TCR_Public/171008.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, October 8, 2017, Vol. 21, No. 280

                            Headlines

280 PARK AVE 2017-280P: Fitch Assigns B- Rating to Cl. HRR Debt
ABACUS LTD 2006-10: S&P Lowers Class A Notes Rating to CC(sf)
ACA ABS 2003-2: Moody's Hikes Class A1-SD Notes Rating to Caa3(sf)
AIR 2: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Series B EENs Notes
ALLEGRO CLO V: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes

ARES CLO XLV: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
ARES CLO XXXV: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D5: Moody's Affirms C on Cl. PS-1 Certs
BANK 2017-BNK7: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Ratings to 2 Tranches
BAYVIEW KOITERE 2017-RT4: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating to Cl. B5 Notes

CBAM LLC 2017-3: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E-2 Notes
CBAM LTD 2017-3: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
CG-CCRE COMMERCIAL 2014-FL2: S&P Hikes Cl. SSS Certs Rating to B+
CIM TRUST 2017-7: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
CITIGROUP 2017-P8: Fitch Assigns Final B- Ratings on 2 Tranches

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC35: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on F Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-P8: S&P Assigns BB Rating on 2 Tranches
COMM 2017-COR2: Fitch Assigns B- Rating to Class G-RR Certs
COMM 2017-DLTA: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
COSMOPOLITAN HOTEL 2016: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Certs

CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
CSAIL 2017-CX9: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Certs
CSMC TRUST 2016-MFF: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. S Certs
DRYDEN XXV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on Class E-RR Notes

FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
GREAT WOLF 2017-WOLF: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
GSMS 2015-GS1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2013-2: S&P Gives Prelim B- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Fitch Affirms BB Preferred Stock Rating

JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC18: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC20: Moody's Hikes Class B Certs Rating to B1
JP MORGAN 2015-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B-4 Debt From Ba1
JP MORGAN 2017-MAUI: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Rating on Class F Certs

JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2017-JP7: DBRS Finalizes (P)BB on F-RR Debt
KILIMANJARO RE 2014-1: S&P Lowers Cl. B Notes Rating to 'B-(sf)'
LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-3: S&P Affirms B (sf) Rating on Cl. M1 Notes
MARINER CLO 2017-4: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Cl. F Notes
MERCURY CDO 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 3 Tranches to B1

MERRILL LYNCH 2004-BPC1: S&P Affirms B(sf) Rating on Class E Certs
MILL CITY 2017-3: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class B2 Notes
MILL CITY 2017-3: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Class B1 Notes
ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-7: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to B1
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class K Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C25: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C34: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes 'B-sf'
NATIONSTAR HECM 2017-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. M2 Debt
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-5: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Ratings on 5 Tranches
NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XVI: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes

NXT CAPITAL 2017-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
OFSI FUND VII: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 2000-C1: Moody's Affirms C on Cl. M Debt
PUTNAM STRUCTURED 2003-1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-CH1: Moody's Rates Cl. B-5 Certs 'Ba2'

SHELLPOINT CO-ORIGINATOR 2017-2: Moody's Gives Ba1 to B-4 Debt
SLM STUDENT 2006-3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
SLM STUDENT 2010-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. A & B Notes
SOCO REAL ESTATE: Proposed Sale of Austin Property for $1.5M Denied
STONEMONT PORTFOLIO 2017-STONE: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'Bsf'

SUNTRUST BANKS: Fitch Affirms BB Preferred Stock Rating
TABERNA PREFERRED VIII: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-2 Notes Rating to Ba1
THL CREDIT 2013-2: S&P Gives BB- Ratings on 2 Tranches
TOWD POINT 2017-4: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B2 Notes
TOYS 'R' US 2001-31: S&P Lowers $13.09MM Class A-1 Certs to 'D'

VOYA CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Moody's Lowers Cl. G Certs' Rating to C
WELLS FARGO 2017-C40: Fitch to Rate Class G Notes 'B-sf'
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C24: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on SJ-D Certs
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $2.1BB of RMBS Issued 2014-2015

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $259.7MM of Alt-A Issued 2004-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $946MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[*] S&P Completes Review on 38 Classes From 15 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 56 Classes From 14 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Completes Review on 58 Classes From 9 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Completes Review on 60 Classes From Six US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Discontinues 'D(sf)' Ratings on Three US CMBS Deals

                            *********

280 PARK AVE 2017-280P: Fitch Assigns B- Rating to Cl. HRR Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to 280 Park Avenue 2017-280P Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates:

-- $509,053,000a class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $78,257,000a class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $80,865,000a class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- 106,825,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $151,000,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $95,000,000a class F 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $54,000,000ab class HRR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

a)Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
b)Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 5% of the
loan balance (as of the closing date).

Two interest only classes, class X-CP and class X-EXT, were removed
from the final deal structure and withdrawn after Fitch issued
expected ratings for the deal on Sept. 11, 2017.

The certificates represent the beneficial interests in the mortgage
loan securing the fee interest in a 1,260,101 square foot (sf),
43-story office tower located at 280 Park Avenue between 48th and
49th Streets in New York City. Mortgage and mezzanine loan proceeds
were used to refinance the property's existing $900 million
mortgage, pay closing costs and return approximately $278 million
of cash equity to the sponsor. The certificates will follow a
sequential-pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Asset in Strong Location: 280 Park Avenue is a
43-story, class A office building located on Park Avenue between
48th and 49th Streets in the Grand Central office submarket of
Midtown Manhattan. Fitch has assigned it a property quality grade
of 'A'.

Capital Improvements: The sponsor acquired the property in 2011 and
has spent $142.5 million ($113psf) on the redevelopment of the
building. The redevelopment included a complete redesigning of the
lobby and exterior plaza, installing a new breezeway, redeveloping
the public plazas, repositioning the retail, upgrading the
elevators, electrical and plumbing systems, replacing the room and
installing a modern HVAC system.

High Overall Fitch Leverage: The $1.075 billion mortgage loan has a
Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan to value (LTV) of
0.84x and 104.7%, respectively, and debt of $853psf. The capital
stack also includes a $125 million mezzanine loan. The total debt
Fitch DSCR and LTV are 0.75x and 116.9%, respectively, and the
total debt is $952psf.

Creditworthy Tenancy: Approximately 20% of the net rentable area
(NRA) is leased to creditworthy tenants including: Franklin
Templeton (not rated by Fitch), GIC (AAA/F1+), Orix USA (A-/F2),
Wells Fargo Advisors (parent rated AA-/F1+), Scottrade
(BBB-/Positive) and Starbucks (A/F1).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings for class A and
found that a 10% decline in Fitch's implied NCF would result in a
one-category downgrade, while a 34% decline would result in a
downgrade to below investment grade.

The Rating Sensitivity section in the presale report includes a
detailed explanation of additional stresses and sensitivities. Key
Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further described in
the accompanying presale report.


ABACUS LTD 2006-10: S&P Lowers Class A Notes Rating to CC(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class A, B, and C
notes from Abacus 2006-10 Ltd., a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction backed by commercial mortgage-backed
securities.

The downgrade on the class A notes reflects S&P's expectation that
they will incur a principal loss under the most optimistic
collateral performance scenario within the next 12 months. The
downgrades on the class B and C notes reflect principal losses on
these notes based on recent trustee reports.

  RATINGS LOWERED

  Abacus 2006-10 Ltd.

                   Rating
  Class        To          From
  A            CC (sf)     CCC- (sf)
  B            D (sf)      CCC- (sf)
  C            D (sf)      CCC- (sf)


ACA ABS 2003-2: Moody's Hikes Class A1-SD Notes Rating to Caa3(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by ACA ABS 2003-2, Limited:

US$10,000,000 Class A1-SW Floating Rate Notes, due December 10 ,
2038 (current outstanding balance of $ 78,946.42), Upgraded to Caa3
(sf); previously on May 28, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

US$315,000,000 Class A1-SU Floating Rate Notes, due December 10 ,
2038 (current outstanding balance of $2,486,812.23), Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

US$146,500,000 Class A1-SD Floating Rate Notes, due December 10,
2038 (current outstanding balance of $ 1,156,565.06), Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf); previously on May 28, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

ACA ABS 2003-2, Limited issued in November 2003, is a
collateralized debt obligation backed primarily by a portfolio of
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) originated between
2003 and 2006.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratio since September 2016. The Class
A1-SW, Class A1-SU, and Class A1-SD notes have been paid down
collectively by approximately 91.9%, or $42.0 million, since that
time. Based on Moody's calculation, the OC ratio for the Class A-1S
notes is currently 240.2% versus 67.9% in September 2016. The
paydown of the Class A-1S notes is primarily the result of sales
proceeds of certain assets treated as defaulted by the trustee in
amounts materially exceeding expectations.

Nevertheless, due to shortage in interest proceeds generated by
performing assets, principal proceeds were used to make interest
payments to subordinated notes. Since September 2016, the Class
A-1J and A2 notes have received $4.0 million in interest payments
from principal proceeds.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead To an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: Primary causes of uncertainty about
assumptions are the extent of any deterioration in either consumer
or commercial credit conditions and in the residential real estate
property markets. The residential real estate property market's
uncertainties include housing prices; the pace of residential
mortgage foreclosures, loan modifications and refinancing; the
unemployment rate; and interest rates.

2) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from principal proceeds, recoveries from
defaulted assets, and excess interest proceeds will continue and at
what pace. Faster than expected deleveraging could have a
significantly positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Lack of portfolio granularity: the performance of the portfolio
depends largely on the credit conditions of and cashflows from a
few obligors. The transaction will be negatively affected if these
assets experience deterioration in credit quality and/or disruption
in their cashflows.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Owing to the deal's lack of granularity and credit quality of the
portfolio, Moody's did not use a cash flow model to analyze the
default and recovery properties of the collateral pool. Instead,
Moody's analyzed the transaction by assessing the deal's
sensitivity in scenario runs that include analysing
overcollateralization levels under different default scenarios,
different waterfall mechanisms and asset coverage of the rated
notes.

The deal's ratings are not expected to be sensitive to the typical
range of changes (plus or minus two rating notches on Caa-rated
assets) in the rating quality of the collateral that Moody's tests,
and no sensitivity analysis was performed.


AIR 2: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Series B EENs Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on the following enhanced
equipment notes (EENs) issued by AIR 2 US:

-- Series A EENs at 'BB+/RR1';
-- Series B EENs at 'BB-/RR5'.

AIR 2 US is a special purpose Cayman Islands company created to
issue EENs; use the proceeds to purchase permitted investments; and
enter into a risk transfer agreement. The transaction is structured
as a lease payment securitization backed by payments from United
Airlines for 22 Airbus A320's. The deal initially included payments
from American Airlines for 19 leased A300's, but American's
obligations only ran through October 2011. United's lease payments
were restructured when they filed for bankruptcy in 2002, creating
a continuing deficiency on each payment date. As such, the class C
and class D notes (not rated by Fitch) are subject to on-going
payment deficiencies. The shortfall is funded by allocating a
portion of a pool of permitted investments to the lessor on each
payment date. The class A and B notes continue to receive timely
payments.

AIR 2 US entered into the risk transfer agreement (the Payment
Recovery Agreement), with a subsidiary of Airbus. The primary
provision of the Payment Recovery Agreement states that if United
Airlines, Inc. ('BB'/Outlook Stable) fails to pay scheduled rentals
under existing subleases of aircraft with subsidiaries of Airbus,
AIR 2 US will pay these rental deficiencies to a subsidiary of
Airbus. These deficiency payments will come from the cash flows
created by the Permitted Investments. As such, the greatest risk of
the transaction is the bankruptcy risk of the lessee airline.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch rates this transaction using its Non-Financial Corporates
Notching and Recovery Ratings Criteria. Fitch's analysis utilizes a
discounted cash flow model to determine the NPV of future lease
payments. The analysis assumes that lease payments experience a
severe haircut in the stress case, reflecting a scenario where the
aircraft are rejected and re-leased at a lower rate. The analysis
also assumes a six month re-leasing period, wherein, no rental
proceeds are received. The NPV is then compared to the outstanding
principal balance to determine a recovery rating. Fitch expects
recoveries for series A noteholders to be very strong in a lease
rejection scenario. Discounted lease cash flows, applying heavy
stresses to current A320 lease rates, cover series A principal and
a full liquidity facility draw. The 'BB+/RR1' rating, one notch
above United's 'BB' IDR, reflects the high level of projected
recovery. Fitch notes that the series A notes have sufficient
collateral cushion to withstand a longer re-leasing period, or
lower future lease rates while still maintaining an RR1 recovery
rating.

Expected recoveries for series B noteholders may be weak, in the
'RR5' range, reflecting a high probability of lease payment
shortfalls in a post-rejection scenario. The one-notch differential
between the 'BB-/RR5' rating of the series B notes and United's
'BB' corporate IDR captures this weak recovery potential.

Fitch notes that the aircraft underlying this transaction are not
highly desirable. The collateral aircraft consist of Airbus
A320-200s that were delivered in the mid-1990s and are now in
excess of 20 years old. While newer build A320s would be considered
tier 1 aircraft, older production A320's such as those in this pool
are classified as tier 2 due to the lower demand for these less
fuel efficient vintages.

Although Air 2 US features some structural features that are akin
to EETC transactions or ABS transactions, AIR 2 US is not covered
effectively by Fitch's EETC or ABS ratings criteria. Underlying
aircraft cannot be sold and liquidated in the event of a lease
rejection by United, as they would be in a standard EETC. In
addition, the underlying subleases are not cross-defaulted or
cross-collateralized. ABS transactions include multiple lessors,
whereas Air 2 US is solely reliant on lease payments from United.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Air 2 US is a unique transaction and is not directly comparable to
EETC ratings or other aircraft backed debt. Fitch rates the Air 2
US class A notes in line with United's secured term loan
facilities. The term loans benefit from their security interests in
key strategic assets for United like slots and gates at key
airports. Fitch does not consider the A320s underlying the Air 2 US
transaction to be key strategic assets due to their advanced age.
Nonetheless, both Air 2 US and the United term loans are rated at
'BB+/RR1' due to their strong recovery prospects. The class B notes
are rated one notch below United's unsecured notes reflecting the
subordinated position and relatively weak recovery prospects of the
class B notes.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Air 2 US
include"

-- A stress scenario where the underlying releases are rejected
    in the near- to intermediate term;

-- Lease rates come under pressure, falling below current market
    rates;

-- The collateral aircraft experience a re-leasing period of six
    months.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings are primarily driven by Fitch's recovery expectations
and by the IDR of the underlying airline. Therefore, changes in
either of those factors could lead to rating actions on the Air 2
US notes.

LIQUIDITY

The class A notes are cash collateralized in an amount intended to
cover up to 18 months of interest payments.


ALLEGRO CLO V: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Allegro CLO V, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$317,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$59,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$26,750,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$33,250,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$25,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes , and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Allegro CLO V is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist, in the aggregate, of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 65% ramped as
of the closing date.

AXA Investment Managers, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2951

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2951 to 3394)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2951 to 3836)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


ARES CLO XLV: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Ares XLV CLO Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$341,250,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$53,813,000 Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$27,562,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$36,750,000 Class D Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$23,625,000 Class E Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Ares XLV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of not senior secured loans. The
portfolio is approximately 83% ramped as of the closing date.

Ares CLO Management II LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer has issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $525,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2928

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2928 to 3367)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2928 to 3806)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


ARES CLO XXXV: Moody's Affirms Ba2(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Ares XXXV CLO Ltd.:

US$39,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025,
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on September 29, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on September 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$271,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2025,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on September 29, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on September 29, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$19,750,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on September 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Ares XXXV CLO Ltd., issued in September 2015, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a portfolio of senior
secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in
October 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the short period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
October 2017. In light of the reinvestment restrictions during the
amortization period, and therefore the limited ability of the
manager to effect significant changes to the current collateral
pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that
the collateral pool characteristics will maintain a positive buffer
relative to certain covenant requirements. The deal has also
benefited from a shortening of the portfolio's weighted average
life since September 2016. Furthermore, the transaction's reported
OC ratios have been stable since September 2016.

Nevertheless, the credit quality of the portfolio has deteriorated
since September 2016. Based on the trustee's August 2017 report,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is currently 2872
compared to 2670 in September 2016. Additionally, the weighted
average spread (WAS) of the portfolio has decreased. Based on the
trustee's August 2017 report, the WAS is currently 3.53% compared
to 4.05% in September 2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to a)
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy and b)
the large concentration of upcoming speculative-grade debt
maturities, which could make refinancing difficult for issuers.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2301)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C: +4

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3451)

Class A: 0

Class B: -3

Class C: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $400.2 million, no defaulted par, a
weighted average default probability of 23.05% (implying a WARF of
2876), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.76%, a
diversity score of 78 and a weighted average spread of 3.53%
(before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


ASSET SECURITIZATION 1997-D5: Moody's Affirms C on Cl. PS-1 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service Moody's Investor Service has affirmed the
rating of one interest-only (IO) class of Asset Securitization
Corporation 1997-D5, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1997-D5:

Cl. PS-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the IO class, Class PS-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes. The IO class is the only
outstanding Moody's rated class in this transaction.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.8%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 5.7% at last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

An IO class may be subject to ratings upgrades if there is an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes,
subject to the limits and provisions of the updated IO
methodology.

An IO class may be subject to ratings downgrades if there is (i) a
decline in the credit quality of the reference classes and/or (ii)
paydowns of higher quality reference classes, subject to the limits
and provisions of the updated IO methodology.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Class PS-1 was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 14, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.8% to $3.7
million from $1.8 billion at securitization. The Certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans. Two loans, representing 51%
of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US Government
securities.

Twenty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $102.9 million (64% loss severity on
average).

The sole non-defeased loan is the 2080 North Black Horse Pike Loan
($1.8 million -- 49% of the pool). The loan is secured by a 135,000
square foot (SF) single tenant retail property in Williamstown, New
Jersey located approximately 24 miles southeast of Philadelphia.
This loan is fully-amortizing and the property is fully leased to
Sam's Club through October 2019, which is coterminous with the
maturity date of the loan. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 23%
and 4.67X, respectively.


BANK 2017-BNK7: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Ratings to 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following Ratings and Rating
Outlooks to BANK 2017-BNK7 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-BNK7:

-- $32,602,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35,234,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,439,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,058,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $334,853,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $807,186,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $233,508,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $144,141,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,449,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38,918,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,242,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,063,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,531,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,242,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,063,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,531,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

-- $34,594,180ab class X-G;
-- $34,594,180b class G;
-- $60,690,746.32bc RR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Sept. 28, 2017.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Sept. 13, 2017, the
class X-B changed from 'A-sf' to 'AA-sf' based on the final deal
structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 65 loans secured by 83
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,213,814,926 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC; Bank of America, National
Association; and National Cooperative Bank, N.A.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 82.1% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 86.3%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is lower than recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and loan
to value (LTV) for the pool are 1.53x and 90.9%, respectively,
significantly better than the year-to-date (YTD) 2017 averages of
1.25x and 101.4%. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion and
multifamily cooperative loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of
1.22x and 106.7%, respectively, in line with the YTD 2017
normalized averages of 1.20x and 106.7%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans, representing
21.4% of the pool, have investment-grade credit opinions. General
Motors Building (9.2% of the pool), Westin Building Exchange
(5.6%), The Churchill (4.0%), and Moffett Place B4 (2.6%) have
investment-grade credit opinions of 'AAAsf*', 'AAAsf*', 'AAAsf*'
and 'BBB-sf*', respectively, on a stand-alone basis. Combined, the
four loans have a weighted average (WA) Fitch DSCR and LTV of 1.80x
and 50.6%.

Above-Average Multifamily Concentration: Loans secured by
multifamily properties make up 22.2% of the pool, which is well
above the YTD 2017 average of 6.8% for other Fitch-rated
multiborrower transactions. Loans secured by multifamily properties
have a below-average probability of default in Fitch's
multiborrower model.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 15.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2017-BNK7 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


BAYVIEW KOITERE 2017-RT4: Fitch Assigns Bsf Rating to Cl. B5 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to Bayview Koitere
Fund Trust 2017-RT4 (BKFT 2017-RT4):

-- $79,074,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $79,074,000 class A-IOA notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $79,074,000 class A-IOB notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $9,317,000 class B1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,317,000 class B1-IOA notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,317,000 class B1-IOB notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,807,000 class B2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,807,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,346,000 class B3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,346,000 class B3-IOA notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $7,346,000 class B3-IOB notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $6,510,000 class B4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $4,300,000 class B5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $10,094,297 class B6 notes.

The notes are supported by a pool of 2,052 seasoned performing and
re-performing loans (RPL) totaling $119.45 million, which including
$4.1 million in non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as
of the cutoff date. Distributions of principal and interest and
loss allocations are based on a sequential pay, senior subordinate
structure.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A, A-IOA and A-IOB notes reflects
the 33.80% subordination provided by the 7.80% class B1, 2.35%
class B2, 6.15% class B3, 5.45% class B4, 3.60% class B5, and 8.45%
class B6 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer (Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, RSS2+), the representation (rep) and warranty
framework, minimal due diligence findings, and the sequential pay
structure.


KEY RATING DRIVERS

Recent Delinquencies (Negative): Approximately 30.5% of the
borrowers in the pool have had a delinquency in the prior 24
months, with 22.5% occurring in the past 12 months. The majority of
the pool (53.5%) has received a modification due to performance
issues. Although the borrowers had prior delinquencies as recent as
two or three months ago and tend to be chronic late payers, the
seasoning of roughly 11 years indicates a willingness to stay in
their home.

Low Property Values (Negative): Based on Fitch's analysis, the
average current property value of the pool is approximately
$112,000, which is lower than the average of other Fitch-rated RPL
transactions of over $150,000. Historical data from CoreLogic Loan
Performance indicate that recently observed loss severities (LS)
have been higher for very low property values than implied by
Fitch's loan loss model. For this reason, LS floors were applied to
loans with property values below $100,000, which increased the
'AAAsf' loss expectation by roughly 230 basis points (bps).

Tier I Representation Framework (Positive): While the breach review
trigger has been revised from prior transactions, Fitch still
considers the transaction's representation, warranty and
enforcement (RW&E) mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I
quality. The automatic third-party review performed on any loan
that becomes 120+ days delinquent or experienced a realized loss
has been replaced with an automatic review of any loan that incurs
a realized loss or is 180 or more days delinquent after cumulative
realized losses plus the 180+ delinquency bucket exceeds 50% of the
single-B percentage as of the closing date. In addition, any
unaffiliated investor has the ability to cause a third-party review
(TPR) on any loans within 180 days of the loan incurring a realized
loss.

The transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws) as well as a backstop by Bayview Asset Management
(BAM) in the event the sponsor, Koitere Fund L.P., is liquidated or
terminated.

Due Diligence Findings (Negative): A third-party review, which was
conducted on 100% of the pool, resulted in 14.7% (or 302 loans)
graded 'C' or 'D'. For 230 loans, the due diligence results showed
issues regarding high-cost testing; the loans were either missing
the final HUD1, used alternate documentation to test, or had
incomplete loan files. Therefore, a slight upward revision to the
model output LS was applied, as further described in the
Third-Party Due Diligence section beginning on page six of the
presale report. In addition, timelines were extended on 227 loans
that were missing final modification documents (excluding 54 loans
that were already adjusted for HUD1 issues).

Hurricane Harvey and Irma Loans (Mixed): The extent of damage from
Hurricane Harvey and Irma to properties in the mortgage pool is not
yet known. The servicer, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (BLS), will be
conducting inspections on properties located in counties designated
as major disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) as a result of Harvey and Irma.

The sponsor is obligated to repurchase loans that have incurred
property damage due to water, flood or hurricane prior to the
transaction's closing that adversely affects the value of the
property. Fitch currently does not expect the effect of the storm
damage to have rating implications due to the repurchase obligation
of the sponsor and due to the limited exposure to affected areas
relative to the credit enhancement (CE) of the rated bonds.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
In addition, 40 bps from the interest remittance amount will be
used to pay down principal as well as any excess interest
allocation from the loan-level daily interest accrual calculation.
The provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest on the
'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions, as well as the application of excess interest to the
notes, is highly supportive of timely interest payments to those
classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS are less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Koitere Fund
L.P., will acquire and retain a 5% vertical interest in each class
of the securities to be issued.

In addition, the sponsor will also be the rep provider until at
least September 2024. If the fund is liquidated or terminated, BAM
will be obligated to provide a remedy for material breaches
of R&Ws.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $4.1 million (3.4%) of the unpaid
principal balance are outstanding on 1,534 loans. Fitch included
the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited
relative to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Servicing Fee Stress (Negative): Fitch determined that the
servicing fee may be insufficient to attract subsequent servicers
under a period of poor performance and high delinquencies. To
account for the potentially higher fee above what is allowed for
under the current transaction documents, Fitch's cash flow analysis
assumed a 100-bp servicing fee.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria," and one criteria variation from
"U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria," which are described below.

The first variation relates to overriding the default assumption
for original DTI in Fitch's Loan Loss model. Based on a historical
data analysis of over 750,000 loans from Fannie Mae and Fitch's
rated RPL transactions, Fitch assumed an original debt-to-income
ratio (DTI) of 45% for all loans in pool that did not have original
DTI data available (100% of the pool). The historical loan data
supports the DTI assumption of 45%. Prior to conducting the
historical analysis, Fitch had previously assumed 55% for loans
that were missing original DTI values.

The second variation is that 0.05% of the tax, title, and lien
review will be conducted within 90 days after securitization. If
there are any issues found, the loan will be repurchased from the
trust. Fitch also considered the robust servicing and ongoing
monitoring from Bayview Loan Servicing, which is a high-touch
servicing platform that specializes in seasoned loans. Given the
strength of the servicer, Fitch considered the impact of a small
percentage of missing tax, title, and lien reviews as of the
closing date to be nonmaterial.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 37.5% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


CBAM LLC 2017-3: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E-2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following rating to a class of notes issued by CBAM 2017-3 (Secured
Note) LLC:

US$299,100,000 Class A Secured Notes due 2029 (the "Class A Secured
Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf) with respect to the ultimate cash
receipt of the Class A Secured Note Balance (as defined in the
transaction's indenture).

The Class A Secured Notes are composed of the following components
that were issued by CBAM 2017-3, Ltd. (the "CLO Issuer") on
September 29, 2017:

US$51,999,999 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$67,925,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$74,100,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$12,999,999 Class E-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class E-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$93,527,499 Subordinated Notes (the "Subordinated Notes")

The Class B-2 Notes, Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class
E-2 Notes, and the Subordinated Notes are referred to herein,
collectively as the "CLO Notes". The Secured Note Issuer was
created solely to issue secured notes.

