TCR_Public/170604.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, June 4, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 154

                            Headlines

245 PARK AVENUE: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class HHR Certs
A10 TERM: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
AASET TRUST 2017-1: Fitch to Rate Class C Notes 'BBsf'
ACIS CLO 2014-3: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class F Debt
AIMCO CLO 2017-A: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes

ALESCO PREFERRED IX: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on 4 Tranches
ALESCO PREFERRED VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to B1
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2014-FL1: S&P Hikes Cl. PGA Debt Rating to BB-
BANC OF AMERICA 2004-5: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class K Certs
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL4: DBRS Rates Cl. B5 Debt 'Bsf'

BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL4: Fitch Rates Cl. B5 Notes 'Bsf'
BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL4: Fitch to Rate Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
BLACK DIAMOND 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. D Debt
BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO III: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes Rating From Ba1
CALCULUS TRUST: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Trust Units to C

CAN CAPITAL 2014-1: DBRS Cuts Class B Notes Rating to B(high)(sf)
CAVALRY CLO V: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1(sf)
CD 2017-CD4: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB(low) Rating on Class F Debt
CENT CLO 19: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Debt
COMM 2013-THL: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs

COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
COMM 2015-LC21: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C03: DBRS Finalizes BB on 18 Tranches
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C04: Fitch to Rate 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
COUNTRYWIDE 2007-MF1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 4 Tranches

CSAIL 2015-C2: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
CSAIL 2016-C6: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class X-F Certs
DT AUTO 2017-2: DBRS Finalizes Prov BBsf Rating on Class E Debt
EARNEST STUDENT 2017-A: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class C Debt
EARNEST STUDENT 2017-A: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating to Class C Debt

FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2017-2: DBRS Gives (P)BB Ratings to Cl. E Debt
FREMF MORTGAGE 2012-KF01: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. X Debt
GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C4: Moody's Affirms B3sf Rating on Class B Debt
GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Cl. G Certs
GOLD KEY 2014-A: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Debt

GOLUB CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A Certs
GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC13: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class X-B Certs
HALCYON LOAN 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. D Notes
HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Confirms 22 Ratings From Six Series

HOSPITALITY 2017-HIT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certificates
HPS LOAN 11-2017: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
JP MORGAN 2003-LN1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certs to D
JP MORGAN 2004-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Certs to Caa2(sf)
JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Cl. B Debt

JP MORGAN 2006-CH1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-3 Debt Rating to B3
JP MORGAN 2006-CH2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class AV-4 Debt to B3
JP MORGAN 2007-LDP10: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. A-M Certs to CCCsf
JPMCC 2017-JP6: DBRS Gives Prov BB Rating to Class F-RR Certs
LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C4: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. L Debt

LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Certs to BB
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on E-2 Debt
LEAF RECEIVABLES 2017-1: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-2 Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M3 Notes to Csf
LNR CDO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 14 Note Classes

LNR CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 12 Note Classes
MADISON PARK XXV: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: DBRS Cuts Class D Debt Rating to D(sf)
MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CKI1: S&P Affirms Bsf Rating on Class E Certs
METROPOLITAN ASSET 1998-A: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Debt Rating to Caa3

MJX VENTURE II: Moody's Assigns Ba1(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: S&P Hikes Class H Debt Rating From BB+
MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP23: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. E Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on F Debt

MORGAN STANLEY 2017-H1: DBRS Assigns B Ratings to Cl. H-RR Debt
N-STAR REL VIII: Moody's Hikes Class C Notes Rating to B3(sf)
NATIONSTAR HECM 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Cl. M2 Debt
NCMS 2017-75B: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on 3 Tranches
OCTAGON INVESTMENT XIV: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. E-R Notes

OLYMPIC TOWER 2017-OT: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating to Class E Certs
PALMER SQUARE 2015-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
PREFERREDPLUS TRUST CZN-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on $34MM Certs to B2
RAIT TRUST 2015-FL4: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
REALT 2015-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Certificates

REALT 2016-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Certificates
REGATTA IX: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
ROCKWALL CDO II: S&P Puts Cl. B-2L Notes' BB- Rating on Watch Pos.
SDART 2017-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class E Notes
SDART 2017-2: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BBsf'

SDART 2017-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on $75.19MM Class E Notes
SOUND POINT XVI: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
TICP CLO VII: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
TOWD POINT 2015-2: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
TRITON AVIATION: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt to C(sf)

UBS COMMERCIAL 2017-C1: Fitch to Rate Class F-RR Notes 'B-sf'
UNITED AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class E Notes
WELLS FARGO 2015-C28: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Debt
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Review 24 Ratings From 6 ABS Transactions

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C8: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
[*] DBRS Reviews 333 Classes From 47 US RMBS Transactions
[*] DBRS Reviews 406 Classes From 31 US RMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Hikes $19.9MM of Second Lien RMBS Issued 2001-2005
[*] Moody's Hikes $219.4MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2000-2004

[*] Moody's Hikes $33.5MM of Second Lien RMBS Issued 2003-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.13BB of RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $239.7MM Alt-A Debt Issued 2002-2004
[*] S&P Completes Review on 104 Classes From 13 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 106 Classes From 12 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Completes Review on 52 Ratings From 11 RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 60 Classes From 24 CDO Deals
[*] US CMBS Loan Loss Severities Down in Q1 2017, Moody's Says

                            *********

245 PARK AVENUE: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class HHR Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to 245 Park Avenue Trust 2017-245P Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates.

-- $260,000,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $260,000,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,000,000a class X-B 'NR'; Outlook Stable;
-- $39,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,000,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $90,000,000 class E 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,000,000b class HHR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5.0% of the fair market value of the non-residual classes in the
aggregate (as of the closing date).

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on May 11, 2017, the
class X-B changed from 'AA-sf' to 'NR' based on the final deal
structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial interests in the mortgage
loan securing the fee interest in a 1,723,093 square foot (sf),
44-story office tower located at 245 Park Avenue 46th and 47th
streets in New York, NY. Proceeds of the loan were used to acquire
the property and pay closing costs. The certificates will follow a
sequential-pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Office Collateral in a Prime Manhattan Location: The
245 Park Avenue property is a 44-story Class A office building
located on an entire block bound by Park Avenue, Lexington Avenue
and 47th and 48th streets in the Grand Central office submarket of
Midtown Manhattan. Fitch assigned a property quality grade of
'A-'.

Historical Occupancy and High-Quality Tenancy: The property was
91.2% occupied as of Feb. 28, 2017 and has recorded average
occupancy of 95.1% since 2007. The property serves as a
headquarters for Societe Generale, Major League Baseball, Angelo
Gordon, and RaboBank. Tenants with investment-grade credit ratings
account for 65.1% of the properties base rental revenue.
Acquisition by Institutional Sponsorship: The loan is funding the
acquisition of the subject property for $2.21 billion by HNA Group
(HNA). HNA, based in China, is a global Fortune 500 company with
interests across a diverse array of sectors.

Rollover Risk and Departure of Major League Baseball (MLB): MLB is
the second largest tenant at the property, occupying 12.6% of net
rentable area (NRA). MLB expires in October 2022 but has announced
their intention to relocate in 2019. In total, 29.3% of NRA expires
in 2022 with an additional 21.8% of NRA expiring in 2026, one year
prior to loan maturity.

Fitch Leverage: The $500.0 million mortgage loan has a Fitch debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) of 1.08x and
81.1%, respectively and debt of $696 psf based on the current NRA.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch performed a break-even analysis to determine the amount of
value deterioration the pool could withstand prior to $1 of loss on
the total debt and 'AAAsf' rated class. The break-even value
declines were performed using both the appraisal values at issuance
and the Fitch-stressed value.

Based on the as-is appraisal value of $2.21 billion, break-even
values represent declines of 45.7% and 66.5% for the total debt and
'AAAsf' class, respectively.

Similarly, Fitch estimated total debt and 'AAAsf' break-even value
declines using the Fitch-adjusted property value of $1.5 billion,
which is a function of the Fitch net cash flow (NCF) and a stressed
capitalization rate, in relation to the appropriate class balances.
The break-even value declines relative to the total debt and
'AAAsf' balances are 18.9% and 50.0%, respectively, which
correspond to equivalent declines to Fitch NCF, as the Fitch
capitalization rate is held constant.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A and
found that a 10% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 31% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade.



A10 TERM: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed the following Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2016-1 issued by A10 Term Asset Financing
2016-1, LLC:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at A (low) (sf)
-- Class C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the pool. The transaction consists of 23 loans secured by 27
transitional commercial real estate assets, including office,
retail, industrial and multifamily properties. A total of nine
underlying loans are cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into
four separate portfolios. According to the May 2017 remittance,
there has been a collateral reduction of 12.6% since issuance, as
five loans have been repaid in full, and one property out of an
original six-property portfolio loan has been re-leased, with
proceeds paying down the portfolio loan. The remaining loans
benefit from low leverage on a per-unit basis, with the
weighted-average debt yield based on the most recently reported net
operating income and outstanding trust balance at 8.5%, which is
moderately stable given that the pool consists of stabilizing
assets.

Most loans were originally structured with two- to four-year terms
and include built-in extensions and future funding facilities meant
to aid in property stabilization, both of which are at the
lender’s sole discretion. The reserve account has a current
balance of $29.4 million against total potential future funding
obligations of $42.3 million. According to the most recent
reporting, the collateral assets have stable debt yields; however,
the majority of the properties continue to perform below their
respective stabilization plans.

The largest loan in the transaction, the Troy and First
Center/Southfield Portfolio, represents 16.8% of the current pool
balance. This loan is secured by five flex-industrial properties in
Troy, Michigan, and a 638,000-square foot (sf) Class B office
property in Southfield, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. The
borrower’s business plan is to lease the vacancy across the
portfolio and to sell individual buildings as they stabilize. To
aid in portfolio stabilization, the loan is structured with a $10.4
million future funding facility to fund leasing costs and capital
renovation projects. As of May 2017, the balance of the facility is
$8.0 million.

The First Center office property remains 44% occupied as of May
2017, which is the same as at issuance. The largest tenants are
Secure 24 (83,000 sf) and United Healthcare (65,000 sf) on leases
expiring in July 2018 and August 2019, respectively. The borrower
has successfully renewed American Axle’s lease (32,000 sf) for
three years at $17.00 psf and signed new tenant, Jack Cooper CT
Services (15,000 sf) for eight years at $15.50 psf. The tenants
received tenant improvement allowances of $12.50 psf and $25.00
psf, respectively. According to the servicer, the borrower is
negotiating with a medical office user for a significant portion of
space. The loan had an original leasing facility of $4.86 million
to fund leasing costs. According to Reis, the submarket vacancy
rate remains elevated at 32.1%, which compares similarly with the
31.5% vacancy rate for the submarket at issuance. Capital projects
completed to date include updates to the central atrium and common
areas, the resurfacing of the parking lot and exterior painting of
the building.

The five remaining flex-industrial properties have occupancy rates
ranging from 53.0% to 100.0%. The least occupied property, Research
Drive, is predominantly finished as office space among the six
individual buildings, and according to the servicer, the borrower
is in the process of negotiating a lease for approximately 125,000
sf, which would significantly improve the occupancy rate. The
remaining industrial properties are well occupied and considered to
be stabilized. The loan formerly securing the Big Beaver Warehouse
property has been paid in full, and three additional properties
have experienced partial prepayment as a result of individual
building releases. Total prepayments across the portfolio are $9.2
million.

The ratings assigned by DBRS contemplate timely payments of
distributable interest and, in the case of the offered notes other
than the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Senior Fixed Rate Notes, ultimate
recovery of deferred collateralized note interest amounts
(inclusive of interest payable thereon at the applicable rate, to
the extent permitted by law). The transaction is a standard
sequential-pay waterfall.

The rating assigned to the Class B notes materially deviates from
the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviation is warranted given the
undemonstrated sustainability of loan performance trends.


AASET TRUST 2017-1: Fitch to Rate Class C Notes 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Outlooks
to the AASET 2017-1 Trust (AASET 2017-1) notes:

-- $479,456,000 class A asset-backed notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $88,515,000 class B asset-backed notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $44,257,000 class C asset-backed notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

The notes issued from AASET 2017-1 will be backed by lease payments
and disposition proceeds on a pool of 32 mid to end-of-life
aircraft. Apollo Aviation Management Limited (AAML), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Apollo Aviation Holdings Limited (Apollo), will be
the servicer. Note proceeds will finance the purchase of the
aircraft from certain funds (SASOF funds) managed by affiliates of
Apollo. AASET 2017-1 is the first AASET transaction rated by Fitch
and the fourth issued since 2014 serviced by Apollo. Fitch does not
rate Apollo or AAML.

SASOF III, the primary seller of the assets to AASET 2017-1, will
retain a position as E certificate holder, consistent with similar
investments made by funds managed by affiliates of Apollo in prior
AASET transactions. Therefore, Apollo will have a vested interest
in performance of the transaction outside of merely collecting
servicing fees due to the European style waterfall in SASOF III.
Fitch views this as a positive since Apollo has a significant
interest in generating positive cash flows through management of
the assets over the life of the transaction.

The majority of the aircraft in the pool will be sold from SASOF
III to the AOE Issuers during a delivery period ending 270 days
after closing of the transaction. However, there are certain
aircraft in the pool that are currently not owned by SASOF III or
its affiliates and may be acquired by the AOE Issuers from the
third-party sellers after close. If an aircraft in the pool (or
replacement aircraft) are not transferred to the AOE Issuers within
270 days of closing, the applicable amount attributable to each
aircraft not transferred will be used to prepay the notes without
premium, consistent with prior ASSET and other aircraft ABS
transactions.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as trustee and operating bank and
Phoenix American Financial Services, Inc. will act as managing
agent.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Asset Quality: Despite a weighted average (WA) age of 12
years, the pool is largely comprised of high-quality, in-production
A320 and B737 family aircraft. The WA remaining lease term is 4.6
years and 37.8% of the pool is on lease until at least 2023, a
positive for future cash flow generation. However, there is a
significant concentration in less marketable A330-200s.

Weak Lessee Credit: Most of the 23 lessees in the pool are either
unrated or speculative-grade airline credits, which is typical of
aircraft ABS. Fitch assumed unrated lessees would perform
consistent with a 'B' Issuer Default Rating to accurately reflect
default risk in the pool. Ratings were assumed to migrate lower
during future recessions and once aircraft reach Tier 3
classification.

Technological Risk Exists: Current generation A320 and B737
aircraft both face replacement over the next decade from the
A320neo and B737 MAX, with the former debuting in 2016 and the
latter in May this year. The A330 family also faces future neo
replacement as well as ongoing competition from the A350 and B787.
New variants will pressure current aircraft values and lease rates,
but the long lead time for replacement and healthy operator bases
will help mitigate replacement risk.

Consistent Transaction Structure: Credit enhancement is comprised
of overcollateralization, a liquidity facility and a cash reserve.
The initial loan-to-values (LTV) for the class A, B and C notes are
65.6%, 77.7% and 83.8%, respectively, based on the lower of the
medium or mean (LMM) of the maintenance adjusted base value.

Capable Servicing History and Experience: Fitch believes AAML has
the ability to collect lease payments, remarket and repossess
aircraft in an event of lessee default and procure maintenance to
retain values and ensure stable performance. Fitch considers AAML
to be a capable servicer, evidenced by prior securitization
performance and their servicing experience of aviation assets and
Apollo's managed aviation funds.

Adequate Loss Coverage: Each class of notes makes full payment of
interest and principal in the primary scenarios commensurate with
their recommended ratings after applying Fitch's asset assumptions
and stresses. Fitch also created multiple alternative cash flows to
evaluate the structure sensitivity to different scenarios, detailed
later in the report.

High Industry Cyclicality: Commercial aviation has been subject to
significant cyclicality due to macroeconomic and geopolitical
events. Downturns are typically marked by reduced aircraft
utilization rates, values, and lease rates, as well as
deteriorating lessee credit quality. Fitch's analysis assumes
multiple periods of significant volatility over the life of the
transaction.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Due to the correlation between global economic conditions and the
airline industry, the ratings may be impacted by global
macro-economic or geopolitical factors over the remaining term of
the transaction. Therefore, Fitch evaluated various sensitivity
scenarios which could affect future cash flows from the pool and
recommended ratings for the notes.

Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis assuming a 25% decrease to
Fitch's lease rate factor curve to observe the impact of depressed
lease rates on the pool. This scenario highlights the effect of
increased competition in the aircraft leasing market, particularly
for mid to end-of-life aircraft over the past few years, and
stresses the pool to a higher degree by assuming lease rates well
below observed market rates. Under this scenario, the notes could
be subject to ratings downgrades of two to four notches.

Fitch evaluated a scenario in which all unrated airlines are
assumed to carry a 'CCC' rating. This scenario mimics a prolonged
recessionary environment in which airlines are susceptible to an
increased likelihood of default. This would, in turn, subject the
aircraft pool to more downtime and expenses as repossession and
remarketing events would increase. Under this scenario, the notes
show little sensitivity despite the increase in expenses due to
increased defaults and are still able to pay in full for each
respective rating scenario. Therefore, this scenario is unlikely to
result in any negative rating actions.

Fitch created a scenario in which the A330-200s in the pool
encounter a considerable amount of stress to their residual values.
Fitch removed outlier appraisal values for each A330-200 in the
pool and took the average of the lower two appraisals to determine
maintenance-adjusted base values for modeling. All the A330-200s
were assumed to be Tier 3 aircraft to stress recessionary value
declines, and Fitch placed a higher 25% haircut to residual
proceeds. Under this scenario the A330-200s are only granted
part-out value at the end of their useful lives, and the notes show
slight sensitivity that would likely result in downgrades of one to
two notches.


ACIS CLO 2014-3: S&P Affirms B+ Rating on Class F Debt
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, A-1F,
A-2a, A-2b, B, C, D, E, and F notes from ACIS CLO 2014-3 Ltd., a
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed
in February 2014 and is managed by Acis Capital Management L.P.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 2017 trustee report.  The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
February 2019.

Since the transaction's effective date, the trustee-reported
collateral portfolio weighted average life has decreased to 4.86
years from 5.32 years. This seasoning has decreased the overall
credit risk profile. In addition, the number of obligors in the
portfolio increased during this period to 201 from 164, which
contributed to the portfolio's increased diversification.  Assets
rated 'CCC+' and below also increased, to $28.91 million as of
April 2017 from $6.99 million as of the April 2014 effective date
report.

According to the April 2017 trustee report that S&P used for this
review, the overcollateralization (O/C) ratios for each class have
exhibited declines since the April 2014 trustee report, which S&P
used for its May 2014 rating affirmations:

The class A/B O/C ratio was 130.93%, down from 132.30%.
The class C O/C ratio was 119.50%, down from 120.74%.
The class D O/C ratio was 113.03%, down from 114.20%.
The class E O/C ratio was 107.66%, down from 108.78%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in 'CCC+' and below rated assets has been
largely offset by the decline in the weighted average life.
However, any significant deterioration in these metrics could
negatively affect the deal in the future, especially the junior
tranches. As such, the affirmed ratings reflect S&P's belief that
the credit support available is commensurate with the current
rating levels.

Although its cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class B, C, D, E, and F notes, its rating actions consider
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period, which is scheduled to end in February 2019.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with its criteria, S&P's cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as it deems
necessary.

RATINGS AFFIRMED

ACIS CLO 2014-3 Ltd.

Class         Rating
A-1A          AAA (sf)
A-1F          AAA (sf)
A-2a          AAA (sf)
A-2b          AAA (sf)
B             AA (sf)
C             A (sf)
D             BBB (sf)
E             BB (sf)
F             B+ (sf)


AIMCO CLO 2017-A: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by AIMCO CLO, Series 2017-A.

Moody's rating action is:

US$258,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$44,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$19,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

US$6,000,000 Class F Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class F Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, the Class E Notes, and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

AIMCO 2017-A is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is approximately 84% ramped as of the closing date.

Allstate Investment Management Company (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2891

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.16 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2891 to 3325)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2891 to 3759)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3


ALESCO PREFERRED IX: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on 4 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding IX, Ltd.:

US$365,000,000 Class A-1 First Priority Delayed Draw Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of $243,899,139),
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on July 13, 2015 Affirmed at Aa3
(sf)

US$59,000,000 Class A-2A Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2036, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on July 13,
2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class A-2B Second Priority Senior Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2036, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf);
previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$51,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of $49,870,878), Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf); previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

US$7,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Third Priority Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of $6,845,022),
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to Ba1
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$54,000,000 Class C-1 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
$53,270,064 including deferred interest balance), Affirmed at Caa2
(sf); previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

US$48,500,000 Class C-2 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
$52,100,042 including deferred interest balance), Affirmed at Caa2
(sf); previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

US$12,500,000 Class C-3 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine
Secured Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of
$12,342,747 including deferred interest balance), Affirmed at Caa2
(sf); previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

US$7,000,000 Class C-4 Deferrable Fourth Priority Mezzanine Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2036 (current balance of $9,177,256
including deferred interest balance), Affirmed at Caa2 (sf);
previously on July 13, 2015 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding IX, Ltd., issued in December 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed by a portfolio of bank and
insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1 notes, an increase in some of the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios, and the resumption of interest
payments of previously deferring assets.

The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately 0.4% or $1.0
million since May 2016, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets. Based on Moody's calculations,
the current OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2, Class B and
Class C notes are 202.5%, 161.5%, 136.2%, and 100.9%, respectively,
compared to May 2016 levels of 202.8%, 161.8%, 136.6%, and 99.7%,
respectively. Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to two
deferring assets that meet certain criteria, totaling $12.0 million
in par. Since May 2016, two previously deferring banks with a total
par of $11.0 million have resumed making interest payments on their
TruPS. Based on the trustee's March report, the Class A OC ratio,
at 158.4%, was passing the trigger of 146.2%, therefore excess
interest was used to pay $1.7 million of the Class C deferred
interest balance in March 2017. The Class C notes will continue to
benefit from the use of excess interest to repay the notes'
deferred interest balance.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 620)

Class A-1: 0

Class A-2A: +1

Class A-2B: +1

Class B-1: +2

Class B-2: +2

Class C-1: +1

Class C-2: +2

Class C-3: +1

Class C-4: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1474)

Class A-1: -1

Class A-2A: -1

Class A-2B: -1

Class B-1: -1

Class B-2: -1

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class C-3: -2

Class C-4: -2


ALESCO PREFERRED VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Alesco Preferred Funding VII, Ltd.:

US$188,000,000 Class A-1-A First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $68,131,358), Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$177,000,000 Class A-1-B First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035 (current balance of $64,144,948), Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf); previously on August 10, 2015 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2035, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on August 10,
2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

US$35,000,000 Class B Third Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2035 (current balance of $37,055,927 including cumulative
deferred interest balance), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
August 10, 2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Alesco Preferred Funding VII, issued in April 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1-A and Class A-1-B notes and an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios (OC) since May 2016.

The Class A-1-A and Class A-1-B notes have paid down by
approximately 17.0% or $27.1 million since May 2016, using
principal proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets and
the diversion of excess interest proceeds. Based on Moody's
calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2 and Class
B notes have improved to 271.7%, 177.7% and 150.2%, respectively,
from May 2016 levels of 233.0%, 163.0% and 141.7%, respectively.
Moody's gave full par credit in its analysis to one deferring
asset,$5.5 million in par, that meets certain criteria. The Class
A-1-A and Class A-1-B notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool.

The actions also reflect the consideration that an Event of Default
(EoD) is continuing for the transaction. On March 21, 2012, the
transaction declared an EoD because the Class A/B
Overcollateralization Ratio fell below 100%, according to Section
5.1(j) of the indenture. On April 2, 2012, the Credit Enhancer
directed the trustee to declare all of the rated notes immediately
due and payable. As the EoD continues, the Class A-1-A and A-1-B
notes will continue to receive all excess interest and principal
proceeds until they are paid in full. Under Article V of the
indenture, if the EOD continues, the Credit Enhancer (if it is the
controlling party) and the holders of 66-2/3% of each class of
rated notes voting as a separate class can direct the trustee to
proceed with the sale and liquidation of the collateral. In such a
case, the severity of losses will depend on the timing and choice
of remedy. Although Moody's believes the likelihood of liquidation
is remote, the upgrade magnitude on the Class A-2 and Class B notes
was tempered by concerns about potential losses arising from
liquidation. The Class B notes also continue to defer interest, and
will continue to do so until the Class A-1-A, Class A-1-B and Class
A-2 notes are paid in full.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking
sector. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US insurance
sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 719)

Class A-1-A: 0

Class A-1-B: 0

Class A-2: +2

Class B: +2

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1695)

Class A-1-A: -1

Class A-1-B: -1

Class A-2: -1

Class B: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $359.4 million, defaulted/deferring par of $71.2, a weighted
average default probability of 12.28% (implying a WARF of 1169),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.4%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc(TM), an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2014-FL1: S&P Hikes Cl. PGA Debt Rating to BB-
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class PGA commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from BAMLL Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2014-FL1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
ratings on seven other classes from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates follow its analysis of the transaction primarily using
its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which
included a review of the credit characteristics and the current and
future performance of the collateral securing the four loans in the
pool, the deal structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

The upgrade on the class PGA raked certificates reflects S&P's
re-evaluation of the PGA National Resort & Spa loan.  The class
derives 100% of its cash flows from a subordinate nonpooled
component of the loan.

The affirmations on the pooled principal- and interest-paying
certificates reflect S&P's expectation that the available credit
enhancement for these classes will be within its estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement required for the current ratings and
our views regarding the loans' current and future performance.

The affirmation on the class ELJ raked certificates reflects S&P's
analysis of the Estancia La Jolla Hotel & Spa loan.  The ELJ raked
certificates derive 100%of its cash flow from a subordinate
nonpooled component of the loan.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X-EXT interest-only (IO)
certificates based on S&P's criteria for rating IO securities,
under which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher
than that of the lowest-rated reference class.  The notional
balance on class X-EXT references classes A, B, C, D, and E.

The analysis of large loan transactions is predominantly a
recovery-based approach that assumes a loan default.  Using this
approach, our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the lodging and retail properties that secure the four mortgage
loans in the trust.  S&P's analysis also considered the performance
of the volatile lodging collateral, which makes up 43.9% of the
pooled trust balance, as well as the stable servicer-reported net
operating income (NOI) and occupancy for the retail property.

According to the May 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of four floating-rate IO loans indexed to one-month LIBOR
with an aggregate pooled trust balance of $419.0 million and an
aggregate trust balance of $432.6 million.  All of the loans
currently mature in 2017 and have two, 12-month extension options
remaining.  According to the transaction documents, the borrowers
will pay the special servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as
well as costs and expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections
the special servicer conducts.  To date, the trust has not incurred
any principal losses.

S&P based its analysis partly on a review of each property's
available historical NOI for the years ended 2016, 2015, and 2014,
and where applicable, the most recent 2016 rent roll and Smith
Travel Research (STR) reports that the master servicer provided to
determine our opinion of a sustainable cash flow for the
properties. Details on the four loans are as follows:

The Lynnhaven Mall loan, the largest loan in the pool, has a pooled
trust and whole loan balance of $235.0 million (56.1% of the pooled
trust balance).  The loan is IO, pays a floating-rate interest rate
of LIBOR plus 1.85% per year, and currently matures on June 9,
2017.  It has two, 12-month extension options remaining.  The loan
is secured by a fee simple interest in 972,616 sq. ft. of a 1.15
million-sq.-ft. enclosed mall in Virginia Beach, Va.  The master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a 4.60x debt service
coverage (DSC) for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016.  Based on
adjustment to the Dec. 31, 2016, rent roll, S&P calculated the
collateral space to be approximately 93.5% occupied, and the five
largest tenants make up 53.1% of the collateral's total net
rentable area (NRA).  In addition, 2.1% of the NRA has leases that
expire in 2017, 27.5% has leases that expire in 2018, and 14.6% has
leases that expire in 2019.  S&P's analysis considered the stable
servicer-reported NOI, and its expected-case value, using a 7.25%
capitalization rate, yielded an 83.0% pooled trust loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio.

The PGA National Resort & Spa loan, the second-largest loan in the
pool, has a $96.0 million whole loan balance that is divided into a
$90.6 million senior pooled component (21.6%) and a $5.4 million
subordinate nonpooled trust component that supports the class PGA
raked certificates.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests
in the whole loan secure $29.0 million of mezzanine debt.  The loan
is IO, pays a floating-rate interest rate of LIBOR plus 1.775%
(pooled) and 4.761% (nonpooled) per year, and currently matures on
Sept. 9, 2017.  It has two, 12-month extension options remaining.
The loan is secured by a first-priority fee mortgage encumbering a
339-room, AAA-four-diamond-rated, full-service resort hotel in Palm
Beach Gardens, Fla. Wells Fargo reported revenue per available room
(RevPAR) of $141.51 and DSC of 6.18x for the year ended Dec. 31,
2016.  S&P's analysis considered the upward trending
servicer-reported NOI, and its expected-case value, using a 9.64%
weighted average capitalization rate, yielded a 71.3% pooled trust
LTV ratio.

The Warner Center Marriott loan, the third-largest loan in the
pool, has a $74.5 million whole loan balance that is split into two
notes: a $51.5 million senior A note representing 12.3% of the
pooled trust balance and a $23.0 million subordinate nontrust B
note. In addition, there's $22.0 million in preferred equity.  S&P
considered this preferred equity as additional unsecured debt when
evaluating this loan.  The loan is IO, pays a floating-rate
interest rate of LIBOR plus 2.871% per year and matures on Aug. 4,
2017.  It has two, 12-month extension options remaining.  The loan
is secured by a first-priority fee mortgage encumbering a 474-room,
16-story full-service luxury hotel in Woodland Hills, Calif. Wells
Fargo reported RevPAR of $139.04 and DSC of 3.65x for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2016.  S&P's analysis considered the stable
servicer-reported NOI, and S&P's expected-case value, using a 9.00%
weighted average capitalization rate, yielded a 74.8% LTV ratio on
the trust balance.

