill Lynch Financial Assets, Inc., Series
2006-Canada 18, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-Canada 18 as follows:

Cl. XC, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO Class, was upgraded based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's does
not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in the current
environment. However, over the remaining life of the transaction,
losses may emerge from macro stresses to the environment and
changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings reflect the
potential for future losses under varying levels of stress. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model in
formulating a rating recommendation. The large loan model derives
credit enhancement levels based on an aggregation of adjusted
loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios.
Major adjustments to determining proceeds include leverage, loan
structure and property type. Moody's also further adjusts these
aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan
level diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 20, 2016 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.3% to $4.3
million from $590.2 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one remaining mortgage loan and the deal has had
an aggregate realized of less than 0.1% based on the original
pooled balance.

The one remaining loan is the Cote Vertu Multifamily Loan ($4.3
million -- 100.0% of the pool), which is secured by a freestanding
multi-family building comprised of 97 units located approximately
twelve kilometers west of the Montreal CBD. The property contains
48 one-bedroom, 48 two-bedroom and one three-bedroom unit. Per the
May 2015 rent roll, the property was 93.8% leased. The loan is a
fully recourse to the borrower and matures in November 2017.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 0.96X, respectively,
compared to 98% and 0.94X at the last review.


MILL CITY 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes B(sf) Ratings on Class B2 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2017-1 (the Notes) issued by Mill City Mortgage
Loan Trust 2017-1 (the Trust) as follows:

-- $241.7 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $32.2 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $24.1 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $23.7 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B2 at B (sf)

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 38.85% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 30.70%,
24.60%, 18.60%, 14.00% and 9.95% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of primarily
first-lien, seasoned, performing and re-performing residential
mortgages and home equity lines of credit mortgage loans (HELOCs).
The Notes are backed by 1,660 loans with a total principal balance
of approximately $395,316,146 as of the Cut-Off Date (February 28,
2017).

The loans are approximately 110 months seasoned and all are current
as of the Cut-Off Date, including 28 bankruptcy-performing loans.
Approximately 43.3% and 58.9% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for the past 36 months and 24
months, respectively, under the Mortgage Banker Associations
method.

The portfolio contains 58.9% modified loans. Within the pool, 507
loans have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates to
5.6% of the total principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 89.1% of the
modified loans. In accordance with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 5.9% of the loans
are designated as QM Safe Harbor, less than 0.1% as QM Rebuttable
Presumption and 0.1% as non-QM. Approximately 94.0% of the loans
are not subject to the QM rules.

Approximately 16.5% of the pool are HELOCs, of which 97.8% are
first liens and 2.2% are second liens. These loans have a fixed
credit limit for a 120-month draw period and then amortize for the
remaining 240 months subject to a decreasing credit limit. HELOC
borrowers may make draws on the mortgage up to the credit limit
until maturity, which will increase the current principal balance
of such loans. In addition, HELOC borrowers may also experience
payment shocks when the amortization period begins. As of the
Closing Date, Mill City Depositor, LLC (the Depositor) will fund a
HELOC Draw Reserve Account to purchase future draws from the
related servicer. For a detailed analysis of the HELOCs included in
the pool, refer to the HELOC section in Key Probability of Default
Drivers of the report.

Through a series of transactions, Mill City Holdings, LLC (Mill
City) will acquire the mortgage loans on the Closing Date. Prior to
the Closing Date, the loans were held in one or more trusts that
acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and 2016. Such trusts are
entities of which the Representation Provider or an affiliate
thereof holds an indirect interest. Upon acquiring the loans, Mill
City, through a wholly owned subsidiary (the Depositor), will
contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, Mill City will
acquire and retain a 5% eligible vertical interest in each class of
securities to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to
satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.

These loans were originated and previously serviced by various
entities through purchases in the secondary market. As of the
Cut-Off Date, the loans are serviced by Resurgent doing business as
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (68.9%) and Fay Servicing, LLC
(31.1%).

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M2 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The ratings reflect transactional strength in that the underlying
assets have generally performed well through the crisis.
Additionally, a satisfactory third-party due diligence review was
performed on the portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance,
payment history, data capture as well as title and lien review.
Updated broker price opinions or exterior appraisals were provided
for 100.0% of the pool; however, a reconciliation was not performed
on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
provider (CVI CVF II Lux Master S.à.r.l.), certain knowledge
qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS
criteria for seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1)
significant loan seasoning and relative clean performance history
in recent years, (2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including a
delinquency review trigger and a breach reserve account.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C9: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class H Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C9
issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2013-C9 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. At issuance, this transaction
consisted of 60 loans secured by 77 properties for a total trust
balance of approximately $1.28 billion. As of the March 2017
remittance report, the trust balance was $1.18 billion,
representing collateral reduction of 7.8% resulting from scheduled
amortization and loan repayments with 58 of the original 60 loans
remaining in the pool.

Loans representing 99.0% of the current pool balance are reporting
YE2015 figures with a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and a WA debt yield of 2.0 times (x) and 11.5%,
respectively. The WA net cash flow growth at YE2015 for the top 15
loans was 19.0% over the DBRS issuance figures with a WA DSCR of
2.01x compared with the WA DBRS issuance DSCR of 1.67x.

As of the March 2017 remittance report, there are three loans,
representing 1.3% of the pool, on the servicer's watchlist. There
are no loans in special servicing. Two of the three loans on the
watchlist report healthy DSCR figures and are being monitored for
upcoming tenant rollover with the servicer reporting that all
tenants in question have renewed. The remaining loan on the
watchlist is being monitored for reporting a low YE2016 DSCR.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans as well as for the largest
15 loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-C16: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2014-C16.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The pool's performance and Fitch's loss
projections remain stable since the last rating action. There have
been no material changes to the pool's performance since issuance.

Limited Amortization: The pool has experienced 2.3% of collateral
reduction since issuance. Nine loans representing 25.35 of the pool
are interest-only (IO) for the full term. An additional 13 loans
representing 19.4% of the pool have partial IO periods and have not
yet begun to amortize.

Hotel Concentration: Lodging represents 23.7% of the total pool
balance. There are four loans in the top 15 alone (14.1% of the
pool) that are secured by hotels.

Exposure to Casino Income: The largest (Arundel Mills and
Marketplace) and seventh largest (La Concha Hotel and Tower) loans
in the pool are secured by properties that also include casino
income, which is considered to be more volatile than traditional
commercial income types. Fitch's analysis of these loans included
an additional haircut to reflect this volatility.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains Stable due to stable
collateral performance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative
ratings migration until a material economic or asset-level event
changes the transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $22 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $132.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $72.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $43.9 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $250 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $335.8 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $925.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $69.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $91.8 million class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $91.8 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $47.5 million class C at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class PST at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $72.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $28.5 million class E at 'BB-sf', Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only

Fitch does not rate the class F, G, H or the interest-only class
X-C certificates. The class A-S, B and C certificates may be
exchanged for class PST certificates and vice versa.


NORTHEAST ENERGY: Laurel Machinery Buying Deere 160D for $64K
-------------------------------------------------------------
Northeast Energy Management, Inc., asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania to authorize the sale of
E125 John Deere 160D excavator Serial No. 1FF160DXLBD05117 to
Laurel Machinery for $64,000.

The Debtor is the owner in fee simple of the Property.  Among the
Debtor's assets is its interest in the Property.

S & T Bank is a secured creditor in this proceeding by virtue of a
security interest in the Debtor's equipment and assets with an
aggregate balance due as of the date of filing of $622,696.

The Buyer is an independent bona fide purchaser for value.  

The Buyer has agreed to purchase the said excavator, subject to the
approval of the Court, for the total purchase price $64,000.  The
Buyer is not related to the Seller and its offer on the Debtor's
excavator is a fair market value offer for the respective
property.

The Debtor avers that the sales price is fair and reasonable and is
in the best interests of all parties since the sale will generate
funds for the secured creditor (S & T Bank) - $9,860) and the
remainder for the Debtor's operations including its payment of its
ongoing insurance premiums.  Accordingly, the Debtor asks the Court
enters an order authorizing the sale of the John Deere excavator to
the Buyer upon the terms and conditions as described.

The Debtor asks an expedited hearing on the matter for these
reasons:

   a. The monthly premium is due on April 8, 2017 and it is not
possible to schedule a hearing date before that time;

   b. It is necessary to have an expedited hearing to approve the
financing agreement so that the insurance premiums can be paid;
and

   c. The need for an expedited hearing has not been caused by any
lack of due diligence by the Debtor or its counsel but has been
brought on by the circumstances beyond its control.

The Purchaser can be reached:

          LAUREL MACHINERY
          Jonnet Road, William Penn Highway
          Blairsville, PA 15717

                About Northeast Energy Management

Northeast Energy Management, Inc., based in Indiana, PA, filed a
Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Case No. 17-70032) on Jan.
16,
2017.  The Hon. Jeffery A. Deller presides over the case.  The
petition was signed by Paul G. Ruddy, secretary.  In its petition,

the Debtor estimated $1 million to $10 million in both assets and
liabilities.  Michael J. Henny, Esq., at the Law Office of Michael

J. Henny, serves as bankruptcy counsel.


OHA LOAN 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the refinancing notes issued by OHA Loan Funding
2014-1, LLC (OHA 2014-1):

-- $507,000,000 class A-1-R notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,000,000 class A-2-R notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,000,000 class B-1-R notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,800,000 class B-2-R notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $34,000,000 class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,500,000 class D notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,500,000 class E notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The class A-1, A-2, B-1 and B-2 notes are marked 'PIF'.
Fitch does not rate the subordinated notes.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

OHA 2014-1 issued class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-1-R and B-2-R notes
(collectively, the refinancing notes), and applied the net issuance
proceeds thereof to redeem the existing class A-1, A-2, B-1 and B-2
notes at par (plus accrued interest) on the refinancing date of
March 24, 2017. No other classes of notes were refinanced. Fitch
originally rated the class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D and E notes.