The secured notes' structure includes several notable features. The
Class A Secured Notes promise the repayment of Class A Secured Note
Balance and do not bear a stated rate of interest. Moody's rating
of the Class A Secured Notes does not address any other payments or
additional amounts that a holder of the Class A Secured Notes may
receive pursuant to the underlying documents. In addition to the
Class A Secured Notes, the Secured Notes Issuer issued Class B
Secured Notes. Any proceeds from the CLO Notes will be first
applied to the payment of principal of the Class A Secured Notes
until its principal is reduced to zero and second, distributed to
the Class B Secured Notes. While the Class A Secured Notes are
outstanding, the CLO Notes will not be refinanced.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating of the Class A Secured Notes addresses the expected
loss posed to noteholders. The rating reflects the risks due to
defaults on the CLO Issuer's underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the CLO
Issuer's underlying assets.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1,
Section 3.4 and Appendix 14 ("Approach to Rating Instruments that
Are Backed by CLO Secured Debt Tranches and Equity, and CLO
Instruments with non-Standard Promises") of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions for the CLO Issuer's portfolio:

Par amount: $1,300,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.53%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

The CLO Issuer is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes of the
CLO Issuer are collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first
lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and senior unsecured loans.

CBAM CLO Management LLC (the "CLO Manager") directs the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the CLO
Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the CLO Issuer's four year reinvestment period.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

The performance of the Class A Secured Notes is subject to
uncertainty. The performance of the Class A Secured Notes is
sensitive to the performance of the CLO Notes and the CLO Issuer's
portfolio, which in turn depend on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The CLO Manager's investment decisions and
management of the CLO Issuer will also affect the performance of
the Class A Secured Notes.

The rating on the Class A Secured Notes, which combines cash flows
from the CLO Notes, is subject to a higher degree of volatility
than the rated notes of the CLO Issuer, primarily due to the
uncertainty of cash flows from the Subordinated Notes. Moody's
applied haircuts to the cash flows from the Subordinated Notes
based on the target rating of the Class A Secured Notes. Actual
distributions from the Subordinated Notes that differ significantly
from Moody's assumptions can lead to a faster (or slower) speed of
reduction in the Class A Secured Note Balance, thereby resulting in
better (or worse) ratings performance than previously expected.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the rating assigned to the Class A Secured Notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case default probability assumption for the
CLO Issuer's portfolio.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Class A
Secured Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference
versus the current model output, whereby a negative difference
corresponds to higher expected losses), holding all other factors
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Secured Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Secured Notes: -2


CBAM LTD 2017-3: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to eight classes of
notes issued by CBAM 2017-3, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "CBAM 2017-3").

Moody's rating action is:

US$13,000,000 Class X Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class X
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$832,000,000 Class A Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class A
Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$101,263,158 Class B-1 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$54,736,842 Class B-2 Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the "Class
B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$71,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$78,000,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 (the
"Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$44,815,790 Class E-1 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class E-1 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$13,684,210 Class E-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029
(the "Class E-2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class
B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E-1
Notes and the Class E-2 Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

CBAM 2017-3 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and senior
unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately
75% ramped as of the closing date.

CBAM CLO Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $1,300,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.53%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E-1 Notes: 0

Class E-2 Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E-1 Notes: -1

Class E-2 Notes: -1


CG-CCRE COMMERCIAL 2014-FL2: S&P Hikes Cl. SSS Certs Rating to B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on five nonpooled classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from CG-CCRE
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-FL2, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P
affirmed its ratings on six pooled classes and five other nonpooled
classes from the same transaction.

The rating actions on the principal- and interest-paying
certificate classes follow S&P's analysis of the transaction
primarily using its criteria for rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS
transactions. This included a review of the collateral securing the
remaining five interest-only (IO) floating-rate mortgage loans in
the trust, the deal structure, and the liquidity available to the
trust.

The downgrades on the nonpooled STC1, STC2, STC3, CURT, and SSS
rake classes reflect S&P's analysis of the South Towne Center,
Curtis Center, and Sheraton Station Square loans. The STC, CURT,
and SSS classes derive 100% of their cash flow from a subordinate
nonpooled portion of the South Towne Center, Curtis Center, and
Sheraton Station Square loans, respectively. Details on these loans
are below.

S&P said, "The affirmations on the pooled principal- and
interest-paying certificate classes reflect our expectation that
the available credit enhancement for these classes will generally
be within our estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required
for the current ratings.

"The affirmations of the class COL1, COL2, and COL3 rake
certificates reflect our analysis of the Colonie Center loan. The
$110.0 million trust loan is secured by 759,750 sq. ft. of a 1.33
million-sq.-ft. regional mall in Albany, N.Y. The class COL rake
certificates derive 100% of their cash flows from the subordinate
nonpooled component totaling $36.3 million of the loan. Our
property analysis concluded stable operating performance, and using
a 7.25% capitalization rate, we derived an S&P Global Ratings'
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 99.4% on the trust balance.

"The affirmations on the class RGN1 and RGN2 rake certificates
reflect our analysis of the Regions Tower loans. The $50.0 million
trust loan is secured by a 685,612-sq.-ft. office property in
Indianapolis, Ind. The class RGN rake certificates derive 100% of
their cash flows from the subordinate nonpooled component totaling
$10.4 million of the loan. Our property analysis concluded stable
operating performance, and using a 7.50% capitalization rate, we
derived an S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio of 79.7% on the trust
balance.

"The affirmation on the class X-EXT IO certificates is based on our
criteria for rating IO securities, in which the rating on the IO
securities would not be higher than that of the lowest-rated
reference class. The notional balance on class X-EXT references
classes A, B, C, D, and E."

As of the Sept. 15, 2017, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of five floating-rate IO loans indexed to one-month LIBOR
with an aggregate pooled trust balance of $345.7 million and an
aggregate trust balance of $447.3 million, down from six loans
totaling $410.2 million pooled trust balance and $512.0 million
trust balance at issuance. Four loans mature in 2017, and the
remaining loan matures in 2018. All of the loans have extension
options remaining with final maturities in 2019. According to the
transaction documents, the borrowers will pay the special
servicing, work-out, and liquidation fees, as well as costs and
expenses incurred from appraisals and inspections conducted by the
special servicer. The trust has not incurred any principal losses
to date.

Details on the three loans with material cash flow changes are as
follows:

-- The South Towne Center loan, the largest loan remaining in the
pool, has a whole loan balance of $146.3 million that is split into
a $113.1 million (32.7% of the pool trust balance) senior pooled
trust participation interest and a $33.2 million subordinate
nonpooled trust participation interest that provides support to the
STC rake classes. In addition, the borrower's equity interest in
the whole loan secures mezzanine debt totaling $20.0 million. The
loan is IO, pays a floating interest rate of LIBOR plus spread
(2.72898% [pooled], 4.36680% [nonpooled]) per year, and currently
matures Nov. 9, 2017. The loan has two one-year extension options
remaining. The loan is secured by 1,065,947 sq. ft. of a
1,277,885-sq.-ft. super regional mall and power center in Sandy,
Utah. The loan is on the master servicer's watchlist because the
borrower has requested for a six-month maturity extension. Our
analysis considered the decline in servicer-reported net operating
income (NOI) due to increasing operating expenses and decreasing
revenue. The master servicer, KeyBank Real Estate Capital (KeyBank)
reported a debt service coverage (DSC) and occupancy for year-end
2016 of 2.49x and 94.5%, respectively, on the trust balance. S&P's
expected-case valuation, using a 7.50% S&P Global Ratings'
capitalization rate, yielded an 83.1% S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio
on the trust balance.

-- The Curtis Center loan, the second-largest loan remaining in
the pool, has a whole loan balance of $102.0 million that is
divided into a $90.2 million (26.1%) senior pooled trust balance
and a $11.8 million subordinate nonpooled trust balance that
provide support to the CURT rake class. In addition, the borrower's
equity interest in the whole loan secures mezzanine debt totaling
$48.0 million. The loan is IO, pays a floating interest rate of
LIBOR plus spread (3.2941% [pooled], 4.01350% [nonpooled]) per
year, and currently matures Oct. 9, 2017. The loan has two one-year
extension options remaining. The loan is secured by a mixed-use
(office/retail) building totaling 885,786 sq. ft., located in the
central business district of Philadelphia, Penn. Our analysis
considered the declining servicer-reported NOI and occupancy since
issuance. KeyBank reported a 72.7% occupancy and a 1.74x DSC for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2016. S&P's expected-case valuation, using
a 7.00% S&P Global Ratings' capitalization rate, yielded an 83.0%
S&P Global Ratings' LTV ratio on the trust balance.

-- The Sheraton Station Square loan, the smallest loan remaining
in the pool, has a whole loan balance of $39.0 million that is
divided into a $29.1 million (8.4%) senior pooled trust
participation interest and a $9.9 million subordinated nonpooled
trust participation interest. In addition, the borrower's equity
interest in the whole loan secures mezzanine debt totaling $22.6
million. The loan is IO, pays a floating interest rate of LIBOR
plus spread (2.60000% [pooled], 5.01350% [nonpooled]) per year, and
currently matures Nov. 9, 2017. The loan has two one-year extension
options remaining. The loan is secured by a 399-key, full-service
hotel in Pittsburgh, Penn. The loan is on KeyBank's watchlist
because the loan matures in November 2017, and the first-quarter
2017 debt yield test was 5.75%, which failed to meet the debt yield
trigger event threshold of 12.24% or the debt yield cure of 13.03%.
Our analysis considered the servicer-reported declining NOI.
KeyBank reported a DSC and occupancy of 3.03x and 57.4%,
respectively, for the trailing 12 months ended March 31, 2017.
S&P's expected-case valuation, using a 9.25% S&P Global Ratings'
capitalization rate, yielded an 85.6% S&P Global Ratings' LTV
ratio.

RATINGS LIST

  CG-CCRE Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-FL2
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-FL2

                                         Rating
  Class       Identifier          To                 From
  A           12528PAA0           AAA (sf)           AAA (sf)
  X-EXT       12528PAG7           BBB- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
  B           12528PAB8           AA- (sf)           AA- (sf)  
  C           12528PAC6           A (sf)             A (sf)  
  D           12528PAD4           A- (sf)            A- (sf)
  E           12528PAE2           BBB- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
  STC1        12528PAJ1           BB (sf)            BBB- (sf)
  STC2        12528PAK8           B+ (sf)            BB (sf)
  STC3        12528PAL6           B+ (sf)            BB- (sf)  
  CURT        12528PAM4           BB- (sf)           BBB- (sf)  
  COL1        12528PAN2           BBB- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
  COL2        12528PAP7           BB- (sf)           BB- (sf)  
  COL3        12528PAQ5           B- (sf)            B- (sf)  
  RGN1        12528PAS1           BBB- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
  RGN2        12528PAT9           BB- (sf)           BB- (sf)
  SSS         12528PAU6           B+ (sf)            BB- (sf)


CIM TRUST 2017-7: Fitch to Rate Class B2 Notes 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate CIM Trust 2017-7 as follows:

-- $264,166,000 class A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $264,166,000 class A-IO notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $47,657,000 class M1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,657,000 class M1-IO notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,829,000 class M2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,829,000 class M2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,067,000 class M3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,067,000 class M3-IO notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $34,334,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37,409,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $91,984,384 class B3 notes;
-- $512,446,384 notional class A-IO-S notes.

The notes are supported by 3,548 seasoned performing and
re-performing mortgages with a total balance of approximately
$512.5 million (which includes $34.4 million, or 6.7%, of the
aggregate pool balance in non-interest-bearing deferred principal
amounts) as of the cut-off date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A1 notes reflects the 48.45%
subordination provided by the 9.30% class M1, 4.65% class M2, 2.55%
class M3, 6.70% class B1, 7.30% class B2, and 17.95% class B3
notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicer, Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS, rated RPS1-), and the
representation (rep) and warranty framework, minimal due diligence
findings and the sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs). Based on Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) methodology,
6.8% of the loans were 30 days delinquent and 1.1% of the loans
were 60 days delinquent as of the cut-off date. Of these, 59.7%
have either experienced a delinquency in the past 24 months, or had
an incomplete pay string, identified by Fitch as "dirty current."
The remaining 32.4% have been paying for the past 24 months,
identified as "clean current"; 83.2% of the loans have received
modifications.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, or a
majority-owned affiliate, will retain at least a 5% eligible
horizontal interest in the securities to be issued. Fitch considers
the transaction's representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier 1 quality. The
transaction benefits from life-of-loan representations and
warranties (R&Ws).

New Issuer (Neutral): This is Chimera Investment Corporation's
first rated RPL securitization. Chimera has been involved as an
issuer in 16 non-rated RPL securitizations since 2014 and completed
five prime jumbo securitizations from 2008 to 2012. Fitch conducted
a full review of Chimera's aggregation processes and believes they
meet industry standards that are needed to properly aggregate and
securitize re-performing and non-performing residential mortgage
loans (RPL and NPL, respectively). In addition to the satisfactory
operational assessment, a due diligence review was completed on
100% of the pool.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing.

Limited Excess Cash Flow (Negative): The excess cash flow in the
structure is limited due to the inclusion of corresponding
interest-only (IO) notes for all of the non net-WAC classes (class
A, M1, M2, and M3) which results in nearly all of the interest from
the collateral being used to pay interest to the bonds. This, in
conjunction with principal being diverted to pay interest to the A
and M1 bonds, causes the difference between Fitch's expected losses
and the subordination needed to be higher than in other recently
rated RPL transactions.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Mixed): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted on 100% of the pool and focused on regulatory
compliance, pay history, and a tax and title lien search. The
third-party review (TPR) firms' due diligence review resulted in
7.7% 'C' and 'D' graded loans, meaning the loans had material
violations or lacked documentation to confirm regulatory
compliance. This is below the average of approximately 10.8% seen
in other recently rated RPL transactions and demonstrates
relatively low operational risk.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $34.4 million (6.7%) of the unpaid
principal balance are outstanding on 1,877 loans. Fitch included
the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (i.e. sale or refinancing) will be limited relative
to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severities
(LS) are less for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf'
rated classes.

Hurricane Harvey and Irma Loans (Negative): Inspections were
ordered on properties located in counties designated as major
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as
a result of Hurricane Harvey. Out of the 125 loans in the disaster
areas, only two loans showed minimal damage and therefore remain in
the loan pool. The extent of damage from Hurricane Irma to
properties in the mortgage pool is not yet known. Currently, 16.9%
of the pool is located in disaster areas in AL, FL, GA, and SC.
Within 30 days of the closing date, the servicer will order
inspections on properties located in designated disaster areas.

The remedy provider is obligated to repurchase loans that have
incurred property damage due to water, flood, or hurricane prior to
the transaction's closing that adversely affects the value of the
property. Fitch currently does not expect the effect of the storm
damage to have rating implications due to the repurchase obligation
of the sponsor and due to the limited exposure to affected areas
relative to the credit enhancement (CE) of the rated bonds.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria," which is described below.

The variation relates to overriding the default assumption for
original debt-to-income ratio (DTI) in Fitch's Loan Loss model.
Based on a historical data analysis of over 750,000 loans from
Fannie Mae and Fitch's rated RPL transactions, Fitch assumed an
original DTI of 45% for all loans in pool that did not have
original DTI data available (100% of the pool). The historical loan
data supports the DTI assumption of 45%. Prior to conducting the
historical analysis, Fitch had previously assumed 55% for loans
that were missing original DTI values.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 37.7% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


CITIGROUP 2017-P8: Fitch Assigns Final B- Ratings on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings and Outlooks to Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-P8 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

-- $31,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $40,600,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $285,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $317,631,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,700,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $111,022,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $833,953,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41,310,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41,310,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,601,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,765,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,765,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,655,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,655,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,328,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,328,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.
-- $43,892,263bcd class V-2A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,174,211bcd class V-2B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,242,158bcd class V-2C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,513,947bcd class V-2D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,308,632bcd class V-3AC 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $2,513,947bcd class V-3D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

-- $36,147,149b class G;
-- $36,147,149ab class X-G;
-- $54,355,745bc class V-1;
-- $3,533,166bcd class V-2E;
-- $3,533,166bcd class V-3E.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.
(d) Exchangeable classes that are components of class V-1.

Since Fitch issued its expected ratings on Sept. 8, 2017, the
issuer removed the interest-only class X-C; as such, Fitch withdrew
its expected rating on this class. Also, the V-2A, V-2B, V-2C,
V-2D, V-2E, V-3AC, V-3D and V-3E classes have been added to the
transaction as exchangeable certificates exchangeable for class
V-1. The classes above reflect the final ratings and deal
structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 53 loans secured by 167
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,087,114,895 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Citi Real Estate Funding Inc., Barclays Bank PLC,
Principal Commercial Capital, Starwood Mortgage Capital LLC and
Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 75% of the properties by
balance, cash flow analysis of 89.8%, and asset summary reviews on
100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage in Line with Recent Transactions: The pool has a
weighted average Fitch DSCR of 1.26x, which is slightly better than
the 2016 average of 1.21x and approximately in line with the YTD
2017 average of 1.25x for other recent Fitch-rated U.S.
multiborrower deals. Additionally, the pool's weighted average
Fitch LTV of 100% is slightly better than the 2016 and YTD 2017
averages of 105.2% and 101.4%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Three loans representing
11.98% of the pool received an investment grade credit opinion on a
stand-alone basis including, 225 & 233 Park Avenue South
(BBB-sf*), General Motors Building (AAAsf*) and 245 Park (BBB-sf*).
This is higher than the 2016 and YTD 2017 averages of 8.36% and
11.33% for other recent Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals.
Fitch's stressed conduit DSCR and LTV, net of credit opinion loans,
are 1.24x and 104.8%, respectively.

Diverse Pool: Top 10 loans comprise 43.5% of the pool by balance.
This is better than average when compared with the 2016 and YTD
2017 averages of 54.8% and 53.3%, respectively. As a result, the
pool's loan concentration index (LCI) of 301 is below the 2016 and
YTD 2017 averages of 422 and 399, respectively.

Higher Office and Lower Hotel Concentrations: The largest property
type in the pool is office at 43.4% of the pool by balance,
followed by retail at 32.4% and hotel at 10.1%. Office
concentration is significantly higher than the 2016 average of
28.7% and slightly higher than the YTD 2017 average of 41.3%.
Retail concentration is average compared to 31.4% for other
Fitch-rated deals in 2016 but higher than the YTD 2017 average of
24.3%. The pool's hotel concentration is lower than the 2016 and
YTD 2017 averages of 16% and 15.8%, respectively. Loans secured by
hotel properties have an above-average probability of default in
Fitch's multiborrower model, all else equal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 9.6% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CGCMT 2017-P8 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2015-GC35: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust (CGCMT) 2015-GC35 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2015-GC34.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the overall stable performance of the
majority of the underlying collateral with no material changes to
pool metrics since issuance. As of the September 2017 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
0.84% to $1.096 billion from $1.105 billion at issuance. Currently,
there is one specially serviced loan (2.9%) while seven additional
loans (9%) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs). The
majority of these loans are experiencing performance issues
anticipated at closing. All loans remain current. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting the non-rated class H.

Specially Serviced Loan: The 10th largest loan in the pool, Hammons
Hotel Portfolio (2.9% of the pool), transferred to special
servicing in August 2016 due to the borrower and parent company
filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The filing was made in connection
with litigation, which was ongoing at issuance, related to a
complex deal made in 2005 to reprivatize Hammons Hotels. Overall
portfolio cash flow has improved since issuance, with year-end (YE)
2016 net cash flow (NCF) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) at
1.96x, up from 1.88x at YE 2015. Further, per the trailing 12
months (TTM) June 2017 STR reporting, the weighted average revenue
per available room (RevPAR) penetration for the collateral
properties was 119.9%.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Seven additional loans (9% of the pool) are
considered FLOCs, including the eighth largest loan in the
transaction. At issuance, 750 Lexington Avenue (4.2% of the pool)
was facing a large imminent lease roll; Locke Lord, which occupied
31% of the net rentable area (NRA; 22% of the revenue),
subsequently vacated the property at lease expiration in June 2016.
The loan includes a $7.75 million upfront leasing reserve related
to this space. Fitch will continue to monitor the leasing status of
the space.

High Hotel Exposure: Approximately 23% of the pool by balance
consists of loans secured by hotel properties, including four of
the largest 10 loans. This concentration is above the average for
Fitch-rated transactions of similar vintage. Hotels have the
highest probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower CMBS
model.

Above-Average Pool Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for
63% of the pool by balance, which is higher than Fitch-rated
transactions of similar vintage.

Pool Amortization: To date, the pool has paid down by only 0.84%.
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is scheduled
to amortize by approximately 7.7%. Eight loans (37.8%) are full
term interest only while 23 loans (33.1%) are partial interest
only.

Hurricane Exposure: Fitch has identified eight loans (4.7% of the
pool), which are located in areas of Texas and Florida impacted by
Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Servicer reporting on the six Texas
locations noted significant flooding damage at one small retail
property (0.4%), which was factored into Fitch's analysis. A
servicer update on any damage to the Florida properties has not yet
been received; however, recent Fitch inquiries found the three
properties open for business.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction, and also serves
as the backup advancing agent. Fitch recently downgraded Deutsche
Bank's Issuer Default Rating to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A-'/'F1' on Sept.
28, 2017. Please refer to press release, "Fitch: Deutsche Bank
Downgrade Breaches SF Counterparty Triggers," dated Oct. 3, 2017
for further details. Fitch is in discussion with Deutsche Bank for
potential mitigants.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $21.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $111.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $386.6 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44.5 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $829.3 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.4 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $183.7 million class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.4 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58 million* class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.1 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

* Notional amount and interest only.

Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged for
class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged
for the class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G or the class H.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2017-P8: S&P Assigns BB Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-P8's $917.9 million commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2017-P8.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction backed by 53 commercial mortgage loans with an
aggregate principal balance of $1.087 billion ($917.9 million of
offered certificates), secured by the fee and leasehold interests
in 167 properties across 32 states.

The ratings reflect the credit support provided by the transaction
structure, S&P's view of the underlying collateral's economics, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the collateral pool's relative
diversity, and our overall qualitative assessment of the
transaction.

Since preliminary ratings were issued, the X-C certificate class
has been removed from the transaction. Additionally, a portion of
the non-offered vertical risk retention will be rated, as
represented by the V-2A through V-2D, V-3AC, and V-3D certificates.


RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-P8
  Class       Rating             Amount ($)
  A-1         AAA (sf)           31,000,000
  A-2         AAA (sf)           40,600,000
  A-3         AAA (sf)          285,000,000
  A-4         AAA (sf)          317,631,000
  A-AB        AAA (sf)           48,700,000
  X-A         AAA (sf)          833,953,000(i)
  X-B         AA (sf)            41,310,000(i)
  A-S         AAA (sf)          111,022,000
  B           AA (sf)            41,310,000
  C           A (sf)             42,601,000
  X-D(ii)     BBB- (sf)          47,765,000(i)
  X-E(ii)     BB (sf)            20,655,000(i)
  X-F(ii)     BB- (sf)           10,328,000(i)
  X-G(ii)     NR                 36,147,149(i)
  D(ii)       BBB- (sf)          47,765,000
  E(ii)       BB (sf)            20,655,000
  F(ii)       BB- (sf)           10,328,000
  G(ii)       NR                 36,147,149
  V-1(ii)     NR                 30,771,042(iii)
  V-2A(ii)    AAA (sf)            9,227,244(iii)
  V-2B(ii)    AA (sf)               457,073(iii)
  V-2C(ii)    A(sf)                 471,073(iii)
  V-2D(ii)    BBB-(sf)              528,494(iii)
  V-2E(ii)    NR                    742,759(iii)
  V-3AC(ii)   A (sf)             10,805,216(iii)
  V-3D(ii)    BBB- (sf)             562,295(iii)
  V-3E(ii)    NR                    790,265(iii)


(i)Notional balance.
(ii)Non-offered certificates.
(iii)Initial balance. Class V-1 certificates can be exchanged for
Class V-2A through Class V-3E certificates.
NR--Not rated.


COMM 2017-COR2: Fitch Assigns B- Rating to Class G-RR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to COMM 2017-COR2 Mortgage Trust Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-COR2:

-- $23,905,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,998,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $255,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $315,633,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $703,398,000 class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,862,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,533,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $44,678,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,533,000 class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,640,000 class X-D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,640,000 class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22,912,000 class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,621,000 class F-RR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,602,000 class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Sept. 28, 2017.

Fitch does not rate the $40,096,327 class H-RR.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 42 loans secured by 55
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$916,480,327 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Jefferies LoanCore LLC, German American Capital
Corporation and Citi Real Estate Funding Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 80.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 80.0%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage Compared to Recent Transactions: The pool has
higher leverage than other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.15x is lower than both the year-to-date (YTD) 2017 average of
1.25x and the 2016 average of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch loan to value
(LTV) of 109.8% is higher than both the YTD 2017 average of 101.6%
and the 2016 average of 105.2%.

Limited Amortization: There are 14 loans (42.1% of the pool) that
are full-term interest-only and 17 loans (39.0%) that are partial
interest-only. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool
will pay down by 8.4%, which is below both the YTD 2017 average of
8.2% and the 2016 average of 10.4%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The seventh largest loan,
Colorado Center (4.4% of the pool) has a credit opinion of 'A+sf*'
on a stand-alone basis; this is below the YTD 2017 average of 11.3%
credit opinion loans in other Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. Net of this loan, the Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.14x
and 112.1%, respectively, for this transaction.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 7.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the COMM
2017-COR2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


COMM 2017-DLTA: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to COMM 2017-DLTA Mortgage
Trust's $283.0 million commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction
backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial mortgage loan
totaling $283.0 million with five one-year extension options,
secured by the fee simple interest in 56 industrial properties
within northern California.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsors' and managers' experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  COMM 2017-DLTA Mortgage Trust

  Class       Rating(i)          Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)          118,916,000
  X-EXT       NR                          0(ii)
  B           AA- (sf)           29,363,000
  C           A- (sf)            22,021,000
  D           BBB- (sf)          27,014,000
  E           BB- (sf)           36,702,000
  F           B- (sf)            34,834,000
  VRR(iii)    NR                 14,150,000

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii)The class X-EXT certificates' amount will equal to zero, and
any prepayment charges will be allocated to this class and the
class VRR certificates.
(iii)Non-offered vertical risk retention class.
NR--Not rated.


COSMOPOLITAN HOTEL 2016: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on five classes of
Cosmopolitan Hotel Trust 2016-COSMO, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-COSMO. Moody's rating action
is:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 9, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on five P&I classes due to the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
being within acceptable ranges.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns, an increase in defeasance or
an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2017 Payment Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance remains unchanged at $1.037 Billion.
The securitization is backed by a single floating rate loan
collateralized by The Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas. The interest only
loan's final maturity date including three one-year extensions is
in November 2021. The property encumbered with $513 million of
subordinated mezzanine debt.

The Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas is a full-service, luxury hotel and
casino located on the Las Vegas Strip, NV. The hotel opened in 2010
and is one of the newest properties in the market. The property
features 3,005 rooms and suites situated within two high-rise
towers, a 111,500 SF casino, 30 restaurants, lounges and bars, a
nightclub/dayclub, full-service spa, two fitness centers, a live
theater, 23,500 SF of retail, three outdoor swimming pools, various
public and private spa pools, two rooftop tennis courts, business
center, and 250,000 SF of meeting/conference space.