The Estancia La Jolla Hotel & Spa loan, the smallest loan in the
pool, has a $50.1 million whole loan balance that is split into a
$41.9 million senior pooled component (10.0%) and an $8.2 million
subordinate nonpooled component that backs the class ELJ raked
certificates.  In addition, the borrower's equity interests in the
whole loan secure $15.9 million in mezzanine debt.  The loan is IO,
pays a floating-rate interest rate of LIBOR plus 2.112% (pooled)
and 2.549% (nonpooled) per year, and matures on Dec. 9, 2017.  It
has two, 12-month extension options remaining.  The loan is secured
by a first-priority leasehold mortgage encumbering a 210-room,
three-story full service luxury hotel in La Jolla, Calif.  Wells
Fargo reported RevPAR of $163.93 and DSC of 4.23x for the trailing
12 months ended Dec. 31, 2016.  S&P's analysis considered the
stable servicer-reported NOI, and its expected-case value, using a
9.00% weighted average capitalization rate, yielded a 78.3% pooled
trust LTV ratio.

RATINGS LIST

BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2014-FL1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-FL1
                                 Rating
Class      Identifier            To                   From
A          05525VAA4             AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
X-EXT      05525VAE6             BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)
B          05525VAG1             AA- (sf)             AA- (sf)
C          05525VAJ5             A- (sf)              A- (sf)
D          05525VAL0             BBB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
E          05525VAW6             BB- (sf)             BB- (sf)
ELJ        05525VAN6             B- (sf)              B- (sf)
PGA        05525VAQ9             BB- (sf)             B+ (sf)


BANC OF AMERICA 2004-5: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class K Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-5:

Cl. H, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. XC, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2016
Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on four P&I classes, Classes H, J, K and L, were
affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The rating on the P&I class, Class M, was affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class, Class XC, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit performance (or the weighted average rating
factor or WARF) of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.9% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. XC was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of BACM 2004-5.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98.4% to $22.2
million from $1.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 2 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
22% to 78% of the pool.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $26.5 million (for an average loss
severity of 13.4%). There are no loans currently in special
servicing.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 92.7%, compared to 80.6% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 28.6% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.11%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.33X and 1.23X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service.

Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress
rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest performing loan represent 78% of the pool balance. The
loan is the L'Oreal Warehouse Loan ($17.3 million -- 78%% of the
pool), which is secured by a 649,250 square foot (SF) mixed-use
office and warehouse building that is 100% leased to L'Oreal
through October 2019. Built to suit in 2004 for L'Oreal, the
property has 51 overhead doors, 40 trailer parking spots and has
good access to major highways connecting to Cleveland, Youngstown,
Akron, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Due to the single tenant
exposure, Moody's stressed the value of this property utilizing a
lit/dark analysis. The L'Oreal lease is also coterminous with the
loan maturity date. The loan has amortized 14% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 100.3% and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 84.3% and 1.15X at last review.

The second largest loan is the Country Club Ridge Loan ($4.8
million -- 22% of the pool), which is secured by a 247-unit co-op
property in Hartsdale, Westchester County, New York. The loan has
amortized 11.3% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 66.1% and 1.55X, respectively, compared to 67.4% and 1.52X at
last review.


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL4: DBRS Rates Cl. B5 Debt 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2017-SPL4 (the Notes) issued by
Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4 (the Trust):

-- $143.6 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $143.6 million Class A-IOA at AAA (sf)
-- $143.6 million Class A-IOB at AAA (sf)
-- $15.3 million Class B1 at AA (sf)
-- $15.3 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)
-- $15.3 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)
-- $8.8 million Class B2 at A (sf)
-- $8.8 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)
-- $11.2 million Class B3 at BBB (sf)
-- $11.2 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)
-- $11.2 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)
-- $8.9 million Class B4 at BB (sf)
-- $8.9 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)
-- $8.9 million Class B4-IOB at BB (sf)
-- $8.0 million Class B5 at B (sf)

Classes A-IOA, A-IOB, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B2-IO, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B4-IOA
and B4-IOB are interest-only notes. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 34.20% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 27.20%,
23.15%, 18.00%, 13.90% and 10.25% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 4,738 loans with a total interest-bearing
principal balance of $218,262,302 as of the Cut-off Date (April 30,
2017).

The portfolio comprises 95.7% daily simple interest (DSI) loans and
has an average original loan size of $63,434. The loans are
approximately 133 months seasoned, and all are current as of the
Cut-off Date, including 1.3% bankruptcy-performing loans.
Approximately 96.3% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30
days delinquent (0 x 30) based on the interest paid through date
for the past 24 months under the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)
delinquency methods. Approximately 30.1% of the loans have been
modified, 100.0% of which happened more than two years ago. Within
the pool, 2,060 mortgages have non-interest-bearing deferred
amounts as of the Cut-off Date, which are not certificated into the
rated Notes, and any recoveries on these will instead be payable to
the holders of the Class X Notes. As a result of the seasoning of
the collateral, none of the loans are subject to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage
rules.

An affiliate of BFA IVb Depositor, LLC (the Depositor) acquired the
loans from CitiFinancial Credit Company and its lending
subsidiaries during the period from July 2016 through February
2017, and subsequently transferred the loans to various
transferring trusts owned by Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb
L.P. (the Sponsor). On the Closing Date, the transferring trusts
will assign the loans to the Depositor, who will contribute the
loans to the Trust. The Sponsor will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
to satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations
promulgated thereunder.

These loans were originated and previously serviced by
CitiFinancial Credit Company. As of the Cut-off Date, all of the
loans are serviced by Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Class A and Class B1 Notes (and the related interest-only bonds),
but such shortfalls on more subordinate bonds will not be paid from
principal. In addition, diverted interest from the mortgage loans
will be used to pay down principal on the Notes sequentially.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds used to pay interest to
the Notes sequentially and subordination levels greater than
expected losses may provide for timely payment of interest to the
rated Notes.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis, an
experienced servicer and strong structural features. Additionally,
a third-party due diligence review was performed on the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history, data
capture and title and lien review. Updated property values
(generally Home Data Index values and, for a subset of the pool,
broker price opinions or 2055 appraisals) were provided for the
mortgage loans.

The representations and warranties provided in this transaction
generally conform to the representations and warranties that DBRS
would expect to receive for a RMBS transaction with seasoned
collateral; however, the transaction employs a representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb L.P.) with a backstop
by an unrated entity (Bayview Asset Management, LLC) and certain
knowledge qualifiers. Mitigating factors include (1) significant
loan seasoning and relatively clean performance history in recent
years; (2) third-party due diligence review; (3) a strong
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including
delinquency review trigger; and (4) for representations and
warranties with knowledge qualifiers, even if the Sponsor did not
have actual knowledge of the breach, the Remedy Provider is still
required to remedy the breach in the same manner as if no knowledge
qualifier had been made.

The enforcement mechanism for breaches of representations includes
automatic breach reviews by a third-party reviewer for any
seriously delinquent loans or any loans that incur loss upon
liquidation. Resolution of disputes are ultimately subject to
determination in an arbitration proceeding.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS rating of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) addresses the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.



BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL4: Fitch Rates Cl. B5 Notes 'Bsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2017-SPL4:

-- $143,616,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $143,616,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $143,616,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,278,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,278,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,278,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,840,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,840,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,241,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,241,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $11,241,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,948,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,948,000 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,948,000 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,967,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $22,372,302 class B6 notes;
-- $22,372,302 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 4,738 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans totaling $218.26 million, which excludes
$6.1 million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as
of the cutoff date. Of the total interest-bearing pool balance,
95.7% are daily simple interest mortgage loans. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a
sequential pay, senior subordinate structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 34.20% subordination provided by the 7.00% class B1, 4.05%
class B2, 5.15% class B3, 4.10% class B4, 3.65% class B5, and
10.25% class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 11 years with 96.3% paying on time for the past 24
months and 92.9% for the past three years. In addition, 30.1% have
been modified due to performance issues, while the remaining loans
were either not modified (38%) or had their interest rates reduced
due to a rate reduction rider at origination (31.9%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$88,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than implied by
Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were applied to
loans with property values below $99,000, which increased the
'AAAsf' loss expectation by roughly 240bps.

Daily Simple Interest Loans (Concern): Approximately 96% of the
pool consists of daily simple interest loans that accrue interest
on a daily basis from the date of the borrower's last payment.
While the monthly payment is fixed, if a borrower pays earlier than
the due date, less of the payment is applied to interest and more
is applied to principal. If the borrower pays late, more of the
payment is applied to interest and less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds. Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date. In
addition, approximately 49% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk. Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later-pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial). Given that roughly 94% of
the loans were originated and serviced by a single originator prior
to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that the approximately 22%
compliance, data integrity and pay history sample is sufficient to
capture the potential risk of incomplete files that could accompany
portfolios traded in the secondary market. A full custodial file
review was conducted on 100% of the pool, and a tax and title
search was conducted on over 99% of the pool. In addition, BAM,
with the guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (BLS; as servicer,
rated 'RSS2+'), reconstructed the past three years of pay histories
for 100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps from the interest remittance amount will be used
to pay down principal as well as any excess interest allocation
from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation. The
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions, as
well as the application of excess interest to the notes, is highly
supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in the
absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral and will generally not be repaid
until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Per Fitch's criteria, it may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued. In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
July 2021. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches of R&Ws.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated five criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Master Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,' which are described below.

Fitch's analysis incorporated three criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,'
which are described below.

The first variation is the less than 100% third-party review (TPR)
due diligence review for regulatory compliance, data integrity and
pay history. Tax and title review was conducted on approximately
99% of the pool, and a custodial file review was conducted on 100%
of the pool. The remaining tax and title review will be performed
post-close. The less than 100% TPR review is consistent with
Fitch's criteria for seasoned performing pools. However, because
Fitch's criteria state it views pools as seasoned performing if
they consist of loans that were never modified, a criteria
variation was made. Without this variation, the pool would have had
100% compliance, data integrity and pay history TPR review to
achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.

Fitch is comfortable with the reduced due diligence sample because
roughly 94% of the loans were originated by a single lender and the
sample provided is sufficient to provide a reliable indication of
the operational quality of the lender.

The second variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM). Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an AVM
product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors. Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but, rather, an
indexation product. Clear Capital is a reputable third-party vendor
that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set that goes down to the neighborhood level
and incorporates REO sales. Fitch believes the HDI product to be an
adequate alternative to an AVM. The HDI product was only used for
loans that were clean current for the prior 24 months and had an
LTV


BAYVIEW OPPORTUNITY 2017-SPL4: Fitch to Rate Class B5 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb
Trust 2017-SPL4 (BOMFT 2017-SPL4):

-- $143,616,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $143,616,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $143,616,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,278,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,278,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $15,278,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,840,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,840,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,241,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,241,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $11,241,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $8,948,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,948,000 class B4-IOA notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,948,000 class B4-IOB notional notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,967,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $22,372,302 class B6 notes;
-- $22,372,302 class B6-IO notional notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 4,738 seasoned performing and
re-performing (RPL) loans totaling $218.26 million, which excludes
$6.1 million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as
of the cutoff date. Of the total interest-bearing pool balance,
95.7% are daily simple interest mortgage loans. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a
sequential pay, senior subordinate structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 34.20% subordination provided by the 7.00% class B1, 4.05%
class B2, 5.15% class B3, 4.10% class B4, 3.65% class B5, and
10.25% class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, rated 'RSS2+'), the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Clean Current Loans (Positive): The loans are seasoned
approximately 11 years with 96.3% paying on time for the past 24
months and 92.9% for the past three years. In addition, 30.1% has
been modified due to performance issues, while the remaining loans
were either not modified (38%) or had their interest rates reduced
due to a rate reduction rider at origination (31.9%).

Low Property Values (Concern): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$88,000, which is much lower than the average of other Fitch-rated
RPL transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic
Loan Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities
(LS) have been higher for very low property values than implied by
Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were applied to
loans with property values below $99,000, which increased the
'AAAsf' loss expectation by roughly 240 basis points (bps).

Daily Simple Interest Loans (Concern):
Approximately 96% of the pool consists of daily simple interest
loans that accrue interest on a daily basis from the date of the
borrower's last payment. While the monthly payment is fixed, if a
borrower pays earlier than the due date, less of the payment is
applied to interest and more is applied to principal. If the
borrower pays late, more of the payment is applied to interest and
less goes to principal.

Because the bonds pay on a 30/360 day schedule, Fitch analyzed the
risk of a disproportionate number of borrowers paying earlier than
scheduled, which could cause the bonds to become
undercollateralized solely due to the mismatch in application of
payments between the loans and the bonds. Fitch analyzed pay dates
of the borrowers and found that roughly the same number of
borrowers pay either earlier or later than the due date. In
addition, approximately 49% of the borrowers are on autopay, which
mitigates the payment date risk. Furthermore, Fitch believes the
excess interest generated by the later pay borrowers that is
available to pay down principal should offset the risk of
undercollateralization.

Portfolio Loans from a Single Originator (Positive): This
transaction consists of a portfolio of loans that Bayview Asset
Management (BAM) purchased from CitiFinancial Credit Company and
its lending subsidiaries (CitiFinancial). Given that roughly 94% of
the loans were originated and serviced by a single originator prior
to sale to BAM, Fitch believes that the approximately 22%
compliance, data integrity and pay history sample is sufficient to
capture the potential risk of incomplete files that could accompany
portfolios traded in the secondary market. A full custodial file
review was conducted on 100% of the pool, and a tax and title
search was conducted on over 99% of the pool. In addition, BAM,
with the guidance of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (BLS; as servicer
and rated 'RSS2+' by Fitch), reconstructed the past three years of
pay histories for 100% of the loans.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40bps from the interest remittance amount will be used
to pay down principal as well as any excess interest allocation
from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation. The
provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions, as
well as the application of excess interest to the notes, is highly
supportive of timely interest payments to those classes, in the
absence of servicer advancing.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed):
To address the lack of an external P&I advance mechanism, principal
otherwise distributable to the notes may be used to pay monthly
interest. While this helps provide stability in the cash flows to
the high investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower rated bonds may
experience long periods of interest deferral and will generally not
be repaid until the note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Per Fitch's criteria, it may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): Fitch considers the
transaction's representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws), as well as a backstop by BAM in the event the
sponsor, Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., is liquidated
or terminated.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Bayview
Opportunity Master Fund IVb, L.P., will acquire and retain a 5%
vertical interest in each class of the securities to be issued. In
addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at least
July 2021. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM will be
obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches of R&Ws.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated five criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Master Rating Criteria' and 'U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing
and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,' which are described below.

Fitch's analysis incorporated three criteria variations from 'U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Criteria,'
which are described below.

The first variation is the less than 100% TPR due diligence review
for regulatory compliance, data integrity and pay history. Tax and
title review was conducted on approximately 99% of the pool, and a
custodial file review was conducted on 100% of the pool. The
remaining tax and title review will be performed post-close. The
less than 100% TPR review is consistent with Fitch's criteria for
seasoned performing pools. However, because Fitch's criteria state
it views pools as seasoned performing if they consist of loans that
were never modified, a criteria variation was made. Without this
variation, the pool would have had 100% compliance, data integrity
and pay history TPR review to achieve a 'AAAsf' rating.

Fitch is comfortable with the reduced due diligence sample because
roughly 94% of the loans were originated by a single lender and the
sample provided is sufficient to provide a reliable indication of
the operational quality of the lender.

The second variation is the use of Clear Capital's HDI valuation
product as updated property values instead of an automated
valuation model (AVM). Fitch's criteria allow for the use of an AVM
product as updated values if there are sufficient compensating
factors. Clear Capital's HDI product is not an AVM but, rather, an
indexation product. Clear Capital is a reputable third-party vendor
that provides valuation services.

A review of the HDI product's white paper indicates values are
based on a robust data set that goes down to the neighborhood level
and incorporates REO sales. Fitch believes the HDI product to be an
adequate alternative to an AVM. The HDI product was only used for
loans that were clean current for the prior 24 months and had an
LTV 60% based on the more conservative of the HDI value and Fitch's
indexed value. The impact of using this product is neutral, as the
HDI product is a sufficient alternative to an AVM product and was
only used on loans with an LTV of less than 60%.

Lastly, an updated BPO will not be provided on 3.1% of the pool.
Due to the rural location of the property, updated BPOs will not be
received in time for the transaction. As such, a 25% haircut was
applied to the original appraisal with no indexation applied,
increasing the loss expectations by approximately 15bps-50bps,
depending on rating category. These properties are located in rural
areas and have an average original property value of approximately
$81,000. Given the unknown condition of the property and the rural
location, there is a higher probability of decline in value. The
25% haircut used is based on the median value of available BPOs
with a negative variance to the original appraisal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 36.3% at AAAsf The analysis indicates there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to CCCsf.


BLACK DIAMOND 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. D Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
nine classes of notes issued by Black Diamond CLO 2017-1, Ltd.
("Black Diamond CLO 2017-1" or the "Issuer").

Moody's rating action is:

US$2,500,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$232,400,000 Class A-1a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1a Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class A-1b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-1b Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$29,600,000 Class A-2a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-2a Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class A-2b Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2b Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A-1a Notes, the Class A-1b Notes, the
Class A-2a Notes, the Class A-2b Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Black Diamond CLO 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans, first lien last out loans and unsecured loans. Moody's
expects the portfolio to be approximately 68.75% ramped as of the
closing date.

Black Diamond 2017-1 Adviser, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue two other
classes of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.2%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.17 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2900 to 3335)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1a Notes: 0

Class A-1b Notes: 0

Class A-2a Notes: -1

Class A-2b Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2900 to 3770)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1a Notes: -1

Class A-1b Notes: -1

Class A-2a Notes: -3

Class A-2b Notes: -3

Class B-1 Notes: -4

Class B-2 Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


BLUEMOUNTAIN CLO III: Moody's Hikes Cl. E Notes Rating From Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by BlueMountain CLO III Ltd.:

US$20,250,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes, due
2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on November 1, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

US$21,150,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes, due
2021, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on November 1, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$31,500,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes, due 2021 (current
outstanding balance of $4,103,532.88), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on November 1, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$29,250,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes, due
2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on November 1, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

BlueMountain CLO III Ltd., issued in February 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in March 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2016. The Class A
notes have been paid down in full or $37.2 million and the Class B
notes have been paid down by 87% or $27.4 million since that time.
Based on the trustee's May 2017 report, the OC ratios for the Class
A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are reported at 2132.00%,
262.30%, 163.21% and 117.03%, respectively, versus October 2016
levels of 219.60%, 154.01%, 127.62% and 108.25%, respectively.
Additionally, the deal currently holds $43.4 million of principal
proceeds which are expected to be paid to the Class B, Class C, and
Class D notes on the next payment date in June 2017.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since October 2016. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor is currently 4027 compared to 2896 at that
time. Additionally, based on Moody's calculations, which include
adjustments for ratings with a negative outlook and ratings on
review for downgrade, assets with a Moody's default probability
rating of Caa1 or below currently make up 39.3% of the portfolio,
compared to 16.4% in October 2016.

The upgrades also partially reflect a correction to Moody's
modeling. In prior rating actions, there was an error in the way
that failed coverage tests were cured. This error has now been
corrected, and rating actions reflect this change.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology Moody's used in these ratings was
"Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature after the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. This risk is borne first by investors with the lowest
priority in the capital structure. Moody's assumes that the
terminal value of an asset upon liquidation at maturity will be
equal to the lower of an assumed liquidation value (depending on
the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the
liabilities) or the asset's current market value. However, actual
long-dated asset exposures and prevailing market prices and
conditions at the CLO's maturity will drive the deal's actual
losses, if any, from long-dated assets.

6) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors Moody's rates low speculative grade, especially if they
jump to default.

7) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets with the worst Moody's speculative grade
liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to additional
risks if these assets default. The historical default rate is
higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's exposure to
such assets, which constitute around $5.3 million of par, Moody's
ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3222)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4832)

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: 0

Class E: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $89.7 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 22.19% (implying a WARF of
4027), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 50.76%, a
diversity score of 13 and a weighted average spread of 4.09%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.

Moody's analysis reflects adjustments with respect to the default
probabilities associated with assets that do not have Moody's
ratings. Specifically, Moody's assumed an equivalent of Caa3 for
assets without Moody's ratings, which represent approximately 5.6%
of the collateral pool.


CALCULUS TRUST: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Trust Units to C
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings on the following trust units
issued by Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust:

Series 2006-1 Trust Units, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
Jul 15, 2016 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Series 2006-4 Trust Units, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
Jul 15, 2016 Affirmed Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has downgraded the ratings of two trust units due to
deterioration of the credit quality of reference obligation as
evidenced by WARF and WARR, and the realized losses from the
write-downs of certain reference obligation, which have reduced the
expected recoveries of both outstanding trust units. The rating of
Series 2006-1 trust unit will be subsequently withdrawn. The rating
action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial
real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO Synthetic)
transactions.

Calculus CMBS Resecuritization Trust is a static synthetic credit
linked notes transaction backed by a portfolio of credit default
swaps referencing 100% commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS).

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference obligations
it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
4629, compared to 4358 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated reference obligations and the assessments of the
non-Moody's rated reference obligations follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 21.0%
compared to 13.7% at last review; Ba1-Ba3 and 38.9% compared to
17.5% at last review; B1-B3 and 0.0% compared to 34.7% at last
review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 40.1% compared to 34.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.1 years, compared to 1.0 years at last
review. The WAL is based on extension assumptions about the
look-through loans within the underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 6.0%, compared to 14.1% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 11.1%, compared to 15.7% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
ratings of the underlying reference obligations and credit
assessments. However, in light of the performance indicators noted
above, Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings
announced are sensitive to further change.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


CAN CAPITAL 2014-1: DBRS Cuts Class B Notes Rating to B(high)(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. placed the outstanding ratings of the Class A and Class
B Notes (the Notes) of the CAN Capital Funding LLC Series 2014-1
structured finance asset-backed securities transaction Under Review
with Negative Implications. The ratings on the Notes were
previously downgraded on March 2, 2017; the Class A Notes to BBB
(high) (sf) from A (sf) and the Class B Notes to B (high) (sf) from
BBB (low) (sf). At the time of the March 2017 rating action, credit
enhancement available to the Notes was not sufficient to cover
DBRS’s expected losses at the assigned ratings and the ratings
were downgraded to levels that DBRS believed were more consistent
with the loss coverage available. The current action is the result
of uncertainty over the recent performance trends of the
collateral, increasing losses on the portfolio and the sufficiency
of credit enhancement to cover losses that may result from that
performance volatility.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to  
    servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and projected
    performance.

As of the April 20, 2017 Payment Due Date, the principal balance of
the Class A Notes outstanding was $43,103,687 as reported in the
Monthly Servicing Statement for the above referenced transaction.
The outstanding principal balance of the Class B Notes was
$20,000,000 as reported in the Monthly Servicing Statement. As of
the April 20, 2017 Payment Due Date, the Ending Eligible Aggregate
Unamortized Funded Amount of the transaction was $59,829,658 as
reported in the Monthly Servicing Statement for the above
referenced transaction. As such, the Notes currently do not benefit
from credit enhancement in the form of overcollateralization. As of
the April 20, 2017 Payment Due Date, Newly Non-Performing Assets
were reported to be $4,246,310 and Non-Performing Assets that have
been approved for a grace period were reported to have $3,222,177
remaining.


CAVALRY CLO V: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Cavalry CLO V, Ltd.:

US$18,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on February 3, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

US$14,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on February 3, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on February 3, 2017 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$244,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2024
(current outstanding balance of $42,832,027.06), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on February 3, 2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

US$35,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2024,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 3, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cavalry CLO V, Ltd., issued in December 2014, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
January 2016.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are primarily a result of deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since February 2017. The Class A
Notes have been paid down by approximately 58.2% or $59.6 million
since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratios for
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E notes are currently
189.55%, 154.23%, 134.70 and 114.07%, respectively, versus February
2017 levels of 153.03%, 135.39%, 124.26%, and 111.19%,
respectively.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since February 2017. Based on Moody's calculations, the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) is currently 3055 compared to 2953 at
that time.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those that Moody's
assumes as having defaulted could result in volatility in the
deal's OC levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and whether a
manager decides to work out or sell defaulted assets create
additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries
assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in
order to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Realization of higher than assumed recoveries would positively
impact the CLO.

6) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The presence of assets rated Caa3 with a negative outlook, Caa2 or
Caa3 on review for downgrade, or the worst Moody's speculative
grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, exposes the notes to
additional risks if these assets default. The historical default
rate is higher than average for these assets. Due to the deal's
exposure to such assets, which constitute around $2.9 million of
par, Moody's ran a sensitivity case defaulting those assets.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF - 20% (2444)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0

Class D: +2

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3666)

Class A: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: -1

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Loss and Cashflow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $147.2 million, defaulted par of $6.0
million, a weighted average default probability of 20.9461%,
(implying a WARF of 3055), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.73%, a diversity score of 35 and a weighted average
spread of 3.51% (before accounting for LIBOR Floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


CD 2017-CD4: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB(low) Rating on Class F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings and, in the case of
certain classes, assigned new ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-CD4 (the
Certificates) issued by the CD 2017-CD4 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class V-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class V-BC at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class V-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes D, E, F, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F have been privately placed.


The Class X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E and X-F balances are notional.

The Class VRR Interest and Classes V-A, V-BC, V-D and V-E (not
rated and therefore not listed above) represent beneficial
interests in the VRR Specific Grantor Trust Assets (as such terms
are defined in the deal documents), which collectively represent
approximately 5.0% of the aggregate initial certificate balance of
all of the ABS interests issued by the issuing entity. These
classes are non-offered certificates that will be retained by
certain retaining parties in accordance with the credit risk
retention rules applicable to this securitization transaction.

The Class V-A, V-BC, V-D and V-E Certificates collectively
represent a beneficial ownership interest in the Class V-A/BC/D/E
Percentage of the VRR Specific Grantor Trust Assets. The Class
V-A/BC/D/E Certificates will not have Pass-Through Rates, but will
instead collectively entitle Holders to interest on any
Distribution Date in an aggregate amount equal to the sum of (a)
the product of (i) the Class V-A/BC/D/E Percentage and (ii) the VRR
Interest Distribution Amount for such Distribution Date and (b) the
product of (i) the Class V-A/BC/D/E Percentage and (ii) the VRR
Interest Percentage of the Excess Interest Distribution Amount for
such Distribution Date (as such terms are defined in the deal
documents).

On the closing date, pursuant to the VRR Interest Purchase
Agreement, German American Capital Corporation (GACC) is purchasing
$45,022,523 of the VRR Interest for cash from the Depositor and
Citi Real Estate Funding Inc. (CREFI) is in turn purchasing
$14,617,250 of the VRR Interest for cash from GACC, with GACC to
retain the remaining $30,405,273 of the VRR Interest through an
affiliate, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch (DBNY). It is also
expected that CREFI will retain its portion of the VRR Interest
through Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. (CGMRC), one of its
affiliates.

The collateral consists of 47 fixed-rate loans secured by 53
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the ratings, reflecting the long-term
probability of loan default within the term and its liquidity at
maturity. Trust assets contributed from two loans, representing
16.8% of the pool, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS.
Proceeds for the shadow-rated loans are floored at their respective
ratings within the pool. When the combined 16.8% of the pool has no
proceeds assigned below the rating floor, the resulting pool
subordination is diluted or reduced below that rated floor. When
the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS Stabilized
net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual constants, three
loans, representing 2.3% of the total pool, had a DBRS Term debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold
indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 21 loans, representing 47.2%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x. These credit
metrics are based on whole loan balances. One of the pool's loans
with a DBRS Refi DSCR below 0.90x, Hilton Hawaiian Village,
representing 6.3% of the transaction balance, has large pieces of
subordinate mortgage debt outside the trust. Based on A-note
balances only, the deal's weighted-average DBRS Refi DSCR improves
marginally to 1.07x.

Term default risk is moderate as indicated by the relatively strong
DBRS Term DSCR of 1.61x. In addition, 18 loans, representing 43.1%
of the pool, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. Two loans,
95 Morton Street and Hilton Hawaiian Village, representing a
combined 16.8% of the pool, exhibit credit characteristics
consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings of BBB (low) and
BBB (high), respectively, and even when excluding these loans, the
deal exhibits a favorable DBRS Term DSCR of 1.58x. Nine loans,
representing 41.9% of the pool, are located in either urban or
super dense urban markets, both of which benefit from consistent
investor demand and increased liquidity even in times of stress.
Super dense urban markets represented in this deal include New
York, New York, and Santa Monica, California, while urban markets
consists of Sunnyvale, California; Honolulu, Hawaii; Long Island
City, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and Brooklyn, New York.
Additionally, only eight loans, representing 8.7% of the pool, are
located in tertiary/rural markets. Four of the largest 15 loans,
representing 27.9% of the DBRS sample, received an Excellent or
Above Average property quality grade, and no loans received Below
Average or Poor property quality grades. Higher-quality properties
are more likely to retain existing tenants/guests and more easily
attract new tenants/guests, resulting in a more stable performance.


The pool is extremely concentrated based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 23
equal-sized loans. The largest five and ten loans total 38.9% and
55.7% of the pool, respectively. The pool is also highly
concentrated by property type, as the office concentration is
45.0%. Ten loans, representing 28.4% of the pool, including four of
the largest 15 loans, are structured with full-term IO payments. An
additional 18 loans, comprising 44.5% of the pool, have partial IO
periods ranging from 19 months to 84 months. As a result, the
transaction's scheduled amortization by maturity is only 9.9%,
which is generally below other recent conduit securitizations. Ten
loans, representing 19.1% of the transaction balance, are secured
by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to a single
tenant. This includes one of the largest 15 loans, Moffett Place
Google. Loans secured by properties occupied by single tenants have
been found to suffer higher loss severities in an event of default.
As such, DBRS applied a higher probability of default and cash flow
volatility to single-tenant properties compared with multi-tenant
properties.

