/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/180325.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 25, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 83

                            Headlines

ACRE COMMERCIAL 2017-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB(low) on Cl. E Notes
AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB on Class E Notes
AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
AMUR EQUIPMENT 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 1-R: S&P Gives Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E Notes

ARBOUR CLO III: Fitch Corrects March 15 Release
BANC OF AMERICA 2008-1: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
BANCORP 2018-CRE3 : DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class F Certs
BBCMS MORTGAGE 2017-C1: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Cl. X-G Certs
BBCMS TRUST 2018-RRI: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Certs

BCC FUNDING 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
BEAR STEARNS 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. I-A Debt to Caa3
BENCHMARK MORTGAGE 2018-B3: Fitch to Rate Class H-RR Certs 'B-sf'
BX COMMERCIAL 2018-BIOA: Fitch Assigns B-sf Ratings on 2 Tranches
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2018-4: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on Cl. G Certs

CD 2007-CD4: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 2 Tranches
CEDAR FUNDING IX: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
CENTERLINE 2007-1: Moody's Withdraws C Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt
CGGS COMMERCIAL 2018-WSS: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating to Cl. HRR Certs
CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class X-D Certs

CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC21: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on E Certs
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC21: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs.
CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2018-B2: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'B-sf'
COMM 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class G Certs
COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. F Certs

COMM 2014-UBS3: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class G Certs
CPS AUTO RECEIVABLES: DBRS Reviews 60 Ratings From 12 ABS Deals
CROWN POINT 4: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
DEUTSCHE BANK 2016-C1: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Cl. X-D Certs
DRYDEN 57: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Jr. Notes

DT AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
ECP CLO 2015-7: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class E-R Notes
EVERBANK MORTGAGE 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on B-4 Certs
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on B-5 Certs

FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. F Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2018-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on Cl. M Certs
GP PORTFOLIO 2014-GPP: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Tranches to BB+
ICG US 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
IMSCI 2014-5: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs

JAMESTOWN CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
JP MORGAN 2012-CIBX: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Debt to B1
JP MORGAN 2013-LC11: Moody's Lowers Cl. F Debt Rating to B3(sf)
JP MORGAN 2015-SGP: Moody's Lowers Class F Certs. Rating to B1
JP MORGAN 2017-JP5: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E-RR Notes

JP MORGAN 2018-3: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
JP MORGAN 2018-ASH8: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
JPMCC MORTGAGE 2012-CIBX: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to B3sf
LCCM MORTGAGE 2014-909: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on E Certs

MARINER CLO 5: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on $20.20MM Cl. E Notes
MCA FUND I: DBRS Keeps BB(high) on Class C Notes Under Review
MONROE CAPITAL VI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: DBRS Lowers Cl. C Certs Rating to Csf
MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C21: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. X-FG Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C28: DBRS Confirms BB Ratings on 4 Tranches
MORGAN STANLEY 2017-PRME: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
MOUNTAIN HAWK I: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to B+(sf)
NATIONSTAR HECM 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. M4 Debt
NATIXIS 2018-ALXA: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Certs

NEUBERGER BERMAN XXI: S&P Gives Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
NEWSTAR EXETER: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
OBX TRUST 2018-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-5 Notes 'Bsf'
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 18-R: S&P Gives Prelim B-(sf) Rating on E Notes
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. E Notes

ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-2: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB on Class E Notes
ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-2: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2018-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Cl. E Notes
PALMER SQUARE 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. D Notes
PHH MORTGAGE 2007-SL1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-3 Debt Rating to Caa2

PROSPER MARKETPLACE 2018-1: Fitch Rates $79.45MM Cl. C Notes BB-sf
PURCHASING POWER 2018-A: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on D Notes
READY CAPITAL 2018-4: DBRS Assigns Prov. B(low) on Class G Certs
SKOPOS AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class D Notes
SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Bsf Ratings on 3 Trust Series

STACR 2018-HQA1: Fitch to Rate 12 Note Classes 'Bsf'
STACR 2018-SPI1: Fitch to Rate Class M-2 Certificates BB-sf
TCP DLF VIII 2018: DBRS Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
TOWD POINT: Moody's Hikes $984.5MM of RMBS Issued 2015 & 2017
WELLS FARGO 2012-C7: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs

WELLS FARGO 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Certs
WELLS FARGO 2015-C29: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Notes
WELLS FARGO 2017-RB1: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E-2 Notes
WELLS FARGO 2018-C43: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(low) Rating to F Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on X-B Certs.

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. G Certs
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certs
[*] DBRS Reviews 1,169 Classes From 160 US RMBS Transactions
[*] DBRS Reviews 156 Classes From 17 U.S RMBS Transactions
[*] DBRS Reviews 180 Classes From 30 US RMBS Transactions

[*] Moody's Hikes $133MM of Housing Securities Issued 1997-2002
[*] Moody's Hikes $270MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.1BB of RMBS Issued 2005-2007
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $322.9MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $33MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2004

[*] Moody's Takes Action on $422.8MM of Alt-A Debt Issued 2005-2006
[*] S&P Puts Rating on 14 Tranches From 4 US CLO on Watch Positive
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 117 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 452 Classes From 116 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 69 Classes From 16 US RMBS Deals

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 72 Classes From 24 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 90 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

ACRE COMMERCIAL 2017-FL3: DBRS Confirms BB(low) on Cl. E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
secured Floating Rate Notes issued by ACRE Commercial Mortgage
2017-FL3 Ltd.:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes E and F are non-offered classes.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's expectations
since issuance. At issuance, the collateral for the transaction
consisted of 12 floating-rate mortgages secured by 16 transitional
commercial real estate properties, with a total balance of $341.2
million. As of the February 2018 remittance, six loans have repaid
out of the trust, including the Brookfield LA Office Portfolio
(Prospectus ID#2), which had an outstanding principal balance of
$34.0 million and was repaid with the February 2018 remittance. The
transaction has a Reinvestment Period that is scheduled to expire
on March 15, 2019, that allows the Issuer to replace loans repaid
from the trust with newly originated loans. As part of this
transaction feature, DBRS will evaluate new loans to assess any
credit drift caused by potential loan concentrations and retains
the ability to provide a Rating Agency Confirmation for proposed
additions to the pool. Since issuance, five loans have been added
to the pool with redeployed funds between September 2017 and
January 2018. As of the February 2018 remittance, there are 11
floating-rate loans outstanding in the pool, secured by
transitional assets in various stages of stabilization. Ten out of
these 11 loans, representing 87.8% of the outstanding loan pool
balance, have a pari passu companion participation held by a
subsidiary of the trust asset seller and sponsor, ACRC Lender LLC.

Based on recently reported quarterly financials and servicer
updates, most of the collateral properties are in some period of
transition, with sponsors in the process of executing their
respective business plans. The underlying loans are structured with
future funding components that are generally allocated for
renovations and leasing costs for the collateral properties. The
current loans in the pool benefit from low leverage on a per-unit
basis, with the weighted-average current debt yield at 7.0%, based
on the DBRS As-Is Cash Flows and the current outstanding trust
balance, which is considered healthy given that the pool consists
of stabilizing assets. As of the February 2018 remittance, there
are no loans in special servicing and three loans on the servicer's
watch list, representing 34.7% of the current pool balance. The two
most pivotal loans on the servicer's watch list are detailed
below.

The Marriott Westchester Tarrytown loan (Prospectus ID#4, 12.5% of
the current pool balance) is secured by a 444-key hotel located 30
miles northeast of New York City in the Tarrytown suburb. At
issuance, the property was undergoing a $13.7 million ($30,743 per
key) property improvement plan (PIP), with renovations to the
common spaces and the ballrooms, as well as soft goods replacement
in the guest rooms, which would bring all spaces up to Marriott
brand standards. The loan was originally structured with $2.5
million in future funding to be allocated toward the PIP costs,
none of which has been advanced to the borrower to date. The loan
was added to the watch list as a result of the cash flow declines
related to the ongoing renovations at the property throughout
November 2016 and May 2017. In addition, the loan is on the watch
list due to its upcoming maturity in June 2018 and, according to
the most recent servicer update, the borrower is considering a
refinance or sale of the property.

During the renovation period, occupancy at the subject has been
reported in the 50% range, due to the logistics of renovating rooms
two floors at a time. However, according to the September 2017
Operating Statement, the in-place occupancy, average daily rate
(ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPAR) metrics have improved
to 83.8%, $152.20 and $190.16, respectively, compared with the T-12
ending December 2016 occupancy, ADR and RevPAR of 71.7%, $147.70
and $105.86, respectively. The property remains popular with
travellers to Tarrytown and generally received a positive reception
following the renovation, with reviews placing it in the top five
hotels in the area on TripAdvisor as of February 2018. Although the
loan reported a Q2 2017 annualized debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 0.66 times (x), which was a decline from the DBRS Term
DSCR of 1.21x, DBRS expects cash flows to improve as the
renovations have been completed, with all 444 units on line and
available for booking. Despite the operational disruptions from the
renovations, the hotel has historically been a leader in its market
in terms of both occupancy and rate, demonstrating RevPAR indices
in excess of 100%. The loan benefits from a seasonality reserve
with an ending balance of $408,747 as of February 2018.

The U.S. National Bank Building loan (Prospectus ID#6, 11.5% of the
current pool balance) is secured by three multi-tenanted buildings
in Portland, Oregon, approximately ten miles southwest of the
Portland International Airport. The sponsor has owned the property
since 2014 and contributed $13.0 million in cash to close the
subject loan. At issuance, the loan was structured with $4.4
million in future funding to facilitate capital improvement
projects and leasing, of which $847,376 has been advanced to the
borrower to date. The loan was added to the watch list following
the eviction of the largest tenant, Thetus Corporation (Thetus,
15.4% of the NRA), in February 2016, following the tenant's default
on the lease.

Although the sponsor has allocated funds toward immediate repairs,
leasing momentum has been slow, with an occupancy rate of 55.9% and
an average rental rate of $25.96 per square foot (psf) as of
September 2017, remaining relatively unchanged since issuance. The
largest three tenants collectively represent 31.1% of the NRA, on
leases that are scheduled to expire between June 2019 and December
2024. The largest tenant is U.S. Bank National Association,
representing 13.3% of the NRA and paying an average rental rate of
$25.96 psf, which is below the Portland office submarket average
rental rate of $30.70 psf as of February 2018, according to CoStar.
At issuance, the sponsor reported a letter of intent had been
received from Adidas AG for the former Thetus space; however, it
appears that a lease did not materialize as the space remains
vacant, according to the September 2017 rent roll. In addition,
CoStar is showing the property as 61.1% leased as of February 2018,
with the former Thetus space remaining available for lease. The
servicer previously noted that the property was under contract for
sale with a targeted closing date of mid-February 2018; as of the
date of this press release, DBRS is waiting on a servicer update
for the status of that sale. Despite the elevated vacancy at the
subject, the borrower has $3.5 million in remaining commitments to
facilitate leasing and the loan reported a Q2 2017 annualized DSCR
of 0.97x, compared with the DBRS Term DSCR of 0.54x. DBRS will
continue to monitor the loan for developments.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust
2018-1 (ACAR 2018-1):

-- $99,400,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $29,400,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $50,400,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $35,700,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $22,400,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)
-- $14,000,000 Class F Notes rated B (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
     subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
     spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
     the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption
     under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
     address the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and

     the payment of principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- ACAR 2018-1 provides for Class A, B, C and D coverage
     multiples that are slightly below the DBRS range of multiples

     set forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS believes

     that this is warranted, given the magnitude of expected loss
     and the structural features of the transaction.

-- The capabilities of American Credit Acceptance, LLC (ACA) with

     regard to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of ACA and considers
     the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
     subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup
     servicer.

-- The ACA senior management team has considerable experience,
     with an average of 18 years in banking, finance and auto
     finance companies, as well as an average of approximately
     five years of company tenure.

-- ACA has completed 21 securitizations since 2011, including
     four transactions in 2017.

-- ACA maintains a strong corporate culture of compliance and a
     robust compliance department.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and the consistent
     performance of ACA's auto loan portfolio.

-- Considerable availability of historical performance data and a

     history of consistent performance on the ACA portfolio.

The ratings also consider the statistical pool characteristics:

-- The pool is seasoned approximately two months and contains ACA

     originations from Q1 2013 through Q1 2018.

-- The average remaining life of the collateral pool is
     approximately 68 months.

-- The weighted-average FICO score of the pool is 545.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with ACA, that
     the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the

     assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
     U.S. Structured Finance" methodology.

The ACAR 2018-1 transaction represents the 22nd securitization
completed by ACA since 2011 and will offer both senior and
subordinate rated securities. The receivables securitized in ACAR
2018-1 will be subprime automobile loan contracts secured primarily
by used automobiles, light-duty trucks, vans, motorcycles and
minivans.

The rating on the Class A Note reflects the 66.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Fund (1.50%) and overcollateralization (10.25%). The
ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F Notes
reflect 55.50%, 37.50%, 24.75%, 16.75% and 11.75% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to American Credit
Acceptance Receivables Trust 2018-1's $251.3 million asset-backed
notes series 2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction
backed by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 66.3%, 59.1%, 48.9%,
41.1%,36.1%, and 33.6% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, E,
and F notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
scenarios (including excess spread). These credit support levels
provide coverage of approximately 2.30x, 2.05x, 1.67x, 1.35x,
1.20x, and 1.10x our 28.25%-29.25% expected net loss range for the
class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes, respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made to the rated
notes by the assumed legal final maturity dates under S&P's
stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that it believes are
appropriate for the assigned ratings.

-- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario,
all else being equal, the ratings on the class A, B, and C notes
would remain within the same rating category as our 'AAA (sf)', 'AA
(sf)', and 'A (sf)' ratings; the ratings on the class D notes would
remain within two rating categories of our 'BBB (sf)' rating; and
the rating on the class E and F notes would remain within two
rating categories of our 'BB- (sf)' and 'B (sf)' rating,
respectively in the first year, but the E and F classes are
expected to default by their legal final maturity date with
approximately 54%-90% and 0% repayment, respectively. These
potential rating movements are consistent with S&P's credit
stability criteria, which outline the outer boundaries of credit
deterioration equal to a one-rating category downgrade within the
first year for 'AAA' and 'AA' rated securities, a two-rating
category downgrade within the first year for 'A' through 'BB' rated
securities, and a downgrade to 'D' within the first year for 'B'
rated securities under moderate stress conditions. Eventual default
for a 'BB' and 'B' rated class under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario is also consistent with our credit stability criteria.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction.

-- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

-- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures.

-- The transaction's legal structure.

RATINGS ASSIGNED
  American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2018-1
   Class     Rating        Type          Interest      Amount
                                           rate       (mil. $)
  A         AAA (sf)       Senior          Fixed         99.40
  B         AA (sf)        Subordinate     Fixed         29.40
  C         A (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed         50.40
  D         BBB (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed         35.70
  E         BB- (sf)       Subordinate     Fixed         22.40
  F         B (sf)         Subordinate     Fixed         14.00


AMUR EQUIPMENT 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of equipment contract-backed notes issued by Amur Equipment
Finance Receivables V LLC (the Issuer):

-- $50,000,000 Series 2018-1, Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $114,779,000 Series 2018-1, Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $8,167,000 Series 2018-1, Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $6,616,000 Series 2018-1, Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $8,580,000 Series 2018-1, Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $5,272,000 Series 2018-1, Class E Notes at BB (sf)
-- $4,135,000 Series 2018-1, Class F Notes at B (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings as well as
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement, which includes
     overcollateralization (OC), subordination and amounts held in

     the reserve account, to support the DBRS-projected cumulative

     net loss assumption under various stressed cash flow  
     scenarios.

-- The proposed concentration limits mitigating the risk of
     material migration in the collateral pool's composition
     during the approximately three-month prefunding period.

-- The capabilities of Amur Equipment Finance, Inc. (AEF) with
     regard to originations, underwriting and servicing. DBRS has

     performed an operational review of AEF and considers the
     entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
     equipment-backed lease and loan contracts. In addition, Wells

     Fargo Bank, National Association, an experienced servicer of
     equipment lease-backed securitizations, is the back-up
     servicer for the transaction.

-- The collateral pool primarily consists of essential use
     equipment, with approximately 93% of the contracts supported
     by personal guarantees with a weighted-average non-zero
     guarantor FICO score of 703.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with AEF, that
     the trustee has a valid first-priority security interest in
     the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
     for U.S. Structured Finance."

AEF (f/k/a Axis Capital, Inc.) is a privately owned commercial
finance company providing equipment financing solutions to a broad
range of small- to medium-sized businesses across all 50 states of
the United States.

The rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 77.2% of initial hard
credit enhancement (as a percentage of collateral balance) provided
by the subordinated notes in the pool (71.4%), the Reserve Account
(1.39%) and OC (4.45%). The rating on the Class A-2 Notes reflects
21.7% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by the
subordinated notes in the pool (15.9%), the Reserve Account (1.39%)
and OC (4.45%). The ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class
E and Class F Notes reflect 17.7%, 14.5%, 10.4%, 7.8% and 5.8% of
initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 1-R: S&P Gives Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Anchorage
Capital CLO 1-R Ltd.'s $428.00 million floating notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 19,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Anchorage Capital CLO 1-R Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 1-R LLC
   Class                  Rating          Amount
                                       (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)        282.50
  A-2                    NR               27.50
  B                      AA (sf)          30.00
  C (deferrable)         A (sf)           61.00
  D (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)        34.00
  E (deferrable)         BB- (sf)         20.50
  Subordinated notes     NR               56.45

  NR--Not rated.


ARBOUR CLO III: Fitch Corrects March 15 Release
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a correction to the ratings release on
Arbour CLO III DAC's published on March 15, 2018 to amend the data
adequacy section.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned Arbour CLO III DAC's refinancing notes
final ratings as follows:

EUR10 million Class A-1-R: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR230 million Class A-2-R: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR25 million Class B-1-R: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR19 million Class B-2-R: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23 million Class C-R: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.5 million Class D-R: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR27.5 million Class E-R: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR11.75 million Class F-R: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

The transaction is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The portfolio is managed by Oaktree Capital management (UK)
LLP. Arbour CLO III DAC closed in February 2016 and is still in its
reinvestment period, which is set to expire in March 2020.

The issuer has issued new notes to refinance the original
liabilities. The refinanced notes have been redeemed in full as a
consequence of the refinancing. The refinancing notes bear interest
at a lower margin than the notes being refinanced. In addition, the
issuer has extended the weighted average life (WAL) covenant to 7.2
years from the refinancing date and has updated the Fitch test
matrices.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the 'B'
range. The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
current portfolio is 30.7.

High Recovery Expectations
At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured obligations.
Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets as more
favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets.
The Fitch weighted average recovery rate of the current portfolio
is 68.8%.

Extended WAL covenant
The WAL of the current portfolio is 5.79 years and the issuer will
extend the WAL covenant to 7.2 years. Fitch has analysed the
refinancing notes in line with the extended WAL covenant.

Diversified Portfolio
The transaction features different Fitch test matrices with
different allowances for exposure to the 10 largest obligors
(maximum 18% and 26.5%). The manager can then interpolate between
these two matrices. This covenant ensures that the asset portfolio
will not be exposed to excessive obligor concentration.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge
Between 5% and 15% of the portfolio may be invested in fixed- rate
assets, while fixed-rate liabilities account for 8.75% of the
target par amount. The collateral manager will not be able to buy
floating-rate assets if the proportion of fixed- rate assets falls
below 5%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating levels, would lead
to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of up to
three notches for the rated notes.


BANC OF AMERICA 2008-1: Moody's Lowers Ratings on 2 Tranches to C
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the ratings on three classes in Banc of America
Commercial Mortgage Inc. Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2008-1:

Class A-J, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on August 17, 2017
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Class B, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on August 17, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Class C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on August 17, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Class XW, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on August 17, 2017
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on one P&I class was affirmed because the rating is
consistent with expected recovery of principal and interest from
specially and troubled loans as well as losses from previously
liquidated loans.

The ratings on two P&I classes were downgraded due to the
anticipated timing of losses of loans in special servicing. Two
loans, representing 51% of the pool balance, are already real
estate owned ("REO").

The rating on the IO Class (Class XW) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 38.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 15.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.4% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating BACM 2008-1 Cl.A-J, Cl. B
and Cl. C was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating BACM 2008-1 Class XW were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 69.7% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior classes and the recovery
as a pay down of principal to the most senior class.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96.7% to $41.5
million from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans ranging in size from 5.0% to
40.2% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of three, the same as at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 30.3% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Twenty-four loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in
an aggregate realized loss of $148.6 million (for an average loss
severity of 46.6%). Four loans, constituting 69.7% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Commonwealth Storage Facility -- A note Loan ($16.7 million
-- 40.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 692,190 square foot
(SF) industrial property located in Suffolk, Virginia. The loan
first transferred to special servicing in March 2014 and a loan
modification was executed, creating a $5.1 million B-Note. The loan
subsequently returned to the master servicer, however, the loan
transferred back to special servicing in March 2017 for imminent
monetary default. As of February 2018, the property is 64%
occupied.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 470 Friendship
Road Loan ($5.6 million -- 13.6% of the pool), which is secured by
86,776 SF office property, located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2018 due to
maturity default. As of December 2017, the property was 86%
occupied.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the College Creek Loan
($2.1 million -- 5.0% of the pool), which is secured by 11,950 SF
unanchored retail strip center located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The loan transferred to special servicing due to maturity default.
As of February 2018, the property was 82% occupied.

As of the March 12, 2018 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $8.7 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). There
is only one remaining conduit loan cited below. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
29.7% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
10.0%.

The only remaining conduit loan represents 30.3% of the pool
balance. It is the Home Depot -- 87th & Dan Ryan Loan ($12.6
million), which is secured by a 128,000 SF retail property located
in Chicago, Illinois. Home Depot, occupies 100% of the GLA. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 122.8% and 0.81X, respectively, compared
to 99.3% and 1.01X at the last review.


BANCORP 2018-CRE3 : DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Bancorp 2018-CRE3 Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
(the Certificates) to be issued by Bancorp 2018-CRE3 (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The collateral for the transaction consists of 30 recently
originated floating-rate mortgages secured by 35 transitional
commercial real estate properties totaling $304.3 million based on
current trust cut-off balances ($328.7 million, including funded
pari passu participation interests) and $376.1 million based on the
fully funded loan amounts. The transaction is a sequential-pay
pass-through structure. The loans are secured by currently
cash-flowing assets, some of which are in a period of transition,
with plans to stabilize and improve the asset value. The
floating-rate mortgages were analyzed to determine the probability
of loan default over the term of the loan and its refinance risk at
maturity based on a fully extended loan term. Because of the
floating-rate nature of the loans, the index (one-month LIBOR) was
applied at the lower of a DBRS stressed rate that corresponded to
the remaining fully extended term of the loans or the strike price
of the interest rate cap, with the respective contractual loan
spread added to determine a stressed interest rate over the loan
term. When the cut-off balances were measured against the DBRS
In-Place net cash flow (NCF) and their respective stressed
constants, there were 17 loans, representing 81.4% of the pool,
with term debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) below 1.15 times
(x), a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk, DBRS applied its refinance
constants to the balloon amounts, resulting in 14 loans, or 48.6%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x relative to the
DBRS Stabilized NCF. The properties are frequently transitioning,
with potential upside in the cash flow; however, DBRS does not give
full credit to the stabilization if there are no holdbacks or if
other loan structural features in place are insufficient to support
such treatment. Furthermore, even with structural features
provided, DBRS generally does not assume the assets will stabilize
above market levels.

The loans were all sourced by Bancorp, a commercial mortgage
originator with strong origination practices, and Bancorp is
expected to purchase and retain 100.0% of the Class C Certificates,
accounting for 5.75% of the total principal balance of the
Certificates. The risk-retention role will be fulfilled by Double
Line Mortgage Opportunities Master Fund LP (Double Line) purchasing
Class G-RR as a third-party purchaser. DBRS considers Double Line
to be a sophisticated investor.

All loans have floating interest rates and are interest only during
the original term, which are all three years, creating interest
rate risk. The borrowers of all loans have purchased interest rate
caps to protect against a rise in interest rates over the term of
the loan. The weighted-average (WA) DBRS stressed interest rate for
the pool is 2.9% higher than the pool's WA interest rate. In order
to qualify for extension options, the loans must meet minimum debt
yield and loan-to-value requirements. In addition, all loans
amortize during the extension option.

The loans have been analyzed by DBRS to a stabilized cash flow that
is, in some instances, above the current in-place cash flow. There
is a possibility that the sponsors will not execute their business
plans as expected and the higher stabilized cash flow will not
materialize during the loan term. Failure to execute the business
plan could result in a term default or the inability to refinance
the fully funded loan balance. DBRS made relatively conservative
stabilization assumptions and, in each instance, considered the
business plan to be rational and the future funding amounts to be
sufficient to execute such plans. In addition, DBRS models
probability of default (POD) based on the DBRS In-Place NCF and the
fully funded loan amount (including the future funding
participation structures). The corresponding WA DBRS Debt Yield is
7.3%, which is significantly lower than the WA DBRS Exit Debt
Yield, based on a DBRS Stabilized NCF of 9.3%. This indicates a
modest amount of upside that is modeled.

The pool is relatively concentrated based on loan size, as there
are only 30 loans in the pool and it has a concentration profile
similar to a pool of 20.6 equally sized loans. The ten largest
loans represent 58.7% of the pool, and the largest three loans
represent 24.7% of the pool. Although the concentration profile is
similar to a pool of 20.6 equally sized loans, which is typically
worse than most fixed-rate conduit transactions, the concentration
profile is similar or superior compared with many floating-rate
transactions that generally have fewer than 30 loans and sometimes
fewer than 20.

The loans are secured by traditional property types (i.e.,
multifamily, retail and office), with limited exposure to
higher-volatility property types or those with short-term leases
such as hotels or self-storage. One loan, representing 2.7% of the
pool, is backed by a limited-service hotel, and there are no
self-storage assets in the pool. Twenty-three loans, totaling 80.1%
of the deal balance, represent acquisition financing, with
borrowers contributing cash equity to the transaction. The
properties are located in primarily core markets (3.8% super-dense
urban, 11.2% urban and 80.1% suburban), which benefit from greater
liquidity. Only three loans, representing 5.0% of the pool, are
located in a tertiary market, and no properties are located in
rural markets.

Despite being secured mostly by transitional properties, the loans
are cash flowing strongly, as indicated by a WA DBRS Debt Yield of
7.3% that is considered strong for this type of transaction. In
addition, the WA DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 9.3% is also considered
attractive, especially considering the fact that 57.9% of the pool
is secured by multifamily properties that typically carry lower
debt yields than other commercial properties. None of the
multifamily loans in the pool are currently secured by student or
military housing properties, which often exhibit higher cash flow
volatility than traditional multifamily properties. Multifamily
properties are generally considered to be lower risk than
commercial properties, such as office, retail and industrial, and
far lower risk than hospitality properties. While cash flow
volatility can be elevated due to the short-term nature of the
underlying leases, loss severity for loans secured by multifamily
properties is lower than that of most other property types.

DBRS considered two loans, representing 6.5% of the pool, to be
backed by sponsors considered to be Bad (Litigious), and two loans,
representing 11.3% of the pool, to be backed by sponsors considered
to be Weak as a result of prior loan default, limited net worth
and/or liquidity, a historical negative credit event and/or
inadequate commercial real estate experience. Loans with Weak
sponsors were modeled with increased POD levels to mitigate
increased risk.


BBCMS MORTGAGE 2017-C1: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Cl. X-G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-C1 (the Certificates) issued
by BBCMS Mortgage Trust 2017-C1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-G at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained generally in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The collateral consists of 58
fixed-rate loans secured by 75 commercial and multifamily
properties. Two of the loans in the pool are cross-collateralized
and cross-defaulted and as such are treated like one loan in the
DBRS analysis. As of the February 2018 remittance, there has been a
collateral reduction of 0.4% since issuance with a current
outstanding trust balance of $852.3 million.

The weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term Debt Service Coverage Ratio
(DSCR) and WA DBRS Debt Yield for the pool at issuance were 1.60x
and 9.0%, respectively. The largest 15 loans in the pool
collectively represent 62.2% of the transaction balance. Based on
the most recent financial reporting available, 13 of the top 15
loans are reporting updated cash flows with a WA net cash flow
growth of 11.7% over the DBRS issuance figures, with a WA DSCR and
current debt yield of 1.59x and 8.65%, respectively.

There are four loans on the servicer's watch list, representing
5.37% of the current pool balance. In general, the loans on the
watch list are being monitored for cash flow declines (based on an
annualized year-to-date figure) or tenant rollover risk. For
additional information on the watch listed loans, please see the
full commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which
information has been provided below.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E, X-Fand X-G are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


BBCMS TRUST 2018-RRI: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-RRI (the Certificates) issued by BBCMS Trust 2018-RRI (the
Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at A (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X-CP and Class X-NCP balances are notional.

The $400.0 million trust mortgage loan is secured by the fee and
leasehold interests in a portfolio of 86 limited-service Red Roof
Inn (RRI) hotels that have franchise agreements that expire in
2035, well beyond the loan's maturity. In aggregate, the portfolio
totals 10,397 keys located in 25 different states. Twenty-three
properties totaling 3,205 keys (44.6% of allocated loan balance)
represent Red Roof Inns Inc.'s premier design package, otherwise
known as Red Roof PLUS + (RR+). Sponsorship for the loan is
provided by a joint venture between the affiliates of Westmont
Hospitality Group (Westmont; 20%), which is the owner of the RRI
and RR+ brands, and Bestford Capital Pte. Ltd. (Bestford Capital;
80%), a Singapore-based investment advisory firm. Westmont owns a
diversified portfolio of over 500 hotels across three continents,
which include some of the world's largest hotel brands. RRI West
Management, LLC, an affiliate of Westmont, manages the portfolio.
All of the properties were previously pledged as collateral for
BBCMS 2015-RRI. The $400.0 million mortgage debt, along with $50.0
million of mezzanine debt and $9.6 million of borrower equity,
serves to refinance $445.3 million of debt that was originated in
2015, out of which the $360.0 million mortgage loan was securitized
in BBCMS 2015-RRI; fund $4.5 million in upfront reserves; and cover
closing costs of $9.8 million. The sponsors will have more than
$150.0 million of cash equity remaining in the assets based on the
total 2015 acquisition cost. The loan has a two-year initial term
with three one-year extension options with a floating-rate
(one-month LIBOR plus 3.125% per annum) interest-only (IO) mortgage
loan.

The properties are relatively old, having been built between 1975
and 2001. Since acquiring the collateral properties for $575.0
million ($55,304 per key) in 2015, the sponsor has spent
approximately $15.5 million ($1,488 per key) in capital investment
across the portfolio through January 2018. Although limited in
recent years, there was a significant amount of capital invested in
the portfolio prior to the 2015 acquisition totaling approximately
$81.3 million ($7,816 per key) by previous Starwood Hotels and
Resorts Worldwide, LLC affiliates, bringing total renovations and
elective capex invested to $96.7 million ($9,304 per key) since
2011. Based on the site inspections, DBRS assessed the overall
portfolio quality to be Average, but individual property quality
assessments ranged from Average (-) to Average. There are 22 hotels
that have been upgraded since the last securitization. The
inspected properties that had undergone recent renovations were
noted to be clean and well maintained and in line with the national
brand standard quality of recently renovated RRI extended-stay
hotels; however, the revenue-per-available-room increase from the
YE2014 level to the trailing 12 months ending November 30, 2017,
achieved by these properties (8.7%) mirrored the overall portfolio
(8.5%). Moving forward, the sponsor intends to spend an additional
$4.3 million on 14 of the portfolio properties in the near future,
which equates to about $2,500 per key across such properties. The
loan is structured with ongoing furniture, fixtures and equipment
reserves that will be collected at 6.0% of gross revenue on a
monthly basis in the first year and 5.0% thereafter, as well as a
$1.8 million upfront renovation reserve that will be available for
planned maintenance throughout the term.

The as-is portfolio appraised value is $630.0 million, assuming a
bulk sale, based on an applied cap rate of 7.2%, which equates to a
relatively low appraised loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 63.5%. The
DBRS-concluded value of $361.2 million ($34,741 per key) represents
a significant 42.7% discount to the bulk sale appraised value and
results in a DBRS LTV of 110.7%, which is indicative of
high-leverage financing. However, the DBRS value is based on a
reversionary cap rate of 11.61%, which represents a significant
stress over current prevailing market cap rates. Furthermore, the
loan's DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio at
10.5% and 1.95 times, respectively, are moderate considering the
portfolio is primarily securitized by suburban limited-service
hotels.

The portfolio is geographically diverse, with the 86 hotel assets
located across 25 states and eight regions. Pennsylvania has the
highest concentration by allocated loan balance and number of
hotels at 9.7% and ten, respectively. The next largest state
concentration belongs to Florida, which represents 8.6% of the
total loan amount by allocated balance from six hotel assets. No
single hotel represents more than 6.5% of the allocated loan
balance.

