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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, April 16, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 105

                            Headlines

A10 TERM ASSET 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
ACACIA CRE 1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 6 Tranches
ACCESS GROUP 2005-B: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes to Ba1
ACIS CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating on Class F-R Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating to Cl. D Debt

ATRIUM IX: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
CANYON CAPITAL 2014-2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-R Debt
CANYON CAPITAL 2015-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-R Debt
CAPLEASE CDO 2005-1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class D Notes
CD 2007-CD5: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Certs to 'B+'

CEDAR FUNDING IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
CFIP CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
COMM 2013-CCRE7: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Debt to B1(sf)
COMM 2014-CCRE17: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Certs
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C3: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. A-M Certs

CSFB MANUFACTURED 2002-MH3: Moody's Ups M-1 Debt Rating From Ba1
CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. G Debt to C(sf)
DBJPM MORTGAGE 2016-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim B on Cl. B-2 Notes
DUANE STREET IV: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes

FIRSTKEY MASTER 2017-R1: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Class M3 Debt
FREMF 2015-K718: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class C Certs
GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C3: Fitch Hikes Rating on Cl. E Notes to CCC
GOLDENTREE LOAN: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Tranches to Csf

GRAYSON CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to B2(sf)
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. G Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2014-GC22: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
JP MORGAN 2002-C3: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class G Certs
JP MORGAN 2004-C1: Moody's Hikes Class N Certs Rating to B1

JP MORGAN 2006-RR1: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt
JP MORGAN 2014-CBM: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Certs
JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. G Debt
LB COMMERCIAL 1999-C1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. J Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl J Certs to B2

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C5: Fitch Affirms CCCsf Rating on Cl. H Debt
LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. C Debt to C
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2016-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E-2 Debt
LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-RR Debt
MADISON PARK VI: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating From Ba1(sf)

MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C10: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. H Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-150E: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. G Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2014-CPT: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class G Certs
MSAT 2005-RR4: DBRS Hikes Class M Debt Rating to BB(sf)
NATIONSTAR HECM: Moody's Takes Action on $278MM of RMBS Deals

RR TRUST 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
SCHOONER TRUST 2007-8: DBRS Confirms C(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
SIERRA TIMESHARE 2013-2: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. C Debt
SLM STUDENT 2012-3: Fitch Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches From 'Bsf'
STACR 2017-DNA2: Fitch Assigns 'B+sf' Rating to 12 Tranches

STRATFORD CLO: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
THAYER PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D Notes
VENTURE X CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-RR Debt
WATERFRONT CLO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Debt
WELLS FARGO 2005-AR4: Moody's Hikes on 2 Tranches to Ba1

[*] Moody's Hikes $237MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
[*] Moody's Hikes $839MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.4BB of RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] S&P Completes Review on 41 Classes From 12 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 42 Classes From 10 CDO Deals

[*] U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Inch Higher in March, Fitch Says

                            *********

A10 TERM ASSET 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the following Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-1 issued by A10 Term Asset Financing
2014-1, LLC:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Classes B and C, which
have had their trends changed to Positive from Stable.

Additionally, the rating assigned to Class A-1 has been
discontinued as the class has been repaid in full.

The rating confirmations and trend changes reflect the overall
stable performance of the pool and the increased credit support to
the bonds as a result of successful loan repayment. The transaction
consists of seven loans secured by nine traditional commercial real
estate assets, including office, retail and industrial properties.
According to the March 2017 remittance, there has been collateral
reduction of 66.1% since issuance, as 12 loans have been repaid in
full and eight properties out of an original 11-property portfolio
loan have been re-leased, with proceeds paying down the portfolio
loan. The remaining loans benefit from low leverage on a per-unit
basis, with the weighted-average debt yield based on the most
recently reported net operating income and outstanding trust
balance at 9.8%, which is moderately stable given that the pool
consists of stabilizing assets.

Most loans were originally structured with three-year terms and
include built-in extensions and future funding facilities meant to
aid in property stabilization, both of which are at the lender's
sole discretion. The reserve account has a current balance of $4.2
million against total potential future funding obligations of $7.4
million. According to the most recent reporting, the collateral
assets have stable debt yields; however, the majority of the
properties continue to perform below their respective stabilization
plans.

The transaction is concentrated, as the largest loan in the
transaction represents 28.9% of the current pool balance. This
loan, Norris Technology Center, is secured by a two-building
flex-office property in San Ramon, California. The loan was
originally structured with a $5.3 million future funding component,
which was to be utilized for renovating the subject into more
traditional office space, along with proceeds for future leasing
activity. To date, $3.4 million of the reserve has been released as
all capital projects have been completed and the borrower
successfully signed new or renewal leases with three tenants in
2016. Adept Technology (25.3% of the net rentable area (NRA)) and
Donor Network West (12.2% of the NRA) signed new ten- and 12-year
leases, respectively, with each tenant receiving $45.00 per square
foot in tenant improvements. The collateral is currently 74.4%
occupied; however, it will fall to approximately 50.0% when
Giga-tronics vacates at its lease expiration at month-end April
2017. According to the servicer, the borrower is discussing either
possibly expanding with Adept Technology or completing a lease with
a new tenant. The current reserve balance of $1.9 million equates
to approximately $12.00 psf of the total potential vacant space.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of the offered notes other
than the Class A-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes, ultimate recovery of
deferred collateralized note interest amounts (inclusive of
interest payable thereon at the applicable rate, to the extent
permitted by law). The transaction is a standard sequential-pay
waterfall.


ACACIA CRE 1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 6 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Acacia CRE CDO 1, Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
Implied losses continue to increase, leaving the transaction
materially under-collateralized which more than offsets any
improvement in the weighted average rating factor (WARF). The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation and
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Acacia CRE CDO 1, Ltd. is a cash transaction whose reinvestment
period ended in April 2008. The transaction is currently backed by
a portfolio of: i) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(80.1% of the pool balance); ii) CRE CDO (17.2%); and iii) asset
backed securities (ABS), primarily in the form of residential
mortgage backed securities (2.7%). As of the February 28, 2017
trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $279.5 million from
$300.0 million at issuance, with principal pay-down directed to the
senior most outstanding class of notes. The pay-down was the result
of a combination of regular amortization and the failing of certain
par value tests.

As of the February 28, 2017 trustee report, the par balance of the
collateral, including defaulted securities, is $23.3 million, which
represents a high under-collateralization as the current note
balance is $279.5 million.

The pool contains three assets totaling $6.8 million (29.3% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's February 28, 2017 report. While there have been
realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's does
expect moderate-to-high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the WARF, the weighted
average life (WAL), the weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's typically models these as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4790,
compared to 5097 at last review. The current distribution of
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral is: A1-A3 and 1.1% compared to 1.5% at last
review; Baa1-Baa3 and 14.3% compared to 1.8% at last review;
Ba1-Ba3 and 0.0% compared to 10.4% at last review; B1-B3 and 34.4%
compared to 27.7% at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 50.2% compared
to 58.5% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.1 years, compared to 2.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral and look-through CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.6%, compared to 0.8% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 37.5%, compared to 34.6% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
However, in light of the performance indicators noted above,
Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced
today are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


ACCESS GROUP 2005-B: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches and confirmed one tranche in five securitizations
sponsored by Access Group. The underlying collateral consists of
private student loans that were extended primarily to graduate and
professional students.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Access Group Inc. Private Student Loan asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-B

2005-B Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 20, 2017 Aa1
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

2005-B Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 20, 2017 B1
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Access Group, Inc. Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2007-A

2007-A-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa; previously on Jan 20, 2017 Aa2 Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

2007-A-B, Upgraded to Baa2; previously on Jan 20, 2017 Ba3 Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Federal Student Loan Asset-Backed
Notes, Series 2001

Cl. II A-1 Group II, Confirmed at A2; previously on Jan 20, 2017 A2
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba1; previously on Jan 20, 2017 B1 Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Private Student Loan Asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-A

2005-A-A-3, Upgraded to Aa3; previously on Jan 20, 2017 A3 Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

2005-A-B-1, Upgraded to Ba2; previously on Jan 20, 2017 B3 Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Access Group, Inc., Series 2003-A

Senior Ser. 2003-A Cl. B, Upgraded to Ba3; previously on Jan 20,
2017 B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of a continued build-up in
overcollateralization as a result of lower than expected defaults.
Additionally, the top-pay senior classes have benefitted from the
rapid deleveraging due to the substantial pay down of the classes
in a sequential-pay structure.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating U.S. Private Student Loan-Backed Securities"
published in January 2010.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
"Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance".
If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit
Ratings on Access Group, Inc., Federal Student Loan Asset-Backed
Notes, Series 2001, Access Group, Inc., Series 2003-A, Access
Group, Inc., Private Student Loan Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes,
Series 2005-A, Access Group Inc. Private Student Loan asset-Backed
Floating Rate Notes, Series 2005-B and Access Group, Inc. Private
Student Loan Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes, Series 2007-A are
not expected to be affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for
Comment, titled " Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to
Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further
details regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology
revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Among the factors that could drive the ratings up are a decrease in
defaults rates, higher recoveries on defaulted loans and/or lower
net losses on the underlying assets than Moody's expects.

Down

Among the factors that could drive the ratings down are an increase
in defaults rates, lower recoveries on defaulted loans and/or
higher net losses on the underlying assets than Moody's expects.


ACIS CLO 2013-2: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating on Class F-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class B-R, C-1-R,
C-2-R, D-R, E-R, and F-R replacement notes from ACIS CLO 2013-2
Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued
in 2013 that is managed by Acis Capital Management L.P.  S&P
withdrew its ratings on the transaction's original class A, B, C-1,
C-2, D, E, F, and combination notes following payment in full on
the April 10, 2017, refinancing date.

On the April 10, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
class B-R, C-1-R, C-2-R, D-R, E-R, and F-R replacement note
issuances were used to redeem the original class B, C-1, C-2, D, E,
and F notes as outlined in the transaction document provisions.
Therefore, S&P withdrew the ratings on the transaction's original
notes in line with their full redemption, and S&P assigned ratings
to the transaction's replacement notes.

ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd. is an amortizing deal that has paid down its
class A notes to 14.86% of the original balance.  As of the
March 6, 2017, monthly trustee report, the deal had approximately
$56.72 million of principal cash, which was used to completely pay
down the outstanding balance of the class A notes on the
refinancing date; therefore S&P withdrew the rating on this
tranche.

Additionally, the combination notes were also paid down in full and
were not refinanced; therefore S&P withdrew its rating on this
tranche as well.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support available
is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the transaction remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take rating
actions as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Replacement class    Rating                Amount (mil. $)
B-R                  AAA (sf)                        69.00
C-1-R                AAA (sf)                        28.00
C-2-R                AAA (sf)                        25.00
D-R                  AA+ (sf)                        31.00
E-R                  BBB+ (sf)                       26.00
F-R                  B+ (sf)                         13.00

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

                        Rating
Original class      To          From
A                   NR          AAA (sf)
B                   NR          AAA (sf)
C-1                 NR          AA+ (sf)
C-2                 NR          AA+ (sf)
D                   NR          A+ (sf)
E                   NR          BB+ (sf)
F                   NR          B (sf)
Combination notes   NR          AA+ (sf)

UNAFFECTED CLASS

ACIS CLO 2013-2 Ltd.

Class                   Rating
Subordinated notes      NR

NR--Not rated.


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2013-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating to Cl. D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Anchorage Capital CLO 2013-1, Ltd.:

US$52,100,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2025,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$35,300,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2025, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$295,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$32,400,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on June 27, 2013 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Anchorage Capital CLO 2013-1, Ltd., issued in June 2013, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in July 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
July 2017. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's
assumed that the deal will continue to benefit from lower weighted
average rating factor (WARF) and higher weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) levels compared to the covenants. Moody's modeled a
WARF of 3027 compared to a covenant of 3232 and a WARR of 50.11%
compared to a covenant of 43%. Furthermore, the transaction's
reported OC ratios have been relatively stable since closing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2422)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: 0

Class A-2b: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3632)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2a: -1

Class A-2b: -1

Class B: -2

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $496.6 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 21.94% (implying a WARF of
3027), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.11%, a
diversity score of 47 and a weighted average spread of 3.86%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


ATRIUM IX: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Atrium IX, a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in February
2013 that is managed by Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.  The replacement class A-R, B-R, and C-R notes are expected
to be issued at a lower spread than the original notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 10,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 20, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also make these changes:

   -- The replacement class B-R notes are expected to be issued at

      a floating rate, replacing the current class B1 floating-
      rate notes and class B2 fixed-rate notes.  The stated
      maturity will be extended 6.25 years.

   -- The reinvestment period will be extended 5.25 years.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Atrium IX/Atrium IX LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             549.56
B-R                       AA (sf)               91.59
C-R                       A (sf)                70.01
D-R                       BBB (sf)              40.27
E-R                       BB (sf)               35.80
Subordinated notes        NR                    88.70

NR--Not rated.


CANYON CAPITAL 2014-2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-R Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Canyon Capital CLO 2014-2, Ltd.:

US$2,700,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$252,000,000 Class A-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class A-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-J Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$29,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$19,000,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-S Notes, the Class A-J Notes, the
Class B-R Notes, the Class C-R Notes, the Class D-R Notes and the
Class E-R Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
loss posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

The Issuer will issue the Rated Notes in connection with the
refinancing of five classes of secured notes (the "Refinanced
Notes"), previously issued on November 20, 2014 (the "Original
Closing Date"). The Issuer will use the proceeds from the issuance
of the Rated Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Notes. On the
Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one class of
subordinated notes, which is not subject to this refinancing and
will remain outstanding.

In addition to changes to the capital structure described above and
to the coupons of the notes, key modifications to the CLO that will
occur in connection with the refinancing include: an extension of
the non-call period, reinvestment period, weighted average life
test and stated maturity of the notes, changes to the collateral
quality matrix and a variety of other changes to transaction
features.

Canyon 2014-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 100% ramped
as of the closing date for this refinancing.

Canyon Capital Advisors LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $399,677,369

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-S Notes: 0

Class A-J Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-S Notes: -1

Class A-J Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -4

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: -1



CANYON CAPITAL 2015-1: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-R Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Canyon Capital CLO 2015-1, Ltd.:

US$2,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$265,200,000 Class A-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$8,500,000 Class A-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-J Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$42,100,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$30,750,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$20,900,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-S Notes, the Class A-J Notes, the
Class B-R Notes, the Class C-R Notes, the Class D-R Notes and the
Class E-R Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
loss posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

The Issuer will issue the Rated Notes in connection with the
refinancing of five classes of secured notes (the "Refinanced
Notes"), previously issued on April 17, 2015 (the "Original Closing
Date"). The Issuer will use the proceeds from the issuance of the
Rated Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Notes. On the Original
Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one class of subordinated
notes, which is not subject to this refinancing and will remain
outstanding.

In addition to changes to the capital structure described above and
to the coupons of the notes, key modifications to the CLO that will
occur in connection with the refinancing include: an extension of
the non-call period, reinvestment period, weighted average life
test and stated maturity of the notes, changes to the collateral
quality matrix and a variety of other changes to transaction
features.

Canyon 2015-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 95% ramped
as of the closing date for this refinancing.

Canyon Capital Advisors LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period, the Manager may
reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of
credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $421,250,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-S Notes: 0

Class A-J Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-S Notes: -1

Class A-J Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -4

Class D-R Notes: -2

Class E-R Notes: -1


CAPLEASE CDO 2005-1: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by CapLease CDO 2005-1 Ltd. Collateralized Debt
Obligations ("CapLease CDO 2005-1, Ltd."):

Cl. A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on five classes of notes because
the key transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings.
The affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO CLO)
transactions.