The property's Net Cash Flow (NCF) for the trailing twelve month
period ending March 2017 was $235.6 million, up significantly from
$172.0 Million at securitization. Moody's stabilized NCF is $133.1
million, the same as securitization. Moody's stressed LTV and
stressed DSCR are 91% and 1.39X, respectively. The trust has not
incurred any losses or interest shortfalls as of the current
Payment Date.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes and downgraded one class of
Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust (CSMC) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2006-C4.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with only 17
loans remaining, and the top three loans represent 75% of the pool.
In addition, the second and third largest loans (47%) are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC). Due to the concentrated
nature of the pool, Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis which
grouped the remaining loans based on loan structural features,
collateral quality and performance, which ranked them by their
perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes fully amortizing
loans, balloon loans, and FLOCs. The ratings reflect this
sensitivity analysis.

High Percentage of Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated nine
loans (62.5% of the pool balance) as FLOCs, which includes five
specially serviced loans (28.6%). The four FLOCs not in special
servicing (29.2%) are characterized by deteriorating performance,
near-term tenant rollover and/or previously modified loans
including one Hope Note (4.7%). The transaction's distressed
ratings reflect the high percentage of FLOCs, as well as the
concentrated nature of the pool.

Maturity Schedule: The remaining loans have maturity dates as
follows: 2017 (26.8%), 2018 (29.4%), 2019 (8%), 2021(6.9%) and 2026
(1.7%). In addition, three loans (27.2%) matured in 2016 and are in
special servicing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future upgrades are unlikely due to the portfolio's concentration;
however, upgrades to class A-J are possible in the event recoveries
are better than expected on the second largest loan in the pool
(25.5%), which is also the largest FLOC. Classes B and C are
subject to further downgrades should more loans transfer to special
servicing and/or additional losses are realized.

Fitch has downgraded the following class:
-- $12 million class D to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE 0%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $101 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 95%;
-- $26.7 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $64.1 million class C at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.
-- $0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.
-- $0 class Q at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4 FL, A-1-A and A-M were repaid in
full. Fitch does not rate the class S certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the ratings on the interest-only class A-X,
A-SP and A-Y certificates.


CSAIL 2017-CX9: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Ratings
Outlooks to CSAIL 2017-CX9 Commercial Mortgage Trust Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2017-CX9:

-- $21,973,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $233,274,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97,756,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93,339,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $140,010,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14,861,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $703,205,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73,004,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $101,992,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $703,205,000d class V1-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,943,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,061,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $73,004,000d class V1-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,134,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31,134,000ad class V1-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,252,000ab class X-E'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,252,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $18,252,000ad class V1-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,588,000ac class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

-- $24,693,504ac class NR;
-- $33,281,503ad class V1-F;
-- $858,876,503ad class V2-A.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 3.71% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).
(d) Exchangeable classes.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Sept. 29, 2017.

Fitch revised its rating for class X-B to a final rating of 'AA-sf'
from an expected rating of 'A-sf' based on the final deal
structure.

VRR Interest - The amount of the VRR Interest represents 4.27%
($36,680,503) of the pool balance (as of the closing date).

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 31 loans secured by 70
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$858,876,504 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by: Column Financial, Inc., Natixis Real Estate Capital
LLC, and Benefit Street Partners CRE Finance LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 84.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 97.5%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
statistics are significantly lower than those of recent, comparable
Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR of
1.55x is better than the 2017 YTD average of 1.25x and 2016 average
of 1.21x. The pool's Fitch LTV of 85.0% is better than the 2017 YTD
and 2016 averages of 101.4% and 105.2%, respectively. Excluding the
transaction's five credit opinions, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and
LTV of 1.53x and 95.7%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans, representing
29.3% of the pool, have investment-grade credit opinions - 245 Park
Avenue (6.3% of the pool) and 85 Broad Street (5.2%) both have
'BBB-sf*'credit opinions. West Town Mall (3.5%) has a 'BBBsf*'
credit opinion, while Two Independence Square (6.4%) and Building
Exchange (7.9%) have respective credit opinions of 'A-sf*' and
'AAAsf'.

Dark Value Adjustment: Fitch adjusted the 'AAA' proceeds assigned
to the Bob Evans portfolio loan to constrain the 'AAA' proceeds to
Fitch's calculated dark value for the portfolio of $11.6 million.
The loan, which is secured by 23 free-standing restaurants,
represents 2.8% of the pool.

Highly Concentrated Pool: The largest 10 loans compose 60.5% of the
pool, higher than the average top 10 concentration for 2017 YTD and
2016 of 53.3% and 54.8%, respectively. The pool's loan
concentration index (LCI) score is 491, indicating greater
concentration than the 2017 YTD average of 399 and 2016 average of
422.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 8.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CSAIL 2017-Cx9 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf'
could result.


CSMC TRUST 2016-MFF: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on seven classes of
CSMC Trust 2016-MFF, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2016-MFF. Moody's rating action is:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. X-CP, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on six P&I classes due to the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio and Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR),
being within acceptable ranges. Moody's has affirmed the rating on
the Class X-CP based on the credit quality of the referenced class.
Moody's does not rate Class X-EXT.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns, an increase in defeasance or
an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Class X-CP was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2017 Payment Date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance remains unchanged at $280 million.
The securitization is backed by a single floating rate loan
collateralized by a portfolio of 27 standalone retail properties
(approximately 5.94 million SF) occupied under a unitary Master
Lease by Mills Fleet Farm, a Midwest (WI, MN and IA) regional
outdoor and lifestyle retailer. The base rent payable is
$42,875,000 per annum with annual increase equal to 2.0%.

The interest only floating rate loan is secured by first lien on
cross collateralized and cross defaulted fee simple interests in
the portfolio. The final maturity date, including three one-year
extensions, is in October 2021. The properties are encumbered with
$38.5 million of subordinated mezzanine debt.

Moody's stressed LTV and stressed DSCR are 99% and 1.25X,
respectively. The trust has not incurred any losses or interest
shortfalls as of the current Payment Date.


DLJ COMMERCIAL 1999-CG3: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. S Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
upgraded the rating on one class in DLJ Commercial Mortgage Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 1999-CG3:

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class B-4 was upgraded based primarily on an increase
in credit support resulting from loans amortization. The deal has
paid down 6.5% since Moody's last review.

The rating on the IO class, Class S, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0% of the
current balance, the same as at Moody's last review. Moody's base
expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.2% of the original
pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a
current list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. S was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 11, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $10.3 million
from $899 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four remaining mortgage loans. One loan,
constituting 27% of the pool, has defeased and is secured by US
government securities.

Two properties, representing 19.7% of the pool, located in Florida
that were potentially affected by Hurricane Irma. While the full
extent of any damage is not yet known, Moody's will continue to
monitor potentially affected loans as more information becomes
available.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, the same as at Moody's last review.

Thirty-seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $46.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 30%). There are currently no loans in special servicing
or on the servicer's watchlist.

The three non-defeased loans represent 73% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is The Regency Apartments Loan ($5.6 million -- 52.8%
of the pool), which is secured by a 186-unit multifamily property
located in Fayetteville, North Carolina, just south of the Fort
Bragg military base. As of June 2017, the property was 86% occupied
compared to 84% as of March 2016. Performance has been stable and
the loan matures in September 2018. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 64% and 1.52X, respectively, compared to 71% and 1.36X at the
last review. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The second largest loan is the Whitfield Village Apartments Loan
($1.3 million -- 12.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 48-unit,
seven building apartment complex located in Sarasota, Florida. The
loan previously had been transferred to special servicing in March
2012 due to monetary default and was modified in January 2015,
resulting in the loan's modification with a decrease in the
interest rate and an extension of the maturity date to December
2024. The property was 98% occupied as of June 2017 the same as of
April 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 77% and 1.25X,
respectively, compared to 78% and 1.24X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Manor Court Apartments Loan ($0.8
million -- 7.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 74-unit
apartment complex located in North Miami, Florida. As of June 2017,
the property was 97% occupied, the same as of June 2016. The loan
is fully amortizing and has paid down 54% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 20% and >4.00X, respectively,
compared to 21% and >4.0X at the last review.


DRYDEN XXV: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on Class E-RR Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement notes from Dryden XXV
Senior Loan Fund, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in December 2012 that is managed by PGIM Inc. The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 3,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 16, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
originally refinanced class A-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, D, and E notes.
S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the ratings on
those notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Extend the stated maturity, reinvestment period, and non-call
period; and

-- Make changes to maturity extension provisions and some
concentration limitations.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Dryden XXV Senior Loan Fund Replacement
              class         Rating        Amount (mil. $)
  A-RR                      AAA (sf)              451.00
  B-RR (deferrable)         AA (sf)                80.60
  C-RR (deferrable)         A (sf)                 56.00
  D-RR (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)              34.35
  E-RR (deferrable)         BB-                    29.25

  NR--Not rated.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2017-1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Cl. B-5 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-1 (the Certificates) issued
by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2017-1 (the Trust) as follows:

-- $365.9 million Class 1-A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $365.9 million Class 1-A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $343.4 million Class 1-A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $343.4 million Class 1-A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $257.6 million Class 1-A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $257.6 million Class 1-A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.9 million Class 1-A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.9 million Class 1-A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $22.4 million Class 1-A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $22.4 million Class 1-A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $365.9 million Class 1-A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $365.9 million Class 1-A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $343.4 million Class 1-A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $257.6 million Class 1-A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.9 million Class 1-A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $22.4 million Class 1-A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.2 million Class 2-A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $47.1 million Class 2-A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $3.1 million Class 2-A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $50.2 million Class 2-A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $9.1 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $7.8 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $5.3 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $2.4 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.1 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes 1-A-X-1, 1-A-X-2, 1-A-X-3, 1-A-X-4, 1-A-X-5, 1-A-X-6 and
2-A-X-1 are interest-only certificates. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes 1-A-1, 1-A-2, 1-A-3, 1-A-4, 1-A-5, 1-A-7, 1-A-9, 1-AX-2,
1-AX-3 and 2-A-1 are exchangeable certificates. These classes can
be exchanged for a combination of depositable certificates as
specified in the offering documents.

Classes 1-A-3, 1-A-4, 1-A-5, 1-A-6, 1-A-7, 1-A-8 and 2-A-2 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior support certificates (Classes 1-A-9, 1-A-10
and 2-A-3) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.25% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.20%, 2.45%, 1.25%, 0.70% and 0.45% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 668 loans with a total principal balance of $443,790,711
as of the Cut-off Date (July 1, 2017).

The loans are divided into two groups: Group 1 and Group 2. Group 1
consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) with
original terms to maturity of 20 to 30 years, while Group 2
consists of fully amortizing FRMs with original terms to maturity
of 15 years.

Flagstar Bank, FSB is the originator and servicer of the mortgage
loans and the sponsor of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
will act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator,
Certificate Registrar and Custodian. Wilmington Trust, National
Association will serve as Trustee. Inglet Blair LLC will act as the
Representation and Warranty Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure. Group
1 and Group 2 senior certificates will be backed by collateral from
each pool, respectively. The subordinate certificates will be
cross-collateralized between the two pools. This is generally known
as Y-Structure.

Unique to this transaction, the servicing fee payable to the
Servicer comprises three separate components: the base servicing
fee, the aggregate delinquent servicing fee and the aggregate
incentive servicing fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency
status of the related loan and will be paid from interest
collections before distribution to the securities. The base
servicing fee will reduce the Net weighted-average coupon (WAC)
payable to certificateholders as part of the aggregate expense
calculation. However, the delinquent and incentive servicing fees
will not be included in the reduction of Net WAC and will thus
reduce available funds entitled to the certificateholders (except
for the Class B-6-C Net WAC). To capture the impact of such
potential fees, DBRS ran additional cash flow stresses based on its
60+-day delinquency and default curves.


GREAT WOLF 2017-WOLF: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings today assigned its ratings to Great Wolf Trust
2017-WOLF's $1.0 billion commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one two-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan totaling $1.0 billion, with three one-year extension
options, secured by cross-collateralized first-mortgage liens on
the fee interests in 12 Great Wolf resort properties (the wholly
owned properties), a pledge of the borrowers' indirect equity
interests in two joint venture properties (the JV properties), and
a pledge of the borrowers' interest in the license and franchise
management agreements in one property (the non-owned
managed/licensed property).

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Great Wolf Trust 2017-WOLF

  Class       Rating             Amount ($)
  A           AAA (sf)          319,900,000
  X-CP(i)     BBB- (sf)         448,400,000(ii)
  X-EXT(i)    BBB- (sf)         648,400,000(ii)
  B           AA- (sf)          120,500,000
  C           A- (sf)            89,600,000
  D           BBB- (sf)         118,400,000
  E           BB- (sf)          186,600,000
  F           B (sf)            114,000,000
  HRR         B- (sf)            51,000,000

(i)Interest-only class.
(ii)Notional balance. The notional amount of the class X-CP
certificates will be reduced by the aggregate amount of principal
distributions and realized losses allocated to the A-2 portion of
the class A certificates and the class B, C, and D certificates.
The notional amount of the class X-EXT certificates will be reduced
by the aggregate amount of principal distributions and realized
losses allocated to the class A, B, C, and D certificates. The A-2
portion of the class A certificates will be $119.9 million.


GSMS 2015-GS1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of GSMS 2015-GS1 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral. As of the September distribution date, the
pool had paid down 0.9% to $820.6 million from $813.4 million at
issuance.

Stable Performance: The overall performance of the pool has been
stable since issuance. There is one loan in special servicing
totaling 5.4% of the pool. Only one loan (0.6%) is on the servicer
watch list, however, this loan is not a Fitch Loan of Concern.

Specially Serviced Loan: The sixth largest loan, Hammons Hotel
Portfolio (8.4%), transferred to special servicing in August 2016
due to the borrower and parent company filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. The filing was made in connection with litigation,
which was ongoing at issuance, related to a complex deal made in
2005 to reprivatize Hammons Hotels. Overall portfolio cash flow has
improved since issuance, with year-end (YE) 2016 NCF debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) at 1.96x, up from 1.88x at YE 2015. Further,
per the trailing 12 month (TTM) June 2017 STR reporting, the
weighted average revenue per available room (RevPAR) penetration
for the collateral properties was 119.9%.

High Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 65.6% of the
pool, which is much higher than the 2015 and 2014 vintage averages
of 49.3% and 50.5%, respectively. It was also noted at issuance
that the sponsor and loan concentrations were higher than average
for this transaction.

Property Type Concentration: Retail and office properties also
account for 37.3% and 32% of the pool, respectively. This compares
with average retail and office concentrations of 26.7% and 23.5%,
respectively, during 2016. The retail concentration includes two
regional mall properties (16% of the pool) in tertiary markets,
with direct or indirect exposure to Sears, Macy's, and JCPenney,
which have recently experienced declining sales and closed stores.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the overall
stable performance of the pool and continued amortization. Upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and significant paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should overall
pool performance decline.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $21,922,780 class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $297,565,000 class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,694,000 class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $618,469,780b class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,082,000b class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51,288,000c class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43,082,000c class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $141,554,000c class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,184,000c class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,056,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42,056,000b class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $20,515,000a class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8,207,000a class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate class G.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 2013-2: S&P Gives Prelim B- Rating on Cl. E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1A-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from
Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2 Ltd./Highbridge Loan Management
2013-2 LLC, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2013 that is managed by Highbridge Investment Partners
CLO (US) LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect our opinion that the credit support
available is commensurate with the associated rating levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 3,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 20, 2017 refinancing date, the proceeds from the
replacement note issuance are expected to redeem the original
notes. At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the ratings on the
original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, propose that:

-- At closing, the issuers' names will change from Highbridge Loan
Management 2013-2 Ltd./Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2 LLC to HPS
Loan Management 2013-2 Ltd./HPS Loan Management 2013-2 LLC.

-- The original class A-1 notes will be broken out into two
sequentially paying class A-1A-R and A-1B-R replacement notes. A
class X note will be issued.
  
-- The original class B-1 and B-2 fixed- and floating-rate notes
will be collapsed into the class B-R floating-rate notes.

-- All replacement classes are expected to be issued at a floating
spread.

-- The stated maturity and reinvestment period will both be
extended five years.

-- The manager will be able to use the formula-based Standard &
Poor's CDO Monitor.

-- The updated S&P Global Ratings industry categories and recovery
rates will be used.

S&P sid, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Highbridge Loan Management 2013-2 Ltd./Highbridge Loan
  Management 2013-2 LLC

  Class              Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  X                  NR                      4.00
  A-1A-R             AAA (sf)              278.50
  A-1B-R             NR                      8.50
  A-2-R              AA (sf)                90.50
  B-R (deferrable)   A (sf)                 30.50
  C-R (deferrable)   BBB- (sf)              32.00
  D-R (deferrable)   BB- (sf)               17.50
  E-R (deferrable)   B- (sf)                11.00

  NR--Not rated.


HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Fitch Affirms BB Preferred Stock Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term and short-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of Huntington Bancshares, Inc. (HBAN) with a
Stable Outlook.

The rating action follows a periodic review of the large regional
banking group, which includes Huntington Bancshares Inc. (HBAN),
BB&T Corporation (BBT), Capital One Finance Corporation (COF),
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. (CFG), Comerica Incorporated (CMA),
Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB), Keycorp (KEY), M&T Bank Corporation
(MTB), MUFG Americas Holding Corporation (MUAH), PNC Financial
Services Group (PNC), Regions Financial Corporation (RF), SunTrust
Banks Inc. (STI), US Bancorp (USB), and Wells Fargo & Company
(WFC).

Company-specific rating rationales for the other banks are
published separately, and for further discussion of the large
regional bank sector in general, refer to the special report titled
'Large Regional Bank Periodic Review,' to be published shortly.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

HBAN's rating affirmation is supported by the company's solid
financial profile, including good earnings trajectory, improved
funding profile and stable asset quality performance. Further, HBAN
seems on pace to successfully execute the integration of FirstMerit
(FMER) while also demonstrating continued progress in achieving its
financial targets.

Fitch believes the company's earnings are sustainable, particularly
given good loan growth and stable credit performance, which support
the current ratings level. Additionally, the FMER transaction
presents good cost save opportunities, estimated at 40%, which, in
Fitch's view, is a reasonable assumption given market overlap in
key markets such as Ohio as well as Michigan.

The combined entity is expected to deliver improvements to ROAA of
15 basis points (bps) and ROTCE of 300bps compared to HBAN's
stand-alone measures by 2018. HBAN expects to achieve $255 million
in annualized cost savings. Fitch believes these forecasted
measures are achievable based on cost saves and the expected credit
performance of FMER's portfolio. Further, the company is targeting
$100 million of total revenue enhancements in 2018 mainly through
cross-sell opportunities to FMER's customer base and growth in
consumer assets such as residential mortgages and RV & Boat lending
while also expanding small business lending.

HBAN's credit performance, like many of its peers, remains sound
and supports current ratings. Over the last few years, HBAN loan
growth has been above the peer average. Much of the growth has come
from auto lending and acquisitions that have increased C&I loans.
More recently, excluding the FMER acquisition, loan growth has
slowed and is in-line with the peer group. To-date, credit
performance has remained stable and NCOs are well below normalized
ranges of 35bps to 55bps. Fitch remains cautious regarding C&I
lending across the industry which remains very competitive.

Incorporated in the Stable Outlook is Fitch's view that HBAN will
continue to deliver above peer credit performance within its auto
securitization programs as well as its on balance sheet portfolio
despite expected challenges in the auto sector related to used car
values. The company has a long, established history of indirect
auto lending with strong asset quality measures through various
credit downturns. Of note, the company has grown its auto portfolio
in new markets over the last few years given opportunities as
others have pulled back. Nonetheless, the company has continued to
originate the same borrower base with minimal changes to its
underwriting practices. Further, HBAN has prudent risk monitoring
practices in place, particularly for newer markets.

HBAN's funding profile is considered solid and in-line with peers.
Over the last several years, HBAN has been focused on growing its
retail deposit base with much success reflected by the increase in
non-interest bearing deposits which accounts for about 30% of total
deposit mix. Nonetheless, similar to peers, Fitch expects HBAN to
experience a manageable level of deposit run-off in a rising rate
environment.

Although HBAN's capital position has been trending lower given its
acquisitions, loan growth and capital return to shareholders, Fitch
considers the bank's capital levels to be adequate given HBAN's
improvements in its risk profile. Additionally, HBAN's solid
earnings growth has led to a good rate of internal capital
generation, which should help maintain sound capital levels. Given
the FMER acquisition, HBAN's tangible common equity position has
declined compared to a year ago but is still in-line with current
ratings and expectations. For 2Q17, HBAN's CET1 ratio stood at
9.88%, its TCE/TA totaled 7.28% and its FCC/RWA was 8.9%.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

HBAN has a Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'NF'.
In Fitch's view, HBAN is not systemically important and therefore,
the probability of support is unlikely. IDRs and VRs do not
incorporate any support.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

HBAN's subordinated debt is notched one level below its VR for loss
severity. HBAN's preferred stock is notched five levels below its
VR, two times for loss severity and three times for
non-performance, while HBAN's trust preferred securities are
notched two times from the VR for loss severity and two times for
non-performance. These ratings are in accordance with Fitch's
criteria and assessment of the instruments non-performance and loss
severity risk profiles and have thus been affirmed due to the
affirmation of the VR.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The uninsured deposit ratings of Huntington National Bank are rated
one notch higher than HBAN's IDR and senior unsecured debt because
U.S. uninsured deposits benefit from depositor preference. U.S.
depositor preference gives deposit liabilities superior recovery
prospects in the event of default.

HOLDING COMPANY

HBAN's IDR and VR are equalized with those of its operating
companies and bank, reflecting its role as the bank holding
company, which is mandated in the U.S. to act as a source of
strength for its bank subsidiaries. Ratings are also equalized
reflecting the very close correlation between holding company and
subsidiary failure and default probabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch believes HBAN's ratings do not have ratings upside over the
near to intermediate term given that performance is in-line with
similarly rated peers coupled with its forecasted capital
position.

HBAN's ratings are sensitive to its ability to achieve many of the
key targets in undertaking the FMER transaction. Moreover, HBAN's
ratings could be pressured if it is not able to realize/generate
the internal rate of return, estimated profitability improvements,
and targeted cost saves. Further, should unexpected operational and
integration risks arise that are material to financial performance
HBAN's rating could likely be reviewed for negative rating action.

Given its relatively larger auto lending portfolio and Fitch's
concerns with auto lending in general, HBAN's ratings would be
sensitive to the performance of this portfolio.

Additionally, ratings pressure could ensue should management take
an aggressive approach to capital management such as future
acquisitions of size or a total pay-out ratio that pushes capital
below peers.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Since HBAN's Support and Support Rating Floors are '5' and 'NF',
respectively, there is limited likelihood that these ratings will
change over the foreseeable future.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings for HBAN and its operating companies' subordinated debt
and preferred stock are sensitive to any change to HBAN's VR.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The long- and short-term deposit ratings are sensitive to any
change to HBAN's long- and short-term IDR.

HOLDING COMPANY

Should HBAN's holding company begin to exhibit signs of weakness,
demonstrate trouble accessing the capital markets, or have
inadequate cash flow coverage to meet near-term obligations, there
is the potential that Fitch could notch the holding company IDR and
VR from the ratings of the operating companies.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Huntington Bancshares, Incorporated
-- Long-term IDR at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term IDR at 'F1';
-- Viability rating at 'a-';
-- Senior unsecured at 'A-';
-- Subordinated debt at 'BBB+';
-- Preferred stock at 'BB'.
-- Support at '5';
-- Support Floor at 'NF'.

Huntington National Bank
-- Long-term deposits at 'A';
-- Long-term IDR at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Viability rating at 'a-';
-- Senior unsecured at 'A-';
-- Subordinated debt at 'BBB+';
-- Short-term IDR at 'F1';
-- Short-term deposits at 'F1';
-- Support at '5';
-- Support Floor at 'NF'.

Huntington Capital I, II
-- Preferred stock at 'BB+'.

Sky Financial Capital Trust III & IV
-- Preferred stock at 'BB+'.


JP MORGAN 2006-LDP7: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Cl. A-J Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp (JPMCC) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2006-LDP7.   

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pool Concentration/Adverse Selection: The transaction is highly
concentrated with only 25 of the original 271 loans remaining. Due
to the pool's concentrated nature, a sensitivity analysis was
performed which grouped and ranked the remaining loans by their
structural features, performance, and estimated likelihood of
repayment.

High Percentage of Specially Serviced Loans: 14 loans (87%) are in
special servicing and significant losses are expected. Of the 14
loans, six (52%) are REO; five (4.8%) are in foreclosure; and three
(30%) are non-performing matured.

Maturity Schedule: 10 loans (39%) mature in Oct. 2017 (all but one,
1.1%, are in special servicing); two loans (6.6%) mature in 2019;
two loans (3.4%) mature in 2020; two loans (0.9%) mature in 2021;
three loans (1.1%) mature in 2026.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class A-M is revised to Stable as the class
is expected to be paid in full in approximately five months as a
result of scheduled amortization from fully amortizing and
performing balloon loans. Downgrades to classes A-J and B are
likely as additional losses are incurred.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $3.3 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook revised to Stable
    from Negative;
-- $310.3 million class A-J at 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;
-- $78.8 million class B at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;
-- $44.3 million class C at 'Csf''; RE 0%;
-- $14.8 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $39.4 million class E at 'Csf'; RE 0%;
-- $31.4 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;
-- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3A, A-3FL, A-3B, A-4, A-SB and A-1A
certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class N, P,
Q and NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the
interest-only class X certificates.


JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC18: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on seven
classes and affirmed the ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CIBC18:

Cl. A-M, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016
Affirmed A2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016
Affirmed A2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016
Affirmed A2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 4, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes, Classes A-M through C, were
downgraded due to higher anticipated losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans.

The ratings on three P&I classes, Classes D, E and F, were affirmed
because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 48.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 12.0% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 14.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 54% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 15% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $658.1
million from $3.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 26 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 31% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 81% of
the pool.

One loan, constituting 0.3% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Forty-two loans have been liquidated with a loss from the pool,
resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $251 million (for an
average loss severity of 39%). Twenty loans, constituting 54% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is The Plaza at PPL Center
($66.4 million -- 10.2% of the pool). The loan is secured by a six
unit mixed use property located in Allentown, Pennsylvania that was
built in 2003. The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2016. The Borrower was unable to refinance, as the main
tenant, PPL Service Corporation, has a lease expires in 2018 and a
notice of extension was not provided per lease terms. The special
servicer indicated they are pursuing foreclosure and a receiver has
engaged a local broker to begin the leasing process. As of December
2016, the property was 81% occupied.

The second largest specially serviced loan is Southside Works
($44.6 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is secured by a 251,400
square foot mixed used property located in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The property consists of office, multifamily and
retail space. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
February 2017 due to maturity default as a result of the Borrower's
inability to obtain refinancing. As of April 2017, property was 74%
occupied and the property is no longer producing sufficient cash
flow to fund all required debt service and operating expenses. The
special servicer indicated they are pursuing foreclosure.