Bestford Capital, the 80% majority owner of the assets and one of
the loan sponsors, is considered strong because of its extensive
holdings and ample financial resources. Additionally, the guaranty
for full-recourse events, such as voluntary bankruptcy, is not
capped.

The cumulative investment-grade-rated proceeds per key exposure are
$21,233, which is well below the appraiser's market value of
$60,594 per key for the assets, and the associated DBRS Debt Yield
is attractive at 18.9%. This per-key exposure is comparable to the
recovered proceeds per key for the RRI Hotel Portfolio loan that
was securitized across two transactions in 2007 and incurred a 51%
loss on the securitized whole loan balance. The subject portfolio
has considerable overlap with the RRI Hotel Portfolio, and DBRS
believes that the substantial capital investment made into the
subject portfolio since 2011 has resulted in a much higher overall
property quality than would have been the case at the time of
liquidation.

Classes X-CP and X-NCP are IO certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one notch if
senior in the waterfall.


BCC FUNDING 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of the equipment contract-backed notes issued by BCC
Funding XIV LLC (the Issuer):

-- $73,500,000 Series 2018-1, Class A-1 Notes at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- $140,447,000 Series 2018-1, Class A-2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $20,376,000 Series 2018-1, Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- $11,745,000 Series 2018-1, Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- $13,442,000 Series 2018-1, Class D Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- $6,934,000 Series 2018-1, Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement, which includes
     overcollateralization (OC), subordination and amounts held in

     the reserve account, to support the DBRS-projected cumulative

     net loss assumption under various stressed cash flow
     scenarios.

-- The concentration limits mitigating the risk of material
     migration in the collateral pool's composition during the  
     approximately three-month prefunding period.

-- The capabilities of Balboa Capital Corporation (BCC) with
     regard to originations, underwriting and servicing. DBRS has
     performed an operational review of BCC and considers the
     entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of
     equipment-backed lease and loan contracts. In addition,
     Portfolio Financial Servicing Company, an experienced
     servicer of equipment lease-backed securitizations, is the
     backup servicer for the transaction.

-- The collateral for the transaction is granular with respect to

     obligor, vendor and geographical concentrations. More than
     81.0% of the obligors have been in business for six or more
     years and approximately 42.5% have been in business for 16 or

     more years. The weighted-average Small Business Scoring
     Service (SBSS) scores for the businesses in the collateral
     pool will be at least 201.5. In addition, obligations
     comprising more than 75.0% are supported by personal
     guarantees, and the payments on obligations accounting for
     approximately 89.1% are collected through Automated Clearing
     House (ACH).

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with BCC, that
     the trustee has a valid first-priority security interest in
     the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
     for U.S. Structured Finance."

BCC provides equipment and working capital financing to small- and
mid-sized companies in the United States. It originates leases and
loans through three principal channels: (1) vendor financing
through partnerships with equipment vendors, (2) small-ticket
originations through direct calling and (3) larger small-ticket
direct originations to middle-market obligors.

The rating on the Class A-1 Notes reflects 75.5% of initial hard
credit enhancement (as a percentage of collateral balance) provided
by the subordinated notes in the pool (68.2%), the Reserve Account
(1.50%) and OC (5.85%). The rating on the Class A-2 Notes reflects
25.9% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by the
subordinated notes in the pool (18.6%), the Reserve Account (1.50%)
and OC (5.85%). The ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D and
Class E Notes reflect 18.7%, 14.6%, 9.8% and 7.4% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively.


BEAR STEARNS 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. I-A Debt to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one tranche,
issued by Bear Stearns Second Lien Trust 2007-1.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Second Lien Trust 2007-1

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 10,
2010 Downgraded to C (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade is driven by the total credit enhancement available to
the bond. The action reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the
pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.



BENCHMARK MORTGAGE 2018-B3: Fitch to Rate Class H-RR Certs 'B-sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on Benchmark 2018-B3
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
Series 2018-B3.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

-- $25,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $162,100,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66,600,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $125,000,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $340,076,000 class A-5 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46,000,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $849,448,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $99,694,000a class X-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $84,672,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,164,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50,530,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,873,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,873,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21,851,000bc class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,291,000bc class F-RR 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $12,291,000bc class G-RR 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $15,022,000bc class H-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:
-- $45,067,711bc class NR-RR.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of March 19, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 45 loans secured by 75
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,092,537,712 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by German American Capital Corporation, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, National Association, and Citi Real Estate Funding Inc.

Fitch received a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 75.6% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 81.2%, and asset summary reviews
of 81.2% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool has
average leverage relative to other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.19x is lower than the YTD 2018 average of 1.27x and the 2017
average of 1.26x. The pool's Fitch loan to value (LTV) of 107.6% is
higher than the YTD 2018 average of 104.0% and the 2017 average of
101.6%.

Pool Diversity: The top 10 loans comprise 45.0% of the pool, which
is below the 2017 average of 53.1% and 2016 average of 54.8%. The
loan concentration index (LCI) score of 327 is better than the 2017
average of 398 and 2016 average of 422.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: One loan, representing 4.57%
of the pool, has an investment-grade credit opinion. Twelve Oaks
Mall has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a
stand-alone basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.2% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full-year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
BMARK 2018-B3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


BX COMMERCIAL 2018-BIOA: Fitch Assigns B-sf Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to BX Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-BIOA Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-BIOA:

-- $676,000,000 class A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $122,000,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $81,000,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $129,000,000 class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $199,000,000 class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $123,000,000 class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70,000,000a class HRR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not rated by Fitch:

-- $1,400,000,000b class P.

a) Horizontal credit risk retention interest.
b) Notional amount and solely represents the right to receive the
spread maintenance premiums collected with respect to the mortgage
loan.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Feb. 26, 2018, the
expected ratings of two classes of interest-only certificates,
class X-CP (notional balance $182,700,000) and class X-NCP
(notional balance $203,000,000) have been withdrawn because the
classes were removed from the final deal structure by the issuer.
Additionally, class P has been added to the transaction capital
structure.

The BX Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-BIOA pass-through
certificates represent the beneficial interest in a trust that
holds a two-year, floating-rate, interest-only $1.40 billion
mortgage loan secured by the fee and leasehold interests in 26 lab
office properties and one multifamily property with a total of
approximately 4.1 million sf. The floating-rate loan has five,
one-year extension options and was funded by the loan originators
on March 6, 2018.

Proceeds from the loan, along with $510 million in subordinate
mezzanine debt, were used to refinance approximately $1.54 billion
in existing CMBS debt on the portfolio, pay for transaction
expenses and return approximately $301.4 million to the sponsor.
The refinanced debt was securitized in January 2016 as part of the
CGGS 2016-RND transaction (Pool A). This facilitated Blackstone
Real Estate Partners VIII's (the sponsor) acquisition of BioMed
Realty Trust Inc., a public REIT that owned, managed and developed
office and laboratory space. The certificates will follow a
sequential-pay structure, but as long as there is no event of
default, any voluntary prepayments (up to the first 25% of the
loan), including property releases, will be applied to the loan
components on a pro rata basis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Assets in Strong Locations: The portfolio is
collateralized by a pool of high-quality lab office properties in
highly desirable and in-fill life science submarkets. Of the
allocated loan amount (ALA), 95.5% is located in a top three life
science market, according to JLL's Life Sciences Outlook 2017
Report. The portfolio received a weighted average (WA) Fitch
property quality grade of 'A-'/'B+', and 78% (as a percentage of
ALA) of the properties were built or renovated since 2000.

Portfolio Diversity: The portfolio is collateralized by the fee
(24) and leasehold (three) interests in 27 (4.1 million sf)
properties located across three states and four distinct markets.
The largest five properties (by ALA) account for approximately
61.7% of the issuer's portfolio NOI and 57.3% of total NRA. The
portfolio also exhibits significant tenant diversity as it features
98 distinct tenants with no individual tenant representing more
than 11.4% of base rents (Ironwood Pharmaceuticals).

Institutional Sponsorship: The sponsor of the loan will be
Blackstone Real Estate Partners VIII, which is owned by affiliates
of the Blackstone Group, L.P., a global leader in real estate
investment with over $115.3 billion in assets under management as
of December 2017, including more than 12 million sf of life science
properties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 6.1% below
the FY 2017 NCF. Included in Fitch's presale report are numerous
Rating Sensitivities that describe the potential impact given
further NCF declines below Fitch's NCF. Fitch evaluated the
sensitivity of the ratings for class A and found that a 30% decline
would result in a downgrade to 'BBB-sf'.


CANADIAN COMMERCIAL 2018-4: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating on Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited assigned provisional ratings to the following classes
of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-4
issued by Canadian Commercial Mortgage Origination Trust 4:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)
-- Class X at A (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Classes A-2, B, C, D, E, F and G will be privately placed. Class X
is notional.

The collateral consists of 53 fixed-rate loans secured by 53
commercial properties. The transaction is a sequential-pay
pass-through structure. The conduit pool was analyzed to determine
the provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of
loan default within the term and its liquidity at maturity. When
the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS Stabilized
NCF and their respective actual constants, DBRS did not identify
any loans, based on the trust balances, as having a term DSCR below
1.15 times (x), which is a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance
risk given the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied
its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in
eight loans, representing 16.8% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs
below 1.00x base on the trust balance, indicating elevated
refinance risk.

Twelve loans (27.7% of the pool by loan balance) were considered by
DBRS to have Strong sponsor strength, and 42 loans (79.1% of the
pool by loan balance) were considered to have meaningful recourse
to the respective sponsor; all else being equal, recourse loans
typically have lower probability of default and were modeled as
such. All loans in the transaction amortize for the entire term,
with 83.9% of the pool by loan balance amortizing on schedules that
are 25 years or less and the remaining loans amortizing on
schedules that are between 25 years and 30 years.

The transaction exhibits sponsor concentration as evidenced by only
41 sponsors and/or sponsor groups for the pool of 53 loans, and 17
loans (34.8% of the pool balance) have related borrowers to one or
more loans within the pool. However, all these 17 loans have
meaningful recourse to the sponsor, and none of the related
sponsors were considered by DBRS to be weak or below average in
terms of net worth or liquidity.

The DBRS sample included 34 of the 53 loans in the pool. Site
inspections were performed on 30 of the 53 properties in the
portfolio (75.1% of the pool by allocated loan balance). The DBRS
sample had an average NCF variance of -4.5% from the Issuer's NCF
and ranged from -29.1% (Calgary Cross Dock) to +2.5% (5200 Dixie
Industrial).

Class X is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references
multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
reference tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.



CD 2007-CD4: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Ratings on 2 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
in CD 2007-CD4 Commercial Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CD4:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2017 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. XC, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. XW, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Class A-J was affirmed because the ratings are
consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Class
A-J has already experienced an 11% realized loss as result of
previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 61.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 26.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 13.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 13.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. XC and Cl. XW were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 64% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 32% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 13, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $108 million
from $6.6 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 10, the same as at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 32% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seventy-seven loans have been liquidated with a loss from the pool,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $798 million (for an
average loss severity of 60%). Eight loans, constituting 64% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Westport Shopping Center Loan ($16.5 million
-- 15.3% of the pool), which is secured by a grocery anchored
retail center and located 15 miles southwest of Chicago CBD. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2017 due to
imminent maturity default. The former anchor tenant, Ultra Foods,
which occupied 49% of the net rentable area (NRA) vacated their
space in April 2017. As of February 2018 the property was 49%
occupied and the Lender anticipates a foreclosure sale in the first
quarter of 2018.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Lake Center V
Loan ($15.3 million -- 14.2% of the pool), which is secured by a
suburban office property. The property is located in Marlton, New
Jersey which is approximately 14 miles east of the Philadelphia
CBD. The property's largest tenant vacated in May 2015 and the
property is currently vacant. The master servicer deemed the
non-recoverable as of April 2017 and the loan became REO in March
2018.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the REVA -- Portfolio
Loan ($12.6 million -- 11.7% of the pool), which is secured by 14
buildings in 3 industrial/flex/office parks. The portfolio was sold
in on February 22nd for $8.6 million.

The remaining specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $41.5 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (60% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for three
poorly performing loans, constituting 32% of the pool, and has
estimated an aggregate loss of $25 million (a 73% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 92% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 51%. Moody's conduit component
includes only three loans and excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 11% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.69X and 2.93X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 1.35X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 33.9% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Sunset Mall Loan which is
split into a $15.5 million A Note (14.4% of the pool) and a $10.0
million B Note (9.3% of the pool). The loan is secured by an
enclosed regional mall built in 1979 and located in San Angelo,
Texas, approximately 250 miles west of Dallas. The mall is anchored
by JC Penney, Dillard's-Women's and Dillard's-Men's. One former
anchor space, Sears, has vacated. The JC Penney and Dillards-Womens
boxes are individually owned. The loan transferred the special
servicing in November 2016 due to imminent maturity default. The
loan was modified in May 2017 with an A / B Note split. The loan is
currently performing under the terms of the modifications, however,
Moody's has identified both the A Note and the B Note as troubled
loans.

The second largest performing loan is the Broomfield Plaza Shopping
Center Loan ($8.6 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by
a 105,064 square foot retail (SF) center constructed in 1979 and
renovated in 2005. The property is located in Broomfield, Colorado,
between Denver and Boulder. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2015 due to imminent default. A 24-month loan
extension was subsequently executed and the loan returned to the
master servicer in February 2017. Due to the low DSCR, Moody's has
identified this as a troubled loan.

The third largest loan is the Rite Aid -- Vancouver Loan ($2.5
million -- 2.3% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant
retail property leased to Rite Aid. The property is located 15
miles northeast of the Portland, Oregon CBD. The loan is fully
amortizing and has amortized down by 38% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 60% and 1.60X, respectively,
compared to 64% and 1.49X at the last review.


CEDAR FUNDING IX: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Cedar
Funding IX CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding IX CLO LLC's $425.50 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 22,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Cedar Funding IX CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding IX CLO LLC  

  Class                      Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                        AAA (sf)                 297.00
  A-2                        NR                        32.00
  B                          AA (sf)                   51.25
  C (deferrable)             A (sf)                    28.50
  D (deferrable)             BBB- (sf)                 28.00
  E (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                  20.75
  Subordinated notes         NR                        53.00

  NR--Not rated.


CENTERLINE 2007-1: Moody's Withdraws C Rating on Cl. A-1 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the ratings on the
following notes issued by Centerline 2007-1 Resecuritization
Trust:

Cl. A-1, Withdrawn (sf); previously on May 4, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Moody's has decided to withdraw the rating for its own business
reasons.


CGGS COMMERCIAL 2018-WSS: DBRS Gives (P)B Rating to Cl. HRR Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-WSS to
be issued by CGGS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-WSS:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class HRR at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X-CP and Class X-NCP balances are notional.

The $405.0 million trust mortgage loan is secured by the fee
interest in a portfolio of 92 economies, extended-stay hotels,
totaling 10,978 keys, located in 22 different states across the
United States. All the hotels in the portfolio will operate under
the Wood Spring Suites flag. Six of the assets currently operate
under the Value Place flag, but are expected to be converted by the
end of Q1 2018. The 92 collateral assets are being acquired by the
sponsor, Brookfield Strategic Real Estate Partners II (Brookfield),
as part of a 107 Wood Spring Suites hotel portfolio for a total
purchase price of $767.5 million from Lindsay Goldberg.
Simultaneously, Choice Hotels International, Inc. (Choice) will
acquire the Wood Spring Suites brand from Lindsay Goldberg in a
separate transaction for approximately $231.0 million and will then
enter into new 20-year franchise agreements with Brookfield for the
hotels. Lindsay Goldberg will retain the management platform and
will continue to manage the hotels following the acquisition by
Brookfield. Brookfield is acquiring the assets as part of a series
of private investment funds with over $9.0 billion of capital
commitments at its closing in April 2016. Brookfield Asset
Management, Inc. and its affiliates have over $155 billion of
assets under management around the world. The subject financing
totals $530.0 million, with $405.0 million structured as mortgage
debt and $125.0 million structured as mezzanine debt. The debt
package, along with a $177.3 million equity infusion from
Brookfield, will acquire the 92 collateral assets for an allocated
purchase price of $707.3 million and cover closing costs. The 15
remaining non-collateral hotels are transitional and will be
financed separately. The loan is a two-year floating-rate
(one-month LIBOR plus 2.46% per annum) interest-only mortgage loan
with five one-year extension options.

The properties are relatively new, having been built between 2003
and 2016. Since 2013, approximately $54.6 million ($4,972 per key)
of capital expenditure (capex) has been invested across the
collateral portfolio, including $8.9 million in rebranding costs in
2016 and 2017. Since June 2016, 81 of the assets were converted
from the Value Place brand to Wood Spring Suites as part of a
brand-wide initiative, while five assets represent newly
constructed Wood Spring Suites hotels. The rebrand has greatly
benefitted from the converted assets despite the level of capital
investment associated with conversions being quite low, as 76
assets, reporting full YE2015 and YE2017 financial figures, have
experienced a 14.9% increase in revenue per available room (RevPAR)
and an 18.6% in net cash flow (NCF). Meanwhile, the unconverted
assets have experienced a 3.7% decrease in RevPAR and a 14.4%
decrease in NCF over the same period. These six assets are
anticipated to benefit from the rebrand; however, more importantly,
the portfolio as a whole will benefit from the brand acquisition of
the brand by Choice. Being part of the Choice platform will create
a brand activation and access to revenue management systems,
national customer accounts and its loyalty program. Additionally,
the portfolio should be able to push NCF margins through economies
of scale, operational efficiencies and savings with online travel
agencies. DBRS assessed the overall portfolio quality to be Average
based on the site inspections, with all inspected properties deemed
to be Average, except for one property with a quality assessment of
Average (-). The properties inspected were generally noted to be in
good condition and appealing for a low-cost alternative product as
all properties had been recently converted or are of relatively new
construction. The recent capex spent across the portfolio will
serve to benefit the hotels in the near term to maintain the
overall quality of the product as the portfolio has exhibited
consistently higher occupancies which will expedite the wear and
tear on the rooms.

The portfolio is concentrated by property type, as all properties
are extended-stay hotels. Hotels have the highest cash flow
volatility of all property types because of the relatively short
lease/length of stay compared with commercial properties, as well
as higher operating leverage. These dynamics can lead to rapidly
deteriorating cash flow in a declining market and, with nationwide
RevPAR in its eighth consecutive year of growth, relatively easy
RevPAR gains appear to be gone. However, the portfolio has
experienced substantial gains in RevPAR increasing 24.9% since
2014, with year-over-year gains being relatively consistent at 7.3%
in 2015, 6.9% in 2016, and 8.9% in 2017. Performance is expected to
continue in the near term as the benefits of being part of the
Choice flag are fully recognized. Furthermore, extended-stay
hotels, which have a much more stable cash flow profile than
traditional hotels by virtue of offering limited housekeeping
services and limited to essentially non-existent food and beverage
outlets, keeping common areas small and not offering more than just
basic amenities, the expense ratios of this product type are
relatively low. As of YE2017, the portfolio's NCF margin was 42.0%,
and has the ability to improve as various cost synergies are
implemented at the properties being part of the Choice platform.
NCF margins for extended-stay hotels generally compare very
favorably with traditional hotel properties, as high cash flow
margins result in lower cash flow volatility, allowing the subject
portfolio to withstand greater revenue declines than traditional
lodging assets.

The as-is portfolio appraised value is $710.0 million, assuming a
bulk sale, based on an applied cap rate of 8.3%, which equates to a
relatively low appraised loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 57.0%. The
DBRS-concluded value of $424.8 million ($38,696 per key) represents
a significant 40.2% discount to the bulk sale appraised value and
results in a DBRS LTV of 95.3%, which is indicative of
high-leverage financing; however, the DBRS value is based on a
reversionary cap rate of 11.61%, which represents a significant
stress over current prevailing market cap rates. Furthermore, the
loan's DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Term DSCR at 12.2% and 2.32 times,
respectively, are moderate considering the portfolio is primarily
securitized by secondary suburban extended-stay hotels and the
portfolio's insurable replacement cost of $637.1 million (excluding
land value) is substantial higher than the whole loan amount of
$530.0 million.

Classes X-CP and X-NCP are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


CITIGROUP 2014-GC19: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class X-D Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC19 issued by Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC19 as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class PEZ at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. In addition, the rating on Class A-1 was
discontinued following the full repayment of its outstanding
balance with the January 2018 remittance.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction. As of the February 2018 remittance, 76 loans remained
in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of approximately
$965.6 million, representing a collateral reduction of 5.0% since
issuance due to unscheduled loan repayment and scheduled loan
amortization. There are six loans (3.7% of the current pool) that
have been fully defeased. To date, 49 loans, representing 65.6% of
the current pool, have reported partial-year 2017 financials, while
65 loans, representing 86.6% of the current pool, have reported
YE2016 financials. Based on the most recent year-end financials
available, the pool had a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and a WA debt yield of 1.70 times (x) and
10.9%, respectively, compared to the DBRS Term DSCR and WA Debt
Yield of 1.50x and 9.6%, respectively. Based on the same
financials, the top 15 loans (57.2% of the current pool) reported a
WA DSCR of 1.65x, compared to the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.47x,
representing a 19.2% WA net cash flow growth over the DBRS issuance
figures.

As of the February 2018 remittance, there are no loans in special
servicing and nine loans, representing 8.5% of the current pool, on
the servicer's watch list. Of the nine loans on the servicer's
watch list, four loans (4.8% of the current pool) were flagged for
deferred maintenance issues, three loans (2.7% of the current pool)
were flagged for performance-related reasons and one loan (0.5% of
the current pool) was flagged for near-term tenant rollover. The
remaining loan, Ramada Denver (Prospectus ID#48, 0.5% of the
current pool) was recently transferred back from special servicing
following the servicer's resolution of an unauthorized property
management change.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC21: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-GC21 issued by
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-GC21 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The collateral consists of 70
fixed-rate loans secured by 111 commercial properties. Six loans,
representing 54.0% of the pool balance (including two of the
largest loans), are structured with full-term interest-only (IO)
payments. An additional 23 loans, representing 32.3% of the pool,
were structured with partial-term IO payments at issuance, with
only four loans (representing 9.2% of the pool) with partial IO
terms remaining. As of the February 2018 remittance, there has been
a collateral reduction of 3.6% since issuance as a result of
scheduled loan amortization. Loans representing 92.0% of the pool
balance reported full year-end 2016 financials, and these loans
reported a weighted-average (WA) debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and WA debt yield of 1.64 times (x) and 10.7%, respectively,
compared with the DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS Debt Yield of 1.39x and
8.5%, respectively. The largest 15 loans reported a WA DSCR and WA
debt yield of 1.58x and 9.9%, respectively, representing a WA net
cash flow improvement of 17.6% over the DBRS Net Cash Flow figures
derived at issuance.

The pool does have challenges in a relatively high concentration of
retail properties, which represent 36.4% of the pool balance. Given
the current environment for the retail sector in the volume of
recent store closures and chain bankruptcies, this is considered
particularly noteworthy. Overall, however, performance is stable as
the retail loans in the pool reported a WA YE2016 DSCR and WA debt
yield of 1.60x and 9.2%, respectively. In addition, most of the
retail loans in the pool are secured by anchored retail or regional
mall properties, which are generally more desirable compared with
unanchored retail property types. In addition, loans comprising
30.9% of the pool, secured by retail properties, are located in
established suburban markets.

As of the February 2018 remittance, there were ten loans
representing 19.1% of the pool balance on the servicer's watch
list, including the largest loan in the pool, Maine Mall
(Prospectus ID#1 – 12.5% of the pool balance), which is being
monitored due to the departure of anchor tenant Bon-Ton. The loan
benefits from a strong sponsorship in GGP, Inc. (GGP), and Maine
Mall is considered the prominent mall in the state, serving as a
true destination center for a relatively large geographic area.
Most of the loans on the servicer's watch list are being monitored
for upcoming lease expiration dates, with many of the leases in
questions since renewed or spaces re-leased and most of the
properties located in stable suburban markets.

There is one loan that DBRS is monitoring for the loss of a grocery
anchor in Prospectus ID#13, Hairston Village (1.7% of the pool). It
is also noteworthy that the loan was reported late but less than 30
days delinquent for February 2018. DBRS has asked the servicer why
the loss of Kroger (30.6% of the net rentable area) in October 2017
did not result the loan's addition to the watch list. As of the
publication date of this press release, the servicer's response is
pending. For additional information on this loan, please see the
loan commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which
information is provided below.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2014-GC21: Fitch Affirms B Rating on F Certs.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one and affirmed 15 classes of
Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2014-GC21 (CGCMT 2014-GC21).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the relatively stable performance for the
majority of the pool and increased credit enhancement relative to
Fitch's loss expectations. The downgrade of the interest-only class
X-B corrects an error made by Fitch at issuance, which incorrectly
identified the referenced tranches. The interest-only class X-B
references classes B and C, which are rated 'AA-sf' and 'A-sf',
respectively, with both classes contributing cash flow to the
interest-only class. The rating of class X-B is capped at the
rating of the lowest referenced tranche.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated nine loans (21.8% of
current pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), including four of
the top 15 loans (19.2%). Three of the top 15 loans reported
significant occupancy declines following the loss of major tenants
in 2017. The Maine Mall (12.5%) in South Portland, ME lost its
largest collateral anchor when The Bon-Ton terminated its lease and
vacated in June 2017. The 201 Fourth Avenue North (2.8%) office
property in Downtown Nashville, TN lost its second-largest tenant,
which vacated at its February 2017 lease expiration. The Hairston
Village (1.7%) retail property in Stone Mountain, GA lost its
Kroger grocery-anchor tenant, which closed in October 2017, ahead
of its scheduled December 2019 lease expiration.

The Lanes Mill Marketplace (2.3%) retail property in Howell, NJ
reported yoy declines in occupancy since issuance and has upcoming
rollover concerns when the lease of the second-largest tenant,
Barnes & Noble, expires in February 2019. The tenant, who exercised
a three-month extension of its original November 2018 lease
expiration, has been reporting declining sales since 2013. The
other FLOCs outside of the top 15 (combined, 2.6%) were flagged for
low DSCR, declining occupancy, lease rollover concerns or
significant hurricane damage. Fitch performed an additional
sensitivity scenario, which assumed higher losses on the FLOCs, and
the ratings and Outlooks reflect this analysis.

Pool Concentrations: Loans secured by retail properties comprise
30.3% of the current pool balance and include five of the top 15
loans (20.3%). The regional mall exposure is limited to the largest
loan, Maine Mall (12.5%), a regional mall in South Portland, ME
with exposure to Macy's and Sears as non-collateral tenants and JC
Penney as a collateral tenant. Loans secured by multifamily
properties also make up 30.3% of the current pool balance,
including four of the top 15 loans (19.2%).

Amortization: As of the February 2018 distribution date, the pool's
aggregate principal balance has paid down by 3.6% to $1 billion
from $1.04 billion at issuance. The majority of the pool (60 loans,
70.1% of pool) is currently amortizing. Six loans (20.8%) are
full-term interest-only, and an additional four loans (9.2%) still
have a partial interest-only component during their remaining loan
term, compared to 31.8% of the original pool at issuance.

Six loans (5.1% of current pool) have been defeased. There have
been no specially serviced loans and no realized losses since
issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes E, F and X-C reflect potential
rating downgrades due to performance concerns surrounding the
FLOCs. Downgrades are possible if performance of these loans
continues to further decline or with prolonged vacancies at these
properties. Fitch's analysis includes an additional sensitivity
scenario to address the potential for higher losses. The Outlooks
for classes A-1 through D remain Stable due to increasing credit
enhancement and expected continued paydown. Future upgrades may
occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.

Fitch has downgraded the following class as indicated:
-- $115.7 million class X-B* to 'A-sf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook
    Stable.

Fitch has affirmed and revised Rating Outlooks on the following
classes as indicated:

-- $14.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $63.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $9.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $240 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $291.4 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71.6 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $749.3 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class PEZ** at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.7 million class X-C* at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $50.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.7 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
    Stable;
-- $13 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.
**Class A-S, B, and C certificates may be exchanged for a related
amount of class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be
exchanged for class A-S, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G or X-D certificates.


CITIGROUP COMMERCIAL 2018-B2: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following Ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-B2 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, Series 2018-B2:

-- $28,000,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69,000,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $390,485,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,000,000 class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $783,442,000a class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,202,000a class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $76,957,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $49,202,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47,940,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,986,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,232,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,092,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52,986,000b class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $25,232,000b class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $10,092,000b class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

-- $40,371,466b class G;
-- $40,371,466ab class X-G;
-- $53,119,236c VRR Interest.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Feb. 28, 2018, the
expected 'A-sf' rating on the interest-only class X-B has been
revised to 'AA-sf' based on the final deal structure. The classes
above reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
March 20, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 52 loans secured by 142
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,062,384,703 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC, Citi
Real Estate Funding Inc., Starwood Mortgage Funding V LLC and Bank
of America, National Association.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 67.7% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 77.4%, and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's leverage
is greater than that of recent comparable Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool has a weighted average Fitch DSCR of 1.15x,
which is below the 2017 average of 1.26x for other recent
Fitch-rated U.S. multiborrower deals. The pool's weighted average
Fitch LTV of 110.0% is higher than the 2017 average of 101.6%.

Diversified Pool: The largest 10 loans account for 45.4% of the
pool, which is below the 2017 average of 53.1% for fixed-rate
transactions. The pool exhibits lower pool concentration, with a
loan concentration index (LCI) of 339, which is below the 2017
average of 398.

Property Type Concentration: The pool has a higher than average
concentration of self-storage properties and lower than average
concentration of multifamily properties. Self-storage properties
represent 18.8% of the pool, which is above the 2017 average of
3.9% for fixed-rate transactions. Multifamily properties represent
2.4% of the pool, which is below the 2017 average of 8.1% for
fixed-rate transactions. Loans secured by self-storage and
multifamily properties have a lower than average probability of
default in Fitch's multiborrower model, all else equal.
Additionally, two properties representing 4.3% of the pool are
secured primarily by parking facilities, a non-traditional property
type.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's net cash flow (NCF) was 12.8% below
the most recent year's net operating income (NOI) for properties
for which a full year NOI was provided, excluding properties that
were stabilizing during this period. Unanticipated further declines
in property-level NCF could result in higher defaults and loss
severities on defaulted loans and in potential rating actions on
the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the
CGCMT 2018-B2 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.



COMM 2012-CCRE1: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eleven
classes in COMM 2012-CCRE1 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-CCRE1:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 9, 2017 Affirmed Ba3
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the nine P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes X-A and X-B were affirmed based on
the credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 1.9% of the
current balance, the same at last review. Moody's base expected
loss plus realized losses is now 1.5% of the original pooled
balance, the same as at the last review. Moody's provides a current
list of base expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS
transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. X-A and X-B were "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017,
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 22% to $728.4
million from $932.8 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 42 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 58% of the pool. Three loans, constituting
7% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Three loans, constituting 3% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool and there are currently
no loans in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 68% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 92% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 81%, the same as at last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 12% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.75X and 1.38X,
respectively, compared to 1.74X and 1.35X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 30% of the pool. The largest
conduit loan is the Crossgates Mall Loan ($109.8 million -- 15.0%
of the pool), which represents a pari-passu interest in a $274.6
million loan. The loan is secured by a two-story, 1.3 million
square foot (SF) super regional mall located in Albany, New York.
The mall is anchored by J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting Goods, Best
Buy and Regal Crossgates and shadow anchored by Macy's and Lord &
Taylor. As of December 2017, the inline space was 80% leased and
the total mall was 89% leased, compared to 78% and 93%,
respectively, in December 2016. While inline tenant occupancy
increased slightly, overall financial performance declined slightly
since last review. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 101% and
1.04X, respectively compared to 99% and 1.04X at last review.

The second largest conduit loan is the RiverTown Crossings Mall
Loan ($50.4 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which represents a
pari-passu interest in a $140.4 million senior mortgage loan. The
property is also encumbered by $12.8 million in mezzanine debt. The
loan is secured by a 636,000 SF portion of a 1.3 million SF super
regional mall located in Grandville, Michigan. The mall is anchored
by Macy's, Younkers, Sears, Kohl's, J.C. Penney, Dick's Sporting
Goods and Celebration Cinemas, however, only the latter two anchors
serve as collateral for the loan. As of September 2017, the anchor
space was 100% leased and the inline space was 92% leased, the same
as at last review. Moody's A-Note LTV and stressed DSCR are 72% and
1.36X, respectively, compared to 66% and 1.43X, respectively at
last review.