CapLease CDO 2005-1, Ltd. is currently a static cash transaction;
the reinvestment period ended in October 2009. The transaction is
currently backed by a portfolio of i) commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (28.1% of the collateral pool balance) and ii)
credit tenant lease loans (CTL) (71.9%). As of the trustee's 28
February, 2017 report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $113.2 million,
compared to $300.0 million at issuance, as a result of regular
amortization.

The pool contains three assets totaling $0.9 million (0.8% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted securities as
of the trustee's 28 February, 2017 report. All of these assets
(100% of the defaulted balance) are CMBS. While there have been
limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
1763, compared to 1779 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (11.0%, compared to 11.3% at last
review); A1-A3 (10.4%, compared to 6.8% at last review); Baa1-Baa3
(30.1%, compared to 25.4% at last review); Ba1-Ba3 (13.2%, compared
to 16.7% at last review); B1-B3 (22.8%, compared to 27.6% at last
review); and Caa1-Ca/C (12.5%, compared to 12.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 7.3 years, compared to 4.9 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loans and look-through loans exposures of the CMBS
collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 32.4%, as compared to 33.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.5%, compared to 14.5% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the credit quality of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Holding all other parameters constant, notching down
the 100% of the collateral pool by one notch would result in an
average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of zero to three
notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement
of Baa3 to Ba1). Notching down 100% of the collateral pool by two
notches would result in an average modeled rating movement on the
rated notes of one to three notches downward (e.g., two notches
down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CD 2007-CD5: S&P Raises Rating on Class F Certs to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on 10 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust,
a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.
In addition, S&P lowered its rating on one class and affirmed its
'AAA (sf)' ratings on three other classes from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes AM, A-MA, AJ, A-JA, B, C, D, E,
F, and G to reflect its expectation of the available credit
enhancement for these classes, which S&P believes is greater than
its most recent estimate of necessary credit enhancement for the
respective rating levels.  The upgrades also reflect the trust
balance's reduction, as well as the increase in defeasance (11
loans; $204.1 million, 20.9%).

The downgrade on class H to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' reflects
accumulated interest shortfalls that S&P expects will remain
outstanding for the foreseeable future, as well as credit support
erosion that S&P anticipates will occur upon the eventual
resolution of the six assets ($81.8 million, 8.4%) with the special
servicer (discussed below).

According to the March 16, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
current monthly interest shortfalls totaled $160,580 and resulted
primarily from:

   -- Appraisal subordinate entitlement reduction amounts totaling

      $142,435; and

   -- Special servicing fees totaling $15,936.

The current interest shortfalls affected classes subordinate to and
including class H.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificates
reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit enhancement for
these classes will be within its estimate of the necessary credit
enhancement required for the current ratings.

S&P affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class XS interest-only
(IO) certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the March 16, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $977.2 million, which is 46.7% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 99 loans and two real
estate-owned (REO) assets (reflecting cross-collateralized and
cross-defaulted loans), down from 159 loans at issuance.  Six of
these assets are with the special servicer, 11 loans are defeased,
and 33 loans ($287.1 million, 29.4%) are on the master servicers'
combined watchlist.  The master servicers, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
and Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC, reported financial
information for 95.4% of the nondefeased loans in the pool, of
which 58.1% was partial- or year-end 2016 data, and the remainder
was partial- or year-end 2015 data.

S&P calculated a 1.41x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 80.5% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.90% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.  The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the six specially serviced
assets and 11 defeased loans.  The top 10 nondefeased loans have an
aggregate outstanding pool trust balance of
$298.1 million, (30.5%).  Using servicer-reported numbers, S&P
calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC and LTV of
1.63x and 70.0%, respectively, for eight of the top 10 nondefeased
loans. The remaining two loans are specially serviced and
discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $109.3 million in
principal losses, or 5.2% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 6.5% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the six specially serviced assets.

                       CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the March 16, 2017, trustee remittance report, six assets in
the pool were with the special servicer, LNR Partners LLC (LNR).
Details of the two largest specially serviced assets, both of which
are top 10 nondefeased loans, are:

   -- The largest loan with the special servicer is the Versar
      Center Office Building loan ($26.1 million, 2.7%), which is
      the eighth-largest nondefeased loan in the trust and has a
      total reported exposure of $28.2 million.  The loan is
      secured by a 217,396-sq.-ft. office property in Springfield,

      Va.  The loan was transferred to the special servicer on
      Oct. 14, 2014, for imminent default.  Per LNR, discussions
      with the borrower are ongoing for possible alternative
      resolutions with a potential foreclosure in the near term.
      The reported DSC and occupancy for the nine months ended
      Sept. 30, 2016, were 0.84x and 64.5%, respectively.  A
      $3.8 million appraisal reduction amount (ARA) is in effect
      against the loan.  S&P expects a moderate loss (26%-59%)
      upon the loan's eventual resolution.

   -- The second-largest loan with the special servicer is the
      Parkway Plaza loan ($25.6 million, 2.6%), which is the
      ninth-largest nondefeased loan in the trust and has a total
      reported exposure of $26.7 million.  The loan is secured by
      a 262,624-sq.-ft. retail property in Norman, Okla.  The loan

      was transferred to the special servicer on May 2, 2016, for
      imminent default.  Per LNR, foreclosure on the property was
      filed in September 2016, and a receiver is in place.  LNR
      stated that it will track the foreclosure process while
      discussing workout alternatives with the borrower.  The
      reported DSC and occupancy for the nine months ended
      Sept. 30, 2016, were 1.21x and 89.9%, respectively.  A
      $6.4 million ARA is in effect against the loan.  S&P expects

      a moderate loss upon the loan's eventual resolution.

The four remaining assets with the special servicer each have
individual balances that represent less than 1.2% of the total pool
trust balance.  S&P estimated losses for the six specially serviced
assets, arriving at a 33.2% weighted average loss severity.

RATINGS LIST

CD 2007-CD5 Mortgage Trust
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007-CD5
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To             From
A-4              12514AAE1             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-1A             12514AAF8             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
AM               12514AAG6             AAA (sf)       AA (sf)
A-MA             12514AAH4             AAA (sf)       AA (sf)
AJ               12514AAJ0             AA (sf)        BBB- (sf)
A-JA             12514AAK7             AA (sf)        BBB- (sf)
B                12514AAL5             AA- (sf)       BB+ (sf)
C                12514AAM3             A (sf)         BB- (sf)
XS               12514AAP6             AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
D                12514AAT8             BBB+ (sf)      B+ (sf)
E                12514AAU5             BBB- (sf)      B (sf)
F                12514AAV3             B+ (sf)        B- (sf)
G                12514AAW1             B- (sf)        CCC- (sf)
H                12514AAX9             D (sf)         CCC- (sf)


CEDAR FUNDING IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Cedar Funding IV
CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued
in 2014 that is managed by Aegon USA Investment Management LLC.
The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 5,
2017.   Subsequent information may result in the assignment of
final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 24, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Cedar Funding IV CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding IV CLO LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)             362.35
B-R                       AA (sf)               81.55
C-R                       A (sf)                37.45
D-R                       BBB (sf)              29.30
E-R                       BB (sf)               21.75
Subordinated notes        NR                    55.00

NR--Not rated.


CFIP CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from CFIP CLO 2013-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2013 that is managed by Chicago Fundamental Investment Partners
LLC.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed amended
and restated indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 11,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 20, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed amended and
restated indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of
the replacement notes, specifies the below amendments:

   -- The replacement class A-R, D-R, and E-R notes are expected
      to be issued at a higher spread than the original notes.

   -- The replacement class B-R and C-R notes are expected to be
      issued at a lower spread than the original notes.

   -- The stated maturity will be extended five years, the
      reinvestment period will be extended by four years, and the
      non-call period will be extended by two years.

   -- The overcollateralization ratio thresholds, minimum weighted

      average spread covenant, and minimum weighted average
      recovery rate covenant are being amended.

                    CASH FLOW ANALYSIS RESULTS

Current date after proposed refinancing
Class     Amount     Interest      BDR      SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)     rate (%)      (%)      (%)       (%)
A-R      292.000   3ML + 1.34    68.87    67.00      1.86
B-R       61.300   3ML + 1.85    65.66    59.52      6.14
C-R       36.100   3ML + 2.70    55.93    53.77      2.16
D-R       24.150   3ML + 3.95    49.08    47.65      1.44
E-R       18.975   3ML + 6.65    39.34    38.49      0.85

Effective date
Class     Amount     Interest      BDR      SDR   Cushion
        (mil. $)      rate (%)     (%)      (%)       (%)
A        258.000   3ML + 1.30    68.44    37.49      2.41
B         44.750   3ML + 2.15    67.03    26.64      8.96
C         30.000   3ML + 3.10    56.67    19.37      4.70
D         19.250   3ML + 3.75    51.15    14.71      5.58
E         18.500   3ML + 5.15    42.60    10.23      4.38

BDR--Break-even default rate.
SDR--Scenario default rate.
3ML--Three-month LIBOR.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance (see table).  In line with
S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

CFIP CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-R                       AAA (sf)            292.000
B-R                       AA (sf)              61.300
C-R                       A (sf)               36.100
D-R                       BBB (sf)             24.150
E-R                       BB-(sf)              18.975


COMM 2013-CCRE7: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Debt to B1(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of twelve
classes and downgraded the ratings of four classes in COMM
2013-CCRE7 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE7:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on nine P&I Classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on four P&I Classes, Classes D, E, F and G, were
downgraded due to higher anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans.

The transaction contains exchangeable certificates. Classes A-M, B
and C may be exchanged for Class PEZ certificates. The PEZ
certificates will be entitled to receive the sum of interest and
principal distributable on the Classes A-M, B and C certificates
that are exchanged for such PEZ certificates. The rating on Class
PEZ was affirmed based on the weighted average rating factor (WARF)
of the exchangeable classes.

The ratings on two interest only (IO) Classes, Classes X-A and X-B,
were affirmed based on the credit performance (or WARF) of their
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.3% of the
current balance, compared to 3.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015. The methodology used in
rating the exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" methodology published in June 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and X-B was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" methodology published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of COMM 2013-CCRE7, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE7.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is . The pool
has a Herf of 19, compared to 21 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, property
type and sponsorship. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated
proceeds for any pooling benefits associated with loan level
diversity and other concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 9% to $855 million
from $936 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 57% of
the pool. Three loans, constituting 1.4% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US Government securities.

Four loans, constituting 8.0% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool since securitization.
There are currently four loans, constituting 7.2% of the pool, in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is One West
Fourth Street ($48.3 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 431,000 SF Class A office property located in Winston-Salem,
NC approximately 28 miles west of Greensboro. The loan transferred
to special servicing in November 2016 due to imminent default when
the largest tenant, Wells Fargo (representing 46% NRA) announced it
will be vacating at its lease expiration in December 2016. Monthly
debt service payments remain current, however, cash flow is
expected to significantly decline in 2017 due the decreased
occupancy.

The remaining loans in special servicing (totaling $15.2 million --
1.6% of the pool), represent three cross-collateralized loans
secured by select-service hotels within the Bakken Formation of
North Dakota. The hotels, which include two Microtel hotels and one
Hampton Inn & Suites, total 254 keys and are located in Williston
(two properties) and Dickinson (one property), North Dakota. The
performance of the hotels have suffered from declining occupancy
and average daily rates as a result of the downturn in the North
Dakota oil industry.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 1.6% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of 23.6 million loss (31.3% expected loss on
average) from these specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 96.2%, compared to
94.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 21% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.68X and 1.17X,
respectively, compared to 1.72X and 1.17X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29.4% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Moffett Towers Phase II Loan ($130.0
million -- 15.2% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
portion of a $245 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is also
encumbered with mezzanine debt of $29.8 million. The loan is
secured by a 676,598 SF office property located in Silicon Valley
office market of Sunnyvale, CA. The property consists of three
separate LEED Gold certified eight-story office buildings. As of
September 2016 the Property was 100% leased, unchanged since
Moody's last review. The two tenants occupying the properties are
Hewlett Packard (58% of NRA) and a subsidiary of Amazon.com, Inc.
(42% of NRA). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 107% and 0.94X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Lakeland Square Mall Loan ($65.2
million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 535,937 SF
component of a 883,290 SF regional mall located in Lakeland,
Florida approximately 35 miles east of Tampa. The property is
anchored by Dillard's, J.C. Penney, Macy's and Sears. Only J.C.
Penney is contributed as collateral for this loan. Junior anchors
include Burlington Coat Factory and Cinemark Movie Theaters. Macy's
has previously announced its plan to close this location and Sports
Authority vacated its space in late 2016 after filing bankruptcy
earlier in the year. As of September 2016, the total mall and
inline space were 89% and 84% leased, respectively. Moody's
analysis incorporates the potential volatility concerns of B-Malls
which have historically exhibited higher cash flow volatility.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 123% and 0.92X, respectively,
compared to 100% and 1.11X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Larkspur Landing Hotel Portfolio Loan
($56.2 million -- 6.6% of the pool), which represents a pari passu
portion of a $131 million senior mortgage loan. The loan is secured
by 11 cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted extended-stay (all
suite) hotels located within the metropolitan areas of San
Francisco (5 properties), Sacramento (3), Seattle, (2) and Portland
(1). The hotels contain a total of 1,277 rooms and were constructed
between 1997 and 2000. The portfolio's performance has improved due
to higher revenues. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80.1% and
1.45X, respectively, compared to 81.6% and 1.42X at last review.


COMM 2014-CCRE17: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 14 classes in
COMM 2014-CCRE17 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 15, 2016 Affirmed
Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eleven P&I Classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the exchangeable class PEZ was affirmed due to the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the exchangeable classes.

The ratings on two IO Classes, Classes X-A and X-B, were affirmed
based on the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.0% of the
current balance, compared to 3.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.9% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 3.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014. The
methodology used in rating the exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in
June 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of COMM 2014-CCRE17.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is . The pool
has a Herf of 20, compared to 21 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 2.1% to $1.16
billion from $1.19 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 59 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 55% of
the pool. There are no loans that have investment-grade structured
credit assessments. Four loans, constituting 2.4% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US Government securities.
Seven loans, constituting 7.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are currently no loans in special servicing and no loans have
been liquidated from the pool since securitization.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 96% of the
pool and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 95% of the
pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 106.8%, compared to
102.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 15.7% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.52X and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.03X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 32% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Bronx Terminal Market Loan ($140.0 million --
12.0% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
$380.0 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a borrower's
leasehold interest in a 912,333 square foot (SF) anchored retail
power center located in Bronx, New York. The center is of Class A
quality and anchored by Target, BJs and Home Depot. The property is
subject to a ground lease which expires in September 2055. As of
December 2016, the collateral was 99% leased, the same at the last
review and securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 108%
and 0.80X, respectively, the same at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 25 Broadway Loan ($130.0 million --
11.1% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
250.0 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 22-story,
Class B office building located in the financial district submarket
of Manhattan, New York. The largest tenants are Claremont
Preparatory School (19% of NRA) and Deloitte & Touche (15% of NRA).
As of September 2016, the property was 96% leased, the same at last
review and securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 119%
and 0.80X, respectively, the same at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Cottonwood Mall Loan ($101.3 million
-- 8.6% of the pool), which is secured by 410,452 SF portion of a
1.06 million SF super-regional mall located in western Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The property is anchored by Dillard's, Macy's, JC
Penney, Sears, Conn's HomePlus and a 16-screen Regal Cinema, with
only the Regal Cinema contributed as part of the collateral. The
property is one of two regional mall in the area primarily serving
the area west of Interstate 25 and the Rio Grande River, including
the Rio Grande submarket. The competition, Coronado Mall is located
only 12 miles southwest of the property and is considered the
dominant mall in the market. As of March 2017, the total mall was
96% leased compared to 99% in September 2016 and 94% in December
2015. Despite the high occupancy, Macy's has announced its plan to
close its store at this property and several other national
retailers have either recently vacated or indicated plans to
vacate. These tenants include Wet Seal, LensCrafters, The Limited,
Footaction, the Body Shop and Sports Authority. Due to the store
closure, property performance is expected to decline and Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 122% and 0.95X, respectively, compared to
87% and 1.27X at securitization.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C3: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Cl. A-M Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the ratings on four classes and downgraded the ratings on
two classes in Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3:

Cl. A-1-A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. A-X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2016
Affirmed B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I Classes, Class A-1-A2 and A-4 were upgraded
primarily due to an increase in credit support since Moody's last
review, resulting from paydowns and amortization, as well as
Moody's expectation of additional increases in credit support
resulting from the payoff of loans approaching maturity that are
well positioned for refinance. The pool has paid down 51% since
Moody's last review and loans constituting approximately 37% of the
pool have either defeased or have debt yields exceeding 10.0% and
are scheduled to mature within the next six months.