The DBRS sample included 20 of the 47 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 20 of the 53 properties in the
portfolio (65.6% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -12.1% from the Issuer's NCF
and ranged from -23.7% (Troy Office Portfolio) to +0.2% (Champion
Forest Self Storage).


CENT CLO 19: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class D Debt
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes from Cent
CLO 19 Ltd., a U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in October 2013 and is managed by Columbia
Management Investment Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the April 2017 trustee report. The
transaction is scheduled to remain in its reinvestment period until
October 2017.

Since the transaction's effective date in December 2013, the
collateral portfolio's weighted average life has decreased to 4.99
years from 5.13 years, which has decreased the overall credit risk
profile. In addition, the number of obligors in the portfolio has
increased during this period, to 294 from 201, which has
contributed to the portfolio's increased diversification.

The transaction has experienced an increase in both defaults and
assets rated 'CCC+' and below since the December 2013 effective
date report. Specifically, the amount of defaulted assets increased
to $4.36 million as of April 2017 from zero as of December 2013.
The amount of assets rated 'CCC+' and below increased to $18.47
million from $2.00 million over the same period.

The increase in defaulted assets, as well as other factors, has
affected the level of credit support available to all tranches, as
seen by the decline in overcollateralization (O/C) ratios:

The class A O/C ratio decreased to 135.28% from 136.10%.
The class B O/C ratio decreased to 119.80% from 120.52%.
The class C O/C ratio decreased to 112.70% from 113.38%.
The class D O/C ratio decreased to 107.38% from 108.02%.

Even with the decline in credit support, all coverage tests are
currently passing and are above the minimum requirements.

Overall, the increase in defaulted assets has been largely offset
by the decline in the weighted average life and an increase in
higher-rated assets.

Since S&P's last rating actions, the weighted average rating of the
portfolio has improved to 'B+' from 'B' as of S&P's effective date
analysis.

Although S&P cash flow analysis indicates higher ratings for the
class A-2a, A-2b, B, and C notes, S&P's rating actions consider
additional sensitivity runs that considered the exposure to
specific distressed industries and allowed for volatility in the
underlying portfolio given that the transaction is still in its
reinvestment period. The results of the cash flow analysis
indicated a lower rating on the class D notes than the current
rating reflects; however, S&P believes there is sufficient credit
enhancement to maintain the current rating.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with its criteria, S&P's cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in S&P's view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

S&P said, "We will continue to review whether, in our view, the
ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit
enhancement available to support them, and will take rating actions
as we deem necessary."

RATINGS AFFIRMED

Cent CLO 19 Ltd.
Class         Rating
A-1a          AAA (sf)
A-1b          AAA (sf)
A-2a          AA (sf)
A-2b          AA (sf)
B             A (sf)
C             BBB (sf)
D             BB (sf)


COMM 2013-THL: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of COMM 2013-THL Mortgage
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2013-THL.

The certificates in this transaction represent the beneficial
interests in a trust that holds a $734.4 million mortgage loan
secured by 148 hotel properties located in 31 states across the
U.S. The loan is sponsored by Whitehall Street Global Real Estate
Limited Partnership 2005 and Whitehall Street Global Employee Fund
2005.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Hotel Performance at Peak Levels: Overall performance at hotels has
been at peak levels, and performance is likely to decline or remain
stable throughout the remaining loan term. Of the remaining 148
hotels, 75 have experienced an increase in ADR and revenue per
available room (RevPAR) for the trailing 12-month (TTM) period
ending March 2017 while 73 have experienced a decrease compared
with the prior TTM period.

Portfolio Performance and Cash Flow: On an overall portfolio basis,
issuer net cash flow (NCF) for the 148 hotels has increased
approximately 7.8% since issuance. As of first-quarter 2017, the
hotel portfolio's TTM occupancy and RevPAR were 70.1% and $77.97,
respectively. The issuer's underwritten occupancy and RevPAR were
69.6% and $71.98. Although Fitch adjusted recent occupancy, ADR and
RevPAR assumptions for 2014, the Fitch cash flow remains above
issuance but below peak levels observed in 2015.

Additional Debt and Preferred Equity: The total debt package
includes mezzanine financing in the amount of $530.6 million
outstanding. The servicer-reported preferred equity balance is
approximately $116.1 million.

Geographic Diversity: The portfolio exhibits significant geographic
diversity across 31 states. The largest state exposure is
California with 22 hotels. The collateral consists mainly of
limited service or extended stay properties, with the largest flags
consisting of Fairfield Inn, Residence Inn, Hampton Inn and
Courtyard. A significant portion of the hotels are located in
secondary and tertiary markets, including some exposure to areas
affected by volatility in energy prices and/or weak economic
growth.

Strong Structural Features: The loan has structural features
including a hard lock-box for credit card receipts, up-front
reserves for deferred maintenance, monthly reserves for taxes,
insurance (springing), ground leases, and capital expenditures. If
the debt yield falls below 8.0% for two consecutive quarters, a low
cash-flow trigger will occur and all excess cash flow will be
trapped in the cash collateral account and held as additional
collateral for the loan.

Experienced Sponsorship: The transaction is sponsored by Whitehall
Street Global Real Estate Limited Partnership 2005 and Whitehall
Street Global Employee Fund 2005 (Whitehall). The Whitehall funds
are a family of opportunistic real estate funds managed by Goldman
Sachs. The funds invest in real estate companies, projects, loan
portfolios, debt recapitalizations and direct property .

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook for the rated classes remains Stable. The
borrower has extended the loan for the second and final time, with
a scheduled maturity in June 2018. Downgrades are unlikely unless
the portfolio sees a significant decline in performance and/or is
not able to pay off at its final maturity date.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third- party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks:

-- $36.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $280.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $108.1 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $79 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $78.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- Interest-only class X-EXT at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $122.5 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $29 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Stable from Positive.

Class X-CP is paid in full.


COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited (confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-CCRE23
issued by COMM 2015-CCRE23 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class CM-X-EXT at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has upgraded one class of COMM 2015-CCRE23
Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class CM-B to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

These rating actions reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction since issuance in May 2015. The transaction consists of
83 fixed-rate loans secured by 220 commercial properties. The pool
has experienced a collateral reduction of 1.2% since issuance as a
result of scheduled amortization, with all of the original 83 loans
outstanding. Approximately 99.5% of the pool reported YE2015
financials, including a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.79 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 9.4%. The
DBRS issuance WA DSCR and WA debt yield were 1.92x and 9.5%,
respectively.

As of the April 2017 remittance, there were two loans, representing
2.9% of the pool balance, on the servicer's watchlist and no loans
in special servicing. One loan was flagged for performance dropping
below the DSCR threshold of 1.20x as at Q2 2016 reporting but has
since improved to 1.21x as at the YE2016 financials. The other loan
was watchlisted for failing a covenant-compliance stressed DSCR
test, and as such, a lockbox has been activated and the loan is
being monitored. The two loans reported a WA DSCR of 1.24x and WA
debt yield of 8.4%.

The Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#2; 7.4% of
the current pool) is secured by a portfolio of 65 Courtyard by
Marriott hotels, totalling 9,590 keys. The collateral includes the
fee and leasehold interest in 49 hotels, the fee interest in nine
hotels and the leasehold interest in seven hotels. The subject loan
consists of the $33.5 million A-1 piece and $100.0 million A-2A
piece of the whole Senior A-note debt of $315.0 million, as well as
the controlling subordinate B-note debt of $355.0 million. The A-1
piece and B-note debt are included in the trust as non-pooled rake
bonds, while the A-2A piece is pooled in the trust. At issuance,
DBRS shadow-rated this loan as investment grade. DBRS confirms with
this review that the performance of this loan remains consistent
with investment-grade loan characteristics.

Class CM-B is a non-pooled rake bond backed by the $355.0 million
Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio B-note. This class was upgraded
with this review in accordance with the changes in the "North
American Single-Asset/Single-Borrower Methodology" published in
March 2017.


COMM 2015-LC21: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-LC21 issued by COMM 2015-LC21 Mortgage
Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The collateral consists of 103 loans
secured by 198 commercial properties; as of the April 2017
remittance, the pool has experienced collateral reduction of 1.3%
because of scheduled amortization, with all of the original loans
remaining in the pool. Thirteen loans, representing 24.9% of the
pool balance, including six loans in the Top 15, were structured
with full interest-only (IO) terms at issuance, while an additional
40 loans, representing 36.9% of the pool balance, were structured
with partial IO periods. As of the April 2017 remittance, 26 loans,
representing 26.8% of the pool balance, have remaining partial-IO
terms ranging from one to 37 months. Based on the most recent
year-end (YE) reporting for the underlying loans, the pool reported
a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
Debt Yield of 2.10 times (x) and 10.7%, respectively. At issuance,
the pool reported a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.70x and 10.4%,
respectively, with a WA DBRS Term DSCR and WA DBRS Debt Yield of
1.58x and 8.6%, respectively.

As of the April 2017 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and seven loans, representing 4.2% of the pool balance,
on the servicer's watchlist. One loan (Prospectus ID#35 - Shoppes
of Beavercreek, 1.1% of the pool balance) was watchlisted because
of its retail tenant bankruptcy exposure and was analyzed with a
stressed cash flow to reflect the increased risk. Two loans (1.5%
of the pool balance) were watchlisted because of structural
triggers but are performing in line with DBRS's expectations at
issuance. The four remaining loans are being monitored for a low
DSCR.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the largest loan, Courtyard by
Marriott Portfolio (Prospectus ID#1, 7.4% of the pool balance)
investment grade. DBRS has today confirmed that the performance of
these loans remains consistent with investment-grade loan
characteristics.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C03: DBRS Finalizes BB on 18 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS), Series 2017-C03 notes (the
Notes) issued by Fannie Mae (the Issuer):

-- $568.2 million Class 1M-1 at BBB (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1M-2A at BB (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1M-2B at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1M-2C at B (high) (sf)
-- $607.3 million Class 1M-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1A-I1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1E-A1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1A-I2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1E-A2 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1A-I3 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1E-A3 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1A-I4 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $199.8 million Class 1E-A4 at BB (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1B-I1 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-B1 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1B-I2 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-B2 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1B-I3 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-B3 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1B-I4 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-B4 at BB (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1C-I1 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-C1 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1C-I2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-C2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1C-I3 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-C3 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1C-I4 at B (high) (sf)
-- $203.8 million Class 1E-C4 at B (high) (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1E-D1 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1E-D2 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1E-D3 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1E-D4 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1E-D5 at BB (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1E-F1 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1E-F2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1E-F3 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1E-F4 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1E-F5 at B (high) (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1-X1 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1-X2 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1-X3 at BB (sf)
-- $403.6 million Class 1-X4 at BB (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1-Y1 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1-Y2 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1-Y3 at B (high) (sf)
-- $407.5 million Class 1-Y4 at B (high) (sf)

The holders of Class 1M-2 may exchange for proportionate interests
in the class 1M2A, 1M-2B and 1M-2C (Exchangeable Notes) and vice
versa. Holders of the Exchangeable Notes may further exchange for
proportionate interests in the Related Combinable or Recombinable
(RCR) Notes and vice versa. Certain classes of the RCR Notes may be
further exchanged for other classes of RCR Notes and vice versa.
Classes 1M-2, 1A-I1, 1E-A1, 1A-I2, 1E-A2, 1A-I3, 1E-A3, 1A-I4,
1E-A4, 1B-I1, 1E-B1, 1B-I2, 1E-B2, IB-I3, 1E-B3, IB-I4, 1E-B4,
IC-I1, 1E-C1, IC-I2, 1E-C2, IC-I3, 1E-C3, IC-I4, 1E-C4, 1E-D1,
1E-D2, 1E-D3, 1E-D4, 1E-D5, 1E-F1, 1E-F2, 1E-F3, 1E-F4, 1E-F5,
I-X1, 1-X2, 1-X3, 1-X4, 1-Y1, I-Y2, 1-Y3 and 1-Y4 are RCR Notes.

Classes 1A-I1, 1A-I2, 1A-I3, 1A-I4, 1B-I1, 1B-I2, IB-I3, IB-I4,
IC-I1, IC-I2, IC-I3, IC-I4, I-X1, 1-X2, 1-X3, 1-X4, 1-Y1, I-Y2,
1-Y3 and 1-Y4 are interest-only notes. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

The BBB (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 2.55% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The BB
(high), BB (sf) and B high (sf) ratings reflect 2.04%, 1.52% and
1.00% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The Notes in the transaction represent unsecured general
obligations of Fannie Mae. The Notes are subject to the credit and
principal payment risk of a certain reference pool (the Reference
Pool) of residential mortgages held in various Fannie
Mae-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.

The Reference Pool consists of 167,115 25- and 30-year fully
amortizing first-lien, fixed-rate mortgage loans underwritten to a
full documentation standard with original loan-to-value ratios
greater than 60% and less than or equal to 80%. Payments to the
Notes will be determined by the credit performance of the Reference
Pool.

Cash flow from the Reference Pool will not be used to make any
payment to the Noteholders; instead, Fannie Mae will be responsible
for making monthly interest payments at the note rate and periodic
principal payments on the Notes based on the actual principal
payments it collects from the Reference Pool.

This transaction is the 11th transaction in the CAS series where
Note writedowns are based on actual realized losses and not on a
predetermined set of loss severities. Furthermore, unlike earlier
CAS transactions where a credit event could occur as early as the
date on which a mortgage becomes 180 or more days delinquent, for
this transaction a delinquent mortgage would typically need to go
through the entire liquidation process for a credit event to occur.


Fannie Mae is obligated to retire the Notes by October 2029 by
paying an amount equal to the remaining class balance plus accrued
and unpaid interest. The Notes also may be redeemed on or after (1)
the date on which the Reference Pool pays down to less than 10% of
its cut-off date balance or (2) the payment date in April 2027,
whichever comes first. If there are unrecovered losses for any of
the Notes as of the termination date, then Noteholders are entitled
to certain projected recovery amounts.

DBRS notes the following strengths and challenges for this
transaction:

STRENGTHS
-- Seller (or lender)/servicer approval process and quality
    control platform,
-- Well-diversified reference pool,
-- Strong alignment of interest,
-- Strong structural protections and
-- Extensive performance history.

CHALLENGES
-- Unsecured obligation of Fannie Mae,
-- Representation and warranties framework and
-- Limited third-party due diligence.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2017-C04: Fitch to Rate 19 Tranches 'Bsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut
Avenue Securities, series 2017-C04:

-- $257,814,000 class 2M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $601,566,000 class 2M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2A-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2A-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2A-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2A-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2B-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2B-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2B-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2B-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2C-I1 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2C-I2 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2C-I3 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2C-I4 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $200,522,000 class 2E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-X1 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-X2 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-X3 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-X4 exchangeable notional notes 'BB-sf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-Y1 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-Y2 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-Y3 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $401,044,000 class 2-Y4 exchangeable notional notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $28,947,583,273 class 2A-H reference tranche;
-- $13,569,593 class 2M-1H reference tranche;
-- $10,554,128 class 2M-AH reference tranche;
-- $10,554,128 class 2M-BH reference tranche;
-- $10,554,128 class 2M-CH reference tranche;
-- $143,230,000 class 2B-1 notes;
-- $7,538,663 class 2B-1H reference tranche;
-- $150,768,663.17 class 2B-2H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the 1M-1 note reflects the 3.10%
subordination provided by the 0.70% class 1M-2A, the 0.70% class
1M-2B, the 0.70% class 1M-2C, the 0.50% class 1B-1 and their
corresponding reference tranches as well as the 0.50% 1B-2H
reference tranche. The notes are general senior unsecured
obligations of Fannie Mae (rated 'AAA'/Outlook Stable) subject to
the credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain
residential mortgage loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed
MBS.

The reference pool of mortgages will consist of mortgage loans with
loan to values (LTVs) greater than 80.01% and less than or equal to
97.00%.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2017-C04 (CAS 2017-C04) is
Fannie Mae's 19th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2017 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single family mortgages.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Fannie Mae to private investors with respect to a $30.2 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held in previously issued MBS
guaranteed by Fannie Mae where principal repayment of the notes are
subject to the performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans.
As loans liquidate, are modified or other credit events occur, the
outstanding principal balance of the debt notes will be reduced by
the loan's actual loss severity percentage related to those credit
events.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors. Due to the counterparty
dependence on Fannie Mae, Fitch's expected rating on the 2M-1,
2M-2A, 2M-2B and 2M-2C notes will be based on the lower of: the
quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and credit enhancement
(CE) available through subordination and on Fannie Mae's Issuer
Default Rating.

The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C, and 2B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate
falls below the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described
in the offering memorandum, the interest payment on the
interest-only notes will be capped at the excess of (i) the
interest amount payable on the related class of exchangeable notes
for that payment date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the
class of floating rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR)
notes included in the same combination for that payment date. If
there are no floating rate classes in the related exchange, then
the interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at
the aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high quality mortgage loans that were acquired by
Fannie Mae from October 2016 through December 2016. In this
transaction, Fannie Mae has only included one group of loans with
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) from 80.01%-97.00%. Overall, the
reference pool's collateral characteristics are similar to recent
CAS transactions and reflect the strong credit profile of
post-crisis mortgage originations.

Actual Loss Severities (Neutral): This will be Fannie Mae's 12th
actual loss risk transfer transaction in which losses borne by the
noteholders will not be based on a fixed loss severity (LS)
schedule. The notes in this transaction will experience losses
realized at the time of liquidation or modification, which will
include both lost principal and delinquent or reduced interest.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Fannie Mae (Positive): The
majority of the loans in the pool are covered either by
borrower-paid mortgage insurance (BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI).
Fannie Mae will be guaranteeing the mortgage insurance (MI)
coverage amount, which will typically be the MI coverage percentage
multiplied by the sum of the unpaid principal balance as of the
date of the default, up to 36 months of delinquent interest, taxes,
and maintenance expenses. While the Fannie Mae guarantee allows for
credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of
BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision as
required by the Homeowners Protection Act when the loan balance is
first scheduled to reach 78%.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C,
and 2B-1 notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. As a
result, any collateral losses on the reference pool that occur
beyond year 12.5 are borne by Fannie Mae and do not affect the
transaction. Fitch accounted for the 12.5-year window in its
default analysis and applied a reduction to its lifetime default
expectations.

Limited Size/Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): This is the
ninth transaction in which Fitch received third-party due diligence
on a loan production basis as opposed to a transaction-specific
review. Fitch believes that production-based diligence is
sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality control (QC)
processes. The sample selection was limited to 6,811 loans that
were previously reviewed as part of Fannie Mae's post-purchase QC
review. Of those loans, 999 were selected for a full review
(credit, property valuation, and compliance) by third-party due
diligence providers. Of the 999 loans, 167 were part of this
transaction's reference pool. Fitch views the results of the due
diligence review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence.

Advantageous Payment Priority (Positive): The 2M-1 class strongly
benefits from the sequential pay structure and stable CE provided
by the more junior 2M-2A, 2M-2B, 2M-2C, and 2B-1 classes which are
locked out from receiving any principal until classes with a more
senior payment priority are paid in full. However, available CE for
the junior classes as a percentage of the outstanding reference
pool increases in tandem with the paydown of the 2M-1 class. Given
the size of the 2M-1 class relative to the combined total of all
the junior classes, together with the sequential pay structure, the
class 2M-1 will de-lever and CE as a percentage will build faster
than in a pro rata payment structure.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will be retaining credit risk in the transaction by
holding the 2A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial
loss protection of 4.00%, as well as 100% of the first loss 2B-2H
reference tranche, sized at 50bps. Fannie Mae is also retaining an
approximately 5% vertical slice/interest in the 2M-1, 2M-2A, 2M-2B,
2M-2C, and 2B-1 tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae; this is reflected in Moody's
current ratings of Fannie Mae. However, if, at some point, Fitch
views the support as being reduced and receivership likely, the
ratings of Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 2M-1, 2M-2A,
2M-2B, and 2M-2C notes' ratings affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 'BBB' sMVD of 23.6% and 'BB' sMVD of 18.8%. It indicates
there is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared
with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 34% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from Adfitech,
Inc. The due diligence focused on credit and compliance reviews,
desktop valuation reviews and data integrity. Adfitech examined
selected loan files with respect to the presence or absence of
relevant documents. Fitch received certification indicating that
the loan-level due diligence was conducted in accordance with
Fitch's published standards. The certification also stated that the
company performed its work in accordance with the independence
standards, per Fitch's criteria, and that the due diligence
analysts performing the review met Fitch's criteria of minimum
years of experience. Fitch considered this information in its
analysis and the findings did not have an impact on the analysis.


COUNTRYWIDE 2007-MF1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 4 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
and upgraded one class in Countrywide Commercial Mortgage Trust
2007-MF1, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-MF1:

Cl. A, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 14, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was upgarded due to an increase in
credit support since Moody's last review, resulting from paydowns
and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of additional
increases in credit support resulting from the payoff of loans
approaching maturity that are well positioned for refinance. The
pool has paid down by 56% since Moody's last review.

The ratings on seven P&I classes, Class B through H, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 14.9% of the
current balance, compared to 8.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 9.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to 27 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 83% to $111 million
from $640 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 39 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 20% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 63% of
the pool. Three loans, constituting 9% of the pool, have defeased
and are secured by US government securities.

Fourteen loans, constituting 39% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $40 million (for an average loss
severity of 52%). Five loans, constituting 29% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Carrington Park Apartments Homes ($21.9 million 6% of the
pool), which is secured by 330-unit multi-family property located
in Jonesboro, Georgia. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in November 2011 due to monetary default. The property
was 95% leased as of December 2016 compared to 93% as of December
2015 and 92% leased as of December 2014.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by
multi-family and mixed-use properties. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $15.6 million loss for all specially serviced loans (49%
expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 1% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $127 thousand (a 15% expected loss based on a
probability of default) from the troubled loan.

As of the May 12, 2017 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $2.5 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 92% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 76% of
the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 77%, compared to
78% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes
loans with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans,
and specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow
(NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of 10% to the most
recently available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value
reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 8.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.43X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.47X and 1.25X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Spring Pointe Apartments Loan ($11.7 million --
10.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 208-unit multifamily
property in Richardson, Texas, about 20 miles northwest of Dallas.
The property was 96% leased as of September 2016 compared to 97%
leased as of December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69%
and 1.33X, respectively, compared to 80% and 1.15X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Chalmers Court Loan ($7.2 million --
6.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 23-unit multifamily
property in Los Angeles, California, in a portion of western Los
Angeles adjacent to Beverly Hills. The Property was 100% leased as
of March 2017 compared to 87% in December 2016. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 121% and 0.71X, respectively, compared to 129%
and 0.67X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Triton MHP Portfolio Loan ($4.8
million -- 4.4% of the pool), which is secured by 345-pads across
four mobile home parks located in Derby, East Aurora, Angola and
Arcade, New York, approximately 20 miles southeast of Buffalo. The
portfolio was 100% leased as of December 2016 compared to 99% in
December 2015. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 62% and 1.56X,
respectively, compared to 60% and 1.63X at the last review.


CSAIL 2015-C2: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C2 issued by CSAIL 2015-C2
Commercial Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The collateral consists of 118
fixed-rate loans secured by 160 commercial properties; as of the
April 2017 remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of
2.2% since issuance. Loans representing 63.2% of the current pool
balance are reporting YE2016 figures, and loans representing 29.2%
of the current pool balance are reporting partial-year 2016
financials. According to YE2016 financials, the pool reported a
weighted average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
debt yield of 1.83 times (x) and 9.8%, respectively. The DBRS WA
DSCR and WA debt yield at issuance were 1.61x and 8.5%,
respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool represent 44.4% of
the transaction balance, and nine of those loans, representing
31.4% of the current pool balance, reported YE2016 financials,
which showed a WA net cash flow growth of 10.4% over the DBRS
issuance figures, with a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.61x and
7.6%, respectively.

As of the April 2017 remittance, there were seven loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 4.2% of the current pool
balance, and two loans in special servicing, representing 2.8% of
the current pool balance, including one loan in the Top 15.


CSAIL 2016-C6: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on Class X-F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust's CSAIL 2016-C6 Commercial Mortgage Trust
Pass-Through Certificates and withdraws one interest-only class.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The overall pool performance remains stable
from issuance. There are no delinquent or specially serviced loans.
As of the May 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance
has been reduced by 0.26% to $765.5 million, from $767.5 million at
issuance. There are no loans on the servicer's watchlist and no
loans are considered Fitch Loans of Concern.

Above Average Pool Concentration: At issuance the top 10 comprised
61.6% of the pool, which is greater than other transactions issued
in 2015 and early 2016. In addition, the loan concentration index
and sponsor concentration index are greater than the 2015 and early
2016 averages. Currently the top 15 loans comprise 72.9% of the
pool. There is limited retail exposure as 19% of the pool is
collateralized by retail properties. There is one regional mall,
Quaker Bridge Mall (8.7%), which includes anchors: Macy's, Sears
and JC Penney. None of these stores were on closing lists.

High Fitch Conduit Leverage: At issuance, the Fitch DSCR and LTV,
excluding the GLP Industrial Portfolio, were 1.11x and 110%,
respectively, worse than the 2015 and early 2016 averages.

Below Average Amortization: At issuance, based on the scheduled
balance at maturity, the pool will paydown 7.5%, which is below the
YTD 2016 average of 9.9%. Seven loans representing 40.7% of the
pool are full-term interest only, and 25 loans representing 40.3%
of the pool are partial interest only. The remainder of the pool
consists of 18 balloon loans representing 19.0% of the pool with
loan terms of five to 10 years.

Wide Credit Dispersion: In this transaction at issuance, 11 loans
representing 22.2% of the pool by balance had loan-level stressed
losses below 3.0%. Conversely, 10 loans comprising 17.2% of the
pool had loan-level stressed losses above 8.0%.

Class X-D: Due to an update to Fitch's Global Structured Finance
Criteria on May 3, 2017, Fitch will no longer rate Interest Only
(IO) bonds that reference only non-cashflowing bonds. Class X-D
references class D, which has a WAC pass-through rate. The rating
is withdrawn based on the criteria update.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action. .

Fitch has affirmed and withdrawn the following ratings:

-- Notional class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $15.0 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $67.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $92.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $128.5 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $198.1 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $57.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33.6 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20.1 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.6 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.
-- Notional class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Notional class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Notional class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Notional class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate classes X-NR or class NR.


DT AUTO 2017-2: DBRS Finalizes Prov BBsf Rating on Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Series 2017-2 Notes issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2017-2 (DTAOT
2017-2):

-- $193,000,000 Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $57,510,000 Class B at AA (sf)
-- $69,500,000 Class C at A (sf)
-- $67,090,000 Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $55,310,000 Class E at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- DTAOT 2017-2 provides for Class A, B, C, D and E coverage
    multiples slightly below the DBRS range of multiples set forth

    in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS believes that this
    is warranted, given the magnitude of expected loss and
    structural features of the transaction.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool

    data for DriveTime Automotive Group, Inc. (DriveTime)
    originations and performance of the DriveTime auto loan
    portfolio.

-- The November 19, 2014, settlement of the Consumer Financial
    Protection Bureau inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade
    practices.

-- Review of the legal structure and presence of legal opinions,
    which address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
    non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with
    DriveTime, that the trust has a valid first-priority security
    interest in the assets and the consistency with the DBRS
    "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The DTAOT 2017-2 transaction represents a securitization of a
portfolio of motor vehicle retail installment sales contracts
originated by DriveTime Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator).
The Originator is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of DriveTime.
DriveTime is a leading used vehicle retailer in the United States
that focuses on the sale and financing of vehicles to the subprime
market.

The rating on the Class A Note reflects the 66.28% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.50%) and overcollateralization (19.27%). The
ratings on the Class B, C, D and E Notes reflect 55.79%, 43.11%,
30.86% and 20.77% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.


EARNEST STUDENT 2017-A: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class C Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by Earnest Student Loan Program 2017-A LLC (EARN
2017-A):

-- $24,424,000 Class A-1 rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $130,261,000 Class A-2 rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $15,096,000 Class B rated BBB (sf)
-- $5,479,000 Class C rated BB (sf)

The finalized ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's form and sufficiency of available credit
    enhancement.
-- The quality and credit characteristics of the student loan
    borrowers.
-- Structural features of the transaction that require the Class
    A Notes to enter into full turbo principal amortization if
    certain performance triggers are breached or if credit
    enhancement deteriorates.
-- Earnest Operations LLC's capabilities with regard to        
    originations, underwriting and servicing.
-- The benefits offered by the existence of a hot backup  
    servicer.
-- The legal structure and legal opinions that address the true
    sale of the student loans, the non-consolidation of the trust
    and that the trust has a valid first-priority security
    interest in the assets, and the consistency with the DBRS
    "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.
    The variable-rate Class A-1 Notes are primarily secured by a
    group of variable-rate loans. The fixed-rate Class A-2 Notes
    are primarily secured by a group of fixed-rate loans. The
    Class B and Class C Notes are secured by both the fixed-rate
    and variable-rate loan groups.

EARN 2017-A uses a traditional pass-through structure, with credit
enhancement consisting of overcollateralization, a separate reserve
account for each class of Class A Notes, a liquidity account for
the Class B and Class C Notes, subordination provided by the Class
B and Class C Notes for the benefit of the Class A Notes, excess
spread and limited cross-collateralization.


EARNEST STUDENT 2017-A: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating to Class C Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by Earnest Student Loan Program 2017-A LLC (EARN 2017-A):

-- $24,424,000 Class A-1 rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $130,261,000 Class A-2 rated AA (high) (sf)
-- $15,096,000 Class B rated BBB (sf)
-- $5,479,000 Class C rated BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's form and sufficiency of available credit
    enhancement.
-- The quality and credit characteristics of the student loan
    borrowers.
-- Structural features of the transaction that require the Class
    A Notes to enter into full turbo principal amortization if
    certain performance triggers are breached or if credit
    enhancement deteriorates.
-- Earnest Operations LLC's capabilities with regard to
    originations, underwriting and servicing.
-- The benefits offered by the existence of a hot backup
    servicer.
-- The legal structure and expected legal opinions that will
    address the true sale of the student loans, the non-
    consolidation of the trust, that the trust has a valid first-
    priority security interest in the assets and consistency with
    the DBRS "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance"
methodology.