The third largest conduit loan is the Creekside Plaza Loan ($54.4
million -- 7.5% of the pool), which is secured by 228,000 SF, Class
A, three-building office complex and an above-ground parking
structure located in San Leandro, California. As of December 2017,
the property was 89% leased, compared to 100% in December 2016. The
lower occupancy caused a decline in the financial performance in
2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 87% and 1.18X, respectively
compared to 83% and 1.23X, respectively at last review.


COMM 2013-CCRE13: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s COMM 2013-CCRE13 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the majority of
the underlying loans. The Negative Outlooks on the junior classes,
D through F, reflect concern over potential losses related to the
Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 16% of the pool), including four
specially serviced loans/real estate owned (REO) assets (11.4%).

As of the March 2018 distribution date, the transaction has paid
down 4.1%. There have been no realized losses to date.
Approximately 8.8% of the pool is currently defeased. Interest
shortfalls are currently affecting the non-rated class G.

FLOCs: Eight loans/assets are designated as FLOCs, including four
specially serviced loans/REO assets.

The largest specially serviced loan is secured by 175 West Jackson
(8.3% of the pool), a 1.45 million sf office property located in
Chicago, IL. The property has suffered from declining occupancy
over the last few years, and is currently nearly 30% vacant. The
loan recently transferred to special servicing due to concerns over
imminent default; the loan is currently 30 days delinquent. The
next largest specially serviced loan is secured by Abbotts Square
(2.2%), a mixed-use property located in downtown Philadelphia, PA.
The property consists of 40,000 sf of ground-floor retail space,
8,000 sf of second-floor office space, 14 residential units, and a
318-space parking garage. The loan transferred in April 2016 due to
imminent monetary default after the DSCR dropped to a
servicer-reported 0.67x. A high-end specialty grocer, which prior
to issuance had signed a lease for 20,000 sf, never took possession
of the space, and another smaller retail tenant went dark. While a
new grocer has signed a lease and started paying rent, the space
remains in the build-out phase.

Two additional specially serviced assets (combined 0.9%) are REO
multifamily properties located in the Bakken Shale region of North
Dakota. The loans both transferred in 2016 due to payment default
after deteriorating oil prices resulted in declining property
occupancies and cash flow insufficient to pay debt service. The
servicer has been working to stabilize these properties and is
currently marketing them for sale.

The remaining FLOCs include two loans (2.8% of the pool) secured by
office properties suffering from occupancy and/or tenant roll
issues; one loan (1%) secured by a hotel experiencing occupancy
issues as a result of increased market competition; and another
loan (0.8%) secured by a 240-unit multifamily property that has a
most recently reported occupancy of 60.8%.

Fitch continues to monitor all concerning loans and assets.

Concentration: The top 10 loans represent 62.2% of the pool, while
the top three loans represent 29.8%. Two of these top three loans
are secured by unique asset types, including 60 Hudson Street
(11.8% of the pool) in New York City, which is one of the world's
leading carrier hotels (a specialized telecommunications data
center); and Kalahari Resort and Convention Center (8.6%), which is
a Sandusky, OH located resort comprising hotel rooms, villas, condo
units, two waterparks, several food and retail outlets, and a
significant amount of meeting space. The other top three loan is
secured by the Saint Louis Galleria (9.4% of the pool), which is
located in Saint Louis, MO, and reports healthy in-line sales of
$562 psf (excluding Apple).

The highest property type concentration is office at 28.8% and then
retail at 20.8%. The pool has a higher than average concentration
of hotel properties at 20.7%. Two of the top five loans are secured
by hotel properties including the above mentioned Kalahari Resort
and Convention Center, and the Hilton Universal Studios (7.5% of
the pool), which is a 482-room full-service hotel located adjacent
to Universal Studios Hollywood.

Amortization: Approximately 75% of the pool is fully or partially
amortizing. The largest two loans (21.2%) and one smaller loan
(1.3%) are the only fully interest-only loans in the pool.

Maturity Schedule: Nine loans (18% of the pool) are scheduled to
mature in late 2018. The remaining loans all mature or have their
scheduled ARD in 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks assigned to classes D through F primarily
reflect concern over the specially serviced assets and Fitch Loans
of Concern. Should performance continue to decline on these assets,
and/or should the servicer project a prolonged resolution timeframe
and significant value decline for the recently transferred 175 West
Jackson, these classes could be subject to downgrade. Outlooks for
classes A-1 through C and PEZ remain Stable due to the pool's
otherwise overall stable performance. Approximately 18% of the pool
is scheduled to mature in 2018 while 81% is scheduled to mature in
2023. Upgrades to classes B through C and PEZ may occur with
improved pool performance and additional class paydown or
defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible should an asset
level or economic event cause a decline in pool performance.

Fitch affirmed the following ratings:

-- $6.7 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $187.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $72.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $175 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $287.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $105 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $47 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $52.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class PEZ* at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $55.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $22.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- $9.7 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative;
-- Class X-A** at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable.

* The class A-M, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class
PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for
the class A-M, B and C certificates.

** Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class X-C, G and SLG certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on class X-B.


COMM 2014-UBS3: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class G Certs
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-UBS3
(the Certificates) issued by COMM 2014-UBS3 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PEZ at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class PEZ certificates are exchangeable for the Class A-M,
Class B and Class C certificates (and vice versa).

At issuance, the collateral consisted of 49 fixed-rate loans
secured by 81 commercial properties. As of the February 2018
remittance, all loans remain in the pool, which has an outstanding
balance of $1,032.5 million, representing a collateral reduction of
2.2% since issuance. There is one loan that is fully defeased,
representing 0.5% of the pool balance. The weighted-average (WA)
DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA DBRS Debt Yield
at issuance were 1.47 times (x) and 8.6%, respectively. As of
YE2016 reporting, the pool reported a WA DSCR and in-place debt
yield of 1.57x and 9.5%, respectively (98.3% reporting). Forty-one
loans (81.8% of the pool) are reporting Q3 2017 financials. The top
15 loans reported a YE2016 WA DSCR of 1.60x compared with the
YE2015 WA DSCR of 1.53x and the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.50x. Based
on YE2016 figures, the top 15 loans showed a WA net cash flow (NCF)
growth of 7.55% over the DBRS issuance figures.

As of February 2018, there are eight loans on the servicer's watch
list, representing 18.4% of the pool balance. Four of these loans
are on the watch list for outstanding deferred maintenance items,
three are watch listed for a low DSCR and the remaining loan was
watch listed as a result of a tenant's bankruptcy. Village Square
and Deerpath Court (Prospectus ID #10, 2.5% of the pool) and
Woodbridge Apartments (Prospectus ID #32, 0.5% of the pool) both
showed a large drop in NCF with the most recent reporting for each.
The overall performance of the loans on the watch list is stable,
with a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 1.27x and 8.8%, respectively.

There are three specially serviced loans in the pool, collectively
representing 2.2% of the transaction balance: Cincinnati
Multifamily Portfolio (Prospectus ID #19, 1.3% of the pool),
Fairfield Inn & Suites by Marriott (Prospectus ID #35, 0.5% of the
pool) and Radcliff Square Shopping Center (Prospectus ID #39, 0.5%
of the pool). The Cincinnati Multifamily Portfolio loan has been
with the special servicer since 2015, but the two smaller loans are
relatively recent transfers, both having been shipped to the
special servicer in early 2017. For additional information on these
loans, please see the Loan Commentary in the DBRS Viewpoint
platform. Information on accessing the DBRS Viewpoint platform is
provided below.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO ratings mirror the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


CPS AUTO RECEIVABLES: DBRS Reviews 60 Ratings From 12 ABS Deals
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., in mid-February 2018, reviewed 60 ratings from 12 CPS
Auto Receivables Trust asset-backed securities transactions. Of the
60 outstanding publicly rated classes reviewed, 14 were confirmed,
43 were upgraded and three classes were discontinued due to full
repayment. For the ratings that were confirmed, performance trends
are such that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover
DBRS's expected losses at their current respective rating levels.
For the ratings that were upgraded, performance trends are such
that credit enhancement levels are sufficient to cover DBRS's
expected losses at their new respective rating levels.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
     origination, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral pool and historical
     performance.

A copy of the Affected Ratings is available at:

               http://bit.ly/2EDcrLh


CROWN POINT 4: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Crown Point CLO 4 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$3,375,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$285,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$51,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$29,250,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$20,250,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Crown Point 4 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, and up to 10.0% of the portfolio may consist
of second lien loans, first-lien last-out loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 65% ramped as of the closing
date.

Pretium Credit Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2846

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.10 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2846 to 3273)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2846 to 3700)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


DEUTSCHE BANK 2016-C1: Fitch Affirms BB-sf Rating on Cl. X-D Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Deutsche Bank Securities,
Inc.'s 2016-C1 pass-through certificates (DBJPM 2016-C1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Aside from three Fitch Loans of Concern, the
remaining pool has had relatively stable performance, with no
material changes to the pool's metrics since issuance. As of the
March 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 0.8% to $811.4 million from $818
million at issuance. There have been no specially serviced or
delinquent loans since issuance. None of the loans are defeased,
and there have been no interest shortfalls impacting the classes to
date.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Three loans (13% of pool) have been
identified as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC).

The Sheraton North Houston loan (4.9%), which is secured by a 419
key full service hotel in Houston, TX, was flagged as a FLOC for
underperformance, including declining occupancy and low debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR). Per servicer reporting, the third
quarter 2017 net cash flow (NCF) DSCR declined to 1.01x at 67%
occupancy, compared to 1.60x at year end (YE) 2016 with 75%
occupancy and 2.38x at issuance with 81% occupancy. In addition to
the declining energy sector for the Houston market, the primary
revenue decline for the subject property is attributed to United
Airlines moving their pilot training program to Denver in 2017.
According to the servicer, the airline accounted for an average of
180 to 200 rooms per night. The borrower is working with other
airlines to replace the business. Also, with United's departure the
hotel will have more availability for rooms that command a higher
ADR than United's rate of approximately $84 per night.

The SLS South Beach loan (4.3%), which is secured by a 140 key
hotel in Miami Beach, FL, was flagged as a FLOC for declining
performance. The YE 2017 servicer reported NCF DSCR is 0.91x at 77%
occupancy, compared to 1.21x at YE 2016 with 75% occupancy and
2.10x at issuance with 73% occupancy. According to the servicer,
the property has experienced cash flow declines due to increased
competition in the Miami area in addition to customer concerns of
the Zika Virus. A cash management agreement is in place, including
a cash flow sweep to collect any excess cash, once available.
According to the servicer, the property sustained no damage from
Hurricane Irma.

The Columbus Park Crossing loan (3.8%), which is secured by a
638,028 square foot regional mall in Columbus, GA, was flagged as a
FLOC for major tenant vacancy. Sears closed its store in March
2017, which dropped occupancy to 78% from 99%. As of February 2018,
no replacement tenant has been found; however, no co-tenancy
clauses have been triggered, and the borrower is working on a
releasing/repurposing plan. Also, Toys R Us, which occupies 7.2% of
NRA, recently renewed its lease for an additional five years
through January 2023. Servicer reported NCF DSCR as of September
2017 is 1.55x, compared to 1.81x at YE 2016. Based on amortized
payments which began in January 2018, the DSCR is 0.83x for YTD
September 2017 and 1.39x for YE 2016, compared to 1.22x at
issuance. Fitch's analysis includes a stressed scenario to the
subject loan, which considers higher losses should property
performance decline further. However, the stressed scenario did not
result in negative rating actions given the overall stable
performance of the pool.

Pool Concentration: The top 10 loans in the pool comprise 57% of
the pool, which is higher than the 2016 and 2015 averages of 54.8%
and 49.3%, respectively. Eleven loans (57.9%) have accompanying
pari passu debt, and are all within the top 15. The largest
collateral type concentrations are retail at 34.9%, office at 32.7%
and lodging at 21.1%. None of the retail properties currently
reflect Sears, J.C. Penney or Macy's exposure, following the recent
closure of the Sears at Columbus Park Crossing.

Limited Amortization: The pool is scheduled to amortize by 9.4% of
the initial pool balance prior to maturity, which is below average
compared to the 2016 and 2015 averages of 10.4% and 11.7%,
respectively. Seven loans (38.9%) are full-term interest only, and
11 loans (35.1%) are partial interest only, of which four loans
(18.3%) have begun to amortize.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: At issuance, Fitch assigned
credit opinions on two loans. 787 Seventh Avenue (9.8% of pool) is
the largest loan in the transaction and was assigned an
investment-grade credit opinion of 'BBB+sf' on a standalone basis.
225 Liberty Street (5.0% of pool) is the fifth largest loan in the
transaction and was assigned an investment grade credit opinion of
'BBBsf' on a standalone basis.

Hurricane Irma Exposure: Per media reports, Naples Grande Beach
Resort (7.4% of pool) suffered damage from Hurricane Irma, which
included roof damage and flooding on the first floor. The resort
remained closed for approximately three months through Dec. 14,
2017. Per conversations with the resort's concierge on Feb. 22,
2018, it re-opened on Dec. 15, 2017 and was fully operational. Due
to the damage from Irma, Naples Grande underwent a
multi-million-dollar upgrade to rooms, landscaping, pools and
public places. The on-site Aura Restaurant, Lobby Lounge and Vista
Ballroom were also updated.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to relatively
stable performance with no material changes to pool metrics since
issuance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration until a material economic or asset-level event changes
the transaction's overall portfolio-level metrics. Fitch's analysis
includes a stress scenario, whereby additional losses were assumed
for the Columbus Park Crossing loan due to potential further
decline in performance. However, the stressed scenario did not
result in negative rating actions given the overall stable
performance of the pool.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $22.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $140 million class A-3A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $247.7 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $75 million class A-3B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $64.4 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $35.8 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17.4 million class E at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- $8.2 million class F at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-C at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-D at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class G or H certificates or the X-E or X-F
interest-only certificates.


DRYDEN 57: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Jr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Dryden 57 CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$4,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$269,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$45,650,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,900,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$24,900,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$16,600,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class X Notes, the Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class
C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to
herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Dryden 57 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans. The
portfolio is at least 96% ramped as of the closing date.

PGIM, Inc. (the "Manager") will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $415,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2880

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.2 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2880 to 3312)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2880 to 3744)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


DT AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes issued by DT Auto Owner Trust 2018-1 (DTAOT 2018-1 or the
Issuer):

-- $210,000,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $57,000,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $87,000,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $69,000,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $57,000,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the
following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- DTAOT 2018-1 provides for Class A, B, C, D and E coverage
     multiples slightly below the DBRS range of multiples set
     forth in the criteria for this asset class. DBRS believes
     that this is warranted given the magnitude of expected loss
     and structural features of the transaction.

-- The transaction parties' capabilities with regard to
     originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of the provided historical static
     pool data for Drive Time originations and the performance of
     the Drive Time auto loan portfolio.

-- The November 19, 2014, settlement of the Consumer Financial
     Protection Bureau inquiry relating to allegedly unfair trade
     practices.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Drive Time,

     that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
     in the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal
     Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."

The DTAOT 2018-1 transaction represents a securitization of a
portfolio of motor vehicle retail installment sales contracts
originated by Drive Time Car Sales Company, LLC (the Originator).
The Originator is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Drive Time.
Drive Time is a leading used vehicle retailer in the United States
that focuses primarily on the sale and financing of vehicles to the
subprime market.

The provisional rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 66.50% of
initial hard credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes
in the pool, the Reserve Account (1.50%) and overcollateralization
(20.00%). The ratings on the Class B, C, D and E Notes reflect
57.00%, 42.50%, 31.00% and 21.50% of initial hard credit
enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted


ECP CLO 2015-7: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by ECP CLO
2015-7, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is:

US$315,000,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$5,000,000 Class A-X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A-X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$56,000,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$32,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$6,000,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned B2 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Silvermine Capital Management LLC (the "Manager") manages the CLO.
It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on March 20, 2018 (the
"Refinancing Date") in connection with the refinancing of all
classes of the secured notes (the "Refinanced Original Notes")
previously issued on April 9, 2015 (the "Original Closing Date").
On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance
of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $488,830,777

Defaulted par: $14,776,630

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2669

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.08 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2669 to 3069)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1-R Notes: 0

Class A-X Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Notes: -1

Class B-R Notes: -1

Class C-R Notes: -1

Class D-R Notes: 0

Class E-R Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2669 to 3470)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1-R Notes: -1

Class A-X Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -3

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1

Class E-R Notes: -4


EVERBANK MORTGAGE 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on B-4 Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-1 (the
Certificates) issued by EverBank Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-1 (the
Trust):

-- $342.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $342.2 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $342.2 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.7 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.7 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.7 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.6 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.6 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.6 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.8 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.8 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.8 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.4 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.4 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.4 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.6 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.6 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.6 million Class A-21 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-22 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-23 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-24 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $342.2 million Class A-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $342.2 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $342.2 million Class A-IO4 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.7 million Class A-IO5 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.7 million Class A-IO6 at AAA (sf)
-- $256.7 million Class A-IO7 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.6 million Class A-IO8 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.6 million Class A-IO9 at AAA (sf)
-- $85.6 million Class A-IO10 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.8 million Class A-IO11 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.8 million Class A-IO12 at AAA (sf)
-- $273.8 million Class A-IO13 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.4 million Class A-IO14 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.4 million Class A-IO15 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.4 million Class A-IO16 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class A-IO17 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class A-IO18 at AAA (sf)
-- $17.1 million Class A-IO19 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.6 million Class A-IO20 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.6 million Class A-IO21 at AAA (sf)
-- $19.6 million Class A-IO22 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-IO23 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-IO24 at AAA (sf)
-- $361.9 million Class A-IO25 at AAA (sf)
-- $4.6 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $5.5 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $4.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $2.7 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO6, A-IO7, A-IO8,
A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14, A-IO15, A-IO16,
A-IO17, A-IO18, A-IO19, A-IO20, A-IO21, A-IO22, A-IO23, A-IO24 and
A-IO25 are interest-only certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12,
A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-22, A-23, A-24, A-IO2, A-IO3,
A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO8, A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14,
A-IO17, A-IO20, A-IO23, A-IO24 and A-IO25 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of
exchange certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11,
A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-16, A-17 and A-18 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
senior support certificates (Classes A-19, A-20 and A-21) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 5.15% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect
3.95%, 2.50%, 1.30% and 0.60% of credit enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are backed
by 511 loans with a total principal balance of $381,539,066 as of
the Cut-Off Date (February 1, 2018).

TIAA, FSB (formerly known as EverBank, FSB) originated the mortgage
loans directly or through correspondents and is the Sponsor and
Servicer of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with
a Stable trend by DBRS) will act as Master Servicer, Securities
Administrator, Paying Agent and Certificate Registrar. U.S Bank
National Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS)
will serve as Trustee and Custodian.

For any mortgage loan that becomes 90 days or more delinquent, the
Servicer has the option to purchase such loan from the Trust at the
repurchase price (the unpaid principal balance of such mortgage
loan, plus accrued interest and other fees and expenses), subject
to a maximum of 10.0% of the Cut-Off Date principal balance.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
financially strong transaction counterparties, high-quality
underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers, a satisfactory
third-party due diligence review and a traditional lifetime
representations and warranties framework.

Although EverBank issued two post-crisis prime jumbo RMBS
transactions in 2013 under the EBMLT shelf, the Trust is
re-entering the market for the first time in several years. As a
result, TIAA, FSB has limited performance history on securitized
loans. However, the available historical performance on TIAA, FSB's
non-securitized prime jumbo production has been stellar with
minimal delinquencies and no losses. Also, DBRS conducted
operational risk assessments on TIAA, FSB's origination and
servicing platforms and deemed them to be acceptable.

The DBRS ratings address the timely payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Certificates.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes issued by Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-1 (the Issuer):

-- $122,750,000 Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- $22,500,000 Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- $24,560,000 Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- $18,420,000 Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- $11,770,000 Class E Notes at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and  

     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement in the form of overcollateralization (OC),
     subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess
     spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
     the DBRS-projected cumulative net loss assumption under
     various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
     address the timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and

     the payment of principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- The strength of the combined organization after the merger of
     Flagship Credit Acceptance LLC (Flagship) and CarFinance
     Capital LLC. DBRS believes the merger of the two companies
     provides synergies that make the combined company more
     financially stable and competitive.

-- The capabilities of Flagship with regard to originations,
     underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Flagship and
    considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and
    servicer of subprime automobile loan contracts with an
    acceptable backup servicer.

-- The Flagship senior management team has considerable
     experience and a successful track record within the auto
     finance industry.

-- DBRS used a proxy analysis in its development of an expected
     loss.

-- A combination of company-provided performance data and
     industry-comparable data was used to determine an expected
     loss.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Flagship,
     that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
     in the assets and the consistency with the DBRS "Legal
     Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance."

Flagship is an independent full-service automotive financing and
servicing company that provides (1) financing to borrowers who do
not typically have access to prime credit-lending terms for the
purchase of late-model vehicles and (2) refinancing of existing
automotive financing.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 42.01% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(37.76%), the Reserve Account (2.00%) and OC (2.25%). The ratings
on the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E Notes reflect 31.01%,
19.01%, 10.00% and 4.25% of initial hard credit enhancement,
respectively. Additional credit support may be provided from excess
spread available in the structure.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on B-5 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-1 issued by
Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-1:

-- $458.4 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $458.4 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $414.5 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $414.5 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $331.6 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $331.6 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $82.9 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $82.9 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.0 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.0 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.9 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.9 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $43.9 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $43.9 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $458.4 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $458.4 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $414.5 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $331.6 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $82.9 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $68.0 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $14.9 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $43.9 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $7.3 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $8.3 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $5.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.5 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, A-X-5, A-X-6, A-X-7 and A-X-8
are interest-only certificates. The class balances represent
notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-11, A-13, A-X-2,
A-X-3 and A-X-5 are exchangeable certificates. These classes can be
exchanged for a combination of initial exchangeable certificates as
specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11 and A-12 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior support certificates (Classes A-13 and A-14)
with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.00% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.50%, 2.80%, 1.65%, 0.85% and 0.55% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 754 loans with a total principal balance of $487,656,132
as of the Cut-off Date (February 1, 2018).

Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar) is the originator and servicer of the
mortgage loans and the sponsor of the transaction. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) will act as the Master Servicer,
Securities Administrator, Certificate Registrar and Custodian.
Wilmington Trust, National Association will serve as Trustee.
Inglet Blair LLC will act as the Representation and Warranty (R&W)
Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Unique to this transaction, the servicing fee payable to the
Servicer comprises three separate components: the base servicing
fee, the aggregate delinquent servicing fee and the aggregate
incentive servicing fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency
status of the related loan and will be paid from interest
collections before distribution to the securities. The base
servicing fee will reduce the net weighted-average coupon (WAC)
payable to certificate holders as part of the aggregate expense
calculation. However, the delinquent and incentive servicing fees
will not be included in the reduction of Net WAC and will thus
reduce available funds entitled to the certificate holders (except
for the Class B-6-C Net WAC). To capture the impact of such
potential fees, DBRS ran additional cash flow stresses based on its
60+-day delinquency and default curves, as detailed in the Cash
Flow Analysis section of the related report.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets and well-qualified borrowers.

This transaction exhibits certain challenges, such as limited
third-party due diligence, as well as a R&W framework that contains
materiality factors, an unrated R&W provider, knowledge qualifiers
and sunset provisions that allow for certain R&Ws to expire within
three to six years after the Closing Date. The framework is
perceived by DBRS to be limiting compared with traditional lifetime
R&W standards in certain DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the
perceived weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator score in this
pool. A lower originator score results in increased default and
loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


FOURSIGHT CAPITAL 2018-1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust
2018-1 (FCRT 2018-1). This is the first auto loan transaction of
the year for Foursight Capital LLC (Foursight; Unrated) and the
first rated by Moody's. The notes are backed by a pool of retail
automobile loan contracts originated by Foursight, who is also the
servicer and administrator for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Foursight Capital Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-1

$100,000,000, 2.85%, Class A-2 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned
Aaa (sf)

$54,340,000, 3.24%, Class A-3 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
(sf)

$32,580,000, 3.53%, Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
(sf)

$18,900,000, 3.68%, Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

$11,630,000, 4.19%, Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
(sf)

$11,630,000, 5.56%, Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
(sf)

$15,120,000, 6.82%, Class F Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, the experience and expertise of Foursight as the
servicer and administrator and the backup servicing arrangement.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2018-1 pool
is 9.25% and the loss at a Aaa stress is 40%. Moody's based its
cumulative net loss expectation and loss at a Aaa stress on an
analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the
historical performance of similar collateral, including
securitization performance and managed portfolio performance; the
ability of Foursight to perform the servicing functions; and
current expectations for the macroeconomic environment during the
life of the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes, Class
D notes, Class E notes and Class F notes benefit from 36.25%,
25.05%, 18.55%, 14.55%, 10.55% and 5.35% of hard credit enhancement
respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the notes consists of a
combination of overcollateralization, a non-declining reserve
account, and subordination, except for the Class F notes, which do
not benefit from subordination. The notes also benefit from excess
spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such as the one in
this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a percentage of the
collateral balance as collections pay down senior notes.
Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note principal
payments will accelerate this build of enhancement. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a lower
number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud.


FREDDIE MAC 2018-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on Cl. M Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional rating to the
Asset-Backed Security, Series 2018-1 issued by Freddie Mac Seasoned
Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2018-1 (the Trust):

-- $73.3 million Class M at B (low) (sf)

The B (low) (sf) rating on the Certificate reflects 6.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the pool.

Other than the specified class above, DBRS does not rate any other
classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
re-performing first-lien residential mortgages funded by the
issuance of the certificates, which are backed by 10,983 loans with
a total principal balance of $1,832,425,341 as at the Cut-Off Date
(January 31, 2018).

The mortgage loans were either purchased by Freddie Mac from
securitized Freddie Mac Participation Certificates or retained by
Freddie Mac in whole-loan form since their acquisition. The loans
are currently held in Freddie Mac's retained portfolio and will be
deposited into the Trust on the Closing Date (March 14, 2018).

Modified loans comprise 100% of the portfolio. Each mortgage loan
was modified under either the Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE)
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) or GSE non-HAMP. Within
the pool, 3,854 mortgages have forborne principal amounts as a
result of modification, which equates to 10.5% of the total unpaid
principal balance as of the Cut-Off Date. For 82.5% of the modified
loans, the modifications happened more than two years ago. The
loans are approximately 137 months seasoned, and all are current as
of Cut-Off Date. Furthermore, 73.0% of the mortgage loans have been
zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for at least the past 24
months under the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency
methods. None of the loans are subject to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau's Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC. There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or
interest on any mortgages by the servicer; however, the servicer is
obligated to advance to third parties any amounts necessary for the
preservation of mortgaged properties or real estate¬–owned
properties acquired by the Trust through foreclosure or a loss
mitigation process.

Freddie Mac will serve as the Sponsor, Seller and Trustee of the
transaction, as well as Guarantor of the senior certificates (the
Class HT, Class HA, Class HB, Class HV, Class HZ, Class MT, Class
MA, Class MB, Class MV, Class MZ, Class M45T, Class M45F, Class
M45D, Class M45S, Class M45C, Class M45I, Class M60T, Class M60F,
Class M60S, Class M60C and Class M60I certificates; collectively,
the Guaranteed Certificates). Wilmington Trust National Association
(Wilmington Trust; rated A (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS) will
serve as Trust Agent. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA with a
Stable trend by DBRS) will serve as the Custodian for the Trust.
U.S. Bank National Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend
by DBRS) will serve as the Securities Administrator for the Trust
and will act as paying agent, registrar, transfer agent and
authenticating agent.

Freddie Mac, as the Seller, will make certain representations and
warranties (R&Ws) with respect to the mortgage loans. It will be
the only party from which the Trust may seek indemnification (or in
certain cases, a repurchase) as a result of a breach of R&Ws. If a
breach review trigger occurs, the Trust Agent, Wilmington Trust,
will be responsible for the enforcement of R&Ws. The warranty
period will only be effective through March 12, 2021 (approximately
three years from the Closing Date), for substantially all R&Ws
other than the REMIC R&W.

The mortgage loans will be divided into four loan groups. The Group
H loans (25.4% of the pool) were subject to step-rate
modifications. The Group M loans (47.6% of the pool), Group M45
loans (15.7% of the pool) and Group M60 loans (11.3% of the pool)
were subject to either fixed-rate modifications or step-rate
modifications that have reached their final step dates and the
borrowers have made at least one payment after such loans reached
their final step dates as of the Cut-Off Date. Each Group M loan
has a mortgage interest rate less than or equal to 4.5% or has
forbearance. Each Group M45 loan has a mortgage interest rate
greater than 4.5% but less than or equal to 5.5% and has no
forbearance. Each Group M60 loan has a mortgage interest rate
greater than 5.5% and has no forbearance. Principal and interest
(P&I) on the Guaranteed Certificates will be guaranteed by Freddie
Mac. The Guaranteed Certificates will be backed by collateral from
each respective group. The remaining certificates, including the
subordinate, non-guaranteed, interest-only mortgage insurance and
residual certificates, will be cross-collateralized among the four
groups.

The transaction employs a pro rata pay cash flow structure with a
sequential-pay feature among the subordinate certificates. Certain
principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
rated Class M certificates. Senior classes benefit from guaranteed
P&I payments by the Guarantor, Freddie Mac; however, such
guaranteed amounts, if paid, will be reimbursed to Freddie Mac from
the P&I collections prior to any allocation to the subordinate
certificates. The senior principal distribution amounts vary
subject to the satisfaction of a step-down test. Realized losses
are allocated reverse sequentially.

The rating reflects transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have generally performed well through the crisis (73.0%
of the pool has remained consistently current in the past 24
months), good credit quality relative to other re-performing pools
reviewed by DBRS and a strong servicer. Additionally, a third-party
due diligence review, albeit on less than 100% of the portfolio
with respect to regulatory compliance and payment histories, was
performed on a sample that exceeds DBRS's criteria. The due
diligence results and findings on the sampled loans were
satisfactory.

Although improved from Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer
Trust, Series 2016-1 (SCRT 2016-1), the transaction employs a
relatively weak R&W framework that includes a 36-month sunset (as
opposed to 12 months in SCRT 2016-1) without an R&W reserve
account, substantial knowledge qualifiers (with clawback) and fewer
mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for
seasoned pools. DBRS increased loss expectations from the model
results to capture the weaknesses in the R&W framework. Other
mitigating factors include (1) significant loan seasoning and very
clean performance history in the past two years, (2) stringent and
automatic breach review triggers, (3) Freddie Mac as the R&W
provider and (4) a satisfactory third-party due diligence review.
The lack of P&I advances on delinquent mortgages may increase the
possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the note holders;
however, certain principal proceeds can be used to pay interest to
the rated Certificate and subordination levels are greater than
expected losses, which may provide for interest payments to the
rated Certificate.

The DBRS rating addresses the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related certificates.


GP PORTFOLIO 2014-GPP: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Tranches to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on five classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from GP Portfolio Trust
2014-GPP, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its rating on class A from
the same transaction.

For these classes, S&P's expectation of credit enhancement was
generally in line with the raised or affirmed rating levels. The
upgrades also reflect the reduced trust balance due to property
releases at about 115% of the allocated loan balance.

The upgrade on the class X-EXT interest-only (IO) certificates is
based on our criteria for rating IO securities, in which the
ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than that of the
lowest-rated reference class. Class X-EXT's notional balance
references classes A, B, C, D, and E.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
floating-rate IO mortgage loan secured by a portfolio of 83 office
and industrial properties totaling 5.0 million sq. ft. in New
Jersey, Minnesota, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, down from
94 office and industrial properties totaling 6.6 million sq. ft.
Our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of the
office/industrial portfolio that secures the mortgage loan in the
trust and considered the slightly declining servicer-reported net
operating income and occupancy for the past two years (2016 and
trailing 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2017), as well as the
portfolio's in-place base rent, which is above the appraiser's
market rent forecast at origination. S&P derived its sustainable
in-place net cash flow, which it divided by a 8.26% S&P Global
Ratings weighted average capitalization rate to determine its
expected-case value. This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings
loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC) of 66.4% and
1.78x (based on LIBOR cap plus spread), respectively, for the whole
loan balance.

As of the March 15, 2018, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a $291.1 million trust balance down from $460.2
million at issuance. The IO loan pays floating-rate interest of
LIBOR plus a 3.39% weighted average spread and had an initial
maturity of Feb. 9, 2016, subject to three one-year extension
options. The borrowers exercised their remaining extension option
and the loan currently matures on Feb. 9, 2019. To date, the trust
has not incurred any principal losses.

The master servicer, Midland Loan Services, reported a DSC of 2.73x
and 3.05x on the trust balance for the trailing 12 months ended
Sept. 30, 2017, and year-end 2016, respectively. The reported
occupancy for the portfolio was 82.9% according to the September
2017, rent rolls. Based on the Sept. 2017 rent rolls, the five
largest tenants make up 9.9% of the portfolio's total net rentable
area (NRA). In addition, 15.5%, 14.3%, and 8.2% of the NRA has
leases that expire in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively.