The refinancing notes generally have the same terms as the
previously outstanding classes except that the stated coupons have
changed and the refinancing notes may not be subsequently
refinanced or repriced. Spreads over LIBOR on the floating class
A-1-R and B-1-R notes were reduced to 1.15% and 1.55%,
respectively, from 1.53% and 2.30%. Coupons for the fixed rate
class A-2-R and B-2-R notes were reduced to 2.95% and 3.60%,
respectively, from 3.349% and 4.323%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The reduction in the cost of the liabilities is viewed as credit
positive, and no other material changes were made to the capital
structure as a result of the refinancing. The transaction remains
in its reinvestment period (ending October 2018) and continues to
display stable performance since Fitch's last review in November
2016. All coverage tests continue to pass and the current
portfolio's rating default rate (RDR) and rating loss rate (RLR)
for each applicable rating stress, plus losses to date, remains
lower than the corresponding RDR and RLR modelled for the Fitch
stressed portfolio at close. As a result, the modelled Fitch
stressed portfolio at close continues to serve as a proxy, and an
updated cash flow model analysis was not conducted for this rating
action. Fitch has determined that the class A-1-R and A-2-R notes
shall be assigned the same rating as the original class A-1 and A-2
notes ('AAAsf'/Outlook Stable), class B-1-R and B-2-R notes shall
be assigned the same rating as the original class B-1 and B-2 notes
('AAsf'/Outlook Stable), and that the class C, D and E notes shall
be affirmed at their current rating levels.

The current portfolio, including approximately $37.2 million of
principal cash totals $849.7 million as of the February 2017
trustee report. All collateral quality tests and concentration
limitations are in compliance. The current weighted average spread
(WAS) is 3.75% versus a minimum WAS trigger of 3.60%. Fitch
currently considers 6.0% of the collateral assets to be rated in
the 'CCC' category, based on Fitch's Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
Equivalency Map. The current weighted average Fitch rating factor
is 33.0 ('B') compared to 33.6 ('B/B-') at the last review.
Additionally, approximately 92.1% of the portfolio (excluding cash)
has strong recovery prospects or a Fitch-assigned Recovery Rating
of 'RR2' or higher.

The Stable Outlook on the class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C, D
and E notes reflects the expectation that each class has a
sufficient level of credit protection to withstand potential
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio in stress
scenarios commensurate with such class's rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of the class A-1-R, A-2-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C, D and E
notes may be sensitive to the following: asset defaults,
significant credit migration, and lower than historically observed
recoveries for defaulted assets. Fitch conducted rating sensitivity
analysis on the closing date of OHA Loan Funding 2014-1, LLC,
incorporating increased levels of defaults and reduced levels of
recovery rates, among other sensitivities. Initial Key Rating
Drivers and Rating Sensitivity are further described in the New
Issue Report dated Feb. 17, 2016.

VARATIONS FROM CRITERIA

The indenture contains variations from Fitch's ' Structured Finance
and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating Criteria' because the issuer
is permitted to invest in eligible investments that do not have a
Fitch rating. While the transaction documents permit this, Fitch
expects eligible investments to carry Fitch ratings of 'A' or 'F1'
(maturities up to 30 days), or 'AA-' or 'F1+' (maturities 30 to 365
days). Fitch will monitor the transaction's eligible investments
and may take rating action if their ratings no longer satisfy
criteria or if they are replaced by another investment that does
not satisfy criteria.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool was not
prepared for this transaction. Offering documents for U.S. CLO
transactions do not typically include RW&Es that are available to
investors and that relate to the asset pool underlying the
security. Therefore, Fitch credit reports for U.S. CLO transactions
will not typically include descriptions of RW&Es. For further
information, please see Fitch's Special Report titled
'Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global
Structured Finance Transactions,' dated May 31, 2016.



PALMER SQUARE 2013-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. D-R Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1a-R, A-1b-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R floating-rate
replacement notes from Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2013 that
is managed by Palmer Square Capital Management LLC.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed amended and
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 23,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 17, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the ratings on
the original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square CLO 2013-2 Ltd
Replacement class          Rating         Amount
                                        (mil. $)
A-1a-R                     AAA (sf)      280.000
A-1b-R                     AAA (sf)       25.000
A-2-R                      AA (sf)        37.700
B-R                        A (sf)         31.000
C-R                        BBB (sf)       23.000
D-R                        BB (sf)        18.000
E-R                        B- (sf)         8.500
Junior mezzanine notes     NR              1.300
Subordinated notes         NR             43.986

NR--Not rated.


PREFERRED TERM XVI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.:

US$327,250,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes due March 23,
2035 (current balance of $154,930,593.83), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on November 19, 2015 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);

US$63,650,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes due March 23,
2035 (current balance of $62,341,548.34), Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
previously on November 19, 2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf);

US$77,650,000 Floating Rate Class C Mezzanine Notes due March 23,
2035 (current balance of $87,573,300.96, including capitalized
interest), Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on April 21, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf);

Moody's has also upgraded the rating on the following notes issued
by PreTSL Combination Trust I:

US$5,000,000 Combination Certificates, Series P XVI-1 Certificates
due 2035 (current balance of $1,005,816.11), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on November 19, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.:

US$69,900,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes due March 23,
2035, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on November 19, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf);

US$12,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class A-3 Senior Notes due March
23, 2035, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on November 19, 2015
Upgraded to A1 (sf);

Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd., issued in December 2004, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed by a portfolio of bank
and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

PreTSL Combination Trust I, issued in December 2004, is a trust
that issued combination certificates originally comprising $2.5
million of Class A-1 Notes (current outstanding balance of $1.2
million) and $2.5 million of subordinate income notes issued by
Preferred Term Securities XVI, Ltd.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, the resumption of interest
payments on previously deferring assets, and the repayment of the
Class B notes' deferred interest balance.

The Class A-1 notes have been paid down by approximately 18.4% or
$34.9 million since March 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Additionally, the Class B notes' deferred
interest balance of $6.4 million was paid down in full and the
Class B notes were paid down by 0.3% or $0.2 million, using
diverted excess interest proceeds. The Class A-1 notes will
continue to benefit from proceeds from the redemption of underlying
assets in the pool. Furthermore, the Class C notes' deferred
interest, which was reduced by $2.1 million since March 2016, will
continue to be paid down using excess interest proceeds as long as
the Class B OC test continues to pass.

Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1,
Class A, Class B, and Class C notes have improved to 244.8%,
160.2%, 126.8% and 98.1%, respectively, from March 2016 levels of
205.8%, 144.6%, 115.9% and 92.4%, respectively. Moody's notes that
the Class A and Class B OC tests began passing since March 2016.
Based on the trustee's March 2017 report, the Class A OC test,
reported at 146.60%, was passing the trigger of 128.0%, and the
Class B OC test, reported at 116.05%, was passing the trigger of
115.0%.

Additionally, the total par amount that Moody's treated as having
defaulted declined to $113.8 million from $134.8 million in March
2016 and three previously deferring assets with a total par of
$35.3 million have resumed interest payments since that time.
Moody's also gave full par credit in its analysis to two deferring
assets that meet certain criteria, totaling $32.1 million in par.

The upgrade action on the Series P-XVI-1 combination certificates
reflects the increasing coverage from the underlying components of
the certificates. At issuance, the combination certificates
comprised $2.5 million of Class A-1 notes and $2.5 million of
subordinate income notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XVI,
Ltd. Currently, the combination certificates' rated balance of $1.0
million is backed by $1.2 million of Class A-1 notes and $2.5
million of subordinate income notes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector and the US P&C insurance sector, and a negative outlook on
the US life insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 746)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2: +2

Class A-3: +2

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Series P-XVI-1: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1863)

A-1: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class A-3: -1

Class B: -3

Class C: -2

Series P-XVI-1: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $379.3 million, defaulted and deferring par of $113.8 million, a
weighted average default probability of 12.9% (implying a WARF of
1239), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate
publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not
have public ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric
model developed by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores.
Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors
in the pool relies on the latest FDIC financial data. For insurance
TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's relies on the
assessment of its Insurance team, based on the credit analysis of
the underlying insurance firms' annual statutory financial reports.


REGIONAL DIVERSIFIED 2005-1: Moody's Ups A-2 Debt Rating From B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1 Ltd.:

US$170,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2036
(current balance of $59,327,701.45), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on April 7, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class A-1b Fixed Rate Senior Notes Due 2036 (current
balance of $ 3,489,864.73), Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
April 7, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Notes Due 2036,
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on April 7, 2015 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Regional Diversified Funding 2005-1 Ltd., issued in April 2005, is
a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank trust preferred securities (TruPS) and TruPS CDO tranches.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, the resumption of interest
payments on a previously deferring asset, and corrections to
Moody's modeling.