The variable-rate Class A-1 Notes will be primarily secured by a
group of variable-rate loans. The fixed-rate Class A-2 Notes will
be primarily secured by a group of fixed-rate loans. The Class B
and Class C Notes will be secured by both the fixed-rate and
variable-rate loan groups.

EARN 2017-A will use a traditional pass-through structure, with
credit enhancement consisting of overcollateralization, a separate
reserve account for each class of Class A Notes, a liquidity
account for the Class B and Class C Notes, subordination provided
by the Class B and Class C Notes for the benefit of the Class A
Notes, excess spread and limited cross-collateralization.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2017-2: DBRS Gives (P)BB Ratings to Cl. E Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
issued by Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-2 (the Issuer):

-- $113,330,000 Series 2017-2, Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $28,840,000 Series 2017-2, Class B at AA (sf)
-- $23,270,000 Series 2017-2, Class C at A (sf)
-- $18,720,000 Series 2017-2, Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $11,130,000 Series 2017-2, Class E at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement in the form of overcollateralization (OC),
    subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
    spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
    the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
    under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

    assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
    which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
    address the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and
    the payment of principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The strength of the combined organization after the merger of
    Flagship Credit Acceptance LLC (Flagship or the Company) and
    CarFinance Capital LLC; DBRS believes the merger of the two
    companies provides synergies that make the combined company
    more financially stable and competitive.

-- The capabilities of Flagship with regard to originations,
    underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Flagship and
    considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and
    servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts with an
    acceptable backup servicer.

-- The Flagship senior management team has considerable
    experience and a successful track record within the auto
    finance industry.

-- DBRS used a proxy analysis in its development of an expected
    loss.

-- A limited amount of performance data was available for the
    Company's current originations mix.

-- A combination of Company-provided performance data and
    industry comparable data was used to determine an expected
    loss.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
    address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
    consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Flagship,
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in

    the assets and is consistent with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
    U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

Flagship is an independent, full-service automotive financing and
servicing company that provides financing to borrowers who do not
typically have access to prime credit lending terms for the
purchase of late-model vehicles and the refinancing of existing
automotive financings.

The ratings on the Class A Notes reflect the 46.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(40.50%), the Reserve Account (2.00%) and OC (3.50%). The ratings
on the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E Notes reflect 31.75%,
20.25%, 11.00% and 5.50% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.


FREMF MORTGAGE 2012-KF01: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Cl. X Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one CMBS class
in FREMF Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-KF01:

Cl. X, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

One rating was affirmed for one related class of Freddie Mac
Structured Pass-Through Certificates (SPCs), Series K-F01:

Cl. X*, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

*The Structured Pass-Through Certificates (SPCs) from FHMS KF01
represents a pass-through interest in its associated underlying
CMBS Class. SPC Class X represents a pass-through interest in the
underlying CMBS Class X.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO CMBS class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor) of its
referenced classes.

The rating on the SPC class was affirmed based on the rating of the
underlying CMBS class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.9% of the
current balance, compared to 0.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.1% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 0.0% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The rating of an IO class is based on the credit performance of its
referenced classes. An IO class may be upgraded based on a lower
weighted average rating factor or WARF due to an overall
improvement in the credit quality of its reference classes. An IO
class may be downgraded based on a higher WARF due to a decline in
the credit quality of its reference classes, paydowns of higher
quality reference classes or non-payment of interest. Classes that
have paid off through loan paydowns or amortization are not
included in the WARF calculation. Classes that have experienced
losses are grossed up for losses and included in the WARF
calculation, even if Moody's has withdrawn the rating.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

The methodology used in rating the One Structured Pass-through
Certificate (SPC) was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged
Securities" methodology published in June 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of FREMF 2012-KF01.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 27, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $45.7 million
from $1.37 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four remaining mortgage loans.

One loan, constituting 18% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 75% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 80%, compared to 89% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 15% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 8.8%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.59X and 1.22X,
respectively, compared to 2.12X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan is the Marquis At Stonegate Loan ($19.6 million --
42.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 308-unit multifamily
property located in Fort Worth, Texas. The collateral is 19,
three-story buildings, located in close proximity to Texas
Christian University. As of January 2017, the property was 94%
occupied, compared with 94% in December 2015. The property's
occupancy is in line with the submarket occupancy. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 79% and 1.20X, respectively, unchanged since the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Balcones By Windsor Loan ($14.4
million -- 31.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 270-unit
multifamily property located in Austin, Texas. After an initial
interest only period, the loan has recently started to amortize. As
of December 2016, the property was 93% occupied, compared to 91% in
December 2015. Performance has remained stable over the past three
years. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.09X,
respectively, compared to 89% and 1.07X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Carriage House Loan ($8.03 million --
17.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 67-unit (132 bed)
garden-style student rental property located in Storrs Mansfield,
Connecticut. The property is approximately 1-mile from the
University of Connecticut campus. The property is on the watch-list
due to a low DSCR, which is caused by high expenses. The loan was
assumed in March 2012. As of September 2016, the property was 68%
occupied, compared to 93% in December 2015. Moody's has identified
this as a troubled loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 150% and
0.65X, respectively.


GE COMMERCIAL 2005-C4: Moody's Affirms B3sf Rating on Class B Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes
in GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation 2005-C4:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2016 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2016 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-W, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2016 Downgraded to
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of two P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf) are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings of three P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized and
anticipated losses.

The rating of the IO class X-W was affirmed because the class is
not receiving interest and has expected future interest payments of
zero.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 39.7% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 12.4% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 13.1% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-W was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of GECMC 2005-C4.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 8.2% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 85% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three, compared to seven at Moody's last
review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 10, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $193.9
million from $2.4 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 45.2% of the pool.

Three loans, constituting 59.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $221.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 51%). Two loans, constituting 8.2% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Park Ventura Office Center Loan ($15.4 million -- 7.9% of
the pool), which is secured by a 194,000 SF office building located
in Plano, Texas, approximately 20 miles north of Dallas. The loan
was transferred to the special servicer in April 2012 due to
imminent maturity default.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Becker Portfolio
($0.5 million -- 0.2% of the pool), which is secured by the sole
remaining asset in a nine property retail portfolio which totaled
955,000 SF at securitization. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer in April 2015 due to imminent default due to
refinancing issues due to the upcoming maturity date in November
2015. The remaining property is a 226,000 SF grocery-anchored
shopping center.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $11.4 million loss for specially
serviced loans (72% expected loss on average).

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for three poorly
performing loans, constituting 85% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $65.6 million (a 40% expected loss based on a
64% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

The top three conduit loans represent 84.7% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Design Center of the Americas Loan ($87.7
million -- 45.2% of the pool), which is secured by a participation
interest in a $175.4 million first mortgage secured by a 775,000 SF
free-standing interior design campus. The property was built in
1985 and expanded in 1988 and 2001. The loan was previously
modified in April 2012 which reduced the interest rate, extended
the loan for 36 months, and provides for two additional 18-month
extension options. The property was 68% leased as of December 2016.
Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The second largest loan is the Fireman's Fund Loan ($62.9 million
-- 32.4% of the pool), which is secured by is a participation
interest in a $132.2 million first-mortgage secured by a
three-building, 710,000 SF, Class A, corporate office campus
located in Novato, California. The property is 100% leased to
Fireman's Fund through November 2018. Fireman's Fund had previously
announced that it will be vacating the property at the end of its
lease after moving much of their operations to Petaluma,
California. The loan had an anticipated repayment date (ARD) in
October 2015 and the loan has entered its hyperamortization period.
The loan has amortized approximately 30% since securitization.
Moody's has identified this as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the Garret Mountain A-Note Loan ($13.7
million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by two office
buildings totaling 228,000 SF located in West Paterson, New Jersey.
The loan was previously transferred to the special servicer in
September 2015 due to imminent default due to tenant terminations
and the loans impending maturity in December 2015. The loan was
modified in October 2016 via an A-note/B-note split and extended
the maturity through December 2018. The properties were 94% leased
as of March 2017.


GENERAL ELECTRIC 2003-1: Fitch Affirms Csf Rating on Cl. G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of General Electric Capital
Assurance Company (GFCM) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2003-1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Overall Performance: There are no specially serviced loans.
Eleven loans (15.8%) are on the watchlist, eight of which (7.3%)
are considered Fitch loans of concern.
Property Type Concentration: Retail properties represent 44.2% of
the pool, including the largest loan in the pool (15.9%). There are
no regional malls; properties consist of anchored retail strip
centers, unanchored neighborhood centers and drug stores. The
largest loan is Gateway Center, which is collateralized by an
anchored strip center located in Patchogue, NY. Anchor tenants
include Bob's Stores, Best Buy, Marshall's and Home Goods.

Upcoming Tenant Rollover: Large tenant leases are scheduled to
expire during the loan term with respect to several loans in the
Top 15 including the largest loan in the pool, Gateway Center
(15.9%). Anchor tenant Bob's Stores' lease (19.5% NRA) expires in
2018 and approximately 21% of space expires in 2019, including
anchor tenant Best Buy (19.3%). Due to the significant rollover,
Gateway Center is considered a Fitch loan of concern.

Lack of Year-End 2016 Financial Reporting: Approximately 54% of the
remaining loans have not reported YE 2016 financial information.

Maturity Concentration: $2 million in 2017, $2.7 million in 2018,
$5.5 million in 2019, $61.9 million between 2021 and 2023, and
$47.4 million between 2024 and 2033.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes A-5 through F reflect increasing
credit enhancement and expected continued paydown. Fitch's analysis
included a sensitivity analysis whereby an additional stress was
applied to Gateway Center given the larger loan size and upcoming
anchor rollover. This limited the potential for upgrades on classes
D and E. Ratings for class F were capped at 'B' due to significant
retail concentration (44.2%), secondary market locations of the
remaining collateral, limited near-term maturities ($10.2 million
matures through 2019), dated financials (YE 2016 data was provided
for 46% of pool), significant tenant rollover during the loan term
of the largest loan and limited tranche thickness. Upgrades are
possible in the future should the loans within the top 15 renew
their major tenant leases that are scheduled to expire prior to
maturity. Downgrades are possible if expected losses increase.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $52.5 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.3 million class B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13.7 million class C at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.3 million class D at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10.3 million class E at 'BBBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive;
-- $12.3 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.2 million class G at 'Csf'; RE 75%.
-- $1.2 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 were repaid in full. Fitch previously
withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X certificates.


GOLD KEY 2014-A: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class C Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. conducted a review of the outstanding public ratings of
the Gold Key Resorts 2014-A, LLC structured finance asset-backed
securities transaction. The Series 2014-A, Class A, Class B and
Class C ratings were confirmed at their current rating levels of A
(sf), BBB (sf) and BB (high) (sf), respectively. Performance trends
of the securities are such that credit-enhancement levels are
sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their current
respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and projected
    performance.


GOLUB CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by Golub Capital Partners CLO 19(B)-R, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$2,500,000 Class A-X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$293,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class A-1B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1B1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class A-1B2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1B2 Notes"), Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$50,100,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$30,500,000 Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$36,300,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$32,300,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-X Notes, the Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B1 Notes,
the Class A-1B2 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Golub 19(B)-R is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and senior unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 61% ramped as of the closing date.

GC Advisors LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $532,850,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2975

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2975 to 3421)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-X Notes: 0

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B1 Notes: 0

Class A-1B2 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2975 to 3868)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-X Notes: 0

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B1 Notes: -1

Class A-1B2 Notes: -2

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


GS MORTGAGE 2006-CC1: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class A Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the following
class of certificates issued by GS Mortgage Securities Corporation
II, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-CC1:

Cl. A, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Aug 11, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the rating on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. While
the credit quality of the pool has improved since last review, as
evidenced by the weighted average rating factor (WARF), the level
of realized losses and expectations on future performance of the
collateral pool is resulting in the affirmation. The rating action
is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real
estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and ReRemic)
transactions.

GSMS 2006-CC1 is a static cash transaction backed solely by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100% of
the current pool balance); issued between 2003 and 2005. As of the
April 21, 2017 trustee report, the aggregate certificate balance of
the transaction has decreased to $107.3 million from $406.2 million
at issuance, with the pay down directed to the senior most
outstanding class of certificates as a result of amortization of
the underlying collateral and recoveries from defaulted collateral.
Partial losses have been applied to Class A as a result of realized
losses on the underlying collateral; and Classes B through M have
been fully written down and do not have outstanding Moody's
ratings.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the WARF, the weighted
average life (WAL), the weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and
Moody's asset correlation (MAC). Moody's typically models these as
actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4651,
compared to 5697 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (20.7% compared to 12.6% at last
review), A1-A3 (0.0% compared to 4.3% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(12.2% compared to 5.3% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (14.5% compared to
15.6% at last review), B1-B3 (4.7% compared to 4.6% at last
review), Caa1-Ca/C (47.9% compared to 57.6% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.6 years, compared to 2.4 years at last
review. The WAL is based on the assumptions about extensions on the
underlying look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 4.6%, compared to 7.1% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The performance of the certificates is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated
certificates.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated
certificates, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated certificates are particularly
sensitive to changes in the recovery rates of the underlying
collateral and credit assessments. Holding all other parameters
constant increasing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool by 10% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the rated certificates of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up
implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


GS MORTGAGE 2013-GC13: Fitch Affirms BBsf Rating on Class X-B Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2013-GC13 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2013-GC13.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the majority of
the underlying loans. As of the April 2017 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance was reduced by 4.4% to $1.27
billion from $1.33 billion at issuance. There have been no realized
losses to date. There are four Fitch Loans of Concern (LOC; 9.3% of
the pool), including the sixth largest loan in the pool, Holiday
Inn - 6th Avenue (6.1%).

Deal Concentration: The transaction is concentrated. The three
largest loans comprise 30.9% of the pool, and the top 10 comprise
63.5% of the pool.

Interest-Only Loans: There is a high percentage of fully
interest-only loans in the pool at 27.6%, including two of the top
three loans.

New York City Concentration: Five loans in the transaction are
secured by properties located in New York City, comprising 28.1% of
the pool.

Maturity Schedule: There are limited scheduled loan maturities
until 2020 (12.6%) and 2023 (82.2%).

Fitch Loans of Concern (LOC): The largest Fitch LOC is secured by
the Holiday Inn - 6th Avenue, a 226-room full-service hotel located
in the Chelsea neighborhood of Midtown Manhattan. Between 2015 and
2016, net operating income (NOI) dropped nearly 17%, which is
primarily attributable to increased competition from new hotels and
new product appearing in the market, such as Airbnb, and a
corresponding drop in average daily rate (ADR) and revenue per
available room (RevPAR). The next largest Fitch LOC is secured by
the four-property Warehouse & Flex Portfolio (1.6%), which is
located in Bucks County, PA. Portfolio occupancy has decreased
significantly since its issuance level of 93.8%. As of the December
2016 rent roll, occupancy was reported at 75% and is expected to
decline further to 55.7% at the end of this month once its second
largest tenant vacates. Three other smaller loans (combined 1.6%)
are Fitch LOCs due to declining performance related to occupancy
issues. Fitch will continue to monitor all these loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook assigned to class F primarily reflects the
Fitch LOCs, particularly the continued underperformance of the
Holiday Inn - 6th Avenue and the Warehouse & Flex Portfolio. The
class could be subject to downgrade should performance decline
further. The Outlooks on classes A-1 through E remain Stable due to
the overall stable performance of the majority of the underlying
pool. Upgrades to classes B and below may be limited due to the
minimal upcoming scheduled loan maturities (only 5.2% prior to
2020).

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $6.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $72.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $149.7 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $135 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $420.3 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $89.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $98.4 million** class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $88.4 million** class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $50 million** class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $236.8 million** class PEZ at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;
-- $76.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook Stable;
-- $30 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable;
-- $13.3 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $971.5 million* class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30 million* class X-B 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest only.
** Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged
for class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for up to the full certificate principal amount of the
class A-S, class B and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the interest-only class X-C or class G
certificates.


HALCYON LOAN 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Halcyon Loan Advisors Funding 2017-1 Ltd..

Moody's rating action is:

US$221,056,250 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$36,943,750 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029 (the "Class A-1B Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$46,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$16,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1A Notes, the Class A-1B Notes, the Class A-2 Notes,
the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Halcyon 2017-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expect the portfolio to be
approximately 90% ramped as of the closing date.

Halcyon Loan Advisors A LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2650

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.75%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2650 to 3048)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: 0

Class A-1B Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2650 to 3445)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1A Notes: -1

Class A-1B Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


HERTZ VEHICLE II: DBRS Confirms 22 Ratings From Six Series
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. confirmed 22 ratings from six series issued by Hertz
Vehicle Financing II LP. The confirmations are based on performance
trends and credit enhancement levels that are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at their current respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A full text copy of the ratings is available free at:

                 https://is.gd/9c65kh



HOSPITALITY 2017-HIT: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. E Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned ratings to Hospitality 2017-HIT
Mortgage Trust's $805.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan with three one-year extension options totaling $805.0
million, secured by a first-lien mortgage on the borrowers' fee
simple and leasehold interests in 87 hotel properties.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Hospitality 2017-HIT Mortgage Trust
Class               Rating(i)         Amount ($)
A                   AAA (sf)         252,905,000
X-CP(ii)            BBB- (sf)        197,828,000(ii)
X-EXT(ii)           BBB- (sf)        247,285,000(ii)
B                   AA- (sf)          90,725,000
C                   A- (sf)           67,441,000
D                   BBB- (sf)         89,119,000
E                   BB- (sf)         140,503,000
F                   B- (sf)          124,057,000
VRR interest(iii)   NR                40,250,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.  
(ii)Notional balance.  The notional amount of the class X-CP
certificates will be equal to the sum of the portion balances of
the class B-2 portion, class C-2 portion, and class D-2 portion, of
the class B, class C, and class D certificates respectively.  The
notional amount of the class X-EXT certificates will equal the sum
of the class B, class C, and class D certificates.  
(iii)Non-offered vertical interest certificate.
NR--Not rated.


HPS LOAN 11-2017: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by HPS Loan Management 11-2017, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$57,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$28,500,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$21,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$5,265,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

HPS CLO 11-2017 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist in the aggregate of second lien
loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 78%
ramped as of the closing date.

HPS Investment Partners CLO (US), LLC (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 5 year reinvestment
period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2827

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2827 to 3251)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2827 to 3675)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -3


JP MORGAN 2003-LN1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class J Certs to D
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class H commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from JPMorgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp.'s series 2003-LN1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  At the same time,
S&P lowered its rating on class J from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining loans in the pool,
the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

S&P raised its rating on class H to reflect its expectation of the
available credit enhancement for this class, which S&P believes is
greater than its most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating levels, S&P's view regarding
the current and future performance of the transaction's collateral,
significant reduction in the trust balance as well as the class's
interest shortfall history.

S&P lowered its rating on class J to 'D (sf)' because S&P expects
the accumulated interest shortfalls to remain outstanding for the
foreseeable future.  Class J has experienced nine consecutive
months of interest shortfalls because interest payment due to this
class is being diverted to repay prior principal shortfalls to the
trust.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $16.6 million, which is 1.4% of the pool balance
at issuance; however, the asset balance is $17.3 million.  The pool
currently includes three loans, down from 174 loans at issuance.
Two of these loans ($1.8 million, 10.6% of the asset balance) are
defeased, and no loans are on master servicer's watchlist or with
the special servicer.  The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,
reported year-end 2016 financial information for the nondefeased
loan in the pool.

The Piilani Shopping Center loan ($15.4 million, 89.4% of the asset
balance) is the sole remaining loan secured by commercial real
estate.  S&P calculated a 1.54x S&P Global Ratings' debt service
coverage and 60.2% S&P Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio using a
8.25% S&P Global Ratings' capitalization rate for this loan.

To date, the transaction has experienced $47.9 million in principal
losses, or 4.0% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

JPMorgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-LN1
                                         Rating
Class             Identifier             To              From
H                 46625MB81              AA+ (sf)        BB (sf)
J                 46625MB99              D (sf)          B- (sf)


JP MORGAN 2004-C2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. X Certs to Caa2(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded two classes, downgraded one
class and affirmed five classes in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-C2:

Cl. H, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. J, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. P, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, classes H and J, were upgraded
based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from
loan paydowns and amortization, as well as Moody's expectation of
additional increases in credit support resulting from the fully
amortizing loans. The deal has paid down 51% since Moody's last
review, and the fully amortizing loans represent 36% of the pool.

The ratings on the P&I classes, classes K through P, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.9% of the
current balance, compared to 5.8% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of JPMCC 2004-C2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 5 at Moody's last review.

Moody's analysis used the excel-based Large Loan Model. The large
loan model derives credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds derived from Moody's
loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining proceeds
include leverage, loan structure and property type. Moody's also
further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for any pooling benefits
associated with loan level diversity and other concentrations and
correlations.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $31.75
million from $1.03 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 50% of the pool. Two loans, constituting 8% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

There is currently one loan, constituting 10% of the pool, on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Ten loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $12.25 million (for an average loss
severity of 30%). One loan, constituting 6% of the pool, is
currently in special servicing. The specially serviced loan is the
Hillside MHP Portfolio Loan ($1.9 million -- 6.1% of the pool),
which is secured by three manufactured housing properties located
in Mount Morris, Nunda and Silver Springs, New York, approximately
50 miles south of Rochester. The loan transferred to special
servicing in April 2014 for maturity default, however the borrower
continued to remit debt service payments (accepted subject to
non-waiver) until July 2015. The Borrower was unable to refinance
and foreclosure is anticipated in June 2017. As of January 2017,
the portfolio was 65% occupied.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 94% of
the pool.

The top three conduit loans represent 68% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Employers Reinsurance Corporation II Loan
($15.8 million -- 49.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
three-story Class B office building with a total net rentable area
of 166,641 square feet (SF) in Kansas City, Missouri. The property
is fully leased by Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation (Moody's
rated Aa3, Insurance Financial Strength) with a lease expiration in
April 2019. Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation is currently
subleasing their space to Burns & McDonnell, an engineering,
architecture, construction, environmental and consulting firm,
based in Kansas City, Missouri. Moody's value incorporates a
lit/dark analysis to account for the lease rollover risk associated
with the single tenancy. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98% and
0.99X, respectively, compared to 82% and 1.19X at the last review.

The second largest is the Alta Decatur Shopping Center Loan ($3.1
million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 61,120 square
foot retail center located in Las Vegas, Nevada, approximately six
miles from the strip. The property is 100% occupied as of April
2017 consisting of two pads on ground leases occupied by Taco Bell
and McDonald's and a stand-alone Walgreens. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 53% and 1.83X, respectively, compared to 58% and
1.67X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Spring Valley II Apartments Loan
($2.6 million --- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by an 120
unit apartment complex built in 2002. As per the December 2016 rent
roll was 98% occupied, the same as in December 2015. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 63% and 1.51X, respectively, compared to 60%
and 1.57X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2005-CIBC12: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Cl. B Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., series 2005-CIBC12.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the pool
since last rating action. As of the May 2017 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 94.5% to
$122.1 million from $2.22 billion at issuance.

Specially Serviced Loans: The two largest remaining assets are in
special servicing. The two loans total 55.4% of remaining pool
balance and are collateralized by struggling retail properties,
both of which have lost anchor tenants. This includes a tertiary
market mall, Fort Steuben Mall, which recently became real estate
owned (REO). Fort Steuben Mall reflects Sears and Macy's anchors
that have recently closed and a JCPenney that remains open at
present. The ultimate resolution strategy for both of these assets
will likely be the sale of the collateral property.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only nine
loans remaining. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis which grouped the remaining loans
based on loan structural features, collateral quality and
performance which ranked them by their perceived likelihood of
repayment. This includes defeased loans, fully amortizing loans,
balloon loans, and Fitch Loans of Concern. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlook for class A-J is Negative given the potential for
higher losses related to the specially serviced loans, particularly
the Fort Steuben Mall. Additionally, this class reflects the
potential for downgrade should the Discovery Channel Building loan
face refinance challenges. While unlikely, upgrades are possible
given further defeasance, improved loan-level performance, or lower
than expected realized loss severities.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes and assigned Recovery
Estimates as indicated:

-- $33.7 million class A-J at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $43.3 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 90%;
-- $19.0 million class C at 'Csf' '; RE 0%
-- $26.1 million class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3A1, A-3A2, A-3B, A-SB, A-4, A-M, and UHP
certificates have been paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class
NR certificate. Fitch withdrew the ratings on the interest-only
class X-1 and X-2 certificates.


JP MORGAN 2006-CH1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-3 Debt Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of seven
tranches from J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH1. The
transaction is backed by subprime mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds and improvements in Moody's
projections of collateral expected losses. The actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The rating actions on Cl. M-4 and Cl. M-6 also partially reflect a
correction to the cash-flow model previously used by Moody's in
rating this transaction. In prior rating actions, the cash flow
model did not reimburse losses and/or arrears after a tranche was
paid down. This error has now been corrected, and rating action
reflects this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


JP MORGAN 2006-CH2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class AV-4 Debt to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of 2 tranches,
from 1 transaction issued by J.P.Morgan.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-CH2

Cl. AV-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 20, 2015
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


JP MORGAN 2007-LDP10: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. A-M Certs to CCCsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 23 classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2007-LDP10 (JPMCC
2007-LDP10).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Loss Expectations: The downgrade of class A-M reflects the
high loss expectation of the remaining pool relative to the class'
credit enhancement, indicating default risk is a possibility. Fitch
modeled losses of 68.5% on the remaining pool; expected losses on
the original pool balance total 18.8%, including $526.7 million
(9.9% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to date.
Although recoveries were better than previously modeled on the
loans disposed since the last rating action, this was offset by
significantly higher losses expected on the specially serviced
loans/assets. Expected losses have increased from 17.9% at the last
rating action.

Pool Concentration; Adverse Selection: The pool is concentrated
with 22 of the original 223 loans remaining, which includes one
loan (29.4% of the current pool balance) that was previously
modified into A/B notes and another loan (4.4%) previously modified
into A/B/C notes. Sixteen loans (82.6%) are currently in special
servicing, and an additional four loans (15.5%) were classified as
Fitch Loans of Concern.

Specially Serviced Disposition Timing: The ultimate resolution of
loan/asset workouts and the timing of their disposition remain
uncertain. This directly affects the repayment of class A-M, which
relies upon the proceeds from the disposition of loans/assets in
special servicing.

Loan Concentrations: The largest asset, The Skyline Portfolio, and
second largest loan, Lafayette Property Trust, both of which are in
special servicing, comprise 29.4% and 29% of the current pool,
respectively, and remain the largest contributors to Fitch-modeled
losses for the pool.

The largest contribution to Fitch-modeled losses is the Skyline
Portfolio asset. The loan, which is secured by a portfolio of eight
office buildings totaling 2.6 million square feet (sf) and located
in Falls Church, VA, transferred back to the special servicer for a
second time in April 2016 for imminent default. Portfolio
performance had not improved since the loan was modified in October
2013 and returned to the master servicer in February 2014. The
sponsor was not willing to contribute any additional funds to the
portfolio and agreed to a cooperative transition of the portfolio
to real-estate owned (REO). The properties were foreclosed upon in
December 2016. Overall portfolio occupancy was a mere 45.9%, with
the six older Skyline buildings (Skyline One through Six) being
24.5% leased, while One Skyline Tower was 97% leased and Seven
Skyline Place was 70% leased. The special servicer is still
determining workout strategy at this time, while addressing leasing
and deferred maintenance items. The loan had first transferred to
special servicing in March 2012 for imminent default as portfolio
occupancy was negative impacted by the Base Realignment and Closure
statute. The October 2013 loan modification bifurcated the total
debt into a $350 million A-note and a $328 million B-note (trust
portion, $105 million A-note and $98.4 million B-note). The loan's
maturity had been extended to February 2022, with a one-year
extension option if certain performance metrics are attained.

The next largest contributor to Fitch modeled losses is the
Lafayette Property Trust loan, which was originally secured by a
portfolio of nine properties, eight of which were office and one
was a single-tenant Clyde's restaurant, comprising approximately
842,600 sf and located in Alexandria, VA within the Mark Center, a
350-acre master-planned community 10 minutes from the Washington
D.C. central business district and Reagan National Airport. The
loan was transferred to special servicing in November 2015 due to
imminent default. The borrower had delivered written notice of its
inability to make loan payments and fund tenant improvements and
leasing commissions following the August 2015 lease expiration of
the portfolio's largest tenant, CNA Corporation. A receiver was
appointed in November 2015. In April 2016, the trust took title to
three of the office buildings and in February 2017, the
single-tenant Clyde's restaurant building was also foreclosed upon.
Foreclosure is expected for the remaining five office properties.
One of the foreclosed upon office properties, 1701 N. Beauregard
Street, was recently sold in April 2017.

As of the May 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 87% to $690.9 million from
$5.33 billion at issuance. Cumulative interest shortfalls totaling
$66.4 million are currently affecting the A-J classes through class
NR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Downgrades to the remaining distressed classes will occur as losses
are realized. Upgrades are not expected due to adverse selection
and significant losses anticipated on the remaining pool.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has downgraded the following class:

-- $238.3 million class A-M to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf'; RE 90%.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $200.7 million class A-J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $58.8 million class A-JS at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $100 million class A-JFX at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $62.7 million class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $30.4 million class B-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class C-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class D-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class E-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1S, A-2, A-2S, A-2SFX, A-2SFL, A-3, A-3S, A-1A and
A-MS certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the fully
depleted class NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates and the class
A-JFL certificates.