The third largest specially serviced loan is Golden East Crossing -
A note Loan ($31.4 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which is secured
by a 461,700 square foot mall located in Rocky Mountain, North
Carolina. The loan most recently transferred to special servicing
in July 2015 for imminent default. The property is anchored by Belk
(tenant owned), JC Penney and Ross Dress for Less. The loan was
previously modified in 2013 with the term increased by 24 periods;
maturity extended to February 2019 and the creation of Hope Note
(the Golden East Crossing - B note). The loan is currently 90+ days
delinquent. Both the A and B note are in special servicing and the
property was 86% leased as of June 2017, compared to 83% at last
review.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $227.3 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (65% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for three
poorly performing loans, constituting 15% of the pool, and has
estimated an aggregate loss of $62.1 million (a 64% expected loss
on average) from these troubled loans.

As of the September 12, 2017 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $49.7 million. Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan
modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The largest performing loan is the 131 South Dearborn Loan -- A
Note ($200 million -- 30.7% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu interest in a $472 million senior mortgage. The loan was
previously in special servicing but was modified in 2016. The
modification included, among other items, a term extension and an
A/B note split. The loan is secured by the 37-story "Citadel
Center", a 1.5 million square foot (SF) office tower in the Central
Loop submarket of Chicago, Illinois. The property was 97% occupied
as of January 2017, compared to 95% occupied as of April 2016. The
largest tenant, Citadel (38% of net rentable area), will vacate a
portion of their subleased space in 2017, and the second largest
tenant, which occupies 20% of the net rentable area (NRA), is
executing an early termination option to move out in 2017. A
division of Constellation Brands, has agreed to lease about 130,000
SF of space starting in early 2018. The loan is currently
performing under the terms of the modification. Moody's has
identified the $36 million B note as a troubled loan. Moody's A
note LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.85X, respectively,
compared to 116% and 0.89X at the last review.

The second largest performing loan is LaGuardia Plaza Hotel - A
note Loan ($48.8 million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by
a 358 key hotel located near LaGuardia Airport. The hotel underwent
a $5M which included a complete refurbishment of over 190 guest
rooms and all public space. Amenities include a health and fitness
center, heated indoor pool with jacuzzi, restaurant and business
center. The loan was previously in special servicing, but returned
to the master servicer in 2015 after a loan modification was
executed. The modification included, among other items, a term
extension and an A/B note split. For the trailing twelve month
period ending June 2017, the occupancy and RevPAR was 81% and $117,
respectively. The loan is currently performing under the terms of
the modification. Moody's has identified both the A note and the
$12.1 million B note as troubled loans.

The other performing loan is the Berkshire Business Park ($2.6
million -- 0.4% of the pool), which is secured by 246,500 square
foot business park located in York, Pennsylvania which is located
approximately 35 miles south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. As of
April 2017, property was 100% occupied. The loan is fully
amortizing and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 33% and 3.06X,
respectively.


JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC20: Moody's Hikes Class B Certs Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on six classes,
upgraded the ratings on two classes and downgraded the rating on
one class in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2007-CIBC20, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-CIBC20:

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed B3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 30, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. X-1, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on two P&I classes (Classes A-J & B) were upgraded
based primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from
loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 90% since
Moody's last review.

The ratings on six P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-1) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 33.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 8.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.0% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $173 million
from $2.5 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 14 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 25% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 90% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 24% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $189.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 44.5%). Five loans, constituting 28.5% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Holiday Inn - Harrisburg West loan ($12.8 million -- 7.4% of
the pool), which is secured by a 238-key full-service hotel outside
of Harrisburg, PA. The loan transferred to special servicing in
July 2016, and the borrower has indicated they can no longer
support the cash flow waterfall. The borrower will cooperate with
the receiver and foreclosure.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Gannttown loan
($12.6 million -- 7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 107,587
squarefoot (SF) retail center located in Turnersville, New Jersey.
As of July 2017, the property was 67% occupied by seven tenants,
compared to 75% occupied in July 2016 and 91% in June 2013. Major
tenants at the property include Harbor Freight Tools and Bottom
Dollar Food. The loan transferred for imminent payment default in
September 2013 and became REO in February 2016.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Ultra Plaza loan
($9.6 million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 166,727
SF grocery anchored retail center located in Highland, Indiana, 30
miles south-southeast of the Chicago CBD. The anchor tenant Ultra
Foods has occupied the property since securitization, and has
extended their prior lease ten years through December 2022. As of
June 2017, the property was 95% leased. The loan was transferred to
special servicing in August 2017 due to maturity default.

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $27.4 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (56% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 20% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $20.6 million (a 59% expected loss based on a
74% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 117%, compared to 107% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 21.5% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.08X and 0.96X,
respectively, compared to 1.27X and 0.97X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 41.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Clark Tower - A note loan ($43.4 million --
25.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 34-story suburban office
building located in east Memphis, Tennessee. The property is the
tallest building outside of downtown Memphis and the third tallest
in the city of Memphis overall. As of June 2017, the property is
59% leased to 84 different tenants. The loan had transferred to
special servicing in September 2013 due to imminent default and
received a modification in July 2015 before being returned to the
master servicer in March 2016. The original, $60.75 million loan
was bifurcated into the $43.5 million A-Note and a $16.9 million
B-Note, which is also held within the trust. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 132% and 0.80X, respectively, compared to 120%
and 0.88X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Columbus Corporate Office loan
($19.0 million -- 11.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 130,768
SF, Class B suburban office located in Novi, Michigan, 23 miles
northwest of the Detroit CBD. The property is 100% leased by a
single tenant, Henry Ford Health System, through August 2019.
Medical departments based at this location include
gastroenterology, behavioral health services, endocrinology,
internal medicine, physical therapy, pathology, neurological
rehabilitation, podiatry, and sports medicine. Due to the refinance
risk of the sole tenant's upcoming lease expiration, Moody's
employed a Lit-Dark analysis at this review. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 100% and 1.10X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Valet Airpark loan ($8.9 million --
5.2% of the pool), which is secured by The loan is secured by the
fee simple interest in a 182-space surface parking lot, located in
Los Angeles, California. The parking lot services LAX international
airport. The loan matured on 8/1/2017; the borrower is working on
securing refinancing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 129% and
0.86X, respectively, compared to 134% and 0.83X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2015-3: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B-4 Debt From Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 18 tranches
from 2 transactions backed by RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous
issuers.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2015-3

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: WinWater Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-4

Cl. A-15, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-9, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-20, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 29, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-22, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds and a reduction in the expected losses on
the underlying pools owing to strong collateral performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating WinWater Mortgage Loan
Trust 2015-4, Cl. A-X-1,Cl. A-X-2, Cl. A-X-9, Cl. A-X-13, Cl.
A-X-14, Cl. A-X-20, Cl. A-X-22 was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in August 2017 from 4.9% in
August 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


JP MORGAN 2017-MAUI: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has finalized its provisional ratings on the followings
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-MAUI (the Certificates) issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-MAUI:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

All classes have been privately placed. The Class X balance is
notional.

The collateral for the transaction consists of the fee interest in
the Four Seasons Maui at Wailea, a 383-key luxury resort on the
Hawaiian island of Maui. The property has an irreplaceable
oceanfront location within the Wailea Resort master planned
community and is the first Four Seasons Resort Worldwide. Situated
on a 16.2-acre site, collateral amenities include, but are not
limited to, four food and beverage (F&B) venues, 37,571 square feet
(sf) of meeting space (16,827 sf of indoor meeting space and 20,744
sf of outdoor meeting space), a 21,000 sf spa, 12,636 sf of retail,
a 486-space two-story parking structure, three swimming pools and
two rooftop tennis courts. The property is one of the premier
resorts on the island and is the only AAA Five-Diamond and Forbes
Travel Guide Five-Star luxury resort on Maui.

The loan sponsor, MSD Capital, L.P. (MSD), acquired the property in
2004 for a purchase price of $280.0 million ($731,070 per key).
Founded in 1998, MSD is an investment vehicle that exclusively
handles the capital of Michael Dell and his family. Within its
portfolio, MSD currently owns two similar luxury resorts: the Four
Seasons Hualalai at Historic Ka'upulehu and the Fairmont Miramar
hotel in Santa Monica, California. Due to the success and prestige
of the subject and the Four Seasons Hualalai at Historic
Ka'upulehu, MSD is considered to be one of the largest
revenue-generating owners for Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, Inc.
Since acquiring the asset, MSD has invested approximately $145.0
million ($378,500 per key), in capital improvements with the most
recent major renovation occurring between 2015 and 2016 at a cost
of $56.4 million ($147,321 per key), which included a $42.9 million
($111,922 per key) transformation of all guest rooms and corridors.
Over the next three years, management intends to spend an
additional $18.8 million in capital expenditures, which will
include the renovation of the lobby, spa, pool, meeting space and
F&B outlets, among many others.

Loan proceeds of $469.0 million, along with $131.0 million of
mezzanine debt, serves to return $64.0 million of equity back to
the sponsor and refinance $525 million of debt that was originated
in 2014 during which time the $350 million mortgage loan was
securitized in CSMC 2014-TIKI. The first mortgage is a 24-month
term floating-rate (one-month LIBOR plus 1.951% per annum)
interest-only loan with five 12-month extension options. Prior to
that securitization, the subject property was collateral for a $425
million mortgage loan that was securitized in CD 2007-CD4 and GECMC
2007-1. The property was severely affected by the economic
recession and subsequently went into monetary default in 2010. The
sponsor contributed approximately $18.0 million of equity for debt
restructuring and the loan was bifurcated with a $350 million
A-note and $75 million B-note. Both notes were fully repaid as part
of the 2014 refinancing.

HVS has determined the as-is market value of the property to be
$910,700,000 ($2,377,807 per key) based on a cap rate of 5.5%.
Additionally, the appraiser concluded an as-stabilized appraised
value of $976.4 million, which anticipates performance to improve
as the subject benefits from the recent renovation that occurred.
The DBRS value of $434.6 million ($1,134,738 per key) equates to a
substantial 52.3% discount to the as-is appraised value. The DBRS
cap rate of 9.5% is likely at least 400 basis points above a
current market cap rate, allowing for significant reversion to the
mean in lodging valuation metrics. While leverage on the full
$469.0 million mortgage loan is high at a DBRS loan-to-value (LTV)
of 107.9%, the last dollar of mortgage debt is unrated, and the
cumulative investment-grade-rated proceeds of $304.0 million have a
more modest LTV of 69.9%.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMCC COMMERCIAL 2017-JP7: DBRS Finalizes (P)BB on F-RR Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2017-JP7 (the Certificates) to be issued by JPMCC Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2017-JP7:

   -- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
   -- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
   -- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
   -- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
   -- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
   -- Class C at A (sf)
   -- Class D at A (low) (sf)
   -- Class E-RR at BBB (low) (sf)
   -- Class F-RR at BB (sf)
   -- Class G-RR at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes D, E-RR, F-RR and G-RR have been privately placed.  The X-A
and X-B balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 37 fixed-rate loans secured by 168
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the ratings, reflecting the long-term
probability of loan default within the term and its liquidity at
maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, two loans (4.6% of the pool balance) had a DBRS Term
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a
threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 17 loans, representing 54.0%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x and seven loans,
representing 38.2% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
0.90x.

Four of the top ten loans, representing 27.1% of the pool, have
Strong sponsorship. Furthermore, DBRS identified only five loans,
which combined represent just 8.1% of the pool, that have
sponsorship and/or loan collateral associated with a voluntary
bankruptcy filing, a prior discounted payoff, a loan default,
limited net worth and/or liquidity, a historical negative credit
event and/or an inadequate commercial real estate experience. Two
of the top ten loans, Gateway Net Lease Portfolio and West Town
Mall, representing 12.3% of the pool, exhibit credit
characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings.
The Gateway Net Lease Portfolio received a BBB (high) shadow
rating, while West Town Mall was shadow rated A (low). Term default
risk is low, as indicated by a strong weighted-average (WA) DBRS
Term DSCR of 1.77x. In addition, 16 loans, representing 62.6% of
the pool, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x, including nine
of the top 15 loans. Only three loans, totaling 10.6% of the
transaction balance, are secured by properties that are fully
leased to a single tenant. The vast majority of this concentration,
or 81.4%, is attributed to two loans in the top ten, 211 Main
Street and Torre Plaza, which are fully occupied by
investment-grade-rated tenants that have substantial capital
invested into the buildings. The 211 Main Street property is fully
leased to Charles Schwab & Co., while Torre Plaza is occupied by
Amazon.

The pool is concentrated based on loan size, with a concentration
profile equivalent to that of a pool of 21 equal-sized loans. The
largest five and ten loans total 40.7% and 59.5% of the pool,
respectively. As a result, a concentration penalty was applied
given the pool's lack of diversity, which increases each loan's
POD. The transaction's WA DBRS Refinance (Refi) DSCR is 0.98x,
indicating higher refinance risk on an overall pool level.
Seventeen loans, representing 54.0% of the pool, have DBRS Refi
DSCRs below 1.00x, including seven of the top 15 loans.

Additionally, seven of these loans, comprising 38.2% of the pool,
have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x, including six of the top ten
loans. The DBRS Refi DSCRs for these loans are based on a WA
stressed refinance constant of 9.81%, which implies an interest
rate of 9.18% amortizing on a 30-year schedule. This represents a
significant stress of 4.76% over the WA contractual interest rate
of the loans in the pool. The pool's interest-only (IO)
concentration is elevated at 81.2%. Eight loans, representing 50.2%
of the pool, including seven top ten loans, are structured with
full-term IO payments. An additional 19 loans, comprising 31.0% of
the pool, have partial IO periods ranging from 12 months to 60
months. As a result, the transaction's scheduled amortization by
maturity is only 7.4%, which is generally below other recent
conduit securitizations.

The DBRS sample included 25 of the 37 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 58 of the 168 properties in the
portfolio (61.6% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -10.3% and ranged from -20.4%
(Courtyard San Antonio Lackland) to +1.7% (211 Main Street).

The ratings assigned to the Certificates by DBRS are based
exclusively on the credit provided by the transaction structure and
underlying trust assets. All classes will be subject to ongoing
surveillance, which could result in upgrades or downgrades by DBRS
after the date of issuance.

The rating assigned to Class G-RR materially deviates from the
higher rating implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviations are warranted given the expected
dispersion of loan level cash flows post issuance.

For more information on this transaction and supporting data,
please log into www.ireports.dbrs.com. DBRS will continue to
monitor this transaction with periodic updates provided in the DBRS
CMBS IReports platform.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


KILIMANJARO RE 2014-1: S&P Lowers Cl. B Notes Rating to 'B-(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it lowered its ratings on Kilimanjaro Re
Ltd.'s Series 2014-1 Class B notes to 'B-(sf)' from 'BB-(sf)' and
placed the notes on CreditWatch Developing.

The notes cover losses from named storms and earthquakes on an
annual aggregate basis. The covered area for named storms is
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, Virginia, and Puerto Rico. For earthquake, the covered area
is: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas Virginia, Washington, Puerto Rico,
and British Columbia.

The covered loss amount equals the Property Claims Services (PCS)
estimate of insured industry losses multiplied by a
state/commonwealth specific payout factor.

In the past month, there have been three covered events that may
have caused losses in excess of the franchise deductible of $110
million. On Sept. 19, PCS published an insured industry loss
estimate of $15.9 billion from Hurricane Harvey. The majority of
the losses are in Texas, and its payout factor is 2%.

The second event was Hurricane Irma. The current estimate of
insured industry losses in the U.S. from AIR Worldwide Inc. (AIR),
the risk modeling agent for the transaction, ranges between $25
billion and $35 billion, less $2.5 billion-$5.5 billion for losses
attributed to the National Flood Insurance Program. The majority of
the losses was incurred in Florida, and the payout factor is
1.27%.

The third and final event is Hurricane Maria. The current estimate
of insured industry losses from AIR ranges between $40 billion and
$85 billion, with 85% attributed to Puerto Rico. The current loss
estimate from Risk Management Solutions for this event ranges
between $15 billion and $30 billion. The payout factor for Puerto
Rico is 2.73%.

There is still considerable uncertainty regarding the estimates
from Maria and potentially from Irma. Covered losses will be based
on the loss amounts reported by PCS.

The current attachment point is $2 billion. S&P said, "We may lower
the rating on the notes if there are additional covered events or
if the loss amounts as reported by PCS are higher than anticipated.
We may raise the rating on the notes if the loss amounts as
reported from PCS are lower than anticipated or if there are no
additional covered events between now and the end of the hurricane
season."

RATINGS LIST

  Downgrade                To                        From
  Kilimanjaro Re Ltd.
   Series 2014-B notes     B-(sf)/Watch Developing   BB-(sf)


LEHMAN BROTHERS 2007-3: S&P Affirms B (sf) Rating on Cl. M1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various ratings actions on six Lehman
Brothers Small Balance Commercial transactions. These transactions
are asset-backed securitizations backed by payments from small
business loans primarily collateralized by first-liens on
commercial real estate.

LEHMAN BROTHERS SMALL BALANCE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-2

The transaction has paid down to a pool factor of approximately
13.9% as of the July servicer report. Delinquent and defaulted
loans represented 11.8% of the current pool balance. Cumulative
realized losses to date are approximately 19.5%. The reserve
account remains depleted, breaching the $4.065 million current
requisite. Notes exceed the outstanding receivables balance by
approximately $4 million, but the current sequential principal pay
structure continues to support the senior-most classes. The class
M3 certificates have cured their carry-forward interest, and only
the class B certificates have a carry-forward interest amount. S&P
said, "We lowered our ratings on the class M3 and B certificates,
and affirmed our ratings on the class 1A, 2A3, M1, and M2
certificates."  

LEHMAN BROTHERS SMALL BALANCE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-3

The transaction has paid down to a pool factor of approximately
16.0% as of the July servicer report. Delinquent and defaulted
loans represented 24.8% of the current pool balance. Cumulative
realized losses to date are approximately 21.7%. The reserve
account remains depleted, breaching the $4.078 million current
requisite. Notes exceed the outstanding receivables balance by
approximately $13.5 million, but the current sequential principal
pay structure continues to support the senior-most classes. The
class M2 certificates have cured their carry-forward interest, but
the class M3 and B certificates each have increased their
carry-forward interest amounts. S&P said, "We lowered our ratings
on the class M2, M3, and B certificates, and affirmed our ratings
on the class 1A, 2A3, and M1 certificates."

LEHMAN BROTHERS SMALL BALANCE COMMERCIAL LOAN TRUST 2006-SBA

This transaction is a pass-through, whereby the class A
certificates are pledged to the series 2006-3 transaction. The
transaction has paid down to an approximately 7.8% pool factor, as
29 loans remain in the pool. The certificate has paid down to
approximately $685,829. There are no delinquent or defaulted loans
in the pool as of the July servicer report. The note is supported
by a collateral pool consisting of approximately $2.3 million in
receivables and an unrated class B certificate. S&P raised its
rating to 'AA (sf)'.  

LEHMAN BROTHERS SMALL BALANCE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2007-1

The transaction has paid down to a pool factor of approximately
18.5%, as of the July servicer report. Delinquent and defaulted
loans represented 24.0% of the current pool balance. Cumulative
realized losses to date are approximately 22.3%. The reserve
account remains depleted, breaching the $4.089 million current
requisite. Notes exceed the outstanding receivables balance by
approximately $17.8 million, but the current sequential principal
pay structure continues to support the senior-most classes. The
class M1 certificates have cured their carry-forward interest, but
the class M2 through B certificates each has increased their
carry-forward interest amounts. S&P lowered the ratings on the
class M1, M2, M4, and B certificates, and affirmed its ratings on
the class 1A, 2A3, and M3 certificates.

LEHMAN BROTHERS SMALL BALANCE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2007-2

The transaction has paid down to a pool factor of approximately
17.1%, as of the July servicer report. Delinquent and defaulted
loans represented 19.0% of the current pool balance. Cumulative
realized losses to date are approximately 19.1%. The reserve
account remains depleted, breaching the $6.258 million current
requisite. Notes exceed the outstanding receivables balance by
approximately $27.6 million, but the current sequential principal
pay structure continues to support the senior-most classes. The
class M2 certificates have cured their carry-forward interest, but
the class M3 through B certificates each has increased their
carry-forward interest amounts. S&P  said, "We raised our ratings
on the class 1A3, 1A4, and 2A3 certificates, and lowered our
ratings on the class M4, M5, and M6 certificates. We also affirmed
our ratings on the class M1, M2, and M3 certificates."

LEHMAN BROTHERS SMALL BALANCE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST 2007-3

The transaction has paid down to a pool factor of approximately
23.6%, as of the July servicer report. Delinquent and defaulted
loans represented 13.3% of the current pool balance. Cumulative
realized losses to date are approximately 18.6%. The reserve
account remains depleted, breaching the $7.003 million current
requisite. Notes exceed the outstanding receivables balance by
approximately $24.4 million, but the current sequential principal
pay structure continues to support the senior-most classes. The
class M2 certificates have cured their carry-forward interest, but
the class M3 through B certificates each has increased their
carry-forward interest amounts. S&P said, "We lowered our ratings
on the class M2, M5, and B certificates, and affirmed our ratings
on the class AM, AJ, M1, M3, and M4 certificates."

  RATINGS RAISED

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
                     Rating
  Class        To             From
  1A3          BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
  1A4          BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)
  2A3          BBB+ (sf)      BB+ (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Loan Trust 2006-SBA
                   Rating
  Class        To             From
  A            AA (sf)        BBB- (sf)

  RATINGS LOWERED

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-2
                     Rating
  Class        To             From
  M3           CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)
  B            CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-3
                     Rating
  Class        To             From
  M2           CCC- (sf)      CCC+ (sf)
  M3           CC (sf)        CCC+ (sf)
  B            CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-1
                    Rating
  Class        To             From
  M1           CCC (sf)       B- (sf)
  M2           CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)
  M4           CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)
  B            CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
                     Rating
  Class        To             From
  M4           CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)
  M5           CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)
  B            CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3
                     Rating
  Class        To             From
  M2           CCC- (sf)      CCC (sf)
  M5           CC (sf)        CC (sf)
  B            CC (sf)        CCC- (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-2
  Class     Rating
  1A        AA- (sf)
  2A3       AA- (sf)
  M1        A+ (sf)
  M2        BBB+ (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2006-3
  Class     Rating
  1A        BBB+ (sf)
  2A3       BBB+ (sf)
  M1        BBB (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-1
  Class     Rating
  1A        BBB- (sf)
  2A3       BBB- (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-2
  Class     Rating
  M1        B+ (sf)
  M2        CCC+ (sf)
  M3        CCC- (sf)

  Lehman Brothers Small Balance Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-3
  Class     Rating
  AM        A+ (sf)
  AJ        BB+ (sf)
  M1        B (sf)
  M3        CCC- (sf)
  M4        CCC- (sf)


MARINER CLO 2017-4: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Mariner CLO
2017-4 Ltd./Mariner CLO 2017-4 LLC 's $561.8 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is collateralized loan obligation securitization
backed by primarily of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 3,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect our view of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Mariner CLO 2017-4 Ltd./Mariner CLO 2017-4 LLC

  Class                Rating          Amount
                                      (mil. $)
  A                    AAA (sf)        369.90
  B                    AA (sf)          72.00
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)           50.10
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)        34.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)         25.00
  F (deferrable)       B- (sf)          10.80
  Subordinated notes   NR               46.20

  NR--Not rated.


MERCURY CDO 2004-1: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 3 Tranches to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on notes issued
by Mercury CDO 2004-1, Ltd.:

US$299,900,000 Class A-1NV First Priority Senior Secured Non-Voting
Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding balance of
$22,460,634.08), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on October 5, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

US$100,000 Class A-1VA First Priority Senior Secured Voting
Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding balance of $7487.78),
Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on October 5, 2016 Upgraded to B3
(sf)

US$330,000,000 Class A-1VB First Priority Senior Secured Voting
Floating Rate Notes (current outstanding balance of
$24,714,934.86), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on October 5, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Mercury CDO 2004-1, Ltd. is a collateralized debt obligation
issuance backed primarily by a portfolio of Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) and CDOs originated from
2002-2005.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions are due primarily to the deleveraging of the
senior notes and an increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios since October 2016. The Class
A-1 notes have paid down collectively by approximately 28.5%, or
$18.8 million, since that time. Based on Moody's calculation, the
OC ratio of the Class A-1 notes is currently 181.1 %, versus 153.6%
in October 2016. The paydown of the Class A-1 notes is partially
the result of cash collections from certain assets treated as
defaulted by the trustee in amounts materially exceeding
expectations.

The deal has also benefited from an improvement in the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio since October 2016. Based on
Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is
currently 1716, compared to 2011 in October 2016.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs," published in June 2017.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applies a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for SF CDOs. The simulated
defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo scenarios
define the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's then uses
the loss distribution as an input in the CDOEdge(TM) cash flow
model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes. Below is a summary of the impact
of different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of notches
versus the current model output, for which a positive difference
corresponds to lower expected loss):

Caa1 and below ratings notched up by two rating notches (1569):

Class A-1NV: +1

Class A-1VA: +1

Class A-1VB: +1

Class A-2A:0

Class A-2B:0

Class B:0

Class C:0

Caa1 and below ratings notched down by two notches (1864):

Class A-1NV: 0

Class A-1VA: 0

Class A-1VB: 0

Class A-2A: 0

Class A-2B: 0

Class B: 0

Class C: 0


MERRILL LYNCH 2004-BPC1: S&P Affirms B(sf) Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class D commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Trust 2004-BPC1, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on the
class E certificates from the same transaction.

S&P said, "Our rating actions on the certificates follow our
analysis of the transaction, primarily using our criteria for
rating U.S. and Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review
of the credit characteristics and performance of the remaining
loans in the pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity
available to the trust.

"We raised our rating on class D to reflect our expectation of the
available credit enhancement for the class, which we believe is
greater than our most recent estimate of necessary credit
enhancement for the respective rating level. The upgrades also
reflect the reduction in trust balance.

"The rating affirmation on class E reflects our expectation that
the available credit enhancement for the class will be within our
estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required for the
current rating. While available credit enhancement levels suggest
positive rating movement on class E, our analysis also considered
the class's interest shortfalls outstanding of $40,130. We expect
the outstanding interest shortfalls to be repaid over the next
several months."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the Sept. 12, 2017, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $16.7 million, which is 1.3% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes three loans down from 87
loans at issuance. One of these loans, Courtyard Dulles Town Center
($8.5 million, 51.1%), is on the master servicer's watchlist due to
a decline in debt service coverage (DSC). The master servicer,
Midland Loan Services, reported year-end 2016 financial information
for 100.0% of the loans in the pool.

For the three remaining loans, S&P calculated a 1.51x S&P Global
Ratings weighted average DSC and 58.0% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value ratio using a 8.43% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate.

To date, the transaction has experienced $80.0 million in principal
losses, or 6.4% of the original pool trust balance.

