/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/180513.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, May 13, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 132

                            Headlines

1166 AVENUE 2002-C5: S&P Affirms BB+ (sf) Rating on Class E Certs
ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 17 Note Classes
ACC TRUST 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Class B Notes
ALM VI LTD: S&P Assigns Initial B- (sf) Rating on Class E-R3 Notes
AMCAR 2018-1: Fitch Expects to Rate $28MM Notes 'BBsf'

AMERICAN AIRLINES 2012-2: Fitch Gives 'BB' Rating on Cl. C(R) Certs
AMERICAN AIRLINES 2012-2C(R): Moody's Rates Class C Certs 'Ba3'
ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Keeps 'C' Rating on 5 Note Classes
APIDOS CLO XXIX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
ARES XXXIR: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes

BANK 2018-BNK12: Fitch Expects to Rate Class X-F Certs 'B-sf'
BB-UBS TRUST 2012-TFT: S&P Cuts Class E Certs Rating to BB (sf)
BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 2 Cert Classes
BLUEMOUNTAIN 2016-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
BOSS REAL ESTATE: Taps JK Realty as Real Estate Agent

BSCMS 2006-PWR13: Fitch Upgrades Class D Certs Rating at 'Csf'
BWAY 2013-1515: S&P Affirms BB- (sf) Rating on Class G Certs
CEDAR FUNDING IX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
CIM TRUST 2018-J1: DBRS Finalizes 'BB' Rating on Class B-4 Certs
CIM TRUST 2018-J1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class B-4 Debt

COLD STORAGE 2017-ICE3: Moody's Affirms Ba1 on Cl. HRR Certs
COMM 2014-CCRE14: Moody's Lowers Class E Debt Rating to B1
COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms 'B(low)' Rating on Class F Certs
COMM 2018-COR3: Fitch Issues Presale & Expects to Rate Transaction
CPS AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class A Notes

CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Class B Certs
DLJ COMMERCIAL 2000-CKP1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. S Debt
FANNIE MAE 2018-C03: Fitch Says 46 Classes Non-Investment Grade
FIRST INVESTORS 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating on F Notes
FLAGSHIP 2018-2: S&P Assigns Initial BB- Rating on Class E Notes

FLAGSTAR TRUST 2018-2: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on Class B-4 Debt
GRACE 2014-GRCE: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'BB-sf'
GS TRUST 2013-GC13: Fitch Affirms Class E Certs Ratings at 'BBsf'
JP MORGAN 2018-4: DBRS Finalizes 'B' Rating on Class B-5 Certs
JPMBB 2014-C21: Metro West & Waterbury Crossing Loans Sold at Loss

JPMCC 2007-CIBC20: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B3
JPMCC 2007-LDP1O: Fitch Affirms Default Rating on $81MM B Notes
LENDMARK FUNDING 2018-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on D Notes
LENDMARK FUNDING 2018-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB(sf) Rating on D Notes
MAGNETITE XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes

MARANON LOAN 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
MARATHON CLO VI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on D-R2 Notes
MSBAM 2013-C11: Moody's Lowers Class E Certs Rating to Ba3
MSC 2006-TOP23: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Pass Thru Certs
NRMLT 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes 'B' Rating on 10 Classes of Notes

NRMLT 2018-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class B-4 Notes
ORION HEALTHCORP: Committee Taps Pachulski Stang as Legal Counsel
PSMC 2018-2: Fitch Expects to Rate Class B4 Certs at 'BBsf'
RBS COMMERCIAL 2013-SMV: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class F Certs
RSO 2015-CRE4: Moody's Upgrades Class C Notes to Ba3

SEMT 2018-5: Moody's Gives B2 Rating to Class B-4 Debt
SENECA PARK CLO: Moody's Downgrades Class F Notes to Caa1
SEQUOIA TRUST 2018-CH2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 on Class B-5 Debt
SG RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
SGCMS TRUST 2016-C5: Fitch Affirms Class E Certs at 'BB-'