The rating on Class A-M was affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The ratings
on Classes A-J, C and D were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on Class B was downgraded due to the anticipated losses
from specially serviced and troubled loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Class A-X, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.3% of the
current balance, compared to 9.6% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 15.3% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2007-C3.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 33 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15th, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 73% to $729.6
million from $2.68 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 78 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 55% of
the pool. Seven loans, constituting 9% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Sixty-three loans, constituting 80% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $268 million (for an average loss
severity of 34%). Six loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Quince Diamond Executive Center Loan ($24.3 million -- 3.3%
of the pool), which is secured by a 109,151 SF office building
located in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in June 2016 due to scheduled payment default.
Currently, the loan is in the foreclosure and the servicer has
recognized $13.1 million appraisal reduction.

The remaining five specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $30.9 million loss
for all specially serviced loans (59% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for ten poorly
performing loans, constituting 32% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $56.6 million (a 24% expected loss based on
average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 84% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 101%, compared to
97% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 11% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.38X and 1.04X,
respectively, compared to 1.49X and 1.11X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 33.9% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Main Plaza Loan ($160.7 million -- 22.0% of
the pool), which is secured by two Class A office buildings with a
total square footage (SF) of 583,000 and located in Irvine,
California. As of January 2017, the buildings were 77% leased
compared to 83% as of January 2016. The loan has a scheduled
maturity date in May 2017 and the borrower has indicated that they
intend to sell the property in order to payoff the loan prior to
the loan's maturity date.

The second largest loan is the Wedgewood South Loan ($50.0 million
-- 6.9% of the pool). The loan is secured by three office and
industrial buildings located in Frederick, Maryland. As of
September 2016, the buildings were 100% leased, the same as the
last review. The loan has a scheduled maturity date in June 2017
and the borrower has indicated they intend to payoff the loan by
the maturity date.

The third largest loan is the Koger Center Office Park Portfolio --
A Note Loan ($37.0 million -- 5.1% of the pool). The collateral
consists of a 15 building office park totaling 689,137 SF and
located in St. Petersburg, Florida. As of September 2016, the
properties were a combined 80% leased, compared to 72% as of
December 2015. The loan was previously in special servicing and
returned to the master servicer in February 2014 after a loan
modification was completed. As part of the modification, the
original principal balance was reduced to $80 million and the loan
was split into two separate tranches: (i) a $40 million A-Note and
(ii) a $40 million B Note (or Hope Note). Additionally, the
borrower funded $10 million of equity, with $3 million being used
to pay down the A-Note to the current balance of $37 million.
Moody's has identified the $40 million B-Note as a troubled loan
and assumed a significant loss on this portion. The loan has a
scheduled maturity date in April 2017.


CSFB MANUFACTURED 2002-MH3: Moody's Ups M-1 Debt Rating From Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches in four transactions issued between 1999 and 2002. The
collateral backing this transaction consists primarily of
manufactured housing units.

Complete rating action follows:

Issuer: CSFB Manufactured Housing Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-MH3

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10,
2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: GreenPoint Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2001-1

Cl. II M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul
24, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2002-A

Cl. A Certificate, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10,
2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2 Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 10,
2016 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2 Certificate, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 10,
2016 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: MERIT Securities Corp Series 13

A4 Bond, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions are a result of the recent performance of manufactured
housing loans backed pools and reflect Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools. The tranches upgraded are primarily due
to the build-up in credit enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. Please see the
Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions. Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly
dependent on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from
servicing transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact
the performance of these transactions.


CSFB MORTGAGE 2005-C1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. G Debt to C(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
and downgraded the ratings on one class in CSFB Mortgage Securities
Corp. Commercial Mtge Pass-Through Ctfs. 2005-C1:

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class G was downgraded due to realized and
anticipated losses from specially serviced and troubled loans that
were higher than Moody's previously expected. Class G has already
experienced a 82% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on Class F was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class A-X was affirmed because of the credit
performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF) of its
reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.3% of the
current balance, compared to 46.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.2% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. A-X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of CSFB 2005-C1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of four, compared to three at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $8.6 million
from $1.51 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 7.2% to
33.9% of the pool.

Forty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $86 million (for an average loss
severity of 32%). Two loans, constituting 41% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Staples Plaza Loan ($2.9 million -- 33.9% of the pool),
which is secured by a 34,000 SF anchored retail center located in
Easton, Maryland. The property is anchored by a Staples (71% of
NRA) on a lease that expires in October 2018. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer in November 2014 for imminent
default due to uncertainty surrounding Staples' decision to renew
their lease. The property was 80% leased as of the September 2016
rent roll. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's incorporated
a Lit/Dark analysis to account for Staples upcoming lease
expiration.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Carole Properties
Portfolio ($0.6 million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by
an industrial property located in Delray Beach, Florida. The
portfolio was originally comprised of three industrial properties,
totaling 121,000 SF, two of which were in Delray Beach and one in
West Palm Beach. The portfolio was transferred to the special
servicer in November 2009 due to imminent default and all three
properties became REO in March 2015. Two of the three properties
have been sold. The remaining property is currently 90% occupied as
of the February 2017 rent roll.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $1.0 million loss for the specially
serviced loans.

The three performing non-specially serviced loans represent 59% of
the pool balance. The largest loan is the Walgreens (Auburn) Loan
($2.4 million -- 27.8% of the pool), which is secured by
stand-alone Walgreens located in Auburn, Washington, approximately
25 miles south of the Seattle CBD. The property is 100% leased to
Walgreens through June 2029. Moody's value incorporated a Lit/Dark
analysis to account for the single-tenant exposure. The loan is
fully amortizing and has paid down 45% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 71% and 1.46X, respectively,
compared to 70% and 1.47X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Shops at Shawnee Ridge Loan ($1.6
million -- 18.9% of the pool), which is secured by an unanchored
retail center located in Suwanee, Georgia, approximately 30 miles
from the Atlanta CBD. The property was 100% occupied as of the
April 2016 rent roll. The loan is fully amortizing and has paid
down 46% since securitization. The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist due to low DSCR and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
104% and 1.04X, respectively, compared to 83% and 1.31X at the last
review.

The third largest loan is the Montgomery Plaza Apartments Loan
($1.0 million -- 12.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 65-unit
multifamily property located in Ardmore, Pennsylvania approximately
10 miles northwest of the Philadelphia CBD. The property was 100%
occupied as of September 2016. The loan is fully amortizing and has
paid down 46% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 29% and 3.54X, respectively, compared to 31% and 3.27X at the
last review.


DBJPM MORTGAGE 2016-C1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s DBJPM 2016-C1 Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 0.4% to
$815.1 million from $818 million at issuance. No loans are
delinquent, in special servicing, or defeased.

Stable Performance: The performance of the pool has been largely
stable since issuance with no loans delinquent or in special
servicing.

Fitch Loan of Concern: The Columbus Park Crossing loan has been
flagged as a loan of concern due to the recent announcement that
its largest anchor tenant, Sears, will close. Physical occupancy
will decline to 76.8% upon Sears' departure, from 100% as of
October 2015, almost exclusively from Sears' departure.

High Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans in the pool account for
57% of the pool which compares with averages of 49.3% and 54.8% in
2015 and 2016. The top 15 loans in the pool account for 74.1% of
the pool which compares with averages of 60% and 68% in 2015 and
2016. The pool itself is comprised of only 33 loans.

Retail Concentration: Retail represents the largest property type
concentration (34.9%), with no exposure to enclosed regional malls.
While retail concentration is high, none of the retail properties
reflect Sears, JCPenney, or Macy's exposure, following the closure
of the Sears at Columbus Park Crossing.

Low Issuance Fitch Leverage: At issuance, the transaction had lower
leverage than other recent Fitch rated transactions. The Fitch DSCR
was 1.25x at issuance, which compares with averages of 1.14x and
1.16x in 2015 and 2016, respectively. The Fitch LTV at issuance was
98.7%, which compares with averages of 111.9% and 109.9% in 2015
and 2016, respectively. Excluding the credit opinion loans, Fitch
DSCR and LTV at issuance were 1.21x and 105.7%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics. Negative Outlooks may be assigned given
further performance deterioration related to Columbus Park
Crossing, which is a Fitch Loan of Concern.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $25,904,908 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,052,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $140,000,000 class A-3A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $247,714,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $637,044,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64,420,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,105,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,789,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,000,000a class A-3B 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $85,894,000ab class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,856,000ab class X-C 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,384,000ab class X-D 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,856,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,384,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,180,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the $16,360,000 interest-only class X-E, the
$22,496,828 interest-only class X-F, the $8,180,000 class G, or the
$22,496,828 class H.


DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2017-1: S&P Gives Prelim B on Cl. B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Deephaven
Residential Mortgage Trust 2017-1's $219.817 million mortgage
pass-through notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and adjustable-rate and
interest-only residential mortgage loans secured by single-family
residences, planned-unit developments, and condominiums to
nonconforming borrowers.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 5,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

   -- The pool's collateral composition;
   -- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
   -- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
   -- The transaction's representation and warranty framework; and
   -- The mortgage aggregator.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Class       Rating(i)         Amount ($)
A-1         AAA (sf)         141,090,000
A-2         AA (sf)           23,330,000
A-3         A (sf)            27,864,000
M-1         BBB (sf)          11,168,000
B-1         BB (sf)            9,730,000
B-2         B (sf)             6,635,000
B-3         NR                 1,326,489
XS          NR                  Notional(ii)
R           NR                       N/A

(i)The collateral and structural information in this report
reflects the preliminary term sheet dated April 4, 2017.  The
preliminary ratings address ultimate principal and interest
payments, but interest can be deferred on the classes.
(ii)Notional equals to the aggregate balance of the class A-1, A-2,
A-3, M-1, B-1, B-2, and B-3 notes.  
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.



DUANE STREET IV: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class C and D notes
from Duane Street CLO IV Ltd.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
ratings on the class B and E notes from the same transaction.  S&P
also removed its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes from
CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on
Jan. 31, 2017.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the February 2017 trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $239.30 in collective
paydowns to the class A-1T, A-1R, and B notes since S&P's October
2015 rating actions.  These paydowns resulted in improved reported
overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since the August 2015 trustee
report, which S&P used for its previous rating actions:

   -- The class B O/C ratio improved to 736.12% from 147.67%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 226.79% from 127.79%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 141.26% from 114.32%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio improved to 116.22% from 107.83%.

S&P's ratings on the class D and E notes were affected by the
application of the largest obligor default test from S&P's
corporate collateralized debt obligation criteria.  The test is
intended to address event and model risks that might be present in
rated transactions.  Despite cash flow runs that suggested higher
ratings, the largest obligor default test constrained S&P's ratings
on the class D and E notes at 'AA+ (sf)' and 'BB+ (sf)',
respectively.  The top five largest obligors in the transaction
currently make up more than 26% of the portfolio's performing
collateral balance.

The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit support
available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's review of the transaction also relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to "CDOs: Mapping A Third Party's
Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard & Poor's Global Rating
Scale," published May 8, 2014, which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations for the purposes of assessing the
credit quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The
criteria provide specific guidance for treatment of corporate
assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings, and the interpretation
outlines treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or
ultimate principal to each of the rated tranches.  The results of
the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the
rated outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement
available at the rating levels associated with these rating
actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as S&P
deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Duane Street CLO IV Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From

C             AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D             AA+ (sf)    A+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Duane Street CLO IV Ltd.

                  Rating
Class         To          From
E             BB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

RATING AFFIRMED

Duane Street CLO IV Ltd.

Class         Rating
B             AAA (sf)


FIRSTKEY MASTER 2017-R1: DBRS Assigns B Rating on Class M3 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following ratings to the Class A1 Notes,
the Class A2 Notes, the Class A3 Notes, the Class A4 Notes and the
Class A5 US Combination Notes (collectively, the Senior
Securities); as well as the Class M1 Notes, the Class M2 Notes, the
Class M3 Notes, the Class A6 US Combination Notes, the Class A7 US
Combination Notes and the Class M4 Combination Certificates
(collectively, the Mezzanine Securities) of FirstKey Master Funding
2017-R1 Ltd. (the Issuer), as per the Indenture, Deed of Covenant
and Fiscal Agency and Collateral Security Agreement dated as of
March 31, 2017, among FirstKey Master Funding 2017-R1 Ltd., as
Issuer; FirstKey Master Funding, LLC, as Depositor; and U.S. Bank
National Association, as Indenture Trustee, Fiscal and Paying
Agent, Collateral Agent and Securities Intermediary:

-- Class A1 Notes (33767LAA5) at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2 Notes (33767LAB3) at AA (sf)
-- Class A3 Notes (33767LAC1) at AA (sf)
-- Class A4 Notes (33767LAD9) at A (sf)
-- Class M1 Notes (33767LAE7) at BBB (sf)
-- Class M2 Notes (33767LAF4) at BB (sf)
-- Class M3 Notes (33767LAG2) at B (sf)
-- Class A5 US Combination Notes (33767LAN7) at AA (sf)
-- Class A6 US Combination Notes (33767LAP2) at BBB (sf)
-- Class A7 US Combination Notes (33767LAR8) at BBB (sf)
-- Class M4 Combination Certificates (33767LAQ0) at B (sf)

The ratings on the Senior Securities address the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date (as defined in the Indenture and the Fiscal
Agency and Collateral Security Agreement referred to above). The
rating on the Mezzanine Securities address the ultimate payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date (as defined in the Indenture and the Fiscal
Agency and Collateral Security Agreement referred to above).

The securities of FirstKey Master Funding 2017-R1 Ltd. are
collateralized by the Class A-1b and the Class A-1v of West Coast
Funding I, Ltd., which is itself collateralized by a pool of Prime
and Alt-A residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

The ratings reflect the following:
(1) The Indenture, Deed of Covenant and Fiscal Agency and
     Collateral Security Agreement dated as of March 31, 2017.
(2) The integrity of the transaction structure.
(3) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
loss rates under various cash flow stress scenarios.

Under the Indenture and the Fiscal Agency and Collateral Security
Agreement, the date on which an Indenture Event of Default has
occurred and is continuing and the US Notes have been accelerated
pursuant to the terms of the Indenture or a Fiscal Agreement Event
of Default has occurred and is continuing and the Cayman Securities
have been accelerated pursuant to the terms of the Fiscal Agency
and Collateral Security Agreement, all amounts in the Note Payment
Account under the Indenture and the Securities Payment Account
under the Fiscal Agency and Collateral Security Agreement will be
paid, first, to the Issuing Entity, the Indenture Trustee, the
Fiscal and Paying Agent, the Collateral Agent, the Securities
Intermediary, the Administrator and the Cayman Administrator, pro
rata, in respect of any unreimbursed Extraordinary Expenses owing
to such entity (for this purpose, determined and reimbursable
without giving effect to application of the Expense Cap). Thus,
upon that occurrence, the ratings assigned to the securities may be
subject to downgrades as a result of these additional uncapped
expenses.