The Class A-1a and Class A-1b notes have paid down by approximately
15.5% or $10.9 million and $0.6 million, respectively since March
2016, using principal proceeds from the redemption of the
underlying assets and the diversion of excess interest proceeds.
Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1 and
Class A-2 notes have improved to 278.1% and 131.5%, respectively,
from March 2016 levels of 222.0% and 115.3%, respectively. Moody's
gave full par credit in its analysis to one deferring asset that
met certain criteria, totaling $5.0 million in par. Since March
2016, one previously deferring bank with a total par of $10.0
million has resumed making interest payments on its TruPS and one
asset with a total par of $8.0 million has redeemed at par. The
Class A-1 notes will continue to benefit from the diversion of
excess interest due to the failure of the senior subordinate
principal coverage test and the use of proceeds from redemptions of
any assets in the collateral pool.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of prior errors. In
the April 2015 rating action, incorrect modeling assumptions were
used for TruPS CDO tranches in the portfolio. Specifically,
incorrect sector codes were used, leading to overstated
securitization stress being applied. In addition, the wrong
amortization profiles were applied to these assets. The errors have
now been corrected, and actions reflect these changes.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 966)

Class A-1a: +1

Class A-1b: +1

Class A-2: +3

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 2482)

Class A-1a: -3

Class A-1b: -3

Class A-2: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par and (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $174.7 million, defaulted par of $72.4 million, a weighted
average default probability of 18.0% (implying a WARF of 1689), and
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 15.0%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains TruPS issued by small to medium
sized U.S. community banks that Moody's does not rate publicly. To
evaluate the credit quality of bank TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's uses RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed
by Moody's Analytics, to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation
of the credit risk of most of the bank obligors in the pool relies
on the latest FDIC financial data.


RESIX FINANCE 2003-A: Fitch Corrects Feb. 27 Release
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction of a release published Feb. 27,
2017 on Resix Finance Limited 2003-A. It updates the participation
status for RESIX Finance Limited, which was incorrectly stated as
not participating in the rating process in the original release.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has taken the following actions on RESIX Finance
Limited 2003-A, a repackage of notes issued from the synthetic
transaction RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2003-A:

-- Class B9 upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook remains
    Positive;

-- Class B8 marked as 'PIF' from 'BBsf'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Class B9 from RESIX 2003-A is a pass-through of a note in RESI
Finance 2003-A, and the upgrade reflects the upgrade of the
underlying class in September 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis includes rating stress scenarios from 'CCCsf' to
'AAAsf'. The 'CCCsf' scenario is intended to be the most-likely
base-case scenario. Rating scenarios above 'CCCsf' are increasingly
more stressful and less likely to occur. Although many variables
are adjusted in the stress scenarios, the primary driver of the
loss scenarios is the home price forecast assumption. In the 'Bsf'
scenario, Fitch assumes home prices decline 10% below their
long-term sustainable level. The home-price decline assumption is
increased by 5% at each higher rating category up to a 35% decline
in the 'AAAsf' scenario.

In addition to increasing mortgage pool losses at each rating
category to reflect increasingly stressful economic scenarios,
Fitch analyzes various loss-timing, prepayment, loan modification,
servicer advancing, and interest rate scenarios as part of the cash
flow analysis. Each class is analyzed with 43 different
combinations of loss, prepayment and interest rate projections.

Classes currently rated below 'Bsf' are at-risk to default at some
point in the future. As default becomes more imminent, bonds
currently rated 'CCCsf' and 'CCsf' will migrate towards 'Csf' and
eventually 'Dsf'.

The ratings of bonds currently rated 'Bsf' or higher will be
sensitive to future mortgage borrower behavior, which historically
has been strongly correlated with home-price movements. Despite
recent positive trends, Fitch currently expects home prices to
decline in some regions before reaching a sustainable level. While
Fitch's ratings reflect this home price view, the ratings of
outstanding classes may be subject to revision to the extent actual
home price and mortgage performance trends differ from those
currently projected by Fitch.


SASCO 2004-GEL1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M2 Debt to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
tranches issued by Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust
2004-GEL1, which is backed by "scratch and dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust (SASCO) 2004-GEL1

Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 19, 2013
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 18, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades are primarily due to an increase in delinquencies
and the related increase in collateral expected losses. The actions
reflect the recent performance of the underlying pool and Moody's
updated loss expectation on the pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


SEAWALL 2006-1: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to Ba1(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Seawall 2006-1, Ltd.:

Cl. C-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Cl. X, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017 Downgraded
to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's has also downgraded the rating on the following note issued
by Seawall SPC - Series 2005-2:

Cl. C-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2017
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the ratings on two classes of notes issued
by Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. as a result of deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying reference obligation pool as evidenced by
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) and the weighted average
recovery rate (WARR). Moody's has downgraded the rating on one
class of notes issued by Seawall SPC -- Series 2005-2 as a result
of the downgrade of Class C-2 from Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic)
transactions.

Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. is a static synthetic CRE CDO transaction
backed by a portfolio of credit default swaps on commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As
of the February 21, 2017 trustee report, the aggregate issued note
balance of the transaction has decreased to $8.5 million from
$290.0 million at issuance. Additionally, Class X is interest-only
("IO") security referencing the pool of reference obligations.

Seawall SPC - Series 2005-2 is a direct pass-through of the Class
C-2 ("Reference Class") from Seawall 2006-1, Ltd. As of the
February 21, 2017 trustee report, the aggregate issued note balance
of the transaction has decreased to $3.1 million from $11.0 million
at issuance. Since the ratings of Seawall SPC - Series 2005-2 are
linked to the rating of the Reference Class, any credit action on
the Reference Class may trigger a ratings review.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the WARF, the weighted
average life (WAL), the WARR, and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
735, compared to 269 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3(21.8%
compared to 25.9% at last review); A1-A3(0.0% compared to 74.1% at
last review); and Ba1-Ba3 (78.2% compared to 0.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.0 year, the same as at last review. The
WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the underlying
look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 53.7%, compared to 61.5% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, the same as at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X for Seawall
2006-1, Ltd. was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities. If the revised Credit Rating
Methodology is implemented as proposed, ratings of some of the
tranches might change. Please refer to Request for Comment titled
"Moody's Proposes Revised Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities", for further details regarding the
implications of the proposed Credit Rating Methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the ratings of the underlying collateral and credit estimates.
Notching down 100% of the collateral pool by one notch would result
in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of one
notch downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of
Baa3 to Ba1). Notching up 100% of the collateral pool by one notch
would result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated
notes of two notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a ratings
movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-3: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. B-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-3. The certificates are backed
by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans. The assets
of the trust consist of 485 fully amortizing, fixed rate mortgage
loans, substantially all of which have an original term to maturity
of 30 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores,
significant equity in their properties and liquid cash reserves.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-3

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-IO23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-IO25, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.40%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.50% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-3 transaction is a securitization of 485 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $345,210,509. There are more than 107 originators in
this pool, including Quicken Loans Inc. (10.56%) and First Republic
Bank (1.87%). In addition, Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood) acquired approximately 10.86% of the mortgage
loans by stated principal balance from the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Chicago (FHLB Chicago). The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood
from FHLB Chicago were originated by various participating
financial institution originators and purchased by Redwood
according to its acquisition guidelines. None of the originators
other than Quicken Loans Inc. contributed 5.00% or more of the
principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level third
party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting,
property value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has
agreed to backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of
all originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood, which Moody's has
assessed as an aggregator of prime jumbo residential mortgages that
is stronger than its peers. As of the January 2017 remittance
report, there have been no losses on Redwood-aggregated
transactions that closed in 2010 and later, and delinquencies to
date have also been very low.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 481 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review"). For the remaining four loans, Redwood
Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a
TPR firm check for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
four limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that
some of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from the same
originator where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. Redwood acquired 10.86% of the mortgage loans by
outstanding principal balance from the FHLB Chicago. The mortgage
loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB Chicago were originated by
various participating financial institution originators. For these
mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago will provide the loan-level R&Ws that
are assigned to the trust.

The originators and the seller have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee, Master Servicer and Servicers

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee.

We assess the overall servicing arrangement of this pool as
adequate. CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for
servicer oversight, and termination of servicers and for the
appointment of successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is
committed to act as successor if no other successor servicer can be
found. There are three servicers in this pool, including Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (95.05%), Cenlar FSB (3.07%), and First Republic
Bank (1.87%).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-IO1, Cl. A-IO2,
Cl. A-IO3, Cl. A-IO4, Cl. A-IO5, Cl. A-IO6, Cl. A-IO7, Cl. AIO8,
Cl. A-IO9, Cl. A-IO10, Cl. A-IO11, Cl. A-IO12, Cl. A-IO13, Cl.
A-IO14, Cl. A-IO15, Cl. A-IO16, Cl. A-IO17, Cl. A-IO18, Cl. A-IO19,
Cl. A-IO20, Cl. A-IO21, Cl. A-IO22, Cl. A-IO23, Cl. A-IO24, and Cl.
A-IO25 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

In addition, Moody's publishes a weekly summary of structured
finance credit ratings and methodologies, available to all
registered users of Moody's website, www.moodys.com/SFQuickCheck

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


SHACKLETON 2017-X: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Shackleton 2017-X CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$320,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class E Junior Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Shackleton 2017-X is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, unsecured
loans and first-lien last-out loans. The portfolio is approximately
83% ramped as of the closing date.