JPMCC 2017-JP6: DBRS Gives Prov BB Rating to Class F-RR Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-JP6 (the
Certificates) issued by the JPMCC 2017-JP6 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (sf)
-- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes D, E-RR, F-RR, G-RR, and NR-RR will be privately placed.
The Class X-A and X-B balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 42 fixed-rate loans secured by 72
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay, pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, two loans, representing 6.8% of the
total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood
of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance risk given
the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied its
refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 15
loans, representing 50.8% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x.

Term default risk is low, as indicated by a relatively strong DBRS
Term DSCR of 1.63x. In addition, 20 loans, representing 57.0% of
the pool, have DBRS Term DSCRs in excess of 1.50x, including eight
of the top 15 loans. Even with the exclusion of 211 Main Street,
which represents 8.3% of the pool with a DBRS Term DSCR of 2.21x,
the deal continues to exhibit a moderate DBRS Term DSCR of 1.58x.
The two largest loans, 245 Park Avenue and 211 Main Street, which
comprise 25.4% of the DBRS sample, have Strong sponsorship.
Furthermore, DBRS only identified two loans, which combined
represent just 2.5% of the DBRS sample, that have sponsorship
and/or loan collateral associated with a voluntary bankruptcy
filing, a prior DPO, a loan default, limited net worth and/or
liquidity, a historical negative credit event and/or inadequate
commercial real estate experience. Four loans, representing 28.4%
of the pool, are located in urban markets with increased liquidity
that benefit from consistent investor demand, even in times of
stress. Of these, three loans, totaling 25.8% of the transaction
balance, are considered to be located in Super Dense Urban markets,
which DBRS defines as gateway locations with extremely high
liquidity and low cap rates. Urban markets represented in the deal
include New York, San Francisco and Sunnyvale, California. Only
four loans, comprising 5.7% of the pool, are secured by collateral
located in tertiary markets, and no properties are located in rural
markets.

The transaction's weighted-average DBRS Refi DSCR is 1.01x,
indicating higher refinance risk on an overall pool level, and the
transaction has a high concentration of loans suffering from
elevated refinance risk. Fifteen loans, representing 50.8% of the
pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 1.00x. Eight loans,
representing 35.9% of the pool, have a DBRS Refi DSCR less than
0.90x. The pool has a high concentration of properties that are
secured by office assets, with office assets representing 52.7% of
the pool. Furthermore, the transaction has a moderate concentration
of loans (23.4% of the pool) that are secured by assets either
fully or primarily used as retail. The retail sector has generally
underperformed since the Great Recession because of declining
consumer spending power, store closures, chain bankruptcies and the
rapidly growing popularity of e-commerce. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, e-commerce sales represented 7.0% of total retail
sales in 2015 compared with 3.9% in 2009. As the e-commerce share
of sales is expected to continue to grow significantly in the
coming years, the retail real estate sector may continue to be
relatively weak. Six loans, representing 23.2% of the pool, are
secured by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to
a single tenant, and four of these loans are in the top 15. Loans
secured by properties occupied by single tenants have been found to
suffer from higher loss severities in the event of default. As
such, DBRS assumed a higher loss profile for the loans secured by
single-tenant assets than it did for the loans secured by
multi-tenant assets.

The DBRS sample included 27 of the 42 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 38 of the 72 properties in the
portfolio (75.5% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -10.2% from the Issuer's NCF
and ranged from -26.1% (Diamond Hill Apartments) to +1.7% (211 Main
Street).

The rating assigned to Class G-RR differs from the higher rating
implied by the Large Pool Multi-borrower Parameters. DBRS considers
this difference to be a material deviation from the methodology
and, in this case, the ratings reflect the dispersion of loan-level
cash flows expected to occur post-issuance.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


LB COMMERCIAL 1998-C4: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on Cl. L Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes,
upgraded the rating on one class and downgraded the rating on one
class in LB Commercial Trust 1998-C4:

Cl. J, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Cl..K, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class, Class J, was upgraded primarily due to
an increase in credit support since Moody's last review, resulting
from amortization. The pool has paid down by 15.4% since Moody's
last review. Additionally, defeasance has increased to 32.6% of the
pooled balance, compared to 20.5% at Moody's last review.

The ratings on two P&I classes, Classes K and L, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus
realized losses.

The rating on the IO Class was downgraded due to a decline in the
credit performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF)
of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.8% of the
current balance, compared to 3.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.1% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December 2014, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in October 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a "Request
for Comment" in which it has requested market feedback on proposed
changes to its methodology for rating structured finance
interest-only (IO) securities called "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities," dated October 20,
2015. If Moody's adopts the new methodology as proposed, the
changes could affect the ratings of LBCMT 1998-C4.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8, compared to 12 at Moody's last review.

When the Herf falls below 20, Moody's uses the excel-based Large
Loan Model and then reconciles and weights the results from the
conduit and large loan models in formulating a rating
recommendation. The large loan model derives credit enhancement
levels based on an aggregation of adjusted loan-level proceeds
derived from Moody's loan-level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to
determining proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property
type. Moody's also further adjusts these aggregated proceeds for
any pooling benefits associated with loan level diversity and other
concentrations and correlations.

In evaluating the Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) component, Moody's used
a Gaussian copula model, incorporated in its public CDO rating
model CDROM to generate a portfolio loss distribution to assess the
ratings.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98.1% to $37.7
million from $2.0 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 34 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15.2% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 59.6% of the pool. Fourteen loans,
constituting 32.6% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities. The pool contains a Credit Tenant Lease
(CTL) component that includes 10 loans, representing 9.3% of the
pool.

Two loans, constituting 3.8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-eight loans have been liquidated with a loss, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $42.3 million (for an average loss
severity of 29%). Two loans, constituting 7.5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Westgate Plaza Loan ($1.4 million -- 3.9% of the pool),
which is secured by a 45,000 square foot (SF) retail property,
located in Elizabethtown, North Carolina. The largest tenant;
Tractor Supply Co. occupies 58% of the NRA with a lease expiration
of September 2022. The space was previously occupied by Food Lion
who vacated in 2007. The loan transferred to Special Servicing in
May 2010 for imminent default, however the borrower has kept the
loan current. As per the December 2016 rent roll the property was
100% leased. Moody's analysis incorporated a minimal loss for this
loan.

The remaining specially serviced loan is secured by a retail
property.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 57.9%, compared to 54.7% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 26.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.08%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.45X and 2.36X,
respectively, compared to 1.50X and 2.46X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 35.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Pinnacle Center Loan ($5.7 million -- 15.2%
of the pool), which is secured by a 230,000 square foot (SF) retail
property located in Thornton, Colorado. The property is anchored by
a Hobby Lobby, 21% of the NRA, with a lease expiration of June
2017. As per the December 2016 rent roll, the property was 88%
leased compared to, 86% leased as of September 2015. The loan
benefits from amortization as it has amortized 32% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 76.4% and 1.41X,
respectively, compared to 66% and 1.64X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center
Loan ($4.6 million -- 12% of the pool), which is secured by a
70,000 square foot (SF) retail center located in Richmond,
Virginia. As per the March 2017 rent roll, the property was 82%
occupied, compared to, 83% leased as of March 2016. The loan
benefits from amortization as it has amortized 33% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 63.6% and 1.7X,
respectively, compared to 66.4% and 1.63X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Cineplex Multiplex Loan ($3 million
-- 8% of the pool), which is secured by a 48,000 square foot (SF)
cinema located in Huntington, New York. This fully amortizing loan
has paid down 54% since securitization. Both the theater's lease
expiration and the loan maturity are in September 2023. Due to the
single tenant exposure, Moody's valuation reflects a lit/dark
analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 42.8% and 2.78X,
respectively, compared to 43.9% and 2.71X at the last review.

The CTL component consists of 10 loans, constituting 9.3% of the
pool, secured by properties leased to five tenants. The largest CTL
exposures are CVS Health ($1.4 million -- 40.8 % of the pool;
senior unsecured rating: Baa1 -- stable outlook) and Sears Holdings
Corp ($1.05 million -- 30.2 % of the pool; senior unsecured rating:
Ca -- stable outlook). Four of the tenants have a Moody's rating
and Moody's has completed updated credit assessments for the
non-Moody's rated tenants. The bottom-dollar weighted average
rating factor (WARF) for this pool is 4,125, compared to 2,538 at
the last review. WARF is a measure of the overall quality of a pool
of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar WARF is a measure of default
probability.


LB-UBS COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: S&P Raises Rating on Cl. D Certs to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on three classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from LB-UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its rating on the class F certificates from the same
transaction.

S&P's rating actions on the certificates follow its analysis of the
transaction, primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

S&P raised its ratings on classes C, D, and E to reflect its
expectation of the available credit enhancement for these classes,
which S&P believes is greater than its most recent estimates of
necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.  The
upgrades also reflect the significant reduction in the trust
balance.

The affirmation on the class F certificates reflects S&P's
expectation that this class would remain susceptible to reduced
liquidity support available to the class because of interest
shortfalls affecting the trust from the 16 specially serviced
assets ($166.8 million, 91.9%).

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movements on classes C, D, and E and positive rating
movement on class F, S&P's analysis also considered the reduced
liquidity support.

                        TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $181.4 million, which is 4.9% of the pool balance
at issuance.  The pool currently includes 10 loans and seven real
estate-owned (REO) assets (reflecting GTECH Office Campus crossed
assets as one asset), down from 139 loans at issuance.  Sixteen of
these assets are with the special servicer, and no loans are on the
master servicer's watchlist or defeased.  The master servicer,
KeyBank Real Estate Capital, reported financial information for
86.3% of the loans in the pool, of which 45.2% was partial-year or
year-end 2015 data, and the remainder was partial-year or year-end
2016 data.

The top 10 assets have an aggregate outstanding pool trust balance
of $152.9 million (84.3%). Nine of the top 10 assets are defaulted.
For the sole performing loan in the transaction, S&P calculated a
1.07x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service coverage
(DSC) and 93.1% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio using an 8.0% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $166.9 million in
principal losses, or 4.5% of the original pool trust balance.  S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 6.3% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the specially serviced assets.

                        CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 17, 2017, trustee remittance report, 16 assets were
with the special servicer, LNR Partners, LLC.  Details of the two
largest specially serviced assets are:

The GTECH Office Campus Crossed REO asset (aggregate balance $30.9
million, 17.1%) is the largest asset in the transaction and has a
total reported exposure of $34.4 million.  The asset consists of
two suburban office properties totaling 263,000 sq. ft. located in
West Greenwich, R.I.  The two loans are crossed-collateralized and
crossed-defaulted: GTECH Office Campus-GTECH ($16.0 million, 8.8%)
and GTECH Office Campus-Immunex ($14.9 million, 8.2%).  Both loans
were transferred to the special servicer on Sept. 19, 2014, because
of imminent default and became REO on March 31, 2015.  The GTECH
Office Campus-Immunex property (93,000 sq. ft.) is currently
vacant, while the GTECH Office Campus-GTECH property (170,000 sq.
ft.) is 100% occupied by Gtech Corp. under a lease that expires in
November 2019.  An appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of
$19.2 million is in effect against the asset.  S&P expects a
significant loss upon the eventual resolution of this asset.

The CVS - Vero Beach loan ($29.7 million, 16.4%) is the
second-largest loan in the transaction and has a total reported
exposure of $30.4 million.  The collateral is a 412,781 sq. ft.
industrial warehouse in Vero Beach, Fla., which operates as a
distribution center for CVS.  The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on De. 27, 2016, because of imminent maturity
default.  The loan matured on Jan. 11, 2017, and the lease to CVS
expires on Jan. 31, 2031.  The reported DSC and occupancy as of
year-end 2016 were 1.28x and 100.0%, respectively.  S&P expects a
minimal loss upon this loan's eventual resolution.

The remaining assets with the special servicer each have individual
balances that represent less than 7.6% of the total pool trust
balance.  S&P estimated losses for the specially serviced assets,
arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 39.8%.

With respect to the specially serviced assets noted above, a
minimal loss is less than 25%, and a significant loss is 60% or
greater.

RATINGS LIST

LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C1
Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2007 C-1
                                       Rating
Class            Identifier            To            From
C                50179AAK3             A (sf)        B- (sf)
D                50179AAL1             BB (sf)       CCC (sf)
E                50179AAM9             B (sf)        CCC (sf)
F                50179AAN7             CCC- (sf)     CCC- (sf)


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(high) Rating on E-2 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 12, LLC –
Equipment Contract Backed Notes, Series 2017-1 (the Notes):

-- $89,000,000 Class A-1 rated R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $91,000,000 Class A-2 rated AAA (sf)
-- $82,000,000 Class A-3 rated AAA (sf)
-- $24,234,000 Class A-4 rated AAA (sf)
-- $14,427,000 Class B rated AAA (sf)
-- $14,071,000 Class C rated AA (sf)
-- $9,797,000 Class D rated A (sf)
-- $13,893,000 Class E-1 rated BBB (high) (sf)
-- $11,578,000 Class E-2 rated BB (high) (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Form and sufficiency of available credit enhancement and its
    ability to withstand the expected losses under various
    stressed cash flow modeling scenarios.

-- The transaction parties’ capabilities with regard to
    origination and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and the historical
    performance of the LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc. portfolio.

-- The legal opinions, which address the true sale of the assets,

    non-consolidation of the issuing entity, that the issuing
    entity has a valid first-priority security interest in the
    assets and the consistency with the DBRS “Legal Criteria for

    U.S. Structured Finance” methodology.

The Notes are issued in nine classes — Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4
Notes (the Class A Notes), Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D
Notes, Class E-1 Notes and Class E-2 Notes — the respective
interest and principal payments on which will be made in sequential
order of seniority. Thus, the initial hard credit enhancement for
the Class A-1 Notes of 76.5% includes the Class A-2 (25.5%), A-3
(23.0%) and A-4 (6.8%) Notes, the Class B Notes (4.0%), the Class C
Notes (3.9%), the Class D Notes (2.8%), the Class E-1 Notes (3.9%),
the Class E-2 Notes (3.3%), funds on deposit in a fully funded and
non-declining Reserve Account (1.50%) and overcollateralization
(OC; 1.75%). The corresponding initial hard credit enhancement for
the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class A-4, Class B, Class C, Class D and
the Class E-1 Notes are 51.0%, 28.0%, 21.2%, 17.1%, 13.2%, 10.4%
and 6.5%, respectively. The initial Class E-2 credit support of
3.25% comprises the Reserve Account and OC. Additional credit
support may be provided from excess spread available in the
structure. Subject to availability of funds and priority of
payments, the OC will build to 6.00% of the Aggregate Asset Balance
with a floor of 2.00% of the Initial Aggregate Asset Balance.


LEAF RECEIVABLES 2017-1: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating to Cl. E-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by LEAF Receivables Funding 12, LLC, Series 2017-1
(LEAF 2017-1), sponsored by LEAF Commercial Capital, Inc. (LEAF;
unrated). The transaction is a securitization of loans and leases
originated by LEAF Capital Funding, LLC and secured by small to
medium ticket equipment, including office, telephony, medical and
industrial equipment.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: LEAF Receivables Funding 12, LLC, Series 2017-1

$91,000,000 Class A-2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$82,000,000 Class A-3 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$24,234,000 Class A-4 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

$14,427,000 Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

$14,071,000 Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

$9,797,000 Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

$13,893,000 Class E-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

$11,578,000 Class E-2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying equipment
contracts; the strong and steady historical performance of similar
contracts originated by LEAF Capital Funding, LLC; the
transaction's sequential pay structure; the experience and
expertise of LEAF, as the transaction servicer; and the back-up
servicing arrangement with U.S. Bank National Association
(long-term deposits Aa1/ long-term CR assessment Aa2(cr),
short-term deposit P-1, BCA aa3).

Moody's cumulative net loss expectation for the LEAF 2017-1
transaction is 3.0%, and the Aaa level is 23.0%. Moody's cumulative
net loss expectation is based on its analysis of the credit quality
of the underlying collateral, the historical performance of LEAF's
prior securitizations and managed portfolio, the ability of LEAF to
perform the servicing functions, and its current expectations for
future economic conditions. There is initially 21.15% of hard
credit enhancement behind the Class A notes consisting of
overcollateralization that will build over time, a non-declining
reserve account and subordination.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in December 2015.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
"Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance".
If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit
Ratings on LEAF 2017-1 are not expected to be affected. Please
refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled " Moody's Proposes
Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance," for further details regarding the implications
of the proposed Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings."

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if levels of credit protection are
greater than necessary to protect investors against its current
expectations of portfolio loss. Losses could be lower than Moody's
original expectations as a result of lower frequency of default by
the underlying obligors or slower depreciation of the value of the
equipment that secure the obligors' promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and the
performance of various sectors where the lessees operate.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit protection
are insufficient to protect investors against its current
expectations of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's
original expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor
defaults or a deterioration in the value of the equipment that
secure the obligors' promise of payment. Transaction performance
also depends greatly on the US macro economy and the performance of
various sectors where the lessees operate.


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. M3 Notes to Csf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded ratings on two classes of
certificates from one securitization of small balance commercial
real estate loans. The deals are serviced by Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2015
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2013 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade actions are due to continued deterioration of the
pool performance and decreased credit enhancement. The 2007-1
transaction is currently under-collateralized, the reserve fund is
fully depleted, and approximately 24% of the deal collateral
balance is severely delinquent, in foreclosure or in REO status.
The Class M2 and M3 tranches have also incurred cumulative interest
shortfalls equal to approximately 8% and 10% of their respective
balances.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations" published in
October 2015. Please see the Rating Methodologies page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it requested market feedback on potential revisions to its Approach
to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance. If the
revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit Ratings
on Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates are not expected to be affected. Please refer to
Moody's Request for Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to
Its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured
Finance," for further details regarding the implications of the
proposed Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

Moody's evaluated the sufficiency of credit enhancement by first
analyzing the loans to determine an expected lifetime net loss for
each collateral pool. Moody's compared these net losses with the
available credit enhancement. Moody's evaluated the sufficiency of
loss coverage provided by credit enhancement in light of the
projected variability of losses on the collateral.

In order to determine the portion of loans that will default,
Moody's assessed roll rate behavior for fully amortizing loans
according to their delinquency status.

The projected net losses or range of projected net losses are
evaluated against the available credit enhancement provided by
subordination, the reserve account, excess spread, and if
available, overcollateralization.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating these transactions can also be found on
Moody's website. Further information on Moody's analysis of this
transaction is available on www.moodys.com.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Better than expected pool performance and levels of credit
protection that are higher than necessary to protect investors
against current expectations of loss could drive the ratings up.
Losses could decline below Moody's expectations as a result of a
decrease in seriously delinquent loans, lower severities than
expected on liquidated loans, or fewer defaults than expected.

Down

Further occurrence of interest shortfalls and levels of credit
protection that are insufficient to protect investors against
current expectations of loss could drive the ratings down. Losses
could rise above Moody's expectations as a result of an increase in
seriously delinquent loans and higher severities than expected on
liquidated loans.


LNR CDO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 14 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO IV Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2006-1:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

LNR CDO IV is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool
balance). As of the April 28, 2017 trustee report, the aggregate
note balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, is
$1.7 billion compared to $1.6 billion at issuance, as a result of
the combination of pay-down to the senior most outstanding class of
notes, and capitalization of defaulted and deferred interest. The
deal is currently under-collateralized by $1.4 billion as a result
of realized losses to the underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collaterals it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 8299,
compared to 9045 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 2.5% compared to 3.1% at last
review; Ba1-Ba3 and 2.3% compared to 1.8% at last review; B1-B3 and
19.1% compared to 0.0% at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 76.1%
compared to 95.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.2 years, compared to 1.3 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 1.6%, compared to 0.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100.0%, compared to 0.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
However, in light of the performance indicators noted above,
Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced are
subject to further changes.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


LNR CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on 12 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO V LTD. Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2007-1 ("LNR CDO V"):

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because its
key transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

LNR CDO V is a static cash transaction backed by a portfolio of
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool
balance). As of the April 26, 2017 trustee report, the aggregate
note balance of the transaction, including preferred shares, is
$863.5.x million compared to $761.2 million at issuance, as a
result of capitalization of defaulted and deferred interest. The
deal is currently under-collateralized by $742.4 million as a
result of realized losses to the underlying collateral.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collaterals it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10000, the
same as that at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collaterals and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collaterals follow: Ca/C and 100.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.3 years, compared to 1.4 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 0.0%, the same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for the rated notes,
although a change in one key parameter assumption could be offset
by a change in one or more of the other key parameter assumptions.
The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the
recovery rate of the underlying collateral and credit assessments.
However, in light of the performance indicators noted above,
Moody's believes that it is unlikely that the ratings announced are
subject to further changes.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


MADISON PARK XXV: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Madison Park Funding XXV, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or
"Madison Park XXV").

Moody's rating action is:

US$366,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$90,000,000 Class A-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$31,000,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$38,200,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$26,800,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

U.S.$8,000,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Madison Park XXV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. Subject to a cov-lite matrix, at least 90%
of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans or senior
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued subordinated
notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the rating assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2775 to 3191)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2775 to 3608)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -3

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -3


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CIP1: DBRS Cuts Class D Debt Rating to D(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded the rating of the remaining class of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-CIP1
(the Certificates) issued by Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust, Series
2005-CIP1 (MLMT 2005-CIP1 or the Trust) as follows:

-- Class D to D (sf) from C (sf)

The rating downgrade is the result of the most recent realized
losses to the Trust, which occurred after The Centre of Excellence
loan (Prospectus ID#80) was liquidated from the Trust at a loss of
$2.9 million with the April 2017 remittance. The Centre of
Excellence loan was secured by an office property in Wauwatosa,
Wisconsin, and was transferred to special servicing in February
2015 for imminent default. The property experienced cash flow
issues following the departure of the largest tenant in September
2014, as the borrower struggled to backfill the vacant space. The
loan was scheduled for auction in late January 2017 and was
subsequently resolved with the April 2017 remittance. The last
reported property valuation, dated May 2015, valued the property at
$4.9 million, down from $8.5 million at issuance. The servicer
reported proceeds of $2.2 million with the property's sale, with a
loss severity of 57.2%. The loss wiped the remaining balance on
Class E and reduced the principal balance on Class D by 11.5%. As
of the April 2017 remittance, there are four loans remaining, all
of which are performing, with a cumulative outstanding principal
balance of $29.3 million.

There are no outstanding ratings remaining following the
above-referenced rating action. As such, this concludes DBRS's
surveillance of this transaction.


MERRILL LYNCH 2005-CKI1: S&P Affirms Bsf Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class D commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2005-CKI1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.  In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on class
E from the same transaction.

S&P's rating actions follow its analysis of the transaction,
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions, which included a review of the credit characteristics
and performance of the remaining assets in the pool, the
transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P said, "We raised our rating on class D to reflect our
expectation of the available credit enhancement for this class,
which we believe is greater than our most recent estimate of
necessary credit enhancement for the rating level, our views
regarding the collateral's current and future performance, and the
significantly lower trust balance.

"The affirmation on class E reflects our expectation that the
available credit enhancement for this class will be within our
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating and our views regarding the collateral's current and
future performance."

While available credit enhancement levels suggest further positive
rating movement on class D and positive rating movement on class E,
S&P's analysis also considered the susceptibility to reduced
liquidity support from the three specially serviced assets ($56.7
million, 61.7%), as well as the loan ($12.9 million, 14.0%) on the
master servicer's watchlist.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 12, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balancewas $92.0 million, which is 3.0% of the pool balance at
issuance. The pool currently includes three loans and two real
estate owned (REO) assets, down from 169 loans at issuance. Three
of these assets are with the special servicer, one loan is on the
master servicer's watchlist, and there are no defeased loans. The
master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported year-end 2016
financial information for 42.2% of the loans in the pool.

Excluding the three specially serviced assets, we calculated a
1.07x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt service coverage
(DSC) and 95.6% S&P Global Ratings weighted average loan-to-value
ratio using a 7.93% S&P Global Ratings weighted average
capitalization rate for the two performing loans.

To date, the transaction has experienced $162.8 million in
principal losses, or 5.3% of the original pool trust balance. S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 6.4% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses we expect upon the eventual resolution of the
three specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the May 12, 2017, trustee remittance report, three assets in
the pool was with the special servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC
(C-III). Details of the specially serviced assets are as follows:

The EDS Portfolio REO asset ($39.8 million, 43.3%) is the largest
asset in the pool and has a total reported exposure of $40.1
million. The assets are three office properties totaling 353,842
sq. ft. in various states. The loan was transferred to special
servicing on June 26, 2015, due to imminent monetary default and
the properties became REO on Nov. 9, 2016. The reported cash flows
on the properties are not sufficient to cover debt service. S&P
expects a significant loss upon this asset's eventual resolution.

The Orchard Hardware Plaza REO asset ($13.3 million, 14.5%) is the
third-largest asset in the pool and has a total reported exposure
of $19.6 million. The asset is a 145,957-sq.-ft. retail property in
Rancho Cucamonga, Calif. The loan was transferred to the special
servicer on Sept. 14, 2012, and the property became REO on April
15, 2013. C-III indicated the property has stabilized and is being
marketed for sale. S&P expects a minimal loss upon the asset's
eventual resolution.

The Waterfall Plaza loan ($3.6 million, 3.9%) has a total reported
exposure of$3.7 million. The loan, which has a foreclosure in
process payment status, is secured by a 42,728-sq.-ft. retail
property in Waterford, Mich. The loan was transferred to the
special servicer on Aug. 12, 2015, due to maturity default.

The loan matured on Aug. 1, 2015. C-III indicated that the borrower
has continued to make its monthly debt service and escrow payments.
The reported DSC and occupancy as of year-end 2016 were 1.65x and
69.7%, respectively. S&P expects a minimal loss upon this loan's
eventual resolution.

S&P estimated losses for the three specially serviced assets,
arriving at a weighted average loss severity of 57.2%.

For the specially serviced assets noted above, a minimal loss is
less than 25%, a moderate loss is 26%-59%, and a significant loss
is 60% or greater.

RATINGS LIST

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2005-CKI1 Commercial mortgage pass
through certificates series 2005-CKI1

                                  Rating      Rating
Class       Identifier            To          From              
D           59022HLN0             AA- (sf)    BBB- (sf)         
E           59022HLP5             B (sf)      B (sf)  


METROPOLITAN ASSET 1998-A: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Debt Rating to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Cl. X from
Metropolitan 1998-A. The transaction is backed by subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Metropolitan Asset Funding, Inc. II Series, 1998-A

X, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2014 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade reflects the highest current tranche rating on
the outstanding bond that is backed by the pool and the rating
corresponding to the pool's expected loss. The action reflects the
recent performance of the underlying pool and Moody's updated loss
expectation on the pool.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities"
published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment (RFC), in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its cross-sector rating methodology for
rating structured finance IO securities. Please refer to Moody's
RFC titled "Moody's Proposes Revised Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities " for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


MJX VENTURE II: Moody's Assigns Ba1(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by MJX Venture Management II LLC.

Moody's rating action is:

US$19,200,000 Series A/Class A Notes due 2030 (the "Class A
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$3,600,000 Series A/Class B Notes due 2030 (the "Class B Notes"),
Assigned Aa1 (sf)

US$1,525,000 Series A/Class C Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"),
Assigned Aa3 (sf)

US$1,800,000 Series A/Class D Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"),
Assigned A3 (sf)

US$1,475,000 Series A/Class E Notes due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"),
Assigned Ba1 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes," and together with three unrated supplemental payment notes,
are the "Series A Debt." The Series A Debt is the first series of
issuance in a program of financing for CLOs to be managed by the
Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the credit risks of the
collateral assets securing the notes, the Issuer's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the Issuer's assets.

MJX VM II is the collateral manager of Venture XXVII CLO, Limited
(the "Underlying CLO"). The proceeds from the issuance of the Rated
Notes will be used to finance the purchase of a 5% vertical slice
of all the CLO tranches (the "Underlying CLO Notes") issued by the
Underlying CLO, in order for the Issuer to comply with the
retention requirements of both the US and EU Risk Retention Rules.

MJX VM II also acts as "originator" (as defined in the EU Risk
Retention Rules) of a part of the assets of the Underlying CLO (the
"Originated Assets"). As a result, MJX VM II is exposed to
potential credit and market value risk of the Originated Assets
during a holding period from the time the Issuer purchases the
Originated Assets in the market by until the Originated Assets are
sold from the Issuer to the Underlying CLO. To mitigate these
risks, the Issuer incorporates (i) a substantial cash reserve in an
escrow account to cover any potential losses during the holding
period and until the Originated Assets settle into the CLO and (ii)
minimum industry diversity and rating requirements for the
Originated Assets.

The Rated Notes are collateralized primarily by the Underlying CLO
Notes. In addition, the Rated Notes benefit from additional credit
enhancement provided by (i) 50% of the senior management fees from
the Underlying CLO (the "Pledged Management Fee"), (ii) an
unconditional guaranty provided by MJX Asset Management LLC, the
indirect parent of the Issuer, up to 10% of the initial aggregate
principal amount of the Series A Debt, and, (iii) in the event the
Rated Notes experience a default, certain excess collections from
other, non-defaulted Series of notes issued by the Issuer.

On each payment date, each class of Rated Notes will receive an
interest payment equal to 5% of the interest payment paid to the
entire class of the related Underlying CLO Notes. In the event of a
permitted refinancing or re-pricing, the respective interest amount
each class of Rated Notes receives will be reduced by the amount
the respective refinancing or re-pricing reduced the interest rates
on the Underlying CLO Notes.

The Issuer's priority of payments includes an interest trapping
mechanism following the occurrence of certain events (the
"Cash-Trap Events"). Upon a Cash-Trap Event, after payment of
interest on the Rated Notes, all remaining interest proceeds from
the Underlying CLO Notes and the Pledged Management Fee will be
trapped in a cash-trap account. Cash-Trap Events include, but are
not limited to, failure of an overcollateralization test, deferral
of interest on certain Underlying CLO Notes, and certain collateral
manager-related events. Unless the Cash-Trap Event is cured,
amounts in the cash-trap account will be applied to repay the Rated
Notes at maturity or redemption.