RATINGS LIST

  GP Portfolio Trust 2014-GPP
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2014-GPP
                                          Rating
  Class         Identifier        To                  From
  A             36190SAA0         AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
  X-EXT         36190SAE2         BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)
  B             36190SAG7         AA+ (sf)            AA (sf)
  C             36190SAJ1         AA- (sf)            A+ (sf)
  D             36190SAL6         BBB (sf)            BBB- (sf)
  E             36190SAN2         BB+ (sf)            BB (sf)


ICG US 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by ICG US CLO 2018-1, Ltd. (the "Issuer" or "ICG US
CLO 2018-1").

Moody's rating action is:

US$256,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
(sf)

US$18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
(sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

ICG US CLO 2018-1 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of
the closing date.

ICG Debt Advisors LLC -- Manager Series (the "Manager") will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2955

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2955 to 3398)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: -2

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -1

Class D Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2955 to 3842)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A-1 Notes: -1

Class A-2 Notes: -4

Class B Notes: -4

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1


IMSCI 2014-5: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-5 issued
by Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) Series
2014-5 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Class G, for which
DBRS has maintained a Negative trend to reflect the concerns
surrounding the Nelson Ridge Pooled Loan (Prospectus ID#17, 3.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a multifamily property located in
Fort McMurray, Alberta.

As at the February 2018 remittance, 32 loans remain in the pool,
with an aggregate principal balance of $222.2 million, representing
a collateral reduction of 28.7% since issuance as a result of
scheduled amortization and successful loan repayments. To date, 24
loans, representing 72.4% of the pool, have reported year-end 2016
(YE2016) financials, while 29 loans, representing 87.6% of the
pool, have reported YE2015 financials. For those loans reporting
YE2016 financials, the weighted-average (WA) DSCR and WA Debt Yield
were 1.49x and 10.4%, respectively, generally flat as compared with
the WA DSCR and WA debt yield for those loans reporting YE2015
figures. Based on the most recent reporting, net cash flow for the
top 15 loans is up by 5.3% on a weighted-average basis over the
DBRS Issuance NCF figures.

There are eight loans on the servicer's watch list, representing
20.6% of the pool, including the Nelson Ridge Pooled Loan, which is
part of a pari passu whole loan secured by a multifamily property
in Fort McMurray, Alberta. Due to the sustained difficulties in the
local economy, the property has shown significant performance
declines since issuance. The loan was previously transferred to
special servicing for imminent default in February 2016, and was
later returned to the master servicer as a corrected loan in late
January 2017 after the borrower brought the loan current.

According to the July 2017 rent roll, the Nelson Ridge property had
an occupancy rate and an average rental rate of 73.3% and $1,540
per unit, respectively. Occupancy is generally flat as compared
with the July 2016 figures, with average rental rates generally
steady as compared with trends for the last few years. At issuance,
the property reported an occupancy rate and average rental rate of
89.5% and $2,228, respectively, demonstrating the sharp decline in
rental rates driven by the drop-off in the oil markets since
issuance. Although occupancy has improved in the last 18 months,
DBRS believes larger concerns (such as the permanent reduction in
required workforce within the oil sands region, driven by
technological advancements and other market factors) will limit the
property's ability to cash flow anywhere near the issuance levels
in the near to medium term. These factors, coupled with the
financial difficulties for the loan's sponsor, Lane's borough Real
Estate Investment Trust, suggest a successful refinance for the
loan at the scheduled maturity in December 2018 is unlikely. As
such, DBRS has assumed a stressed scenario in its analysis for the
loan as part of this review and will continue to monitor the loan
closely for developments.

There are seven additional loans on the servicer's watch list, the
largest of which is the Fengate Industrial Portfolio loan
(Prospectus ID#5, 6.3% of the pool). The loan is secured by a
portfolio of industrial properties located throughout the
Cambridge, Ontario, area and has been on the watch list since
August 2015 for an occupancy decline since issuance. However,
improvements have recently been achieved and the portfolio had an
overall occupancy rate of 83.8% as at the August 2017 rent rolls, a
significant increase compared to the February 2016 occupancy rate
of 69.4%, but still below the issuance occupancy rate of 89.0%. In
addition, there is significant near-term rollover risk as
approximately 27.8% of the net rentable area scheduled to roll (or
has already rolled) in the next 12 months.

Class X are interest-only (IO) certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one notch if
senior in the waterfall.


JAMESTOWN CLO II: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, A-2-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R replacement notes from Jamestown
CLO II Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in February 2013 that is managed by Investcorp Credit
Management U.S. LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a
proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 21,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 10, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- The replacement class A-1-R, B-R, C-R, and D-R notes are
expected to be issued at a lower spread than the original notes.
-- The class A-2A floating rate notes and A-2B fixed rate notes
are being replaced by the class A-2-R floating rate notes.
-- The non-call period will be reinstated, ending April 2019.
-- The reinvestment period will be reinstated, ending April 2020
and the transaction will re recapitalized to the target par
amount.

-- The stated maturity will be extended to April 2030.

-- The transaction is removing the weighted average spread and
weighted average coupon collateral quality tests.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance (see table). In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Jamestown CLO II Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             222.70
  A-2-R                     AA (sf)               41.80
  B-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                21.00
  C-R (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)             20.30
  D-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              13.10
  Subordinated notes        NR                    50.10

  NR--not rated.


JP MORGAN 2012-CIBX: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Debt to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 10 classes
and downgraded the ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-CIBX, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-CIBX:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 24, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eight P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on three P&I classes were downgraded due to a decline
in performance in the top two conduit loans as well as an increase
in expected losses from two loans backed by regional malls.

The ratings on two IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 8.0% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.5% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.2% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-CIBX Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-4FL,
Cl. A-4FX, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, and Cl. G
were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2012-CIBX Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 32% to $879.2
million from $1.29 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 43 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 9% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding defeasance)
constituting 59% of the pool. Four loans, constituting 9% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 19, compared to a Herf of 20 at Moody's last
review.

Twelve loans, constituting 40% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in or
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $157,592 (for an
average loss severity of less than 1%). One loan, constituting 2.4%
of the pool, is currently in special servicing. The specially
serviced loan is the One Upland Road Loan ($20.9 million -- 2.4% of
the pool), which is secured by an approximately 222,000 square foot
(SF) industrial property located in Norwood, Massachusetts. The
property was built in 1969 with renovations in 2007. The collateral
is 100% leased to one tenant. The loan transferred to special
servicing in January 2018 due to maturity default.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two high
risk Class B malls, constituting 14% of the pool. The properties
are currently performing, however Class B malls in secondary and
tertiary locations have historically exhibited higher cash flow
volatility and loan severity. Moody's accounted for this potential
volatility of the product type in its analysis.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 95% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 93% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 97.2% compared to 96.6% at last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 10% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.44X and 1.16X,
respectively, compared to 1.47X and 1.16X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 25% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is theWit Hotel Loan ($81.2 million -- 9.2% of the
pool), which is secured by a 310-room full-service hotel located in
Chicago, Illinois. The property is a boutique hotel product in the
Hilton Doubletree brand. The December 2017 trailing twelve month
occupancy and revenue per available room (RevPAR) figures were 82%
and $186, respectively, compared to 79% and $168 at securitization.
Despite the increase in both occupancy and RevPAR and consistently
stronger performance relative to its competitive set, expenses have
steadily increased since securitization decreasing net operating
income (NOI). Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 131% and 0.98X,
respectively, compared to 120% and 1.07X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the 100 West Putnam Loan ($72.7 million
-- 8.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 156,000 SF class A
suburban office building located in Greenwich, Connecticut. The
property is also encumbered by a $16 million B Note. As of
September 2017, the property was 68% leased compared to 97% at
securitization. The decrease in occupancy was driven partly by the
departure of a large tenant in the first half of 2016. The property
also has lease rollover risk with the second largest tenant at 18%
of the NRA whose lease expires in September 2018. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 134% and 0.77X, respectively, compared to 127%
and 0.81X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Jefferson Mall Loan ($64.5 million --
7.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 281,000 SF portion of a
957,000 SF regional mall located in Louisville, Kentucky. The
mall's anchors, which are not part of the collateral, include
Sears, Macy's, Dillard's and J.C. Penney. In January 2017, Macy's
announced they would be closing their store at this location before
the end of 2017. CBL & Associates Properties (CBL), the mall's
sponsor, then purchased the Macy's parcel. Additionally, CBL has
purchased the Sears parcel and leased it back to them on a 10-year
lease with termination options for CBL with 6 months advanced
notice. The mall faces competition within the Louisville area from
two superior GGP-owned malls, Oxmoor Center and Mall St. Matthews,
both located approximately eight miles northeast of the subject
property. Moody's has stressed this property's net cash flow to
account for the potential for higher cash flow volatility and loss
severity associated with Class B malls. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 133% and 0.86X, respectively, compared to 120% and 0.95X
at the last review.

The other loan that Moody's identified as a high-risk loan is the
Southpark Mall Loan ($60.8 million -- 6.9% of the pool), which is
secured by approximately 400,000 SF within an approximately 690,000
SF regional mall located in Colonial Heights, Virginia. The mall is
located approximately 22 miles south of Richmond, Virginia. In
January 2018, Sears announced that it will close their store in
Southpark Mall. The other anchors are Regal Cinema (collateral) and
JC Penney and Macy's, which are both non-collateral. Accounting for
Sears departure and temporary tenants as well as the mall's
tertiary location, Moody's has stressed this property's net cash
flow to account for the potential for high cash flow volatility and
loss severity associated with Class B malls in tertiary locations.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 130% and 0.89X, respectively,
compared to 91% and 1.16X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2013-LC11: Moody's Lowers Cl. F Debt Rating to B3(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in J. P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-LC11:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I Classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on Classes E and F were downgraded due to the decline
in performance of the second and third largest loans in the deal as
well as an increase in the number of loans with a Moody's LTV above
130%. Moody's identified three loans, representing 8% of the pool,
that currently have a Mooody's LTV ratio above 130%.

The ratings on IO Classes X-A and X-B were affirmed based on the
credit performance of their referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.3% of the
current balance, compared to 3.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.7% compared to
3.2% at last review. Moody's provides a current list of base
expected losses for conduit and fusion CMBS transactions on
moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating J. P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-LC11 Cl. A-4, Cl. A-5,
Cl. A-SB, Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, and Cl. F was
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating J. P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-LC11 Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B
were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 15% to $1.1 billion
from $1.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 49 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 63% of the pool.

Five loans, constituting 12% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool and there are no
loans currently in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 88% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 99%, compared to 100% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 11.3% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.66X and 1.07X,
respectively, compared to 1.63X and 1.04X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 28% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Grand Prairie Premium Outlets Loan ($116
million -- 10.3% of the pool), which is secured by a 417,000 SF
outlet center located in Grand Prairie, Texas, 20 miles south of
Dallas. The property opened in August 2012. The Property was 93%
leased as of September 2017, compared to 96% in September 2016. The
property is sponsored by Simon Property Group. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 89% and
1.06X at last review.

The second largest loan is the World Trade Center I & II Loan ($111
million -- 9.9% of the pool), which is secured by two adjacent
28-story and 29-story Class A office buildings totaling 770,000 SF
and located in the CBD of Denver, Colorado. The property is also
encumbered with $17.6 million of additional mezzanine financing
held outside of the trust. The buildings were 75% leased as of
December 2017, compared to 70% in December 2016 and 91% at
securitization. The property's annual performance has declined over
the last two years as a result of both lower revenue and higher
operating expenses. The largest tenant, Noble Energy, (representing
approximately 22% of the total NRA), exercised a one-year lease
extension in July 2017 and has two additional one-year extensions
remaining. The property has significant rollover risk, with the top
three tenants all expiring prior to the loan maturity date in 2023.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.82X, respectively,
compared to 106% and 0.92X at last review.

The third largest loan is the Pecanland Mall Loan ($85 million --
7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 433,200 SF component of a
965,238 SF super-regional mall in Monroe, Lousian. Five tenants
anchor the subject including Dillard's (165,930 SF), J.C. Penney
(138,426 SF), Sears (122,032 SF) and Belk (105,650 SF). The
Burlington Coat Factory recently closed their store at this
location in January 2018. The total property was over 99% leased as
of November 2017 but has dropped to 93% with the Burlington Coat
Factory vacancy. The property has limited competition, however,
B-Malls in tertiary locations have historically exhibited higher
cash flow volatility and loan severity. Moody's accounted for this
potential volatility of this product type in its analysis. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 118% and 0.92X, respectively, compared to
114% and 0.95X at last review.


JP MORGAN 2015-SGP: Moody's Lowers Class F Certs. Rating to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on four
classes and affirmed the ratings on three classes in J.P. Morgan
Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-SGP, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-SGP:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Ba1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2016 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. X-EXT, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Classes D, E and F were downgraded due to an
increased weighting of the Sears "dark" scenario in Moody's
analysis. Moody's incorporates a 'lit/dark' approach to account for
the transaction's collateral performance volatility due to
significant exposure to Sears tenancy (including both Sears and
Kmart). The Moody's Sears "dark" scenario assumes Sears vacates all
occupied assets. On January 26, 2018, Moody's downgraded its
Corporate Family Rating for Sears Holdings Corp. (Sears) to Ca from
Caa3, with a Negative Outlook.

The ratings on Classes A, B and C were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, remain within acceptable ranges. The affirmations reflect
Moody's value of the real estate and the progress the sponsor has
achieved in leasing up space to third party tenants according to
its business plan, thereby reducing the transaction's exposure to
the Sears credit. Moody's value used in rating these classes has
been heavily weighted toward the Sears "dark" scenario.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X-EXT) was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
defeasance or an improvement in loan performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the loan or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2015-SGP Cl. A, Cl. B, Cl. C,
Cl. D, Cl. E and Cl. F was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2015-SGP Cl. X-EXT were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 2018 Payment Date, the transaction's certificate
balance was approximately $888 million, down from $925 million at
securitization. The Certificates are collateralized by a single,
floating-rate loan backed by a first lien commercial mortgage
related to a portfolio of 230 retail properties covering 35 million
square feet and located across 49 states and Puerto Rico. The
reduction in certificate balance from securitization reflects the
release of five collateral properties in August 2017, which
resulted in approximately $37 million of loan paydown. In July
2017, the sponsor exercised an option to draw $100 million of
future funding reserves. This amount (represented by the A1 and A2
Notes) is held outside of the trust and is pari passu with the
first lien mortgage. The A1 and A2 note combined balance was
reduced to approximately $96 million following the release of five
collateral assets in August 2017. The properties are also
encumbered by mezzanine debt of approximately $227 million.

The loan sponsor is Seritage Growth Properties, a publicly traded
real estate investment trust (REIT) led by Benjamin Schall, former
Chief Operating Officer of Rouse Properties, Inc. The majority of
the REIT's holdings comprise of former Sears Holdings space
acquired as part of a sale and leaseback transaction which closed
in 2015.

As of December 31, 2017, the sponsor reported the portfolio
approximately 79% leased, down from approximately 90% as of June
2017 and 99% at securitization. The reduction in occupancy is
largely attributable to the conversion of former Sears space to
third party space via the recapture of former Kmart and Sears
stores by the sponsor as well as lease terminations by Sears at
unprofitable locations. While the third party vacancy rate has
increased (third party space was 55% leased as of Q2 2017 compared
to 92% at securitization), the rental revenue associated with these
third party leases nearly doubled to approximately $62 million from
$31 million at securitization. The increase in third party base
rent is consistent with the sponsor's business plan as outlined at
securitization and the sponsor has continued to report strong
leasing momentum.

Moody's loan to value (LTV) ratios for the loan are calculated on a
Sears Lit and Sears Dark basis: Sears Lit (65.8%) and Sears Dark
(101.9%).


JP MORGAN 2017-JP5: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E-RR Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2017-JP5.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations are based on the overall
stable performance of the underlying collateral with no material
changes to pool metrics since issuance. There are no specially
serviced loans. As of the February 2018 distribution date, the
pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by 0.5% to $1.087
billion, from $1.092 billion at issuance.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated three loans (4.8% of
current pool) as Fitch Loans of Concern, one of which is on the
servicer's watchlist (1.5%). The 16th largest loan, Royal Oaks
Plaza (2.7%), is secured by a 165,710 square foot (sf)
grocery-anchored retail property located in Miami Lakes, FL. The
anchor tenant, Winn-Dixie (21.7% of net rentable area), recently
exercised their five-year renewal option through October 2022.
However, Winn-Dixie's parent company, Bi-Lo, announced in February
2018 that it was preparing to file for bankruptcy and plans to
close additional stores.

The 22nd largest loan, Woodglen Village (1.5%), is secured by a
249-unit multifamily property located in Houston, TX. As of
year-to-date September 2017, the servicer-reported NOI DSCR was
1.06x. Occupancy had declined to 84% in March 2017 from 95% at
issuance due to overall weakness in the Houston multifamily market.
Although occupancy has recently improved to 93% as of September
2017 due to concessions, average in-place rents at the property of
$868 per unit are significantly below the market asking rents of
approximately $1,000 per unit.

The 32nd largest loan, St. Albans & Camino Commons (0.6%), which is
secured by a 32,485sf retail property and a 20,721sf mixed use
property located in Newton Square, PA, was reported to be 30 days
delinquent as of the February 2018 remittance reporting. The
servicer expects the borrower to make the loan current.

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.20x is below the 2017
and 2016 averages of 1.26x and 1.21x, respectively. The pool's
Fitch LTV of 102.1% is in line with the 2017 average of 101.6% and
better than the 2016 average of 105.2%.

High Percentage of Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: The two
largest loans in the pool, Hilton Hawaiian Village (7.4% of current
pool) and Moffett Gateway (7.4%), both were assigned
investment-grade credit opinions of 'BBB-sf' on a standalone basis
at issuance.

Pool Concentrations: The largest 10 loans account for 56.7% of the
pool, which is above the 2017 and 2016 averages of 53.1% and 54.8%,
respectively. The largest property type concentration is office at
49.1% of the pool, followed by retail at 25.9% and hotel at 19.0%.
The pool's office concentration is above the 2017 and 2016 averages
of 39.8% and 28.7%, respectively, and the pool's hotel
concentration is also above the 2017 and 2016 averages of 15.8% and
16.0%, respectively, for fixed-rate transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall
stable collateral performance and no material changes since
issuance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration unless a material economic or asset level event changes
the underlying transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $38.1 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $38.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $135 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $396.3 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $69.0 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $71.0 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56.0 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36.9 million(a) class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.3 million(a)(c) class D-RR at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $28.7 million(a)(c) class E-RR at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $830.3 million(b) class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $51.9 million(b) class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $56.0 million(b) class X-C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class F-RR and NR-RR certificates.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing at least
5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity.


JP MORGAN 2018-3: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Cl. B-5 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-3 ("JPMMT 2018-3"). The ratings
range from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by 1,348 fully-amortizing fixed rate
mortgage loans with a total balance of $866,074,338 as of March 1,
2018 cut-off date. Similar to prior JPMMT transactions, JPMMT
2018-3 includes conforming fixed-rate mortgage loans (41.40% by
loan balance) originated by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. (Chase),
underwritten to the government sponsored enterprises (GSE)
guidelines in addition to prime jumbo non-conforming mortgages
purchased by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. ("JPMMAC") from
various originators and aggregators.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. will be the servicer on the conforming
loans originated by Chase. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Fifth
Third Mortgage Company, USAA, First Republic Bank, Guaranteed Rate,
Inc, BOKF, NA (Bank of Oklahama), Johnson Bank, and PHH Mortgage
Corporation will be the servicers on the prime jumbo loans. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") will be the master servicer and
securities administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association will
be the trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer.

Distributions of principal and interest and loss allocations are
based on a typical shifting-interest structure that benefits from
and a senior and subordination floor.

The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-3

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.4%
in a base scenario and reaches 5.00% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

We calculated losses on the pool usingMoody's US Moody's Individual
Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level collateral
information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level adjustments to the
model results included adjustments to probability of default for
higher and lower borrower debt-to-income ratios (DTIs), for
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership association
(HOA) properties in super lien states.Moody's final loss estimates
also incorporate adjustments for originator assessments and the
financial strength of Representation & Warranty (R&W) providers.

We baseMoody's provisional ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction,Moody's assessment of origination and servicing
arrangement quality, the strength of the third party due diligence
and the representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2018-3 is a securitization of a pool of 1,348
fully-amortizing mortgage loans with a total balance of
$866,074,338 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted average (WA)
original term to maturity of 360 months, and a WA seasoning of 3.92
months. The borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and
sizeable equity in their properties. The WA original FICO score is
772 and the WA original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) is
70.4%. The characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are
generally comparable to other JPMMT transactions backed by 30-year
mortgage loans thatMoody's has rated.

There are totally 417 properties that were affected by natural
disasters. Out of these 417 properties, there are 383 properties
located in counties affected by wildfires in California, 33
properties are located in areas affected by Hurricane Irma and
Hurricane Harvey and one property affected by Missouri severe
storms. Results of the inspection reports show no damage on 411
properties. Information is still pending on six properties. Any
reports that come back with damages greater than $10,000 will be
removed or repurchased out of the pool. In addition, there is a
property damage test as part of the breach review process for a
severely delinquent loan or delinquent modified loan which will
provide a further level protection against losses precipitated by
damage from the recent fires.

In this transaction, 41.4% of the pool by loan balance was
underwritten by Chase to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's guidelines
(conforming loans). Moreover, the conforming loans in this
transaction have a high average current loan balance at $540,785.
The higher conforming loan balance of loans in JPMMT 2018-3 is
attributable to the greater amount of properties located in
high-cost areas, such as the metro areas of Los Angeles, San
Francisco and New York/ New Jersey. Chase (41.4%), United Shore
Financial Services, LLC (7.5%), Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (6.4%),
and LendUSA, LLC (5.1%) contribute approximately 60.4% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. The remaining originators each account
for less than 5% of the principal balance of the loans in the
pool.Moody's have made adjustment to the losses based on the
quality of loans originated by different originators.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Four third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, collateral, and regulatory reviews on
100% of the mortgage pool. The TPR results indicated compliance
with the originators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority
of loans, no material compliance issues, and no appraisal defects.
The loans that had exceptions to the originators' underwriting
guidelines had strong documented compensating factors such as
significant liquid assets, significant equity in the property and
consistent, long-term employment. The TPR firms also identified
minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as inadequate RESPA
disclosures (which do not have assignee liability) and TILA/RESPA
Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations related to fees that were
out of variance but then cured and disclosed.Moody's did not make
any adjustments toMoody's expected or Aaa loss levels due to the
TPR results.

JPMMT 2018-3's R&W framework is in line with other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance.Moody's
review of the R&W framework takes into account the financial
strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers
and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association (rated Aa2), who is the R&W provider for
approximately 41.4% (by loan balance) of the loans, is the
strongest R&W provider.Moody's did not make R&W adjustments for the
Chase loans in the pool. In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers
are unrated and/or financially weaker entities. Moreover, JPMMAC
will not backstop any R&W providers who may become financially
incapable of repurchasing mortgage loans.Moody's made an adjustment
for these loans inMoody's analysis to account for this risk.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank Trust National Association.
The custodian's functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells Fargo, as master
servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight, and termination of
servicers and for the appointment of successor servicers. In
addition, Wells Fargo is committed to act as successor if no other
successor servicer can be found.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 0.95% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 6.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 0.70% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate writedown amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero I.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Other Considerations

Similar to recent JPMMT transactions, extraordinary trust expenses
in the JPMMT 2018-3 transaction are deducted from Net WAC as
opposed to available distribution amount.Moody's believe there is a
very low likelihood that the rated certificates in JPMMT 2018-3
will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against key
deal parties. First, all of the loans are prime quality Qualified
Mortgages originated under a regulatory environment that requires
tighter originations controls than pre-crisis, thus reducing the
likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the basis of
a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well defined
processes in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing
basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
(Pentalpha Surveillance, LLC), named at closing must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when certain clearly
defined triggers have been breached which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Third, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a credit, compliance and valuation review
of 100% of the mortgage loans by independent third parties.
Finally, the performance of past JPMMT transactions have been well
within expectations.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.


JP MORGAN 2018-ASH8: DBRS Finalizes B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-ASH8 issued by J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2018-ASH8:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-CP at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB(sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

The trends are Stable.

All classes have been privately placed. Classes X-CP and X-EXT are
notional.

The subject portfolio is secured by eight full-service hotels,
seven of which are affiliated with Hilton, IHG or Starwood, and
operates under four flags (Embassy Suites by Hilton, Crowne Plaza,
Hilton and Sheraton), with one operating as an independent hotel.
The hotels have a combined total room count of 1,964 keys.
Sponsorship for the loan is Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc., a
well-established owner and operator of approximately 120 hotel
assets across the United States. Management for the hotels is
provided by two proven firms, Embassy Suites Management LLC, an
affiliate of Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. (Hilton), and Remington
Lodging and Hospitality, LLC (Remington), an affiliate of the
borrower. Hilton is a global hotel firm with more than 570
properties, while Remington manages more than 90 hotels across 27
states under 16 different brands. The sponsor acquired three of the
assets in 2005 and five of the assets in 2007. The current reported
cost basis equates to approximately $477.0 million ($242,872 per
key), which is in excess of the subject's loan amount. Furthermore,
the sponsor has displayed consistent commitment to the subject
properties, investing roughly $60.2 million ($30,648 per key) since
2013 and $31.8 million ($16,177 per key) since the properties were
last securitized in BAML 2014-ASHF. Mortgage loan proceeds of
$395.0 million refinanced prior existing debt of $378.9 million,
funded $5.8 million of upfront reserves (including a $2.5 million
property improvement plan/capex allowance for the Embassy Suites
Crystal City asset), facilitated a $2.4 million cash-equity
distribution and covered approximately $7.9 million of closing
costs. As of February 2015, the portfolio's appraised value was
$471.0 million ($239,817 per key), with a reported net cash flow
(NCF) of $32.6 million. Since then, the portfolio's appraised value
has increased to $523.1 million ($266,344 per key) with an NCF of
$39.6 million as of the trailing 12 months (T-12) ending November
30, 2017. The loan is a two-year floating-rate (one-month LIBOR,
plus 2.92% with a second and fourth extension spread increase of
0.15% and 0.10%, respectively) interest-only (IO) loan with five
one-year extension options.

Overall, DBRS considers the properties to be in established
suburban or peripheral urban areas with generally stable demand
sources. Occupancy has averaged 79.8% since 2010, increasing every
year except in 2016, and remained stable as of the T-12 ending
November 30, 2017. The average daily rate has also been strong,
increasing every year since 2010 at an average rate of 3.9%. These
figures have produced strong annual revenue per available room
(RevPAR) growth of 5.2% since 2010 (with cumulative growth of
41.8%); however, RevPAR and NCF increases have been increasing at a
declining rate since 2014 to 2015, reflecting an overall tightening
of the national lodging market. To mitigate this downside risk,
DBRS concluded to individual property RevPAR assumptions generally
in line with 2015 actual figures. For two assets, the Key West
Crowne Plaza La Concha and Sheraton Minneapolis West properties,
DBRS concluded to RevPAR assumptions closer to 2014 figures because
of the declining occupancy trends that started in 2016, and the
lost revenue from a primary corporate account, respectively.

The as-is portfolio's appraised value is $523.1 million, assuming
individual sales, based on an average cap rate of 8.1%, which
equates to a high appraised loan-to-value (LTV) of 75.5%. The
DBRS-concluded appraisal value of $336.9 million ($171,541 per key)
represents a significant 35.6% discount to the appraised value and
results in a DBRS LTV of 117.2%, which is indicative of
high-leverage financing; however, the DBRS appraisal value is based
on a blended reversionary cap rate of 10.63%, which represents a
significant stress over the current prevailing market cap rates.
The loan's DBRS Debt Yield and DBRS Term debt service coverage
ratio at 9.1% and 1.58 times, respectively, are considered somewhat
weak considering the portfolio is primarily securitized by suburban
to urban full-service hotels.

Classes X-CP and X-EXT are IO certificates that reference multiple
rated tranches. The IO ratings mirror the lowest-rated reference
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


JPMCC MORTGAGE 2012-CIBX: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-CIBX,
issued by JPMCC 2012-CIBX Mortgage Trust, as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4FL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4FX at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class X-B at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G at B (sf)

In addition, DBRS has assigned Negative trends for the Class F,
Class X-B and Class G certificates. All other trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, with Negative trends assigned to
the three junior classes listed above to reflect DBRS's concerns
surrounding performance declines for the largest loan in the pool
(Prospectus ID #2, theWit Hotel) and anchor losses for two malls in
the top 15 (Prospectus ID #4, Jefferson Mall and Prospectus ID #5,
Southpark Mall). As of the January 2018 remittance, 45 of the
original 49 loans at issuance remained in the pool with an
aggregate principal balance of $925.8 million, representing a
collateral reduction of 28.1% as a result of scheduled loan
amortization and successful loan repayments. With the February 2018
remittance, two additional loans were repaid in full, with
collateral reduction increased to 31.7% since issuance.

The pool benefits from defeasance collateral, as five loans,
representing 12.2% of the current pool balance, are fully defeased.
Of the remaining 40 non-defeased loans as of the January 2018
remittance, 38 loans were reporting YE2016 cash flows, with a
weighted-average (WA) net cash flow growth of 4.7% over theYE2015
cash flow figures. The same 38 loans reported a WA debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA Debt Yield (DY) of 1.59 times (x) and
11.7%, respectively, compared to their respective YE2015 figures of
1.55x and 11.5%. The DBRS WA DSCR and Debt Yield at issuance for
the pool overall was 1.40x and 10.1%, respectively.

There are twelve loans, representing 37.9% of the current pool
balance, on the servicer's watch list, including the three largest
loans in the pool. The watch listed loans reported a WA YE2016 DSCR
and debt yield of 1.44x and 10.8%, respectively. The largest watch
listed loan and the largest loan in the pool is Prospectus ID#2,
theWit Hotel, representing approximately 8.8% of the current pool
balance and secured by a 310-key full-service hotel located in the
North Loop submarket of Chicago, Illinois. The loan reported a Q3
2017 DSCR of 1.05x, with the in-place cash flows consistently
reported below the DBRS NCF figure derived at issuance over the
last several years, largely because of increased expenses since
issuance.

As of the January 2018 remittance, there was one loan in special
servicing in Prospectus ID#17, One Upland Road, which represents
2.3% of the current pool balance. The loan was transferred for a
maturity default after failing to repay at the scheduled January
2018 maturity. The loan is secured by the leasehold interest in a
single-tenant office property in Norwood, Massachusetts. The
property is 100% occupied by the universal Technical Institute
(UTI), a for-profit nationwide provider of technical training. The
current lease is in place until October 2022, with four five-year
extension options remaining. The sponsor is reportedly not
interested in retaining the asset and the special servicer is
currently devising a workout strategy.

In addition to the relatively high concentration of large loans
being monitored on the servicer's watch list for increased credit
risk, the pool also has an above-average concentration of loans
backed by retail properties. As of the January 2018 remittance 20
loans, representing 44.2% of the current pool balance, are secured
by retail properties. Two of these retail loans are secured by
regional malls in Prospectus ID#4, Jefferson Mall, and Prospectus
ID#5, Southpark Mall. Both malls are owned and operated by CBL &
Associates Properties, Inc. (CBL) and both are located in secondary
markets with recent anchor losses. CBL recently reported
disappointing Q4 2017 earnings, with funds from operations down
17.6% year over year due to occupancy and gross rent declines
within their portfolio for the same period.

Jefferson Mall is located in Louisville, Kentucky and in March
2017, the non-collateral Macy's vacated the property. CBL purchased
the former Macy's box and according to the servicer, continues to
determine a strategy for the space. The Southpark Mall is located
in Colonial Heights, Virginia, approximately 20 miles south of the
Richmond CBD. In January 2018, collateral anchor Sears (19.1% of
the net rentable area) was closed ahead of the February 2019 lease
expiry, through which the tenant will continue to pay rent.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


LB COMMERCIAL 2007-C3: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to B3sf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on eight classes
and downgraded the rating on one class in LB Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2007-C3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2007-C3:

Cl. A-J, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-JFL, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on March 23, 2017
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Downgraded to
C (sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on March 23, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. X, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on June 9, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I Classes A-J and A-JFL were affirmed because
the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within
acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the remaining P&I Classes were affirmed because the
ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized
losses.