FREMF 2015-K718: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class C Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six CMBS
classes in FREMF 2015-K718 Mortgage Trust and three classes of
Structured Pass-Through Certificates (SPCs), Series K-718 issued by
Freddie Mac:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. X1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X2-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

SPCs Classes**

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 affirmed
rating Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 affirmed
rating Aaa (sf))

Cl. X1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 affirmed
rating Aaa (sf)

** Each of the SPC Classes represents a pass-through interest in
its associated underlying CMBS Class. SPC Class A-1 represents a
pass-through interest in underlying CMBS Class A-1, SPC Class A-2
represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS A-2, and SPC
Class X1 represents a pass-through interest in underlying CMBS
Class X1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of
their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.7% of the
current balance, compared to 2.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014. The methodology used in rating the three Structured
Pass-through Certificates (SPCs) was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X1 and Cl. X2-A
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of FREMF 2015-K718 Mortgage Trust.


DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 56, the same as at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 27, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 1% to $1.57 billion
from $1.59 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 95 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 6.8% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 28.6% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 3.9% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans are currently in special servicing or have been liquidated
from the trust.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 96% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 122%, compared to 123% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.49X and 0.80X,
respectively, compared to 1.46X and 0.79X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 13.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Monterey Ranch Apartment Homes Loan ($107.2
million -- 6.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 1,072 unit
garden style apartment complex located in Austin, Texas. The
property was built in three phases between 1995 and 1999 and sits
on 80 acres of land. As of September 2016, the property was 94%
occupied. The property is located approximately eight miles
southwest of the Austin CBD. The property features various
amenities including five pools, playgrounds, tennis courts, dog
park and fitness center. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 138% and
0.69X, respectively, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the 12-15 Broadway Loan ($63.4 million
-- 4% of the pool), which is secured by a 214-unit mid-rise (two
building) apartment property located in the Astoria neighborhood of
Queens, New York. As of December 2015, the property was 99%
occupied. The property features a fitness center, lounge, and a
fully landscaped rooftop. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 127%
and 0.66X, respectively, compared to 130% and 0.65X at last
review.

The third largest loan is the Stone Oaks Apartments Loan ($39.1
million -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 392-unit garden
style apartment complex located in Chandler, Arizona. As of
September 2016, the property was 94% occupied. The property
features two pools, a lounge and fitness center. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 133%
and 0.75X at last review.


GMAC COMMERCIAL 2004-C3: Fitch Hikes Rating on Cl. E Notes to CCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes and affirmed 10 of GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Securities, Inc., series 2004-C3 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Deal Concentration: The transaction is highly concentrated with
only four loans remaining. The largest loan represents over 75% of
the current pool balance and is secured by an office property with
60% of the net rentable area (NRA) scheduled to roll prior to
maturity.

Collateral Quality: While the largest loan is secured by an asset
that is mainly leased to government tenants, the overall quality of
the remaining collateral securing the bonds is considered to be
below investment grade.

Extended Maturity Profile: The most senior class receives
approximately $186,000 in scheduled principal each month. The
largest loan is scheduled to mature in 2019; however, 20% of the
outstanding collateral debt is fully amortizing and not scheduled
to mature until 2024 at the earliest.

Disposed Loans: Fitch's projected losses have decreased since the
last review, as one loan previously in special servicing was
disposed from the trust in August 2016 with greater than expected
recoveries. There were no other loans in special servicing at the
last review, and there have been no new transfers since.

The largest loan (75.3% of the pool) is Imperial Center Office and
is secured by a 451,977 square foot (sf) office property located in
Norwalk, CA, directly east of the I-5. Properties in the immediate
area cater heavily to government tenants, which represent a
majority of the subject's leases in place. Various Los Angeles
County departments occupy 60% of the NRA and GSA tenants occupy an
additional 15.5% of the NRA. The loan is scheduled to mature in
2019. In the remaining three years of the loan term, a large
portion of leases are scheduled to roll. Leases representing 7% of
the NRA roll in 2017, 33.5% in 2018 and 22.1% in 2019. The volume
of upcoming rollover is considered a significant refinance risk
given the loan's size relative to the outstanding pool balance.
Fitch's ratings are based in part on a sensitivity scenario which
included a conservative haircut to the most recently reported cash
flow. At maturity, the loan's balance will have amortized down to
approximately $39.6 million, or $87.64 per square foot (psf).

The second largest loan (17.1% of the pool) is Ply Gem Industrial
Portfolio. The loan is secured by a portfolio of seven
industrial/warehouse facilities located in Ohio, Virginia, West
Virginia, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Nebraska and North Carolina,
totalling 1.6 million sf. Ply Gem Industries, a manufacturer of
exterior building materials, occupies 100% of the NRA on a master
lease through August 2024. The loan is scheduled to mature three
months after the master lease expires. The debt is fully amortizing
and there is a current reserve balance of $1.6 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Three classes were upgraded following a change to Fitch's projected
losses. Since the last review, one loan previously in special
servicing was liquidated with better than expected recoveries. The
Rating Outlooks for classes B, C and D remain Stable. Although
class C is likely to become the first pay piece in the next 24
months, there is concern that this class could experience interest
shortfall if the largest loan transfers to special servicing. While
Fitch no longer views losses to class E as probable, losses are
still considered possible given minimal credit support and the
concentrated lease expirations at the property securing the largest
loan. This class may be downgraded should loss projections change
or the class balance be written down by realized losses.
Alternatively, this class and others may be upgraded should the
largest loan in the pool successfully refinance.

Fitch has upgraded the following classes:

-- $4.5 million class B to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $14.1 million class C to 'Asf' from 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $12.5 million class E to 'CCCsf' from 'Csf', RE revised to 100%
from 90%.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $20.3 million class D at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $4.6 million class F at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf', RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf', RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1A, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-AB, A-5 and A-J certificates
have been paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P
certificate. Fitch withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class
X-1 and X-2 certificates.


GOLDENTREE LOAN: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Goldentree Loan
Management US CLO 1 Ltd./Goldentree Loan Management US CLO 1 LLC's
$664.40 million floating- and fixed-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of

      broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.  The
      credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
      cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.  The
      transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Goldentree Loan Management US CLO 1 Ltd./Goldentree Loan Management
US CLO 1 LLC

Class                   Rating                Amount
                                            (mil. $)
X                       AAA (sf)                6.40
A                       AAA (sf)              428.75
B-1                     AA (sf)                66.00
B-2                     AA (sf)                18.00
C (deferrable)          A (sf)                 57.75
D (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)              45.50
E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)               26.25
F (deferrable)          B- (sf)                15.75
Subordinated notes      NR                     46.25

NR--Not rated.


GRAMERCY REAL 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 3 Tranches to Csf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

Cl. A-3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. B-FX, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the rating on the
following note:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of three classes of notes due to
cumulative implied losses to three classes of notes as a result of
the liquidation of all outstanding pool collateral in November
2016. While there are one or more outstanding payment accounts,
Moody's does not expect any further material amortization to those
three classes of notes. Moody's has also affirmed the rating of one
class of notes because of the stable rating of the guarantor, MBIA,
which wraps Class A2 notes. The rating action is the result of
Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation and collateralized loan obligation
(CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

Gramercy RE CDO 2007-1 is a cash transaction; the reinvestment
period ended in August 2012. The collateral pool has been
liquidated, and no further collateral assets remain. There are one
or more outstanding payment accounts which are reserved for
potential future expenses. As of the February 22, 2017 note
valuation report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, has decreased to $303.3 million from
$1.1 billion at issuance, with principal pay-down directed to the
senior most outstanding class of notes. The pay-down was the result
of a combination of regular amortization, resolution and sales of
defaulted collateral, the failing of certain par value tests, and
liquidation of collateral.

The Class A-2 notes are fully supported by MBIA Insurance
Corporation, which provides a guarantee on the scheduled payment of
interest and principal. The latest action on MBIA Insurance
Corporation was taken on December 2, 2016.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CLO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

Moody's has not used any models for this rating action, as there
are no collateral assets remaining.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced today are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GRAYSON CLO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to B2(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
note issued by Grayson CLO, Ltd.:

US$72,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on June 24, 2016 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service also downgraded the rating on the
following note:

US$31,000,000 Class D Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of
$18,075,525.63), Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 24, 2016
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

In addition, Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following
notes:

US$1,015,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2021 (current outstanding balance of $101,566,954.50),
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$111,500,000 Class A-1b Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 24, 2016
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$68,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Senior Secured Extendable
Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on June 24, 2016
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$75,000,000 Class C Floating Rate Senior Secured Deferrable
Interest Extendable Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously
on June 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Grayson CLO Ltd., issued in November 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of senior secured loans.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in November 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade rating action and affirmations are primarily a result
of deleveraging of the senior notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios since June 2016.
The Class A-1a notes have been paid down by approximately 75% or
$302 million since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC
ratios for the Class A, Class B and Class C notes are currently
163.91%, 130.48% and 107.62% respectively, versus June 2016 levels
of 132.59%, 118.02% and 105.89% respectively.

The rating downgrade on the Class D Notes is primarily a result of
deterioration in the credit quality of the portfolio since June
2016. Based on Moody's calculation, the portfolio's weighted
average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2972 compared to 2720 in
June 2016, and the exposure to collateral securities rated (or
assumed by Moody's to be rated) Caa1 or lower is currently 21.0%
compared to 15.7% in June 2016. Additionally, Moody's notes the
transaction contains some thinly traded or untraded loans, whose
lack of liquidity may pose additional risks relating to the
issuer's ultimate ability or inclination to pursue a liquidation of
such assets, especially if the sales can be transacted only at
heavily discounted price levels.

Moody's notes that the transaction holds a significant amount of
equity securities received as part of recoveries from defaulted or
restructured issuers. Moody's considered alternative scenarios in
its analysis where a limited amount of credit was given to these
holdings.

The rating actions also reflect the correction of prior input
errors. In modelling used in the June 2016 rating action, Moody's
failed to include a default probability adjustment for an asset
with an outdated credit estimate, and incorporated incorrect data
regarding intra--period timing for defaults and the final maturity
date for an interest rate cap. These errors have been corrected,
and rating actions reflects the correct modelling.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology Moody's used in these ratings was
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value.

7) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. Moody's normally updates such estimates
at least once annually, but if such updates do not occur, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2377)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: +2

Class C: +1

Class D: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3566)

Class A-1a: 0

Class A-1b: 0

Class A-2: 0

Class B: -1

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $447.9 million, defaulted par of
$55.8 million, a weighted average default probability of 18.96%
(implying a WARF of 2972), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 44.67%, a diversity score of 22 and a weighted average
spread of 3.14% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.

A material proportion of the collateral pool includes debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's assesses through credit
estimates. Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to
the default probabilities associated with credit estimates.
Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for assets with
credit estimates that have not been updated within the last 15
months, which represent approximately 6.27% of the collateral pool.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GCJ14: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Cl. G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fifteen
classes GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GCJ14, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-GCJ14:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 12, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the thirteen P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on Class PEZ was affirmed due to the weighted average
rating factor (or WARF) of the exchangeable classes.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current balance, compared to 2.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014. The methodology used in rating the exchangeable class, Cl.
PEZ was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities"
published in June 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of GSMS 2013-GCJ14.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 23, compared to 24 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6% to $1.17 billion
from $1.24 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 81 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 52% of the pool. Four loans, constituting
4% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Five loans, constituting 6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool which resulted in
a loss and there are no loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 99% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 98% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 98% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.57X and 1.11X,
respectively, compared to 1.60X and 1.10X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 11 West 42nd Street Loan ($150.0 million --
12.8% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a
$300.0 million interest-only mortgage loan. The loan is secured by
a 33-story office building located in the Grand Central submarket
of Manhattan, New York. Performance has been stable. As of December
2016, the property was 99.9% leased, essentially the same as at
Moody's last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and
0.95X, respectively, the same as the last review.

The second largest loan is the ELS Portfolio Loan ($103.8 million
-- 8.9% of the pool), which is secured by eleven manufactured
housing sites totaling 5,654 pads. The properties were developed
between 1950 and 1985 and are located across four states (Florida,
Texas, Arizona and Maine). Portfolio occupancy reported as of
September 2016 was 77%, compared to 89% as of December 2015.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.13X, respectively,
compared to 98% and 1.11X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the W Chicago - City Center Hotel Loan
($85.1 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
403-room, full-service, luxury hotel located in the Loop in
Chicago, Illinois. For the trailing-twelve month period ending
December 2016, the hotel was 77% occupied and had a revenue per
available room (RevPAR) of $192, compared to an occupancy and
RevPAR of 77% and $198, respectively for the prior year period.
Operating expenses have increased since securitization and Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 95% and 1.19X, respectively, compared to
91% and 1.25X at the last review.


GS MORTGAGE 2014-GC22: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC22 issued by GS Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-GC22 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G. The Class A-S, Class B and Class C certificates may be
exchanged for the Class PEZ certificates (and vice versa).

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the pool's underlying collateral. The collateral consists of 59
fixed-rate loans secured by 113 multifamily properties. As of the
March 2017 remittance, the transaction has experienced collateral
reduction of 1.8% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization, with an aggregate outstanding principal balance of
$943.9 million. According to the most recent reporting (YE2016 or
annualized quarterly 2016 financial reporting), the transaction had
a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
debt yield of 1.79 times (x) and 10.3%, respectively. In
comparison, the WA DBRS Term DSCR and the WA DBRS debt yield at
issuance were 1.52x and 8.6%, respectively. The largest 15 loans in
the pool have experienced a WA positive cash flow growth since
issuance of 16.4% over the DBRS issuance figures.

There are currently nine loans on the servicer's watchlist,
representing 8.2% of the pool balance, which have been flagged for
declines in performance, upcoming tenant rollover risk or deferred
maintenance concerns. Notably, the College Towers loan (Prospectus
ID#14) has been flagged for a below threshold DSCR, the Westwood
Plaza loan (Prospectus ID#22) has been flagged for decreased
occupancy and the Two Research Park loan (Prospectus ID#36) has
been flagged for upcoming tenant rollover.


JP MORGAN 2002-C3: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class G Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-C3:

Cl. F, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Reinstated to
Ca (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 19, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class F was affirmed at B1 (sf) due to a temporary
principal loss and previous interest shortfalls. Class F is fully
covered by defeasance, however, the class had previous interest
shortfalls for nearly four years and had a previous principal loss
that has since been recovered.

The rating on Class G was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class G
has already experienced a 39% realized loss as result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class (Class X-1) was affirmed based on the
credit performance of its referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.1%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://v3.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The primary methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2002-C3.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 13, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $11.8 million
from $745 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from 7% to 38%
of the pool. Two loans, constituting 50% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Eleven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $67.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 69%).

Moody's received full year 2015 and full or partial year 2016
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 31%, compared to 34% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
12% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 3.64X,
respectively, compared to 1.64X and 3.37X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 43% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Conroe Shopping Center Loan ($2.1 million --
18.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 51,000 square foot (SF)
retail center located in Conroe, Texas (approximately 41 miles
north of downtown Houston). The property was 96% leased as of
December 2016, compared to 100% leased in September 2015. The loan
is fully amortizing, has paid down 57% since securitization and
matures in December 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 33% and
3.08X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the Shoal Creek Apartments, Phase II
Loan ($1.9 million -- 16.6% of the pool), which is secured by an
87-unit multifamily complex located in Athens, Georgia, near the
University of Georgia campus. The property was 100% leased as of
December 2016, the same as at last review. The loan is fully
amortizing, has paid down 56% since securitization and matures in
November 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 41% and 2.37X,
respectively.

The third largest loan is the Golden State-Santa Clarita Loan ($1.0
million -- 8.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 688 unit
self-storage facility in Santa Clarita, California. The property
was 98% leased as of September 2016, compared to 96% leased as of
December 2015 and 85% in December 2014. The loan is fully
amortizing, has paid down 56% since securitization and matures in
September 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 19% and greater
than 4.00X, respectively, compared to 21% and greater than 4.00X at
the last review.