Alcentra NY, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's approximately four and a half
year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2894

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2894 to 3328)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2894 to 3762)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


SLM STUDENT 2008-7: Fitch Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on
SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-7 (SLM 2008-7):

-- Class A-3 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; removed from Rating Watch
    Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class A-4 downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from
    Rating Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'Asf'; removed from Rating
    Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The class A-4 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
off the notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit based on this agreement; however, it does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Soverign Risk: The trust collateral comprises Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties provided by
eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued
interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Outlook
Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
13.25% and a 39.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 13.25% implies a
constant default rate of 3.85% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.43 years) consistent with the trailing 12-month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3.00% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, Income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 9.9%, 16.1%, 17.4% and 12.8%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.06%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and, for the class A
notes, subordination. As of December 2016, Fitch-calculated total
and senior effective parity ratios (which includes the reserve
account) are, respectively, 101.3% (1.3% CE) and 110.7% (9.7% CE).
Liquidity support is provided by a reserve equal to its floor of
$1,544,879. The transaction will continue to release cash as long
as the specified OC amount of 101.0% (excluding the reserve, as
pool factor is below 40%) is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's SLABS cash flow model indicates that the
class A-4 notes do not pay off before their maturity date in all of
Fitch's modelling scenarios, including the base cases. If the
breach of the class A maturity date triggers an event of default,
interest payments will be diverted away from the class B notes,
causing them to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Since the only
available funds to invest are those held in the Collection Account,
and the funds can only be invested for a short duration given the
payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.  

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'BBsf'; class B 'BBsf';
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.


SLM STUDENT 2008-9: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Tranches to 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on SLM Student
Loan Trust 2008-9 (SLM 2008-9):

-- Class A downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from Rating
    Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable;

-- Class B downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'AAAsf'; removed from Rating
    Watch Negative and assigned Outlook Stable.

The class A notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In downgrading to
'Bsf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered
qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit agreement in
place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full
payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
off the notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit based on this agreement; however, it does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises Federal Family
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans with guaranties provided by
eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued
interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Outlook
Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
14.75% and a 44.25% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 14.75% implies a
constant default rate of 4.26% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.44 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve. The claim reject rate is
assumed to be 0.50% in the base case and 3.00% in the 'AAA' case.

The TTM average of deferment, forbearance, income-based repayment
(prior to adjustment) and constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) are 10.2%, 16.6%, 17.3% and 13.2%, respectively, which
are used as the starting point in cash flow modeling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modeled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be approximately 0.06%, based on information
provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and, for the class A
notes, subordination. As of December 2016, Fitch calculated total
and senior effective parity ratios (which includes the reserve
account) are, respectively, 104.4% (4.3% CE) and 113.8% (12.1% CE).
Liquidity support is provided by a reserve equal to its floor of
$4,175,980. The transaction will continue to release cash as long
as the specified OC amount of 104.17% (excluding the reserve, as
pool factor is below 40%) is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model indicates
that neither the A notes nor the B notes pay off before their
maturity date in any of Fitch's modelling scenarios, including the
base cases. If the breach of the class A maturity date triggers an
event of default, interest payments will be diverted away from the
class B notes.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, Inc. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA VARIATIONS

Under the 'Counterparty Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered
Bonds', dated Sept. 1, 2016, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. Since the only
available funds to invest are those held in the Collection Account,
and the funds can only be invested for a short duration given the
payment frequency of the notes, Fitch does not believe such
variation has a measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

It is important to note that the stresses are intended to provide
an indication of the rating sensitivity of the notes to unexpected
deterioration in trust performance. Rating sensitivity should not
be used as an indicator of future rating performance.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.


STRIPS III: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Class N Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by STRIPs III Ltd./STRIPs III Corp. Master Trust,
Series 2003-1:

Cl. M, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing rating. The
underlying CMBS transactions supporting the cash flows to the
interest only (IO) certificates, which in turn support the STRIPs
2003-1 notes, are nearing their respective maturities. As such, the
remaining cash flows may see some volatility through maturity.
However, these risks are captured in Moody's analysis. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

STRIPs 2003-1 is a pooled re-securitization transaction backed by a
portfolio of three weighted average coupon (WAC) IO certificates
from three CMBS transactions issued from 1999 to 2002. As of the
February 22, 2017 trustee report, the aggregate certificate balance
of the transaction has decreased to $5.1 million from $465.2
million at issuance, with the cash flow from the IO certificates
directed to pay interest and principal in a senior-sequential
manner.

Within the resecuritization pool, the identified weighted average
life is 2.4 years assuming a 0%/0% constant default and prepayment
rate (CDR/CPR).

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Resecuritizations" published in February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Changes in any one or combination of key parameters may have rating
implications on certain classes of rated certificates. However, in
many instances, a change in assumptions of any one key parameter
may be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameters. Cash flows to the underlying IO certificates are
particularly sensitive to changes in recovery rate assumptions for
the underlying CMBS transactions.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.



TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 2007-1: S&P Hikes Turbo 2034 Bonds Rating to BB-
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on eight bonds from Tobacco
Settlement Financing Corp.'s (TSFC's) series 2007-1.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on two bonds from the same series.
The upgrades and affirmations reflect S&P's view of the generally
stable pace of cigarette consumption in recent years, as well as
the positive effects of the transaction debt's continuing
amortization.

TSFC is a tobacco settlement fund securitization.  The bonds are
backed by 76.26% of the total annual tobacco settlement revenues
(TSRs) due to New Jersey under the master settlement agreement
(MSA) between the state and the participating tobacco
manufacturers.  All of the series 2007-1 bonds continue to be
secured by the right, title, and interest to the 76.26% pledged
percentage of New Jersey's share of the TSRs due under the MSA
after the transaction's original sale date.

The class 2007-1B and 2007-1C subordinated capital appreciation
bonds (CABs) were originally structured in 2007 to receive payments
only after every senior class was paid in full.  During that time,
the interest on both classes of CABs accrued by 5.65% and 5.80%,
respectively, and was added to the outstanding balance of each
class.  The original balance at issuance was $126.198 million for
class 2007-1B and $59.785 million for class 2007-1C. Under the 2014
pledge agreements between TSFC and the trustee, TSFC separately
pledged the remaining 23.74% of the total annual TSRs on and after
July 1, 2016, directly to the CABs (15.99% and 7.75% to class
2007-1B and 2007-1C, respectively).  The pledge agreements are
separate from the existing indenture securing the series 2007-1
bonds.  The senior classes of the series 2007-1 bonds, all 2007-1A
serial and turbo tranches, were not affected by the pledge
agreement, and their security and repayment were not altered.  The
CABs' original terms remained the same after the pledge agreements
were executed, except that they are now additionally secured by the
previously unpledged 23.74% TSRs.

Because the senior bonds are subject to optional redemption on or
after June 1, 2017, at par and the CABs are callable on or after
June 1, 2017, at their respective accumulated values, the pledge
agreements did not pledge any collateral until July 1, 2016.  This
makes the April 15, 2017, MSA payment date the first scheduled
payment date for the transaction to receive the additional pledged
TSRs.  Therefore, the first payment to the CABs will be June 1,
2017, at which point class 2007-1B will have a $224.506 million
value, and class 2007-1C will have a $107.973 million value.  In an
effort to have both classes pay in full on the same payment date,
TSFC pledged 15.99% of the TSRs to class 2007-1B and 7.75% to class
2007-1C.

This transaction is unique in that the pledge agreements apply the
additional 23.74% directly to the CABs.  All the senior fees and
operating expenses are paid through the series 2007-1 waterfall
with the TSR from the 76.26% pledged in 2007.  The series 2007-1
CABs will receive the additional TSRs pro rata, with 15.99%
directed to class 2007-1B and 7.75% directed to class 2007-1C.

S&P's rating actions are based on its cash flow modeling analysis
of the scenarios indicated by our criteria, with further
qualitative constraints on tranches with a legal and expected
remaining term exceeding 10 years.  In the case of the 2026 and
2029 turbo bonds, the ratings (before notching for exceeding the
10-year maturity, when applicable) are weak-linked to S&P's rating
on Reynolds American Inc. ('BBB/Stable') because they did not pass
S&P's second-largest participating manufacturer bankruptcy stress.

Since S&P's last rating action, the transaction has benefitted from
cigarette consumption volume higher than what it assumed under its
stress scenarios.  Total modeled cash flows under S&P's 'A'
scenario from 2017 to 2041 are now 8.2% higher than at the time of
S&P's last review.  At that time, the CABs were not expected to
begin receiving cash flows for several years.  This is now
partially mitigated because the remaining nonredemption period is
only a few months; however, this weakness will not be fully
mitigated until the CABs actually start to receive cash payments.

S&P will periodically review this transaction to assess whether the
ratings continue to reflect its view of the transaction's
performance, and S&P will take further rating actions as it deems
appropriate.