RATINGS LIST

  Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2004-BPC1
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2004-BPC1

                                         Rating  
  Class         Identifier          To           From  
  D             59022HFB3           AAA (sf)     A (sf)
  E             59022HFE7           B (sf)       B (sf)


MILL CITY 2017-3: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class B2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings to Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust
2017-3 (MCMLT 2017-3) as follows:

-- $278,728,000 class A1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,944,000 class M1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,199,000 class M2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,860,000 class M3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,352,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,353,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $303,672,000 class A2 subsequent exchangeable notes 'AAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $331,871,000 class A3 subsequent exchangeable notes 'Asf';
    Outlook Stable.
-- $355,731,000 class A4 subsequent exchangeable notes 'BBBsf';
    Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $26,029,000 class B3 notes;
-- $8,676,000 class B4 notes;
-- $8,676,744 class B5 notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
1,665 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $433.82 million (which includes $25.7
million, or 5.9%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the
statistical calculation date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A1 notes reflects the 35.75%
subordination provided by the 5.75% class M1, 6.50% class M2, 5.50%
class M3, 4.00% class B1, 4.00% class B2, 6.00% class B3, 2.00%
class B4 and 2.00% class B5 notes.

Fitch's ratings on the class notes reflect the credit attributes of
the underlying collateral, the quality of the servicers: Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) rated 'RPS1-',Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (Shellpoint) and Fay Servicing, LLC (Fay), both rated
'RSS3+'; the representation (rep) and warranty framework; minimal
due diligence findings and the sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Concern): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage seasoned re-performing loans
(RPLs), including loans that have been paying for the past 24
months, which Fitch identifies as "clean current" (54.7%), and
loans that are current but have recent delinquencies or incomplete
paystrings, identified as "dirty current" (45.3%). All loans were
current as of the cutoff date; 71.3% of the loans have received
modifications.

Due Diligence Findings (Concern): The third-party review (TPR)
firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 349 loans
(21%) graded 'C' and 'D', of which 102 were subject to a loss
severity (LS) adjustment for issues regarding high-cost testing,
and one loan that was not reviewed by any TPR firm. Furthermore,
Fitch applied a 300% LS adjustment to two loans because the TPR
firm concluded that the lender did not document all the Ability to
Repay (ATR) underwriting factors.

Fitch extended timelines on 79 loans that were missing final
modification documents and increased the LS of one loan by $15,500
due to an incurable TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID)
exception cited by the TPR firm.

Hurricane Harvey and Irma Loans Removed (Positive): CarVal
Investors, LLC (CarVal) dropped all loans in Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) zones impacted by Hurricane Harvey. The
company also dropped all loans in the southern half of Florida as
well as the coastal regions of Georgia, South Carolina and North
Carolina that may be affected by Hurricane Irma. In addition, any
loan located in Florida will be repurchased if the borrower does
not make the first two payments following the closing date.

Land Loans Included (Concern): Eleven loans were identified as land
loans. These loans were originated as construction to permanent
over 10 years ago; however, a house was never constructed on these
properties. Fitch treated these land loans conservatively by
assuming 100% LS and as cash-out refinance, manufactured housing
and investor properties. Due to the limited number of land loans in
the transaction, the impact to the expected loss was roughly 5.0
basis points (bps).

Tax and Title Search Aged over Six Months (Concern): For
approximately 48% of the loans, the updated tax and title search
was performed more than six months prior to securitization. Fitch
expects to receive updated gap reports that list all outstanding
tax, title and lien issues, as of the closing date. Fitch believes
the risk of any potential taxes and liens that exist at the time of
closing is low due to the servicers' very close oversight of
borrower payments. Any issues will be cleared within 90 days or the
loans will be repurchased by the issuer.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes, in the absence of servicer advancing.

HELOCs Included (Concern): Approximately 11.7% of the total pool is
made up of loans with home equity lines of credit (HELOCs). To
account for future potential draws, Fitch added the available draw
amount to the loans where the credit line was not permanently
closed or temporarily frozen in declining markets (as evidenced by
declining updated property values). This approach affected 60 loans
(2.6% of the pool) and increased the amount owed by $1.47 million
for determining borrowers' probability of default (PD) and LS in
Fitch's analysis.

Deferred Amounts (Concern): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $25.7 million (5.9% of the unpaid
principal balance) are outstanding on 578 loans. Fitch included the
deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV,
despite the lower payment and amounts not being owed during the
term of the loan. The inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than
if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default
behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as
exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited
relative to those borrowers with more equity in the property.

Potential Interest Deferrals (Mixed): To address the lack of an
external P&I advance mechanism, principal otherwise distributable
to the notes may be used to pay monthly interest. While this helps
provide stability in the cash flows to the high
investment-grade-rated bonds, the lower-rated bonds may experience
long periods of interest deferral that will generally not be repaid
until such note becomes the most senior outstanding.

Under Fitch's "Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria," dated
May 2017, the agency may assign ratings of up to 'Asf' on notes
that incur deferrals if such deferrals are permitted under terms of
the transaction documents, provided such amounts are fully
recovered well in advance of the legal final maturity under the
relevant rating stress.

Representation Framework (Mixed): Fitch generally considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to be generally consistent with a Tier 2
framework due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers and the
exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of third-party due
diligence findings. For 38 loans that are seasoned less than 24
months, Fitch viewed the framework as a Tier 3 because the reps
related to the origination and underwriting of the loan, which are
typically expected for newly originated loans, were not included.
Thus, Fitch increased its 'AAAsf' PD loss expectations by
approximately 480bps to account for a potential increase in
defaults and losses arising from weaknesses in the reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Concern): CVI CVF III Lux Master
S.a.r.l., as rep provider, will only be obligated to repurchase a
loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in October 2018.
Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover amounts due
to noteholders for loans identified as having rep breaches. Amounts
on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the increased level of
subordination, will be available to cover additional defaults and
losses resulting from rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or
after the payment date in October 2018. Fitch applied a breach
reserve account credit, which lowered Fitch's loss expectations by
approximately 25bps.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level LS is less for
this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated to
advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow priorities,
together with increased subordination, provide for timely payments
of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated classes.

Timing of Recordation and Document Remediation (Neutral): A review
to confirm that the mortgage and subsequent assignments were
recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction was performed. The
review confirmed that all mortgages and subsequent assignments were
recorded in the relevant local jurisdiction or were being
recorded.

While the expected timelines for recordation and remediation are
viewed by Fitch as reasonable, the obligation of CVI CVF III Lux
Master S.a.r.l. to repurchase loans for which assignments are not
recorded and endorsements are not completed by the payment date in
October 2018, aligns the issuer's interests regarding completing
the recordation process with those of noteholders. While there will
not be an asset manager in this transaction, the indenture trustee
will be reviewing the custodian reports. The indenture trustee will
request CVI CVF III Lux Master S.a.r.l. to purchase any loans with
outstanding assignment and endorsement issues two days prior to the
October 2018 payment date.

Solid Alignment of Interest (Positive): The sponsor, Mill City
Holdings, LLC, will acquire and retain a 5% interest in each class
of the securities to be issued. In addition, the rep provider is an
indirect owner of the sponsor.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria, as
described in its June 2017 report "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This
incorporates a review of the originators' lending platforms, as
well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originators and arranger, which were found to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Rating Criteria" and one criteria variation from the "U.S.
RMBS Loan Loss Model Criteria," which are described below.

The first variation is that 38 loans (approximately 2.4% by
balance) in the pool are seasoned less than 24 months and
considered newly originated. On average, these loans are
approximately 18 months seasoned. The due diligence scope for these
loans was not consistent with Fitch's scope for newly originated
loans. Fitch is comfortable with the due diligence that was
completed on these loans as the loans made up a small percentage of
the pool. In addition, conservative assumptions were made on the
collateral analysis for these loans.

The second variation relates to overriding the default assumption
for original DTI in Fitch's loan loss model. Based on a historical
data analysis of over 750,000 loans from Fannie Mae and Fitch's
rated RPL transactions, Fitch assumed an original debt-to-income
ratio (DTI) of 45% for all loans in a pool that did not have
original DTI data available (approximately 68% of the pool). The
historical loan data support the DTI assumption of 45%. Prior to
conducting the historical analysis, Fitch had previously assumed
55% for loans that were missing original DTI values.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 37.9% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


MILL CITY 2017-3: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Class B1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to eight
classes of notes issued by Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust ("MCMLT")
2017-3.

The certificates are backed by one pool of 1,665 seasoned
performing and modified re-performing loans which include home
equity lines of credit (HELOC) mortgage loans and loans with a
negative amortization feature. The collateral pool has a non-zero
updated weighted average FICO score of 677 and a weighted average
current LTV of 79.21%.

There are approximately 11.51% HELOC loans in this pool, of which
22.50% of the borrowers are currently eligible to make draws up to
their credit limit. Approximately 64.36% of the HELOC loans have
their credit line temporarily frozen due to certain circumstances
including but not limited to the event where the current home value
has declined below a specified level.

The borrowers may unfreeze their credit line in future if the
circumstances that cause such credit line to be frozen are cured.
The remaining HELOC loans (approx. 13.14%) have their credit lines
permanently frozen. In the event that all HELOC loans (other than
the HELOC loans that are permanently frozen) are no longer
precluded from making draws, the maximum amount of draws available
to the borrowers as of August 2017 is equal to $4,543,930 or
approximately 1.05% of closing date UPB, compared to $668,202 in
MCMLT 2017-2 and $3.698 million in MCMLT 2017-1.

A HELOC borrower will be assessed a principal payment only in the
case that their credit limit amortizes to an amount that is below
the outstanding principal balance of the loan, otherwise the
borrower will be required to make only an interest payment.

During the amortization period, the credit limit will decrease at a
fixed rate. For example, if the amortization period is 240 months
then in each month, the credit limit will reduce by 1/240 of the
original credit limit.

In addition, approximately 9.80% of the loans are originated on or
after January 1, 2010 ("newly originated loans") for which Moody's
also performed additional loan level analysis similar to Moody's
analysis of newly originated prime quality loans and approximately
2.70% of the loans have a negative amortization feature. 70.51% of
the loans in the collateral pool were also previously modified and
the remaining loans have never been modified.

Fay Servicing LLC ("Fay"), Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS")
and Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing ("Shellpoint"), are the servicers
for the loans in the pool. The servicers will not advance any
principal or interest on the delinquent loans. However, the
servicers will be required to advance costs and expenses incurred
in connection with a default, delinquency or other event in the
performance of its servicing obligations. In addition, if a
borrower of a HELOC loan requests a draw on the related HELOC
credit line, the related servicer will be required to fund such
draw.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-3

Cl. A1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A3, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. M1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B1, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected losses on MCMLT 2017-3's collateral pool average
10.20% in Moody's base case scenario. Moody's loss estimates take
into account the historical performance of loans that have similar
collateral characteristics as the loans in the pool. For example,
Moody's observed the performance of 10 year IO-ARM loans as a proxy
to estimate future delinquencies for first lien HELOC loans because
of the similarities in the two loan types. A typical HELOC is an
adjustable rate loan with an IO period after which the loan
amortizes over the remaining term.

For the non-modified portion of this pool, Moody's analyzed data on
delinquency rates for always current (including self-cured) loans.
Moody's final loss estimates also incorporates adjustments for the
strength of the third party due diligence, the servicing framework
(including the capability to service HELOC loans) and the
representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the transaction.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016, and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.

Collateral Description

MCMLT 2017-3 is a securitization of 1,665 loans and is primarily
comprised of seasoned performing and modified re-performing
mortgage loans. Approximately 70.51% of the loans in the collateral
pool have been previously modified.

Moody's based Moody's expected losses on Moody's estimates of 1)
the default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and 2) the
principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. The two factors
that most strongly influence a re-performing mortgage loan's
likelihood of re-default are the length of time that the loan has
performed since a loan modification, and the amount of the
reduction in the monthly mortgage payment as a result of the
modification. The longer a borrower has been current on a
re-performing loan, the less likely the borrower is to re-default.
Approximately 49.14% of the borrowers have been current on their
payments for at least the past 24 months.

There are approximately 221 properties in the pool which had
potential exposure to Hurricane Irma. Majority of the properties
are located in Florida. Moody's did not make any specific
adjustments to Moody's expected loss because (i) there is a No
Damage R&W which specifies that the property is undamaged by events
including flood, tornado and windstorm and (ii) The Representation
Provider covenants that with respect to any property located in
Florida, if the borrower does not make any two of the first three
mortgage payments due immediately following the Closing Date, the
Representation Provider will repurchase the related Mortgage Loan.
It is expected that the servicer will inspect properties that were
affected by Hurricane Irma and any damaged properties will be
removed from the portfolio. This portfolio contains no properties
that were affected by Hurricane Harvey.

Moody's estimated expected losses for the pool using two approaches
-- (1) pool-level approach, and (2) re-performing loan level
analysis.

In the pool-level approach, Moody's estimates losses on the pool by
using a approach similar to Moody's surveillance approach wherein
Moody's apply assumptions on expected future delinquencies, default
rates, loss severities and prepayments as observed from Moody's
surveillance of similar collateral. Moody's projects future annual
delinquencies for eight years by applying an initial annual default
rate and delinquency burnout factors. Based on the loan
characteristics of the pool and the demonstrated pay histories,
Moody's expects an annual delinquency rate of 9.5% on the
collateral pool for year one. Moody's then calculated future
delinquencies on the pool using Moody's default burnout and
voluntary conditional prepayment rate (CPR) assumptions. Moody's
assumptions also factor in the high delinquency rates expected in
the early stages of the transaction due to payment shock expected
during the amortization phase for HELOC loans originated in
2005-2008 as well as payment shock expected for step-rate loans.
The delinquency burnout factors reflect Moody's future expectations
of the economy and the U.S. housing market. Moody's then aggregated
the delinquencies and converted them to losses by applying
pool-specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity
assumptions. Moody's loss severity assumptions are based off
observed severities on liquidated seasoned loans and reflect the
lack of principal and interest advancing on the loans.

Moody's also conducted a loan level analysis on MCMLT 2017-3's
collateral pool. Moody's applied loan-level baseline lifetime
propensity to default assumptions based on the historical
performance of loans with similar collateral characteristics and
payment histories. Moody's then adjusted this base default
propensity up for (1) adjustable-rate loans, (2) loans that have
the risk of coupon step-ups and (3) loans with high updated loan to
value ratios (LTVs). Moody's applied a higher baseline lifetime
default propensity for interest-only loans, using the same
adjustments. To calculate the final expected loss for the pool,
Moody's applied a loan-level loss severity assumption based on the
loans' updated estimated LTVs. Moody's further adjusted the loss
severity assumption upwards for loans in states that give
super-priority status to homeowner association (HOA) liens, to
account for potential risk of HOA liens trumping a mortgage. For
9.80% of newly originated loans, Moody's also performed additional
loan level analysis similar to Moody's analysis of newly originated
prime quality loans.

The deferred balance in this transaction is approximately $25.66
million, representing approximately 5.92% of the total unpaid
principal balance. Loans that have HAMP and proprietary remaining
principal reduction alternative (PRA) amounts totaled $190,278,
representing approximately 0.04% of total deferred balance.

Under HAMP-PRA, the principal of the borrower's mortgage may be
reduced by a predetermined amount called the PRA forbearance amount
if the borrower satisfies certain conditions during a trial period.
If the borrower continues to make timely payments on the loan for
three years, the entire PRA forbearance amount is forgiven. Also,
if the loan is in good standing and the borrower voluntary pays off
the loan, the entire forbearance amount is forgiven.

For non-PRA forborne amounts, the deferred balance is the full
obligation of the borrower and must be paid in full upon (i) sale
of property (ii) voluntary payoff or (iii) final scheduled payment
date. Upon sale of the property, the servicer therefore could
potentially recover some of the deferred amount. For loans that
default in future or get modified after the closing date, the
servicer may opt for partial or full principal forgiveness to the
extent permitted under the servicing agreement.

Based on performance data and information from servicers, Moody's
assume that 100% of the remaining PRA amount would be forgiven and
not recovered. For non-PRA deferred balance, Moody's applied a
slightly higher default rate for these loans than what Moody's
assumed for the overall pool given that these borrowers have
experienced past credit events that required loan modification, as
opposed to borrowers who have been current and have never been
modified. Also, for non-PRA loans, based on performance data from
an RPL servicer, Moody's assumed approximately 95% severity as
servicers may recover a portion of the deferred balance. The final
expected loss for the collateral pool reflects the due diligence
scope and findings of the independent third party review (TPR)
firms as well as Moody's assessments of MCMLT 2017-3's
representations & warranties (R&Ws) framework.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a simple sequential priority of payments
structure without any cash flow triggers. The transaction allocates
75% of excess cashflow (net of realized losses and certain
unreimbursed amounts) pro-rata to Class A1 through Class B3.

This arrangement is weaker than some rated transactions where
excess cashflow is used to pay principal sequentially, however, it
is still beneficial to the senior bonds because principal payments
from excess interest collection helps to build credit enhancement
through overcollateralization.

Similar to MCMLT 2017-2, due to the inclusion of HELOC loans (and
potential for future draws) certain structural features were
incorporated in this transaction. If a borrower of a HELOC loan
makes a draw on the related HELOC credit line, the servicer will be
required to fund such draw and will be reimbursed through the
following mechanism.

On the Closing Date, the Depositor will remit $2.275 million in the
HELOC Draw Reserve Account, which will be used to reimburse the
servicer for any draws made on the HELOC credit line. The remaining
25% of excess cashflow will be used to first fund the HELOC reserve
account to its target amount ($4.544 million).

Subsequently, if amounts on deposit in the HELOC Draw Reserve
Account are not sufficient to reimburse such draws, the Class D
Certificates will be obligated to remit the deficient amount to the
HELOC Draw Reserve Account ("Class D Draw Amount"). The Class D
certificate is not an offered certificate and will represent an
equity interest in the issuer (MCMLT 2017-3)

In the event the holder of the Class D Certificates fails to remit
all or part of any Class D Draw Amount on any payment date, the
Indenture Trustee will fund any unpurchased draw or portion of a
draw on future Payment Dates from amounts in the HELOC Draw Reserve
Account.

The servicer will not advance any principal or interest on
delinquent loans. However, the servicer will be required to advance
costs and expenses incurred in connection with a default,
delinquency or other event in the performance of its servicing
obligations.

Credit enhancement in this transaction is comprised of
subordination provided by mezzanine and junior tranches, the
buildup of overcollateralization from available excess interest and
from additional collateral available to the trust if HELOC
borrowers draw on their credit line, which will be purchased by the
Indenture Trustee from the servicer. If the Indenture Trustee is
unable to purchase the additional collateral, then the servicer
will be entitled to a portion of P&I payments on such HELOC loan.
The principal payment received from this additional collateral will
facilitate a faster pay down on the senior notes.

75% of available excess interest net of realized losses and certain
unreimbursed amounts) pro-rata to Class A1 through Class B3. The
remaining excess interest will be used to first replenish the HELOC
Draw Reserve Account to the target amount, to the Class D
certificate holder and to reimburse any unpaid fees before paying
the Class X certificate.

To the extent that the overcollateralization amount is zero,
realized losses will be allocated to the notes in a reverse
sequential order starting with the lowest subordinate bond. The
Class A1, M1, M2, M3, B1, B2 and B3 notes carry a fixed-rate coupon
subject to the collateral adjusted net weighted average coupon
(WAC) and applicable available funds cap. The Class B4 and B5 are
variable rate notes where the coupon is equal to the lesser of
adjusted net WAC and applicable available funds cap.

Moody's modeled MCMLT 2017-3's cashflows using SFW®, a cashflow
tool developed by Moody's Analytics. To assess the final rating on
the notes, Moody's ran 96 different loss and prepayment scenarios
through SFW. The scenarios encompass six loss levels, four loss
timing curves, and four prepayment curves. The structure allows for
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal with
respect to the notes by the legal final maturity.

Third Party Review

Three third party review (TPR) firms conducted due diligence on all
but one of the loans in MCMLT 2017-3's collateral pool. The TPR
firms reviewed compliance, data integrity and key documents, to
verify that loans were originated in accordance with federal, state
and local anti-predatory laws. The TPR firms also conducted audits
of designated data fields to ensure the accuracy of the collateral
tape. An independent firm also reviewed the title and tax reports
for all the loans in the pool.

Based on Moody's analysis of the third-party review reports,
Moody's determined that a portion of the loans had legal or
compliance exceptions (including 2 loans where the diligence
providers were unable to determine if these loans were originated
in accordance with ATR rules. Moody's have made adjustments
consistent with Moody's approach to account for the rating impact
of ATR rules) that could cause future losses to the trust. Two
loans were also found as Non-QM loans but ATR compliant. Moody's
incorporated an additional hit to the loss severities for these
loans to account for this risk. The title review includes
confirming the recordation status of the mortgage and the
intervening chain of assignments, the status of real estate taxes
and validating the lien position of the underlying mortgage loan.
Once securitized, delinquent taxes will be advanced on behalf of
the borrower and added to the borrower's account. The servicer will
be reimbursed for delinquent taxes from the top of the waterfall,
as a servicing advance. The representation provider has deposited
collateral of $750,000 in the Assignment Reserve Account (ARA) to
ensure one or more third parties monitored by the Depositor
completes all assignment and endorsement chains and record an
intervening assignment of mortgage as necessary. The amount
deposited in the ARA at the closing date is same as MCMLT 2017-1
but lower than previous Mill City transactions issued in 2015 and
2016. Moody's has considered the lower ARA deposit and factors such
as: (i) the high historical cure rate in the previous Mill City
transactions; (ii) the low delinquency rate of the previous Mill
City transactions; and (iii) quality of the collateral.

Representations & Warranties

Moody's ratings also factor in MCMLT 2017-3's weak representations
and warranties (R&Ws) framework because they contain many knowledge
qualifiers and the regulatory compliance R&W does not cover
monetary damages that arise from TILA violations whose right of
rescission has expired. The breach discovery process for this
transaction is also weaker than previous Mill City securitizations
and other rated RPL transactions. Previously, an independent party
reviewed R&W breaches for every loan that became 120 days
delinquent. For this transaction, an independent party reviews R&W
breaches for every loan that incurs a realized loss. Moody's has
made adjustments to account for the weaker breach discovery
process.

While the transaction provides for a Breach Reserve Account to
cover for any breaches of R&Ws, the size of the account is small
relative to MCMLT 2017-3's aggregate collateral pool ($433.8
million). An initial deposit of $1.0 million will be remitted to
the Breach Reserve Account on the closing date, with an initial
Breach Reserve Account target amount of $1.59 million.

Trustee Indemnification

Moody's believes there is a very low likelihood that the rated
notes in Mill City 2017-3 will incur any loss from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, majority of the loans are
seasoned with demonstrated payment history, reducing the likelihood
of a lawsuit on the basis that the loans have underwriting defects.
Second, historical performance of loans aggregated by the sponsor
to date has been within expectation, with minimal losses on
previously issued Mill City transactions. Third, the transaction
has reasonably well defined processes in place to identify loans
with defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an
independent breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of
representations and warranties when a realized loss is incurred on
a loan, which reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for
inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has performed nearly 100% due
diligence by independent third parties with respect to compliance
and payment history and has disclosed the results of the review.

Transaction Parties

The transaction benefits from an adequate servicing arrangement.
Shellpoint will service 81.73% of the pool, Fay will service 9.55%
of the pool and SPS will service 8.73% of the pool. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. is the Custodian of the transaction. The Delaware
Trustee for MCMLT 2017-3 is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB,
d/b/a, Christiana Trust. MCMLT 2017-3's Indenture Trustee is U.S.
Bank National Association.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligors defaulting or
deterioration in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons
for worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error
on the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction
governance and fraud.


ML-CFC COMMERCIAL 2007-7: Moody's Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes,
affirmed the rating on one class and downgraded the ratings on two
classes ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-7, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-7:

Cl. AM, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. AM-FL, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. AJ, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed
Ca (sf)

Cl. AJ-FL, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016
Affirmed Ca (sf)

Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I Classes AM and AM-FL were upgraded based
primarily on an increase in credit support resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The deal has paid down 86% since Moody's
last review.

The ratings on the P&I Classes AJ and AJ-FL were downgraded due to
anticipated losses and realized losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans that were higher than Moody's had previously
expected.

The rating on the IO Class X was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 49.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 7.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 18.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 16.7% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" methodology published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 87% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified an additional troubled
loan representing 4% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 14, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to $219 million
from $2.79 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 30 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 17% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 69% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 13, compared to 70 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $393.8 million (for an average loss
severity of 61%). Twenty-one loans, constituting 87% of the pool,
are currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced
loan is the Scottsdale Center loan ($38.0 million -- 17.3% of the
pool), which is secured by an 201,565 squarefoot (SF) anchored
community shopping center located in Rogers, Arkansas, the
northwest portion of the state in the
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers Metropolitan Area. The property
consists of five buildings situated on 24 acres. Major tenants at
the property include Belk, Ross Dress for Less, Barnes & Noble, and
Staples. Belk currently makes up 57% of the property's net rentable
area, occupying their space on two ground leases until March 2022.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Renaissance III
Retail - A note ($30.0 million -- 13.7% of the pool), which is
secured by a 225,973 SF class B+ grocery-anchored retail center
located in central Las Vegas, Nevada, four miles east of the Vegas
strip. The anchor space is currently leased to Ralph's Grocery,
however the space is unoccupied. Current tenants at the property
include the State of Nevada Welfare Division, Planet Fitness, Ace
Hardware, Chase Bank, and Sonic. The loan first transferred to
special servicing in March 2010 and received a modification in
April 2011. The original note was split into a $30 million A-Note
and a $10 million B-Note. The loan transferred back to special
servicing for imminent default following the borrower's inability
to pay the loan in full at maturity in May 2017.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Gristmill Village
loan ($12.9 million -- 5.9% of the pool), which is secured by a
91,845 SF mixed-use property located in Concord, Ohio, thirty miles
northeast of the Clevelend CBD. The retail component of the
property makes up 59,891 SF (65% by NRA) and is anchored by
Reider's Market, an independent, owner operated grocery store.
Other retail tenants are a mix of small restraunts and local
businesses. The office component makes up 33,264 sf (35% by NRA).
It is primarily leased to a mix of medical offices. The loan
transferred to special servicing after it was not paid at maturity
in April 2017.