The rating on the IO Class (Class X) was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes resulting
from principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes. The
deal has paid down 86% since Moody's last review.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 46.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 9.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 10.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.5% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating LB Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2007-C3 Cl. A-J, Cl. A-JFL, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl.
F, and Cl. G was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating LB Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3
Cl. X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 82.5% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93.5% to $209.0
million from $3.2 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1.7% to
44.0% of the pool, No remaining loans have investment-grade
structured credit assessments. No remaining loans are defeased.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 3, compared to 6 at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 3.2% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fifty-two loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $229.3 million (for an average loss
severity of approximately 54%). Six loans, constituting 83% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the University Mall Loan ($92 million -- 44% of
the pool), which is secured by a 609,000 square foot (SF)
collateral portion of a regional mall located in South Burlington,
Vermont. The property is the largest enclosed shopping center in
the state and is located near the campus of the University of
Vermont. The loan transferred to special servicing in July 2015 for
imminent default and the property became REO in October 2016. The
mall is currently anchored by Sears, Kohl's and JC Penney. The
Sears space does not form part of the loan collateral. Former
anchor Bon-Ton closed its store at the mall in January 2018. Target
is slated to backfill the vacant Bon-Ton space in Q4 2018. Retailer
H&M will also open a new store at the mall in late 2018. The
overall mall was 99% leased as of June 2017. The servicer is
holding nearly $4 million in reserves for capital expenditures and
leasing. The property is currently being marketed for sale.

The second largest specially serviced loan is represented by 50
Danbury and 64 Danbury ($66 million -- 32% of the pool), which
represents two cross-collateralized mortgages secured by two Class
A office properties in Wilton, Connecticut. The properties form
part of a larger 33-acre office park campus. At year-end 2017 the
property lost a major tenant which formerly occupied approximately
31% of the property's total net rentable area (NRA). Prior to the
departure of the major tenant, the property was 100% leased as of
September 2017.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $97.3 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (56% expected loss on
average).

As of the February 16, 2018 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $45.6 million. Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan
modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 100% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 93%, compared to 85% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16.0% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.6%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.30X and 1.18X,
respectively, compared to 1.80X and 1.20X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 15% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Chesterfield East Eight Loan ($13.7 million --
7% of the pool), which is secured by an 89,000 SF retail center in
Chesterfield, Missouri. The property was 93% leased as of September
2017. The loan has amortized 11% since securitization. Moody's LTV
and stressed DSCR are 85% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 87%
and 1.19X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Plaza on San Felipe Loan ($10.7
million -- 5% of the pool), which is secured by a 36,000 SF retail
center located in Houston, Texas. The property was 100% occupied as
of September 2017, the same occupancy rate since 2012. This loan
has amortized 6% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 80% and 1.25X, respectively, compared to 76% and 1.31X at
the last review.

The third largest loan is the Stonecrest Parc Loan ($6.6 million --
3% of the pool), which is secured by a 27,000 SF retail property
located in Lithonia, Georgia. The property was 100% leased as of
September 2017 compared to 89% as of year-end 2016. Financial
performance has increased in concert with occupancy and the loan
has amortized 6% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 144% and 0.75X, respectively, compared to 151% and 0.72X
at the last review.


LCCM MORTGAGE 2014-909: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates issued by LCCM 2014-909 Mortgage Trust as
follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The loan is secured by 909 Third
Avenue, a 32-story, 1.3 million square foot (sf) Class A LEED
Gold-certified office building located in the prestigious Plaza
District submarket in Midtown Manhattan, New York. The loan is
sponsored by Vornado Realty Trust, which has an ownership or
management interest in over 20 million sf of office space in
Manhattan. The property benefits from a concentration of
investment-grade tenants, including the largest three tenants who
collectively occupy 66.3% of the net rentable area (NRA).

As at the October 2017 rent roll, the collateral was 97.5%
occupied, with an average base rental rate of $33.81 per square
foot (psf), down slightly from the YE2016 occupancy rate and
average rental rate of 99.8% and $34.63 psf, respectively. The
decrease in occupancy is due to Morrison Cohen LLP downsizing its
space from 72,527 sf to 65,068 sf upon lease renewal in January
2017, as well as the loss of Bloomingdale's Inc. (1.5% NRA), which
vacated the property in December 2016. The subject's largest
tenant, the United States Postal Service, occupies 36.7% of the
(NRA through October 2023 and is currently paying a below-market
rental rate of $2.23 psf. At issuance, DBRS conservatively
estimated a market rental rate of $30.00 psf gross for the entire
space, which would result in approximately $9.9 million in
additional rental revenue. According to CoStar, the Plaza District
submarket reports a 9.6% vacancy rate with an average rental rate
of $76.24 psf as of February 2018. Other large tenants include
CMGRP Inc. (17.2% of NRA, lease expires February 2028) and Forest
Laboratories (12.5% of NRA, lease expires January 2027). There is
no scheduled rollover in 2018.

According to Q3 2017 financials, the loan reported a debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.82 times (x), a decline from 1.94x as at
YE2016 and 2.13x as at YE2015. Cash flows in the last year have
been slightly depressed due to rent abatements and credits given to
new and renewing tenants. DBRS estimates the DSCR improves to 2.13x
once all in-place rents are factored in and rent steps through the
next six months are included. At issuance, the DBRS Term DSCR was
2.03x.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MARINER CLO 5: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on $20.20MM Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Mariner CLO 5 Ltd.'s
$459.20 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

--The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Mariner CLO 5 Ltd./Mariner CLO 5 LLC
   Class               Rating        Balance (mil. $)
  A                   AAA (sf)                307.00
  B                   AA (sf)                  58.70
  C                   A (sf)                   43.50
  D                   BBB- (sf)                29.80
  E                   BB- (sf)                 20.20
  Subordinated notes  NR                       51.65

  NR--Not rated.


MCA FUND I: DBRS Keeps BB(high) on Class C Notes Under Review
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. maintains the placement of the ratings of the Class B
Notes and Class C Deferrable Notes (together, the Notes) issued by
MCA Fund I Holding LLC as Under Review with Positive Implications.
DBRS continues to monitor the rate of deleveraging of the rated
notes in relation to the current net asset value of the fund.

Debt Rated              Rating      Action
----------              ------      ------
Class B Notes           BBB(high)   Under Review-Positive

Class C Deferrable      BB(high)    Under Review-Positive
Notes

The rating on the Class B Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before their
respective maturity. The rating on the Class C Deferrable Notes
addresses the ultimate payment of interest and principal on or
before their maturity.

The Notes are secured by a 100% limited partnership interest in MCA
Fund I L.P. (MCA Fund), a Delaware-based special-purpose vehicle
that holds a portfolio of limited partnership interests in
leveraged buyout, mezzanine debt and venture capital private equity
funds. As a limited partner, MCA Fund is obligated to fund capital
calls. Failure to comply with a capital call can result in losses
in the committed portion of a fund. MCA Fund is ultimately reliant
on CMFG Life Insurance Company, via MCA Fund I Holding LLC, to fund
these capital calls.


MONROE CAPITAL VI: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Monroe Capital MML CLO VI, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is:

US$252,000,000 Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the
"Class A Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$49,500,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes due 2030 (the "Class B
Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$28,125,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$28,125,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Monroe Capital MML CLO VI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by small and medium
enterprise loans. At least 95% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 5% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans and senior unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing
date.

Monroe Capital Management LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes and combination notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $450,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3460

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.2%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

The CLO permits the manager to determine RiskCalc-derived rating
factors, based on modifications to certain pre-qualifying
conditions applicable to the use of RiskCalc, for obligors
temporarily ineligible to receive Moody's credit estimates. Such
determinations are limited to a small portion of the portfolio and
permits certain modifications for a limited time. Moody's rating
analysis included a stress scenario in which Moody's assumed a
rating factor commensurate with a Caa2 rating for such obligors.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3460 to 3979)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3460 to 4498)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-TOP25: DBRS Lowers Cl. C Certs Rating to Csf
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded one class and confirmed two classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP25
issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust, Series 2007-TOP25 (the
Trust) as follows:

-- Class A-J confirmed at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class B confirmed at B (sf)
-- Class C downgraded to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

All trends are Stable with the exception of Class C, which has a
rating that does not carry a trend.

The rating actions reflect DBRS's views on the outlook for the
remaining loans in the transaction, which has seen a collateral
reduction of 91.7% since issuance. As of the February 2018
remittance, the Trust has a current balance of $129.5 million, with
12 of the original 204 loans remaining in the pool. There are four
loans, representing 74.9% of the pool balance, in special servicing
for maturity default. Those loans matured between September 2016
and January 2017. They include the largest loan in the pool,
Prospectus ID#3, Shoppes at Park Place (54.8% of the pool balance).
DBRS anticipates that the cumulative losses that will be realized
when these loans are liquidated could approach or bleed into Class
C, which will support the rating downgrade for that transaction
with this review.

Given the pay down, the pool is concentrated by loan size, with the
three largest loans representing 71.8% of the total pool balance.
Two of the three largest loans in the pool are in special
servicing, including the aforementioned Shoppes at Park Place loan
and Prospectus ID#16, Romeoville Towne Center (14.1% of the pool).
Both loans are secured by retail properties, and both loans matured
in 2017.

The Shoppes at Park Place loan is secured by a Target
shadow-anchored retail center in Pinellas Park, Florida, and was
transferred to the special servicer after the loan failed to repay
at the January 2017 maturity date. The property's performance is
healthy, with a YE2016 debt-service coverage ratio of 1.29 times
and an occupancy rate that has consistently held near 100% for the
last few years. The difficulty in securing a refinance appears to
be the result of the sponsor's poor credit history, as a February
2017 appraisal obtained by the special servicer indicates an as-is
value of $105.0 million, compared with the current trust exposure
of approximately $73.0 million. DBRS expects the resolution for
this loan to be relatively positive, given the healthy occupancy
rate at the property, its strong location and property valuation
that suggests a successful refinance is possible. Given the general
unknowns, however, DBRS assumed a stressed value of approximately
$66.0 million in its analysis for this loan as part of this review
and will continue to monitor closely for developments.

The outlook for the second-largest loan in special servicing,
Romeoville Towne Center, is less rosy, however. That loan is
secured by a grocery-anchored shopping center in the Chicago suburb
of Romeoville, Illinois. The loan transferred to special servicing
in 2014 when the sponsor requested relief following the loss of
Dominick's, the property's grocery anchor that was closed in 2013
as part of the closure of all of the chain's stores located
throughout the Chicago area. As of October 2017, the physical
occupancy rate for the property was reported at 32.0%, and an
October 2017 appraisal estimated the property's as-is value at $9.6
million, which was well below the total exposure for the Trust of
approximately $19.5 million. DBRS analyzed the loan with a loss
severity in excess of 70.0% as part of this review.

The non-specially serviced loans in the pool are generally
diversified in terms of property type and location. Most are
performing well, with two loans representing 5.9% of the pool on
the servicer's watch list for low coverage ratios. Most of the
performing loans are scheduled to mature in 2021, with a few loans
scheduled to pay out in 2026. There is one defeased loan,
Prospectus ID #189, 40th Street Medical Plaza (0.41%) of the pool.


MORGAN STANLEY 2015-C21: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Cl. X-FG Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-C21 issued by Morgan Stanley
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2015-C21 as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class PST at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X-FG at B (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS expectations
since issuance. The collateral consists of 64 fixed-rate loans
secured by 99 commercial properties, and as of the January 2018
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 1.9% since
issuance. All loans in the pool are reporting YE2016 figures with a
weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA
debt yield of 1.88 times (x) and 10.4%, respectively. This
represents an increase from the respective YE2015 figures of 1.70x
and 9.5%. The largest 15 loans in the pool collectively represent
61.7% of the transaction balance, and based on the YE2016
financials, these loans are reporting annualized WA net cash flow
(NCF) growth of 8.6% over the DBRS NCF figures, with a WA DSCR and
debt yield of 1.95x and 10.1%, respectively.

As of the January 2018 remittance, there were eight loans on the
servicer's watch list, representing 10.5% of the pool, and one loan
in special servicing, representing 5.7% of the pool. Six of the
loans on the watch list are being monitored for low occupancy or
near-term rollover, with the remainder being monitored for a
variety of issues. The specially serviced loan, Prospectus ID#5 –
Fontainebleau Park Plaza, was transferred to special servicing in
January 2017 after the master servicer determined that tenants at
the property were not making their full rent and common area
maintenance reimbursement deposits into the lockbox due to a
dispute with the borrower over the reimbursement of tenant
improvement work, which is considered an event of default. For
additional information on this loan, please see the loan commentary
on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which information is provided
below.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-E and X-FG are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C28: DBRS Confirms BB Ratings on 4 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-C28
issued by Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2016-C28:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E-2 at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class EF at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)
-- Class F-1 at BB (sf)
-- Class F-2 at BB (sf)
-- Class G-1 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall performance of the
transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's expectations
since issuance. As of the February 2018 remittance, all 42 loans
remain in the pool with an aggregate outstanding principal balance
of approximately $948.9 million, which represents a collateral
reduction of 0.7% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization. Pool-wide, six loans (27.3% of the pool) are
structured with full interest-only (IO) terms, while an additional
14 loans (39.2% of the pool) have partial IO periods remaining,
ranging from eight months to 34 months. The DBRS Term debt-service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and DBRS Debt Yield are 1.57 times (x) and
8.6%, respectively, or 1.41x and 8.4%, respectively, when excluding
shadow-rated loans. All loans in the pool are reporting YE2016
figures with a weighted-average (WA) DSCR and WA debt yield of
1.77x and 9.7%, respectively. The 15 largest loans in the pool
collectively represent 72.4% of the transaction balance, and based
on the YE2016 financials, these loans are reporting a WA net cash
flow (NCF) growth of 10.7% over the DBRS NCF figures, with a WA
DSCR and debt yield of 1.82x and 9.5%, respectively.

As of the February 2018 remittance, there were five loans on the
servicer's watch list, representing 15.6% of the pool, including
two loans in the top 15. The loans on the watch list are being
monitored for either a low DSCR, casualty event or servicing
trigger event. The largest loan in the pool, Prospectus ID#1 –
Penn Square Mall, was added to the servicer's watch list in
September 2017 due to a flooding incident that occurred in July
2017. The property sustained water damage as a result of flooding
throughout the first floor, stemming from a broken water main
valve. As of February 2018, the servicer received confirmation from
the borrower that all tenants have re-opened, with the exception of
The Gap (1.2% of the NRA), which is still closed with ongoing
repairs. For additional information on this loan, please see the
loan commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform, for which
information is provided below.

At issuance, DBRS assigned an investment-grade shadow rating to two
loans, Penn Square Mall (Prospectus ID#1, 9.5% of the pool) and GLP
Industrial Portfolio A (Prospectus ID#3, 7.4% of the pool). DBRS
confirmed that the performances of these loans remain consistent
with the investment-grade loan characteristics.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The Affected Ratings is available at http://bit.ly/2os7D5o

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MORGAN STANLEY 2017-PRME: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded two classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series MSC 2017-PRME issued by Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2017-PRME as follows:

-- Class B to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C to A (sf) from A (low) sf)

In addition, five classes were confirmed as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-CP at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-NCP at BBB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating upgrades are reflective of increased credit support for
the upgraded bonds as a result of a property release and subsequent
pay down of the Class A Certificate in November 2017. This
transaction closed in February 2017 and was originally secured by
five Marriott brand-managed hotels (1,959 keys total) operating
under three different flags and located across five different U.S.
states. However, the Dallas/Plano Marriott at Legacy Town Center
(Legacy Town Center) hotel was released from the loan last year,
resulting in an $87.4 million principal pay down to the transaction
(based on a release price set at 115.0% of the asset's allocated
loan balance) with the November 2017 remittance, reflective of a
collateral reduction of 23.9%. As a result of this pay down, the
Class A certificate balance was reduced by over half to $71.09
million, down from $154.09 million at issuance. The Legacy Town
Center property was the fourth-largest asset by allocated loan
balance, representing 17.1% of the total loan amount at issuance.

The remaining collateral includes the Courtyard San Francisco
Downtown (31.4% of the remaining allocated loan balance), the
Seattle Marriott Waterfront (30.9% of the remaining allocated loan
balance), the Courtyard Philadelphia Downtown (25.0% of the
remaining allocated loan balance) and the Renaissance Tampa
International Plaza (12.7% of the remaining allocated loan
balance). As noted at issuance, all four of these hotels had
renovations in process or planned for the near term. According to
the T-12 ending November 2017 Smith Travel Research (STR) reports,
two of the four properties showed RevPAR declines over the previous
year. The Philadelphia property reported RevPAR at $142.22, down
5.6% year-over year (YOY) and down when compared with the RevPAR
reported at issuance of $150.72 as at the T-12 ending October 2016.
In addition, the San Francisco property reported RevPAR at $218.96,
down 10.2% YOY and down when compared with RevPAR reported at
issuance of $244.74 as at the T-12 ending October 2016. At
issuance, the San Francisco property was in the process of a $13.1
million ($32,414 per key) renovation to upgrade virtually every
aspect of the hotel, from guest rooms to common areas. The work was
expected to be complete by July 2017. In addition, property
performance was expected to be impacted by the ongoing expansion
work to be completed in 2018 for the Moscone Convention Center, the
largest conference and exhibit venue in San Francisco, which is
located one and a half blocks southwest of the subject. As of
February 2018, DBRS has received confirmation from the servicer
that the renovation has expanded to an overall budget of $50.0
million, which will include renovations to the lobby, meeting rooms
and facade, to name a few. The project is expected to be complete
by the end of 2019. In addition, the servicer has confirmed that
the work remains ongoing for the convention center, slated for
completion by the end of the year. The T-3 figures shown in the San
Francisco property's STR report indicate performance is trending
back in line with historical performance metrics, with the T-3
ending November 2017 RevPAR figure of $229.09 down 8.7% YOY, a
smaller variance as comparison with the T-12 figures suggests.

Based on the T-12 ending September 2017 reporting, the loan
reported an in-place DSCR of 2.48 times (x), in line with the DBRS
Term DSCR derived at issuance, but down when compared with the
Issuer's underwriting figure of 2.70x. At issuance, DBRS capped
occupancy rates across the portfolio to account for the renovation
risk and for the new supply projected in the appraisals for all of
the hotels. Based on the current occupancy and average daily rate
metrics for each property, as reported for the T-12 period ending
November 2017, DBRS derived an updated DBRS NCF figure of
$37,156,243, representative of a 4.5% haircut to the in-place
figure reported for the T-12 ending September 2017, resulting in a
DBRS Term DSCR of 2.36x and a DBRS Refi DSCR of 1.26x.

Although these figures suggest a slight decline from the DBRS
projections for the remaining properties at issuance, cash flows
remain strong overall and DBRS expects performance and property
values will trend upward as the remaining capital improvement
projects are completed across the portfolio.

Classes X-CP and X-NCP are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MOUNTAIN HAWK I: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to B+(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class B-1, B-2, and C
notes from Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd., a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) managed by Western Asset Management Co. At the
same time, S&P lowered its rating on the class E notes and affirmed
its ratings on the class A-1 and D notes from the same transaction.
S&P also removed the ratings on classes B-1, B-2, C, and D from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with positive implications on
Jan. 19, 2018.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the Feb. 12, 2018, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's $150.95 million in
collective paydowns to the class A-1 and A-X notes since our May
2016 rating actions. The class A-X notes have been fully repaid and
the class A-1 notes have been paid down to only 52.11% of their
initial outstanding balance. Except for class E, these paydowns
have improved the reported overcollateralization (O/C) ratios since
the April 6, 2016, trustee report, which S&P used for its previous
rating actions:

-- The class B O/C ratio improved to 144.79% from 128.59%.
-- The class C O/C ratio improved to 127.34% from 119.01%.
-- The class D O/C ratio improved to 116.23% from 112.36%.
-- The class E O/C ratio declined slightly to 104.53% from
104.86%.

The lower O/C ratio at the class E level reflects greater exposure
to collateral rated in the 'CCC' category, resulting in haircuts
for excess collateral beyond the portfolio concentration limit. It
also reflects that the portfolio's aggregate principal balance has
declined beyond the amount of collateral that has amortized.

S&P said, "The collateral portfolio's credit quality has
deteriorated since our last rating actions. Collateral obligations
with ratings in the 'CCC' category have increased to $39.09 million
as of the February 2018 trustee report from $23.63 million reported
as of the April 2016 one. The remaining performing portfolio also
bears a large 13.3% exposure to the retail sector, which has come
under stress recently, and an additional 3.5% exposure to
energy-related sectors. Additionally, there is now some small
exposure to long-dated assets (i.e., assets that mature after the
CLO's stated maturity), which further expose the portfolio to
market value risks.

"On a standalone basis, the results of the cash flow analysis
indicated higher ratings on the class C and D notes. However,
because the transaction has large exposures to 'CCC' rated
collateral obligations and loans from companies in the retail and
energy sectors, as well as exposure to long-dated assets, we
limited the upgrade on the class C notes and affirmed our rating on
the class D notes to offset future potential credit migration in
the underlying collateral."

The downgrade to 'B+ (sf)' on the class E notes reflects the drop
in the portfolio's weighted average spread to 3.35% from 4.13%
(February 2018 from the April 2016 trustee report), a greater
concentration of 'CCC' rated collateral, increased exposure to
distressed and long-dated assets, a continued drop in O/C to a
level no longer commensurate with the current rating level, and
cash flow model results that indicated insufficient support at the
prior rating level.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance.
In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS

  Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd.
                     Rating
  Class          To          From
  B-1            AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
  B-2            AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
  C (deferable)  AA (sf)     A (sf)/Watch Pos
  D (deferable)  BBB (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
  E (deferable)  B+ (sf)     BB- (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED
  
  Mountain Hawk I CLO Ltd.
  Class         Rating
  A-1           AAA (sf)


NATIONSTAR HECM 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Cl. M4 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2018-1 (NHLT 2018-1). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 1,558 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages (HECMs) and 233 real estate owned
(REO) properties. The servicer for the deal is Nationstar Mortgage
LLC (Nationstar). The complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Nationstar HECM Loan Trust 2018-1

Class A, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class M1, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Class M2, Assigned A3 (sf)

Class M3, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Class M4, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing NHLT 2018-1 consists of first-lien inactive
HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance
secured by properties in the US along with Real-Estate Owned (REO)
properties acquired through conversion of ownership of reverse
mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. If a borrower or
their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity or otherwise
defaults, the sale of the property is used to recover the amount
owed. Nationstar acquired the mortgage assets from Ginnie Mae
sponsored HECM mortgage backed (HMBS) securitizations. All of the
mortgage assets are covered by FHA insurance for the repayment of
principal up to certain amounts. 17.1% of the collateral is from
the recently collapsed NHLT 2016-2 transaction and 24.1% of the
collateral is from the recently collapsed NHLT 2016-3 transaction.

There are 1,791 mortgage assets with a balance of $443,229,218. The
assets are in either default, due and payable, referred,
foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default may move to
due and payable; due and payable loans may move to foreclosure; and
foreclosure loans may move to REO. 26.7% of the assets are in
default of which 10.0% (of the total assets) are in default due to
non-occupancy and 16.8% (of the total assets) are in default due to
delinquent taxes and insurance. 14.7% of the assets are due and
payable, 44.4% of the assets are in foreclosure and 2.2% of the
assets are in referred status. Finally, 12.0% of the assets are REO
properties and were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure on the associated loan. If the value of the related
mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount, some of these
loans may be settled by the borrower or their estate.

As with most NHLT transactions Moody's has rated, the pool has a
significant concentration of mortgage assets backed by properties
in New York, New Jersey and Florida. Such states are judicial
foreclosure states with long foreclosure timelines. Up to 2.3% of
the assets are backed by properties that are in areas affected by
Hurricane Harvey (based on information from FEMA, Texas governor
declarations, and local disaster declarations). Up to 11.0% of the
assets are backed by properties in areas affected by Hurricane Irma
(based on information from FEMA and governor declarations). Also,
6.8% of the assets are backed by properties in California, parts of
which have recently been hit by wildfires. Finally, there are 27
assets (1.0% of the asset balance) in NHLT 2018-1 that are backed
by properties in Puerto Rico, which is still recovering from
Hurricane Maria and suffering from poor economic conditions due to
a public debt crisis and continued out-migration. Moody's credit
ratings reflect state-specific foreclosure timeline stresses as
well as adjustments for risks associated with the recent hurricanes
and the real estate market in Puerto Rico.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst six
classes of notes with structural subordination. All funds
collected, prior to an acceleration event, are used to make
interest payments to the notes, then principal payments to the
Class A notes, then to a redemption account until the amount on
deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to cover future
principal and interest payments for the subordinate notes up to
their expected final payment dates. The subordinate notes will not
receive principal until the beginning of their respective target
amortization periods (in the absence of an acceleration event). The
notes benefit from structural subordination as credit enhancement,
and an interest reserve account funded with cash received from the
initial purchasers of the notes for liquidity and credit
enhancement.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in February 2020. For the Class
M1 notes, the expected final payment date is in July 2020. For the
Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is in September
2020. For the Class M3 notes, the expected final payment date is in
December 2020. For the Class M4 notes, the expected final payment
date is in April 2021. Finally, for the Class M5 notes, the
expected final payment date is in September 2021. For each of the
subordinate notes, there are target amortization periods that
conclude on the respective expected final payment dates. The legal
final maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve account may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as an available funds
cap shortfall. These available funds cap carryover amounts will
have priority of payments in the waterfall and will also accrue
interest at the respective note rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Nationstar
remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Nationstar is servicer. However, servicing advances will
instead have priority over interest and principal payments in the
event that Nationstar defaults and a new servicer is appointed.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Nationstar. The review focused on
data integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification, accuracy of
appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status recording,
borrower age documentation, identification of excessive corporate
advances, documentation of servicer advances, and identification of
tax liens with first priority in Texas. Also, broker price opinions
(BPOs) were ordered for 302 properties in the pool and full
appraisals were ordered for two properties in the pool.

The TPR firm conducted an extensive data integrity review. Certain
data tape fields, such as the mortgage insurance premium (MIP)
rate, the current UPB, current interest rate, and marketable title
date were reviewed against Nationstar's servicing system. However,
a significant number of data tape fields were reviewed against
imaged copies of original documents of record, screen shots of
HUD's HERMIT system, or HUD documents. Some key fields reviewed in
this manner included the original note rate, the debenture rate,
foreclosure first legal date, and the called due date.

The results of the third-party review (TPR) are comparable to
previous NHLT transactions in many respects. However, the number of
exceptions related to data integrity, accuracy of reported
valuations, and foreclosure and bankruptcy attorney fees was higher
than in other recently rated NHLT transactions. NHLT 2018-1's TPR
results showed a 1.6% initial-tape exception rate related to data
integrity, a 25.8% initial-tape exception rate related to the
accuracy of reported valuations, and a 29.4% initial-tape exception
rate related to foreclosure and bankruptcy attorney fees. This
compares to 0.4%, 2.4% and 24.2% initial-tape exception rates for
NHLT 2017-2 in these categories respectively. In Moody's analysis
of the pool, Moody's applied adjustments to account for the TPR
results in certain areas.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Nationstar is the loan-level R&W provider and is rated B2 (Stable).
This relatively weak financial profile is mitigated by the fact
that Nationstar will subordinate its servicing advances, servicing
fees, and MIP payments in the transaction and thus has significant
alignment of interests. However, unlike in previous NHLT
transactions, Nationstar will not commit to retaining a 5.0% net
economic interest in the securitization. Another factor mitigating
the risks associated with a financially weak R&W provider is that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Nationstar represents that the mortgage loans are covered by FHA
insurance that is in full force and effect. Nationstar provides
further R&Ws including those for title, first lien position,
enforceability of the lien, and the condition of the property.
Although Nationstar provides a no fraud R&W covering the
origination of the mortgage loans, determination of value of the
mortgaged properties, and the sale and servicing of the mortgage
loans, the no fraud R&W is made only as to the initial mortgage
loans. Aside from the no fraud R&W, Nationstar does not provide any
other R&W in connection with the origination of the mortgage loans,
including whether the mortgage loans were originated in compliance
with applicable federal, state and local laws. Although certain
representations are knowledge qualified, the transaction documents
contain language specifying that if a representation would have
been breached if not for the knowledge qualifier then Nationstar
will repurchase the relevant asset as if the representation had
been breached.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, Nationstar has to cure
the breach. If Nationstar is unable to cure the breach, Nationstar
must repurchase the loan within 90 days from receiving the
notification. Moody's believe the absence of an independent third
party reviewer who can identify any breaches to the R&W makes the
enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction. Also, Nationstar,
in its good faith, is responsible for determining if a R&W breach
materially and adversely affects the interests of the trust or the
value the collateral. This creates the potential for a conflict of
interest.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the acquisition trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believe that NHLT
2018-1 is adequately protected against such risk in part because a
third-party data integrity review was conducted on a significant
random sample of the loans. In addition, the third-party due
diligence firm verified that all of the loans in the pool are
covered by FHA insurance.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The acquisition and owner trustee for the NHLT 2018-1 transaction
is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank National
Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also serve as the
claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD mortgagee of
record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans," published in August 2016 and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations," published in May 2015.

Our quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan modeling
of expected payout amounts given the structure of FHA insurance and
with various stresses applied to model parameters depending on the
target rating level.

FHA insurance claim types: funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than its appraised value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
marketable title to the property. ABCs are filed six months after
the servicer has obtained marketable title if the property has not
yet been sold. For an SBC, HUD insurance will cover the difference
between (i) the loan balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price
and 95.0% of the latest appraisal, with the transaction on the hook
for losses if the sales price is lower than 95.0% of the latest
appraisal. For an ABC, HUD only covers the difference between the
loan amount and 100% of appraised value, so failure to sell the
property at the appraised value results in loss.

Moody's expect ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Moody's base case expectation is that properties will
be sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. This is
based on the historical experience of Nationstar. Moody's stressed
this percentage at higher credit rating levels. At a Aaa rating
level, Moody's assumed that ABC appraisal haircuts could reach up
to 30.0%.

In Moody's asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed this percentage at higher credit
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that SBC
appraisal haircuts could reach up to 11.0% (i.e., 6.0% below
95.0%).

Under Moody's analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go
through both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability.
Each loan will thus have both of the sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. Based on the historical experience of
Nationstar, for the base case scenario Moody's assumed that 85% of
claims would be SBCs and the rest would be ABCs. Moody's stressed
this assumption and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher
rating levels. At a Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that 85% of
insurance claims would be submitted as ABCs.

Liquidation process: each mortgage asset is categorized into one of
four categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In
Moody's analysis, Moody's assume loans that are in referred status
to be either in foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed
to move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to 12 months
depending on the default reason. Foreclosure status is based on the
state in which that the related property is located and is further
stressed at higher rating levels. The base case foreclosure
timeline is based on FHA timeline guidance. REO disposition is
assumed to take place in six months with respect to SBCs and 12
months with respect to ABCs.

Debenture interest: the receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment.
Moody's base case assumption is that 95.0% of debenture interest
will be received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of
debenture interest that will be received at higher rating levels.
Moody's debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that
Nationstar (B2, Stable) reimburse the trust for debenture interest
curtailments due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD
guidelines.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into Moody's analysis, including the following:

* In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in Moody's analysis. However, for seasoned
appraisals Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential
home price depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the
cut-off date.

* Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in
their homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their
heirs rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's
estimated which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing
each loans' appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB.

* Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

* Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to mimic
expected cash flows in the case where Nationstar is no longer the
servicer. Moody's assume the following in the situation where
Nationstar is no longer the servicer:

* Servicing advances and servicing fees: While Nationstar
subordinates their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing
fees, and MIP payments, a replacement servicer will not subordinate
these amounts.

* Nationstar indemnifies the trust for lost debenture interest due
to servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD guidelines. In
the event of a bankruptcy, Nationstar will not have the financial
capacity to do so.

* A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assume a 25 bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

* One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales
proceeds to reimburse a replacement servicer (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500 per loan.

To account for risks posed by the recent hurricanes and wildfires,
Moody's assumed the following:

* To account for potential delays in the foreclosure process,
Moody's added three months to the foreclosure timeline in the base
case scenario for foreclosure-status properties that are located in
hurricane and wildfire affected areas. At a Aaa (sf) rating level,
this timeline stress is multiplied by 1.6x and so this equates to
adding an additional 4.8 months to foreclosure timelines in a Aaa
(sf) scenario.

* For certain properties located in hurricane and wildfire impacted
areas, Moody's assumed that a higher percentage of insurance claims
would be submitted as ABCs as a result of the hurricanes and
wildfires.

* For certain properties located in hurricane impacted areas,
Moody's increased the amount of non-reimbursable expenses that
Moody's expect would be incurred by a replacement servicer
following a servicer termination event.

* For certain properties located in hurricane and wildfire impacted
areas, Moody's assumed that the loans would complete the
foreclosure process rather than being paid off by the borrowers or
their heirs regardless of how much equity there was in the
properties.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from Moody's original expectations resulting in
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and faster
property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from Moody's original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.


NATIXIS 2018-ALXA: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2018-ALXA (the Certificates) to be issued by Natixis Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-ALXA:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

DBRS also has withdrawn its provisional ratings on the Class X
notes.

All classes have been privately placed.