RATINGS RAISED

Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp.
US$3.622 bil tobacco settlement assets backed bonds series 2007-1

                             Rating           Rating
Class                        To               From
2007-1A serial 2017          A (sf)           BBB (sf)
2007-1A serial 2018          A (sf)           BBB (sf)
2007-1A serial 2019          A (sf)           BBB (sf)
2007-1A turbo 2023           BBB+ (sf)        BB (sf)
2007-1A turbo 2026           BBB (sf)         B+ (sf)
2007-1A turbo 2029           BBB- (sf)        B (sf)
2007-1A turbo 2034           BB- (sf)         B- (sf)
2007-1A turbo 2041           B (sf)           B- (sf)

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Tobacco Settlement Financing Corp.
US$3.622 bil tobacco settlement assets backed bonds series 2007-1

Class                                     Rating
2007-1B capital appreciation bond 2041    A- (sf)
2007-1C capital appreciation bond 2041    A- (sf)


TOWD POINT 2015-2: DBRS Assigns BB Rating to Cl. 2-B2 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has assigned the following ratings to the Asset Backed
Securities (the Notes) from eight previously issued Towd Point
Mortgage Trust (TPMT) transactions as follows:

TPMT 2015-2:
-- $43.3 million Class 1-A2 at AA (high) (sf)
-- $35.8 million Class 1-M1 at AA (low) (sf)
-- $51.1 million Class 1-M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $36.5 million Class 1-B1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $41.1 million Class 1-B2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E at AA (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E1 at AA (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E1X at AA (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E2 at AA (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E2X at AA (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E3 at AA (high) (sf)
-- $305.7 million Class 1-A2E3X at AA (high) (sf)
-- $11.8 million Class 2-M1 at AA (sf)
-- $11.0 million Class 2-M2 at A (sf)
-- $9.5 million Class 2-B1 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.3 million Class 2-B2 at BB (sf)

TPMT 2015-3:
-- $59.8 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $45.6 million Class M1 at A (high) (sf)
-- $43.6 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $35.0 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $28.1 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class A3 at AA (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class A3A at AA (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class A3B at AA (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class A3C at AA (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class X4 at AA (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class X5 at AA (sf)
-- $386.5 million Class X6 at AA (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class A4 at A (high) (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class A4A at A (high) (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class A4B at A (high) (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class A4C at A (high) (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class X7 at A (high) (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class X8 at A (high) (sf)
-- $432.1 million Class X9 at A (high) (sf)

TPMT 2015-4:
-- $78.7 million Class M1 at A (high) (sf)
-- $83.3 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $70.3 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $67.7 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $78.7 million Class M1A at A (high) (sf)
-- $78.7 million Class M1X at A (high) (sf)
-- $83.3 million Class M2A at BBB (sf)
-- $83.3 million Class M2X at BBB (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class A4 at A (high) (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class A4A at A (high) (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class A4B at A (high) (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class A4C at A (high) (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class X7 at A (high) (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class X8 at A (high) (sf)
-- $654.0 million Class X9 at A (high) (sf)

TPMT 2015-5:
-- $73.5 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $62.8 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $60.6 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $51.6 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class A4 at A (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class A4A at A (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class A4B at A (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class A4C at A (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class X7 at A (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class X8 at A (sf)
-- $581.4 million Class X9 at A (sf)

TPMT 2015-6:
-- $54.2 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $48.9 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $42.6 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $37.8 million Class B2 at B (sf)
-- $54.2 million Class M1A at A (sf)
-- $48.9 million Class M2A at BBB (sf)
-- $54.2 million Class M1X at A (sf)
-- $48.9 million Class M2X at BBB (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class A4 at A (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class A4A at A (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class A4B at A (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class A4C at A (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class X7 at A (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class X8 at A (sf)
-- $509.2 million Class X9 at A (sf)

TPMT 2016-1:
-- $37.1 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $32.1 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $29.4 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class B2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class A4 at A (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class A4A at A (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class A4B at A (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class A4C at A (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class X7 at A (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class X8 at A (sf)
-- $474.2 million Class X9 at A (sf)
-- $506.3 million Class A5 at BBB (sf)

TPMT 2016-3:
-- $48.7 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
-- $32.2 million Class B2 at B (sf)

TPMT 2016-4:
-- $42.2 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $40.9 million Class M1 at A (sf)
-- $27.3 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
-- $31.8 million Class B1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $19.5 million Class B2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $18.2 million Class B3 at B (sf)

DBRS has previously assigned ratings to certain other classes in
the above transactions.

These transactions are backed by pools of seasoned performing and
re-performing first-lien residential mortgages.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
well-performing underlying assets, strong servicers and asset
manager oversight. Additionally, satisfactory third-party due
diligence reviews were performed with respect to regulatory
compliance, payment history and data capture, as well as title and
tax review. Servicing comments were reviewed for a sample of loans.


For these transactions there will not be any advancing of
delinquent principal or interest on any mortgages by the servicer
or any other party to the transaction; however, the servicer is
obligated to make advances in respect of taxes and insurance,
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

The transactions generally employ a sequential-pay cash flow
structure. Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest
shortfalls on the Notes, but shortfalls on the subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The transactions employ relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider with a backstop by an unrated entity,
certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan
representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.
Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and
relative clean performance history in recent years, (2) a
comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a strong representations
and warranties enforcement mechanism, including a delinquency
review trigger and breach reserve accounts.

The DBRS ratings of the Notes from TPMT 2015-2, TPMT 2015-3, TPMT
2015-4, TPMT 2015-5, TPMT 2015-6 and TPMT 2016-1 address the timely
payment of interest and full payment of principal by the legal
final maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the related Notes. The DBRS ratings of the Notes from TPMT 2016-3
address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

For the TPMT 2016-4 transaction, the DBRS ratings of AA (sf)
address the timely payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes. Additionally, for this
transaction the DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (high) (sf),
BB (low) (sf) and B (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest
and full payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the related Notes.

The ratings assigned to Class B1 and Class B2 for the TPMT 2016-3
transaction differ from the ratings implied by the quantitative
model. DBRS considers this difference to be a material deviation,
but in this case, the assigned ratings reflect the low seasoning
and lack of historical performance of the TPMT 2016-3 transaction.




UBS-BARCLAYS 2012-C2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 13 classes of
UBS-Barclays Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C2:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S-EC, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-EC, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C-EC, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. EC, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on ten P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Class EC, was affirmed due to
the weighted average rating factor or WARF of the exchangeable
classes.

The ratings on the two IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were
affirmed based on the credit performance of their referenced
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current balance, compared to 2.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014. The methodology used in rating the exchangeable class, Cl.
EC, was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities"
published in June 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 21, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19% to $986.5
million from $1.216 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 54 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 61% of
the pool. One loan, constituting 4% of the pool, has an
investment-grade structured credit assessment. Three loans,
constituting l% of the pool, has defeased and are secured by US
government securities.

Seven loans, constituting 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and no loans are
currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 85% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 94% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 92%, compared to
93% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.61X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.16X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the 909 Third
Avenue Net Lease Loan ($38.6 million -- 3.9% of the pool), which is
secured by the fee interest in a parcel of land located beneath a
1.3 million square foot (SF) office property located in Manhattan,
New York. The collateral is leased to a Vornado Realty Trust
affiliate and the annual ground lease payments are $1.6 million.
The loan is interest-only throughout the term prior to the
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in May 2022. Moody's current
structured credit assessment is a1 (sca.pd), the same as at last
review.

The top three conduit loans represent 25.2% of the pool balance.
The largest conduit loan is the Crystal Mall Loan ($90.8 million
-- 9.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 518,000 SF portion of a
783,000 SF super regional mall located in Waterford, Connecticut.
The mall was built in 1984 and underwent renovations in 1997 and
2012. The mall contains three anchors: Macy's, Sears, and JC Penney
(Macy's and Sears are not included as collateral for the loan). The
loan was interest-only for the first 24 months and is now
amortizing on a 30-year schedule. The subject is the only regional
mall within a 50 mile radius, but it faces significant competition
from other retail centers including Waterford Commons and Tanger
Outlets. Property performance has declined since 2012 due to
decreased rental revenue. As of September 2016 the total mall was
92% leased, compared to 92% in Sept 2015 and 91% at securitization
and approximately 8.2% of inline space had a lease maturity date
between the fourth-quarter of 2016 and year-end 2017. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.97X respectively, compared to 104%
and 1.09X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the Louis Joliet Mall Loan
($85.0 million -- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 359,000
SF portion of a 975,000 SF regional mall located in Joliet,
Illinois. The mall was built in 1978 and renovated in 2009 to
expand its food court and add a 14-screen movie theater. The mall
is anchored by Macy's, Sears, JC Penney and Carson Pirie Scott &
Co. These anchors are not owned by the borrower and are not
included as collateral for the loan. The loan is interest-only for
the entire term. As of March 2016, the property was 99% leased, the
same as in September 2015. Inline space was 98% leased as of March
2016 and approximately 6% of inline space had a lease expiration
date between the fourth-quarter of 2016 and year-end 2017. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 94% and 1.18X, respectively, compared to
81% and 1.20X at last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Southland Center Mall Loan
($73.2 million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by 611,143 SF
portion of a 903,520 SF super-regional mall located in Taylor,
Michigan. Initial improvements consisted of a standalone Macy's box
built in 1970. A JC Penney box was added in 1976. A box formerly
occupied by Mervyn's was added in 1988 and in-line space was
developed in 1992. The mall is currently only anchored by Macy's
and JC Penny, however, Best Buy is a large junior anchor that
serves as a significant draw to the center. The Macy's box is not
owned by the borrower and is not included as collateral for the
loan. Major tenants in occupancy include Best Buy, Forever 21 and a
Cinemark. As of December 2016, the total property was 97% leased.
Approximately 12% of the net rentable area at the mall (including
Best Buy) has a lease expiration in 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 95% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 87% and 1.18X at
last review.


WELLS FARGO 2012-C7: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s
WFRBS 2012-C7 pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Overall pool performance remains stable and
generally in line with issuance expectations. Based on each loan's
most recent year-end reporting, the weighted average net operating
income increase is 2.2% from issuance. Two loans are defeased
(4.2%). One loan is specially serviced (0.3%) and is real
estate-owned (REO).