Although the Rated Notes constitute full recourse indebtedness of
the Issuer, the holders of the Rated Notes have no right to
foreclose upon the assets of the Issuer's other Series and have
limited rights to assets constituting excess collections from other
Series. Holders of other Series of Debt of the Issuer are likewise
precluded from foreclosing on the assets of the Series A Debt and
are limited in their rights to excess collections from the Series A
Debt.

In addition to a variety of other factors, Moody's analysis of the
Issuer's bankruptcy remoteness took into account a substantive
consolidation legal opinion. The opinion provided comfort that the
Issuer's structure and separateness features minimize the risk that
a bankruptcy court would order the consolidation of the assets and
liabilities of Issuer's parent or the guarantor and the Issuer.

Moody's modeled the Rated Notes using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions (based on the Underlying CLO) :

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2925

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
Underlying CLO, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the Underlying CLO will also affect the performance
of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2925 to 3364)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: 0

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2925 to 3803)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -3

Class D Notes: -4

Class E Notes: -1


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-TOP11: S&P Hikes Class H Debt Rating From BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on two classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2003-TOP11, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction.

The upgrades follow S&P's analysis of the transaction, primarily
using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions,
which included a review of the credit characteristics and
performance of the remaining loans in the pool, the transaction's
structure, and the liquidity available to the trust.

S&P said, "We raised our ratings on classes G and H to also reflect
our expectation of the available credit enhancement for these
classes, which we believe is greater than our most recent estimate
of necessary credit enhancement for the respective rating levels.
The upgrades also follow our views regarding the current and future
performance of the transaction's collateral, the reduced trust
balance, and the bonds' interest shortfall histories."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the May 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $16.8 million, which is 1.4% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes 18 loans, down from 185
loans at issuance. Four of these loans ($2.9 million, 17.1%) are
defeased, three loans ($2.3 million, 13.9%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist, and none are specially serviced.  The  master
servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported year-end 2016 financial
information for 97.5% of the nondefeased loans in the pool.

S&P said, "We calculated a 1.93x S&P Global Ratings weighted
average debt service coverage (DSC) and 25.8% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.39% S&P Global
Ratings weighted average capitalization rate. The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the defeased loans. The
top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool trust
balance of $13.0 million (77.4%). Using adjusted servicer-reported
numbers, we calculated an S&P Global Ratings weighted average DSC
and LTV of 1.96x and 27.2%, respectively, for the top 10
nondefeased loans."

To date, the transaction has experienced $21.9 million in principal
losses, or1.8% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-TOP11

Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2003-TOP 11

                                   Rating                          
    
Class             Identifier       To                  From        
    
G                 61746WJ27        AA+ (sf)            AA (sf)     
    
H                 61746WJ35        AA (sf)             BB+ (sf)


MORGAN STANLEY 2006-TOP23: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two classes and affirmed 10 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust (MSCI) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-TOP23.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Downgrades to the distressed classes F and G reflect the likelihood
of losses from two REO assets. The affirmations reflect the pool
concentration and the collateral quality of the remaining loans.
Fitch modeled losses of 38.5% of the remaining pool; expected
losses on the original pool balance total 4.3%, including $32.3
million (2% of the original pool balance) in realized losses to
date. As of the May 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 94.1% to $95.7 million from
$1.61 billion at issuance. No loans are defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting classes G through P.

Pool Concentration and Adverse Selection: The pool is concentrated
with only 13 loans, two REO assets and one specially serviced loan
remaining. Loans secured by retail properties account for 54% of
the pool. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, the ratings
reflect a sensitivity analysis which grouped the remaining loans
based on structural features, collateral quality and performance,
as well as by the perceived likelihood of repayment.

Specially Serviced Assets; Fitch Loans of Concern: The specially
serviced assets account for 27% of the pool. Offers have been
approved for both REO assets and foreclosure is expected for the
one specially serviced loan. There are seven loans (60%) that are
Fitch Loans of Concern, including the largest loan (21.9%).

Loan Maturities; ARD Loans: Of the performing loans, one loan
(3.6%) matures in 2019 and eight loans (29.8%) mature in 2021.
There are four ARD loans (39.3%), two of which are being cash
managed as they are past their anticipated repayment date (ARD) of
June 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes C and D reflect the increasing
credit enhancement, continued amortization, and expected continued
paydown of the pool. Upgrades to these are unlikely due to the
pool's significant concentration and the quality of the remaining
collateral; however, downgrades could occur if losses on the
specially serviced loans/assets exceed Fitch's expectations, if
pool performance deteriorates, or if loans default at maturity.
Distressed classes may be subject to further downgrades as
additional losses are realized or if losses exceed Fitch's
expectations.

Fitch downgrades the following classes:

-- $12.1 million class F to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $14.1 million class G to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises the Rating Outlooks
as indicated:

-- $14.9 million class C at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Positive.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $26.2 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14.1 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;
-- $10.1 million class H at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $4 million class J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $15,554 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-M, A-J and B certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-IQ16: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 20 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust (MSC 2007-IQ16) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates
series 2007-IQ16.

Fitch has issued a focus report on this transaction. The report
provides a detailed and up-to-date perspective on key credit
characteristics of the MSC 2007-IQ16 transaction and property-level
performance of the related trust loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement relative to
Fitch expected losses. As of the May 2017 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by 57.8% to
$1.1 billion from $2.6 billion at issuance.

Stable Loss Projections: Fitch modeled losses of 12.6% of the
original pool balance, including $217.7 million (8.4%) of losses
incurred to date. This is a slight decrease from the previous
rating action in June 2016, when loss expectations of the original
pool balance were 12.8%.

Upcoming Loan Maturities: The vast majority of the pool is
scheduled to mature by year-end (YE) 2017. Maturities are
concentrated in the fourth quarter with 53% of the pool scheduled
to mature. Given the peak vintage issuance for these loans, lack of
amortization (44% of the pool is interest-only) and weak credit
metrics for a portion of the pool (20% of the pool reports a debt
service coverage ratio [DSCR] below 1.0x), Fitch expects an
increase in maturity defaults and additional transfers to special
servicing in 2017.

High Retail Concentration and Tertiary Mall Exposure: Loans backed
by retail properties represent 50% of the pool, including five
within the top 15. Two loans (27%) are secured by regional malls in
tertiary markets. Both malls have exposure to Sears and JCPenney.
In particular, Bangor Mall has exposure to both anchors as
collateral tenants and announced the closure of Macy's in early
2017. Both malls are sponsored by Simon. The pool also has a loan
(1.1%) secured by a portfolio of three retail properties occupied
by Sears in California that has passed its ARD date.

Defeasance: Twelve assets representing 8.4% of the pool are
currently defeased, including two within the top 15.

Specially Serviced Assets: There are 10 loans in special servicing,
representing 6.5% of the pool, seven of which are real estate owned
(REO) or in foreclosure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Stable Outlooks reflect sufficient credit enhancement and continued
paydown from maturing loans. Upgrades to the A-M classes may be
warranted should loans successfully refinance and loans in special
servicing resolve with better than anticipated recoveries.
Downgrades to the distressed classes will occur as losses are
realized.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

-- $76.9 million class A-1A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $458.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $194.7 million class A-M at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20 million class A-MFL at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44.9 million class A-MA at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $131 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $30 million class A-JFX at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;
-- $33.7 million class A-JA at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%.
-- $19.5 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $26 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $16.2 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $38.5 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $6.2 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch does not rate the class O, P, Q and S certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class X-1,
X-2, and A-JFL certificates. Classes A-1, A-2, and A-3 have paid in
full.



MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C33: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on F Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the provisional ratings on the followings
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-C33 (the Certificates) issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2017-C33:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, D, E, F and G have been privately placed. The Classes
X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 44 fixed-rate loans secured by 70
commercial properties. Two of the loans are cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted into a separate crossed group. The DBRS
analysis of this transaction incorporates these loans as a
portfolio, resulting in a modified loan count of 43. The
transaction is a sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit
pool was analyzed to determine the ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured
against the DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their
respective actual constants, there were no loans with a DBRS Term
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a
threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in six loans, representing 21.0%
of the pool, having refinance (Refi) DSCRs below 1.00x.

The pool consists of relatively low-leverage financing, with a DBRS
Debt Yield and DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 9.9% and 11.3%,
respectively. Such figures compare favorably with recently issued
conduit transactions rated by DBRS. In addition, 21 loans,
representing 50.9% of the pool, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of
1.50x. This includes six of the largest ten loans. The pool's
general refinance risk is also relatively low as indicated by the
robust DBRS Refi DSCR of 1.15x. Only six loans, representing 21.0%
of the pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs below 1.00x, which is well below
recent conduit pools rated by DBRS. There are no shadow-rated loans
skewing such metrics.

Six loans, comprising 17.5% of the transaction balance, are secured
by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to a single
tenant. This includes four of the largest 15 loans: Pentagon
Center, 141 Fifth Avenue, Ralph's Food Warehouse Portfolio and 935
First Avenue. Of note, Ralph's Food Warehouse Portfolio, which
totals 2.4% of the pool, is located in tertiary areas across Puerto
Rico, which filed for a form of bankruptcy protection on May 3,
2017, and is 78.1% owner occupied. Loans secured by properties
occupied by single tenants have been found to suffer higher loss
severities in an event of default. However, approximately 68.1% of
the single-tenant concentration stems from properties occupied by
investment-grade tenants with significant capital invested into
their space. Pentagon Center is fully occupied by the Department of
Defense, which recently relocated 1,800 employees to the subject.
It is a low-leveraged loan as indicated by the DBRS Debt Yield of
10.0% with a moderate loan per square foot of $230, which is well
below recent sales prices in its market. The second-largest loan
contributing to the pool's single-tenant concentration is 141 Fifth
Avenue, which has an excellent location in Manhattan's Flatiron
District. Its sole occupant is HSBC, which currently pays a
below-market rental rate. Both loans are well structured with cash
flow sweeps tied to tenant renewals.

DBRS considers the macro-economic risk associated with the Ralph's
Food Warehouse Portfolio loan to be relatively moderate given there
is no currency risk in Puerto Rico and the loan is scheduled to
amortize on a 20-year schedule, which will reduce the loan's
exposure by 32.9% upon maturity in 2017. Moreover, the loan has
prudent leverage metrics with a DBRS Refi DSCR and DBRS Exit Debt
Yield of 1.69x and 16.6%, respectively. Six loans, representing
26.6% of the pool, including four of the largest ten loans, are
structured with interest-only (IO) payments for the full term. An
additional 17 loans, representing 45.4% of the pool, have partial
IO periods remaining ranging from 12 months to 60 months. Four of
the full-term IO loans, representing 70.1% of the full IO
concentration in the transaction, are located in urban markets. Of
these, three loans, totaling 38.0% concentration, have excellent
locations in immensely infill Super Dense Urban markets that
benefit from steep investor demand.

The DBRS sample included 27 of the 42 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 49 of the 70 properties in the
portfolio (81.7% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -8.4% and ranged from -19.6%
to +2.1% (Chicago Crossed Loans).

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-H1: DBRS Assigns B Ratings to Cl. H-RR Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the followings classes
of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-H1
(the Certificates), to be issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
2017-H1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E-RR at BBB (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class H-RR at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes X-D, D, E-RR, F-RR, G-RR and H-RR will be privately placed.
The Class X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional. Classes E-RR,
F-RR, G-RR, H-RR and J-RR (collectively, the HRR Certificates
(Eligible Horizontal Residual Interest)) will be retained by the
retaining sponsor or its majority-owned affiliate in accordance
with the credit risk retention rules applicable to this
securitization transaction.

The collateral consists of 58 fixed-rate loans secured by 89
commercial and multifamily properties. Two of the loans are
cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted into a separate crossed
group. The DBRS analysis of this transaction incorporates these
loans into a portfolio, resulting in a modified loan count of 57,
and the loan number references within this report reflect this
total. The transaction is a sequential-pay pass-through structure.
The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional ratings,
reflecting the long-term probability of loan default within the
term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off loan balances
were measured against the DBRS Stabilized net cash flow (NCF) and
their respective actual constants, one loan, representing 0.8% of
the aggregate pool balance, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a
higher likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess
refinance risk given the current low interest rate environment,
DBRS applied its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This
resulted in 23 loans, representing 48.9% of the pool, having
refinance DSCRs below 1.00x and 14 loans, representing 35.1% of the
pool with refinance DSCRs below 0.90x.

Overall, the pool exhibits a relatively strong DBRS
weighted-average (WA) Term DSCR of 1.59x based on the whole-loan
balance, which indicates moderate term default risk, and there are
no shadow-rated loans skewing such metrics. Furthermore, only three
loans, representing 11.1% of the pool, are secured by properties
that either fully or primarily leased to a single tenant. Loans
secured by properties occupied by single tenants have been found to
suffer from higher loss severities in the event of default. As
such, DBRS modeled single-tenant properties with a higher
probability of default (POD) and cash flow volatility compared with
multi-tenant properties. The pool is relatively diverse based on
loan size with a concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool
of 33 equal-sized loans. Diversity is further enhanced by seven
loans, representing 19.1% of the pool, that are secured by multiple
properties (39 in total). Increased pool diversity insulates the
higher-rated classes from event risk. Nine loans, representing
30.0% of the pool, are located in urban markets with increased
liquidity that benefit from consistent investor demand, even in
times of stress. Urban markets represented in the deal include New
York City; Seattle, Washington; New Orleans, Louisiana; Austin,
Texas; and Denver, Colorado.

The transaction's WA DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCR is 1.01x,
indicating a higher refinance risk on an overall pool level.
Furthermore, 14 loans, representing 39.6% of the pool, including
six of the largest ten loans, are structured with full-term
interest-only (IO) payments. An additional 18 loans, comprising
28.1% of the pool, have partial IO periods ranging from 17 months
to 60 months. The DBRS Term DSCR is calculated by using the
amortizing debt service obligation and the DBRS Refi DSCR is
calculated considering the balloon balance and lack of amortization
when determining refinance risk. DBRS determines the POD based on
the lower of Term or Refi DSCR; therefore, loans that lack
amortization will be treated more punitively. Five of the full-term
IO loans, representing 40.0% of the full IO concentration in the
transaction, are located in urban markets. Of these, three loans,
totaling 20.4% of the concentration, have excellent locations in
immensely infill Super Dense Urban markets that benefit from steep
investor demand. The deal appears to be concentrated by property
type with 14 loans, representing 40.0% of the pool, secured by
office properties and 12 loans, representing 18.6% of the pool,
secured by 13 hotel properties. Of the office property
concentration, 42.6% of the loans are located in urban markets and
no loans are located in tertiary/rural markets. DBRS cash flow
volatility for hotels, which ultimately determines a loan's POD,
assumes between a 22.4% and 28.4% cash flow decline for a BBB
stress and a 60.2% and 76.4% cash flow decline for a AAA stress. To
further mitigate the more volatile cash flow of hotels, the loans
in the pool secured by hotel properties have a WA DBRS Debt Yield
and DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 10.8% and 12.4%, respectively, which
compare quite favorably with the comparable figures of 8.9% and
9.9%, respectively, for the non-hotel properties in the pool.
Additionally, 50.9% of the hotel concentration is located in urban
markets.

The DBRS sample included 31 of the 57 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 50 of the 89 properties in the
portfolio (72.2% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -8.7%, ranging from -21.4% to
-0.4%. DBRS identified ten loans, representing 23.3% of the pool,
with unfavorable sponsor strength, including two of the top ten
loans. DBRS increased the POD for the loans with identified
sponsorship concerns.

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.


N-STAR REL VIII: Moody's Hikes Class C Notes Rating to B3(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by N-Star REL CDO VIII, Ltd.:

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings on the transaction due to higher
than anticipated recoveries on very high credit-risk collateral
including certain commercial real estate whole loans; resulting in
the amortization of approximately 21.7% of the collateral balance
as of last review. Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the
transaction because its key transaction metrics are commensurate
with existing ratings. The affirmation is the result of Moody's
on-going surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

N-Star REL CDO VIII, Ltd. is currently static cash transaction; the
reinvestment period ended in February 2012; that is backed by a
portfolio of: i) CRE CDOs (10.1% of the collateral pool balance),
ii) whole loans and senior-participations (53.6%); and iii)
mezzanine interests (36.4%). As of the trustee's 01 May, 2017
report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction, including
preferred shares, is $460.7 million, compared to $900.0 million at
issuance, with paydowns directed to the senior-most outstanding
class of notes and resulting from regular amortization and
recoveries on defaulted assets. The reduction in note balance is
also due to prior partial junior note cancellations of Class G and
J, which occurred prior to this review. In general, holding all key
parameters static, the junior note cancellations result in slightly
higher expected losses and longer weighted average lives on the
senior notes, while producing slightly lower expected losses on the
mezzanine and junior notes. However, this does not cause, in and of
itself, a downgrade or upgrade on any outstanding class of notes.

The pool contains one commercial real estate whole loan asset
totaling $29.7 million (7.8% of the collateral pool balance) that
is listed as defaulted securities as of the trustee's May 01, 2017
report. While there have been limited losses on the underlying
collateral to date, Moody's does expect moderate losses to occur on
the defaulted security.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
8932, compared to 8256 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Ba1-Ba3 (2.0%, compared to 1.2% at last
review); B1-B3 (1.0%, compared to 0.6% at last review); and
Caa1-Ca/C (96.9%, compared to 98.1% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 4.4 years, as compared to 5.0 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 28.4%, as compared to 28.3% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, same as that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because it
is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which
in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are subject
to change. The servicing decisions of the master and special
servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with respect to
the collateral interests and oversight of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of the
key parameters could have rating implications for some of the rated
notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption could be
offset by a change in one or more of the other key parameter
assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive to changes
in the recovery rates of the underlying collateral and credit
assessments. Reducing the recovery rates of 100% of the collateral
pool by -10.0% would result in an average modeled rating movement
on the rated notes of zero to eleven notches downward (e.g., one
notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing
the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by +10.0% would
result in an average modeled rating movement on the rated notes of
zero to fourteen notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies a
ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given the
weak recovery and certain commercial real estate property markets.

Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a euro area
recession abate.


NATIONSTAR HECM 2017-1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Cl. M2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to three
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2017-1 (NHLT 2017-1). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to Ba2 (sf). The definitive ratings on Class M1 and
Class M2 are higher than for the provisional ratings assigned due
to the reduced coupon on the notes by 0.43% for Class A, 0.56% for
Class M1, and 1.30% for Class M2. Overall, the weighted average
coupon on the notes is lower by 0.55%. Given the available funds
waterfall, the lower coupon will allow for a faster pay-down of
principal on the notes.

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 1,283 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages (HECMs) and 229 real estate owned
(REO) properties. The servicer for the deal is Nationstar Mortgage
LLC.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2017-1

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. M1, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2017-1 consists
of first-lien inactive HECMs covered by Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) insurance secured by properties in the US
along with Real-Estate Owned (REO) properties acquired through
conversion of ownership of reverse mortgage loans that are covered
by FHA insurance. Nationstar acquired the mortgage assets from
Ginnie Mae sponsored HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations.
All of the mortgage assets are covered by FHA insurance for the
repayment of principal up to certain amounts. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, sale of the property is used to recover the amount owed.

There are 1,512 mortgage assets with a balance of $324,518,063.
Mortgage assets are in either default, due and payable, referred,
foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default may move to
due and payable; due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and
foreclosure loans may move to REO. 28.90% of mortgage assets are in
default, of which 3.35% (of total pool) are in default due to
non-occupancy, 25.37% (of total pool) are in default due to taxes
and insurance and 0.18% (of total pool) are in default for other
reasons. 14.45% of the mortgage assets are due and payable. 1.70%
of the mortgage assets are referred loans. 41.93% of the mortgage
assets are in foreclosure. Finally, 13.01% of the mortgage assets
are REO properties and were acquired through foreclosure or
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure on the associated loan. The pool
includes 1,283 loans with an aggregate balance of approximately
$282,288,943 and 229 REO properties with an aggregate balance of
approximately $42,229,120. If the value of the related mortgaged
property is greater than the loan amount, some of these loans may
be settled by the borrower or their estate.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst
three classes of notes with overcollateralization and structural
subordination. All funds collected, prior to an acceleration event,
are used to make interest payments to the notes, then principal
payments to the Class A notes, then to a redemption account until
the amount on deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to
cover future principal and interest payments for the subordinate
notes up to their expected final payment dates. The subordinate
notes will not receive principal until the beginning of their
respective target amortization periods (in the absence of an
acceleration event). The notes benefit from overcollateralization
and structural subordination as credit enhancement, and an interest
reserve account funded with cash received from the initial
purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in May 2019. For the Class M1
notes, the expected final payment date is in November 2019.
Finally, for the Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is
in May 2020. For each of the subordinate notes, there are six month
target amortization periods that conclude on the respective
expected final payment dates. The legal final maturity of the
transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve fund may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer. However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar. The review focused on
data integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification, accuracy of
appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status recording,
borrower age documentation, identification of excessive corporate
advances, documentation of servicer advances, and identification of
tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions
(BPOs) were ordered for 253 properties in the pool.

The results of the third-party review (TPR) are comparable to that
of NHLT 2016-3 and NHLT 2016-2, indicating a number of exceptions
related to the accuracy of appraisal information, and corporate
advances exceeding FHA reimbursement thresholds or missing invoices
or necessary information. NHLT 2017-1's TPR results showed a 3.25%
initial-tape exception rate related to valuation, a 8.71%
initial-tape exception rate related to property inspection, a
15.02% initial-tape exception rate related to foreclosure and
bankruptcy fees, and a 11.25% initial-tape exception rate related
to tax liens. This compares to 5.95%, 26.77%, 12.50%, and 34.15%
initial-tape exception rate for NHLT 2016-3 in these categories
respectively.

The scope of the review was broader than for previously rated NHLT
transactions. In particular, the TPR firm conducted an extensive
data integrity review. Certain data tape fields, such as the MIP
rate, the current UPB, current interest rate, and marketable title
date were reviewed against Nationstar's servicing system. However,
a significant number of data tape fields were reviewed against
imaged copies of original documents of record, screen shots of
HUD's HERMIT system, or HUD documents. Some key fields reviewed in
this manner included the original note rate, the debenture rate,
foreclosure first legal date, and the called due date. This type of
review provides for the highest level of certainty in data
quality.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider and is rated B2 (Stable)
and thus relatively weak from a credit perspective. Given the
nascent nature of their securitization program, Moody's has limited
insight as to their ability to serve in this capacity. This risk is
mitigated by the fact that Nationstar is the equity holder in the
transaction and there is therefore a significant alignment of
interests. Another factor mitigating this risk is that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect. Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is qualified and is made only as to the
initial mortgage loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar
does not provide any other R&W in connection with the origination
of the mortgage loans, including whether the mortgage loans were
originated in compliance with applicable federal, state and local
laws.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, Nationstar has to cure
the breach. If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification. Moody's believes the absence of an independent third
party reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2017-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank National
Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also serve as the
claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD mortgagee of
record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from Moody's original expectations resulting in
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and faster
property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from Moody's original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-performing and Re-Performing
Loans," published in August 2016 and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations," published in May 2015.

Our quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan modeling
of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA insurance and
with various stresses applied to model parameters depending on the
target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than its appraised value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
it. ABCs are filed six months after the servicer has obtained
marketable title if the property has not yet been sold. For an SBC,
HUD insurance will cover the difference between (i) the loan
balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price and 95.0% of the
latest appraisal, with the transaction on the hook for losses if
the sales price is lower than 95.0% of the latest appraisal. For an
ABC, HUD only covers the difference between the loan amount and
100% of appraised value, so failure to sell the property at the
appraised value results in loss.

Moody's expects ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Moody's base case expectation is that properties will
be sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. This is
based on the historical experience of Nationstar. Moody's stressed
these losses at higher credit rating levels.

In Moody's asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed these losses at higher rating
levels.

Under Moody's analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go
through both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability.
Each loan will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. Based on the historical experience of
Nationstar, for the base case scenario Moody's assumed that 85% of
claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs. Moody's stressed
this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher
rating levels.

Liquidation process: each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In
Moody's analysis, Moody's assume loans that are in referred status
to be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed
to move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to twelve
months depending on the default reason. Foreclosure status is based
on the state in which that the related property is located and is
further stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and twelve
months with respect to ABCs.

Debenture interest: the receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment.
Moody's base case assumption is that 95.0% of debenture interest
will be received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of
debenture interest that will be received at higher rating levels.
Moody's debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that
Nationstar (B2, Stable) reimburse the trust for debenture interest
curtailments due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD
guidelines.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into Moody's analysis, including the following:

* In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in Moody's analysis. However, for seasoned
appraisals Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential
home price depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the
cut-off date.

* Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in
their homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their
heirs rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's
estimated which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing
each loans' appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB.

* Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

* Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where Nationstar is no longer the
servicer. Moody's assume the following in the situation where
Nationstar is no longer the servicer:

* Servicing advances and servicing fees: Nationstar subordinates
their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing fees, and MIP
payments. A replacement servicer will not subordinate these
amounts.

* Nationstar indemnifies the trust for lost debenture interest due
to servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD guidelines. If
Nationstar went bankrupt it likely will not have the financial
capacity to do this.

* A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assume a 25 bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

* One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse a replacement servicer (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500.


NCMS 2017-75B: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on 3 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to NCMS 2017-75B's $143.0
million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2017-75B.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a $143.0 million portion of a whole loan with
an aggregate cut-off date principal balance of $230.0 million.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

NCMS 2017-75B  

Class       Rating            Amount (mil. $)
A           AAA (sf)               56,997,000
X-A         AAA (sf)               56,997,000(i)
X-B         A- (sf)                37,764,000(i)
B           AA- (sf)               21,100,000
C           A- (sf)                16,664,000
D           BBB- (sf)              20,442,000
E           BB- (sf)               27,797,000
V1-A(ii)    AAA (sf)               56,997,000
V1-XB(ii)   A- (sf)                37,764,000(i)
V1-B(ii)    AA- (sf)               21,100,000
V1-C(ii)    A- (sf)                16,664,000
V1-D(ii)    BBB- (sf)              20,442,000
V1-E(ii)    BB- (sf)               27,797,000
V2(ii)      BB- (sf)              143,000,000

(i)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-A and X-B
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of realized
losses allocated to the class A certificates.  The notional amount
of the class X-B certificates will be reduced by the aggregate
amount of realized losses allocated to the class B and C
certificates.  
(ii)Exchangeable classes, all of which will have a $0 balance at
issuance.  The dollar amount shown represents the maximum balance
of each class if all initial certificates are exchanged.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT XIV: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to the
following notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Octagon
Investment Partners XIV, Ltd.:

US$6,400,000 Class X-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2019,
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$420,500,000 Class A-1a-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$46,200,000 Class A-1b-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$62,700,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$45,300,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$27,860,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$14,000,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 25, 2017 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on December 19, 2012. On the Refinancing Date,
the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes
to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: reinstatement and extension of the
reinvestment period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call
period; changes to certain collateral quality tests; changes to the
overcollateralization test levels; and changes to comply with the
Volcker Rule.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $693,622,628

Defaulted par balance: $6,374,650

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2692

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.5%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or a Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2692 to 3096)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

X-R Notes: 0

A-1a-R Notes: 0

A-1b-R Notes: -1

A-2-R Notes: -2

B-R Notes: -2

C-R Notes: -1

D-R Notes: 0

E-R Notes: -2

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2692 to 3500)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

X-R Notes: 0

A-1a-R Notes: -1

A-1b-R Notes: -3

A-2-R Notes: -3

B-R Notes: -4

C-R Notes: -2

D-R Notes: -1

E-R Notes: -4


OLYMPIC TOWER 2017-OT: Fitch Assigns BB-sf Rating to Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Olympic Tower 2017-OT Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

-- $230,597,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $230,597,000 class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,990,000 class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,990,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,821,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,092,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $104,500,000 class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the following class:
-- $24,000,000b VRR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5.0% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on May 8, 2017, the
notional balance of the interest-only class X-B changed from
$64,811,000 to $35,990,000. As such, the rating for the class
changed from 'A-sf' to 'AA-sf'. The classes above reflect the final
ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial interests in the mortgage
loan, securing the leasehold interests in 388,170 square feet (sf)
of office space and 36,556 sf of retail space within 21 stories of
a 52-story mixed use building known as Olympic Tower, two adjoining
buildings totaling 75,000 sf of ground and upper level retail
space, and a 25,646 sf, seven-story mixed use building located at
641, 647, and 651 Fifth Avenue, and 10 East 52nd Street in New
York, NY. Proceeds of the loan were used to refinance existing
debt, fund up-front reserves, pay closing costs, and return equity
to the borrower. The certificates will follow a sequential-pay
structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Quality Asset in Prime Office and Retail Location: The
property consists of 388,170 sf of class A office space within the
Plaza submarket and 96,899 sf of retail space along Fifth Avenue,
between East 51st and East 52nd Streets in midtown Manhattan. The
retail submarket is a premier shopping district, with some of the
highest asking rents in the world.

Strong Historical Occupancy and Long Term Leases: The property is
currently 98.8% leased and has maintained an average historical
occupancy of 97.2% since 2008. The top five tenants, which account
for 83.2% of the NRA, have a weighted average remaining lease term
of 13.8 years.

Diverse and High Quality Tenant Base: The property is leased to 22
office and retail tenants. It serves as the headquarters' locations
for the NBA, MSD Capital, and Richemont North America and as
flagship locations for Cartier and Versace USA. The property leases
space to other luxury retailers including Furla, Armani, and H.
Stern.

Below-Market Retail Rents: In-place rents for the retail space that
expires during the loan term are approximately 23% below-market
rents as determined by the appraisal.