JP MORGAN 2004-C1: Moody's Hikes Class N Certs Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three classes
and affirmed the ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C1:

Cl. K, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Cl. L, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. M, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. N, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Classes L, M and N were upgraded primarily due to an
increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of
loans approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance.
The pool has paid down by 26% since Moody's last review. In
addition, loans constituting 48% of the pool have either defeased
or have debt yields exceeding 12.0% and are scheduled to mature
within the next 24 months.

The rating on Class K affirmed because the transaction's key
metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's
stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's
Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges. The rating
on Class P was affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class P has already
experienced a 7.5% realized loss as result of previously liquidated
loans.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.5%
of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMCC 2004-C1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 5, compared to 7 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $17.8
million from $1.042 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 12 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 23.4% of the pool. Four loans, constituting 31.5% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

One loan, constituting 7.8% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eight loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $15.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 43%). There are no loans that are currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 and full or partial year 2016
operating results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially
serviced and defeased loans).

The top three conduit loans represent 48.8% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the McKinleyville Apartments Loan ($4.2 million
-- 23.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 164-unit multifamily
apartment complex located in McKinleyville, California. As per the
December 2016 rent roll the property was 98.7%, the same as in
September 2016. The loan benefits from amortization and matures in
November 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 51% and 1.80X,
respectively, compared to 51.9% and 1.77X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Centennial Valley II Apartments Loan
($2.9 million -- 16.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 144-unit
multifamily property located in Conway, Arkansas. As per the
December 2016 rent roll the property was 96% leased, compared to
99% leased as of June 2016. The property amenities include a
swimming pool, sundeck, tennis court, and clubhouse. The loan
benefits from amortization and matures in December 2018. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 60.7% and 1.51X, respectively, compared
to 62.2% and 1.48X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Eureka Office Loan ($1.5 million --
8.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 34,090 square foot (SF)
suburban office property built in 1917 and renovated in 2003. As of
December 2016, the property was 100% leased, unchanged since 2014.
The loan is fully amortizing, has amortized 50% since
securitization and matures in December 2023. There is significant
lease rollover risk in 2018, as the largest tenant's lease
(approximately 80% of the net rentable area) expires. Due to the
significant tenant concentration, Moody's valuation reflects a
lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 43.6% and
2.36X, respectively, compared to 38.1% and 2.69X at the last
review.



JP MORGAN 2006-RR1: Moody's Affirms Ca(sf) Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
certificate issued by J.P. Morgan-CIBC Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securities Trust 2006-RR1 ("JPMorgan-CIBC 2006-RR1"):

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because the key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. While
the credit metrics of the pool have further deteriorated, as
evidenced by the weighted average rating factor (WARF), the
cumulative and forward-looking expectation of the outstanding
Moody's rated classes is resulting in the affirmation. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
ReRemic) transactions.

JPMorgan-CIBC 2006-RR1 is a static cash re-Remic transaction backed
by a portfolio of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
(100% of the collateral pool balance). As of the March 22, 2017
trustee report, the aggregate certificate balance of the
transaction is $83.1 million, compared to $523.9 million at
issuance. The pay-down is directed to the senior-most class of
certificates due to full and partial amortization of the underlying
collateral. The senior-most class has also realized partial losses
due to asset liquidations within the underlying CMBS collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8369,
compared to 8039 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (3.3%, compared to 2.7% at last
review); A1-A3 (0.0%, compared to 4.6% at last review); B1-B3
(0.0%, compared to 0.7% at last review); and Caa1-Ca/C (96.7%,
compared to 91.9% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.7 years, compared to 1.0 year at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
look-through CMBS loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other parameters
constant, increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool by +10% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated certificate of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


JP MORGAN 2014-CBM: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-CBM, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the credit characteristics of the
lodging collateral securing the loan in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust. The
affirmations also reflect S&P's expectation that the available
credit enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of
the necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings
and S&P's views regarding the current and future performance of the
transaction's collateral.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-EXT interest-only (IO)
certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional balance on
class X-EXT references classes A, B, C, D, E, and F.

The analysis of stand-alone (single-borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the portfolio of 40 select service
Courtyard by Marriott-flagged lodging properties totaling 5,833
rooms in 15 U.S. states that secure the mortgage loan in the trust.
S&P's analysis also considered the volatile collateral
performance, specifically the significant declines in revenue per
available room and net cash flow (NCF) during the economic downturn
in 2009.  S&P derived its sustainable in-place NCF, which S&P
divided by a 9.69% weighted average capitalization rate to
determine its expected-case value.  This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 95.4% and 1.63x based on the floating rate (spread and LIBOR
cap), respectively, on the trust balance.

According to the March 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
trust consisted of a $415.0 million floating-rate IO loan.  The
loan pays interest atone-month LIBOR plus 2.117% spread and
initially matured on Oct. 9, 2016, with three one-year extension
options.  The borrowers exercised one of their extension options,
and the loan currently will now mature on Oct. 9, 2017.  In
addition, the borrowers' equity interests in the whole loan secure
mezzanine debt totaling $97.0 million.  According to the
transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the special
servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well as costs and
expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections conducted by the
special servicer.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NCF for the trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2016, and
year ended Dec. 31, 2015, the master servicer provided to determine
our opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the lodging properties.
The master servicer, KeyBank N.A., reported a DSC of 5.90x on the
trust balance for the trailing 12 months ended
Sept. 30, 2016.

RATINGS LIST

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-CBM
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-CBM

                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A                46643LAA7             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
X-EXT            46643LAE9             B- (sf)       B- (sf)
B                46643LAG4             AA- (sf)      AA- (sf)
C                46643LAJ8             A- (sf)       A- (sf)
D                46643LAL3             BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
E                46643LAN9             BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
F                46643LAQ2             B- (sf)       B- (sf)


JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. G Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C20 issued by JPMCC
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-C20 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class EC at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. The collateral consists of 37 fixed-rate loans
secured by 54 commercial properties, and as of the March 2017
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 2.0% since
issuance. Loans representing 57.6% of the current pool balance are
reporting YE2016 figures and loans representing 40.4% of the
current pool balance are reporting YE2015 financials. According to
the YE2016 financials, the pool reported a weighted-average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.61 times
(x) and 9.3%, respectively. The loans reporting YE2015 figures had
a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.44x and 8.9%, respectively. The
DBRS WA DSCR and WA debt yield at issuance were 1.47x and 8.4%,
respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool represent 73.1% of
the transaction balance. Nine of these loans reported YE2016
financials, exhibiting a WA net cash flow increase of 13.2% over
the DBRS figures, with a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.80x and
13.2%, respectively. One loan, representing 0.5% of the current
pool balance, is fully defeased.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the largest loan, The Outlets at
Orange, representing 10.5% of the current pool balance, as
investment-grade. DBRS has today confirmed that the performance of
this loan remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.

As of the March 2017 remittance, there are three loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 8.7% of the current pool
balance, including one loan in the top 15. There are no loans in
special servicing.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans, as well as for the largest
15 loans in the pool, in the DBRS CMBS IReports platform. To view
these and future loan-level updates provided as part of DBRS's
ongoing surveillance for this transaction, please log in to DBRS
CMBS IReports at www.ireports.dbrs.com.

The ratings assigned to Class B materially deviate from the higher
rating implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers a material
deviation to be a rating differential of three or more notches
between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative model that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the assigned rating reflect the
sustainability of loan performance trends were not demonstrated.


LB COMMERCIAL 1999-C1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. J Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on three classes in LB Commercial Mortgage
Trust 1999-C1:

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of Class G was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization.
The deal has paid down 17% since Moody's last review.

The rating on Classes H and J were affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class X was affirmed because of the credit
performance (or weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.9% of the
current balance, compared to 7.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in October 2015, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Credit Tenant
Lease and Comparable Lease Financings" published in October 2016.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LBCMT 1999-C1.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of two, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

In evaluating the Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component, Moody's used
a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating
model CDOROM to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess
the ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $16.8 million
from $1.58 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 18 mortgage loans. Five loans, constituting 26%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities. The pool contains a Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component
that includes 11 loans, representing 42% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $42.1 million (for an average loss
severity of 35%). There are currently no loans in special
servicing.

Moody's received full and partial year 2015 and 2016 operating
results for 100% of the pool (excluding specially serviced and
defeased loans).

The two non-CTL and non-defeased loans represent 32% of the pool
balance. The largest is the Kohl's Shopping Center Loan ($4.2
million -- 24.7% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored
retail center located in Farragut, Tennessee, approximately 20
miles from Knoxville. The property is anchored by a Kohl's (86% of
the NRA) on a lease that expires in February 2019. The property was
98% occupied as of the September 2016 rent roll. The loan benefits
from amortization and has paid down 33% since securitization.
Moody's analysis incorporated a Lit/Dark approach to account for
the Kohl's upcoming lease expiration. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 90% and 1.14X, respectively, compared to 75% and 1.37X at the
last review.

The second loan is the Spalding Center Shopping Center Loan ($1.3
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 59,000 SF
anchored shopping center located in Norcross, Georgia approximately
30 miles from the Atlanta CBD. The property's anchor, Gold's Gym
(47% of NRA), terminated their lease in April 2017, however, the
borrower signed a five-year lease with Energy Fitness Group to
take-over the Gold's Gym space. The property was 89% occupied as of
the October 2016 rent roll. The loan is fully amortizing and has
paid down 55% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 49% and 2.32X, respectively, compared to 56% and 2.02X at the
last review.

The CTL component consists of 11 loans, constituting 42% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to four tenants. The largest
exposures are Rite Aid Corporation ($3.0 million -- 17.9% of the
pool; senior unsecured rating: B3/Caa1 -- on review for possible
upgrade) and Bed, Bath & Beyond Inc. ($2.3 million -- 13.4% of the
pool; backed senior unsecured rating: Baa1 -- stable outlook). The
bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for this pool
is 2584. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool of
diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2004-C2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl J Certs to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on three
classes, affirmed the ratings on three classes and downgraded the
rating on one class in LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2004-C2,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-C2:

Cl. G, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 6, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 6, 2016
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes G, H and J were upgraded based primarily on
an increase in credit support resulting from loan paydowns and
amortization. The deal has paid down 8% since Moody's last review.
In addition, one loan constituting 24% of the pool has been
defeased.

The ratings on Classes K, L and M were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Class X-CL, was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit performance of its reference classes
resulting from principal paydowns of higher quality reference
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.4% of the
current balance, compared to 19.3% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-CL was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LBUBS 2004-C2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 3 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $42.2 million
from $1.23 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 2% to 46% of the pool. One loan, constituting 24% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

There are currently no loans on the master servicer's watchlist.
The watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $30.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 24%). Three loans, constituting 30% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Warm Springs Loan ($8.5 million -- 20% of the pool), which
is secured by a two-story, 70,000 SF office building in Las Vegas,
NV, just south of McCarran Airport. The loan transferred to special
servicing in August 2012 due to imminent default and became REO in
September 2013.

The second largest specially serviced loan is McKinney Shopping
Center Loan ($2.6 million -- 6% of the pool), which is secured by a
27,000 SF, shopping center built in 1997 and located just north of
Dallas in Mckinney, Texas. The loan transferred to special
servicing in 2012 due to payment default and became REO in April
2013.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Storage Inn and
Summit Self Storage Loan ($1.7 million -- 4% of the pool), which is
secured by two self-storage properties totaling 56,000 SF and
located in Martinsville, Virginia. The loan transferred to special
servicing in January 2012 for payment default and became REO in
June 2014.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $8.2 million loss for specially
serviced loans (64% expected loss on average).

The sole performing non-defeased loan is the Voice Road Shopping
Center Loan ($19.2 million -- 46% of the pool), which is secured by
a 131,000 SF unanchored retail property located in Carle Place, New
York in Nassau County, Long Island. As of December 2016, the
property was 82% leased. The property is less than one mile from
Roosevelt Field Mall and accessible from the Northern State and
Meadowbrook Parkways. The loan has an anticipated repayment date
(ARD) in December 2018 and a final maturity date in December 2033.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 96% and 1.10X, respectively,
compared to 99% and 1.07X at the last review.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2005-C5: Fitch Affirms CCCsf Rating on Cl. H Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 11 classes of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust (LBUBS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2005-C5.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect sufficient cred it enhancement relative to
expected losses. The pool is concentrated with only 20 loans
remaining. As of the March 2017 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 91.3% to $204.2
million from $2.34 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased.
Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes K through T.
High Expected Losses and Concentrated Pool: Fitch modeled losses of
35.5% as a result of conservative assumptions given the pool's
concentration, high percentage of specially serviced assets and
adverse selection. There are 20 loans remaining of the original 116
and the top three loans account for 44.6% of the pool.

High REO Concentration: Seven loans (17%) are currently in special
servicing of which six are real estate owned; losses are expected.

High Property Type Concentration: 65% of the remaining pool is
secured by retail properties located in tertiary markets.

Maturity Concentration: Three loans (42%) are scheduled to mature
in 2017. Of those, one loan (1.7%) maturing in April is currently
in special servicing and losses are expected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on classes C thru G remain Stable due to high
credit enhancement; however, upgrades to classes E thru G are
unlikely given the concentrations. Further downgrades to the
distressed classes are possible should additional losses be
realized

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $7.1 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29.3 million class D at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.4 million class E at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26.4 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.4 million class H at 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;
-- $14.7 million class J at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $20.5 million class K at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.8 million class L at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $5.9 million class M at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $8.8 million class N at 'Csf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M, A-J and B
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P, Q,
S and T certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the ratings on the
interest-only class X-CL and X-CP certificates.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2006-C6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. C Debt to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
and downgraded the ratings on four classes in LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-C6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C6:

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. X-CL, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 16, 2016
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes A-J, B and C were downgraded due to the
anticipated losses from loans in special servicing. Six loans,
representing 86% of the pool, of the pool are in special servicing,
of which four loans (64% of the pool balance) are in the
foreclosure process or are already real estate owned ("REO").

The ratings on Classes D, E and F were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-CL) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 55.6% of the
current balance, compared to 32.1% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.3% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The primary methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-CL was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LBUBS 2006-C6.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 86% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the recovery as a
pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 17, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 89% to $341 million
from $3.05 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by eight mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 41% of the pool.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
or contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $220 million (for
an average loss severity of 52%).

Six loans, constituting 86% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Chesterfield
Mall Loan ($140.0 million -- 41.1% of the pool), which is secured
by 641,800 square feet (SF) of retail space at the Chesterfield
Mall in Chesterfield, Missouri. The mall is anchored by Dillard's,
Macy's and Sears, none of which are part of the collateral. The
overall property was 95% leased as of year-end 2016, compared to
93% leased as of year-end 2015. Dillard's suffered a water main
break that caused significant flooding and the store was closed for
several months. The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2016 for imminent maturity default. The Borrower has indicated that
declining tenant sales and increased competition within the market
have affected rental rates, cash flow and occupancy. Moody's
anticipates a significant loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Greenbrier Mall
Loan ($70.8 million -- 20.8% of the pool), which is secured by an
896,000 SF regional mall in Chesapeake, Virginia. The mall is
anchored by JC Penney, Macy's, Dillard's and Sears, of which only
JC Penney and Macy's are part of the collateral. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2016 for imminent default
and was modified with a three year extension through December
2019.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
retail and office property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate
$184 million loss for the specially serviced loans (63% expected
loss on average).