High Retail Concentration and Mall Exposure: Retail represents
57.7% of the pool. Four of the top 10 loans, representing 39.5% of
the pool, are malls located across various states, including
California, Georgia, Kentucky, and Michigan. All four malls have
exposure to Sears, JCPenney and Macy's. Two malls, totaling 23.4%
of the pool, are sponsored by General Growth Properties (GGP),
while one (12.4%) is sponsored Simon Property Group, LP.
Additionally, the top 10 loans represent 65.1% of the pool of which
one loan is defeased (3.5%).

Amortization: The entire transaction has a scheduled amortization
of 16.1%, which is higher amortization than a typical recent
vintage transaction. One non-defeased loan (8.9% of pool) is
interest only for the full term and only one loan (6.5%) remains
within its partial interest-only period.

Subordinate Debt and Pari Passu Loans: No loan has subordinate debt
outstanding. However, the largest loan, Northridge Fashion Center,
and three other loans allow for additional mezzanine financing
under specific requirements.

Energy Market Exposure: Three loans (2.3%) within the pool have
exposure to the energy markets in Texas, including the Odessa Hotel
Portfolio (1.1%), identified as a Fitch Loan of Concern due to
deteriorating performance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
pool performance and expected continued paydown. Future upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance; however, upgrades may be limited due to the high retail
concentration. Downgrades, although not likely in the near term,
may be possible should overall performance decline significantly.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $94.4 million class A-1 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $418 million class A-2 notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165.3 million class A-FL notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-FX notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82.8 million class A-S notes at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58 million class B notes at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.4 million class C notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.6 million class D notes at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48.3 million class E notes at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class F notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class G notes at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class H certificates, or the interest-only
class X-B. The aggregate balance of class A-FL may be adjusted as a
result of the exchange of all or a portion of the class A-FL
certificates for the non-offered class A-FX certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2015-LC20: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-LC20 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-LC20 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's expectations
since issuance. The collateral consists of 68 fixed-rate loans
secured by 122 commercial properties, and as of the February 2017
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 1.0% since
issuance. Loans representing 92.2% of the current pool balance are
reporting YE2015 figures, and loans representing 27.3% of the
current pool balance are reporting YE2016 financials. According to
the YE2015 financials, the pool reported a weighted average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.65 times
(x) and 9.5%, respectively. The DBRS WA DSCR and WA debt yield at
issuance were 1.46x and 8.2%, respectively. The largest 15 loans in
the pool represent 56.1% of the transaction balance, and all loans
but two reported YE2015 financials, which showed a slight WA net
cash flow decline of 12.1% over the DBRS figures, with a WA DSCR
and WA debt yield of 1.68x and 8.9%, respectively.

As of the February 2017 remittance, there are three loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 4.0% of the current pool
balance, including one loan in the top 15.


WELLS FARGO 2016-C33: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C33 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-C33 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
pool's underlying collateral since issuance. The collateral
consists of 79 fixed-rate loans secured by 112 multifamily
properties. As of the March 2017 remittance, the transaction has
experienced collateral reduction of 0.7% since issuance as a result
of scheduled loan amortization, with an aggregate outstanding
principal balance of $707.5 million. According to the most recent
reporting (YE2016 or annualized quarterly 2016 financial
reporting), the transaction had a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.89 times (x)
and 13.3%, respectively. In comparison, the WA DBRS Term DSCR and
the WA DBRS debt yield at issuance were 1.65x and 9.8%,
respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool have experienced a
WA positive cash flow growth since issuance of 17.1% over the DBRS
issuance figures.

There are currently four loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 1.8% of the pool balance: Candlewood Suites
Fredericksburg (Prospectus ID#40; 0.7% of the pool balance) has
been flagged for a below threshold DSCR as of Q3 2016; two
low-leverage loans backed by co-op properties have been flagged for
failing to report updated financials; and the smallest loan was
flagged for a drop in occupancy.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
the largest 15 loans in the pool, as well as the Candlewood Suites
Fredericksburg loan, in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform.

The ratings assigned to Classes E, X-E, F and X-F differ from the
higher rating implied by the Large Pool Multi-borrower Parameters.
DBRS considers this difference to be a material deviation from the
methodology, and in this case, the rating reflects the
sustainability of loan performance trends not demonstrated.


WELLS FARGO 2017-RB1: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Ratings on 4 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-RB1 (the Certificates), issued by Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-RB1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class E-2 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-1 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F-2 at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class EF at B (sf)
-- Class G-1 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, D, E-1, E-2, E, F-1, F-2, F, EF, G-1, G-2, G and EFG
have been privately placed.

The Class X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional. DBRS ratings on
interest-only (IO) certificates address the likelihood of receiving
interest based on the notional amount outstanding. DBRS considers
the IO certificates' position within the transaction payment
waterfall when determining the appropriate rating.

The collateral consists of 37 fixed-rate loans secured by 72
commercial and multifamily properties, comprising a total
transaction balance of $637,555,685. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the ratings, reflecting the long-term
probability of loan default within the term and its liquidity at
maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, four loans, representing 10.2% of the total pool, had a
DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x),
a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk, given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 15 loans, representing 55.4%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x and 11 loans,
representing 46.9% of the pool, with refinance (Refi) DSCRs below
0.90x. These credit metrics are based on whole-loan balances. One
of the pool's loans with a DBRS Refi DSCR below 0.90x, 1166 Avenue
of the Americas, representing 4.5% of the transaction balance, has
pieces of subordinate mortgage debt outside the trust. Based on
A-note balances only, the deal's weighted-average (WA) DBRS Refi
DSCR improves marginally to 0.98x.

Term default risk is moderate, as indicated by the relatively
strong WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.63x. In addition, 20 loans,
representing 59.3% of the pool, have a WA DBRS Term DSCR in excess
of 1.50x. One loan, Merrill Lynch Drive, has credit characteristics
consistent with an “A” shadow rating; however, even when
excluding this loan, the deal exhibits a favorable WA DBRS Term
DSCR of 1.58x. Eight loans, representing 44.2% of the pool, are
located in urban markets that benefit from consistent investor
demand and increased liquidity even in times of stress. Urban
markets represented in the deal include New York, New York;
Cambridge, Massachusetts; Los Angeles, California; Seattle,
Washington; San Francisco, California; and New Haven, Connecticut.
Only six loans, representing 10.8% of the pool, are located in
tertiary/rural markets. Four of the largest 15 loans, representing
23.1% of the DBRS sample, received an Above Average
property-quality grade and no loans received Below Average or Poor
property-quality grades. Higher-quality properties are more likely
to retain existing tenants/guests and more easily attract new
tenants/guests, resulting in a more stable performance.

The pool is extremely concentrated based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 22
equal-sized loans. The largest five and ten loans total 34.8% and
57.0% of the pool, respectively. The pool is also highly
concentrated by property type as the office concentration is 54.1%.
Six loans, comprising 19.0% of the transaction balance, are secured
by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to a single
tenant. This includes three of the largest 15 loans: The Davenport,
Merrill Lynch Drive and Art Van Portfolio. Loans secured by
properties occupied by single tenants have been found to suffer
higher loss severities in an event of default. As such, DBRS
applied a higher probability of default and cash flow volatility to
single-tenant properties compared with multi-tenant properties.

The DBRS sample included 22 of the 37 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 41 of the 72 properties in the
portfolio (76.9% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -11.3% from the Issuer's NCF
and ranged from -24.6% (100 Ashford Center) to +1.5% (Merrill Lynch
Drive).

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.



WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes (P)BB Rating on E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust
2017-1:

-- $194,800,000 Class A-1 at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $246,960,000 Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $67,350,000 Class B at AA (sf)
-- $89,860,000 Class C at A (sf)
-- $69,250,000 Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $31,780,000 Class E at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
    addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
    and principal by the legal final maturity date for each class.


-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of the
    auto loan portfolio by origination channels.

-- The capabilities of Westlake Services, LLC (Westlake) with
    regards to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for Westlake originations and performance of the Westlake

    auto loan portfolio.

-- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA (high) with a Negative trend
    and R-1 (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS) has served as a
    backup servicer for Westlake since 2003, when a conduit
    facility was put in place.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Westlake,
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
    for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The collateral securing the notes consists entirely of a pool of
retail automobile contracts secured by predominantly used vehicles
that typically have high mileage. The loans are primarily made to
obligors that are categorized as subprime, largely because of their
credit history and credit scores.

The ratings on the Class A Notes reflect the 42.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization (6.50%). The
ratings on the Class B, C, D and E Notes reflect 33.00%, 21.00%,
11.75% and 7.50% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C7: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating Cl. X-B Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on thirteen
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C7:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eleven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
due to the performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.8% of the
current balance, compared to 1.7% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.6% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of WFRBS 2012-C7.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 15, compared to 16 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 9% to $1.0 billion
from $1.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14.4% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 64.1% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
4.2% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Nine loans, constituting 7.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $3.0 million (for a loss severity of
26%). One loan, the Bloomfield and Northshore Self Storage Loan
($2.9 million -- 0.3% of the pool), is currently in special
servicing. The loan is secured by two self-storage properties
located in Connecticut and Massachusetts. The loan was transferred
to the special servicer in September 2014 due to monetary default.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 0.3% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $2.9 million from the specially serviced and
troubled loans.