The subject loan is secured by the fee interest in a 356,909 square
foot (sf) condominium portion of a newly constructed Class A office
building located in downtown Bellevue, Washington, approximately
ten miles east of Seattle. The condominium interest includes 98.3%
of the leasable square footage within the 16-story structure, in
addition to the entirety of the eight-level underground parking
garage. Completed in the second quarter of 2017, the collateral is
situated in the heart of downtown Bellevue, which includes nearly
5.0 million sf of retail and entertainment developments and just
less than 7.0 million sf of office space. The property is currently
100.0% occupied by Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) and Starbucks
Corporation (Starbucks), both investment-grade-rated tenants, with
Amazon accounting for 99.4% of the net rentable area. Bank of
America Corporation previously owned the land parcel and retains a
non-collateral 6,000 sf bank-branch condo unit on the ground floor
of the building. In 2017, Amazon executed a 16-year triple net
lease that extends well beyond the ten-year loan term to September
30, 2033. Amazon's initial base rental payment is $34.63 per square
foot (psf), with annual escalations of 2.25%. This equates to a
gross equivalent rent for Amazon of roughly $50.00 psf, which
compares favorably with the average Class A submarket rents in the
$45.50 psf to $47.00 psf gross range, based on information compiled
by CoStar and from the appraisal.

The sponsors for this loan are RFR Holding LLC (RFR) and TriStar
Capital, LLC (TriStar Capital). RFR is a private full-service
company established in Manhattan, New York, in 1991; it currently
has a multinational portfolio of over 100 assets across a diverse
array of property types and markets. TriStar Capital is a real
estate investment firm based in New York with more than two decades
of experience in the financing and development of commercial real
estate. The principals of the sponsors, David Edelstein, Aby Rosen
and Michael Fuchs, will serve as guarantors for the transaction.
The guarantors have a combined net worth and liquidity of $3.4
billion and $146.9 million, respectively.

Loan proceeds of $266.1 million ($745.43 psf), inclusive of $57.6
million of mezzanine debt, and $71.7 million of borrower equity
were used to finance the acquisition of the subject for a purchase
price of $313.0 million ($876.97 psf), fund upfront free rent and
tenant improvement/leasing commission reserves totaling
approximately $18.0 million and pay closing costs. The loan is a
ten-year fixed-rate interest-only mortgage loan with an anticipated
repayment date (ARD) structure and final loan maturity in 2033.
CBRE has determined the as-is appraised value to be $316.0 million
($885.38 psf) based on a direct capitalization method utilizing a
5.50% terminal capitalization rate, which equates to a relatively
moderate appraised loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 66.0%. The
DBRS-concluded value of $182.3 million ($510.82 psf) represents a
significant 42.3% discount to the appraised value but results in a
DBRS LTV of 114.3% on the mortgage debt, which is indicative of
high-leverage financing; however, the DBRS value is based on a
reversionary cap rate of 8.25%, which represents a significant
stress over current prevailing market cap rates. While the DBRS LTV
on the $208.5 million mortgage debt is relatively high, the
leverage is reflected in the below-investment-grade last-dollar
rating of BB (low). The cumulative investment-grade-rated proceeds
of $177.0 million ($495.92 psf) on the total mortgage debt compares
favorably with the three-year average sales price psf of $548.40
for properties in the surrounding area, according to data from Real
Capital Analytics. Additionally, when taking into account the
implied amortization of 23.8% during the ARD term, cumulative
investment-grade exposure at the end of the Amazon lease is $127.4
million ($356.91 psf), which represents a more modest 69.9% DBRS
LTV and just 40.7% of the purchase price.


NEUBERGER BERMAN XXI: S&P Gives Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from Neuberger
Berman CLO XXI Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued on March 29, 2016, that is managed by Neuberger
Berman Investment Advisers LLC. The class A-2-R replacement notes
are not rated by S&P Global Ratings. The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 19,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 20, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the class A and E notes and assigning ratings to the
class A-1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes. However, if
the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm the ratings on the
original class A and E notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the class A-1-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes." The
current class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, and D notes are not rated by S&P
Global Ratings. In addition, the replacement class A-2-R notes are
not rated by S&P Global Ratings.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Change the rated par amount and target initial par amount to
$357.00 million and $400.00 million, from $242.40 million and
$360.00 million, respectively. The first payment date following the
April 20, 2018, refinancing date is expected to be July 20, 2018.

-- Extend the non-call period on all of the notes to April 20,
2019, from April 20, 2018.

-- Extend the weighted average life test to seven years from the
April 20, 2018, refinancing date, from eight years from the initial
closing date March 29, 2016.

-- Change the required minimum thresholds for the coverage tests.

-- Incorporate the recovery rate methodology and updated industry
classifications outlined in S&P's August 2016 CLO criteria update
There is no proposed change to the reinvestment period duration,
which is expected to end April 20, 2020, or the April 20, 2027,
legal final maturity date.

REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL NOTE ISSUANCES

  Replacement Notes
  Class                Amount    Interest  
                      (mil. $)    rate (%)
  A-1-R                247.00    LIBOR + 0.75
  A-2-R                 13.00    LIBOR + 1.15
  B-R                   44.00    LIBOR + 1.30
  C-R                   26.00    LIBOR + 1.65
  D-R                   22.00    LIBOR + 2.40
  E-R                   18.00    LIBOR + 5.05
  Subordinated notes    30.90    N/A
  Original Notes
  Class                Amount    Interest
                       (mil. $)    rate (%)
  X                      3.00    LIBOR + 1.00
  A                    223.20    LIBOR + 1.55
  B-1                   20.00    LIBOR + 2.40
  B-2                   25.00    3.65
  C-1                   15.50    LIBOR + 3.30
  C-2                    7.90    5.21
  D                     19.80    LIBOR + 4.95
  E                     16.20    LIBOR + 7.00
  Subordinated notes    30.90    N/A

  N/A--Not applicable.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Neuberger Berman CLO XXI Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R                     AAA (sf)             247.00
  A-2-R                     NR                    13.00    
  B-R                       AA (sf)               44.00    
  C-R                       A (sf)                26.00    
  D-R                       BBB- (sf)             22.00    
  E-R                       BB- (sf)              18.00      
  Subordinated notes        NR                    30.90    

  NR--Not rated.


NEWSTAR EXETER: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by NewStar Exeter Fund CLO LLC:

US$12,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on February 19,
2015 Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Moody's also upgraded the rating on the following notes:

US$28,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$172,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$11,000,000 Class C-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class C-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$11,750,000 Class D-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class D-2 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due
January 2027, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on February 19, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

NewStar Exeter Fund CLO LLC, issued in February 2015, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans, with significant exposure to
middle market loans. The transaction's reinvestment period will end
in January 2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade rating action on the Class F notes is primarily due
to the specific risks to the junior notes posed by par loss and
credit deterioration observed in the underlying CLO portfolio.
Based on Moody's calculation, the total collateral par balance,
including expected recoveries on current defaults, is $291.8
million which is $8.2 million less than the $300 million initial
par amount targeted during the deal's ramp-up. Also based on
Moody's calculation, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of
the portfolio is currently 4135 compared to the covenant of 3664.

The upgrade and affirmation rating actions reflect the benefit of
the shorter period of time remaining before the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in January 2019, and the expectation that
deleveraging will commence shortly.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Exposure to credit estimates: The deal contains a large number
of securities whose default probabilities Moody's has assessed
through credit estimates. Moody's normally updates such estimates
at least once annually, but if such updates do not occur, the
transaction could be negatively affected by any default probability
adjustments Moody's assumes in lieu of updated credit estimates.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (3308)

Class A: 0

Class B: +1

Class C-1: +3

Class C-2: +3

Class D-1: +2

Class D-2: +2

Class E: +1

Class F: +2

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (4962)

Class A: 0

Class B: -2

Class C-1: -2

Class C-2: -2

Class D-1: -1

Class D-2: -1

Class E: -1

Class F: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $281.6 million, defaulted par of
$14.0 million, a weighted average default probability of 29.97%
(implying a WARF of 4135), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.97%, a diversity score of 42 and a weighted average
spread of 5.24% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


OBX TRUST 2018-1: Fitch to Rate Class B-5 Notes 'Bsf'
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate OBX 2018-1 Trust (OBX 2018-1) as
follows:

-- $297,816,000 class A-1 exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $297,816,000 class A1-IO notional exchangeable notes 'AAAsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $297,816,000 class A-1A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $293,898,000 class A-2 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $293,898,000 class A2-IO notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $293,898,000 class A-2A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $3,918,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,918,000 class A3-IO notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $3,918,000 class A-3A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $7,184,000 class B-1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,184,000 class B1-IO notional notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7,184,000 class B-1A exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $6,205,000 class B-2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,205,000 class B2-IO notional notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,205,000 class B-2A exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $6,368,000 class B-3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,368,000 class B3-IO notional notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6,368,000 class B-3A exchangeable notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $4,082,000 class B-4 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $1,632,000 class B-5 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:
-- $3,266,471 class B-6 notes;
-- $28,737,471 class B exchangeable notes;
-- $608,288 class FB notes.

The notes are supported by 920 loans with a total unpaid principal
balance of approximately $326.55 million (which does not include
the $608,288 in non-interest bearing deferred principal balances
making up the class FB) as of the cutoff date. The pool consists of
seasoned performing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs) from two called 2005 transactions as well as loans
acquired by Onslow Bay Financial LLC, a subsidiary of Annaly
Capital Management, Inc.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A notes reflects the 8.80%
subordination provided by the 2.20% class B-1, 1.90% class B-2,
1.95% class B-3, 1.25% class B-4, 0.50% class B-5 and 1.00% class
B-6 notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality, Seasoned Performing Mortgage Pool (Positive): The
pool consists of high-quality fixed-rate and adjustable-rate, fully
amortizing seasoned performing mortgage loans to borrowers with
strong credit profiles (weighted average [WA] updated model FICO of
743 and low leverage (WA CLTV of 43.5%). The loans are seasoned
approximately 10 years on average.

Annaly as Aggregator (Neutral): Annaly is the largest mortgage REIT
in the U.S, managing over $101 billion in assets and approximately
$15 billion in capital. Fitch conducted an abbreviated review of
Annaly's aggregation processes and believes that Annaly meets
industry standards needed to aggregate seasoned and re-performing
loans (RPLs) for private-label residential mortgage-backed
securitization.

Updated Property Valuation Method (Neutral): An Automated Valuation
Method (AVM) was used to estimate the current property value on 57%
of the pool, the highest figure of any Fitch-rated transaction to
date. Consistent with criteria, Fitch used the more conservative of
the AVM value and a home-price-indexed (HPI) valuation. The WA MTM
loan to value (LTV) for these properties (when using the more
conservative of an AVM and HPI) is below 34% with no property
having a MTMLTV above 60%. Fitch believes the low LTV of these
properties mitigates the risk of relying on an AVM or HDI versus a
broker-price opinion (BPO). All but 2% of the remaining pool relied
on a BPO to estimate the current property value.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Mixed): A loan-level due
diligence review was conducted on approximately 62% of the pool in
accordance with Fitch's criteria for seasoned performing loans. The
review generally indicated low operational risk, although
approximately 9% of the reviewed loans in the pool received a 'C'
or 'D' grade, meaning the loans had material violations or lacked
documentation to confirm regulatory compliance. A modest adjustment
was applied to the projected pool losses to reflect the diligence
findings.

Representation and Warranty Framework (Negative): Fitch considers
the transaction's representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E)
mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier 3 quality. The RW&E
will be provided by Onslow Bay Financial, LLC, which does not have
a financial credit opinion or public rating from Fitch. As a result
of the Tier 3 RW&E framework and unrated counterparty, the pool
received an expected loss penalty of 61bps at the 'AAAsf' level.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a traditional senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The applicable
credit support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal
to classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Neutral): The servicers will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severity
(LS) is less for this transaction than for those where the servicer
is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow
priorities, together with increased subordination, are expected to
mitigate the risk of interest shortfalls to the rated classes.

CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the
pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor
of 1.75% of the original balance will be maintained for the notes.
Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that might allow
principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders earlier than the
five-year lockout schedule.

Geographic Concentration (Negative): Approximately 43% of the pool
is located in California, which is in line with or slightly higher
than other recent Fitch-rated transactions. In addition, the MSA
concentration is relatively large, as the top three MSAs account
for 41.7% of the pool. As a result, a geographic concentration
penalty of 1.03 was applied to the probability of default.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the notes.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$275,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 7.0%. The analysis indicates there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 18-R: S&P Gives Prelim B-(sf) Rating on E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1a, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes, from Octagon Investment Partners
18-R Ltd. Proceeds from this issuance will be used to redeem the
rated notes from Octagon Investment Partners XVIII Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation originally issued in August 2013
(and subsequently reset in March 2017), that is managed by Octagon
Credit Investors LLC.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 19,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the April 19, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes issued by Octagon Investment
Partners 18-R Ltd., combined with the proceeds of the issuance of
additional subordinated notes, are expected to redeem the currently
outstanding notes from Octagon Investment Partners XVIII Ltd. S&P
said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the ratings on the
original notes and assigning ratings to the replacement notes.
However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we may affirm the
ratings on the original notes and withdraw our preliminary ratings
on the replacement notes."

Based on provisions in the indenture:

-- The new notes are expected to be issued at a lower spread than
the original transaction's notes.

-- The replacement class notes are expected to be issued at a
floating spread, replacing the current floating spread.

-- The stated maturity will be April 16, 2031.

-- The reinvestment period ends in April 2023.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Octagon Investment Partners 18-R Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating     Amount (mil. $)
  A-1a                      AAA (sf)             420.00
  A-1b                      NR                    28.00
  A-2                       AA (sf)               87.50
  B                         A (sf)                38.50
  C                         BBB- (sf)             42.00
  D                         BB- (sf)              28.00
  E                         B- (sf)               14.00
  Subordinated notes        NR                    91.95

  NR--Not Rated.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-1
(OMFIT 2018-1):

-- $441,660,000 Series 2018-1, Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $57,240,000 Series 2018-1, Class B at AA (sf)
-- $36,750,000 Series 2018-1, Class C at A (sf)
-- $38,700,000 Series 2018-1, Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $57,230,000 Series 2018-1, Class E at BB (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and  
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For this transaction, the rating
     addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
     and principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- OneMain Financial, Inc.'s (OneMain) capabilities with regards
     to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of  
     OneMain's consumer loan portfolio. DBRS used a hybrid
     approach in analyzing the OneMain portfolio that incorporates

     elements of static pool analysis, employed for assets such as

     consumer loans, and revolving asset analysis, employed for
     such assets as credit card master trusts.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with OneMain,
     that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
     in the assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria

     for U.S. Structured Finance."

DBRS assigned ratings to OMFIT 2018-1. The OMFIT 2018-1 transaction
represents the ninth securitization of a portfolio of non-prime and
subprime personal loans originated through OneMain's branch
network.

Credit enhancement in the transaction consists of over
collateralization (OC), subordination, excess spread and a reserve
account. The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 32.60% of
initial hard credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes
in the pool, the Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC (2.90%). The rating
on the Class B Notes reflects the 23.80% of initial hard credit
enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool, the
Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC (2.90%). The rating on the Class C
Notes reflects the 18.15% of initial hard credit enhancement
provided by the subordinated notes in the pool, the Reserve Account
(0.50%) and OC (2.90%). The rating on the Class D Notes reflects
the 12.20% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by the
subordinated notes in the pool, the Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC
(2.90%). The rating on the Class E Notes reflects the 3.40% of
initial hard credit enhancement provided by the Reserve Account
(0.50%) and OC (2.90%). Additional credit support may be provided
from excess spread available in the structure.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-2: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-2
(OMFIT 2018-2):

-- $182,440,000 Series 2018-2, Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $23,650,000 Series 2018-2, Class B at AA (sf)
-- $15,230,000 Series 2018-2, Class C at A (sf)
-- $18,900,000 Series 2018-2, Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $22,970,000 Series 2018-2, Class E at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:
  
-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and  
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings
     address the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and

     principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- OneMain Financial, Inc.'s (OneMain) capabilities with regards
     to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
     OneMain's consumer loan portfolio. DBRS used a hybrid
     approach in analyzing the OneMain portfolio that incorporates

     elements of static pool analysis, employed for assets such as

     consumer loans, and revolving asset analysis, employed for
     such assets as credit card master trusts.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with OneMain,
     that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
     in the assets and the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria

     for U.S. Structured Finance."

DBRS assigned provisional ratings to OMFIT 2018-2 as listed above.
The OMFIT 2018-2 transaction represents the ninth securitization of
a portfolio of non-prime and subprime personal loans originated
through OneMain's branch network.

Credit enhancement in the transaction consists of
overcollateralization (OC), subordination, excess spread and a
reserve account. The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the
33.40% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by the
subordinated notes in the pool, the Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC
(3.20%). The rating on the Class B Notes reflects the 24.70% of
initial hard credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes
in the pool, the Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC (3.20%). The rating
on the Class C Notes reflects the 19.10% of initial hard credit
enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool, the
Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC (3.20%). The rating on the Class D
Notes reflects the 12.15% of initial hard credit enhancement
provided by the subordinated notes in the pool, the Reserve Account
(0.50%) and OC (3.20%). The rating on the Class E Notes reflects
the 3.70% of initial hard credit enhancement provided by the
Reserve Account (0.50%) and OC (3.20%). Additional credit support
may be provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


ONEMAIN FINANCIAL 2018-2: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OneMain Financial
Issuance Trust 2018-2's $368.44 million personal consumer
loan-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by personal consumer loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 51.8%, 45.0%, 40.4%, 32.9%,
and 26.7% credit support to the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
respectively, in the form of subordination, overcollateralization,
a reserve account, and excess spread. These credit support levels
are sufficient to withstand stresses commensurate with the ratings
on the notes based on our stressed cash flow scenarios.

-- S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, our ratings on the class A and B
notes will remain within one rating category of the assigned 'AAA
(sf)' and 'AA (sf)' ratings, respectively, in the next 12 months,
and our ratings on the class C, D, and E notes, will remain within
two rating categories of the assigned 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB
(sf)' ratings, respectively, in the next 12 months, based on our
credit stability criteria."

-- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to be
made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
assigned ratings.

-- The characteristics of the pool being securitized and
receivables expected to be purchased during the revolving period.

-- The operational risks associated with OneMain Holdings Inc.'s
hybrid business model.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

RATINGS ASSIGNED
  OneMain Financial Issuance Trust 2018-2

  Class     Rating      Type            Interest       Amount
                                        rate         (mil. $)
  A         AAA (sf)    Senior          3.57          255.390
  B         AA (sf)     Subordinate     3.89           33.120
  C         A (sf)      Subordinate     4.04           21.310
  D         BBB (sf)    Subordinate     4.29           26.460
  E         BB (sf)     Subordinate     5.77           32.160


PALMER SQUARE 2018-1: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to Palmer Square Loan Funding, 2018-1, Ltd./LLC:

-- $338,200,000 class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59,300,000 class A-2 notes 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $33,300,000 class B notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,000,000 class C notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $17,200,000 class D notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5,000,000 class E notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the subordinated notes.

Transaction Summary

Palmer Square Loan Funding 2018-1, Ltd. (the issuer) and Palmer
Square Loan Funding 2018-1, LLC (the co-issuer) comprise a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be serviced by
Palmer Square Capital Management LLC (PSCM). Net proceeds from the
issuance of the secured and subordinated notes will be used to
purchase a static pool of primarily senior secured leveraged loans,
totaling $500 million. The CLO will have an approximately 1.1-year
noncall period.

Key Rating Drivers

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) available to
the class A-1, A-2, B, C, D and E notes, in addition to excess
spread, is sufficient to protect against portfolio default and
recovery rate projections in each class's respective rating stress
scenario. The degree of CE available to class E notes is in line
with the average 'Bsf'-category CE of recent CLO issuances. The
degree of CE available to class A-1, A-2, B, C and D notes is below
each rating level's recent average CE; however, the transaction has
a shorter risk horizon and cash flow modeling results for the notes
indicate performance in line with their respective ratings.

'B+/B' Asset Quality: The average credit quality of the purchased
portfolio is 'B+/B', which is comparable to recent CLOs. Issuers
rated in the 'B' rating category denote a highly speculative credit
quality. In Fitch's opinion, each class of rated notes is projected
to be sufficiently robust against default rates in line with its
applicable rating stress.

Strong Recovery Expectations: The portfolio consists of 97.3%
first-lien senior secured loans and 2.7% second-lien loans.
Approximately 89.1% of the portfolio has either strong recovery
prospects or a Fitch-assigned Recovery Rating of 'RR2' or higher,
and the base case recovery assumption is 80.2%.

Shorter Risk Horizon: The transaction does not have a reinvestment
period. Therefore, the transaction's risk horizon is equal to the
portfolio's weighted average life (WAL). The shorter risk horizon
means the transaction is less vulnerable to underlying price
movements and economic and asset performance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch evaluated the structure's sensitivity to the potential
variability of key model assumptions including decreases in
recovery rates and increases in default rates. Fitch expects the
class A-1 and A-2 notes to remain investment grade, even under the
most extreme sensitivity scenarios, and for the other rated classes
to remain within two rating categories of their assigned ratings.
Sensitivity scenarios' passing ratings were 'AAAsf' for the class
A-1 notes, and ranged between 'A+sf' and 'AAAsf' for the class A-2
notes, 'BB+sf' and 'A+sf' for the class B notes, 'BB-sf' and 'Asf'
for the class C notes, 'CCCsf' and 'BBBsf' for the class D notes,
and below 'CCCsf' and 'BB+sf' for the class E notes.


PALMER SQUARE 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on Cl. D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Palmer Square CLO 2018-1
Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2018-1 LLC's $460.0 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Palmer Square CLO 2018-1 Ltd./Palmer Square CLO 2018-1 LLC

  Class                  Rating         Amount
                                      (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)       315.00
  A-2                    AA (sf)         65.00
  B (deferrable)         A (sf)          30.00
  C (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)       25.00
  D (deferrable)         BB- (sf)        25.00
  Subordinated notes     NR              49.90

  NR--Not rated.


PHH MORTGAGE 2007-SL1: Moody's Hikes Cl. M-3 Debt Rating to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class M-3 from
PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2007-SL1.

Complete rating action is:

Issuer: PHH Mortgage Trust, Series 2007-SL1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pool and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on the
pool. The rating upgrade is a result of the improving performance
of the related pool and increase in credit enhancement available to
the bond.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


PROSPER MARKETPLACE 2018-1: Fitch Rates $79.45MM Cl. C Notes BB-sf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to the notes issued by Prosper Marketplace Issuance Trust,
Series 2018-1 (PMIT 2018-1):

-- $387,800,000 class A 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $112,000,000 class B 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $79,450,000 class C 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The class D notes are not rated by Fitch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Changes from Prior PMIT Deals: Structural changes to PMIT 2018-1
include the addition of class D notes to the capital structure and
the inclusion of a prefunding period, subject to portfolio limits,
spanning approximately six weeks, over which approximately 15% of
the final collateral pool will be originated.

Collateral Quality: PMIT 2018-1 has a weighted average (WA) FICO
score of 717, including 18.6% of non-prime borrowers with FICO
scores below 680, improved from series 2017-3. Fitch assigned
cumulative gross default (CGD) assumptions for the 36- and 60-month
loans in this pool of 14.0% and 20%, respectively. These
assumptions are unchanged (36-month) and lower by 0.25% (60-month)
compared to 2017-3, despite the stronger pool, due to observations
of weakening performance.

Recent Asset Performance: Recent Prosper loan vintages have
underperformed expectations, consistent with much of the consumer
sector. While Prosper and WebBank have implemented underwriting
changes to improve performance within internal credit tiers, early
delinquency data for the 2017 loans indicates performance in line
with weaker historical periods such as the first half of 2016. To
account for this, Fitch focused on the early 2016 period in its
default assumption derivation to project future portfolio
performance.

Limitations of Historical Data: While performance data is available
since 2010, originations prior to 2013 are not representative of
current origination volumes and underwriting practices. Fitch
applied high default multiples of 3.3x and 2.7x for the 36- and
60-month loans, respectively, to address this risk.

Rating Cap at 'Asf': Fitch placed a rating cap on the notes at
'Asf' category, considering primarily the sector's untested
performance throughout a full economic cycle. History for unsecured
installment loans originated via online platforms such as Prosper's
thus far has only been during benign macro environment.
Furthermore, the underlying consumer loans are likely at or near
the bottom of repayment priority for consumers, since repayment
does not provide the consumer ongoing utility as auto loans, credit
cards and cellphone plans do. The cap does not currently constrain
the ratings.

Adequate Servicing Capabilities: Prosper will service the pool of
loans, and Citibank, N.A., the named backup, has committed to a
transfer period of 30 business days. Systems & Services
Technologies (SST), the sub-backup servicer, will be responsible
for the operations in the event of a servicer transition. Fitch
considers all parties to be adequate servicers for this pool based
on prior experience and capabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults or write-offs
on customer accounts could produce loss levels higher than the base
case and would likely result in declines of CE and remaining loss
coverage levels available to the investments. Decreased CE may make
certain ratings on the investments susceptible to potential
negative rating actions, depending on the extent of the decline in
coverage.

Rating sensitivities provide greater insight into the model-implied
sensitivities the transaction faces when one or two risk factors
are stressed while holding others equal. The modeling process first
uses the estimation and stress of a base case loss assumption to
reflect asset performance in a stressed environment. Second,
structural protection was analyzed with Fitch's proprietary cash
flow model. The results below should only be considered as one
potential outcome as the transaction is exposed to multiple risk
factors that are all dynamic variables.

-- Default increase 10%: class A 'BBB+sf'; class B 'BB+sf'; class

    C 'B+sf';
-- Default increase 25%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'BBsf'; class C

    'Bsf';
-- Default increase 50%: class A 'BB+sf'; class B 'B+sf'; class C

    'CCCsf';
-- Recoveries decrease to 0%: class A 'BBB+sf'; class B 'BB+sf';
    class C 'B+sf'.



PURCHASING POWER 2018-A: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Series 2018-A Notes issued by Purchasing Power Funding 2018-A,
LLC:

-- $134,510,000 Class A, Series 2018-A rated AA (sf)
-- $13,590,000 Class C, Series 2018-A rated BBB (sf)
-- $13,210,000 Class D, Series 2018-A rated BB (low) (sf)

In addition to finalizing the provisional ratings above, due to the
increased availability of excess spread, DBRS assigns a final
rating of A (high) (sf) to the Class B notes compared with the
provisional rating of A (sf) as follows:

-- $13,690,000 Class B, Series 2018-A rated A (high) (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

(1) The transaction's form and sufficiency of available credit  
enhancement in the form of excess discount, overcollateralization,
subordination and a reserve account.

(2) The credit enhancement present in the transaction was  
sufficient to withstand stressed cash flow scenarios, with note
holders being paid timely interest and full principal in accordance
with the transaction documents.

(3) Inclusion of structural elements featured in the deal, such as
the following:

       -- Eligibility criteria for receivables that are
          permissible in the transaction.

       -- Concentration limits designed to maintain a consistent
          profile of the receivables in the pool.

       -- Performance-based Rapid Amortization Events that when
          breached will end the revolving period and begin
          amortization.

(4) The Seller and Servicer's capabilities with respect to
originations, underwriting and servicing.

(5) The presence of a Back-up Servicer and Back-up Servicer
Sub-Agent acceptable to DBRS, capable of taking over servicing
responsibilities within 30 days, upon a Servicer Default.

(6) The ability of the transaction's capital structure to absorb
the impact of dilution related to the exposure to returned
receivables not repurchased by the seller.

(7) The sufficiency of historical performance data provided and
used in the assessment of expected losses.

(8) The inclusion of transaction provisions that sufficiently
limit the risks associated with perfection of electronic contracts
managed by the transaction sponsor. The legal structure and
presence of legal opinions addressing the assignment of collateral
assets to the Trust and consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
for U.S. Structured Finance."


READY CAPITAL 2018-4: DBRS Assigns Prov. B(low) on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Ready Capital Mortgage Trust 2018-4 Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates to be issued by Ready Capital Mortgage
Trust 2018-4:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class IO-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class IO-B/C at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class IO-A and IO-B/C balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 50 fixed-rate loans secured by 54
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The pool was analyzed to
determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the long-term
probability of loan default within the term and its liquidity at
maturity. When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the
DBRS In-Place net cash flow (NCF) and their respective actual
constants, 20 loans, representing 42.5% of the total pool, had a
DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x),
a threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
With the exception of ten loans, representing 21.0% of the pool
trust balance, all other loans are structured without any
interest-only (IO) period, thus reducing refinance default risk.
The current trust balance is expected to amortize by 15.7% at
maturity.

Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current low
interest rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants to
the balloon amounts. This resulted in 20 loans, representing 41.4%
of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x, and three loans,
representing 13.0% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below 0.90x.
The DBRS term metrics are based on the DBRS In-Place NCF, and the
DBRS refinance metrics are based on the DBRS Stabilized NCF. For
loans without future finding components, DBRS set the DBRS
Stabilized NCF at an equal level to the DBRS In-Place NCF. The
properties with future funding components were typically
transitioning with potential upside in the cash flow; however, DBRS
does not give full credit to the stabilization if there are no
holdbacks or if other loan structural features in place were
insufficient to support such treatment. Furthermore, even with the
structure provided, DBRS generally does not assume the assets will
stabilize above market levels.

The loans are generally secured by traditional property types
(i.e., retail, multifamily, office and industrial), with no
exposure to higher-volatility property types such as hotels. There
are only two loans, representing 5.0% of the pool, secured by
non-traditional properties types (i.e., self-storage and MHC).
There are 23 loans in the pool, representing 38.7% of the mortgage
loan cut-off date balance, secured by multifamily properties.
Multifamily properties benefit from staggered lease rollover and
generally low expense ratios compared with other property types.
While revenue is quick to decline in a downturn because of the
short-term nature of the leases, it is also quick to respond when
the market improves. None of the multifamily loans in the pool are
currently secured by student or military housing properties, which
often exhibit higher cash flow volatility than traditional
multifamily properties.

The pool is relatively diverse based on loan size, with a
concentration profile equivalent to that of a pool of 29
equal-sized loans. Increased pool diversity helps to insulate the
higher-rated classes from event risk. No loan accounts for more
than 10.0% of the pool trust balance, and only two loans account
for more than 5.0% of the trust balance. The pool has an average
trust balance of $3.3 million; this is significantly lower than the
average loan balance for conduit loans, which is typically above
$15 million. Historically, loans with smaller balances have
experienced significantly higher loss severities in the event of
default than larger loans.

Eleven loans, representing 16.8% of the pool, are located in rural
or tertiary markets. Properties located in tertiary and rural
markets are penalized with significantly higher loss severities
than those located in urban and suburban markets. The loans secured
by properties in these markets have a straight-line average DBRS
Exit Debt Yield of 12.4%, which is substantially higher than the
pool's weighted-average (WA) DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 10.7%.

Of the 21 loans DBRS sampled, six loans, representing 14.6% of the
pool (23.1% of the DBRS sample) were identified with Below Average
or Average (-) property quality. Lower-quality properties are less
likely to retain existing tenants, resulting in less stable
performance. The six loans have a straight-line average DBRS Exit
Debt Yield of 12.0%, which is substantially higher than the pool's
WA DBRS Exit Debt Yield of 10.7%. Seven loans, representing 22.9%
of the pool, have sponsorship and/or loan collateral with a prior
discounted payoff, loan default, DST borrower, limited liquidity
relative to loan obligation, and a historical negative credit event
or have a prior or pending litigation issue with the respective
property. DBRS increased the probability of default for loans with
identified sponsorship concerns and loans with Below Average or
Average (-) property quality.

Classes IO-A and IO-B/C are IO certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO ratings mirror the
lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one notch if
senior in the waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


SKOPOS AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes to
be issued by Skopos Auto Receivables Trust 2018-1 (SKOP 2018-1):

-- $76,950,000 Class A Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $21,075,000 Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- $27,090,000 Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $21,870,000 Class D Notes rated BB (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and  
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization
     (OC), subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and
     excess spread. Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to
     support the DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss
     assumption under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow

     assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
     which they have invested. For the transaction, the rating
     addresses the payment of timely interest on a monthly basis
     and the payment of principal by the final scheduled
     distribution date.

-- The capabilities of Skopos Financial, LLC (Skopos) with regard

     to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Skopos and
     considers the entity to be an acceptable originator of
     subprime automobile loan contracts and an acceptable servicer

     of subprime automobile loan contracts with an acceptable
     backup servicer.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of Systems and
     Services Technologies, Inc. and considers the entity to be an

     acceptable backup servicer of subprime automobile loan
     contracts.

-- Skopos outsources certain operational functions to CSC Logic,
     Inc. (CSC). DBRS has performed an operational review of CSC
     and considers the entity to be an acceptable provider of
     servicing-related processes for subprime automobile loan
     contracts.