As of the March 17, 2017 remittance statement, monthly interest
shortfalls were approximately $509,000 and impact up to Class B.
Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls will continue because of
the exposure to specially serviced loans and/or modified loans.
Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including
workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions
(ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The two remaining non-specially serviced loans represent 13.8% of
the pool. The largest performing non-specially serviced loan is the
Eagle Road Shopping Center Loan ($45.9 million -- 13.5% of the
pool), which is secured by a 242,000 SF anchored retail center in
Danbury, Connecticut. As of December 2016, the property was 100%
leased to three tenants. The loan is on the master servicer's
watchlist for low DSCR as the real estate taxes have tripled since
securitization due to a new tax assessment. The loan is current and
matures in September 2021. The borrower has not indicated any
issues with maintaining the loan for the foreseeable future.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.80X, respectively,
compared to 128% and 0.76X at the last review.


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2016-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E-2 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded eight securities and
affirmed eleven securities from the LEAF Receivables Funding LLC,
Series 2013-1, 2015-1, and 2016-1 transactions. The transactions
are securitizations of small-ticket equipment leases serviced by
LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 10, LLC Series 2015-1

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class A-4 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Class E-1 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Class E-2 Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 11 LLC, Series 2016-1

Class A-2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class A-4 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Aa2 (sf)

Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed A1 (sf)

Class D Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

Class E-1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

Class E-2 Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 9, LLC, Series 2013-1

Class C, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class D, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Class E-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Class E-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions were prompted mainly by a build-up of credit
enhancement due to sequential payment structure of the transactions
and non-declining reserve account. The lifetime cumulative net loss
(CNL) expectations for 2013-1 and 2015-1 transactions were
unchanged at 2.50%. The lifetime CNL expectation for the 2016-1
transaction was lowered to 3.00% from 3.50%.

Below are key performance metrics (as of the March 2017
distribution date) and credit assumptions for each affected
transaction. Credit assumptions include Moody's expected lifetime
CNL expectation, which is expressed as a percentage of the original
pool balance; and Moody's remaining net loss expectation and
Moody's Aaa level, both expressed as a percentage of the current
pool balance. The Aaa level is the level of credit enhancement that
would be consistent with a Aaa (sf) rating for the given asset
pool. Performance metrics include pool factor (the ratio of the
current collateral balance to the original collateral balance at
closing); total hard credit enhancement (expressed as a percentage
of the outstanding collateral pool balance) which typically
consists of subordination, overcollateralization, reserve fund as
applicable.

Issuer - Leaf Receivables Funding 9, LLC, Series 2013-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 2.50%; Prior expectation (January 2017)
-- 2.50%

Remaining net loss expectation -- 3.14%

Aaa level -- 18.00%

Pool factor -- 15.05%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Class C -- 76.1%, Class D --
60.8%, Class E-1 -- 38.5%, Class E-2 -- 23.25%

Issuer - Leaf Receivables Funding 10, LLC, Series 2015-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 2.50%; Prior expectation (January 2017)
-- 2.50%

Remaining net loss expectation -- 3.11%

Aaa level -- 21.00%

Pool factor -- 46.9%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Class A -- 50.8%, Class B --
38.3%, Class C -- 29.6%, Class D -- 22.6%, Class E-1 -- 16.2%,
Class E-2 -- 10.7%

Issuer - Leaf Receivables Funding 11, LLC, Series 2016-1

Lifetime CNL expectation -- 3.00%; Prior expectation (January 2017)
-- 3.50%

Remaining net loss expectation -- 3.57%

Aaa level -- 23.00%

Pool factor -- 74.47%

Total Hard credit enhancement -- Class A -- 29.9%, Class B --
24.6%, Class C -- 19.1%, Class D -- 14.7%, Class E-1 -- 10.7%,
Class E-2 -- 7.2%

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

On 22 March 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance. If
the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit
Ratings on LEAF Receivables Funding LLC transactions are not
expected to be affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for
Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to
Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further
details regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology
revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are greater than necessary to
protect investors against expectations of future loss could lead to
an upgrade of the rating. Moody's expectations of future loss may
be better than its original expectations because of lower frequency
of default by the underlying obligors or appreciation in the value
of the equipment that secure the obligor's promise of payment.
Performance of the US macro economy and the equipment markets are
primary drivers of performance. Other reasons for better
performance than Moody's expected include changes in servicing
practices to maximize collections on the leases.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against expectations of future loss could lead to a
downgrade of the ratings. Moody's expectations of future loss may
be worse than its original expectations because of higher frequency
of default by the underlying obligors of the loans or a
deterioration in the value of the vehicles that secure the
obligor's promise of payment. Performance of the US macro economy
and the equipment markets are primary drivers of performance. Other
reasons for worse performance than Moody's expected include poor
servicing, error on the part of transaction parties, lack of
transactional governance and fraud.


LONGFELLOW PLACE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-RR Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement notes from Longfellow
Place CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2013 that is managed by NewStar Capital LLC.  The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed amended indenture.
S&P also assigned a preliminary rating to a new class X note that
was created as part of the refinancing.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of April 7,
2017.  Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differs from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 18, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Longfellow Place CLO Ltd./Longfellow Place CLO LLC
New class                 Rating      Amount (mil. $)
X                         AAA (sf)               2.00
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-RR                      AAA (sf)             297.00
B-RR                      AA (sf)               87.70
C-RR                      A (sf)                28.80
D-RR                      BBB (sf)              26.20
E-RR                      BB (sf)               19.70


MADISON PARK VI: Moody's Hikes Class E Notes Rating From Ba1(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Madison Park Funding VI, Ltd.:

US$30,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on November 14, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$28,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on November 14, 2014 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on November 14, 2014 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

US$17,500,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2021,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on November 14, 2014 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$302,500,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021 (current
balance of $117,811,295.09), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
November 14, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$76,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on November 14, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Madison Park Funding VI, Ltd., issued in September 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since April 2016. The Class A-1
notes have been paid down by approximately 57% or $158.2 million
since that time. Based on the trustee's March 2016 report, the OC
ratios for the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are
reported at 153.07%, 135.78%, 126.74% and 119.03%, respectively,
versus April 2016 levels of 131.01%, 121.91%, 116.79% and 112.21%,
respectively. Additionally, the deal has benefited from an
improvement in the credit quality of the portfolio since April
2016. Based on the trustee's March 2017 report, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 2526 compared to 2721 at that
time.

The portfolio includes a number of investments in securities that
mature after the notes do. Based on the trustee's March 2017
report, securities that mature after the notes do currently make up
approximately 20.5% of the portfolio. These investments could
expose the notes to market risk in the event of liquidation when
the notes mature.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements extending
maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable exposure to
long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

7) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

8) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $3.0 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2200)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: +1

Class D: +3

Class E: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3300)

Class A1: 0

Class A2: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $342.6 million, defaulted par of $1.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 15.95% (implying
a WARF of 2750), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.63%, a diversity score of 39 and a weighted average spread of
3.19% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery
rates for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to
Rating SF CDOs". In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions
may be considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction. In each case, historical and market performance and
the collateral manager's latitude for trading the collateral are
also factors.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C10: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. H Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 18 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2013-C10 (MSBAM 2013-C10).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance with No Material Changes: The overall pool has
exhibited stable performance since issuance. All of the loans are
current, as of the March 2017 distribution date, with no material
changes to pool metrics. As property level performance is generally
in line with issuance expectations, the original rating analysis
was considered in affirming the transaction. The transaction has
had no specially serviced loans since issuance. One loan (0.2% of
current pool) has been defeased.

Retail Concentration; Mall and Anchor Exposure: Retail loans
represent 42.8% of the current pool, which includes six of the top
15 loans (27.2%). Three of these top 15 loans (18.9%) are secured
by regional malls located in Tampa, FL (9.9%), Edina, MN (6.9%) and
Dublin, OH (2.1%), one of which is sponsored by Westfield Group
(9.9%) and two by Simon Property Group, LP (9%). In addition, two
of these regional malls (12%) have exposure to Sears as a
non-collateral tenant and all three (18.9%) have exposure to Macy's
and JC Penney as non-collateral tenants.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated two top 15 loans,
Southdale Center (6.9%) and The Mall at Tuttle Crossing (2.1%), as
Loans of Concern. At the Southdale Center property, the third
largest collateral tenant, Gordman's, recently filed for bankruptcy
and is likely to close its store at the property. At The Mall at
Tuttle Crossing property, Macy's, which is not part of the loan
collateral, has announced it will be closing one of its two stores
at the property in July 2017, its Furniture/Home/Men's/Kid's store.
The other Macy's store is expected to remain open. Although current
collateral cash flow and performance remain stable, Fitch continues
to monitor the overall loan for possible occupancy issues that may
arise from the Macy's store closure.

Hotel Concentration: Hotel loans represent 16.5% of the pool, which
includes three of the top 15 loans (8.1%). These three top 15 loans
include a hotel property in Santa Monica, CA (3%), a portfolio of
hotel properties in the greater Boston, MA area (2.9%) and a
portfolio of hotel properties in Goodyear, AZ and Washington, UT
(2.2%). Additionally, the Milford Plaza Fee (7.9%) is secured by
the fee interest in the ground beneath a Midtown Manhattan hotel.

Loan Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 16.3% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity. Eight loans (21.1% of
current pool) are full-term interest-only loans. One loan (0.9%) is
fully amortizing. One partial interest-only loan (0.6%) remains in
its interest-only period until July 2018. As of the March 2017
remittance reporting, the pool has paid down 6.2% since issuance.
Current scheduled principal payments are approximately $2.22
million per month. Three loans, which represented 1.7% of the
original pool balance, were prepaid with yield maintenance
penalties.

Loan Maturities: 94.7% of the current pool have a scheduled loan
maturity or anticipated repayment date in 2023. The remainder of
the maturities includes 1.1% in 2018, 0.2% in 2020 and 4% in 2028.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the overall
stable performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline significantly.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $126.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125 million class A-3FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-3FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $359.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $111.4 million class A-S* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100.3 million class B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52 million class C* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class PST* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.7 million class F at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.4 million class G at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $16.7 million class H at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Classes A-S, B, and C certificates may be exchanged for class PST
certificates, and class PST certificates may be exchanged for
classes A-S, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class J certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-150E: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Cl. G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on 10 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2014-150E, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the transaction's sole collateral
loan, which is a $525.0 million, fixed-rate, interest-only (IO)
mortgage loan scheduled to mature in September 2024.  The loan is
secured by the leasehold interest in a 1.7 million-sq.-ft. class A
office property in the Grand Central submarket of New York City.
S&P also considered the deal structure and liquidity available to
the trust.  The affirmations further reflect subordination and
liquidity that are consistent with the current ratings.

S&P affirmed its ratings on the class X-A and X-B IO certificates
based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the
ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than that of the
lowest-rated reference class.  The notional amount of the class X-A
certificates references the aggregate balance of classes A and A-S,
and the notional amount of the class X-B certificates references
the balance of class B.

The analysis of stand-alone (single borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the office property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the stable
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the
past few years.  S&P then derived its sustainable in-place net cash
flow, which S&P divided by a 6.25% capitalization rate, and
considered rent steps from investment-grade tenants and the present
value of the savings on the actual ground rent payment, to
determine S&P's expected-case value.  This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 85.9% and 1.50x, respectively, on the trust balance.

According to the March 10, 2017, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust balance of $525.0 million and pays an
annual fixed interest rate of 4.57%.  The borrower's equity
interest in the whole loan also secures $175.0 million of mezzanine
financing that pays an annual fixed interest rate of 5.375%.
According to the transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the
special servicing fees, work-out fees, liquidation fees, and costs
and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections the special
servicer conducts.  To date, the trust has not incurred any
principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NOI for the years ended Dec. 31, 2016, and Dec. 31,
2015, and the Sept. 30, 2016, rent roll the master servicer
provided to determine S&P's opinion of a sustainable cash flow for
the office property.  The master servicer, Berkadia Commercial
Mortgage LLC, reported a DSC of 1.95x on the trust balance as of
Dec. 31, 2016, and reported occupancy was 94.7% as of the same
period.  Based on the September 2016 rent roll, the five largest
tenants make up 78.3% of the collateral's total net rentable area.
In addition, no tenants have leases that are on a month-to-month
basis, and there is minimal exposure to leases scheduled to expire
in 2019 or earlier.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2014-150E
Commercial mortgage pass-throught certificates series 2014-150E

                                       Rating        Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
A                61764BAA1             AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
X-A              61764BAC7             AA (sf)       AA (sf)
X-B              61764BAE3             AA- (sf)      AA- (sf)
A-S              61764BAG8             AA (sf)       AA (sf)
B                61764BAJ2             AA- (sf)      AA- (sf)
C                61764BAL7             A- (sf)       A- (sf)
D                61764BAN3             BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
E                61764BAQ6             BB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
F                61764BAS2             BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)
G                61764BAU7             B (sf)        B (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2014-CPT: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on nine classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley
Capital I Trust 2014-CPT, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.

The affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying certificate
classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions.  S&P's
analysis included a review of the 2,430,472 net rentable sq. ft.
class A office property in Los Angeles, Calif., which secures the
$800.0 million seven-year fixed-rate interest-only (IO) mortgage
loan that serves as the collateral for the stand-alone transaction.
S&P also considered the deal structure and liquidity available to
the trust.  The affirmations reflect subordination and liquidity
that are, more or less, consistent with the outstanding ratings.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-A IO certificates based on
its criteria for rating IO securities, in which the ratings on the
IO securities would not be higher than the lowest-rated reference
class.  The notional balance on class X-A references the aggregate
balances of classes A and A-M.

The analysis of stand-alone (single borrower) transactions is
predominantly a recovery-based approach that assumes a loan
default.  Using this approach, S&P's property-level analysis
included a revaluation of the office property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust.  S&P also considered the stable
servicer-reported net operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the
past four years.  S&P then derived its sustainable in-place net
cash flow, which it divided by a 6.75% capitalization rate, and
considered rent steps from investment-grade tenants and real estate
tax reassessments to determine S&P's expected-case value. This
yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and
debt service coverage (DSC) of 82.1% and 2.50x, respectively, on
the trust balance.

According to the March 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the
mortgage loan has a trust and whole-loan balance of $800.0 million
and pays an annual fixed interest rate of 3.45%.  The mortgage loan
pays interest through its July 9, 2021, maturity.  The borrower can
obtain secondary financing in the form of mezzanine debt subject to
60% LTV and 1.25x DSC constraints, which according to the master
servicer, has not has been obtained.  According to the transaction
documents, the borrowers will pay the special servicing, work-out,
and liquidation fees, as well as costs and expenses incurred from
appraisals and inspections conducted by the special servicer.  To
date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of the property's
historical NOI for the year ended Sept. 30, 2016; years ended Dec.
31, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011; and the Dec. 31, 2016, rent
roll provided by the master servicer to determine S&P's opinion of
a sustainable cash flow for the office property.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 2.71x on the
trust balance for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2016, and
occupancy was 85.2% according to the Dec. 31, 2016, rent roll.
Based on the December 2016 rent roll, the five largest tenants make
up 17.4% of the collateral's total net rentable area (NRA). In
addition, 7.3%, 8.6%, and 10.2% of the NRA have leases that expire
in 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2014-CPT
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-CPT

                                       Rating          Rating
Class            Identifier            To              From
A                61763QAA9             AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
X-A              61763QAC5             AA (sf)         AA (sf)
A-M              61763QAS0             AA (sf)         AA (sf)
B                61763QAG6             AA- (sf)        AA- (sf)
C                61763QAJ0             A- (sf)         A- (sf)
D                61763QAL5             BBB (sf)        BBB (sf)
E                61763QAN1             BBB- (sf)       BBB- (sf)
F                61763QAU5             BB (sf)         BB (sf)
G                61763QAW1             BB- (sf)        BB- (sf)


MSAT 2005-RR4: DBRS Hikes Class M Debt Rating to BB(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. upgraded the ratings of the following five classes of
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-RR4, issued by Multi Security Asset Trust LP, Series
2005-RR4 (MSAT) as follows:

-- Class H to AAA (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class J to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class K to A (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class L to BBB (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class M to BB (sf) from B (low) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the remaining
classes in the transaction as follows:

-- Class E at AAA (sf)
-- Class F at AAA (sf)
-- Class G at AAA (sf)
-- Class N at CCC (sf)
-- Class X-1 at CCC (sf)
-- Class O at C (sf)

All trends are Stable, except for Classes X-1, N and O, which do
not have trends assigned. The rating assigned to Class D has also
been discontinued as it has been repaid in full.