Moody's received full and partial year 2015 operating results for
100% of the pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results
for 97% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased
loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 90%, compared to
91% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 17% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.67X and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 1.68X and 1.20X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 36% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Northridge Fashion Center Loan ($145.2 million
-- 14.4% of the pool), which is secured by a pari-passu interest in
a $227.8 million first-mortgage loan, The loan is secured by a
super-regional mall located in Northridge, California that is owned
by GGP, Inc. (GGP). The property, which was built in 1971 and
re-built following the Northridge earthquake in 1994, was further
expanded in 1998, with the addition of a 10-screen Pacific
Theatres. The property is anchored by a Macy's, Macy's Men's &
Home, JCPenney and Sears; all of which own their own stores. Major
tenants that are part of the loan collateral include Pacific
Theatres, Ross Dress for Less, Forever 21, and Old Navy. The
collateral component of the property was 85% leased as of September
2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.06X,
respectively, compared to 93% and 1.04X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Town Center at Cobb Loan ($124.3
million -- 12.4% of the pool), which is secured by a pari-passu
interest in a $191.3 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 560,000 SF portion of a 1.3 million SF super-regional
mall located in Kennesaw, Georgia, approximately 25 miles northwest
of the Atlanta CBD. The property is owned by Simon Properties. The
property is anchored by a Macy's, Macy's Furniture, JCPenney and
Sears; all of which own their own stores. Major tenants that are
part of the collateral include Belk, Forever 21, and Victoria's
Secret. A portion of the JCPenney space is also part of the
collateral. The collateral component of the property was 87%
occupied as of December 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 97%
and 1.03X, respectively, compared to 93% and 1.02X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Florence Mall Loan ($90.0 million --
8.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 384,000 SF component of a
957,000 SF super-regional mall located in Florence, Kentucky,
approximately 12 miles from the Cincinnati, Ohio CBD. The property
is owned by GGP. The property is anchored by a Macy's, Macy's Home
Store, JCPenney, and a Sears; all of which own their own stores.
Major tenants that are part of the collateral include Cinema de
Lux, H&M, Shoe Depot, and Victoria's Secret. The collateral
component of the property was 87% occupied as of September 2016.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.24X, respectively,
compared to 79% and 1.27X at the last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2013-C11 certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Pool Performance: The transaction's credit
enhancement remains sufficient in relation to a slight increase in
base case losses. The overall pool performance has been stable.
There is one loan (1%) that is 90 days delinquent and in special
servicing. There are nine loans (3.7%) on the master servicer's
watchlist. Since Fitch's last rating action an additional four
loans (4.5%) have been defeased bringing the total defeasance to
seven loans (10.3%).

Specially Serviced Loan: The Minot Hotel Portfolio loan (1%) was
transferred to special servicing in November 2015 due to the
borrower's request for a loan modification. The loan is secured by
two limited service hotels with a total of 238 rooms located in
Minot, ND within the Bakken shale region. The decline in
performance was primarily a result of rooms being off-line due to
PIP renovations in addition to weak market conditions and new
supply in the market. The borrower did not fund operating expense
shortfalls and a receiver was appointed in February 2016. The
special servicer is working with the receiver to address immediate
property needs for brand compliance and assessing when to market it
for sale. Based on the most recent appraisal value, losses are
expected.

Energy Concentration: In addition to the specially serviced loan,
the largest (12%) and sixth largest (5%) loans in the pool have
significant exposure to energy related tenants. Fitch's cash flow
analysis reflects the concentration. Fitch will continue to monitor
the performance of these loans due to ongoing concerns with oil and
gas industry.

Loan Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for 61.9% of the
pool balance, which is slightly higher than the average top 10
percentages for Fitch rated transactions in 2011 and 2012 pools
which were 59.9% and 54.2%, respectively, at issuance. No loan
accounts for more than 12% of the pool's balance.

Loan Maturity Schedule: 11% of the loans mature in 2017, 9% mature
in 2018, and the majority of the remaining loans mature in 2022
(29%) and 2023 (42%).

As of the February 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 11.9% to $1.27 billion from
$1.44 billion at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, seven loans
(10.3% of the pool) are defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class G.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating outlooks for the investment grade rated classes remain
Stable due to the overall stable performance of the pool and
continued amortization and defeasance. Upgrades may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance. The
negative outlooks on the below investment grade classes reflect the
concerns with the specially serviced loan. Downgrades are possible
should additional loans default and overall pool performance
declines.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $173.1 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $417.8 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $134.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $25.1 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate
the class G certificates.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C14: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-C14 due to stable
performance since issuance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Based on annualized and full-year 2016
financial statements for reporting loans, the pool's overall net
operating income has increased 3.4% since last year's rating
action. The pool has three Fitch Loans of Concern (1.8%), which
includes two loans on the watchlist (1.0%) and one specially
serviced loan (0.8%). Two loans (0.8%) are defeased.

As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 3.9% to $1.412 billion from
$1.47 billion at issuance. Per servicer reporting there are five
loans (10.6%) on the watchlist. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting the non-rated class G.

Pool Concentration: At issuance, the pool was more concentrated by
loan size and sponsor than average transactions in 2012 and 2013.
The top 10 loans currently represent 60.8% of the pool. In
addition, there is a high concentration of Manufactured Housing
Communities (16.8%).

Limited Amortization: Five loans, representing 30.1% of the pool,
are full term interest-only, and 26 loans, representing 41.2% of
the pool, are partial interest-only. The remainder of the pool
consists of 31 balloon loans representing 28.7% by balance, with
loan terms of five to 10 years. Based on the scheduled balance at
initial loan maturity, the pool will pay down 10.7%.

Watchlist and Specially Serviced Loans: The pool has a real estate
owned (REO) asset that consists of a portfolio of hotels (0.8%) and
five (10.6%) watchlist loans of which two (1.0%) are considered
Fitch Loans of Concern due to the operating issues that the
collateral is experiencing.

Fitch will publish a focus report on the transaction within the
next several days.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for all classes remains stable. Due to the
recent issuance of the transaction and stable performance, Fitch
does not foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a
material economic or asset level event changes the portfolio-level
metrics. Future upgrades may be limited due to the transaction's
high concentration of retail and manufactured housing properties
which exhibit increased long-term performance volatility, but could
occur with sustained improved performance and additional paydown.
Downgrades are possible with significant performance declines.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $5.8 million Class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48.2 million Class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.0 million Class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160.0 million Class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $437.7 million Class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.0 million#, a Class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0.0a million Class A-3FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95.0 million#, a Class A-4FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0.0a million Class A-4FX 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $116.2 million Class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $108.4b million Class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1.1* billion Class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9* million Class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $102.9b million Class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.3b million Class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $111.7b million Class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77.2a million Class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25.7a million Class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.5 million Class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate class G or the interest-only class X-C.

# Floating rate.
* Notional amount and interest-only.
a Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A .
b Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be exchanged for
Class PEX certificates; and Class PEX certificates may be exchanged
for Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates.


[*] DBRS Hikes 3 & Confirms 8 Classes From 8 ABS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 22 ratings from eight U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions. Of the 22 outstanding
publicly rated classes reviewed, DBRS has confirmed 19 classes and
upgraded three classes. For the ratings that were confirmed,
performance trends are such that credit enhancement levels are
sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their current
respective rating levels. For the ratings that were upgraded,
performance trends are such that credit enhancement levels are
sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their new respective
rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
     origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

The Affected Ratings are:

                                 Rating      Rating
                                 Action
Ally Funding Transferor Exclusive Receivables LLC
AFTER Wholesale                 Confirmed   AA (sf)
AFTER Lease                     Confirmed   A (sf)
AFTER Retail                    Confirmed   A (sf)
ARIOT Retail                    Confirmed   AAA (sf)
ARIOT Lease                  Confirmed   AA (sf)

Ally Retail Installment Obligations Transferor LLC
ARIOT Wholesale            Confirmed   AA (sf)

Axis Equipment Finance Receivables III LLC

Series 2015-1 Notes, Class A-2    Confirmed   AAA (sf)
Series 2015-1 Notes, Class B    Confirmed   AA (sf)
Series 2015-1 Notes, Class C    Confirmed   A (sf)
Series 2015-1 Notes, Class D    Confirmed   BBB (sf)
Series 2015-1 Notes, Class E    Confirmed   BB (sf)
Series 2015-1 Notes, Class F    Confirmed   B (sf)  

BCC Funding XII LLC

Loan                           Confirmed   A (sf)

Driver Australia Two Trust

Class A Notes                    Confirmed   AAA (sf)
Class B Notes                    Upgraded    AA (high) (sf)

Lendmark Funding Trust 2016-A
Series 2016-A, Class A          Confirmed   AA (sf)
Series 2016-A, Class B          Confirmed   A (sf)
Series 2016-A, Class C          Confirmed   BBB (sf)

PCARS, LLC
Facility                   Confirmed    AAA (sf)

SNAAC Auto Receivables Trust 2014-1
Series 2014-1 Notes, Class C   Upgraded     AAA (sf)
Series 2014-1 Notes, Class D   Upgraded     A (sf)
Series 2014-1 Notes, Class E     Confirmed    BB (sf)


[*] DBRS Reviews 845 Classes From 70 RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 845 classes from 70 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 845 classes
reviewed, 26 ratings were upgraded, 818 ratings were confirmed and
one rating was discontinued.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating levels. The
rating confirmations reflect current asset performance and that
credit support levels have been consistent with the current rating.
The discontinued rating is the result of full principal payment to
the bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's applying its updated
"RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology" (see the press release "DBRS
Publishes Updated RMBS Insight 1.2: U.S. Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and Rating Methodology," dated
November 28, 2016).

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, Alt-A, scratch and
dent, option adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) and subprime
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect a dependency on another
tranche's ratings, as well as structural features and historical
performance that constrain the rating from the quantitative model's
output.