-- The Skopos senior management team has considerable experience
     and a successful track record within the subprime auto
     finance industry.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and the performance of
     Skopos' auto loan portfolio.

-- Availability of sufficient historical performance data on the
     Skopos portfolio.

-- The statistical pool characteristics: (1) The pool is seasoned

     by approximately 11 months and contains Skopos originations
     from Q4 2012 through Q1 2018. (2) The weighted-average (WA)
     remaining term of the collateral pool is approximately 60
     months. (3) The WA FICO score of the pool is 549.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that
     address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-
     consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Skopos,
     that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
     in the assets and the consistency with DBRS's Legal Criteria
     for U.S. Structured Finance.

The SKOP 2018-1 transaction represents the third securitization
completed by Skopos and will offer both senior and subordinate
rated securities. The receivables securitized in SKOP 2018-1 will
be subprime automobile loan contracts secured by new and used
automobiles, light duty trucks, minivans and sport utility
vehicles.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 58.55% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool
(39.55%), the Reserve Account (2.00%) and OC (17.00%). The ratings
on the Class B, Class C and Class D Notes reflect 46.65%, 31.35%
and 19.00% of initial hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Additional credit support may be provided from excess spread
available in the structure.


SLM STUDENT: Fitch Affirms Bsf Ratings on 3 Trust Series
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following ratings:

SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-1 (SLM 2008-1)
-- Class A-4 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-2 (SLM 2008-2)
-- Class A-3 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2008-3 (SLM 2008-3)
-- Class A-3 at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Class B at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

For all three trusts, the senior notes miss their legal final
maturity date under both Fitch's base cases. This technical default
would result in interest payments being diverted away from class B
notes, causing them to default as well. In affirming at 'Bsf'
rather than 'CCCsf' or below, Fitch has considered qualitative
factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes upon reaching
10% pool factor, and the revolving credit agreement in place for
the benefit of the noteholders, and the eventual full payment of
principal in modelling.

Each trust has entered into a revolving credit agreement with
Navient by which it may borrow funds at maturity in order to pay
off the notes. Because Navient has the option but not the
obligation to lend to the trust, Fitch cannot give full
quantitative credit to this agreement. However, the agreement does
provide qualitative comfort that Navient is committed to limiting
investors' exposure to maturity risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently
'AAA'/Outlook Stable.

Collateral Performance for SLM 2008-1: Fitch assumes a default rate
of 29.50% and an 88.50% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumes a sustainable constant default rate of
5.2%, and a constant prepayment rate of 11.0% is used as the
sustainable rate in cash flow modelling. Fitch applies the standard
default timing curve in its credit stress cash flow analysis. The
claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.5% in the base case and 3.0%
in the 'AAA' case. The TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, and
income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) are 9.2%, 17.4%, and
17.8%, respectively, and are used as the starting point in cash
flow modelling. Subsequent declines or increases are modelled as
per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.03%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Collateral Performance for SLM 2008-2: Fitch assumes a default rate
of 25.25% and a 75.75% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumes a sustainable constant default rate of
4.2%, and a constant prepayment rate of 11.0% is used as the
sustainable rate in cash flow modelling. Fitch applies the standard
default timing curve in its credit stress cash flow analysis. The
claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.5% in the base case and 3.0%
in the 'AAA' case. The TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, and
income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) are 8.4%, 16.9%, and
21.3%, respectively, and are used as the starting point in cash
flow modelling. Subsequent declines or increases are modelled as
per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.07%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Collateral Performance for SLM 2008-3: Fitch assumes a default rate
of 24% and a 72% default rate under the 'AAA' credit stress
scenario. Fitch assumes a sustainable constant default rate of
4.2%, and a constant prepayment rate of 11.0% is used as the
sustainable rate in cash flow modelling. Fitch applies the standard
default timing curve in its credit stress cash flow analysis. The
claim reject rate is assumed to be 0.5% in the base case and 3.0%
in the 'AAA' case. The TTM levels of deferment, forbearance, and
income-based repayment (prior to adjustment) are 9.2%, 17.1%, and
19.5%, respectively, and are used as the starting point in cash
flow modelling. Subsequent declines or increases are modelled as
per criteria. The borrower benefit is assumed to be approximately
0.03%, based on information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for this transaction
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for SAP and the securities. For SLM 2008-1,
approximately 5% of the student loans are indexed to T-Bill, and
95% are indexed to one-month LIBOR. For SLM 2008-2 and SLM 2008-3,
approximately 2% of the student loans are indexed to T-Bill, and
98% are indexed to one-month LIBOR. Fitch applies its standard
basis and interest rate stresses to this transaction as per
criteria.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by excess
spread, overcollateralization, and for the Class A notes,
subordination. As of December 2017, total and senior parity ratios
for SLM 2008-1 (including the reserve) are 100.39% (0.39% CE) and
113.99% (12.27% CE) respectively. Liquidity support is provided by
a reserve sized at 0.25% of the pool balance, currently equal to
the floor of $1,499,914. Cash is currently being released as total
reported parity is at release level of 100% excluding the reserve.
For SLM 2008-2, total and senior parity ratios (including the
reserve) are 100.31% (0.31% CE) and 110.95% (9.87% CE)
respectively. Liquidity support is provided by the reserve,
currently equal to the floor of $2,199,978. Cash is currently being
released as total reported parity is at release level of 100%
excluding the reserve. For SLM 2008-3, total and senior parity
ratios (including the reserve) are 102.25% (2.20% CE) and 113.60%
(11.97% CE) respectively. Liquidity support is provided by a
reserve sized at 0.25% of the pool balance, currently equal to the
floor of $1,000,020. Cash is currently being released as total OC
amount is at target OC of $5.84 million.

Maturity Risk: For all three trusts, Fitch's SLABS cash flow model
indicates that the outstanding senior notes do not pay off before
their maturity date in all of Fitch's modelling scenarios,
including the base cases. If the breach of the outstanding senior
notes' maturity date triggers an event of default, interest
payments will be diverted away from the class B notes, causing them
to fail the base cases as well.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, LLC. (formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc.). Fitch
believes Navient to be an acceptable servicer, due to its extensive
track record as the largest servicer of FFELP loans.


STACR 2018-HQA1: Fitch to Rate 12 Note Classes 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Freddie Mac's Structured Agency
Credit Risk Debt Notes, Series 2018-HQA1 (STACR 2018-HQA1) as
follows:

-- $225,000,000 class M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2A notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2B notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $620,000,000 class M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $620,000,000 class M-2R exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $620,000,000 class M-2S exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook  
    Stable;
-- $620,000,000 class M-2T exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $620,000,000 class M-2U exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook  
    Stable;
-- $620,000,000 class M-2I notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2AR exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2AS exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2AT exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2AU exchangeable notes 'BBsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2AI notional exchangeable notes 'BBsf';
    Outlook Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2BR exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2BS exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2BT exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2BU exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- $310,000,000 class M-2BI notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
    Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

-- $140,000,000 class B-1 notes;
-- $38,497,995,063 class A-H reference tranche;
-- $95,816,625 class M-1H reference tranche;
-- $131,122,860 class M-2AH reference tranche;
-- $131,122,861 class M-2BH reference tranche;
-- $60,510,391 class B-1H reference tranche;
-- $200,510,391 class B-2H reference tranche.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-1 notes reflects the 3.20%
subordination provided by the 1.10% class M-2A notes, the 1.10%
class M-2B notes, the 0.50% class B-1 notes and their corresponding
reference tranches, as well as the 0.50% class B-2H reference
tranche. The 'BBsf' rating for the M-2A notes reflects the 2.10%
subordination provided by the 1.10% class M-2B notes, the 0.50%
class B-1 notes and their corresponding reference tranches, as well
as the 0.50% class B-2H reference tranche. The 'Bsf' rating for the
M-2B notes reflects the 1.00% subordination provided by the 0.50%
class B-1 notes and its corresponding reference tranche, as well as
the 0.50% class B-2H reference tranche. The notes are general
unsecured obligations of Freddie Mac (AAA/Stable) subject to the
credit and principal payment risk of a pool of certain residential
mortgage loans held in various Freddie Mac-guaranteed MBS.

The objective of the transaction is to transfer credit risk from
Freddie Mac to private investors with respect to a $40.1 billion
pool of mortgage loans currently held and guaranteed by Freddie Mac
where principal repayment of the notes is subject to the
performance of a reference pool of mortgage loans. As loans
liquidate or other credit events occur, the outstanding principal
balance of the debt notes will be reduced by the actual loan's loss
severity (LS) percentage related to those credit events, which
includes borrower's delinquent interest.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS senior-subordinate securities, Freddie Mac
will be responsible for making monthly payments of interest and
principal to investors. Because of the counterparty dependence on
Freddie Mac, Fitch's expected rating on the M-1, M-2A and M-2B
notes will be based on the lower of: the quality of the mortgage
loan reference pool and credit enhancement (CE) available through
subordination, and Freddie Mac's Issuer Default Rating. The M-1,
M-2A, M-2B, and B-1 notes will be issued as LIBOR-based floaters.

In the event that the one-month LIBOR rate falls below zero and
becomes negative, the coupons of the interest-only MAC notes may be
subject to a downward adjustment, so that the aggregate interest
payable to such MAC notes and the other MAC notes in the related
combination does not exceed the interest payable to the notes for
which such classes (or related MAC notes in the case of certain
combinations) were exchanged. The notes will carry a 12.5-year
legal final maturity.

In the event that the ICE Benchmark Administration ceases to set or
publish a rate for LIBOR, Freddie Mac may elect, at its sole
discretion, to use an alternative index in lieu of LIBOR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Freddie
Mac between April 1, 2017 and Sept. 30, 2017. The reference pool
will consist of loans with loan to value (LTV) ratios greater than
80% and less than or equal to 97%. Overall, the reference pool's
collateral characteristics are similar to recent STACR transactions
and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

Home Possible Exposure (Negative): Approximately 18% of the
reference pool was originated under Freddie Mac's Home Possible or
Home Possible Advantage program, which is the largest concentration
that Fitch has seen in a STACR transaction (approximately 7% of
STACR 2017-HQA2 was originated under the Home Possible program).
The Home Possible program targets low- to moderate-income
homebuyers or buyers in high-cost or underrepresented communities,
and provides flexibility for a borrower's LTV, income, down payment
and mortgage insurance coverage requirements.

Fitch anticipates higher default risk for Home Possible loans due
to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and property value),
which is reflected in increased credit enhancement.

Clean Pay History for Loans in Disaster Areas (Positive): Freddie
Mac will not remove loans in counties designated as natural
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, any loans with a prior delinquency were removed from the
reference pool, per the eligibility criteria. Therefore, all loans
in the reference pool in the disaster areas have had clean pay
histories since the occurrence of the natural disaster events.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 99.9% of
the loans are covered either by borrower paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI) or lender paid MI (LPMI). While the Freddie Mac guarantee
allows for credit to be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the
amount of BPMI available due to the automatic termination provision
as required by the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance
is first scheduled to reach 78%. LPMI does not automatically
terminate and remains for the life of the loan.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The M-1, M-2A, M-2B and B-1
notes benefit from a 12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any
losses on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Freddie Mac and do not affect the transaction. In addition, if a
credit event occurs prior to maturity, but the losses from
liquidations or loan modifications are not realized until after the
final maturity date, the losses will not be passed through to
noteholders.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Freddie Mac has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its lender
approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty risk
and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan
quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a
tight control environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has
determined Freddie Mac to be an above average aggregator for its
2013 and later product. The lower risk was accounted for by Fitch
by applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes the transaction benefits from solid alignment of
interests. Freddie Mac will retain credit risk in the transaction
by holding the senior reference tranche A-H, which has 4.00% of
loss protection, as well as a minimum of 5% of the M-1, M-2A, M-2B
and B-1 reference tranches, and a minimum of 75% of the first-loss
B-2H reference tranche. Initially, Freddie Mac will retain an
approximately 29.8% vertical slice/interest in the M-1, M-2A and
M-2B reference tranches.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Freddie Mac into receivership if it determines
that the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) assets are less
than its obligations for longer than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Freddie Mac if it is determined that such action
would promote an orderly administration of the GSE's affairs. Fitch
believes that the U.S. government will continue to support Freddie
Mac, as reflected in its current rating of the GSE. However, if, at
some point, Fitch views the support as being reduced and
receivership likely, the rating of Freddie Mac could be downgraded,
and ratings on the M-1, M-2A and M-2B notes, along with their
corresponding MAC notes, could be affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0%, in addition to the
model projected 24.7% at the 'BBBsf' level and 20.0% at the 'BBsf'
level. The analysis indicates that there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 36% would potentially move the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, down to
non-investment grade, and down to 'CCCsf', respectively.


STACR 2018-SPI1: Fitch to Rate Class M-2 Certificates BB-sf
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Freddie Mac's transaction, Structured
Agency Credit Risk Securitized Participation Interests Trust Series
2018-SPI1 (STACR 2018-SPI1) as follows:

-- $68,209,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $36,750,000 class M-2 certificates 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

-- $0 class X certificates;
-- $17,493,000 class B-1 certificates;
-- $17,495,325 class B-2 certificates;
-- $34,998,325 class B exchangeable certificates.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-1 certificates reflects the 2.05%
subordination provided by the 1.05% class M-2 certificates, the
0.50% class B-1 certificates and the 0.50% class B-2 certificates.

The STACR SPI transactions replace Freddie Mac's Whole Loan
Security (WLS) program where conforming and super-conforming loans
are pooled and credit risk sold to investors. Payments on the
collateral are used to make payments on the SPI certificates.
Freddie Mac issued its first STACR SPI deal in 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of 25- and 30-year fully amortizing fixed-rate loans acquired by
Freddie Mac. The weighted average (WA) credit score of 761, WA
original combined LTV of 80.0% and WA debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of
36% reflect the strong credit profile of the underlying collateral.
The pool is also geographically diverse, with the top three
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) comprising only 18.5%.

Super-Conforming Loans Included (Positive): The pool consists of
roughly 25% (17% by loan count) super-conforming loans, i.e. loan
amounts greater than the conforming limit of $424,100 but capped at
$636,150 for single-unit properties originated in 2017 located in
higher cost areas, sourced from eight Freddie Mac Participation
Certificates (PCs). While the WA credit score and LTVs are
comparable to the conforming loan portion, super-conforming loans
benefit from higher property values and larger loan balances.

New Transaction Structure (Neutral): The SPI transaction is
collateralized by participation interests (PI) in 9,460 mortgage
loans, 96% of which are deposited into PCs and 4% are deposited
into the SPI trust. The PI for loans in the PCs that become 120
days delinquent are purchased by Freddie Mac from the PC and
deposited into the SPI trust. Freddie Mac is repaid from SPI's cash
flows at the top of the waterfall, vis-a-vis the Class X
certificates, from proceeds otherwise distributable to classes M-1,
M-2 B-1 and B-2 certificates.

Potential Interest Shortfalls (Negative): Classes M-1 and M-2 may
be subject to long periods of interest deferral for loans that
become 120 days delinquent, since accrued interest distributions on
the class X certificates are prioritized ahead of the rated
classes. Principal collections are not allowed to cover interest
shortfalls except in limited circumstances.

Modification Treatment (Neutral): Rate modifications and expenses
will be absorbed by interest due to the class B-1 and B-2 first and
any excess amount may be absorbed by principal up to 10bps of the
aggregate class principal balance of M-1, M-2, B-1 and B-2 classes,
as long as the B-1 and B-2 classes are outstanding. Similar to
other STACR actual loss transactions, principal forbearance is
treated as a realized loss and forgiveness modifications are made
to the SPI trust by Freddie Mac, which will only be reimbursable to
Freddie Mac if a loan with principal forgiven defaults.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Freddie
Mac has a well-established and disciplined process in place for the
purchase of loans and views its lender-approval and oversight
processes for minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring sound loan
quality acquisitions as positive. Loan quality control (QC) review
processes are thorough and indicate a tight control environment
that limits origination risk. Fitch has determined Freddie Mac to
be an above-average aggregator for its 2013 and later product.
Fitch accounted for the lower risk by applying a lower default
estimate for the mortgages.

Strong Alignment of Interests (Positive): Fitch believes the
transaction benefits from a solid alignment of interests. Freddie
Mac will retain the class X certificate as well as approximately 5%
of the initial balance of each of the subordinate certificates.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 27.9% of
the loans are covered either by borrower-paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI). Freddie Mac will guarantee the MI
claim amount. While the Freddie Mac guarantee allows for credit to
be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI
available due to the automatic termination provision as required by
the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance is first
scheduled to reach 78% LTV. LPMI does not automatically terminate
and remains for the life of the loan.

Satisfactory Due Diligence (Neutral): A third-party due diligence
review was completed on a statistical sample of the entire pool
(350 loans) by Clayton Services LLC (Clayton). Of the 350 loans
reviewed, seven loans had material findings and were graded 'C' or
'D' due to missing or incomplete documentation, which were all
removed from the pool. The diligence results generally reflected
solid manufacturing controls and, consequently, no adjustments were
made to Fitch's loss expectations.

Home Possible Exposure (Negative): Approximately 1.94% of the
reference pool was originated under Freddie Mac's Home Possible or
Home Possible Advantage program. Home Possible is a program that
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
Home Possible loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV
and property value), which is reflected in increased loss
expectations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 23.9% at the 'BBB-sf' level and 19.3% at the
'BB-sf' level. The analysis indicates that there is some potential
rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model
projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities, which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 10%, 10% and 31% would potentially move the
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


TCP DLF VIII 2018: DBRS Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings of AAA (sf) and BBB (low)
(sf) to the Class A-1 Notes and Combination Notes, respectively,
and new ratings of AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and (B (sf)
to the Class A-2 Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes
and Class E Notes, respectively (collectively, the Notes), issued
by TCP DLF VIII 2018 CLO, LLC (the Issuer) pursuant to the Note
Purchase and Security Agreement dated as of February 28, 2018,
among TCP DLF VIII 2018 CLO, LLC as Issuer; U.S. Bank National
Association (rated AA (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS) as
Collateral Agent, Custodian, Collateral Administrator, Information
Agent and Note Agent; and the Purchasers referred to therein.

Debt Rated        Action               Rating
----------        ------               ------
Class A-1 Notes   Provisional-New      AAA(sf)
Class A-2 Notes   New Rating           AA(sf)
Class B Notes     New Rating           A(sf)
Class C Notes     New Rating           BBB(sf)
Class D Notes     New Rating           BB(sf)
Class E Notes     New Rating           B(sf)
Combination Notes Provisional-New      BBB(low)(sf)

The ratings on the Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes address the
timely payment of interest (excluding the additional 1% of interest
payable at the Post-Default Rate, as defined in the Note Purchase
and Security Agreement referred to above) and the ultimate payment
of principal on or before the Stated Maturity (as defined in the
Note Purchase and Security Agreement referred to above). The
ratings on the Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes and
Class E Notes address the ultimate payment of interest (excluding
the additional 1% of interest payable at the Post-Default Rate, as
defined in the Note Purchase and Security Agreement referred to
above) and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Stated Maturity (as defined in the Note Purchase and Security
Agreement referred to above). The rating on the Combination Notes
addresses the ultimate repayment of the Combination Note Rated
Principal Balance (as defined in the Note Purchase and Security
Agreement referred to above) on or before the Stated Maturity (as
defined in the Note Purchase and Security Agreement referred to
above).

The Notes issued by the Issuer will be collateralized primarily by
a portfolio of U.S. middle-market corporate loans. The Issuer will
be managed by Series I of SVOF/MM, LLC (the Collateral Manager), a
consolidated subsidiary of Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC.

As of the Closing Date of February 28, 2018, the transaction
portfolio contained no collateral obligations. The Issuer will
start to draw on the Notes in reverse-sequential order based on
predetermined initial funding dates, as specified in the Note
Purchase and Security Agreement. Upon each notice of funding, the
Collateral Manager will ensure that certain tests are in compliance
and conditions to funding are met.

The Combination Notes shall consist of a portion of the principal
amount (the Components) of the initial original principal amounts
of each of the Class A-2 Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class
D Notes, Class E Notes and Subordinated Notes (the Underlying
Classes). Each Component of the Combination Notes will be treated
as Notes of the respective Underlying Class. Payments on any
Underlying Class shall be allocated to the relevant Combination
Notes in the proportion that the outstanding principal amount of
the applicable Component bears to the outstanding principal amount
of such Underlying Class as a whole (including all related
Components). Each Component of the Combination Notes shall bear
interest and shall receive payments in the same manner as the
related Underlying Class, and each Component shall mature and be
payable on the Stated Maturity in the same manner as the related
Underlying Class.

All payments made on the Combination Notes (whether interest,
principal or otherwise) shall reduce the Combination Note Rated
Principal Balance of the Combination Notes provided that the
Combination Notes shall remain outstanding until each of the
Components shall have been redeemed and paid in full.

The ratings reflect the following:

(1) The Note Purchase and Security Agreement dated as of February
     28, 2018.

(2) The integrity of the transaction structure.

(3) DBRS's assessment of the portfolio quality.

(4) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral

     loss rates under various cash flow stress scenarios.

(5) DBRS's assessment of the origination, servicing and
     collateralized loan obligation management capabilities of  
     Series I of SVOF/MM, LLC.

To assess portfolio credit quality, DBRS provides a credit estimate
or internal assessment for each non-financial corporate obligor in
the portfolio not rated by DBRS. Credit estimates are not ratings;
rather, they represent a model-driven default probability for each
obligor that is used in assigning a rating to the facility.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


TOWD POINT: Moody's Hikes $984.5MM of RMBS Issued 2015 & 2017
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 32 tranches
from five RMBS transactions issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust.
The transactions are backed by seasoned performing and
re-performing mortgage loans with a large percentage of the loans
previously modified.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-3

Cl. B1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2018 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2018 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2018 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jan 8, 2018 Assigned A2
(sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A2A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A2B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M1A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M1B, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M2A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M2B, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. X1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. X3, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. X4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. X5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. X6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-3

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6

Cl. A3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades result primarily from the correction of an
error related to the delinquency paystring calculation for these
transactions. The delinquency paystring data reported by the
sponsor of the Towd Point transactions was calculated based on the
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) method; however Moody's
calculates its Constant Default Rate (CDR) assumption for these
pools using the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) delinquency
method, which employs a different definition of delinquency than
that used in the MBA method. In Moody's prior analysis, Moody's
failed to recognize this mismatch and thus did not convert the
MBA-calculated data into the OTS method before calculating the CDR
assumptions for the pools. This has been corrected, resulting in
lower projected pool losses, and action reflects the appropriate
delinquency calculations for these transactions.

The rating upgrades are also driven by an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the rated bonds coupled with lower
projected pool loss derived from the conversion of the paystring,
and for the TPMT 2015-3 transaction, the strong performance of the
underlying loans in the pools. The actions reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on the pool, which incorporate Moody's assessment
of the weak representations and warranties frameworks of the
transactions, the due diligence findings of the third party review
received at the time of issuance, and the strength of Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS") as the transaction's servicer.

Moody's base Moody's expected losses on a pool of re-performing
mortgage loans on Moody's estimates of 1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and 2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances. Moody's estimates of defaults are driven
by annual delinquency assumptions adjusted for roll-rates,
prepayments and default burnout factors. In estimating defaults on
these pools, Moody's used expected annual delinquency rates of
6.24% to 10.0% and expected prepayment rates of 8.0% to 9.0% based
on the collateral characteristics of the individual pools.

The rating upgrades further reflect the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds, owing to the sequential pay
structure of the transactions. Credit enhancement for Towd Point
Mortgage Trust 2017-1 Class A2, Class M1, Class M2, and Class B1,
for Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2 Class A2, Class M1, Class M2,
and Class B1, for Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-3 Class M2, Class
B1, and Class B2 has increased between 0.7% to 4.4% since closing.
Credit Enhancement for Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-3 Class M1,
Class M2, Class B1, and Class B2, has increased between 0.3% to
0.9% since assigning ratings to the transaction in January 2018.
Credit Enhancement for Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6 Class B1,
and Class B2 has increased between 0.3% to 0.7% since closing.

Additionally, bonds in Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, 2017-2,
2017-3, and 2017-6 benefit from the excess spread available in the
transaction. The upgrades of the exchangeable and interest-only
certificates reflect the upgraded ratings of their related bonds.
Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1 Class A2A, Class A2B, Class M1A,
Class M1B, Class M2A, and Class M2B, Towd Point Mortgage Trust
2017-2 Class A3, and Class A4, and Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6
Cl. A3 are exchangeable certificates.

The methodologies used in rating Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-3
Cl. B1, Cl. B2, Cl. M1, Cl. M2, Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1
Cl. A2, Cl. A2A, Cl. A2B, Cl. B1, Cl. M1, Cl. M2, Cl. M1A, Cl. M1B,
Cl. M2A, Cl. M2B, Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-2 Cl. A2, Cl. A3,
Cl. A4, Cl. B1, Cl. M1, Cl. M2,Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-3 Cl.
B1, Cl. B2, Cl. M2, Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6 Cl. A3, Cl.
B1, Cl. B2 were "Moody's Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed
by Non- Performing and Re-Performing Loans" published in August
2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January
2017. The methodologies used in rating Towd Point Mortgage Trust
2017-1 Cl. X1, Cl. X2, Cl. X3, Cl. X4, Cl. X5, and Cl. X6 were
"Moody's Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-
Performing and Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016, "US
RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


WELLS FARGO 2012-C7: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s
WFRBS 2012-C7 pass-through certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Retail Concentration and Mall Exposure/Negative Outlook:
Retail represents 56.8% of the pool. Four of the top six loans,
representing 40% of the pool, are secured by regional malls located
throughout various states, including California, Georgia, Kentucky
and Michigan. Two malls, totaling 23.4% of the pool, are sponsored
by General Growth Properties (GGP), while one (12.4%) is sponsored
by Simon Property Group, LP. Also, of the top 10 loans, which
represent 66% of the pool, one (3.6%) is defeased. Fitch added an
additional stress to the Florence Mall and Fashion Square loans
that assumes losses given concerns with performance and general
market conditions. The Negative Rating Outlooks on classes F and G
reflect this sensitivity analysis.

Relative Stable Performance: Overall pool performance remains
stable and generally in line with issuance expectations. Although
Fitch is awaiting YE 2017 financials, a review of interim reporting
indicates relatively stable performance since prior rating actions.
As of February 2018, four loans (5.3%) were defeased and there were
no specially serviced or modified loans.

Amortization: As of February 2018, the transaction had paid down
11% to $977.6 million from $1.1 billion at issuance. The entire
transaction has scheduled amortization of 8.9% from February 2018
through each loan's scheduled maturity date. One non-defeased
retail loan (9.2% of pool) is interest-only for the full term. All
of the pool's partial interest-only loans (22.6%) are now
amortizing.

Energy Market Exposure: Three loans (2.3%) within the pool have
exposure to the energy markets in Texas, including the Odessa Hotel
Portfolio (1.1%). The hotel portfolio experienced an increase in
operating income and occupancy throughout 2017 as oil prices have
recovered, although performance remains below issuance levels.

Subordinate Debt and Pari Passu Loans: No loan has subordinate debt
outstanding. However, the largest loan, Northridge Fashion Center,
and three other loans allow for additional mezzanine financing
under specific requirements.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlook on classes F and G reflect concerns regarding
the retail exposure in the transaction. Rating Outlooks for classes
A-1 through E remain Stable due to the relatively stable
performance of the majority of the remaining pool and expected
continued amortization. Rating upgrades, although unlikely due to
the pool's retail and energy market exposure, may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

-- $68.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $418 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $165.3 million class A-FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $82.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $41.4 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.6 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $48.3 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.3 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;
-- $19.3 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class H certificates, or the interest-only
class X-B. The aggregate balance of class A-FL may be adjusted as a
result of the exchange of all or a portion of the class A-FL
certificates for the non-offered class A-FX certificates.


WELLS FARGO 2014-C20: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all classes of Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-C20 (the Certificates),
issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-C20 as
follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SFL at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SFX at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction. At issuance, the collateral consisted of 98
fixed-rate loans secured by 142 commercial properties. As of the
January 2018 remittance, all loans remained in the pool with an
aggregate principal balance of $1.19 billion, representing a
collateral reduction of 4.9% since issuance as a result of
scheduled loan amortization. There are currently six loans (15.5%
of the pool) with remaining partial interest-only (IO) periods,
ranging from three to 15 months, while two loans (2.8% of the pool)
are structured with full IO terms. Two loans (1.0% of the pool)
have been fully defeased. To date, 91 loans (83.4% of the pool)
reported partial-year 2017 financials, while 96 loans (99.0% of the
pool) reported YE2016 financials. Based on the most recent year-end
financial reporting, the transaction had a weighted-average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA Debt Yield of 1.67 times
(x) and 11.2%, respectively, compared with the DBRS WA Term DSCR
and WA Debt Yield of 1.48x and 9.4%, respectively.

The pool is concentrated by property type, as 24 loans,
representing 34.4% of the pool, are secured by retail properties
(including two regional malls representing 14.5% of the pool),
while 11 loans (23.3% of the pool) are secured by office properties
and 19 loans (18.4% of the pool) are secured by hotel properties.
By loan size, the pool is generally diverse, as the top 15 loans
represent a relatively low 56.6% of the pool. Based on the most
recent cash flows available, the top 15 loans reported a WA DSCR of
1.59x, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR of 1.48x, reflective of
a 12.5% net cash flow growth over the DBRS issuance figures.

As of the January 2018 remittance, there is one loan (1.4% of the
pool) in special servicing and eight loans (7.0% of the pool) on
the servicer's watch list. The Minneapolis Apartment Portfolio loan
(Prospectus ID#10), was transferred to special servicing in January
2018 following an ongoing inquiry from the city into the sponsor's
rental license. According to the servicer, a settlement has been
finalized, and the borrower has until July 2018 to sell the assets
and repay the loan in full. Overall, the loans on the servicer's
watch list are performing, with a WA DSCR of 1.55x (based on the
most recent figures available for each loan), with a range of 0.67x
and 2.91x. The loans are being monitored for various reasons, most
of which do not pose significant near-term risk.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Rockwell – ARINC HQ loan
(Prospectus ID#5, 3.9% of the pool) investment grade and with this
review, DBRS confirms the loan's performance remains in line with
the investment grade rating.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-C are IO certificates that reference a
single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO ratings
mirror the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.


WELLS FARGO 2015-C29: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2015-C29 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates. A detailed list of rating actions follows at the end
of this press release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations are based on the stable performance of the
underlying collateral. The original rating analysis was considered
in affirming the transaction as there have been no material changes
to pool metrics since issuance. As of the February 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 2.04% to $1.15 billion from $1.18 billion at issuance.

Stable Performance: All loans in the pool remain current with
loan-level performance generally in-line with Fitch's issuance
expectations. No loans in the pool have been in special servicing.
One loan is defeased (1.01%). There are 22 loans (10.28%) on the
Servicer's Watchlist for reasons such as deferred maintenance,
outdated financials, and lease rollover, only one of which is a
Fitch Loan of Concern, the Parkway Crossing East Shopping Center
(2.2% of pool) due to the expected vacancy of Babies R' Us.

Pool Diversity: The top 10 loans represent only 32.92% of the pool
by balance. This is well below the 2015 average of 49.3% and the
2016 average of 54.8%.

Property Type Diversity: The largest property type concentrations
are retail (26.8%), office (25.2%) and multifamily (23.2%).

High Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and loan-to-value (LTV) at issuance were 1.37x and 107.0%,
respectively. However, excluding co-op collateral, the pool's Fitch
DSCR and LTV were 1.12x and 111.8%, respectively. This is higher
than other similar vintage Fitch-rated transactions. The 2015 and
2016 average Fitch LTVs were 109.3% and 105.2%, respectively. The
2015 and 2016 average Fitch DSCRs were 1.18x and 1.21x,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $26.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $30.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $170 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $476.1 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $88.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $888.2 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $70.6 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $50 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $208.9 million class PEX at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $58.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $23.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $11.8 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the $120,645,000 interest-only class X-B or the
$50,024,121 class G.


WELLS FARGO 2017-RB1: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2017-RB1.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations are based on the overall
stable performance of the underlying collateral with no material
changes to pool metrics since issuance. There are no delinquent or
specially serviced loans. As of the February 2018 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by 0.2% to
$636.2 million, from $637.6 at issuance.

Fitch Leverage: The pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is lower than the
2017 and 2016 averages of 1.26x and 1.21x, respectively. The pool's
Fitch LTV of 105.0% is higher than the 2017 average of 101.6% and
in line with the 2016 average of 105.2%.

Weak Amortization: Thirteen loans (52.4% of current pool) are
full-term interest only, and 12 loans (33.2%) are partial interest
only. Fitch-rated transactions in 2017 had an average full-term
interest only percentage of 46.1% and a partial interest only
percentage of 28.7%. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down by only 6.2%, which is below the 2017
average of 7.9% and significantly below the 2016 average of 10.4%.