The rating upgrades are a result of positive credit migration on
the underlying U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
assets attributed to amortization, increased defeasance, loan
seasoning and increased credit enhancement as a result of
successful loan repayments at maturity and recoveries on liquidated
loans. This performance has resulted in significant collateral
reduction to the MSAT 2005-RR4 capital structure. Since issuance in
March 2005, the transaction has amortized by 84.2%. Of the 16
original underlying CMBS transactions that were contributing to the
MSAT 2005-RR4 transaction, the contributing classes in 13
transactions have paid off in full and two of the remaining three
underlying U.S. CMBS transactions are currently experiencing
principal repayment.

While potential losses associated with the underlying U.S. CMBS
specially serviced loans could reduce credit enhancement or affect
the lowest-rated classes, the performance of the overall MSAT
2005-RR4 transaction has been strong. As of the March 2017
remittance report, the transaction has experienced realized losses
of approximately $37.0 million; however, losses have been contained
to the unrated Class P-1. With this surveillance review, DBRS
anticipates losses associated with the underlying specially
serviced loans to be contained to Class O, which DBRS rates C (sf).


NATIONSTAR HECM: Moody's Takes Action on $278MM of RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches and confirmed the rating of one tranche, from four
transactions issued by Nationstar HECM Loan Trust. The collateral
backing these transactions consists of pools of first-lien inactive
HECMs.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2015-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-2

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2016-3

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 A2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

Cl. M2, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 11, 2016 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review Direction Uncertain

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily due to the buildup in credit
enhancement since issuance, and this buildup offsets the negative
impact from consideration of corrected data regarding the
transactions. The tranches were previously placed on watch due to a
notification that incorrect data had been provided to us by
Nationstar at the time of initial ratings on the four
transactions.

On 4 October 2016, Nationstar informed us that the unpaid principal
balance at the called due date provided at the time of the deals'
issuance was incorrect for approximately 500 loans across the four
transactions. The called due balance was overstated by between
$8,000 and $45,000 per loan; overall, the overstated amount totaled
roughly $15 million. Nationstar has advised us that the error was
due to their receipt of incorrect information from a third-party
servicer at the time of loan boarding, and that Nationstar
identified the error while conducting review procedures.

The rating actions also reflect corrections to the recovery model
used by Moody's in rating these transactions. In the prior model,
FHA insurance payment amounts were not correctly calculated.
Correction of these errors led to lower cash flows in the more
stressful model scenarios and higher cash flows in the less
stressful model scenarios compared to the original modeling. The
rating actions reflect the corrected modeling.

We received the updated data from Nationstar and the due diligence
findings from a third party reviewer. The final rating actions take
into consideration the corrected data, the due diligence findings,
model corrections, and the most updated performance which includes
improvements in credit enhancement and liquidations to date.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans," published in August 2016 and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations," published in May 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from Moody's original expectations resulting in
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and faster
property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from Moody's original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


RR TRUST 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series RR issued by Series RR
2014-1 Trust as follows:

-- Class A at A (sf)
-- Class B at BBB (sf)
-- Class AB at BBB (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class AC at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

This transaction is a resecuritization collateralized by the
beneficial interest in one commercial mortgage-backed security
pass-through certificate from a deal issued in 2014. The ratings
are dependent on the performance of the underlying transaction.



SCHOONER TRUST 2007-8: DBRS Confirms C(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-8 issued
by Schooner Trust, Series 2007-8:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class H at CCC (sf)
-- Class J at CCC (sf)
-- Class K at CCC (sf)
-- Class L at C (sf)
-- Class XC at C (sf)

DBRS has also retained the Negative trends on Classes F and G and
has changed the trend on Class E to Stable from Negative. All other
trends are Stable with the exception of Classes H, J, K, L and XC,
which have ratings that do not carry trends.

The rating confirmations reflect the current overall performance of
the transaction, which has experienced a collateral reduction of
59.4% since issuance as of the March 2017 remittance. DBRS has
maintained the Negative trend assignments on Classes F and G to
reflect increased risk surrounding the ongoing redevelopment of the
Londonderry Mall (Prospectus ID#1; 21.1% of the current pool
balance); the uncertainties surrounding the disposition of the
specially serviced loan, Best Western Grand Mountain (Prospectus
ID#18; 3.2% of the current pool balance); and the concentration of
upcoming maturities. In DBRS's analysis, the investment-grade
classes have generally shown the propensity to withstand the
elevated risks associated with the pool, supporting the Stable
trend assignment for Class E.

All loans in the pool are scheduled to mature by June 2017 with a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and exit
debt yield of 1.41 times (x) and 14.1% (excluding one defeased
loan), respectively. Over the past 12 months, 17 loans have left
the trust, contributing to a principal paydown of $146.6 million.
As of the March 2017 remittance, 29 loans remain in the pool with
an aggregate outstanding principal balance of approximately $210.2
million. The largest 15 loans in the pool collectively represent
87.1% of the transaction balance and all of those loans (excluding
one defeased loan) are reporting YE2015 financials, showing WA
DSCR, exit yield and cash flow growth over the DBRS issuance
figures of 1.42x, 14.4x and 9.0%, respectively.

As of the March 2017 remittance, there are 27 loans (representing
94.2% of the pool) on the servicer's watchlist with most flagged
for upcoming loan maturity as well as one loan in special
servicing. The largest loan in the pool and on the watchlist,
Londonderry Mall, is secured by a 775,000 square foot regional
shopping centre in Edmonton, Alberta. The property is in the
process of an extensive renovation that is not expected to be
complete by the May 2017 maturity date. According to the servicer,
the borrower may require a short-term extension to secure
replacement financing.

The specially serviced loan, Best Western Grand Mountain, is
secured by a limited-service hotel in Grande Cache, Alberta. The
loan transferred to the special servicer with the April 2016
remittance and the YE2015 DSCR was reported at 0.59x with an
occupancy rate of 43%, down from 62% at YE2014. According to the
March 2017 servicer update, an offer of $5.2 million has been
accepted for both the collateral hotel and an adjacent
non-collateral property. Closing is expected by the end of April
2017. Based on the proposed allocation of the purchase price to the
trust portion of the property, DBRS expects that a loss could be
finalized in excess of $5.0 million.

DBRS has provided updated loan-level commentary and analysis for
larger and/or pivotal watchlisted loans, specially serviced loans
as well as the largest 15 loans in the pool in the DBRS CMBS
IReports platform. To view these and future loan-level updates
provided as part of DBRS's ongoing surveillance for this
transaction, please log into DBRS CMBS IReports at
www.ireports.dbrs.com.

The rating assigned to Class C materially deviates from the higher
rating implied by the quantitative results and the rating assigned
to Class F materially deviates from the lower rating implied by the
quantitative results. DBRS considers a material deviation to be a
rating differential of three or more notches between the assigned
rating and the rating implied by the quantitative results that is a
substantial component of a rating methodology. The deviations for
Class C and F are warranted, given uncertain loan-level event risk.


SIERRA TIMESHARE 2013-2: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Cl. C Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the notes issued by various Sierra
Timeshare Receivables transactions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating affirmations reflect the ability of each transaction's
credit enhancement (CE) to provide loss coverage consistent with
the current ratings. Since Fitch's prior review of the
transactions, cumulative gross default (CGD) performance has been
stable, with the majority of transactions tracking within their
respective initial base case proxy. The Stable Outlook designation
for all five transactions reflects Fitch's expectation that the
notes will remain sufficiently enhanced to cover stressed loss
levels for the next 12 to 18 months.

Fitch will continue to monitor economic conditions and their impact
to trust level performance variables and update the ratings
accordingly.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults could produce
cumulative gross default (CGD) levels higher than the base case and
would likely result in declines of credit enhancement and remaining
default coverage levels available to the notes. Additionally,
unanticipated increases in prepayment activity could also result in
a decline in coverage. Decreased default coverage may make certain
note ratings susceptible to potential negative rating actions,
depending on the extent of the decline in coverage.

At the time of initial rating, Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis
stressing each of the transaction's initial base case CGD and
prepayment assumptions by 1.5x and 2.0x and examining the rating
implications on all classes of issued notes. The 1.5x and 2.0x
increases of each transaction's base case CGD and prepayment
assumptions represent moderate and severe stresses, respectively,
and are intended to provide an indication of the rating sensitivity
of notes to unexpected deterioration of a trust's performance.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Sierra Timeshare 2013-2 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.
-- Class C notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2014-2 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2015-2 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Sierra Timeshare 2016-2 Receivables Funding, LLC
-- Class A notes at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable.


SLM STUDENT 2012-3: Fitch Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches From 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the following SLM Student Loan Trust
2012-3 (SLM 2012-3) ratings:

-- Class A to 'AAAsf' from 'Bsf'; maintained Outlook Stable;
-- Class B to 'AAsf' from 'Bsf'; maintained Outlook Stable.

The class A notes pass the 'AAAsf' scenarios under both maturity
and credit stresses. The class B notes pass the 'AAsf' scenarios
under both maturity and credit stresses.

The class A notes were downgraded in December 2016 to 'Bsf' from
'AAAsf' due to risk that the notes would not pay off in full before
their legal final maturity date. Because a technical default would
lead to the diversion of interest payments away from class B, the
class B would then default as well. As such, class B was downgraded
at the same time to 'Bsf' from 'AAsf'. In March 2017, Navient
successfully amended the legal final maturity date of the class A
notes from December 2025 to December 2038. This proved to be an
effective mitigant to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
17.50% and a 52.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. The base case default assumption of 17.50% implies a
constant default rate of 5.12% (assuming a weighted average life of
3.42 years) consistent with the trailing 12 month (TTM) average
constant default rate utilized in the maturity stresses. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve in its credit stress cash
flow analysis. The claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.50% in the
base case and 3% in the 'AAA' case. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance, income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) and
constant prepayment rate (voluntary and involuntary) are 10.57%,
16.88%, 16.65%, and 12.93%, respectively, and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria. The borrower benefit is
assumed to be approximately 0.05%, based on information provided by
the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Fitch applies its standard basis and
interest rate stresses to this transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread and, for the class A notes, subordination. As of January
2017, total and senior effective parity ratios (including the
reserve) are 107.21% (6.72 % CE) and 101.01% (1.00% CE). Liquidity
support is provided by a reserve sized at 0.25% of the pool balance
(with a floor of $1,249,353), currently equal to $1,638,233.86. The
transaction will continue to release cash as long as the specified
overcollateralization amount, equal to the greater of 1.0% of the
adjusted pool balance and $1,300,000, is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model indicates
that the notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal final
maturity dates under the commensurate rating scenario.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions. (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer, due to its extensive
track record as the largest servicer of FFELP loans.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Under the 'Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating
Criteria', dated March 20, 2017, Fitch looks to its own ratings in
analyzing counterparty risk and assessing a counterparty's
creditworthiness. The definition of permitted investments for this
deal allows for the possibility of using investments not rated by
Fitch, which represents a criteria variation. As trust funds can
only be invested for a short duration given the payment frequency
of the notes, Fitch does not believe such variation has a
measurable impact upon the ratings assigned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables. Additionally, the
results do not take into account any rating cap considerations.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'BBBsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'AAAsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.


STACR 2017-DNA2: Fitch Assigns 'B+sf' Rating to 12 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Freddie Mac's risk-transfer
transaction, Structured Agency Credit Risk Debt Notes Series
2017-DNA2 (STACR 2017-DNA2):

-- $516,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2B notes 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $559,000,000 class M-2 exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $559,000,000 class M-2R exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $559,000,000 class M-2S exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $559,000,000 class M-2T exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $559,000,000 class M-2U exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $559,000,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2AR exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2AS exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2AT exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2AU exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2BR exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2BS exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2BT exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2BU exchangeable notes 'B+sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $279,500,000 class M-2BI notional exchangeable notes 'B+sf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $215,000,000 class B-1 notes;
-- $30,000,000 class B-2 notes;
-- $58,590,835,370 class A-H reference tranche;
-- $212,590,698 class M-1H reference tranche;
-- $115,153,295 class M-2AH reference tranche;
-- $115,153,295 class M-2BH reference tranche;
-- $88,579,458 class B-1H reference tranche;
-- $273,579,458 class B-2H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-1 notes reflects the 2.30%
subordination provided by the 0.65% class M-2A notes, 0.65% class
M-2B notes, 0.50% class B-1 notes and 0.50% class B-2 notes. The
'BBsf' rating for the M-2A notes reflects the 1.65% subordination
provided by the 0.65% class M-2B notes, 0.50% class B-1 notes and
0.50% class B-2 notes. The 'B+sf' rating for the M-2B notes
reflects the 1.00% subordination provided by the 0.50% class B-1
notes and the 0.50% class B-2 notes. The notes are general
unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac ('AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject
to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Freddie Mac-guaranteed
MBS.

STACR 2017-DNA2 represents Freddie Mac's 16th risk transfer
transaction applying actual loan loss severity (LS) issued as part
of the Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic
Plan for 2013 - 2017 for each of the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types
of risk-transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $60.7 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held guaranteed by Freddie Mac
where principal repayment of the notes is subject to the
performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans. As loans
liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding principal
balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual loan's LS
percentage related to those credit events, which includes
borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors. Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1, M-2A and M-2B
notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of the mortgage
loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available through
subordination, and Freddie Mac's Issuer Default Rating. The M-1,
M-2A M-2B, B-1, and B-2 notes will be issued as LIBOR-based
floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate falls below
zero and becomes negative, the coupons of the interest-only
modifications and combinations (MAC) notes may be subject to a
downward adjustment, so that the aggregate interest payable within
the related MAC combination does not exceed the interest payable to
the notes for which such classes were exchanged. The notes will
carry a 12.5-year legal final maturity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference pool consists
of loans with original loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) of over 60% and
less than or equal to 80% with a weighted average (WA) original
combined LTV of 75.8%. The WA debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 34.7%
and credit score of 751 reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

ADDITIONAL RATING DRIVERS

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Freddie Mac's 16th
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed LS schedule. The notes in
this transaction will experience losses realized at the time of
liquidation or loan modification which will include both lost
principal and delinquent interest.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The M-1, M-2A, and M-2B notes
benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Freddie Mac and do not affect the transaction. In addition,
credit events that occur prior to maturity with losses realized
from liquidations or loan modifications that occur after the final
maturity date will not be passed through to noteholders.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Freddie Mac has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its
lender-approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty
risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan
quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a
tight control environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has
determined Freddie Mac to be an above-average aggregator for its
2013 and later product. Fitch accounted for the lower risk by
applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The M-1 class strongly
benefits from the sequential pay structure and stable CE provided
by the more junior M-2A, M-2B, B-1, and B-2 classes, which are
locked out from receiving any principal until classes with a more
senior payment priority are paid in full. However, available CE for
the junior classes as a percentage of the outstanding reference
pool increases in tandem with the paydown of the M-1 class. Given
the size of the M-1 class relative to the combined total of all the
junior classes, together with the sequential pay structure, the
class M-1 will de-lever and CE as a percentage will build faster
than in a pro rata payment structure.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from a solid alignment of
interests. Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 3.50% of
loss protection, as well as a minimum of 5% of the M-1, M-2A, M-2B,
and B-1 tranches and a minimum of 75% of the first-loss B-2
tranche. Initially, Freddie Mac will retain an approximately 29.2%
vertical slice/interest in the M-1, M-2A, and M-2B tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) assets are less
than its obligations for longer than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Freddie Mac if it is determined that such action
would promote an orderly administration of Freddie Mac's affairs.
Fitch believes that the U.S. government will continue to support
Freddie Mac, as reflected in its current rating of the GSE.
However, if, at some point, Fitch views the support as being
reduced and receivership likely, the rating of Freddie Mac could be
downgraded and ratings on the M-1, M-2A, and M-2B notes, along with
their corresponding MAC notes, could be affected

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected 24.0% at the 'BBBsf' level, 22.4% at the 'BBB-sf'
level and 14.5% at the 'Bsf' level. The analysis indicates that
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 34% would potentially move the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


STRATFORD CLO: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D
notes from Stratford CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) managed by Highland Capital Management L.P.  At the same
time, S&P removed these ratings from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with positive implications on Jan. 31, 2017.  In addition,
S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and E notes from
the same transaction.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 28, 2017, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect increased credit support following the
transaction's $318.99 million in collective paydowns to the class
A-1 notes since S&P's June 2015 rating actions.  These paydowns
resulted in improved reported overcollateralization (O/C) ratios
since the May 2015 trustee report, which S&P used for its previous
rating actions:

   -- The class A/B O/C ratio improved to 147.75% from 120.48%.
   -- The class C O/C ratio improved to 121.16% from 111.97%.
   -- The class D O/C ratio improved to 112.38% from 108.64%.
   -- The class E O/C ratio declined slightly to 105.42% from
      105.77%.