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-7, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7,
    Class 2-A-X
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9, Fixed Rate Mortgage-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-9, Class 1-A-X
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9, Fixed Rate Mortgage-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-9, Class 3-A-X
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-9, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-9,
    Class 5-A-3
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-10, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-10,
    Class 6-X
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC1, Class A-1
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE2, Class A-2A
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE2, Class A-2B
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE2, Class A-3
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE2, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE2, Class M-1
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE4, Class A-4
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WFHE4, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE4, Class M-1
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2007-SHL1, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-SHL1, Class A
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2007-WFHE1, Class A-4
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-WFHE1, Asset-Backed Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2007-WFHE1, Class M-1
-- DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR5, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-AR5, Class X-2
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FF1, Mortgage
    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF1, Class M-1
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF9, Mortgage Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9, Class A1
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF9, Mortgage Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9, Class A4
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF2, Mortgage Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2006-FF2, Class A4
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF8, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-FF8, Class I-A1
-- HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-13, Mortgage Loan Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2005-13, Class X
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A4, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A4, Class 1-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class 5-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A5, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A5, Class T-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class A-X
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2006-S1, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-S1, Class 3-A-4
-- MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2005-2, Mortgage Pass-
    Through Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class 7-A-X
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class A-1
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class A-2d
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-B, Asset-
    Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-B, Class M-1
-- RALI Series 2006-QS2 Trust, Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through

    Certificates, Series 2006-QS2, Class II-A-V

A full text copy of the ratings is available free at:

                         https://is.gd/q61tMH


[*] Fitch Lowers 16 Bonds in 8 Transactions to D
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on already
distressed U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) bonds.
Fitch downgraded 16 bonds in eight transactions to 'D', as the
bonds have incurred a principal write-down. The bonds were all
previously rated 'CCC' or below, which indicates that losses were
possible. Of these 16 bonds downgraded to 'D', the ratings on two
of the classes (in two separate transactions) have simultaneously
been withdrawn, as the only remaining ratings in the transaction
are now 'D' after this committee's actions; as a result, the
ratings are considered immaterial.

Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on 26 additional classes
within two transactions (both of which are in connection with the
simultaneous downgrades and withdrawals referenced in the above
paragraph) as a result of realized losses. The trust balances have
been reduced to $0 or have experienced non-recoverable realized
losses and are no longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to the
agency's coverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades are limited to just the bonds with write-downs. Any
remaining bonds in these transactions have not been analyzed as
part of this review.

A spreadsheet detailing Fitch's rating actions on the affected
transactions is available at http://bit.ly/2nneU38

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While the bonds that have defaulted are not expected to recover any
material amount of lost principal in the future, there is a limited
possibility this may happen. In this unlikely scenario, Fitch would
further review the affected classes.



[*] Moody's Hikes $45.5MM of Scratch & Dent RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches issued from three transactions backed by "scratch and
dent" RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-SEA2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: GSRPM Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2007-QHL1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. G, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions also reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $835.9MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 41 tranches
from 17 transactions issued by various issuers, and backed by
subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-HE2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2016 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WF1

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-8, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 20, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-AM1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2010
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-WM1

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-OPT4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2005-AB2

Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Series
2006-BC1

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2005-BC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 11, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 18 Classes From 5 RMBS Deals
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 18 classes from five
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduit (re-REMIC) transactions
issued between 2008 and 2010.  Of the 18 ratings, S&P placed two
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications and removed seven
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.  Six ratings
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P also
discontinued three ratings.

A portion of the rating actions resolve CreditWatch placements made
on Dec. 23, 2016.  The CreditWatch negative placements reflected
S&P's ongoing review of if interest shortfalls were being properly
applied to the appropriate re-REMIC classes for those outstanding
interest shortfalls incurred on the underlying class.  Based on
S&P's assessment, it believes the impact of interest shortfalls
does not negatively affect S&P's ratings on these classes, pursuant
to its criteria.

The transactions in this review are supported by underlying classes
backed by a mix of fixed- and adjustable-rate prime jumbo and
alternative-A mortgage loans, which are secured primarily by first
liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

             APPLICATION OF INTEREST SHORTFALL CRITERIA

In reviewing these ratings, S&P applied its Aug. 1, 2016, criteria,
"Global Methodology For Rating Retranchings Of ABS, CMBS, And
RMBS," and our interest shortfall criteria as stated in "Structured
Finance Temporary Interest Shortfall Methodology," published Dec.
15, 2015, which impose a maximum rating threshold on classes that
have incurred interest shortfalls resulting from credit or
liquidity erosion.  In applying the criteria, S&P looked to see if
the applicable class received additional compensation beyond the
imputed interest due as direct economic compensation for the delay
in interest payment.  In instances where the class did not receive
additional compensation for outstanding interest shortfalls, S&P
used the maximum length of time until full interest is reimbursed
as part of our analysis to assign the rating on the class.

In instances where the class received additional compensation for
outstanding interest shortfalls, S&P used its cash flow projections
in determining the likelihood that the shortfall would be
reimbursed under various scenarios.

                       CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

S&P placed its 'BB+ (sf)' ratings on classes A2 and A4 from Lehman
Mortgage Trust 2008-5 on CreditWatch with negative implications.
The CreditWatch negative placements reflect S&P's review of
interest shortfalls due to extraordinary expenses, as well as the
extent to which they can be reimbursed.  After verifying with the
trustee if these outstanding interest shortfalls can be reimbursed,
even after the class balances have been reduced to zero, S&P will
take rating actions as it considers appropriate according to its
criteria.

S&P removed its ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications
on seven classes from CSMC Series 2010-2R and Jefferies
Resecuritization Trust 2009-R5 after S&P received information to
successfully assess the impact of interest shortfalls on these
classes.

Ratings on six classes from CSMC Series 2010-8R remain on
CreditWatch, where they were also placed with negative implications
on Dec. 23, 2016.  The CreditWatch negative reflects S&P's ongoing
review with the trustee as to the extent to which the reimbursement
of interest shortfalls from the underlying class has been properly
applied to these re-REMIC classes.  After confirming the
application of the reimbursement based on the deal documents, S&P
will adjust the ratings as it considers appropriate according to
its criteria.

                          DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued its ratings on classes 1-A-3, 1-A-6, and 6-A-5
from J.P. Morgan Resecuritization Trust, Series 2010-4 as they were
paid in full in the February 2017 remittance period.

                         ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

When determining a U.S. RMBS collateral pool's relative credit
quality, S&P's loss expectations stem, to a certain extent, from
its view of how the loans will behave under various economic
conditions.  S&P Global Ratings' baseline macroeconomic outlook
assumptions for variables that we believe could affect residential
mortgage performance are:

   -- An overall unemployment rate of 4.6% in 2017;
   -- Real GDP growth of 2.4% in 2017;
   -- An inflation rate of 2.2% in 2017;
   -- The 30-year fixed mortgage rate will average about 4.1% in
      2017; and
   -- Home price appreciation (HPA) of about 5% in 2017.

S&P's outlook for RMBS is stable.  Although S&P views overall
housing fundamentals overall as positive, it believes the
fundamentals of RMBS still hinge on additional factors, such as the
ultimate fate of modified loans, the propensity of servicers to
advance on delinquent loans, and liquidation timelines.

Under S&P's baseline economic assumptions, it expects RMBS
collateral quality to continue to improve.  However, if the U.S.
economy became stressed in line with S&P Global Ratings' downside
forecast, S&P believes that U.S. RMBS credit quality would weaken.
S&P's downside scenario reflects these key assumptions:

   -- The unemployment rate will rise to 5.0% in 2017;
   -- Downward pressure causes GDP growth to fall to 1.4% in 2017;
   -- Home price momentum slows as potential buyers are not able
      to purchase property; and
   -- While the 30-year fixed mortgage rate falls to 3.6% in 2017,

      limited access to credit and pressure on home prices will
      largely prevent consumers from capitalizing on these rates.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2nfrnsP


[*] S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Frontier-Related Securities Series to B+
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on two series of securities
linked to Frontier Communications Corp. to 'B+' from 'BB-' and
removed them from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative
implications on Dec. 8, 2016.

S&P's ratings on these two classes are dependent solely on its
rating on the underlying security, Frontier Communications Co.'s
7.05% senior debentures due Oct. 1, 2046 ('B+').

The rating actions reflect the March 1, 2017, lowering of S&P's
rating on the underlying security to 'B+' from 'BB-' and its
subsequent removal from CreditWatch, where it was placed with
negative implications on Nov. 4, 2016.

S&P may take subsequent rating actions on these transactions due to
changes in its rating assigned to the underlying security.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackages (SATURNS) Citizen
Communication Debenture-Backed Series 2001-2

US$26.122 million callable units series 2001-2

Class                      Rating
                   To               From
Units              B+               BB-/Watch Neg

PreferredPLUS Trust Series CZN-1
US$34.5 million preferred plus 8.375% trust certificates

Class                      Rating
                   To               From
Certificates       B+               BB-/Watch Neg


[*] S&P Discontinues 'D' Ratings on 34 Classes From 24 CMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on 34 classes
from 24 U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

S&P discontinued these ratings according to its surveillance and
withdrawal policy.  S&P had previously lowered the ratings to 'D
(sf)' on these classes because of principal losses and/or
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P believed would remain
outstanding for an extended period of time.  S&P views a subsequent
upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely under the
relevant criteria for the classes within this review.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2o79WrZ





                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552.

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