The remaining 18 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's has also assumed a high default probability
for one other poorly performing loan, constituting 3.8% of the
pool. Moody's estimates an aggregate $107.7 million loss for the
specially serviced and troubled loans (54% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 64% of the
pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 87%, compared to 102% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 22% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.26X and 2.48X,
respectively, compared to 1.37X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top two conduit loans represent 6.6% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Montgomery Trace Shopping Center Loan ($7.4
million -- 3.4% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery
anchored shopping center located in Montgomery, Texas directly off
of Highway 105 and fifty miles north of the Houston CBD. The
anchor, Brookshire Brothers, is currently under lease until 2022.
Per the Master Servicer, the property sustained only minor damage
from Hurricane Harvey; three tenants reported minor roof leaks in
need of ceiling tile replacements. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 123% and 0.81X, respectively, compared to 126% and 0.80X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Villa La Jolla Building Loan ($7.1
million -- 3.3% of the pool), which is secured by a medical office
buillding located in La Jolla, California, roughly ten miles north
of the San Diego CBD. The loan matured in May 2017, however the
borrower reached a six-month extension agreement; the loan now
matures on November 1, 2017. UC San Diego Health rents the entire
space into April 2018. Due to the upcoming lease maturity of the
sole tenant, Moody's employed a lit-dark analysis during this
review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 102% and 1.09X,
respectively.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class K Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
affirmed the ratings on five classes in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series
2003-IQ4:

Cl. J, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on October 20, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on October 20, 2016 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on October 20, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on October 20, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on October 20, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on June 9, 2017 Downgraded to
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class J was upgraded primarily due to an increase in
credit support since Moody's last review, resulting from loan
paydowns and amortization. The pool has paid down by 28% since
Moody's last review and 98% since securitization.

The ratings on Classes K, L, M and N were affirmed because ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss and these classes are
currently impacted by interest shortfalls.

The rating on the IO class, Class X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 30.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 18.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Cl. X-1 was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $13.6 million
from $727.8 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 17 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 35.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 91.3% of the pool. One loan, constituting
0.7% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, compared to 9 at Moody's last review.

Six loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $8.1 million. One loan, the North
Mayfair Loan ($4.8 million -- 35.5% of the pool), is currently in
special servicing. The loan is secured by an 102,500 square foot
(SF), class B, mid-rise office building located in the northwest
suburbs of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. As per the July 2017 rent roll the
property was 73% occupied, compared to 68% occupied as of September
2016. The property has been REO since December 2014 and the special
servicer indicated they have marketed the property for sale in the
third quarter of 2017.

As of the September 15, 2017 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $1.4 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to the specially
serviced loan. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing
fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement
reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 33% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 27.1%, compared to 32.3% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.2% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.31X and 5.43X,
respectively, compared to 1.35X and 4.06X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 28.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Plainview Commons Loan ($1.4 million --
10.1% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property located
in Plainview, New York. As per the December 2016 rent roll the
property was 100% occupied, compared to the 83% at the time of
Moody's last review. The loan is a fully amortizing loan and
matures in February 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 35.0%
and 3.24X, respectively.

The second largest loan is the is the Boardwalk Plaza Loan ($1.3
million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 49,000 square
foot (SF) anchored retail property located east of Detroit, MI. As
per the November 2016 rent roll the property was 100% occupied,
compared to 93% leased at the time of Moody's last review. The loan
is a fully amortizing loan and matures in February 2023. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 29.3% and 3.51X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Garden West Apartments Loan ($1.1
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by 122 units in
garden style apartments in Yuba, California. As per December 2016
rent roll the property was 97% occupied, compared to 90% at the
time of Moody's last review. The loan is a fully amortizing loan
and matures in January 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
32.6% and 3.15X, respectively.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C25: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust (MSBAM) Mortgage Trust 2015-C25
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations are based on the relatively
stable performance of the underlying collateral. As of the
September 2017 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has paid down by 0.8% to $1.17 billion from $1.18 billion
at issuance. There are no specially serviced or delinquent loans.
One loan (4.3% of current pool) is on the servicer's watchlist.
There is one loan (4.7%) that is considered a Fitch Loan of
Concern, Villas at Dorsey Ridge, due to a 24.6% drop in YE 2016 NOI
compared to issuance. The property occupancy still remains strong
at 90% as of July 2017 compared to 98% at issuance and has an
interest-only NOI DSCR of 1.23x at YE 2016.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans comprise 53.6% of the pool,
which is higher than averages of 50.5% and 49.3% for 2014 and 2015,
respectively. The transaction's exposure to areas impacted by
Hurricane Harvey include one loan (1.2%), a multifamily located in
Bay City, TX, that has minor damage. There was also minimal
exposure to Hurricane Irma with one multifamily property (1.5%)
located in Casselberry, Florida for which no update on the
condition has been reported.

Limited Upcoming Maturities: Only 2.3% of the pool is scheduled to
mature in 2020. The majority of the pool matures in 2024 (9.8%) and
2025 (86%).

Below-Average Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by
10.1% of the initial pool balance prior to maturity. This is not as
good as the averages of 12.0% and 11.7% for 2014 and 2015,
respectively. Five loans (22.3%) are full-term interest-only and 32
loans (55.3%) are partial interest-only, with the remaining 19
loans (22.5%) being balloon loans.

Property Diversity: The largest property type is office, which
comprises 22.6% of the pool, followed by retail (21.8%) and
multifamily (19.8%). Hotels comprise 13.3% of the pool, which is
lower than the average of 17% for 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the overall
stable performance of the pool and continued amortization. Rating
upgrades may occur with improved pool performance and additional
paydown or defeasance. Rating downgrades to the classes are
possible should a material asset-level or economic event adversely
affect pool performance.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $24,882,613 class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28,700,000 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93,700,000 class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115,000,000 class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $230,000,000 class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $324,193,000 class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $816,475,613b class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,702,000b class X-B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,394,000b class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45,702,000 class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $89,931,000 class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,022,000 class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63,394,000 class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $29,485,0000a class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $13,269,000a class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Privately placed
(b) Notional amount and interest-only

Fitch does not rate class G.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-C34: Fitch to Rate Class F Notes 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2017-C34, Series 2017-C34.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $25,285,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,024,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $61,577,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $200,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $363,447,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $697,333,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $171,843,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $77,205,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48,564,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,074,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,036,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,905,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,207,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,036,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24,905,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11,207,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

-- $34,867,004b class G;
-- $34,867,004ab class X-G;
-- $52,431,106b class VRR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 50 loans secured by 179
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,048,622,110 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Bank of America, National Association, Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Starwood Mortgage Funding
III LLC and KeyBank National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 77.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 84.5%, and asset summary reviews
on 84.5% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is slightly higher than recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.20x and 105.7%,
respectively, which reflect slightly worse leverage statistics
compared to the YTD 2017 averages of 1.25x and 101.4%,
respectively. Excluding credit opinion loans, the pool has a Fitch
DSCR and LTV of 1.18x and 109.1%, respectively, compared with the
YTD 2017 normalized averages of 1.20x and 109.9%.

Weak Amortization: Thirteen loans representing 42.5% of the pool
are full interest-only loans, which is slightly below the YTD 2017
average of 44.2% but greater than the 2016 average of 33.3% for
other Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. Additionally, there
are 16 loans representing 32.5% of the pool that are partial
interest-only loans. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool is scheduled to pay down by 8.7%, which is slightly above
the YTD 2017 average of 8.2% but below the 2016 average of 10.4%.

Below-Average Hotel Exposure: Hotel properties represent 9.5% of
the pool by balance, which is lower than the YTD 2017 average of
15.8% and 2016 average of 16.0%. Loans secured by hotel properties
have an above-average probability of default in Fitch's
multiborrower model, all else equal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 3.4% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
MSBAM 2017-C34 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


NATIONSTAR HECM 2017-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. M2 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to three
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2017-2 (NHLT 2017-2). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 1,360 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages (HECMs) and 200 real estate owned
(REO) properties. The servicer for the deal is Nationstar Mortgage
LLC (Nationstar).

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2017-2

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. M1, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing NHLT 2017-2 consists of first-lien inactive
HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance
secured by properties in the US along with Real-Estate Owned (REO)
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, the sale of the property is used to recover the amount
owed. Nationstar acquired the mortgage assets from Ginnie Mae
sponsored HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations. All of the
mortgage assets are covered by FHA insurance for the repayment of
principal up to certain amounts. 18.2% of the collateral is from
the recently collapsed NHLT 2015-2 transaction and 33.5% of the
collateral is from the recently collapsed NHLT 2016-1 transaction.

There are 1,560 mortgage assets with a balance of $422,256,709. The
assets are in either default, due and payable, referred,
foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default may move to
due and payable; due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and
foreclosure loans may move to REO. 28.93% of the assets are in
default of which 11.84% (of the total assets) are in default due to
non-occupancy, 16.86% (of the total assets) are in default due to
taxes and insurance and 0.22% (of the total assets) are in default
for other reasons. 9.25% of the assets are due and payable, 48.63%
of the assets are in foreclosure and 1.92% of the assets are in
referred status. Finally, 11.27% of the assets are REO properties
and were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure on the associated loan. If the value of the related
mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount, some of these
loans may be settled by the borrower or their estate.

Compared to previous NHLT transactions that Moody's has rated, NHLT
2017-2 has a comparatively high percentage of loans in states with
long foreclosure timelines such as New York, New Jersey, and
Florida. In addition, 16.0% of the assets in this transaction are
backed by properties that may have been affected by Hurricane
Harvey or Hurricane Irma. Finally, there are 12 assets (0.5% of the
asset balance) in NHLT 2017-2 that are backed by properties in
Puerto Rico. Moody's credit ratings reflect state-specific
foreclosure timeline stresses as well as adjustments for risks
associated with the recent hurricanes and the real estate market in
Puerto Rico.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst
three classes of notes with overcollateralization and structural
subordination. All funds collected, prior to an acceleration event,
are used to make interest payments to the notes, then principal
payments to the Class A notes, then to a redemption account until
the amount on deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to
cover future principal and interest payments for the subordinate
notes up to their expected final payment dates. The subordinate
notes will not receive principal until the beginning of their
respective target amortization periods (in the absence of an
acceleration event). The notes benefit from overcollateralization
and structural subordination as credit enhancement, and an interest
reserve account funded with cash received from the initial
purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in September 2019. For the Class
M1 notes, the expected final payment date is in March 2020.
Finally, for the Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is
in September 2020. For each of the subordinate notes, there are six
month target amortization periods that conclude on the respective
expected final payment dates. The legal final maturity of the
transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve account may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer. However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults and a new servicer is appointed.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar. The review focused on
data integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification, accuracy of
appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status recording,
borrower age documentation, identification of excessive corporate
advances, documentation of servicer advances, and identification of
tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions
(BPOs) were ordered for 300 properties in the pool.

The TPR firm conducted an extensive data integrity review. Certain
data tape fields, such as the MIP rate, the current UPB, current
interest rate, and marketable title date were reviewed against
Nationstar's servicing system. However, a significant number of
data tape fields were reviewed against imaged copies of original
documents of record, screen shots of HUD's HERMIT system, or HUD
documents. Some key fields reviewed in this manner included the
original note rate, the debenture rate, foreclosure first legal
date, and the called due date.

The results of the third-party review (TPR) are comparable to
previous NHLT transactions in many respects. However, the number of
exceptions related to missing invoices and corporate advances in
excess of FHA reimbursement thresholds is higher than in other
recently rated NHLT transactions, particularly with respect to
missing tax and insurance invoices. NHLT 2017-2's TPR results
showed a 24.23% initial-tape exception rate related to foreclosure
and bankruptcy fees, a 3.21% initial-tape exception rate related to
property preservation fees, a 12.79% initial-tape exception rate
related to tax and insurance disbursements and a 7.57% initial-tape
exception rate related to non-tax and insurance disbursements. This
compares to 15.02%, 3.00%, 1.91% and 0.32% initial-tape exception
rates for NHLT 2017-1 in these categories respectively.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider. Nationstar is rated B2
(Stable). At this point, Moody's has limited insight as to their
ability to serve in this capacity. This risk is mitigated by the
fact that Nationstar is the equity holder in the transaction and
there is therefore a significant alignment of interests. Another
factor mitigating this risk is that a third-party due diligence
firm conducted a review on the loans for evidence of FHA
insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect. Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is made only as to the initial mortgage
loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar does not provide any
other R&W in connection with the origination of the mortgage loans,
including whether the mortgage loans were originated in compliance
with applicable federal, state and local laws. Although certain
representations are knowledge qualified, the transaction documents
contain language specifying that if a representation would have
been breached if not for the knowledge qualifier then Nationstar
will repurchase the relevant asset as if the representation had
been breached.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, Nationstar has to cure
the breach. If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification. Moody's believes the absence of an independent third
party reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the acquisition trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the Seller. Moody's believes that NHLT
2017-2 is adequately protected against such risk in part because a
third-party data integrity review was conducted on a significant
random sample of the loans. In addition, the third-party due
diligence firm verified that all of the loans in the pool are
covered by FHA insurance.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2017-2 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank National
Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also serve as the
claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD mortgagee of
record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016, and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations" published in May 2015.

Moody's quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan
modeling of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA
insurance and with various stresses applied to model parameters
depending on the target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than its appraised value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
it. ABCs are filed six months after the servicer has obtained
marketable title if the property has not yet been sold. For an SBC,
HUD insurance will cover the difference between (i) the loan
balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price and 95.0% of the
latest appraisal, with the transaction on the hook for losses if
the sales price is lower than 95.0% of the latest appraisal. For an
ABC, HUD only covers the difference between the loan amount and
100% of appraised value, so failure to sell the property at the
appraised value results in loss.

Moody's expects ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Moody's base case expectations is that properties will
be sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. This is
based on the historical experience of Nationstar. Moody's stressed
this percentage at higher credit rating levels. At a Aaa rating
level, Moody's assumed that ABC appraisal haircuts could reach up
to 30.0%.

In Moody's asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed this percentage at higher credit
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that SBC
appraisal haircuts could reach up to 11.0% (i.e., 6.0% below
95.0%).

Under Moody's analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go
through both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability.
Each loan will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. Based on the historical experience of
Nationstar, for the base case scenario Moody's assumed that 85% of
claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs. Moody's stressed
this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that 85% of
insurance claims would be submitted as ABCs.

Liquidation process: each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In
Moody's analysis, Moody's assume loans that are in referred status
to be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed
to move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to 12 months
depending on the default reason. Foreclosure status is based on the
state in which that the related property is located and is further
stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and 12
months with respect to ABCs.

Debenture interest: the receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment.
Moody's base case assumption is that 95.0% of debenture interest
will be received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of
debenture interest that will be received at higher rating levels.
Moody's debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that
Nationstar (B2, Stable) reimburse the trust for debenture interest
curtailments due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD
guidelines.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into Moody's analysis, including the following:

* In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in Moody's analysis. However, for seasoned
appraisals Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential
home price depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the
cut-off date.

* Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in
their homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their
heirs rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's
estimated which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing
each loans' appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB.

* Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

* Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where Nationstar is no longer the
servicer. Moody's assume the following in the situation where
Nationstar is no longer the servicer:

* Servicing advances and servicing fees: While Nationstar
subordinates their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing
fees, and MIP payments, a replacement servicer will not subordinate
these amounts.

* Nationstar indemnifies the trust for lost debenture interest due
to servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD guidelines. In
the event of a bankruptcy, Nationstar will not have the financial
capacity to do so.

* A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assume a 25 bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

* One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse a replacement servicer (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500 per loan.

Finally, to account for risks posed by the recent hurricanes,
Moody's assumed the following:

* To account for delays in the foreclosure process due to the
hurricanes, Moody's added 7.5 months to the foreclosure timeline in
the base case scenario for properties located in hurricane affected
areas. At a Aaa rating level, this timeline stress is multiplied by
1.6x and so this equates to adding an additional year to
foreclosure timelines in a Aaa scenario.

* For properties located in hurricane impacted areas, Moody's
assumed that a higher percentage of insurance claims would be
submitted as ABCs as a result of the hurricanes.

* For properties located in hurricane impacted areas, Moody's
increased the amount of non-reimbursable expenses that Moody's
expect would be incurred by a replacement servicer following a
servicer termination event.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from Moody's original expectations resulting in
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and faster
property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from Moody's original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2017-5: DBRS Finalizes Bsf Ratings on 5 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2017-5 issued by New Residential
Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-5 (the Trust):

-- $302.6 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $302.6 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $311.8 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $319.1 million Class A-3 at A (sf)
-- $302.6 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $311.8 million Class A-5 at AA (sf)
-- $319.1 million Class A-6 at A (sf)
-- $319.1 million Class IO at A (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class B1-IO at AA (sf)
-- $9.2 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)
-- $7.2 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $16.5 million Class B-IO at A (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)
-- $4.4 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-4A at BB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-4B at BB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B4-IOB at BB (sf)
-- $2.7 million Class B-5 at B (sf)
-- $2.7 million Class B-5A at B (sf)
-- $2.7 million Class B-5B at B (sf)
-- $2.7 million Class B5-IOA at B (sf)
-- $2.7 million Class B5-IOB at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, X, IO, B1-IO, B2-IO, B-IO, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B3-IOC,
B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B5-IOA and B5-IOB are interest-only notes. The
class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, IO, B-1A, B-2A, B-IO, B-3A, B-3B,
B-3C, B3-IOA, B3-IOB, B3-IOC, B-4A, B-4B, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B-5A,
B-5B, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B-7, B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11 and B are
exchangeable notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations
of initial exchangeable notes as specified in the offering
documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 10.00% of credit
enhancement provided by the subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 7.25%,
5.10%, 3.80%, 2.65% and 1.85% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 1,312 loans with a total principal balance of
$336,216,788 as of the Cut-Off Date (July 1, 2017).

The loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted-average age of
163 months. As of the Cut-Off Date, 96.8% of the pool is current,
1.9% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association
(MBA) delinquency method and 1.3% is in bankruptcy (all bankruptcy
loans are performing or 30 days delinquent). Approximately 85.3%
and 89.1% of the mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days
delinquent (0 x 30) for the past 24 months and 12 months,
respectively, under the MBA delinquency method. The portfolio
contains 11.2% modified loans. The modifications happened more than
two years ago for 77.6% of the modified loans. As a result of the
seasoning of the collateral, none of the loans are subject to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay/Qualified
Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor VII LLC (NRZ), acquired certain loans prior
to the Closing Date and will acquire certain loans on the Closing
Date in connection with the termination of various securitization
trusts or through a whole loan purchase. Upon acquiring the loans
from the securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New
Residential Funding 2017-5 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute the
loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment
Corp., through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain
a 5% eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be
issued (other than the residual notes) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 76.8% of the pool is serviced by Nationstar
Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and 23.2% by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.
Nationstar will also act as the Master Servicer and the Special
Servicer.

Beginning on November 1, 2017, the Seller will have the option to
repurchase any loan that becomes 60 or more days delinquent under
the MBA method at a price equal to the principal balance of the
loan (Optional Repurchase Price), provided that such repurchases
will be limited to 10% of the principal balance of the mortgage
loans as of the Cut-Off Date.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates and satisfactory deal performance.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.

Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance, title/lien, payment history and data
integrity. Updated Home Data Index and/or broker price opinions
were provided for the pool; however, a reconciliation was not
performed on the updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.


NORTHWOODS CAPITAL XVI: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by Northwoods Capital XVI, Limited.

Moody's rating action is:

US$317,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$60,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes, and the Class E Notes are referred to herein as the "Rated
Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

Northwoods Capital XVI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio
must consist of senior secured loans and up to 7.5% of the
portfolio may consist of assets that are not senior secured loans.
Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 70% ramped as of
the closing date.

Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2800 to 3220)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 3640)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


NXT CAPITAL 2017-2: S&P Gives Prelim. BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to NXT Capital
CLO 2017-2 LLC's $352.00 million floating-rate notes (see list).

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by middle-market speculative-grade senior secured
term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 3,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are
governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  NXT Capital CLO 2017-2 LLC

   Class                Rating          Amount
                                     (mil. $)
  A                    AAA (sf)       228.000
  B                    AA (sf)         40.000
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)          32.000
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)       26.000
  E (deferrable)       BB (sf)         26.000
  Subordinated notes   NR              54.715

  NR--Not rated.


OFSI FUND VII: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to the replacement class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes from OFSI Fund VII Ltd., a U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by OFS
Capital Management LLC. S&P withdrew its ratings on the original
class A, B, C, D, E, and combination notes from this transaction
after they were fully redeemed. The combination note consists of
the class A and B notes.

S&P said, "The new notes were issued via a supplemental indenture.
On the Oct. 3, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the new
note issuances were used to redeem the original notes as outlined
in the transaction docu ment provisions. We withdrew our ratings on
the original notes in line with their full redemption, and we
assigned ratings to the new notes. We also affirmed our ratings on
the class X and F notes which were not affected by this amendment.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the trustee
report, to estimate future performance. In line with our criteria,
our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the
expected timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon
default, under various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios.
In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's ability to
pay timely interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the
rated tranches.

"The assigned and affirmed ratings reflect our opinion that the
credit support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take rating actions as we
deem necessary."

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  OFSI Fund VII Ltd.
  New class            Rating           Amount (mil $)
  A-R                  AAA (sf)                238.800
  B-R                  AA (sf)                  59.000
  C-R                  A (sf)                   28.800
  D-R                  BBB (sf)                 20.600
  E-R                  BB (sf)                  17.000

  RATINGS WITHDRAWN

  OFSI Fund VII Ltd.
                             Rating
  Original class       To              From
  A                    NR              AAA (sf)
  B                    NR              AA (sf)
  C                    NR              A (sf)
  D                    NR              BBB (sf)
  E                    NR              BB (sf)
  ComboNotes           NR              AA (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  OFSI Fund VII Ltd.
  Class                  Rating
  X                      AAA (sf)
  F                      B (sf)

  OTHER RATING

  OFSI Fund VII Ltd.
  Class                  Rating
  Subordinate notes      NR

  NR--Not rated.


PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES 2000-C1: Moody's Affirms C on Cl. M Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class in
Prudential Securities Secured Financing Corporation, Series Key
2000-C1:

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class, class M, was affirmed because the
class has already experienced a 98% realized loss as result of
previously liquidated loans.

Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.5% of the
original pooled balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.9% to $349
thousand from $816 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan that has defeased and is
secured by US government securities.

Twenty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $28.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 20.9%).


PUTNAM STRUCTURED 2003-1: Moody's Affirms C Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Putnam Structured Product Funding 2003-1 Ltd/Putnam
Structured Product Funding 2003-1 LLC ("Putnam Funding 2003-1"):

Moody's rating action is:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2016 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2016 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2016 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. Equity, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2016 Affirmed C
(sf)

The Class A-2 Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, and Class Equity
are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmations are the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO &
Re-REMIC) transactions.

Putnam Funding 2003-1 is a cash transaction whose reinvestment
period ended in October 2010. The transaction is currently backed
by a portfolio of: i) asset backed securities (ABS) (67.9% of the
pool balance) which are primarily in the form of subprime
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS); ii) CRE CDO bonds
(15.7%); and iii) commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
(16.4%). As of the trustee's September 8, 2017 report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, is $166.3.1 million, as compared to $561 million at
issuance with the paydown directed to the senior most outstanding
class of notes, as a result of regular amortization, redirection of
interest proceeds as principal due to the failure of one or more
over-collateralization tests; and the reclassification of interest
as principal on defaulted assets.

The pool contains forty one assets totaling $48.5 million (39.0% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as defaulted
securities as of the trustee's August 8, 2017 report. Thirty two of
these assets (37% of the defaulted balance) are RMBS, five assets
(34.7%) are CDO, and four assets (28.3%) are CMBS. While there have
been limited realized losses on the underlying collateral to date,
Moody's does expect moderate/high losses to occur on the defaulted
assets once they are realized.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO CLO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset correlation (MAC).
Moody's typically models these as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO CLO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it
does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of
6869, compared to 6631 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (6.2% compared to 8.0% at last
review), A1-A3 (8.5% compared to 1.1% at last review), Baa1-Baa3
(0.9% compared to 8.6% at last review), Ba1-Ba3 (3.4% compared to
4.5% at last review), B1-B3 (8.7% compared to 1.9% at last review),
and Caa1-Ca/C (72.3% compared to 76.0% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.9 years, as compared to 2.5 years at
last review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on
the underlying look-through loan collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 6.9%, as compared to 6.7% at last
review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 100%, same as last review. The high MAC is
the result of high-risk collateral concentrated within a small
number of collateral names.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty,
because it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that are subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master
and special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the Rated Notes.

Changes to any one or more of the key parameters could have rating
implications for some of the Rated Notes, although a change in one
key parameter assumption could be offset by a change in one or more
of the other key parameter assumptions. The Rated Notes are
particularly sensitive to changes in the ratings recovery rates of
the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Reducing the
recovery rate of 100% of the collateral pool by -5% would result in
an average modeled rating movement on the Rated Notes of zero
notches downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement
of Baa3 to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the
collateral pool by +5% would result in an average modeled rating
movement on the rated notes of zero to one notch upward (e.g., one
notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2017-CH1: Moody's Rates Cl. B-5 Certs 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust (SEMT) 2017-CH1, except for the
interest-only classes. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans.

SEMT 2017-CH1 is the first securitization that includes loans
acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation ("Redwood"
or "Seller"), a subsidiary of Redwood Trust, Inc., under its
expanded credit prime loan program called "Redwood Choice".
Redwood's Choice program is a prime program with credit parameters
outside of Redwood's traditional prime jumbo program, "Redwood
Select." The Choice program expands the low end of Redwood's FICO
range to 661 from 700, while increasing the high end of eligible
loan-to-value ratios from 85% to 90%. The pool also includes loans
with non-QM characteristics (27.09%), such as debt-to-income ratios
greater than 43%. Non-QM loans were acquired by Redwood under each
of the Select and Choice programs.

The assets of the trust consist of 409 fixed rate mortgage loans,
all of which are fully amortizing, except for two mortgage loans
that have an interest-only term. The mortgage loans have an
original term to maturity of 30 years except for one loan which has
an original term to maturity of 20 years. The loans were sourced
from multiple originators and acquired by Redwood. All of the loans
conform to the Seller's guidelines, except for loans originated by
First Republic Bank, which were originated to conform with First
Republic Bank's guidelines.

The transaction benefits from nearly 100% due diligence of data
integrity, credit, property valuation, and compliance conducted by
an independent third-party firm.

CitiMortgage, Inc. will act as the master servicer of the loans in
this transaction. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing and First Republic
Bank will be primary servicers on the deal.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2017-CH1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2B, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.85%
in a base scenario and reaches 9.90% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2017-CH1 transaction is a securitization of 409 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $307,636,938.92. There are more than 100 originators in
this pool, including Fairway (6.68%), PrimeLending (6.65%),
Homestreet Bank (5.28%), and Homebridge Financial Services Inc.
(5.25%). The remaining contributed less than 5% or more of the
principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level third
party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting,
property value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood has
agreed to backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of
all originators other than First Republic Bank.