SOUND POINT CLO XIX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
TIDEWATER AUTO 2018-A: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
TRUPS 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class C Notes
UPLAND CLO: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D-R Notes
WBCMT 2005-C20: Moody's Affirms Class F Certs Rating at B2

WELLS FARGO 2014-LC16: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
WESTLAKE AUTO 018-2: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on F Notes
WESTLAKE AUTO 2018-2: DBRS Gives Prov. 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
[*] DBRS Reviews 602 Classes from 67 US RMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Hikes $1.1BB of GSE CRT RMBS Issued 2016-2017

[*] Moody's Takes Action on 46 Tranches from 19 US RMBS Deals
[*] Moody's Takes Action on 47 Tranches from 16 US RMBS Loans
[*] Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 33 Tranches from 4 US RMBS Loans
[*] Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 35 Tranches from 23 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Places Ratings on 8 Tranches From 2 US CLO on Watch Pos.

[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 100 Classes from 27 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

1166 AVENUE 2002-C5: S&P Affirms BB+ (sf) Rating on Class E Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on six classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from 1166 Avenue of
the Americas Commercial Mortgage Trust 2002-C5, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

For the affirmations, the classes' expected credit enhancement was
in line with the affirmed rating levels.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
fixed-rate, amortizing mortgage loan secured by a
560,925-net-rentable-sq.-ft. office condominium. The collateral
consists of floors seven to 21 (excluding floor 13) of a 44-story,
1.6 million net rentable sq. ft. class A office building located in
Manhattan.

S&P said, "Our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of
the office condominium that secures the mortgage loan in the trust
and considered the stable servicer-reported net operating income
and occupancy for the past four years (2014 through 2017). Our
analysis also considered the fact that the tenant leasing 100% of
the collateral space has a Dec. 31, 2020, lease expiration which is
co-terminus with the loan's anticipated repayment date. The
condominium unit is currently 100% leased to JPMorgan Chase Bank
N.A. and the lease was subsequently assigned to Marsh & McLennan
Cos. We then derived our sustainable net cash flow (NCF) assuming
an as-dark analysis, which we divided by a 6.50% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate to determine our expected-case value. This
yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio of 55.0%
on the trust balance."

According to the April 17, 2018, trustee remittance report, the
mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan balance of $141.6 million,
down from a trust- and whole-loan balance of $147.4 million and
$240.0 million, respectively, at issuance. The mortgage loan pays
an annual fixed interest rate of 6.35%. In addition, the equity
interest in the mortgage borrower secures mezzanine debt totaling
$112.4 million.

To date, class E, the most subordinate class, has incurred $299 of
principal losses and carries an accumulated interest shortfall
amount of $22,274. These principal losses and interest shortfalls
are partially the result of non-cash adjustments related to the
amortization of the trust component mortgage loan in November 2017
and historical trust expenses incurred as the result of Lehman
Bros' bankruptcy filing, whereby the trust incurred cost when it
filed a proof of claim on behalf of the trust. S&P's rating on the
class E certificates is predicated on the fact that, based on the
information provided by the master servicer and trustee, it deemed
the shortfalls and principal losses to be non-credit related
events.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 2.77x
on the trust balance for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2017, and
occupancy was 100% according to the Oct. 30, 2017, rent roll.

  RATINGS LIST

  1166 Avenue of the Americas Commercial Mortgage Trust, 2002-C5
  Commercial mortgage pass through certifcates series 2002-C5
                                         Rating
  Class         Identifier        To              From
  A             682438AA4         AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  X             682438AB2         AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  B             682438AC0         AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  C             682438AD8         AAA (sf)        AAA (sf)
  D             682438AE6         AA- (sf)        AA- (sf)
  E             682438AF3         BB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)


ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on 17 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd.:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

The Cl. A, Cl. B, Cl. C-FL, Cl. C-FX, Cl. D, Cl. E-FL, Cl. E-FX,
Cl. F-FL, Cl. F-FX, Cl. G-FL, Cl. G-FX, Cl. H, Cl. J, Cl. K, Cl. L,
Cl. M, and Cl. N are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
rating action is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