Pool Concentrations: The top 10 loans compose 57.0% of the pool,
which is above the 2017 and 2016 averages of 53.1% and 54.8%,
respectively. The pool's largest property type is office at 49.8%,
followed by retail at 18.8% and hotel at 10.3% of the pool.
Self-storage represents 8.5% with no other property type
representing more than 7.1% of the pool. The pool's office
concentration is above the 2017 and 2016 averages of 39.8% and
28.7%, respectively.

Pari Passu Loans: Eleven loans comprising 53.7% of the pool,
including six of the top 10, are pari passu loans. This is
significantly higher than the 2017 average of 45.0% for other
Fitch-rated multiborrower deals.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall
stable collateral performance and no material changes since
issuance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration unless a material economic or asset level event changes
the underlying transaction's portfolio-level metrics.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- $9.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $19.9 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $5.6 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $160 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $203.2 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $24.8 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $37.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $42.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $27.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.8 million(a) class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $14.4 million(a)(c) class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $6.8 million(a)(c) class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $21.2 million(a)(c) class EF at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $422.7 million(b) class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $107.5 million(b) class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $31.8 million(a)(b) class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.2 million(a)(c) class E-1 at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $7.2 million(a)(c) class E-2 at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the F-1, F-2, G, G-1, G-2, EFG, H, H-1, H-2,
and RRI classes.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Presale report on exchangeable certificates.
(d) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing 5.0% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).


WELLS FARGO 2018-C43: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(low) Rating to F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-C43 (the
Certificates) to be issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2018-C43:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

Classes X-D, D, E and F will be privately placed. The Class X-A,
Class X-B and Class X-D balances are notional.

The collateral consists of 63 fixed-rate loans secured by 132
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The trust asset contributed
from two loans, representing 11.6% of the pool, are shadow-rated
investment grade by DBRS. Proceeds for each shadow-rated loan are
floored at their respective rating within the pool. When 11.6% of
the pool has no proceeds assigned below the rated floor, the
resulting pool subordination is diluted or reduced below the rated
floor. The conduit pool was analyzed to determine the provisional
ratings, reflecting the long-term probability of loan default
within the term and its liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off
loan balances were measured against the stabilized net cash flow
and their respective actual constants, two loans, representing 2.4%
of the total pool, had a DBRS Term debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative of a higher
likelihood of mid-term default. Additionally, to assess refinance
risk, given the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied
its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 17
loans, representing 38.8% of the pool, having refinance DSCRs below
1.00x, and eight loans, representing 25.6% of the pool, with
refinance DSCRs below 0.90x. These credit metrics are based on
whole-loan balances.

Two of the ten largest loans in the pool — Moffett Towers II –
Building 2 and Apple Campus 3 — exhibit credit characteristics
consistent with shadow ratings of BBB and AA (high), respectively.
These loans represent 11.6% of the transaction balance. The hotel
concentration of six loans, representing 6.6% of the pool balance,
is at a lower level than recent transactions that typically have
concentrations around 15.0% or more. Hotel properties have higher
cash flow volatility than traditional property types, as their
income, which is derived from daily contracts rather than
multi-year leases, and their expenses, which are often mostly
fixed, are quite high as a percentage of revenue. These two factors
cause revenue to fall swiftly during a downturn and cash flow to
fall even faster because of the high operating leverage.

Term default risk is low, as indicated by the relatively strong
DBRS Term DSCR of 1.69x. In addition, 31 loans, representing 58.0%
of the pool, have a DBRS Term DSCR in excess of 1.50x. This
includes nine of the largest 15 loans. Even when excluding the two
loans shadow-rated investment grade, the deal exhibits a robust
weighted-average (WA) DBRS Term DSCR of 1.61x.

Nine loans, comprising 27.2% of the transaction balance, are
secured by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to
a single tenant. This includes five of the largest ten loans:
Moffett Towers II – Building 2, Houston Distribution Center,
Apple Campus 3, Walmart Supercenter Houston and FedEx Distribution
Center. Loans secured by properties occupied by single tenants have
been found to suffer higher loss severities in an event of default.
As a result, excluding Moffett Tower II – Building 2 and Apple
Campus 3, both of which are shadow-rated investment grade, DBRS
applied a penalty for single-tenant properties that resulted in
higher loan-level credit enhancement. The Houston Distribution
Center is a single-tenant building that is 100.0% leased to Academy
Sports, whose 220,000 square foot headquarters is located directly
to the south. Walmart signed a 20-year lease in July 2015 at The
Walmart Supercenter Houston where the lease extends seven years
beyond the loan term. With regard to FedEx Distribution Center,
FedEx has invested $35.0 million ($115 per square foot) in capital
improvements to the facility and views the asset as mission
critical. Additionally, the loans where tenants have leases
expiring during the loan term have been structured with cash flow
sweeps prior to tenant expiry that will help to defray re-leasing
costs in the event the single tenant vacates.

Twenty-six loans, representing 23.3% of the pool, are secured by
properties located in tertiary or rural markets, including one of
the top 15 loans. Properties located in tertiary and rural markets
are modeled with significantly higher loss severities than those
located in urban and suburban markets. Further, the WA DBRS Debt
Yield and DBRS Exit Debt Yield for such loans are 10.0% and 11.6%,
respectively, which are materially higher than the overall pool
metrics.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2011-C4: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on X-B Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on twelve
classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2011-C4, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C4:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-FL, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-FX, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 31, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to
B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the IO classes were affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.1% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.4% at the last review.
Moody's provides a current list of base expected losses for conduit
and fusion CMBS transactions on moodys.com at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF215255.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Approach to Rating US
and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017, "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 16, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 27% to $1.08 billion
from $1.48 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 58 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 49% of the pool. Nine loans, constituting
18% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US government
securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 16, compared to 18 at Moody's last review.

Six loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

No loans have been liquidated from the pool. Two loans,
constituting 2.4% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the Wausau Center Loan
($16.9 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is secured by a regional
mall located in Wausau, Wisconsin, located 100 miles west of Green
Bay and 185 miles northwest of Milwaukee. The loan transferred to
special servicing for imminent monetary default in June 2016, and
became real estate owned (REO) in August 2017. The mall has lost 2
anchor tenants, Sears and JC Penney. The remaining anchor tenant,
Younkers, is among the 42 department stores being closed by parent
company Bon-Ton Stores Inc.. The other specially serviced loan is
secured by a 252-bed student housing complex in Fredonia, New York,
approximately 50 miles south of Buffalo. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $19.4 million loss for the specially serviced loans (74%
expected loss on average).

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 93% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 97% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 77%, compared to 73% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 14% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.76X and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 1.83X and 1.51X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 29% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is is the Fox River Mall Loan ($145.9 million -- 13.5%
of the pool), which is secured by a 649,000 square foot (SF)
portion of a 1.2 million SF super-regional mall in Appleton,
Wisconsin. The mall is anchored by Macy's, Sears, Target, Younkers
and Scheel's. Scheel's is the only anchor that is part of the
collateral. As of Sep 2017, the total property was 97% leased,
compared to 95% in Sep 2016 and 97% in Dec 2015. Younkers, an
anchor store at this mall since 1992, is among the 42 stores being
closed by parent company Bon-Ton Stores Inc. Due to slightly lower
2017 financial performance coupled with the the closing of the
113,766 SF Younkers store, Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 86%
and 1.29X, respectively, compared to 73% and 1.33X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the Preferred Freezer Portfolio Loan
($107.3 million -- 10.0% of the pool), which is secured by seven
industrial cold storage facilities. The portfolio is subject to a
25-year triple net lease through 2033 to Preferred Freezer
Operating, LLC. The lease provides for rent steps every five years.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 65% and 1.66X, respectively,
compared to 66% and 1.63X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Cole Retail Portfolio Loan ($60.5
million -- 5.6% of the pool), which is secured by 14 single-tenant
properties and one anchored multi-tenanted property located across
11 states. Tenants include CVS, Carmax, On the Border and Bed Bath
and Beyond. As of November 2017, the portfolio was 97% leased ,
compared to 100% as of September 2016 and September 2015. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 89% and 1.11X, respectively, the same as
Moody's last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2012-C8: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. G Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2012-C8 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates (WFRBS 2012-C8).  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Increasing Credit Enhancement: Outside of
the Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC), the remaining pool has had
relatively stable performance since issuance. Credit enhancement
has increased due to amortization and loan repayments, with 23% of
the original pool balance repaid. Eight loans (5.74% of the pool)
are fully defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting
class H.

Specially Serviced Loan / Fitch Loans of Concern: Two loans have
been identified as FLOC's (2.44% of the pool), including one
currently in special servicing (0.74%). The specially serviced loan
is secured by a 96 room Spring Hill Suites hotel, located in San
Angelo, TX. According to the servicer, the property has been
impacted by the decline in the oil and gas industries and as a
result experienced cash flow issues from declining occupancy. By
year-end (YE) 2016, occupancy fell to 47% with net operating income
(NOI) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reporting at 0.26x. The
servicer foreclosed on the property in December 2017, and a new
property manager is in place and working on Marriott's Property
Improvement Plan.

The non-specially serviced FLOC, 11800 Tech Road (1.7%) is secured
by 230,394 square foot flex office/industrial facility located in
Silver Spring, MD. Occupancy has continued to decline since
issuance, falling to 55% by third quarter 2017, from 72% at YE2016,
82% at issuance. The building is currently occupied by three
tenants, two of which represent 52.3% of the net rentable area
(NRA). Approximately 30% of the property's NRA is scheduled to roll
during the loan term, primarily the largest tenant, Comcast of
Maryland (27%), whose lease expires in September 2019; Comcast, had
previously downsized by approximately 16% of its original space.
Fitch's analysis includes a stressed scenario, which considers
higher losses on the loan should property performance continue to
decline. However, the stressed scenario did not result in negative
rating actions given the increased credit enhancement due to
paydown and defeasance.

Since issuance, one loan had liquidated while in special servicing:
Shops at Freedom (0.65% of original pool balance) was disposed in
September 2017, with a $26,689 loss absorbed by class H.

High Retail Concentration and Mall Exposure: Loans backed by retail
properties represent 42.4% of the pool, including seven within the
top 15. Two loans (13.6%) are secured by regional malls; both are
anchored by Sears, JCPenney and Macy's (all not part of
collateral). Retail properties representing 9.8% of the pool are
anchored by a grocery tenant greater than 25% of the NRA.

Amortization: Of the pool, 89% is structured with amortization,
including 53 amortizing balloon loans (52.2%) and eight partial
interest-only loans (36.3%), all of which have commenced
amortization. Two loans (11.5%) are full interest only throughout
the term.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to overall stable
performance of the pool and increased credit enhancement since
issuance. Fitch's analysis included a stress scenario whereby
additional losses were assumed on the FLOC 11800 Tech Road (1.7%).
However, the analysis did not result in negative rating actions due
to the increased credit enhancement. Upgrades may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance, but
may be limited given the retail concentration. Downgrades to the
classes are possible should overall pool performance decline.

Deutsche Bank is the trustee for the transaction, and also serves
as the backup advancing agent. Fitch downgraded Deutsche Bank's
Issuer Default Rating to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A-'/'F1' on Sept. 28,
2017. Fitch relies on the master servicer, Wells Fargo & Company
rated 'A+'/'F1', which is currently the primary advancing agent, as
a direct counterparty. Fitch provided ratings confirmation on Jan.
24, 2018.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

-- $13,724 class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $414.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $85.9 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $115 million class A-FL at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $0 class A-FX at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $728.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $113.8 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66.7 million class B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $66.7 million* class X-B at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $43.9 million class C at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26 million class D at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $45.5 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $22.8 million class F at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $26 million class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class H certificates. Class A-1 has paid in
full.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the swap counterparty for the floating
rate class A-FL. In the event that any swap breakage costs are due
to the swap counterparty from the trust, any breakage costs will
only be paid after all payments on the class A-FL certificates have
been paid in full. The aggregate balance of the class A-FL may be
adjusted as a result of the exchange of all or a portion of the
class A-FL certificates for the non-offered class A-FX.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C11: Fitch Affirms B Rating on Cl. F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgrades three classes and affirms nine classes of
WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C11 certificates.  

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The upgrades are a due to increased
credit enhancement resulting from loan prepayments and one loan
paying off at maturity since Fitch's last rating action. As of the
February 2018 remittance report, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by 26.3% to $1.06 billion from $1.44
billion at issuance. There is one loan (1.3%) that is 90 days
delinquent and in special servicing. Eight loans (6.5%) are
considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), five (1.6%) of which are
on the master servicer's watchlist due to occupancy declines,
upcoming rollover, and deferred maintenance, one (1.3%) is
specially serviced, two (3.6%) are retail properties within the top
15 with tenants vacating and upcoming rollover. Six loans (5.6%)
are fully defeased.

Specially Serviced Loan: The Minot Hotel Portfolio loan (1.3%) was
transferred to special servicing in November 2015 due to the
borrower's request for a loan modification. The loan is secured by
two limited service hotels with a total of 238 rooms located in
Minot, ND within the Bakken shale region, a market suffering from
weak market condition and new supply. The decline in performance
was also due to rooms being offline due to PIP renovations. A
receiver was appointed to the property in February 2016. The
special servicer has been working with the receiver to address
immediate needs at the property for brand compliance and the
properties are currently being marketed for sale. As of January
2018, the Holiday Inn Riverside was 40.5% occupied with ADR of
$90.72 and RevPAR $36.77 and the Holiday Inn Express had an
occupancy of 42.82% with ADR at $88.44 and RevPAR at $37.87. Based
on the most recent appraisal values, losses are expected. The
Negative Outlook on class F reflects the potential for outsized
losses on this loan and the potential for downgrades if additional
loans transfer to special servicing.

Energy Tenancy Concentration: The largest loan, Republic Plaza
(14.1%) and the fifth largest loan, Encana Oil & Gas (6.2%), have
significant exposure to energy related tenants. The fifth largest
loan is no longer considered a FLOC as the space vacated by the
energy related tenant, Encana was subleased. Fitch's cash flow
analysis reflects the concentration. Fitch will continue to monitor
the performance of these loans due to ongoing concerns with the oil
and gas industry.

Pool Concentrations: The largest 10 loans account for 63.4% of the
pool balance, which is slightly higher than the average top 10
percentages for similar Fitch rated transactions. No loan accounts
for more than 14% of the pool's balance. 34.7% of the pool is
secured by office properties, 28.3% retail with no exposure to
retailers Macy's, JC Penney's or Sears, 12.9% mobile home
communities, and 11% hotels.

Loan Maturity Schedule: Of the non-specially serviced loans, 19
loans (37.7%) mature in 2022 and 53 loans (61.1%) in 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for the investment grade rated classes remain
Stable due to the overall stable performance of the pool increased
credit enhancement since issuance. Future upgrades may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance but
may be limited given the Fitch Loans of Concern and concentration
issues. Downgrades to the below investment grade classes are
possible should loss expectations increase.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has upgraded the following ratings:

-- $93.4 million class B to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-B to 'Asf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $59.2 million class C to 'Asf; from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch also has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks
as indicated:

-- $13.3 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $100 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $417.8 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $97.3 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $134.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $46.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;
-- $32.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Stable from
    Negative;
-- $25.1 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full. Fitch does
not rate the class G certificates.


[*] DBRS Reviews 1,169 Classes From 160 US RMBS Transactions
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on March 9, 2018, reviewed 1,169 classes from 160 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the
1,169 classes reviewed, DBRS confirmed 1,078 ratings, upgraded 80
ratings and discontinued 11 ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The discontinued ratings
are the result of full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, Alt-A, subprime, net
interest margin, reperforming, seasoned and ReREMIC collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect the structural features and
historical performance that constrain the quantitative model
output.

-- Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-3, Mortgage-Backed
     Notes, Series 2005-3, Class M2

-- Asset Backed Funding Corporation Series 2004-OPT5, ABFC Asset-
     Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT5, Class M-2

-- Asset Backed Funding Corporation Series 2004-OPT5, ABFC Asset-
     Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT5, Class M-3

-- Asset Backed Funding Corporation Series 2004-OPT5, ABFC Asset-
     Backed Certificates, Series 2004-OPT5, Class M-4

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series NC 2006-HE2, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series NC 2006-HE2, Class A1

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series NC 2006-HE4, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series NC 2006-HE4, Class A2

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series NC 2006-HE4, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series NC 2006-HE4, Class A5

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series NC 2006-HE4, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series NC 2006-HE4, Class A6

-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-4, Asset-Backed Notes,
     Series 2005-4, Class M-1

-- ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-
     ASAP1, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
     ASAP1, Class A-2D

-- ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-
     ASAP1, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
     ASAP1, Class M-1

-- ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE2,
     Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE2,
     Class A-1

-- ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-HE2,
     Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE2,
     Class A-2C

-- BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-2, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2007-2, Class A2

-- Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-HE1, Asset-Backed
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-HE1, Class A-2

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AMC1, Asset-Backed Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2006-AMC1, Class A-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2, Asset-Backed Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE2, Class M-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-HE2, Asset-Backed Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE2, Class M-2

-- CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-SPS1, Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2006-SPS1, Class A

-- Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-1, Mortgage-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class A-2

-- Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-1, Mortgage-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class A-3

-- Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-1, Mortgage-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class M-1

-- Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B2

-- Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class BX2

-- Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B3

-- Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B4

-- Galton Funding Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class BX3

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class A4

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class A5

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE10

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE4

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE5

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE6

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE7

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE8

-- Towed Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
     2015-1, Class AE9

-- Banc of America Funding 2015-R3 Trust, Securitization Trust
     Securities, Class 9A1

-- BCAP LLC 2015-RR3 Trust, Securitization Trust Securities,
     Class 2A1

-- BCAP LLC 2015-RR3 Trust, Securitization Trust Securities,
     Class 4A1

-- BCAP LLC 2015-RR3 Trust, Securitization Trust Securities,
     Class 5A1

-- CSMC Series 2015-3R, CSMC Series 2015-3R, Class 5-A-1

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2015-3, Securitization Trust
     Securities, Series 2015-3, Class 1A1

The Affected Ratings are available at http://bit.ly/2IoFK6w


[*] DBRS Reviews 156 Classes From 17 U.S RMBS Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., in February 2018, reviewed 156 classes from 17 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the
156 classes reviewed, DBRS confirmed 145 ratings, upgraded two
ratings, downgraded seven ratings and discontinued two ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The rating downgrades
reflect the transactions' continued erosion of credit support as
well as negative trends in delinquency and projected loss activity.
The discontinued ratings are the result of full repayment of
principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, Alt-A and subprime
collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect the structural features and
historical performance that constrain the quantitative model
output.

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2004-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
     Securities, Series 2004-A, Class A5 Risk Band

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-A & RESI Finance DE  
     Corporation 2004-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
     Series 2004-A, Class B1 Risk Band

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2004-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
     Securities, Series 2004-C, Class A5 Risk Band

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2004-C & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2004-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment Notes,
     Series 2004-C, Class B1 Risk Band

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-A & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2005-A, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
     Securities, Series 2005-A, Class A5 Risk Band

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-B & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2005-B, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
     Securities, Series 2005-B, Class A5 Risk Band

-- RESI Finance Limited Partnership 2005-C & RESI Finance DE
     Corporation 2005-C, Real Estate Synthetic Investment
     Securities, Series 2005-C, Class A5 Risk Band

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR1,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-FR1, Class A-
     2C

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-
     2

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-

     3

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-
     4

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-OP1,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1, Class M-
     5

-- Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
     2007-BC3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-
     BC3, Class 1-A2

-- Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
     2007-BC3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-
     BC3, Class 2-A2

-- Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Certificates,
     Series 2005-3, Class M-3

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     AI-8

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     AI-9

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,

     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     AIII-3

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
    Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class M-

    1

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     M-2

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     M-4

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     M-5

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     M-6

-- Wells Fargo Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities 2004-2 Trust,
     Home Equity Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-2, Class
     M-7

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR3, Class I-
     A-1

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2005-AR3 Trust,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR3, Class I-
     A-2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class M1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class M1A

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class M1B

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class X3

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class M2A

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,  
     Series 2017-1, Class X5

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class M2B

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class X4

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-1, Asset Backed Securities,
     Series 2017-1, Class X6

The Affected Ratings are available at http://bit.ly/2Fz4asX


[*] DBRS Reviews 180 Classes From 30 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., in early March 2018, reviewed 180 classes from 30 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions. Of the
180 classes reviewed, DBRS upgraded 93 ratings, confirmed 49
ratings and discontinued 38 ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The discontinued ratings
are the result of full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are a result of DBRS's application of "RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology," published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. Re-REMIC transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, Alt-A, subprime,
scratch and dent and Option-ARM collateral.

The Affected Ratings are available at http://bit.ly/2D0myIl


[*] Moody's Hikes $133MM of Housing Securities Issued 1997-2002
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 19, 2018, upgraded the ratings
of nine tranches from six transactions, issued by multiple issuers
from 1997 to 2002. The collateral backing these transactions
consists primarily of manufactured housing units.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CSFB Manufactured Housing Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2002-MH3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1997-05

M-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2011 Downgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-02

A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

A-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded to
Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1998-08

A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2011 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Lehman ABS Manufactured Housing Contract Trust 2002-A

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: UCFC Funding Corporation 1998-2

A-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


[*] Moody's Hikes $270MM of Subprime RMBS Issued 2003-2006
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 24 tranches
from 10 transactions issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-C

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Encore Credit Receivables Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 13, 2009 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: First NLC Trust 2005-3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS1 Trust

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2004-RS12 Trust

Cl. M-II-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS1 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-I-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-I-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-I-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. M-II-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-II-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2004-KS12 Trust

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC11

Cl. B, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2003-BC5

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent performance
of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on
the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $1.1BB of RMBS Issued 2005-2007
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 29 tranches
from 14 transactions, downgraded the ratings of five tranches from
two transactions and assigned a rating to Class M4 from J.P. Morgan
Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2013
Confirmed at A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2005-CB8

Cl. AF-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB6

Cl. A-I, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-II-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-II-4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Citicorp Residential Mortgage Trust Series 2006-3

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Apr 14, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-13

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: First NLC Trust 2005-4

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CH4

Cl. M1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded to
Ca (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Assigns to C (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2016 Withdrawn
(sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-WMC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2c, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-D

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. A-2d, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Newcastle Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-1

Cl. M-1, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-5

Cl. AF-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. AF-5, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-6

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Downgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. Rating upgrades for J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Trust 2007-CH4 are primarily due to the substantial
settlement money distributed to the transaction in January 2018.
The assignment of rating on J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust
2007-CH4 Class M4 reflects the reinstated balance for the bond and
expected tranche loss. Ratings on this bond were withdrawn in the
past as the tranche was written down due to losses, but the tranche
has since been partially written back up due to the settlement
proceeds.

The rating downgrades are due to outstanding interest shortfalls
that are unlikely to be recouped because of a weak interest
shortfall reimbursement mechanism. Rating downgrades on Bear
Stearns Structured Products Trust 2007-EMX1 Classes A-1 and A-2 are
due to consistently increasing interest shortfalls on the bonds
that have not been reimbursed. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $322.9MM of RMBS Issued 2005-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on the ratings of 12
tranches issued by six transactions, backed by Subprime mortgage
loans.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Centex Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-D

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2015 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 25, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: New Century Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: OwnIt Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-2

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Ownit Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Popular ABS Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-B

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 10, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools and an increase in credit enhancement available to
the bonds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $33MM of RMBS Issued 2003-2004
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 4 tranches,
and downgraded the ratings of 3 tranches, from 2 transactions
backed by Prime Jumbo RMBS loans, issued by miscellaneous issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2003-49

Cl. A-8-B, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013
Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at B1 (sf)

Cl. M, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-BB Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 27, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades for Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities
2004-BB Trust are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating downgrades for CHL Mortgage
Pass-Through Trust 2003-49 are due to a decline in credit
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions reflect the recent
performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $422.8MM of Alt-A Debt Issued 2005-2006
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 37 tranches from
12 US residential mortgage backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
Alt-A loans, issued by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-4

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-5

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-7

Cl. I-1A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-2

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-X, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 6-M-2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CSFB Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-3

Cl. 8-M-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2015
Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 30, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-5AR

Cl. 1-A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 1-B-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 30, 2008
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. 1-M-6, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-AR4

Cl. III-A-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates 2005-4

Cl. I-A1D, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. I-A2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. I-APT, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2

Cl. M-7, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 20, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-3

Cl. A-1C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-PT, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. The
rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of total credit
enhancement available to the bonds and pool performance.

The principal methodology used in rating Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust
2005-4 Cl. I-A-1 and Cl. I-A-2; Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-5 Cl.
I-A-1, Cl. I-A-3, and Cl. I-A-4; Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-7
Cl. I-1A-2, Cl. I-2A-2, and Cl. I-2A-3; CSFB Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Trust 2005-2 Cl. 1-A-1, Cl. 1-A-2, and Cl. 6-M-2; CSFB
Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2005-3 Cl. 8-M-1; IndyMac INDX
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR3 Cl. 2-A-1, Cl. 3-A-1, Cl. 3-A-2, Cl.
4-A-1, Cl. 4-A-2, Cl. 5-A-1, and Cl. 5-A-2; Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Loan Trust 2005-5AR Cl. 1-A-4, Cl. 1-B-1, Cl. 1-B-2, and Cl. 1-M-6;
Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan Trust, Series
2005-AR4 Cl. III-A-1; Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Asset
Backed Pass-Through Certificates 2005-4 Cl. I-A1D, Cl. I-A2, Cl.
I-APT, Cl. II-A1, and Cl. M-1; Opteum Mortgage Acceptance
Corporation, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-2
Cl. M-7; Opteum Mortgage Acceptance Corporation, Asset Backed
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-3 Cl. A-1C, Cl. A-2, Cl.
A-PT, and Cl. M-4; and Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1 Cl. A-3
and Cl. A-4 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
January 2017. The methodologies used in rating CSFB Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Trust 2005-2 Cl. 1-A-X were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in February 2018 from 4.7% in
February 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Puts Rating on 14 Tranches From 4 US CLO on Watch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on 14 tranches from four U.S.
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions on CreditWatch
with positive implications. The CreditWatch placements follow its
surveillance review of U.S. cash flow collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transactions. The affected tranches had an
original issuance amount of $370.90 million.

The CreditWatch positive placements resulted from enhanced
overcollateralization due to paydowns to the senior tranches of
these CLO transactions. All of the transactions have exited their
reinvestment periods.

The table below reflects the year of issuance for the four
transactions whose ratings were placed on CreditWatch.

  Year of issuance    No. of deals
  2006                1
  2012                1
  2013                2

S&P said, "We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placements within
90 days after we complete a comprehensive cash flow analysis and
committee review for each of the affected transactions. We will
continue to monitor the CDO transactions we rate and take rating
actions, including CreditWatch placements, as we deem
appropriate."

  RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH
  Blue Hill CLO Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  B-1-R       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
  B-2-R       AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
  C-1-R       A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
  C-2-R       A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)

  Canyon Capital CLO 2006-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  C           AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
  D           A+ (sf)/Watch Pos     A+ (sf)
  E           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)
  
  Cent CLO 16 L.P.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  A-2-R       AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
  B-R         AA- (sf)/Watch Pos    AA- (sf)
  C-R         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
  D-R         BB (sf)/Watch Pos     BB (sf)


  Ballyrock CLO 2013-1 Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  B           AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
  C           A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
  D           BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 117 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 117 classes from 25 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1998 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime collateral. The review yielded 49 upgrades, eight
downgrades, 59 affirmations, and one discontinuance.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Proportion of re-performing loans in the pool;
-- Loan Modification criteria;
-- Expected short duration until bond pay down;
-- Default virtually certain; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The ratings affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support and collateral performance on these classes has
remained relatively consistent with its prior projections.

S&P said, "We lowered our ratings on classes M-1 and M-2 from
Structured Asset Securities Corp., Series 1998-8 to 'BB+ (sf)' from
'AA+ (sf)' and 'AA (sf)', respectively, after assessing the impact
of interest shortfalls on these classes. We based these downgrades
on our cash flow projections, which show that ultimate repayment of
the interest shortfalls on these classes is unlikely at higher
rating levels.

"We lowered our ratings on classes M-1 and M-2 from Renaissance
Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1 to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)', and on
classes M-4 and M-5 from Soundview Home Loan Trust 2003-1 to 'CCC
(sf)' and 'D (sf)' from 'B (sf)' and 'CCC (sf)', respectively.
These downgrades reflect the application of our loan modification
criteria, "Methodology For Incorporating Loan Modifications And
Extraordinary Expenses Into U.S. RMBS Ratings," published April 17,
2015, and "Principles For Rating Debt Issues Based On Imputed
Promises," published Dec. 19, 2014, which resulted in a maximum
potential rating lower than the previous rating on each of these
classes."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2pmH94M


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 452 Classes From 116 US RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 452 classes from 116
U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions
issued between 2003 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed
by mixed collateral. The review yielded 15 upgrades, 35 downgrades,
380 affirmations, three withdrawals, and 19 discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of re-performing loans in the pool; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2HHW1Ta


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 69 Classes From 16 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 69 classes from 16 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed by
prime jumbo collateral. The review yielded 33 upgrades, eight
downgrades, 27 affirmations, and one withdrawal.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The affirmations of ratings reflect S&P's opinion that its
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with its prior
projections.

A vast majority of the classes whose ratings were raised by three
or more notches have the benefit of increased credit support. These
classes have benefitted from the failure of performance triggers
and/or reduced subordinate class principal distribution amounts,
which has built credit support for these classes as a percent of
their respective deal balance. Ultimately, S&P believes these
classes have credit support that is sufficient to withstand
projected losses at higher rating levels.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/2ILd7AT


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 72 Classes From 24 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 72 classes from 24 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 1999 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime collateral. The review yielded 25 upgrades, nine
downgrades, 36 affirmations, one withdrawal, and one
discontinuance.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance and delinquency trends;
-- Erosion of or increases in credit support;
-- Historical missed interest payments;
-- Loan modification criteria;
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization; and
-- Interest-only criteria

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"We lowered our ratings on class M-2 to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)'
and on class M-3 to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' from Bear Stearns
Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-HE3 after assessing the impact
of missed interest payments on these classes. Our cash flow
projections showed that ultimate repayment of the missed interest
on these classes is unlikely at higher rating levels."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2GaCoGg


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 90 Classes From 25 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 90 classes from 25 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2000 and 2006. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime collateral. The review yielded 25 upgrades, 14 downgrades,
49 affirmations, one discontinuance, and one rating placed on
CreditWatch with developing implications.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The ratings affirmations reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"We placed our rating on class AV-24 from FBR Securitization Trust
2005-4 on CreditWatch with developing implications due to
outstanding questions with the trustee regarding the reported
interest payments to the bond holders. After verifying the reported
interest payments we will take rating actions as we consider
appropriate according to our criteria.

"On Nov. 30, 2017, we placed our ratings on classes AF and M-1 from
Home Equity Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust, series SPMD 2002-B on
CreditWatch negative due to reported missed interest payments by
the trustee beginning in September 2017. The CreditWatch negative
placements reflected the recent and ongoing funds recoupment
related to previous servicer advances of payments for maturing
balloon loans within the collateral pool that had their maturities
extended. The funds recoupment by the servicer from the trust has
resulted in several months of missed interest payments for the
rated classes. Today's rating actions resolve the CreditWatch
placements by affirming the current rating on senior class AF and
downgrading the current rating for the mezzanine class M1. These
decisions are based on our cash flow projections used in
determining the likelihood that the missed interest payments would
be reimbursed under various scenarios, as these classes received
additional compensation for outstanding missed interest payments.

"We raised our ratings by five or more notches on eight ratings
from eight transactions because of increases in credit support and
one rating from one transaction because of decreases in
delinquencies. The upgrades related to an increase in credit
support can be attributed to the subject classes having senior
positions in their respective distribution waterfalls with failing
cumulative loss triggers benefiting these classes with excess
proceeds and/or limiting the excess proceeds from reducing more
subordinate class balances. As a result, the upgrades on these
classes reflect the classes' ability to withstand a higher level of
projected losses than previously anticipated. The class with a
large upgrade attributed to a decrease in delinquencies saw a
significant improvement of the supporting collateral and as a
result, our projected losses have decreased for this class. This
class also is benefiting from a failing cumulative loss trigger and
holds a senior position in the distribution waterfall, helping to
increase its credit support.

"We lowered our ratings by five or more notches on class M-4 from
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2005-WMC3 and class M-1
from New Century Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-1 after assessing the
impact of missed interest payments on these classes. These
downgrades are based on our cash flow projections used in
determining the likelihood that the missed interest payments would
be reimbursed under various scenarios, as these classes received
additional compensation for outstanding missed interest payments."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          http://bit.ly/2FKxBvt


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
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The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
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                   *** End of Transmission ***