Fitch Leverage: The $760.0 million mortgage loan has a Fitch DSCR
and LTV of 1.05x and 83.6%, respectively, and debt of $1,447 psf.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch performed a break-even analysis to determine the amount of
value deterioration the pool could withstand prior to $1 of loss on
the total debt and 'AAAsf' rated class. The break-even value
declines were performed using both the appraisal values at issuance
and the Fitch-stressed value.

Based on the as-is appraisal value of $1.9 billion, break-even
values represent declines of 60.0% and 76.4% for the total debt and
'AAAsf' class, respectively.

Similarly, Fitch estimated total debt and 'AAAsf' break-even value
declines using the Fitch-adjusted property value of $909.5 million,
which is a function of the Fitch NCF and a stressed capitalization
rate, in relation to the appropriate class balances. The break-even
value declines relative to the total debt and 'AAAsf' balances are
16.4% and 50.7%, respectively, which correspond to equivalent
declines to Fitch NCF, as the Fitch capitalization rate is held
constant.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A and
found that a 7% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 31% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade.




PALMER SQUARE 2015-1: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Cl. D-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the class A-1-R, A-2-R,
B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Palmer Square CLO 2015-1
Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in
2015 that is managed by Palmer Square Capital Management LLC.  S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D
notes following payment in full on the May 22, 2017, refinancing
date.

On the May 22, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement note issuances were
used to redeem the original class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes as
outlined in the transaction document provisions.  Therefore, S&P
withdrew its ratings on the original notes in line with their full
redemption, and S&P is assigning ratings to the replacement notes.

S&P's review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance.  In line with S&P's
criteria, its cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios.  In addition, S&P's analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

The assigned ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 Ltd. (Refinancing And Extension)
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             457.00
A-2-R                     AA (sf)               84.20
B-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                56.50
C-R (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              36.10
D-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              33.10
Subordinated notes        NR                    76.40

RATINGS WITHDRAWN

Palmer Square CLO 2015-1 Ltd.
                         Rating
Original Class    To               From
A-1               NR               AAA (sf)
A-2               NR               AA (sf)
B                 NR               A (sf)
C                 NR               BBB (sf)
D                 NR               BB- (sf)

NR--Not rated.


PREFERREDPLUS TRUST CZN-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on $34MM Certs to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of the following certificates issued by PREFERREDPLUS Trust
Series CZN-1:

  $34,500,000 PREFERREDPLUS Trust Series CZN-1 Certificates,
  Downgraded to B2; previously on November 10, 2016
  Downgraded to B1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the change in the rating of 7.05%
Debentures due October 01, 2046 issued by Frontier Communications
Corporation ("Underlying Securities") which was downgraded to B2 on
May 22, 2017.

The transaction is a structured note whose ratings are based on the
rating of the Underlying Securities and the legal structure of the
transaction.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The ratings will be sensitive to any change in the rating of the
7.05% Debentures due October 01, 2046 issued by Frontier
Communications Corporation.


RAIT TRUST 2015-FL4: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class F Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
notes issued by RAIT 2015-FL4 Trust:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class X-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

DBRS has changed the trend on Class B to Positive from Stable. All
other trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class G.

The rating confirmations and trend change reflect the stable
overall performance of the pool and the successful repayment of
loans from the transaction. The transaction currently consists of
12 interest-only, floating-rate loans secured by 16 transitional
commercial real estate assets, including office, retail, industrial
and multifamily properties. According to the April 2017 remittance,
there has been collateral reduction of 39.5% since issuance, as
eight loans have left the trust since issuance, contributing to a
principal paydown of $88.2 million. In the last 12 months, six
loans have left the trust, providing increased credit support to
the bonds. Based on YE2016 financial reporting for the individual
loans, the pool has a weighted-average debt yield of 8.5%.

According to the April 2017 remittance, there are currently no
loans on the servicer's watchlist nor any delinquent or specially
serviced loans. All the properties securing the loans are
cash-flowing assets, and a majority of the properties are
approaching stabilization, with viable plans in place to improve
asset value. Select loans were initially funded with reserves,
which may have included funds for capital improvements, tenant
inducements, leasing commissions and operating shortfalls. In both
its initial transaction analysis and in this review, DBRS took into
account the potential effects of the in-place reserves. The largest
loan is highlighted below.

The Monarch Portfolio loan (22.3% of the current pool balance) is
secured by three retail properties across Georgia, and two ground
leases totalling 466,906 square feet (sf), built between 1983 and
1989. At issuance, loan proceeds were used to fund upfront
reserves, including approximately $4.4 million for TI/LCs to
facilitate leasing at the subject. According to the March 2017 rent
roll, the portfolio was 77.4% occupied with an average rental rate
of $9.70 psf, showing steady improvement since issuance, when the
occupancy rate was 71.3% with an average rental rate of $7.42 psf.
The largest three tenants collectively represent 32.5% of the net
rentable area (NRA) with leases scheduled to expire between
February 2021 and June 2032. The largest tenant, Kroger, 13.7% of
the NRA, renewed its lease by five years in March 2016, and the
borrower executed a new 15-year lease with Zion Market for 11.0% of
the NRA commencing in June 2017. Zion Market will pay a base rental
rate of approximately $8.00 psf. According to the March 2017
servicer update, The Checkers pad and the Zion parcel paid off as a
partial release, which has been reflected in the April 2017
remittance report, as the principal balance has been reduced by
approximately $800,000 following the release. According to Reis,
retail properties in the NE Gwinnet/I-85 submarket built in the
1980s reported average asking rent of $16.10 psf with average
vacancy of 19.6%. Overall, retail properties throughout the
submarket reported average rent of $17.73 psf with average vacancy
of 12.7%

According to the April 2017 loan level reserve report,
approximately $1.0 million of the TI/LC reserve balance has been
used, with an ending balance $3.4 million. Based on the current
vacancy across the property, this computes to over $30 psf in
available dollars to lease the property to a stabilized occupancy
rate. According to the YE2016 financials, the net cash flow was
$2.3 million, indicative of a 7.7% debt yield.

The ratings assigned to the Class B and C notes materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviations are warranted given the
undemonstrated sustainability of loan performance trends.


REALT 2015-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-1 issued
by Real Estate Liquidity Trust (REALT), Series 2015-1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable. DBRS does not rate the first loss piece,
Class H.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance in May 2015. The transaction
consists of 46 fixed-rate loans secured by 46 commercial
properties. The pool has experienced a collateral reduction of 5.1%
since issuance as a result of scheduled amortization, with all of
the original 46 loans outstanding. The most recent financials
available at the time of review were YE2015 financials, which
reported a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.64 times (x) and a WA debt yield of 10.8% for the pool. The
DBRS WA DSCR and WA debt yield for the pool at issuance were 1.50x
and 9.3%, respectively.

As of the May 2017 remittance, there was one loan, representing
2.2% of the pool balance, on the servicer's watchlist, and no loans
in special servicing. The York Industrial Leduc loan (Prospectus
ID#15, 2.2% of the current pool) was added to the servicer's
watchlist, as the largest tenant, Raptor Manufacturing, which
occupied 54.5% of the net rentable area at issuance, went bankrupt
and vacated the property. As such, the subject is currently 45.5%
occupied by one tenant on a lease through October 2019.

The U-Haul SAC 3 Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID#35-38, 41-46; 3.7%
of the current pool) is secured by a portfolio of ten individual
loans backed by self-storage properties totalling 4,985 units
across ten different cities in Ontario. At issuance, DBRS
shadow-rated this loan as investment grade. DBRS confirms with this
review that the performance of this loan remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.

The ratings assigned to Class X materially deviate from the lower
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the deviation is warranted on the
notional class, as it is less likely to be adversely affected by
collateral credit losses supported by historical performance of
Canadian CMBS, in which total losses in the sector are less than
0.01% since inception in 1998.


REALT 2016-1: DBRS Confirms B(sf) Rating on Class G Certificates
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings for all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-1 (the
Certificates) issued by Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust (REALT),
Series 2016-1 (the Trust) as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited by the transaction since issuance in 2016. At issuance,
the collateral consisted of 55 fixed-rate loans secured by 91
commercial properties. As of the May 2017 remittance, all loans
remained in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of $391.7
million, representing a collateral reduction of 2.3% due to
scheduled loan amortization. To date, only eight loans (7.7% of the
pool) have reported 2016 net cash flow figures.

The pool is fairly concentrated by property type, as 26 loans
(representing 39.9% of the pool) are secured by retail properties,
11 loans (23.1% of the pool) are secured by multifamily properties,
nine loans (17.6% of the pool) are secured by industrial properties
and five loans (14.7% of the pool) are secured by office
properties; in total representing 95.3% of the pool. By
geographical location, the pool is most concentrated in central
Canada, as the largest concentration by province is Ontario with 34
loans (55.8% of the pool), followed by Québec with eight loans
(17.6% of the pool) and British Columbia with nine loans (10.0% of
the pool). The pool is rather diverse in concentration by loan
size, as the top ten and top 15 loans only represent 43.7% and
56.0% of the pool, respectively. The transaction benefits from 27
loans (50.7% of the pool) having some degree of recourse to their
respective sponsors.

As of the May 2017 remittance, there are no loans on the servicer's
watchlist or in special servicing.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Toronto Congress Centre
(Prospectus ID#2, 5.4% of the pool) as investment grade. DBRS
confirms that the performance of this loan remains consistent with
investment-grade loan characteristics.

The rating assigned to Class X materially deviate from the lower
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology; in this case, the deviation is warranted on the
notional class as it is less likely to be adversely affected by
collateral credit losses supported by historical performance of
Canadian commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), in which
total losses in the sector are less than 0.01% since inception in
1998.


REGATTA IX: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Regatta IX Funding Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$256,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$47,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$18,800,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$24,800,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$20,900,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Regatta IX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of first-lien and last-out, second lien
loans and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 90%
ramped as of the closing date.

Regatta Loan Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2727

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2727 to 3136)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2727 to 3545)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


ROCKWALL CDO II: S&P Puts Cl. B-2L Notes' BB- Rating on Watch Pos.
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on five classes from Rockwall
CDO II Ltd., a U.S. hybrid collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction, on CreditWatch with positive implications. Today's
CreditWatch placements follow our surveillance review of U.S. cash
flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions. The
affected tranches had an original issuance amount of
$293.51 million.

The CreditWatch positive placements resulted from enhanced
overcollateralization due to paydowns to the transaction's senior
tranches.  The transaction closed in 2007 and exited it
reinvestment period in 2014.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements within 90 days
after S&P completes a comprehensive cash flow analysis and
committee review of the affected transaction.  S&P will continue to
monitor the CDO transactions it rates and take rating actions,
including CreditWatch placements, as S&P deems appropriate.

RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

Rockwall CDO II Ltd.

                     Rating
Class       To                    From
A-Lb        AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
A-2L        A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
A-3L        BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
B-1L        BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
B-2L        BB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB- (sf)


SDART 2017-2: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
the notes issued from Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2017-2
(SDART 2017-2):

-- $245,000,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
-- $343,000,000 class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $147,280,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $163,150,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $199,240,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $150,370,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75,190,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Quality: 2017-2 is backed by collateral relatively
consistent with the 2014-2017 pools, with a WA FICO score of 614
and internal weighted average (WA) loss forecast score (LFS) of
555. Obligors with no FICO scores are down from peak levels, but
remain at 12.2% of the pool.

Increased Extended-Term Contracts: The concentration of 73-75-month
loans decreased to 7.7% from 12.3% in 2017-1 (NR), and 60+ month
loans account for 92.7% of the pool, towards the higher end of the
range, historically, for the platform. Consistent with prior
Fitch-rated transactions, an additional stress was applied to the
73-75-month loans when deriving the loss proxy.

Weakening Performance: Although within range of the 2010 - 2012
performance, recent 2013 - 2016 portfolio and securitization losses
are tracking higher. Loss frequency has been driven higher by
looser underwriting, while loss severity has risen due to slightly
weaker wholesale vehicle values and early-stage defaults on
extended term collateral. Fitch expects the 2015 -2016 vintages to
perform relatively in line with 2013-2014, if not weaker.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: The cash flow distribution is a
sequential pay structure. Initial hard credit enhancement (CE)
totals 52.10% for the class A notes, up slightly from recent
transactions. Excess spread is expected to be 9.84% per annum, down
from recent transactions due to the decline in the WA APR.

Stable Corporate Health: Santander Consumer USA Inc.'s recent
financial results have been weaker due to higher losses on the
managed portfolio. However, the company has been profitable since
2007 and Fitch currently rates Santander, SC's majority owner,
'A-'/'F2'/Outlook Stable.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: SC demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer as
evidenced by historical portfolio and securitization performance.
Fitch deems SC capable to service this series.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SC would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case. This in turn could result in Fitch taking
negative rating actions on the notes.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2017-2 to increased credit
losses over the life of the transaction. Fitch's analysis found
that the transaction displays some sensitivity to increased
defaults and credit losses. This shows a potential downgrade of one
or two categories under Fitch's moderate (1.5x base case loss)
scenario, especially for the subordinate bonds. The notes could
experience downgrades of three or more rating categories,
potentially leading to distressed ratings (below 'Bsf') or possibly
default, under Fitch's severe (2x base case loss) scenario.


SDART 2017-2: Fitch to Rate Class E Notes 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Outlooks
to the notes issued from Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust
2017-2 (SDART 2017-2):

-- Class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';
-- Class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Quality: 2017-2 is backed by collateral relatively
consistent with the 2014-2017 pools, with a WA FICO score of 614
and internal weighted average (WA) loss forecast score (LFS) of
555. Obligors with no FICO scores are down from peak levels, but
remain at 12.2% of the pool.

Increased Extended-Term Contracts: The concentration of 73-75-month
loans decreased to 7.6% from 12.3% in 2017-1 (NR), and 60+ month
loans account for 92.7% of the pool, towards the higher end of the
range, historically, for the platform. Consistent with prior
Fitch-rated transactions, an additional stress was applied to the
73-75-month loans when deriving the loss proxy.

Weakening Performance: Although within range of the 2010-2012
performance, recent 2013-2016 portfolio and securitization losses
are tracking higher. Loss frequency has been driven higher by
looser underwriting, while loss severity has risen due to slightly
weaker wholesale vehicle values and early-stage defaults on
extended term collateral. Fitch expects the 2015-2016 vintages to
perform relatively in line with 2013-2014, if not weaker.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: The cash flow distribution is a
sequential pay structure. Initial hard credit enhancement (CE)
totals 52.10% for the class A notes, up slightly from recent
transactions. Excess spread is expected to be 9.48% per annum, down
from recent transactions due to the decline in the WA APR.

Stable Corporate Health: Santander Consumer USA Inc.'s recent
financial results have been weaker due to higher losses on the
managed portfolio. However, the company has been profitable since
2007 and Fitch currently rates Santander, SC's majority owner,
'A-/F2'/Stable.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: SC demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter, and servicer as
evidenced by historical portfolio and securitization performance.
Fitch deems SC capable to service this series.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of SC would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case. This in turn could result in Fitch taking
negative rating actions on the notes.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to
Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2017-2 to increased credit
losses over the life of the transaction. Fitch's analysis found
that the transaction displays some sensitivity to increased
defaults and credit losses. This shows a potential downgrade of one
or two categories under Fitch's moderate (1.5x base case loss)
scenario, especially for the subordinate bonds. The notes could
experience downgrades of three or more rating categories,
potentially leading to distressed ratings (below 'Bsf') or possibly
default, under Fitch's severe (2x base case loss) scenario.


SDART 2017-2: S&P Assigns BB Rating on $75.19MM Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Santander Drive Auto
Receivables Trust (SDART) 2017-2's $1.32 billion automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2017-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

- The availability of 53.90%, 47.08%, 37.74%, 30.55%, and 27.01%
of credit support for the class A (A-1, A-2, A-3), B, C, D, and E
notes, respectively, based on stress cash flow scenarios (including
excess spread), which provide coverage of approximately 3.30x,
2.85x, 2.25x, 1.70x, and 1.50x S&P's 15.75%-16.50% expected
cumulative net loss.

- The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the assigned ratings.

- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.7x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, its ratings
on the class A, B, and C notes ('AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', and 'A
(sf)', respectively) will remain within one rating category, and
our rating on the class D notes ('BBB (sf)') will remain within two
rating categories of the assigned ratings while they are
outstanding. These rating movements are within the outer bounds
specified by S&P's credit stability criteria. These criteria
indicate that S&P would not assign 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' ratings
if, under moderate stress conditions, the ratings would be lowered
by more than one rating category within the first year and by more
than three rating categories over a three-year period. The criteria
also specify that S&P would not assign 'A (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)'
ratings if such ratings would fall by more than two categories in
one year or three categories over three years. The 'BB (sf)' rated
class E notes will remain within two rating categories of the
assigned rating during the first year but will eventually default
under the 'BBB' stress scenario, after having received 88% of their
principal.

- Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC; originator/servicer's) long
history of originating and servicing subprime auto loan
receivables. S&P's analysis of nine years of origination static
pool data on SC's lending programs.

- Six years of performance on SC's securitizations since it
re-entered the asset-backed securities market in 2010.

- The transaction's payment/credit enhancement and legal
structures.

- The inclusion of a representation by the originator that states
the obligor on each receivable has made, or will make, the first
two monthly payments under such receivable.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2017-2

Class    Rating        Type         Interest        Amount
                                     rate          (mil. $)
A-1       A-1+ (sf)    Senior        Fixed           245.00
A-2       AAA (sf)     Senior        Fixed           343.00
A-3       AAA (sf)     Senior        Fixed           147.28
B         AA (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed           163.15
C         A (sf)       Subordinate   Fixed           199.24
D         BBB (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed           150.37
E         BB (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed            75.19


SOUND POINT XVI: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Sound Point CLO XVI, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$520,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$88,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Sound Point CLO XVI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans, senior unsecured loans and first-lien last-out loans.
Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 60% ramped as of
the closing date.

Sound Point Capital Management, LP (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $800,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2600

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2600 to 2990)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2600 to 3380)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


TICP CLO VII: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by TICP CLO VII, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

U$293,500,000 Class A-S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-S Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$36,500,000 Class A-J Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class A-J Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$36,250,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$28,750,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-S Notes, the Class A-J Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, and the
Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

TICP VII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 65% ramped as of the closing date.

TICP CLO VII Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2860

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2860 to 3289)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-S Notes: 0

Class A-J Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -1

Class B-2 Notes: -1

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2860 to 3718)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-S Notes: 0

Class A-J Notes: -3

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


TOWD POINT 2015-2: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Outlooks to
three previously unrated classes from three Towd Point Mortgage
Trust (TPMT) Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS)
transactions issued in 2015:

-- Series 2015-1 class B-1 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-2 class 1-B3 notes 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Series 2015-2 class 2-B3 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch had previously rated the more senior classes from these
transactions at deal close. The transactions are collateralized
with seasoned performing and re-performing residential mortgages.
Both of the transactions have performed well since closing with
many of the rated bonds upgraded or assigned a Positive Rating
Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Performance Better Than Expected (Positive): Serious delinquency
has increased since issuance for each transaction under review to
approximately 6% for TPMT 2015-1 and 3.8% and 1.5% for TPMT 2015-2
groups 1 and 2, respectively. These values are materially lower
than Fitch's base case cumulative lifetime default expectations at
initial rating, which ranged from 20% to 38%. Realized losses have
also been limited with losses as a percentage of original balance
all less than 1%. When losses have been realized, severities have
generally been in line to slightly below Fitch's initial base case
expectations.

Lower Loss Expectations (Positive): Reflecting solid performance,
the expected losses for the underlying pools backing the rated
notes have decreased since issuance. On average the 'Bsf' expected
loss has fallen by 3 to 4 points. The reduced loss expectation is
driven by home price appreciation over the past two years,
continued borrower performance and criteria changes. Since initial
rating Fitch has expanded its application of a seasoned performing
credit for borrower's that have been current for at least three
years. This has led to both a higher credit as well as more
borrowers receiving the benefit as they have continued to perform
since transaction close.

Increased Subordination (Positive): Since the transactions have
closed, the subordination on the newly rated classes listed above
has increased by two to three points on average. The increase in
subordination has been driven by limited losses to date, steady
paydown of the mortgages and the use of excess spread to build up
additional protection to the rated notes.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, loan-level loss severity is less
for these transactions than for those where the servicer is
obligated to advance P&I.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities, which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


TRITON AVIATION: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt to C(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of Class A-1
issued by Triton Aviation Finance.

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Triton Aviation Finance

Class A-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jan 22, 2016
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating action on Class A-1 issued by Triton Aviation
Finance reflects the value of the aircraft backing the deal and
Moody's expectations about future note amortization of Class A-1.
Four aircraft have been sold since August 2016, and the deal has
only one remaining aircraft that Triton Aviation is in the process
of selling. The deal is now receiving minimal cash flows and the
Class A-1 has not received any principal since August 2016.

Using the most recent appraisal value of the remaining aircraft as
a rough proxy for expected Class A-1 Note principal pay down,
Moody's estimated that note holders would recover around 15% of
their notes outstanding. Moody's used appraisal value as of March
2017 and adjusted it down by assuming 10% per annum depreciation.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
To Pooled Aircraft-Backed Securitization' published in March 1999.


On March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for Comment, in which
it has requested market feedback on potential revisions to its
"Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance".
If the revised Methodology is implemented as proposed, the Credit
Ratings on the transaction will be neutral. Please refer to Moody's
Request for Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its
Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance,"
for further details regarding the implications of the proposed
Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

Primary sources of uncertainty include the global economic
environment, aircraft lease income generating ability, aircraft
maintenance and other expenses to the trust, and valuation for the
aircraft backing the transaction.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade of the rating:

Changes to lease rates or aircraft values that differ from
historical and current trends.


UBS COMMERCIAL 2017-C1: Fitch to Rate Class F-RR Notes 'B-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks:

-- $40,505,000 class A-1'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,665,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,548,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $235,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $296,571,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $671,289,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175,015,000b class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95,899,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,551,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,565,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,069,000ab class X-D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,069,000a class D 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,278,000ac class D-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19,179,000ac class E-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,590,000ac class F-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:

-- $33,565,038ac class NR-RR.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity (as of the closing
date).

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 22, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 67 loans secured by 134
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$958,985,038 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by UBS AG, Rialto Mortgage Finance, LLC, Natixis Real
Estate Capital LLC, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Societe
Generale and CIBC Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 65.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 80.9%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Pool Diversity: The largest 10 loans account for 37.8% of the
pool, which is well below the YTD 2017 average of 53.7% for
fixed-rate multiborrower transactions. The transaction exhibits
very low pool concentration, with a loan concentration index (LCI)
of 243, compared to the YTD 2017 average of 399.

Lower Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is lower than recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.23x and 100.3%,
respectively, which are comparable to the YTD 2017 averages of
1.22x and 104.3%. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion loans,
the pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.21x and 103.3%,
respectively, better than the YTD 2017 normalized averages of 1.18x
and 107.4%.

Above-Average Amortization: Eleven loans, representing 29% of the
pool, are full-term interest-only, well below the YTD 2017 average
of 42.9%. Partial interest-only loans represent 27.4% of the pool,
compared to 31.8% for YTD 2017. The pool is scheduled to pay down
by 11.5%, above the YTD 2017 average paydown of 8.3%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period). Unanticipated further
declines in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and
loss severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions
on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to UBS
2017-C1 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


UNITED AUTO 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed the four outstanding ratings of United Auto
Credit Securitization Trust 2016-1 (the Issuer). Of the four
outstanding publicly rated classes reviewed, DBRS has confirmed one
class, upgraded two classes and discontinued one class due to full
repayment. For the rating that was confirmed, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at the current rating level. For the ratings
that were upgraded, performance trends are such that credit
enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses
at their new respective rating levels.

The Issuer's ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

   Debt Rated     Rating Action   Rating
United Auto Credit Securitization Trust 2016-1
   Class B Notes  Disc-Repaid     Discontinued
   Class C Notes  Upgraded        AAA(sf)
   Class D Notes  Upgraded        A(sf)
   Class E Notes  Confirmed       BB(high)(sf)


WELLS FARGO 2015-C28: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C28 issued by Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2015-C28 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The collateral consists of 99
fixed-rate loans secured by 134 commercial properties; as of the
April 2017 remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of
1.0% since issuance. Loans representing 88.4% of the current pool
balance are reporting YE2016 figures, and loans representing 23.2%
of the current pool balance are reporting partial-year 2016
financials. According to YE2016 financials, the pool reported a
weighted average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
debt yield of 1.71 times (x) and 9.7%, respectively. The DBRS WA
DSCR and WA debt yield at issuance were 1.53x and 8.5%,
respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool represent 57.1% of
the transaction balance, and all but two of those loans reported
YE2016 financials, which showed a WA net cash flow increase of
15.9% over the DBRS figures, with a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of
1.66x and 8.7%, respectively.

As of the April 2017 remittance, there are eight loans on the
servicer's watchlist, representing 10.3% of the current pool
balance, including one loan in the Top 15; however, the largest
watchlisted loan, RPC Northeast Storage Portfolio (Prospectus ID
#4, 6.0% of the pool), was placed on the watchlist because of
property condition issues that have since been resolved.



WELLS FARGO 2016-C34: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class G Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C34 (the
Certificates) issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2016-C34.

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The transaction consists of 68
fixed-rate loans secured by 92 commercial properties. As of the
April 2017 remittance report, the trust balance was $698.8 million,
representing collateral reduction of 0.6% from issuance as a result
of scheduled amortization with all of the original loans remaining
in the pool. As of the April 2017 remittance report, loans
representing 69.5% of the pool are reporting YE2016 figures and
loans representing 14.6% of the pool are reporting annualized Q3
2016 figures. Based on the most recent reporting for the underlying
loans, the pool has a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) of 1.48 times (x), with a WA debt yield of 9.4%. These
figures compare with the DBRS WA DSCR and DBRS WA debt yield at
issuance of 1.35x and 8.5%, respectively.

As of the April 2017 remittance report, there are no loans in
special servicing and there are five loans, representing 5.4% of
the pool, including one in the top ten, on the servicer's
watchlist. Only one of these loans, Prospectus ID#8, Nolitan Hotel,
representing 3.4% of the pool, is on the servicer's watchlist for a
performance decline since issuance, with the loan reporting a low
YE2016 net cash flow figure.


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE: DBRS Review 24 Ratings From 6 ABS Transactions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 24 ratings from six U.S. structured finance
asset-backed securities transactions of Westlake Automobile
Receivables Trust. Of the 24 outstanding publicly rated classes
reviewed, DBRS has confirmed 18 classes, upgraded four classes and
discontinued two classes due to repayment. For the ratings that
were confirmed, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their
current respective rating levels. For the ratings that were
upgraded, performance trends are such that credit enhancement
levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's expected losses at their new
respective rating levels.

The issuer's ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
    origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- Credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
    performance.

A full text copy of the ratings is available free at:

                  https://is.gd/KCubzW


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C8: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fourteen
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C8, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C8:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 2.1% of the
current balance, compared to 1.9% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.7% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 1.8% at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in December
2014.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
Securities" published in October 2015.

DESCRIPTION OF MODELS USED

Moody's review used the excel-based CMBS Conduit Model, which it
uses for both conduit and fusion transactions. Credit enhancement
levels for conduit loans are driven by property type, Moody's
actual and stressed DSCR, and Moody's property quality grade (which
reflects the capitalization rate Moody's uses to estimate Moody's
value). Moody's fuses the conduit results with the results of its
analysis of investment grade structured credit assessed loans and
any conduit loan that represents 10% or greater of the current pool
balance.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 20, compared to 22 at Moody's last review.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the May 17th, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 19.5% to $1.05
billion from $1.30 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 55% of the pool. Seven loans, constituting
4% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Nine loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. One loan, constituting
0.7% of the pool, is currently in special servicing. The specially
serviced loan is the Springhill Suites - San Angelo loan ($7.7
million -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 96-room hotel
built in 2010 and is located in San Angelo, Texas. Per the
Borrower, the extreme down turn of the oil and gas industry was the
major cause of the drastic decline in the hotel's recent
performance. The loan transferred to special servicing in April
2016. The special servicer and borrower are actively engaged in
resolution discussions. Moody's estimates a severe loss for the
specially serviced loan.

Moody's received full year 2015 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2016 operating results for 86% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 86% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.69X and 1.24X,
respectively, compared to 1.82X and 1.27X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the 100 Church Street Loan ($143 million -- 14% of
the pool), which represents a participation interest in a $220
million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 1.1 million square
feet (SF), Class B office property in Lower Manhattan. The property
was 98% leased as of March 2017, compared to 99% leased as of March
2016 and 84% leased as of securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 93% and 1.05X, respectively, compared to 95% and 1.03X at
Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Northridge Fashion Center Loan ($82
million -- 8% of the pool). The loan represents a participation
interest in a $227 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a
644,000 SF portion of a 1.5 million SF super-regional mall located
in Northridge, California. The mall's non-collateral anchors
include Macy's, Macy's Men and Home, Sears and JC Penney. The mall
was 95% leased as of year-end 2016, compared to 97% leased as of
year-end 2015. The loan benefits from amortization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.07X, respectively, compared to 93% and
1.05X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the BJ's Portfolio Loan ($68 million --
6.5% of the pool). The BJ's Portfolio loan is secured by first
mortgage liens on six properties consisting of five retail stores
of BJ's Wholesale Club and one industrial center serving as a BJ's
Distribution facility. The portfolio is located in five different
states: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey and
Florida. The portfolio is 100% occupied by a single tenant, BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc. Due to the single tenant exposure, Moody's
valuation reflects a lit/dark analysis. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 98% and 1.13X, respectively.


[*] DBRS Reviews 333 Classes From 47 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 333 classes from 47 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 333 classes
reviewed, 80 ratings were upgraded, 227 ratings were confirmed, one
rating was downgraded and 25 ratings were discontinued.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating levels. The
rating confirmations reflect current asset performance and that
credit support levels have been consistent with the current rating.
The rating downgrade reflects the transaction's continued erosion
of credit support as well as negative trends in delinquency and
projected loss activity. The discontinued ratings are the result of
full principal payment to the bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's applying its "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology" (see the press release "DBRS Publishes RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," dated April 4, 2017).