SEMT 2017-CH1 includes loans acquired by Redwood under its Choice
program. Although from a FICO and LTV perspective, the borrowers in
SEMT 2017-CH1 are not the super prime borrowers included in
traditional SEMT transactions, these borrowers are prime borrowers
with a demonstrated ability to manage household finance. On
average, borrowers in this pool have made a 25.5% down payment on a
mortgage loan of $762,785.38. In addition, the majority of
borrowers have more than 24 months of liquid cash reserves or
enough money to pay the mortgage for two years should there be an
interruption to the borrower's cash flow. Moreover, the borrowers
on average have a monthly residual income of $11,920. The WA FICO
is 744, which is lower than traditional SEMT transactions, which
has averaged 769 in 2017 SEMT transactions. The lower WA FICO for
SEMT 2017-CH1 may reflect recent mortgage lates (0x30x3, 1x30x12,
2x30x24) which are allowed under the Choice program, but not under
Redwood's traditional product, Redwood Select (0x30x24). While the
WA FICO may be lower for this transaction, Moody's does not
believes that the limited mortgage lates demonstrates a history of
financial mismanagement.

Moody's also note that SEMT 2017-CH1 is the first SEMT transaction
to include a significant number of non-QM loans (108) compared to
previous SEMT transactions, where the number of non-QM loans was
limited. Previously, SEMT 2015-3 had the largest number of non-QM
loans at 26 loans out of 460 loans.

Redwood's Choice program is in its early stages, having been
launched by Redwood in April 2016. In contrast to Redwood's
traditional program, Select, Redwood's Choice program allows for
higher LTVs, lower FICOs, non-occupant co-borrowers,
non-warrantable condos, limited loans with adverse credit events,
among other loan attributes. Under both Select and Choice, Redwood
also allows for loans with non-QM features, such as interest-only,
DTIs greater than 43%, asset depletion, among other loan
attributes.

However, Moody's note that Redwood historically has been on average
stronger than its peers as an aggregator of prime jumbo loans,
including a limited number of non-QM loans in previous SEMT
transactions. As of the July 2017 remittance report, there have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that Moody's has
rated to date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
While in traditional SEMT transactions, Moody's has factored this
qualitative strength into Moody's analysis, in SEMT 2017-CH1,
Moody's has a neutral assessment of the Choice Program until
Moody's is able to review a longer performance history of Choice
mortgage loans.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2017-CH1 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments owing to
potential future lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the
loans are prime quality and were originated under a regulatory
environment that requires tighter controls for originations than
pre-crisis, which reduces the likelihood that the loans have
defects that could form the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood (or
a majority-owned affiliate of the sponsor), who will retain credit
risk in accordance with the U.S. Risk Retention Rules and provides
a back-stop to the representations and warranties of all the
originators except for First Republic Bank, has a strong alignment
of interest with investors, and is incentivized to actively manage
the pool to optimize performance. Third, the transaction has
reasonably well defined processes in place to identify loans with
defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent
breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations
and warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which
reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.90% ($5,845,101.84) of the closing pool
balance, which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds
from eroding credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

One TPR firm conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the initial pool population of 421 loans. For 417
loans, the TPR firm conducted a review for credit, property
valuation, compliance and data integrity ("full review") and
limited review for 4 First Republic loans. For the 4 loans, Redwood
Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a
TPR firm check for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

For the full review loans, the TPR report identified one grade "C"
compliance-related condition relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule. The TPR firm assigned a "C" grade for a
loan that closed within the 3-day waiting period under TRID.
However, Moody's did not believes that this condition was material
because the mortgage file contains a letter from the borrower
acknowledging that the borrower waives the right to not receiving
the closing disclosure at least 3 days prior to consummation and
the borrower has provided reasoning for closing prior to the end of
the waiting period.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some
of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. We, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from First
Republic Bank where a full review was conducted and there were no
material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase
Moody's Aaa loss for the limited review loans originated by First
Republic Bank.

The property valuation review conducted by the TPR firm consisted
of (i) a review of all of the appraisals for full review loans,
checking for issues with the comparables selected in the appraisal
and (ii) a value supported analysis for all loans. After a review
of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's found the exceptions to be
minor in nature and did not pose a material increase in the risk of
loan loss. The TPR report identified one grade "C" condition where
the TPR firm was still reviewing a property valuation as of the
date of the TPR report. Moody's expects to receive the final
finding before closing.

Moody's has received the inspection results for all properties in
the areas affected by Hurricane Harvey. The inspection report noted
that all of the properties in areas affected by Hurricane Harvey
did not sustain any damage.

Moody's has received the inspection results for all the properties
in the areas affected by Hurricane Irma backing the loans that
remain in the pool. The results indicate that the majority of the
properties did not sustain any damage due to Hurricane Irma. Four
properties sustained minor damage, which included damage to
landscaping and fencing, and one property sustained significant
damage due to beach erosion. According to the inspection report,
the estimated cost to repair the damage is between $25,000 and
$50,000 on a property where the initial appraisal valued is $1.15
million and where the current loan amount is approximately
$781,034. It is Moody's understanding that Redwood has ordered a
new appraisal of the property. SEMT 2017-CH1 includes a
representation that the pool does not include properties with
material damage that would adversely affect the value of the
mortgaged property.

The originators and Redwood have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


SHELLPOINT CO-ORIGINATOR 2017-2: Moody's Gives Ba1 to B-4 Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 28
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2017-2 (SCOT 2017-2). The ratings
range from Aaa (sf) to Ba1 (sf).

The certificates are backed by one pool of prime quality, 30-year
first-lien mortgage loans originated by various originators. The
loans are primarily fixed rate (99.6%); two loans have an
adjustable mortgage rate. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing is the
primary servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) is the
master servicer and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, is the
trustee.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2017-2

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.35%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.30% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SCOT 2017-2 transaction is a securitization of 459 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$323,377,050. The loans in this transaction have strong borrower
characteristics with a weighted average original FICO score of 773
and a weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
of 70.2%. In addition, 21.4% of the borrowers are self-employed and
refinance loans comprise 30.6% of the aggregate pool. The pool has
a high geographic concentration with 41.1% of the aggregate pool
located in California and 11.7% located in the Los Angeles-Long
Beach-Anaheim MSA. Loans located in Texas and Florida comprise
10.7% of the pool. The transaction has minimal exposure to the
areas affected by the recent hurricanes in Texas and Florida. In
addition, Shellpoint has provided a property inspection report
which shows no material damages to properties in the affected
areas.

Out of total of 459 loans in this transaction, 7 loans (1.16% of
stated principal balance) were originated or acquired by New Penn
Financial, LLC ("New Penn"). The remaining 452 loans (98.84% of
stated principal balance) were aggregated by Bank of America
National Association (BANA) through its jumbo whole loan purchase
program. There are 17 originators in the transaction. The largest
originators in the pool with more than 5% by balance are Guild
Mortgage Company (23.04%), New Penn Financial, LLC (15.50%),
Guaranteed Rate Inc. (13.65%), PrimeLending (9.65%), JMAC Lending,
Inc. (8.88%), Loandepot.com LLC (8.63%), Home Point Financial
Corporation (7.40%), Stearns Lending, LLC (6.55%).

Moody's reviewed the SCOT 2017-2 acquisition criteria of BANA's
jumbo whole loan purchase program. All the loans aggregated by BANA
were underwritten to the SCOT 2017-2 acquisition criteria except
for Quicken and Caliber. However, given that Moody's has limited
performance information on the majority of the originators, Moody's
increased Moody's base case and Aaa loss expectations for the loans
aggregated by BANA with the exception of PrimeLending and Caliber
Home Loans Inc. both of which Moody's views as stronger than their
peers. Moody's also views New Penn Financial, LLC as an above
average originator of prime jumbo residential mortgage loans.
Moody's decreased Moody's base case and Aaa loss expectations for
loans originated by New Penn Financial, LLC and Caliber Home Loans
Inc.

All of the mortgage loans in SCOT 2017-2 will be serviced by
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (SMS). Moody's views SMS to be an
above average primary servicer of residential mortgage loans with
adequate collection abilities, loss mitigation efforts, foreclosure
and REO timeline management, and loan administration. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. will serve as the master servicer.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Three third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data integrity and
regulatory reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR results
indicate that the majority of reviewed loans were in compliance
with originators' and aggregators' underwriting guidelines, no
material compliance or data issues, and no appraisal defects.

New Penn and each originator of a loan acquired by Bank of America
and New Penn will provide comprehensive loan level R&W for their
respective loans. For Bank of America aggregated loans, the bank
will assign each originator's R&W to New Penn, who will assign to
the depositor, which will assign to the trust. To mitigate the
potential concerns regarding Bank of America originators' ability
to meet their respective R&W obligations, New Penn will backstop
the R&Ws for all originators' loans acquired by the bank as well as
originators' loans acquired by New Penn. New Penn's obligation to
backstop third party R&Ws will terminate 5 years after the closing
date. While Moody's acknowledge New Penn's relatively weak
financial strength, the collateral pool benefits from the diversity
of the originators that sourced the loans. In addition, Shellpoint
Partners LLC will act as guarantor for New Penn in the event that
New Penn has insufficient funds to fulfill its repurchase
obligation. Moody's note that Shellpoint Partners' financial
strength is also weak.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB.
The custodian and securities administrator functions will be
performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In addition, Wells Fargo is the
master servicer and is responsible for servicer oversight,
termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. As master servicer, Wells Fargo is also committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found. Moody's
assess Wells Fargo as a strong master servicer of residential
loans.

Other Considerations

Similar to prior SCOT transactions, extraordinary trust expenses in
the SCOT 2017-2 transaction are deducted from Net WAC as opposed to
available distribution amount. Moody's believes there is a very low
likelihood that the rated certificates in SCOT 2017-2 will incur
any losses from extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments
from potential future lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the
loans are prime quality, 100% Qualified Mortgages and were
originated under a regulatory environment that requires tighter
controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well defined
processes in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing
basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer must
review loans for breaches of representations and warranties when
certain clearly defined triggers have been breached which reduces
the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction. Third, the
issuer has disclosed the results of a credit, compliance and
valuation review of all of the mortgage loans by an independent
third parties (AMC, Opus and Clayton Services LLC): 100% of the
mortgage loans were included in the due diligence performed on the
pool. Finally, the performance of past SCOT transactions have been
well within expectation.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction has a shifting interest structure that allows
subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under certain
defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure allows
subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks,
senior bonds are exposed to increased performance volatility, known
as tail risk. The transaction provides for a senior subordination
floor of 1.80% of the closing pool balance, which mitigates tail
risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding credit enhancement
over time. Additionally there is a subordination lock-out amount
which is 1.35% of the closing pool balance.

Transaction Structure

The transaction is structured as a one pool shifting interest
structure in which the senior bonds benefit from a senior floor and
a subordination floor. Funds collected, including principal, are
first used to make interest payments to the senior bonds. Next
principal payments are made to the senior bonds and then interest
and principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in
sequential order, subject to the subordinate class percentage of
the subordinate principal distribution amounts.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balances of the
subordinate bonds are written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balances of the senior support bonds until
their principal balances are reduced to zero. Next realized losses
are allocated to the super senior bonds until their principal
balances are written off.

As in all transactions with shifting-interest structures, the
senior bonds benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all
prepayments to the senior bonds for a specified period of time, and
allocates increasing amounts of prepayments to the subordinate
bonds thereafter only if loan performance satisfies both
delinquency and loss tests.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.


SLM STUDENT 2006-3: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Ratings on 2 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SLM Student Loan Trust 2006-3 as
follows:

-- Class A-4 notes at 'AAAsf';
-- Class A-5 notes at 'Bsf';
-- Class B notes at 'Bsf'.

The Rating Outlook remains Stable for all notes.

The class A-5 notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In affirming at
'Bsf' rather than downgrading to 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has
considered qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call
the notes upon reaching 10% pool factor, the revolving credit
agreement in place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the
eventual full payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
the off notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
25.25% and a 75.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumed a sustainable constant default rate of 5.1%
and a sustainable constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) of 10.5% based on data provided by the issuer. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve in its credit stress cash
flow analysis. The claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.5% in the
base case and 3.0% in the 'AAA' case. The trailing 12 months (TTM)
levels of deferment, forbearance and income-based repayment (prior
to adjustment) are 10.4%, 15.4%, and 16.4%, respectively, and are
used as the starting point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent
declines or increases are modelled as per criteria. The borrower
benefit is assumed to be 0.01%.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for this transaction
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for SAP and the securities. As of June 2017, 3.7 % of
the trust student loans are indexed to 91-day T-Bill and 96.3% to
one-month LIBOR. All notes are indexed to three-month LIBOR. Fitch
applies its standard basis and interest rate stresses to this
transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and for the class A
notes, subordination. As of June 2017, senior and total effective
parity ratio (including the reserve) are 146.71% (31.84% CE) and
101.25% (1.24% CE), respectively. Liquidity support is provided by
a reserve account currently sized at its floor of $2,502,119. No
cash can be released until all notes are paid in full because the
pool factor has reached 10%.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model indicates
that the A-4 notes are paid in full on or prior to the legal final
maturity dates under the 'AAAsf' rating scenarios. The class A-5
notes, however, do not pay off before their maturity date in all of
Fitch's modelling scenarios, including the base cases. If the
breach of the class A-5 maturity date triggers an event of default,
interest payments will be diverted away from the class B notes,
causing them to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables. Additionally, the
results do not take into account any rating cap considerations.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity
-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.


SLM STUDENT 2010-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. A & B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SLM Student Loan Trust 2010-1 class A
and B notes at 'Bsf'. The Rating Outlook remains Stable.

The class A notes miss their legal final maturity date under both
Fitch's credit and maturity base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B,
which would cause that note to default as well. In affirming at
'Bsf' rather than downgrading to 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has
considered qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call
the notes upon reaching the 10% pool factor, the revolving credit
agreement in place for the benefit of the noteholders, and the
eventual full payment of principal in modelling.

The trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
the off notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, approximately 11% of
which are rehab loans, with guaranties provided by eligible
guarantors and reinsurance provided by the U.S. Department of
Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and accrued interest.
The U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance: Fitch assumes a base case default rate of
26.75% and 80.25% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumed a sustainable constant default rate of 5.8%
and a sustainable constant prepayment rate (voluntary and
involuntary) of 12% based on data provided by the issuer. Fitch
applies the standard default timing curve in its credit stress cash
flow analysis. The claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.5% in the
base case and 3.0% in the 'AAA' case. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) are
10.6%, 15%, and 19.1%, respectively, and are used as the starting
point in cash flow modelling. Subsequent declines or increases are
modelled as per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be
0.05%.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for this transaction
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for SAP and the securities. As of June 2017, 19.9% of
the trust student loans are indexed to 91-day T-Bill and 80.1% to
one-month LIBOR. All notes are indexed to one-month LIBOR. Fitch
applies its standard basis and interest rate stresses to this
transaction as per criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread, and for the class A
notes, subordination. As of June 2017, senior and total effective
parity ratio (including the reserve) are 114.7% (12.8% CE) and
101.3% (1.3% CE), respectively. Liquidity support is provided by a
reserve account sized at its floor of $1,211,252. The transaction
will continue to release cash as long as the specified OC amount of
$3 million is maintained.

Maturity Risk: Fitch's student loan ABS cash flow model (SLABS)
indicates that the class A notes do not pay off before their
maturity date in all of Fitch's modelling scenarios, including the
base cases. If the breach of the class A maturity date triggers an
event of default, interest payments will be diverted away from the
class B notes, causing them to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions. Fitch believes Navient to be an acceptable
servicer, due to its extensive track record as the largest servicer
of FFELP loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

'AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating, given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign by nature of the reinsurance and SAP
provided by ED. Sovereign risks are not addressed in Fitch's
sensitivity analysis.

Fitch conducted a CE sensitivity analysis by stressing both the
related lifetime default rate and basis spread assumptions. In
addition, Fitch conducted a maturity sensitivity analysis by
running different assumptions for the IBR usage and prepayment
rate. The results below should only be considered as one potential
model-implied outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
risk factors that are all dynamic variables. Additionally, the
results do not take into account any rating cap considerations.

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

-- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- CPR increase 100%: class A 'AAsf'; class B 'AAsf'
-- IBR Usage increase 100%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'
-- IBR Usage decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'

Stresses are intended to provide an indication of the rating
sensitivity of the notes to unexpected deterioration in trust
performance. Rating sensitivity should not be used as an indicator
of future rating performance.


SOCO REAL ESTATE: Proposed Sale of Austin Property for $1.5M Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Tony M. Davis of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Texas denied SOCO Real Estate, LLC's proposed sale of
real property located at 808 Avondale Road, Austin, Texas for
$1,500,000, subject to higher and better offers.

The Debtor owns and maintains the Property.

                   About SOCO Real Estate

Based in Austin, Texas, SOCO Real Estate, LLC, sought protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Case No.
17-10393) on April 4, 2017.  The petition was signed by Gerald
McMillan, managing member.  At the time of the filing, the Debtor
estimated its assets and debt at $1 million to $10 million.  Mark
A. Castillo, Esq., and Bryan C. Assink, Esq., at Curtis | Castillo
PC, serve as counsel to the Debtor.


STONEMONT PORTFOLIO 2017-STONE: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Stonemont Portfolio Trust 2017-STONE commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates:

-- $344,850,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,950,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $53,200,000 class C; 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,000,000 class D; 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115,900,000 class E; 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $93,100,000 class F; 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $468,350,000a class X-CP; 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $551,000,000a class X-EXT; 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $24,000,000b RR Interest;
-- $16,000,000b class RR certificates.

a) Notional amount and interest-only.
b) Vertical credit risk retention interest.

The Stonemont Portfolio Trust 2017-STONE Mortgage Trust commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates represent the beneficial
interests in a trust that holds a two-year, floating-rate,
interest-only $800 million mortgage loan securing the fee simple
interest in 94 properties and a leasehold interest in one property
in a portfolio totaling 6,846,154 sf. The portfolio consists of
office, industrial, retail and bank branch property types
distributed across 20 states.

Proceeds of the loan, along with mezzanine loans totaling $274.1
million, were combined with $181 million of preferred equity and
$72.5 million of sponsor equity to acquire the portfolio for $1.294
billion and pay closing costs. The certificates will follow a
sequential-pay structure; however, so long as there is no event of
default, any voluntary prepayments (up to the first 15% of the
loan), including property releases, will be applied to the loan
components on a pro rata basis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Aggregate Leverage: The trust amount of $800 million
represents 61.8% of the purchase price. The total capitalization of
$1.074 billion (not including $181 million of preferred equity)
represents a loan-to-cost of 82.9%. Fitch's LTV on the trust is
99.3%, while Fitch's LTV on the total outstanding debt is 155.7%.
Fitch's stressed DSCR on the trust is 0.91x. Approximately 90.7% by
allocated loan amount is leased to long-term, investment-grade
tenants.

Long-Term Investment-Grade Tenancy: Investment-grade tenants
account for approximately 90.7% of the allocated loan amount (ALA).
All of the tenants are considered long-term with lease expirations
more than three years beyond the initial loan term. The weighted
average term remaining on the leases is 11.2 years. The tenants are
distributed across 12 different industries including biotech,
financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, and
pharmaceuticals.

Diverse and Granular Pool: The loan is secured by 95 commercial
properties including 18 office (66.2% of ALA), 8 industrial assets
(19.4% of ALA), 51 bank branches (12.6% of ALA) and 18 retail
properties (1.7% of the ALA). The properties are located in 20
states and are occupied by 16 unique tenants across 12 different
industries. No state represents more than 32.9% of the trust amount
and only two represent more than 10% of the total portfolio value.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 5.3% below the current
budgeted contractual cash flow (inclusive of a 3% management fee).
Included in Fitch's presale report are numerous Rating
Sensitivities that describe the potential impact given further NCF
declines below Fitch's NCF. Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the
ratings for class A and found that a 30% decline would result in a
downgrade to 'BBB+sf'.

The Rating Sensitivity section in the presale report includes a
detailed explanation of additional stresses and sensitivities. Key
Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further described in
the accompanying presale report.


SUNTRUST BANKS: Fitch Affirms BB Preferred Stock Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SunTrust Banks Inc.'s (STI) long-term
and short-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'A-/F1',
respectively. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The affirmation reflects its balanced and diverse business profile,
generally improving trends in earnings, and still benign asset
quality.

The rating action follows a periodic review of the large regional
banking group, which includes BB&T Corporation (BBT), Capital One
Finance Corporation (COF), Citizens Financial Group, Inc. (CFG),
Comerica Incorporated (CMA), Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB), Huntington
Bancshares Inc. (HBAN), Keycorp (KEY), M&T Bank Corporation (MTB),
MUFG Americas Holding Corporation (MUAH), PNC Financial Services
Group (PNC), Regions Financial Corporation (RF), SunTrust Banks
Inc. (STI), US Bancorp (USB), and Wells Fargo & Company (WFC).

Company-specific rating rationales for the other banks are
published separately, and for further discussion of the large
regional bank sector in general, refer to the special report titled
'Large Regional Bank Periodic Review,' to be published shortly.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VRs, AND SENIOR DEBT

SunTrust Banks, Inc.'s (STI) ratings have been affirmed reflecting
its diverse business profile, generally improving trends in
earnings, and still benign asset quality.

STI's ratings reflect the company's balanced consumer and
commercial banking franchise, as well as a national mortgage
banking franchise and a sizable and strong middle-market-focused
capital markets business. Since the financial crisis, STI has
materially reduced its reliance on residential real estate.

STI's earnings benefit from a solid level of non-interest income,
with revenues from deposit service charges, investment banking,
trading income, mortgage revenues, CRE-related income, as well as
trust and investment management income. During 1H17, STI earned a
0.98% ROA, as compared to the peer median of approximately 1.05%,
and 1bp better than a year ago. STI is targeting a medium-term
tangible efficiency ratio of below 60%, both of which Fitch views
as attainable, especially under a higher interest rate
environment.

The company's asset quality performance also supports its ratings.
While STI's level of NPAs remains somewhat elevated, this includes
a large balance of mortgage-related troubled debt restructurings
(TDRs), of which, 89%% of TDRs are accruing, and of those, 98% are
current, mitigating the associated credit risk. Excluding the
accruing TDRs, STI's ratio of nonaccrual loans to total loans falls
to the third lowest of the large regional peer group at June 30,
2017. With NCOs in second quarter 2017 (2Q17) at just 20bps, Fitch
expects some credit deterioration for STI, as well as the industry,
as credit losses are likely at unsustainably low levels.

Fitch notes that STI's Common Equity Tier 1 and Fitch Core Capitals
both fall below peer medians. Despite this, Fitch views STI's
capital ratios as appropriate for its risk profile. Further, Fitch
expects many peers will manage capital lower over time. During
2Q17, STI issued $750 million of 5.05% preferred stock,
contributing to Tier 1 capital. STI indicated it hopes to get its
CET1 ratio below 9% over the next couple of years. Fitch expects
most large regionals will manage with long-term CET1 between 8% and
9.5%.

STI's liquidity profile remains stable. However, compared with
large regional peers, STI's loan to deposit LTD ratio is on the
higher end. Nonetheless, Fitch views STI's liquidity profile as in
line with others. STI has access to diversified sources of funding,
including deposits, FHLB advances, and access to the capital
markets.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

STI's subordinated debt is notched one level below its VR for loss
severity. STI's preferred stock is notched five levels below its
VR, two times for loss severity and three times for
non-performance, while STI's trust preferred securities are notched
two times from the VR for loss severity and two times for
non-performance. These ratings are in accordance with Fitch's
criteria and assessment of the instruments non-performance and loss
severity risk profiles and have thus been affirmed due to the
affirmation of the VR.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The uninsured deposit ratings of SunTrust Bank are rated one notch
higher than the bank's IDR and senior unsecured debt because U.S.
uninsured deposits benefit from depositor preference. U.S.
depositor preference gives deposit liabilities superior recovery
prospects in the event of default.

HOLDING COMPANY

STI's VR is equalized with those of its operating companies and
banks, reflecting its role as the bank holding company, which is
mandated in the U.S. to act as a source of strength for its bank
subsidiaries. Ratings are also equalized reflecting the very close
correlation between holding company and subsidiary failure and
default probabilities.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

STI has a Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor (SRF)
of 'NF'. In Fitch's view, the probability of support is unlikely.
IDRs and VRs do not incorporate any support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRs, AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch envisions limited near-term upward ratings momentum for STI.
The company's ratings incorporate expectations of gradual
improvement in earnings over time, especially under a higher rate
environment, and that capital will be deployed over time. If
capital is maintained at appropriate levels, asset quality remains
stable, and STI's earnings performance consistently improves to
levels above the peer average, there could be further upside to
STI's ratings, though this would likely only occur over the medium-
to long-term. Fitch anticipates that if there were any upwards
rating potential, it would likely be capped to a one-notch
upgrade.

Conversely, a material deterioration in capital or asset quality
may prompt negative rating action, though Fitch expects some level
of mean reversion in loan losses, as well as a reduction in capital
ratios over time. Long-term capital targets are expected to remain
between 8% and 9.5% for the large regional bank peer group. For
those banks whose long-term capital targets fall to the lower end
of that range, Fitch expects they will also have a superior
earnings profile that provides for adequate capital generation
capabilities. Absent that, there could be negative rating actions.

While not anticipated, greater reliance on more volatile capital
markets revenues may be a constraint to further upside in the
company's ratings. On average, STI's investment banking and trading
income accounts for around 9% of revenues, slightly more elevated
than in the past. A sustained reliance of greater than 20% to 25%
or being on a trajectory to doing will likely constrain further
upside ratings momentum.

Fitch views STI as one of the few large regional banks that is in
the position to do bank-level M&A. STI has not completed a
significant bank acquisition since 2004. Fitch would evaluate any
transaction on its individual merits. As such, rating implications
are dependent on the financial implication, strategic rationale,
and execution risks inherent in any transaction.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings for STI and its operating companies' subordinated debt,
trust preferred securities, and preferred stock are sensitive to
any change to the VR.

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The long- and short-term deposit ratings are sensitive to any
change to STI's long- and short-term IDR.

HOLDING COMPANY

Should STI's holding company begin to exhibit signs of weakness,
demonstrate trouble accessing the capital markets, or have
inadequate cash flow coverage to meet near-term obligations, there
is potential that Fitch could notch the holding company VR from the
ratings of the operating companies.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Since STI's Support and Support Rating Floors are '5' and 'NF',
respectively, there is limited likelihood that these ratings will
change over the foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

SunTrust Banks, Inc.
-- Long-term IDR at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term IDR at 'F1';
-- Viability Rating at 'a-';
-- Preferred stock at 'BB';
-- Senior debt at 'A-';
-- Subordinated debt at 'BBB+';
-- Short-term debt at 'F1';
-- Support at 5;
-- Support Floor at 'NF'.

SunTrust Bank
-- Long-term IDR at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term IDR at 'F1';
-- Viability Rating at 'a-';
-- Long-term deposits at 'A';
-- Market-linked securities at 'Aemr';
-- Senior notes at 'A-';
-- Short-term deposits at 'F1';
-- Subordinated debt at 'BBB+';
-- Short-term debt at 'F1';
-- Support at 5;
-- Support Floor at 'NF'.

SunTrust Capital I
SunTrust Capital III
National Commerce Capital Trust I
-- Preferred stock at 'BB+'.