The collateral portfolio's credit quality has deteriorated slightly
since S&P's last rating actions.  The concentration of collateral
obligations rated 'CCC' and below has increased, with 8.00%
reported as of the Feb. 28, 2017, trustee report, compared with
5.15% reported as of the May 31, 2015, trustee report.  Over the
same period, trustee-reported defaults have increased to 9.10% from
5.46%.  Despite the increase in 'CCC' rated and defaulted
collateral, the transaction has benefited significantly from the
paydowns and drop in the weighted average life due to the
underlying collateral's seasoning, with 3.36 years reported as of
the February 2017 trustee report, compared with 3.73 years as of
the May 2015 trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels.  The affirmations reflect S&P's view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

S&P's ratings on the class D and E notes are constrained at 'BBB+
(sf)' and 'B+ (sf)', respectively, by the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test included
as part of S&P's corporate collateralized debt obligation
criteria.

The affirmed ratings reflect adequate credit support at the current
rating levels, though any further deterioration in the credit
support available to the notes could result in further rating
changes.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take further rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS RAISED

Stratford CLO Ltd.

Class                 Rating
               To                From
B              AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C              AA+ (sf)          A- (sf)/Watch Pos
D              BBB+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)/Watch Pos

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Stratford CLO Ltd.

Class       Rating
A-1         AAA (sf)
A-2         AAA (sf)
E           B+ (sf)



THAYER PARK: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Thayer Park CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$302,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$64,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$39,500,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$28,750,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$24,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Thayer Park CLO, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
80% ramped as of the closing date.

GSO / Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC (the "Manager") will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on
behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2880

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2880 to 3312)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2880 to 3744)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


VENTURE X CLO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB' Rating on Cl. E-RR Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-RR, E-RR, and F-RR replacement notes from
Venture X CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2012 that is managed by MJX Asset Management
LLC.  The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed amended
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

On the April 20, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes.  At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes.  However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

S&P's review of the transaction relied in part upon a criteria
interpretation with respect to its May 2014 criteria, "CDOs:
Mapping A Third Party's Internal Credit Scoring System To Standard
& Poor's Global Rating Scale," which allows S&P to use a limited
number of public ratings from other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) to assess the credit
quality of assets not rated by S&P Global Ratings.  The criteria
provide specific guidance for the treatment of corporate assets not
rated by S&P Global Ratings, while the interpretation outlines the
treatment of securitized assets.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as presented to S&P in
connection with this review, to estimate future performance.  In
line with S&P's criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis
considered the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or
ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.  The
results of the cash flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that
all of the rated outstanding classes have adequate credit
enhancement available at the preliminary rating levels associated
with these rating actions.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Venture X CLO Ltd./Venture X CLO Corp.

Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-RR                      AAA (sf)             260.50
B-RR                      AA (sf)               58.75
C-RR                      A (sf)                27.00
D-RR                      BBB (sf)              18.50
E-RR                      BB (sf)               13.75
F-RR                      B+ (sf)               5.00


WATERFRONT CLO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. D Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Waterfront CLO 2007-1, Ltd.

US$19,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on December 21, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

US$11,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on December 21, 2016 Affirmed Ba1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$32,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020 (current
outstanding balance of $29,747,030.66), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on December 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$9,500,000 Class A-3 Floating Rate Notes Due 2020, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on December 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$10,500,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2020,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on December 21, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

Waterfront CLO 2007-1, Ltd., issued in August 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans, with some exposure to
second-lien loans and bonds. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in October 2013

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since December 2016. The Class
A-1 notes have been fully paid down, by $7.1 million and the Class
A-2 notes have been paid down by approximately 7% or $2.3 million
since then. Based on the trustee's March 2017 report, the OC ratios
for the Class A, B, C, and D notes are reported at 230.21%,
155.12%, 129.54% and 112.59%, respectively, versus December 2016
levels of 199.23%, 143.27%, 122.46% and 108.11%, respectively

Notwithstanding the benefits of deleveraging, the transaction's
exposure to securities that mature after the notes do (long-dated
securities) has increased since December 2016. Based on the
trustee's March 2017 report, long-dated securities currently make
up approximately 31.1% or $29.9 million, compared to 27.2% or $28.7
million in December 2016. These investments could expose the notes
to market risk in the event of liquidation when the notes mature.
Despite the increase in the OC ratios of the Class D notes, Moody's
affirmed the ratings on the Class D notes owing to market risk
stemming from the deal's exposure to these long-dated securities.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and collateral sales by the manager, which could have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are faster than
Moody's current expectations will usually have a positive impact on
CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. The deal's
increased exposure owing to amendments to loan agreements extending
maturities continues. In light of the deal's sizable exposure to
long-dated assets, which increases its sensitivity to the
liquidation assumptions in the rating analysis, Moody's ran
scenarios using a range of liquidation value assumptions. However,
actual long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2619)

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +2

Class D: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3929)

Class A-2: 0

Class A-3: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $89.7 million, defaulted par of $6.5
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.17% (implying
a WARF of 3274), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
44.09%, a diversity score of 23 and a weighted average spread of
4.50% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


WELLS FARGO 2005-AR4: Moody's Hikes on 2 Tranches to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of four tranches
from one transaction backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by
Wells Fargo.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR4 Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgraded are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions are a result of the
recent performance of the underlying pools and reflect Moody's
updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $237MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of twenty-six
tranches from 9 RMBS transactions, issued by various issuers and
backed by Subprime mortgage loans.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS1 Trust

M-II-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS10 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS12 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 17, 2012
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS6 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS8 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS6 Trust

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC5

Cl. B, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 11, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.7% in February 2017 from 4.9% in
February 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $839MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2005-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 16 tranches
from eight transactions issued by various issuers, and backed by
subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-4

Cl. AV1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AV2-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC5

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE7

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 3, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Structured Trust I 2007-1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.4BB of RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on APril 10, 2017, upgraded the ratings
of 41 tranches from 17 transactions, and downgraded the rating of
one tranche from one transaction, issued by various issuers, backed
by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2014 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB8

Cl. AF-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB6

Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-II-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-C

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-D

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-A

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: First NLC Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH4

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 5, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2013 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. II-A3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 27, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-D

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WCW2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-3

Cl. AV-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. AV-1B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-5

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. MV-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrade on Bear
Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1 Cl. M-1 is primarily
due to interest shortfalls that are unlikely to be recouped. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.5% in March 2017 from 5.0% in March
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 41 Classes From 12 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 41 classes from 12 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2006.  The review yielded 10 upgrades, five
downgrades, 25 affirmations, and one discontinuance.

With respect to insured obligations, the rating on a bond-insured
class will be the higher of the rating on the bond insurer and the
rating of the underlying obligation, without considering the
potential credit enhancement from the bond insurance.

Of the classes reviewed, Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust
2002-3's class A ('AA (sf)') is insured by Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp. ('AA').

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P raised its ratings on 10 classes because its projected credit
support for these classes is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for these rating levels.  The upgrades reflect either
improved collateral performance/delinquency trends or increased
credit support relative to S&P's projected losses.

The upgrades include three ratings that were raised three notches.
Of these, class A-I-6 from RASC Series 2003-KS7 Trust was upgraded
because the underlying collateral performance during the most
recent performance periods improved from previous review dates.
Classes M-1 and M-2 from Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trusts'
series 2004-4 were upgraded because of increased credit support and
the classes' ability to withstand a higher level of projected
losses than previously anticipated.  This transaction has also
permanently failed its payment allocation triggers resulting in
sequential principal payments.

Class A-2D from Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series
2006-ASAP1 was raised 10 notches, which reflects a decrease in
S&P's projected losses and its belief that S&P's projected credit
support for the affected class will be sufficient to cover its
revised projected losses at the rating level.  S&P has decreased
its projected losses because there have been fewer reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods compared
with previous review dates.  Severe delinquencies decreased to 14%
in January 2017 from 21% in October 2014.

S&P upgraded class A-2D from Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan
Trust Series 2005-HE6 by seven notches to reflect increased credit
support and the class' ability to withstand a higher level of
projected losses than previously anticipated.  This remaining
senior class is receiving all of the principal payments as the
payment allocation triggers have permanently failed, resulting in
sequential principal payments.  Credit support for the class
increased to 78% in January 2017 from 64% in October 2014.

Additionally, the raised ratings on three more classes from Aegis
Asset Backed Securities Trust's series 2004-4 and class M-1 from
Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-HE6 also
reflect increased credit support for each class and their ability
to withstand a higher level of projected losses than previously
anticipated.

S&P raised its rating on class B1 from Aegis Asset Backed
Securities Trust's series 2004-1 because S&P believes this class is
no longer virtually certain to default, primarily due to improved
collateral performance.  However, S&P's 'CCC (sf)' rating indicates
that it believes that its projected credit support will remain
insufficient to cover its projected loss for this class and that
the class is still vulnerable to defaulting.

                             DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its rating on one class to speculative-grade ('BB+' or
lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or higher), while the
remaining four downgraded classes already had speculative-grade
ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected
credit support for the affected classes will be insufficient to
cover its projected losses for the related transactions at a higher
rating.  The downgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

The downgrades include one rating that was lowered three or more
notches due to the application of S&P's imputed promises criteria.

S&P also lowered its rating on class M-1 from Renaissance Home
Equity Loan Trust 2005-4 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' because of
principal writedowns incurred by this class.

Interest Shortfalls

S&P downgraded class M-2 from Argent Securities Inc. 2004-W11
because of interest shortfalls to this class and the application of
its interest shortfall criteria, which designate a maximum
potential rating (MPR).

Because this class is subject to a delayed reimbursement provision
for interest shortfalls, S&P projected the transaction's cash flows
to assess the likelihood of the interest shortfalls' reimbursement
under various rating scenarios.  The resulting rating reflects the
application of S&P's criteria based on those projections.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

S&P lowered ots ratings on class A-I-5 from RASC Series 2003-KS7
Trust and class A-4 from Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-4
to reflect the application of S&P's imputed promises criteria,
which resulted in a maximum potential rating (MPR) lower than the
previous ratings on these classes.

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications, S&P imputes an amount of interest owed to that class
of securities by applying "Methodology For Incorporating Loan
Modification And Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings,"
published April 17, 2015, and "Principles For Rating Debt Issues
Based On Imputed Promises," published Dec. 19, 2014. Based on S&P's
criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a particular class,
the resulting rating may be lower than if S&P had solely considered
that class' paid interest based on the applicable WAC.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

S&P affirmed its ratings on four classes in the 'AA' through 'B'
rating categories to reflect S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support on these classes remained relatively consistent with
S&P's prior projections and is sufficient to cover its projected
losses for those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of our upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                         DISCONTINUANCES

S&P discontinued one rating as the class paid down in full during
recent remittance periods.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2p4aJhB


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 42 Classes From 10 CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 41 classes from nine
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions
and one class from one CF collateral debt obligation (CDO) backed
by commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

The discontinuances follow the complete paydown of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment report for
each transaction:

   -- ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in March
      2017.

   -- BlueMountain CLO III Ltd. (CF CLO): senior most tranches
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in March 2017.

   -- Mercer Field CLO L.P. (CF CLO): optional redemption in March

      2017.

   -- N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd. series 2006-1 (CF CDO of CMBS):
      senior most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Palmer Square Loan Funding 2016-1 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in March 2017.

   -- Race Point V CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in March

      2017.

   -- San Gabriel CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      March 2017.

   -- Westwood CDO I Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid down.

   -- ZAIS CLO 4 Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in February
      2017.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED


ACAS CLO 2012-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
B-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
C-R                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
D-R                 NR                  A+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

BlueMountain CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Highbridge Loan Management 2012-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1R                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2R                NR                  AA (sf)
B-R                 NR                  A (sf)
C-R                 NR                  BBB (sf)
D-R                 NR                  BB (sf)
E                   NR                  B (sf)

Mercer Field CLO L.P.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
E                   NR                  BB (sf)

N-Star REL CDO VI Ltd. series 2006-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  BB+ (sf)

Palmer Square Loan Funding 2016-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA (sf)
B                   NR                  A (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB (sf)

Race Point V CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
C-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
D-R                 NR                  AA (sf)
E-R                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)

San Gabriel CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-3L                NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1L                NR                  A+ (sf)
B-2L                NR                  BB (sf)

Westwood CDO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B                   NR                  A+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-1                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
C-2                 NR                  BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
D                   NR                  BB (sf)/Watch Pos

ZAIS CLO 4 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AA (sf)
C                   NR                  A (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


[*] U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Inch Higher in March, Fitch Says
------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. CMBS delinquencies climbed higher last month due to a
shrinking overall index denominator and moderately higher late-pays
across four property types, according to the latest results from
Fitch Ratings.

Loan delinquencies rose four basis points (bps) in March to 3.41%
from 3.37% a month earlier. New delinquencies of $668 million
exceeded resolutions of $553 million. In addition, portfolio runoff
of $6.3 billion continues to outpace Fitch-rated new issuance
volume of $4.6 billion from four transactions in February,
resulting in a lower overall index denominator.

The largest new delinquency in March was a mixed-use property, the
$58.4 million Northstar loan (LBUBS 2007-C2). The 820,683sf
mixed-use property contains office, hotel and parking garage
components and is located in Minneapolis, MN. The largest
resolution in March was the $32.2 million Great Northern Mall asset
(BSCMS 2004-PWR3), a 504,000sf portion of an 898,000sf regional
mall located in Clay, NY, which became real-estate owned (REO) in
2015.

The first three months of 2017 have been marked by a slow rise in
CMBS delinquencies that Fitch had envisioned at the end of last
year, with much of the increase coming from peak vintage (2007)
loans. Assuming current market refi rates for maturing loans and
new issuance trajectory, Fitch is projecting overall CMBS
delinquencies to hit 5.25% - 5.75% by the end of 2017.

Current and previous delinquency rates by property type are as
follows:

-- Retail: 5.55% (from 5.35% in February);
-- Office: 5.50% (from 5.41%);
-- Industrial: 4.77% (from 4.30%);
-- Mixed Use: 4.16% (from 3.89%);
-- Hotel: 3.22% (from 3.28%);
-- Multifamily: 0.63% (from 0.75%);
-- Other: 0.68% (from 0.70%).


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
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Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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