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS and Resecuritization of Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (Re-REMIC) transactions. The
pools backing these transactions consist of Prime, Alt-A, Scratch
and Dent, Option - Adjustable-Rate Mortgage (ARM), Second Lien and
Subprime collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect a dependency on another
tranche's ratings, as well as structural features and historical
performance that constrain the rating from the quantitative model's
output.

-- ASG Resecuritization Trust 2009-1, REMIC Notes, Series 2009-1,

    Class G75
-- ASG Resecuritization Trust 2009-1, REMIC Notes, Series 2009-1,

    Class A75
-- Banc of America Funding 2015-R5 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
    Securities, Class 1A1
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 2A2
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 3A2
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 7A6
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 7A7
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 9A2
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-4, Re-REMIC Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-4, Class 13A3
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-8, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-8, Class 6A2
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-10, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-10, Class 2A2C
-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2009-10, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-10, Class 3A2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC
    Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 1-A4
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC
    Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 6-A3
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC
    Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 8-A5
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC   
    Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 9-A4
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., CSMC
    Series 2009-6R, CSMC Series 2009-6R, Class 12-A5
-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2015-3R, Resecuritization Trust
    Securities, Series 2015-3R, Class 1A-1
-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2015-3R, Resecuritization Trust
    Securities, Series 2015-3R, Class 2A-1
-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2015-3R, Resecuritization Trust
    Securities, Series 2015-3R, Class 1A-1D
-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2015-3R, Resecuritization Trust   

    Securities, Series 2015-3R, Class 2A-1C
-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2015-3R, Resecuritization Trust
    Securities, Series 2015-3R, Class 2A-1D
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust, Series 2008-R4, Series 2008-R4
    Trust Certificates, Class 2-A-1
-- LVII Resecuritization Trust 2009-1, Mortgage Resecuritization
    Notes, Series 2009-1, Class M-2
-- LVII Resecuritization Trust 2009-1, Mortgage Resecuritization

    Notes, Series 2009-1, Class M-3
-- LVII Resecuritization Trust 2009-1, Mortgage Resecuritization
    Notes, Series 2009-1, Class M-4
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2013-R6,
    Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 5-A3
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2013-R6,
    Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 5-A
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2013-R9,
    Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 3-A3
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2013-R9,
    Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 5-A3
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2013-R9,
    Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 3-A
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2013-R9,
    Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 5-A
-- RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-5, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-5, Class 4-A2
-- RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-5, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-5, Class 4-A4
-- RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-6, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-6, Class 7-A2
-- RBSSP Resecuritization Trust 2009-6, Resecuritization Trust
    Certificates, Series 2009-6, Class 7-A4
-- C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-CB7, Class M-1
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FFH2, Mortgage

    Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FFH2, Class M2
-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FFH2, Mortgage

     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FFH2, Class M3
-- Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-2, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2007-2, Class A-IO
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates, \
    Series 2004-7HE, Class A-1
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-7HE, Class A-3
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-7HE, Class M-1
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-7HE, Class M-2
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-7HE, Class S
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-9HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-9HE, Class A-1
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-9HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-9HE, Class A-3
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-13ALT, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-13ALT, Class 2-P-X
-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-15ALT, Asset-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2004-15ALT, Class A-X
-- C-BASS 2005-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-CB1, Class M-1
-- C-BASS 2005-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-CB1, Class M-2
-- C-BASS 2005-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-CB1, Class M-3
-- C-BASS 2005-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-CB1, Class B-1
-- C-BASS 2005-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-CB1, Class B-2
-- C-BASS 2006-MH1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-MH1, Class M-1
-- C-BASS 2006-MH1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-MH1, Class M-2
-- C-BASS 2006-MH1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-MH1, Class B-1

A full text copy of the ratings is available free at:

                 https://is.gd/3bomro


[*] DBRS Reviews 406 Classes From 31 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 406 classes from 31 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the 406 classes
reviewed, 23 ratings were upgraded and 383 ratings were confirmed.


The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and that
these classes have experienced increases in credit support
sufficient to withstand stresses at their new rating levels. The
rating confirmations reflect current asset performance and that
credit support levels have been consistent with the current rating.


The rating actions are the result of DBRS’s applying its “RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology” (see the press release “DBRS Publishes RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology,” dated April 4, 2017).

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of Prime, Alt-A, Second Lien,
Subprime and Re-Performing collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect a small collateral loan count,
as well as structural features and historical performance that
constrain the ratings from the quantitative model’s output.

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5,
    Class 6-A-1-2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5,
    Class 6-A-2-1
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
    Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-5, Adjustable Rate
    Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-5,
    Class 6-A-2-2
-- C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-CB6, Class A-I
-- C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-CB6, Class A-II-3
-- C-BASS 2006-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-CB6, Class A-II-4
-- C-BASS 2006-CB8 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-CB8, Class A-2B
-- C-BASS 2006-RP1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2006-RP1, Class B-2
-- C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-2
-- C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-3
-- C-BASS 2007-MX1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2007-MX1, Class A-4
-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB2, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2004-AB2, Class M-3
-- Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,

    Series 2005-D, Class 1-A-1
-- Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2005-D, Class 2-A-4
-- Fremont Home Loan Trust 2005-D, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
    Series 2005-D, Class M1
-- GSAMP Trust 2005-HE3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
    Series 2005-HE3, Class M-4
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2005-8, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-8, Class M-2
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2006-4, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-4, Class 1-A-1
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2006-4, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-4, Class 2-A-3
-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
    Equity Asset Trust 2006-4, Home Equity Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2006-4, Class 2-A-4
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 1-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 1-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 2-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 2-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 3-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through   
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 3-A-3
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 3-A-4
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 4-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 5-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 5-A-3
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 6-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through    
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 6-A-2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 7CB1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 7CB2
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 8-A-1
-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2005-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-A2, Class 9-A-1
-- Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-WL1, Class III-M1
-- Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-WL1, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-WL1, Class III-M2
-- Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-6, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2008-6, Class 1-A1
-- Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-6, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2008-6, Class 2-A1
-- Lehman Mortgage Trust 2008-6, Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2008-6, Class 2-A2
-- Meritage Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2, Asset-Backed
    Certificates, Series 2005-2, Class M-2
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-3, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2004-3, Class M-1
-- New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-4, Asset-Backed Notes,

    Series 2004-4, Class M-1

A full text copy of the ratings is available free at:

              https://is.gd/S5tE65


[*] Moody's Hikes $19.9MM of Second Lien RMBS Issued 2001-2005
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight
tranches from six transactions backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2003-S2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HS3

Cl. A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2016 Upgraded to
B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-HI3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 4, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2001-HI3

A-I-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2001-HI4

A-7, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Loan Trust 2003-HI3

A-I-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2016 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

A-II, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 7, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and Moody's updated loss expectations on these pools. The tranches
upgraded are primarily due to the build-up in credit enhancement
available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $219.4MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2000-2004
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 32 tranches
from 17 transactions issued by various issuers, backed by subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC10

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC7

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC8

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2013 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE5

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE7

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2013 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE8

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-HE9

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 24, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 1, 2013 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 26, 2014 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-WMC1

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-WMC2

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Trust 2000-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2013
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-NC3

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2001-AM1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Capital I Inc. Trust 2002-HE2

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 11, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-3

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on August 8, 2016)

Cl. AF-5, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2015
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on August 8, 2016)

Cl. AF-6, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2013 Downgraded
to A2 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 10,
2013 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp (Affirmed at
A2, Outlook Stable on August 8, 2016)

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 9, 2014 Downgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 30, 2015 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.



[*] Moody's Hikes $33.5MM of Second Lien RMBS Issued 2003-2005
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
from 8 transactions backed by second-lien RMBS loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Issuer: Irwin Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-1

Cl. IA-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2003-B

B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Upgraded to Baa1
(sf)

IA, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 1, 2015 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

M, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Upgraded to A2
(sf)

Issuer: Irwin Whole Loan Home Equity Trust 2005-B

Cl. 1B-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1B-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 1M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2010
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2015 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 14, 2015
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2005-SL3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2015 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-S2

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the build-up in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.13BB of RMBS Issued 2004-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 41 tranches
from 18 transactions and downgraded the rating of one tranche from
one transaction, issued by various issuers, and backed by subprime
mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
Series 2005-1

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2004-RM1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 15, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2005-HE6

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-ASAP4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
2006-CW1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2004-6

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bravo Mortgage Asset Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 1, 2014 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB5

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 10, 2015 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: HSI Asset Securitization Corporation Trust 2005-OPT1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: IXIS Real Estate Capital Trust 2005-HE4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2015 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. 2006-RM1

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH1,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH1

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 28, 2010
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. AV-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AV-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. MV-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Feb 19, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. MV-7, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 1, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. MV-8, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2009
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1

Cl. AV-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. AV-1B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. AV-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: SG Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-OPT2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3B, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2014
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-3C, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. A-3D, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on May 5, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT4

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 17, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 22, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the total credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating downgrade on Class
M-1 from ACE 2005-HE6 is due to the outstanding unpaid interest
shortfall that is unlikely to be recouped. The actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

Class X-2 from Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT4 is an
Interest-Only (IO) bond linked to Classes II-A-2 and II-A-3, thus
this IO bond should carry the same rating following the upgrade
actions on Classes II-A-2 and II-A-3.

The rating actions on Classes MV-5, MV-7 and MV-8 from JPMAC
2007-CH1 also partially reflect a correction to the cash-flow model
previously used by Moody's in rating this transaction. In prior
rating actions, the cash flow model overestimated the excess spread
available to be paid as principal. This error has now been
corrected, and rating actions reflect this change.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-2 from Soundview
Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT4 was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities" published in October
2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment (RFC), in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its cross-sector rating methodology for
rating structured finance IO securities. Please refer to Moody's
RFC titled "Moody's Proposes Revised Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities " for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $239.7MM Alt-A Debt Issued 2002-2004
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 28 tranches
and downgraded two tranches from 10 transactions backed by Alt-A
mortgage loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2003-8

2-NC-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. 2-NC-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-6

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust 2004-8

Cl. 2-CB-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2004-12

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2016
Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. I-M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-30

Cl. D-B-1, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 16, 2012
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-AR5

Cl. I-B-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2015
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. C-B-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-5

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-7

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 22, 2011 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. X-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RALI Series 2004-QS16 Trust

Cl. I-A-V, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 18, 2012
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-14

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 6, 2012 Confirmed
at Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7-A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 10, 2011
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of credit
enhancement and pay down of the affected bonds. The rating
downgrades are due to declining credit enhancement and in some
cases, tail risk associated with pro rata pay structures.

The actions also reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating HarborView Mortgage
Loan Trust 2004-7 Cl. X-1 and Cl. X-2 S16 and RALI Series 2004-QS16
Trust Cl. I-A-V was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only Securities" published in October 2015.

Please note that on February 27, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment (RFC), in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its cross-sector rating methodology for
rating structured finance IO securities. Please refer to Moody's
RFC titled "Moody's Proposes Revised Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities " for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed methodology revisions on
certain Credit Ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in April 2017 from 5.0% in April
2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 4.5% to
5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 104 Classes From 13 RMBS Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 104 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2005.  The review yielded 32 upgrades, two
downgrades, 69 affirmations, and one withdrawal.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate alternative-A and prime mortgage loans, which are
secured primarily by first liens on one- to four-family residential
properties.

                               ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                             UPGRADES

S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
   -- The class' expected short duration; and/or
   -- Principal-only (PO) criteria.

The upgrades include 20 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  Of these, two were due to their expected shorter duration
because S&P anticipates the classes to be paid down within the next
12 months, five were due to the improvement of the underlying
collateral performance during the most recent performance periods
compared to previous review dates, 12 were due to an increase in
credit support and the classes' ability to withstand a higher level
of projected losses than previously anticipated, and one reflects
the application of S&P's criteria for PO classes.

The upgrades on the following classes reflect a decrease in S&P's
projected losses because there have been fewer reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods compared
to those reported during the previous review dates.  This table
shows the change in delinquencies for the related pool associated
with each class since the last review.

                       Date of         Delinquency (%)
Transaction  Class     last review   Current       Prior

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust
             III-A-2   March 2015       0.12       15.46
             III-A-3   March 2015       0.12       15.46

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-K
             II-A-5    March 2015       9.22       10.29
             II-A-7    March 2015       9.22       10.29

Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-L Trust
             I-A-5     March 2015       2.96        6.31

The upgrades on the following classes reflect an increase in credit
support since S&P's last review and the classes' ability to
withstand a higher level of projected losses than previously
anticipated.  This table shows the change in credit support for
each class since the last review.

                       Date of         Delinquency (%)
Transaction  Class     last review   Current       Prior

Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust Series
2003-1
             A-1       March 2015      20.92       17.09
             A-3       March 2015      20.92       17.09

Deutsche Mortgage Securities Inc Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2004-3
             I-A-5     January 2015    28.36       21.82
             II-AR-1   January 2015    51.39       34.78

Homestar Mortgage Acceptance Corp. Series 2004-2
             M-1       March 2015      27.93       18.75

First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-AR1
             I-A-1     January 2015    18.08       10.67
             II-A-1    January 2015    18.08       10.67
             II-A-2    January 2015    22.03       14.83
             II-A-4    January 2015    22.03       14.83
             II-A-5    January 2015    18.08       10.67
             III-A-1   January 2015    18.08       10.67
             IV-A-1    January 2015    28.63       19.05

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its ratings on classes IV-A-2 and IV-A-3 from Wells
Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2003-J Trust due to an increase in
delinquencies for the related pool.  The downgrades reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support for the affected classes
will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the related
transactions at a higher rating.  Total delinquencies increased to
9.77% at March 2017 from 0.00% at March 2015.

                             AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Low priority in principal payments; and/or
  -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's
view that these classes are still vulnerable to defaulting, and the
'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that these classes remain
virtually certain to default.

                           WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its rating on class IV-M-2 from Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2003-AR15 because the
related pool has a small number of loans remaining.  Once a pool
has declined to a de minimis amount, we believe there is a high
degree of credit instability that is incompatible with any rating
level.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                      http://bit.ly/2rBC9MO


[*] S&P Completes Review on 106 Classes From 12 US RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 106 classes from 12 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2006.  The review yielded 34 upgrades, six
downgrades, 53 affirmations, and 13 withdrawals.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                              UPGRADES

The upgrades include 18 ratings that were raised three or more
notches.  S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes
is sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating
levels.  The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- Expected short duration.

S&P raised its rating on class I-M-1 from Bear Stearns Asset-Backed
Securities Trust 2005-SD3 to 'A (sf)' from 'B (sf)' to reflect
increased credit support to 39.88% in March 2017 from 29.71% at the
time of S&P's prior review in March 2015. Additionally, S&P expects
credit support to continue to increase because all funds are paid
sequentially due to failing cumulative loss triggers.

S&P raised its ratings on seven classes from 'CCC (sf)' because S&P
believes these classes are no longer vulnerable to default.  S&P
also raised one rating to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because S&P
believes this class is no longer virtually certain to default.
However, the 'CCC (sf)' ratings reflect S&P's belief that its
projected credit support will remain insufficient to cover its
projected losses for these classes and that the classes are still
vulnerable to defaulting.

                            DOWNGRADES

S&P lowered its rating on one class to speculative-grade ('BB+' or
lower) from investment-grade ('BBB-' or higher).  One of the
lowered ratings remained at an investment-grade level, while the
remaining four downgraded classes already had speculative-grade
ratings.  The downgrades reflect S&P's belief that its projected
credit support for the affected classes will be insufficient to
cover its projected losses for the related transactions at higher
ratings.  The downgrades further reflect one or more of these:

   -- Deteriorated credit performance trends;
   -- Decreased credit support;
   -- Tail risk; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

S&P lowered its rating on class A-4 from American General Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-1 to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'.  This downgrade
reflects the application of S&P's imputed promises criteria, which
resulted in a maximum potential rating (MPR) lower than the
previous rating on the class.

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications, S&P imputes an amount of interest owed to that class
of securities by applying "Methodology For Incorporating Loan
Modifications And Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings,"
published April 17, 2015, and "Principles For Rating Debt Issues
Based On Imputed Promises," published Dec. 19, 2014. Based on S&P's
criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a particular class,
the resulting rating may be lower than if S&P had solely considered
that class' paid interest based on the applicable WAC.

Classes M-1, M-2, and B-1 from American General Mortgage Loan Trust
2006-1 have also been affected by reduced interest payments because
of loan modifications.  However, the amount of reduced interest
payments has been mitigated due to the amount of principal these
classes have received and will continue to receive.  Therefore, the
downgrades on these classes reflect the increase in S&P's projected
losses due to higher reported loss severities during the most
recent performance periods than those reported during the previous
review dates.  Observed loss severities have increased to 56.47% as
of February 2017 from 33.53% at the time of the prior review in
March 2015.

                           AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination, overcollateralization, or both;
   -- Delinquency trends;
   -- Historical interest shortfalls;
   -- Tail risk;
   -- Expected shorter duration; and/or
   -- Significant growth in observed loss severities.

In addition, some of the transactions have failed their delinquency
triggers, resulting in reduced--or a complete stop
of--unscheduled principal payments to their subordinate classes.
However, these transactions allow for unscheduled principal
payments to resume to the subordinate classes if the delinquency
triggers begin passing again.  This would result in eroding the
credit support available for the more-senior classes.  Therefore,
S&P affirmed its ratings on certain classes in these transactions
even though these classes may have passed at higher rating
scenarios.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Per "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

                            WITHDRAWALS

S&P withdrew its ratings on 13 classes from three deals because the
related loan pools have a small number of loans remaining. Once a
pool has declined to a de minimis amount, S&P believes there is a
high degree of credit instability that is incompatible with any
rating level.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                 http://bit.ly/2rzHl3I



[*] S&P Completes Review on 52 Ratings From 11 RMBS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 52 ratings from 11 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2006.  The review yielded 20 upgrades, four
downgrades, and 28 affirmations.

The transactions in this review are backed by a mix of fixed- and
adjustable-rate reperforming mortgage loans secured primarily by
first liens on one- to four-family residential properties.

                             ANALYSIS

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by S&P's projected cash flows.  These
considerations are based on transaction-specific performance or
structural characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on
certain classes.

                               UPGRADES

S&P's projected credit support for the affected classes is
sufficient to cover its projected losses for these rating levels.
The upgrades reflect one or more of these:

   -- Improved collateral performance/delinquency trends;
   -- Increased credit support relative to our projected losses;
      and/or
   -- The class' expected short duration.

Fifteen of the upgrades were due to an increase in credit support
for each class and its ability to withstand a higher level of
projected losses than previously anticipated.  This table shows the
change in credit support for each class since the last review.

                      Date of           Credit support (%)
Transaction  Class    last review       Current             Prior

Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust Series 2005-B
             M-3      March 30, 2015    72.67             52.08
             M-4      March 25, 2015    61.91             44.37
             B-1      March 30, 2015    43.98             31.52
             B-2      March 30, 2015    20.22             14.49

Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust Series 2005-C
             M-1      March 30, 2015    85.39             62.54
             M-2      March 30, 2015    67.73             49.41
             M-3      March 30, 2015    39.37             28.32
             M-4      March 30, 2015    28.66             20.36

Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust Series 2005-D
             AF-4     March 28, 2015    48.98             40.26

C-BASS 2005-RP1 Trust
             M-2      March 25, 2015    76.03             58.92
             M-3      March 25, 2015    46.25             37.40

C-BASS 2005-RP2 Trust
             M-1      March 25, 2015    79.28             64.76

CSMC Trust 2006-CF1
             M-1      March 25, 2015    66.75             52.21
             M-2      March 25, 2015    39.37             31.05
             B-1      March 25, 2015    25.87             20.60

The upgrade to class M-2 from Bayview Financial Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust's series 2005-B is due to an expected short
remaining duration based on the current rate of payments received.

The upgrades on classes 2-A3 and 2-A4 from Bayview Financial
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust's series 2006-D reflect a decrease in
S&P's projected losses and its belief that its projected credit
support for the affected classes will be sufficient to cover its
revised projected losses at these rating levels.  S&P has decreased
its projected losses because there have been fewer reported
delinquencies during the most recent performance periods compared
to those reported during the previous review dates. Severe
delinquencies decreased to 22.74% in April 2017 from 27.02% in
March 2015.

In addition, S&P raised its ratings on classes B-1 from 2003-CB3
Trust and B-2 from Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass Through Trust
2005-C to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' because S&P believes these
classes are no longer virtually certain to default, primarily owing
to the improved performance of the collateral backing this
transaction.  However, the 'CCC (sf)' rating indicates that S&P
believes that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its projected losses for these classes and that the
classes are still vulnerable to defaulting.

                             DOWNGRADES

The downgrades include one rating that was lowered three or more
notches.  One lowered rating remained at in investment-grade level
('BBB-' or higher), and the remaining three already had
speculative-grade ratings ('BB+' or lower).  The downgrades reflect
S&P's belief that our projected credit support for the affected
classes will be insufficient to cover its projected losses for the
related transactions at a higher rating.  The downgrades reflect
one or more of these:

   -- Decreased credit enhancement available to the classes;
   -- Observed interest shortfalls; and/or
   -- Reduced interest payments over time due to loan
      modifications or other credit-related events.

Interest Shortfalls

The downgrades on classes M-1 and B-2 from Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities Trust 2004-1 were based on S&P's assessment of
interest shortfalls to the affected classes during recent
remittance periods.  The lowered ratings were derived by applying
S&P's interest shortfall criteria, which designate a maximum
potential rating (MPR) to these classes.

Loan Modifications And Imputed Promises

S&P lowered its rating on class 1-A3 from Bayview Financial
Mortgage Pass-Through Trust's series 2006-D to reflect the
application of S&P's imputed promises criteria, which resulted in
an MPR lower than the previous rating on each of these classes.

When a class of securities supported by a particular collateral
pool is paid interest through a weighted average coupon (WAC) and
the interest owed to that class is reduced because of loan
modifications, S&P imputes an amount of interest owed to that class
of securities by applying "Methodology For Incorporating Loan
Modifications And Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings,"
published April 17, 2015, and "Principles For Rating Debt Issues
Based On Imputed Promises," published Dec. 19, 2014. Based on S&P's
criteria, it applies an MPR to those classes of securities that are
affected by reduced interest payments over time due to loan
modifications.  If S&P applies an MPR cap to a particular class,
the resulting rating may be lower than if S&P had solely considered
that class' paid interest based on the applicable WAC.

                             AFFIRMATIONS

The affirmations of ratings in the 'AAA' through 'B' rating
categories reflect S&P's opinion that its projected credit support
on these classes remained relatively consistent with S&P's prior
projections and is sufficient to cover its projected losses for
those rating scenarios.

For certain transactions, S&P considered specific performance
characteristics that, in its view, could add volatility to its loss
assumptions and, in turn, to the ratings suggested by S&P's cash
flow projections.  When S&P's model recommended an upgrade, it
either limited the extent of its upgrade or affirmed its ratings on
those classes to account for this uncertainty and promote ratings
stability.  In general, these classes have one or more of these
characteristics that limit any potential upgrade:

   -- Insufficient subordination/overcollateralization;
   -- Delinquency trends limiting upgrade; and/or
   -- Bond performance projection remaining stable.

The ratings affirmed at 'CCC (sf)' or 'CC (sf)' reflect S&P's
belief that its projected credit support will remain insufficient
to cover its 'B' expected case projected losses for these classes.
Pursuant to "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012, the 'CCC (sf)' affirmations
reflect S&P's view that these classes are still vulnerable to
defaulting, and the 'CC (sf)' affirmations reflect S&P's view that
these classes remain virtually certain to default.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

                       http://bit.ly/2qN6cjw


[*] S&P Discontinues Ratings on 60 Classes From 24 CDO Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its ratings on 52 classes from 18
cash flow (CF) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions,
one class from one CF structured credit retranching (SC
retranching), five classes from three CF collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) backed by commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), one class from one CF hybrid CLO, and one class from one
CDO transaction.

The discontinuances follow the complete paydowns of the notes as
reflected in the most recent trustee-issued note payment reports
for each transaction:

   -- 1776 CLO I Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Black Diamond CLO 2006-1 (Luxembourg) S.A. (CF CLO): senior-
      most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Blue Wing Asset Vehicle Series 2009-1 (CF SC retranching):
      last remaining rated tranche paid down.

   -- Brentwood CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid down;

      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- California Street CLO III Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most
      tranches paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in April 2017.

   -- Carlyle Daytona CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      April 2017.

   -- ECP CLO 2012-3 Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- GoldenTree Loan Opportunities III Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in May 2017.

   -- Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS):
      senior-most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd. (CF CDO of CMBS):
      senior-most tranches paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Grayson CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Keuka Park CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): rated tranche paid down.

   -- Multi Security Asset Trust L.P. (CF CDO of CMBS): senior-
      most tranche paid down; other rated tranches still
      outstanding.

   -- Octagon Investment Partners XII Ltd. (CF CLO): optional
      redemption in April 2017.

   -- Red River CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid down;
      other rated tranche still outstanding.

   -- Rockwall CDO II Ltd. (CF Hybrid CLO): senior-most tranche
      paid down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Rockwall CDO Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid down.

   -- Shackleton 2016-IX CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): class X notes(i) paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Shackleton I CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): all rated tranches paid
      down.

   -- Sheridan Square CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): optional redemption in
      May 2017.

   -- Stratford CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranches paid down;

      other rated tranches still outstanding.

   -- Trainer Wortham First Republic CBO IV Ltd. (CF CDO): senior-
      most tranche paid down; other rated tranche still
      outstanding.

   -- Westchester CLO Ltd. (CF CLO): senior-most tranche paid
      down; other rated tranches still outstanding.

(i)An "X note" within a CLO is generally a note with a principal
balance intended to be repaid early in the CLO's life using
interest proceeds from the CLO's waterfall.

RATINGS DISCONTINUED

1776 CLO I Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Black Diamond CLO 2006-1 (Luxembourg) S.A.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Blue Wing Asset Vehicle Series 2009-1
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A2                  NR                  AAA (sf)

Brentwood CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1A                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1B                NR                  AAA (sf)

California Street CLO III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1b                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2a                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2b                NR                  AAA (sf)
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Callidus Debt Partners CLO Fund VI Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1D                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-1T                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
B                   NR                  AA (sf)
C                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BB (sf)

Carlyle Daytona CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3L                NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1L                NR                  A+ (sf)
B-2L                NR                  BB+ (sf)

ECP CLO 2012-3 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

GoldenTree Loan Opportunities III Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  AAA (sf)
C                   NR                  AA+ (sf)
D                   NR                  A+ (sf)

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2005-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  B- (sf)
D                   NR                  CCC+ (sf)

Gramercy Real Estate CDO 2006-1 Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
C                   NR                  CCC- (sf)
D                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Grayson CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1a                NR                  AAA (sf)

Keuka Park CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Multi Security Asset Trust L.P.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
E                   NR                  BBB+ (sf)

Octagon Investment Partners XII Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-R                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
B-2-R               NR                  AAA (sf)
C-R                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
D-R                 NR                  A+ (sf)
E-R                 NR                  BB+ (sf)

Red River CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
D                   NR                  AA+ (sf)

Rockwall CDO II Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1LA               NR                  AAA (sf)

Rockwall CDO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-2L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-3L                NR                  AAA (sf)
A-4L                NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1L                NR                  A+ (sf)

Shackleton 2016-IX CLO Ltd.                            
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
X                   NR                  AAA (sf)

Shackleton I CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
E                   NR                  BB (sf)

Sheridan Square CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)
B-1                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
B-2                 NR                  AA+ (sf)
C                   NR                  A+ (sf)
D                   NR                  BBB (sf)
E                   NR                  BB (sf)
E-1                 NR                  BB (sf)
F                   NR                  B (sf)

Stratford CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1                 NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2                 NR                  AAA (sf)

Trainer Wortham CBO IV Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
B                   NR                  CCC- (sf)

Westchester CLO Ltd.
                            Rating
Class               To                  From
A-1-A               NR                  AAA (sf)

NR--Not rated.


[*] US CMBS Loan Loss Severities Down in Q1 2017, Moody's Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
US CMBS loan loss severity decreased for the loans liquidated
during the first quarter of 2017, Moody's Investors Service says in
its latest report on losses in US commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS). The quarterly weighted average loss severity
declined to 36.1% for loans liquidated in the quarter from 48.7%
for loans liquidated in the prior quarter, primarily as a result of
lower losses on loans liquidated from the 2007 vintage, which had a
weighted average loss severity of 25.8% due to a high share of
maturity default liquidations in the quarter.

Moody's quarterly report on US CMBS loss severities covers all US
conduit and fusion transactions, regardless of whether Moody's
rates them, and provides both point-in-time and cumulative
estimates of loss severity. The current report details losses for
the 1998 to 2017 vintages based on liquidations that took place
from January 1, 2000 to March 31, 2017.

"Loans liquidated after a maturity default have lower loss
severities than loans that defaulted during their terms," says
Associate Managing Director, Keith Banhazl. "This was especially
evident for 2007 vintage loans liquidated during the first quarter,
in which loans that liquidated after a maturity default constituted
67.9% of the 2007 vintage liquidations by balance and had an
average loss severity of 8.3%, compared to the average loss
severity of 62.9% for loans that defaulted during their terms."

Among the five major property types, loans backed by retail
properties continued to have the highest cumulative weighted
average loss severity, at 49.0%, Banhazl says. During the first
quarter, 68 loans backed by retail properties liquidated with an
aggregate loss of $457.5 million and loss severities of 54.6%.

Loans backed by troubled malls continued to see high loss
severities. In the first quarter, seven loans backed by regional
malls were liquidated with an average loss severity of 73.6%.
Losses from loans secured by troubled malls accounted for 43.0% of
the aggregate dollar loss of retail loans liquidated during the
quarter.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
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