SunTrust Preferred Capital I
-- Preferred stock at 'BB'.


TABERNA PREFERRED VIII: Moody's Hikes Cl. A-2 Notes Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the following
notes issued by Taberna Preferred Funding VIII, Ltd.:

Us$120,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on April 20,
2017 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$160,000,000 Class A-1A First Priority Delayed Draw Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of
$2,679,841), Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 20, 2017
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

US$215,000,000 Class A-1B First Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes Due 2037 (current balance of $3,601,036), Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on April 20, 2017 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Taberna Preferred Funding VIII, Ltd., issued in March 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of REIT trust preferred securities (TruPS) and corporate bonds.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes, an increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization ratios (OC), the improvement
in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio and the maturity
of six out-of-money interest rate swaps since April 2017.

The Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes have paid down by approximately
86% or $38.5 million since April 2017 using primarily principal
proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets. Based on
Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1, A-2, B and C
notes have improved to 4308.1%, 214.3%, 134.2% and 110.0%,
respectively, compared to April 2017 levels of 689.4%, 187.5%,
128.8% and 108.8%, respectively. In addition, the notes will
benefit from credit enhancement available in the form of excess
spread, because six out-of-money interest rate swaps, with a total
notional of $163.9 million, matured in August 2017. On the August
2017 payment date, $1.6 million of interest proceeds were used to
make payments on the swaps.

The deal has also benefited from improvement in the credit quality
of the underlying portfolio. According to Moody's calculations, the
weighted average rating factor (WARF) improved to 4377 from 4663 in
April 2017.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's maintains its stable outlook on the US
REIT sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using credit estimates. Because these
are not public ratings, they are subject to additional
uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 2638)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: +3

Class B: +5

Class C: +3

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 5429)

Class A-1A: 0

Class A-1B: 0

Class A-2: -2

Class B: -3

Class C: 0

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM) cash
flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under Products
and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a signed free
license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool has having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of $270.6 million, defaulted/deferring par of $24.2
million, a weighted average default probability of 55.61% (implying
a WARF of 4377), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 11.85%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized REIT companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To
evaluate the credit quality of REIT TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's REIT group assesses their credit quality using the
REIT firms' annual financials.


THL CREDIT 2013-2: S&P Gives BB- Ratings on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, E-1-R, and E-2-R replacement notes from THL
Credit Wind River 2013-2 CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) originally issued in 2013 that is managed by THL Credit
Advisors LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels. The replacement classes are all expected to be issued at
floating spreads, replacing the current floating-rate notes.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 2,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 18, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  THL Credit Wind River 2013-2 CLO Ltd. Replacement class

                            Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-R                       AAA (sf)             320.00
  B-R                       AA (sf)               53.75
  C-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                38.75
  D-R (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)             27.50
  E-1-R (deferrable)        BB- (sf)              15.00
  E-2-R (deferrable)        BB- (sf)               5.00



TOWD POINT 2017-4: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the Asset
Backed Securities, Series 2017-4 (the Notes) issued by Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2017-4 (the Trust):

   -- $920.9 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
   -- $78.2 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
   -- $64.1 million Class M1 at A (sf)
   -- $55.2 million Class M2 at BBB (sf)
   -- $44.9 million Class B1 at BB (sf)
   -- $26.9 million Class B2 at B (sf)
   -- $999.1 million Class A3 at AA (sf)
   -- $1063.3 million Class A4 at A (sf)

Classes A-3 and A-4 are exchangeable notes.  These classes can be
exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as specified in the
offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 28.20% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect credit
enhancement of 22.10%, 17.10%, 12.80%, 9.30% and 7.20%,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 5,487 loans with a total principal balance of
$1,282,579,499 as of the Cut-Off Date (July 31, 2017).

As of the Statistical Calculation Date (June 30, 2017), the
portfolio contains 5,528 loans with a total principal balance of
$1,296,211,338. All of the following statistics regarding the
mortgage loans are based on the Statistical Calculation Date. The
portfolio is approximately 132 months seasoned and contains 90.3%
modified loans. The modifications happened more than two years ago
for 86.5% of the modified loans. Within the pool, 789 mortgages
have non-interest-bearing deferred amounts, which equates to 2.9%
of the total principal balance. Included in the deferred amounts
are proprietary principal forgiveness and HAMP principal reduction
alternative amounts (collectively, the PRA amounts), which comprise
approximately 0.8% of the total principal balance. All loans
(100.0%) were current as of the Statistical Calculation Date,
including 1.5% bankruptcy-performing loans. Approximately 72.3% of
the mortgage loans have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30)
for at least the past 24 months under the Mortgage Bankers
Association delinquency method. In accordance with the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Ability-to-Repay (ATR) and Qualified
Mortgage (QM) rules, only two loans (0.1% of the pool) are
designated as QM Safe Harbor and the rest are not subject to the
ATR/QM rules.

FirstKey Mortgage, LLC (FirstKey) will acquire the loans from
various transferring trusts on or prior to the Closing Date. The
transferring trusts acquired the mortgage loans between 2013 and
2017, and are beneficially owned by funds managed by affiliates of
Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. Upon acquiring the loans from the
transferring trusts, FirstKey, through a wholly owned subsidiary,
Towd Point Asset Funding, LLC (the Depositor), will contribute
loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor, FirstKey, through a
majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than any residual certificates) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements. These loans were originated and previously
serviced by various entities through purchases in the secondary
market. As of the Closing Date, 96.5% of the loans will be serviced
by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and 3.5% by Selene Finance LP.

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicer or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicer is obligated to make advances in
respect of homeowner association fees, taxes and insurance,
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the course of servicing
and disposing of properties.

FirstKey, as the Asset Manager, has the option to sell certain
non-performing loans or real estate owned (REO) properties to
unaffiliated third parties individually or in bulk sales. The asset
sale price has to equal a minimum reserve amount to maximize
liquidation proceeds of such loans or properties. The minimum
reserve amount equals the product of 69.22% and the then-current
principal amount of the mortgage loans or REO properties. In
addition, on the payment date when the aggregate pool balance of
the mortgage loans is reduced to less than 30% of the Cut-Off Date
balance, the holders of more than 50% of the Class X Certificates
will have the option to cause the Issuer to sell all of its
remaining property (other than amounts in the Breach Reserve
Account) to one or more third-party purchasers so long as the
aggregate proceeds meets a minimum price.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M1 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Noteholders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that generally performed well through the crisis, a strong
servicer and Asset Manager oversight. Additionally, a satisfactory
third-party due diligence review was performed on the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance, payment history and data
capture as well as title and tax review. Servicing comments were
reviewed for a sample of loans. Updated broker price opinions or
exterior appraisals were provided for 100.0% of the pool; however,
a reconciliation was not performed on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
representation provider (FirstKey), certain knowledge qualifiers
and fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS criteria
for seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1) significant loan
seasoning and relative clean performance history in recent years,
(2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a strong
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including
delinquency review trigger and breach reserve accounts.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B
(sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the related Notes.

The full description of the strengths, challenges and mitigating
factors is detailed in the related presale report. Please see the
related appendix for additional information regarding sensitivity
of assumptions used in the rating process.

Notes:  All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TOYS 'R' US 2001-31: S&P Lowers $13.09MM Class A-1 Certs to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating on Corporate-Backed Trust
Certificates Toys "R" Us Debenture-Backed Series 2001-31 Trust's
$13.09 million class A-1 certificates to 'D' from 'CCC'.

S&P said, "Our rating on the class A-1 certificates is dependent on
our rating on the underlying security, Toys "R" Us Delaware Inc.'s
8.75% debentures due Sept. 1, 2021 ('D').

"The rating action reflects the Sept. 19, 2017, lowering of our
rating on the underlying security to 'D' from 'C' and removal of it
from CreditWatch, where we placed it with negative implications on
Sept. 7, 2017. For more details, see "Research Update: Toys "R" Us
Inc. Downgraded To 'D' On Chapter 11 Filing," published Sept. 19,
2017.

"We may take subsequent rating actions on the class A-1
certificates due to changes in our rating assigned to the
underlying security."


VOYA CLO 2013-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1AR, A-2R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Voya CLO
2013-1 Ltd./Voya CLO 2013-1 LLC, a collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) originally issued in 2013 that is managed by Voya Alternative
Asset Management LLC. S&P also assigned a preliminary rating to the
new class X-R notes.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Oct. 2,
2017. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 16, 2017, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also make the following changes:

-- The transaction will be increased to $627.85 million.

-- The transaction will issue additional class X-R notes,
bifurcate the class A-1 notes, and increase the income notes
balance.

-- The replacement class A-2R, B-R, and C-R notes are expected to
be issued at lower spreads than the original notes.

-- The replacement class D-R notes are expected to be issued at a
higher spread than the original notes.

-- The non-call period, reinvestment period, and stated maturity
will be extended 4.25 years, 5.25 years, and 6.25 years,
respectively.

-- The overcollateralization ratio test thresholds and certain
concentration limitations will be amended.

-- The transaction will incorporate relevant criteria updates from
S&P Global Ratings' "Global Methodologies And Assumptions For
Corporate Cash Flow And Synthetic CDOs," published Aug. 8, 2016.

-- The transaction will incorporate S&P Global Rating's non-model
version of CDO Monitor.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

Voya CLO 2013-1 Ltd./Voya CLO 2013-1 LLC
Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
X-R                       AAA (sf)               6.00
A-1AR                     AAA (sf)             362.50
A-1BR                     NR                    35.00
A-2R                      AA (sf)               58.50
B-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                38.00
C-R (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)             34.00
D-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              25.00
Income notes              NR                    68.85

NR--Not rated.


WACHOVIA BANK 2006-C25: Moody's Lowers Cl. G Certs' Rating to C
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the rating on one class in Wachovia Bank Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2006-C25, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-C25:

Cl. F, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Affirmed Caa1
(sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class F was affirmed because the rating is consistent
with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on Class G was downgraded due to realized losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans that were higher than Moody's
had previously expected. Class G has already experienced a 47%
realized loss as result of previously liquidated loans.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 10.9% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 28.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 6.6% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $31.2 million
from $2.86 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two remaining mortgage loans.

Twenty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $208 million (for an average loss
severity of 51%). There are no loans currently in special
servicing.

The two remaining loans represent 100% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Shoppes at North Village Loan ($28.6 million --
91.9% of the pool), which is secured by 226,000 square foot (SF)
portion of a 710,000 SF power center built in 2005 and located in
Saint Joseph, Missouri. The property is anchored by Target, The
Home Depot and Sam's Club, all non-collateral. As of March 2017,
the property was 98% leased to 26 tenants, the same as at the prior
review. The loan has passed the November 2015 Anticipated Repayment
Date (ARD) and has a final maturity date in 2025. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 127% and 0.81X, respectively.

The second remaining loan is the Ballantyne Shopping Center Loan
($2.5 million -- 8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a 10,000 SF
retail property located in Charlotte, NC. As of year-end 2016, the
property was 100% leased to six tenants, the same as at the prior
review. The loan matures in February 2026. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 83% and 1.23X, respectively.


WELLS FARGO 2017-C40: Fitch to Rate Class G Notes 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2017-C40, Series 2017-C40.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $23,786,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23,626,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,869,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $185,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $203,796,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $469,077,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $118,944,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56,122,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32,668,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30,154,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,344,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $34,344,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,701,000bc class E 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9,214,000bc class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,701,000bc class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

-- $3,350,000b class H;
-- $21,779,541b class J;
-- $35,268,976bc class RR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 65 loans secured by 150
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$705,379,517 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Barclays Bank
PLC, Rialto Mortgage Finance LLC and C-III Commercial Mortgage
LLC.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 74.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 81.1%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch Leverage in Line with Recent Transactions: The pool a
weighted average Fitch DSCR of 1.23x, which is in line with the
2016 average of 1.21x and the YTD 2017 average of 1.25x for other
recent Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals. Additionally, the
pool's weighted average Fitch LTV of 102.0% is in line with the YTD
2017 level of 101.4%.

Credit Opinion Loans: Two loans in the pool, representing 12.1%,
has an investment-grade credit opinion. 225 & 233 Park Avenue South
(8.5%) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis and Del Amo Fashion Center (3.5%) has an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBBsf*' on a stand-alone
basis.

Below-Average Pool Concentration: The largest 10 loans account for
49.2% of the pool, which is below the 2017 average of 53.3% for
fixed-rate transactions. The pool exhibits below-average pool
concentration, with a loan concentration index (LCI) of 342, which
is below the 2017 average of 399.

Retail Concentration: The pool's largest property type is retail at
37.9%, followed by office at 22.2% and hotel at 16.7% of the pool.
No other property type representing more than 10.0% of the pool.
The pool's retail concentration is higher than the 2017 average of
24.3%, and the hotel concentration is also higher than the 2017
average of 15.8%. The pool's office concentration is below the 2017
average of 41.3%. Loans secured by office and retail properties
have an average probability of default in Fitch's multiborrower
model, loans secured by hotel properties have the highest
probability of default, and multifamily properties have a lower
probability of default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 10.9% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the WFCM
2017-C40 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C24: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on SJ-D Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on fourteen
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C24, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C24:

Cl. A-1, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. PEX, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. SJ-A, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. SJ-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Upgraded to
A2 (sf)

Cl. SJ-C, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. SJ-D, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes, Classes A-1 through C were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the non-pooled rake classes, Classes SJ-A through
SJ-D, was affirmed based on the credit performance (or the weighted
average rating factor or WARF) of the referenced classes. The rake
classes are supported by the subordinate debt associated with the
St. John's Town Center loan.

The rating on the PEX class was affirmed based on the credit
performance (or the weighted average rating factor or WARF) of the
referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.8% of the
current balance compared to 4.0% at Moody's last review. Moody's
provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit and
fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017.


The methodology used in rating the exchangeable class Cl. PEX was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in
June 2015.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 15, 2017 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 1.4% to
$1.072 billion from $1.088 billion at securitization. The
certificates are collateralized by 86 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to just under 10% of the pool, with the top
ten loans constituting 47% of the pool. One loan, constituting 9.7%
of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit assessment.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 29, the same as at Moody's last review.

Ten loans, constituting 11% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. Three loans,
constituting 1.4% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest loan is special servicing is the Crosswinds Apartments
Loan ($7.1 million -- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
240-unit multifamily property located in Houston, Texas. It was
transferred to special servicing on September 2012, 2017 due to
payment default. The property is continuing a leasing and marketing
plan to improve occupancy and performance. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $2.1 million loss for the specially serviced loan (29%
expected loss on average).

The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $5.6 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (37% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 8.8% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $26.6 million (a 22.2% expected loss based on
a 74% probability default) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 93% of the
pool and partial year 2017 operating results for 86% of the pool.
Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 110.8%, compared to 113.1%
at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans
with structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.59X and 0.97X,
respectively, compared to 1.56X and 0.95X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the St. Johns Town
Center Loan ($103.5 million -- 9.7% of the pool), which is secured
by a 981,000 SF component of a 1.4 million SF super-regional mall
located in Jacksonville, Florida. The loan represents a 51%
pari-passu interest in a $203.5 million senior loan. The property
is also encumbered by a $146.5 million B-note which contribute to
the transaction as non-pooled rake bonds, and are rated separately.
The loan sponsor is a joint venture between subsidiaries of Simon
Property Group (SPG), Inc. and Deutsche Bank Asset & Wealth
Management. SPG manages the property. The mall is anchored by
Dillard's, Target, Dick's Sporting Goods, Ashley Furniture, and
Nordstrom. Dillard's, Target and Ashely Furniture are not part of
the collateral and own their own spaces. The mall was developed in
three phases from 2005-2014. As of June 2017, the property was 98%
occupied. Following Hurricane Irma, the property is open and no
damage has been reported. Moody's structured credit assessment and
stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 1.61X, respectively, the same as
at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 22% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Two Westlake Park Loan ($91.0 million -- 8.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 450,000 SF office building
located in Houston, Texas. The property represents part of the
larger 58-acre Westlake Park office complex. The property is
located approximately one half mile from I-10 in Houston's Energy
Corridor/West Katy Freeway market. The property was developed in
1982 and primarily consists of a 17-story office tower and seven
story parking garage. The parking garage contains additional office
space in a portion of the top two floors. As of July 2017, the
property was 68% occupied compared to 91% occupied in June 2016 and
100% leased as of December 2014. The two largest tenants are
ConocoPhilips (46% of the NRA, leased through November 2019) and BP
(15% of the NRA, leased through 2019). ConocoPhilips is subleasing
121K square feet of space and BP is looking to sublease their
space. This loan has been identified as troubled due to ongoing
occupancy concerns. The borrower has confirmed that there was no
damage from Hurricane Harvey to the property. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 143% and 0.76X, respectively, compared to 132%
and 0.8X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Gateway Center Phase II Loan ($75.0
million -- 7.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 602,000 SF
power center located in Brooklyn, New York. The property was
recently constructed in 2014 and sits adjacent to the Belt Parkway
in between JFK Airport and East New York. As of March 2017, the
property was 100% occupied. The anchor tenants include JC Penney,
ShopRite and Burlington Coat Factory. JC Penney is not part of the
collateral. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 114% and 0.78X,
respectively, the same as at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Crossing at Corona Loan ($70.0
million -- 6.5% of the pool), which is secured by an 834,000 SF
component of an approximately 962,200 SF power center located 50
miles south-east of Los Angeles in Corona, California. The center
is anchored by a Kohl's, Edwards Cinemas (Regal) and Toys/Babies R
Us. The center is shadow anchored by a Target. The property was
developed from 2004-2008. As of June 2017, the property was 94%
occupied compared to 99% as of March 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 122% and 0.8X, respectively, the same as at the last
review.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $2.1BB of RMBS Issued 2014-2015
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on Sept. 28, 2017, upgraded the ratings
of 41 tranches from 8 transactions issued by the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and backed by RMBS loans.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2014-C01

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2014-C04

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2014-HQ1

Cl. M-12, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2014-HQ2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-12, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1I, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2014-HQ3

Cl. M-12, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2015-DN1

Cl. M-12, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3I, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. MA, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2015-HQ1

Cl. MA, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3F, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-3I, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 17, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2015-HQ2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-12, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1I, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-3F, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3I, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. MA, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 3, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a reduction in the expected
losses on the underlying pools owing to strong collateral
performance. The rating actions also reflect the correction of
errors in the cash flow model used by Moody's in rating these
transactions.

The Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) and Connecticut Avenue
Securities (CAS) transactions are designed to provide credit
protection to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, respectively, against the
performance of reference pools of prime first-lien conforming
mortgages. All of the Notes in the transactions are direct,
unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and as such
investors are exposed to the credit risk of Freddie Mac (currently
Aaa Stable) and Fannie Mae (currently Aaa Stable).

Unlike in a typical RMBS transaction, Note holders are not entitled
to receive any cash from the mortgage loans in the reference pool.
Instead, the timing and amount of principal and interest that
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are obligated to pay on the Notes is
linked to the performance of the mortgage loans in the reference
pool. In general, these transactions have continued to benefit both
from a steady increase in the credit enhancement as a result of
sequential principal distributions among subordinated bonds, and
from a reduction in the expected losses on the underlying pools
owing to strong collateral performance.

In these fixed severity transactions, every loan that experiences a
Credit Event -- defined among other things as a delinquency of 180
days or more -- is assigned a fixed loss severity based on a
predetermined schedule. In loss calculations used in prior rating
actions, Moody's mistakenly did not adjust the tiered fixed
severity thresholds to reflect the reduction in the pool balances
over time. Also, prior calculations of loss severity did not
include the cumulative percentage of Net Credit Events experienced
to date. These errors have now been corrected, and rating actions
reflect the appropriate calculation of loss severities.

The correction of these errors had no impact on 32 of the ratings
in action, which are being upgraded as a result of the improved
performance of the transactions. The ratings on five of the bonds
in action -- Class M-1 of CAS 2014-C01, Classes 1M-2 and 2M-2 of
CAS 2014-CO4, Class MA of STACR 2015-DN1, and Class MA of STACR
2015-HQ1 -- are being upgraded solely due to the correction of the
error. For the remaining four bonds -- Class M-12 of STACR
2014-HQ2, and Classes M-3, M-3F, and M-3I of STACR 2015-HQ2 -- the
upgrades are the result of both the error correction and improved
performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating Class M-2l of STACR
2014-HQ1; Classes M-1l and M-2l of STACR 2014-HQ2; Class M-2l of
STACR 2014-HQ3; Classes M-1I, M-2I and M-3I of STACR 2015-HQ2;
Classes M-2I and M-3I of STACR 2015-DN1; and Class M-3l of STACR
2015-HQ1 was "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in August 2017 from 4.9% in
August 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $259.7MM of Alt-A Issued 2004-2007
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 26 tranches from
five transactions backed by Alt-A and Option ARM mortgage loans,
issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2004-2

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-X, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-X, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-X, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 6-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 7-M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2004-18CB

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-8, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2016
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Mortgage Securities, Inc. Mortgage Loan Trust,
Series 2004-5

Cl. A-4B, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-4A, Current rating Ba3 (sf), previously on October 28, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Cl. A-5B, Current rating Ba1 (sf), previously on October 28, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 28,
2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-11

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 28, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Today's rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those
pools. Today's rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of
credit enhancement available to the bonds and expected loss on the
collateral.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Additionally, the methodology used in rating CSFB Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Trust 2004-2 Cl. 2-A-X, Cl. 3-A-X, and Cl. 4-A-X was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017. Please see the Rating
Methodologies page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this
methodology.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in August 2017 from 4.9% in
August 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $946MM of RMBS Issued 2004-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 50 tranches,
and downgraded the rating of one tranche, from 21 transactions
issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-HE1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Series 2005-R1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 22, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AQ2

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE4

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 14, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2016
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2016
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. II-A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 14, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-7

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-10

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2013
Affirmed C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-12

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-14

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-15

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. MF-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. MV-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2004-AB2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-9

Cl. 2-AV, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. 3-AV-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016
Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-4

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Confirmed
at B1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2016 Confirmed
at Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-7

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. MF-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-9

Cl. MF-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. MV-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. MV-4, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 5, 2013 Affirmed C
(sf)

Issuer: CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-BC5

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016
Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-3

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2005-9

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-MLN1

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2015 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. Additionally, the upgrade for Structured
Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-MLN1, Class A2, is due to reduced
risk of future interest shortfall as the bond continues to receive
principal payments. The downgrade for Bear Stearns Asset Backed
Securities I Trust 2005-HE4, Class M-2, is primarily due to a
recent interest shortfall which is unlikely to be recouped. The
actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.4% in August 2017 from 4.9% in
August 2016. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
4.5% to 5.5% for the 2017 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2017. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] S&P Completes Review on 38 Classes From 15 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 38 classes from 15 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1997 and 2005. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime collateral. The review yielded seven upgrades, four
downgrades, 24 affirmations, and three discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

Please see the ratings list for the rationales for classes with
rating transitions. The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's
opinion that its projected credit support and collateral
performance on these classes has remained relatively consistent
with its prior projections.

Class M-1 from Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Trust 2003-HE1
was downgraded to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' because of a missed
interest payment that will likely not be reimbursed at higher
rating levels. The missed interest payment has been outstanding
since June 2017.

S&P said, "We raised the rating on class A-8 from Amresco
Residential Securities Corp. Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-3 to 'B (sf)'
from 'D (sf)' because the bond is no longer in default. Previously
we downgraded this class to 'D (sf)' because of missed interest
payments that have since been reimbursed. A recent missed interest
payment in the August 2017 distribution was partially reimbursed in
September 2017. The class has not experienced any writedowns and it
is not projected to take writedowns.
Furthermore, any future or currently outstanding missed interest
payments are projected for full reimbursement under the current
rating scenario."

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

          http://bit.ly/2xS6ppk


[*] S&P Completes Review on 56 Classes From 14 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 56 classes from 13 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and one resecuritized
real estate mortgage investment conduits (re-REMIC) transactions
issued between 2000 and 2009. All of these transactions are backed
by mixed collateral. The review yielded five upgrades, 13
downgrades (including two with ratings removed from CreditWatch
negative), 36 affirmations, and two discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Underlying collateral performance;
-- Historical interest shortfalls or missed interest payments;
-- Loan modification criteria;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

S&P said, "We lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative our
ratings on class M-1 from Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities
Trust 2003-2 to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' and on class M-1 from ACE
Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust Series 2005-SD3 to 'CCC
(sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' after assessing the impact of missed interest
payments on these classes. We placed these ratings on CreditWatch
negative on Aug. 1, 2017, because of recent missed interest
payments (see "Various Rating Actions Taken On 39 Classes From 34
U.S. RMBS Transactions"). These downgrades are based on our cash
flow projections used in determining the likelihood that the missed
interest payments would be reimbursed under various scenarios, as
these classes received additional compensation for outstanding
missed interest payments."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2xctPXA


[*] S&P Completes Review on 58 Classes From 9 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 58 classes from nine
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 2003 and 2005. All of these transactions are backed
by alternative-A collateral. The review yielded three upgrades, 16
downgrades, 35 affirmations, and four discontinuances. S&P removed
one of the lowered ratings and one of the affirmed ratings from
CreditWatch negative.

S&P said, "We lowered our rating on class M-1 from MASTR
Alternative Loan Trust 2004-9 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and
removed it from Creditwatch negative. The class had a partial
missed interest payment in the March 2017 distribution, and we
believe the ultimate payment of this missed interest is unlikely
under any of our projected cash flow scenarios."

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporated various considerations into our decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Change in the constant prepayment rate;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization; and
-- Payment priority

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

             http://bit.ly/2yDvIZt


[*] S&P Completes Review on 60 Classes From Six US RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 60 classes from six U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2002 and 2005. All of these transactions are backed by a
mix of collateral. The review yielded 17 downgrades, 16
affirmations, 24 discontinuances and three withdrawals.

Analytical Considerations

S&P said, "We incorporate various considerations into our decisions
to raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes." Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Tail risk;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization;
-- Principal-only criteria; and
-- Interest-only criteria.

Rating Actions

Please see the ratings list for the rationales for classes with
rating transitions. The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's
opinion that its projected credit support and collateral
performance on these classes has remained relatively consistent
with its prior projections.

A list of the Affected Ratings is available at:

          http://bit.ly/2xa2RLp


[*] S&P Discontinues 'D(sf)' Ratings on Three US CMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings discontinued its 'D (sf)' ratings on three
classes from three U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities
transactions.

S&P said, "We discontinued these ratings according to our
surveillance and withdrawal policy. We had previously lowered the
ratings on these classes to 'D (sf)' because of principal losses
and/or accumulated interest shortfalls that we believed would
remain outstanding for an extended period of time. We view a
subsequent upgrade to a rating higher than 'D (sf)' to be unlikely
under the relevant criteria for the classes within this review."

  RATINGS DISCONTINUED

  Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust
                                Rating
  Series      Class        To           From
  2003-C6     O            NR           D (sf)
  2006-C23    H            NR           D (sf)

  Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.  
                                Rating
  Series      Class        To           From
  2003-C5     K            NR           D (sf)


                            *********

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