ACAS CRE CDO 2007-1 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance). As of the March 30, 2018 trustee report, the
collateral par amount is $4.1 million, representing a $1.2 billion
decrease since securitization primarily due to realized losses to
the collateral pool.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), a primary measure of credit quality with
credit assessments completed for all of the collateral; weighted
average life (WAL); weighted average recovery rate (WARR); number
of asset obligors; and pair-wise asset correlation. These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 10,000,
same as that at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collaterals and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collaterals follow: Ca/C and 100.0%, the same as that at last
review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 0.4 years, compared to 0.5 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying collateral and look-through CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled 2 obligors, compared to 4 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 47.9%, compared to
52.0% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The servicing decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of Rated Notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. The Rated
Notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the recovery rates
of the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Holding all
other parameters constant, increasing the recovery rate of 100% of
the collateral pool by +10% would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the Rated Note of zero notches upward (e.g., one
notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2). There would
be no further movement on the Rated Notes with a decrease in
recovery rates as the current mean recovery rates are 0%, as
evidenced by WARR.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


ACC TRUST 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by ACC Trust 2018-1 (ACC 2018-1). This is the first
auto lease transaction for RAC King, LLC (not rated). The notes are
backed by a pool of closed-end retail automobile leases originated
by RAC King, LLC. RAC Servicer, LLC is the servicer and
administrator for this transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: ACC Trust 2018-1

$154,286,000, 3.70%, Class A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
(sf)

$31,721,000, 4.82%, Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1
(sf)

$26,592,000, 6.81%, Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B2
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of RAC Servicer, LLC as
the servicer and administrator.

Moody's median cumulative net credit loss expectation for ACC
2018-1 is 30%. Moody's based its cumulative net credit loss
expectation on an analysis of the quality of the underlying
collateral; managed portfolio performance; the historical credit
loss of similar collateral; the ability of RAC Servicer, LLC to
perform the servicing functions; and current expectations for the
macroeconomic environment during the life of the transaction.

Moody's also analyzed the residual risk of the pool based on the
exposure to residual value risk; the historical turn-in rate; and
the historical residual value performance.

At closing, the Class A notes, the Class B notes and the Class C
notes are expected to benefit from 44.85%, 33.10%, 23.25% of hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Hard credit enhancement for the
notes consists of a combination of overcollateralization, a
non-declining reserve account and subordination, except for the
Class C notes, which do not benefit from subordination. The notes
may also benefit from excess spread.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the subordinate notes if levels of credit
enhancement are higher than necessary to protect investors against
current expectations of portfolio losses. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the vehicles
securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses also
depend greatly on the US job market and the market for used
vehicles. Other reasons for better-than-expected performance
include changes to servicing practices that enhance collections or
refinancing opportunities that result in prepayments.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if levels of credit enhancement
are insufficient to protect investors against current expectations
of portfolio losses. Losses could rise above Moody's original
expectations as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or
deterioration in the value of the vehicles securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Portfolio losses also depend greatly on the US
job market and the market for used vehicles. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.


ALM VI LTD: S&P Assigns Initial B- (sf) Rating on Class E-R3 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-R3, A-2-R3, B-1-R3, B-2-R3, C-R3, D-R3, and E-R3 replacement
notes and additional class X notes from ALM VI Ltd., a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued in 2012 that
is managed by Apollo Credit Management (CLO) LLC.

The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 9, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the June 1, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Replace the current floating spreads with lower floating
spreads.
-- Extend the reinvestment period by six months.
-- Extend the weighted average life test by two years.
-- Extend the non-call period through April 2019.

Issue additional class X senior floating-rate notes, which are
expected to be paid using interest proceeds in quarterly
installments beginning July 15, 2018. S&P said, "Our review of this
transaction included a cash flow analysis, based on the portfolio
and transaction as reflected in the trustee report, to estimate
future performance. In line with our criteria, our cash flow
scenarios applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected
timing and pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under
various interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios."

S&P said, "In addition, our analysis considered the transaction's
ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal, or both, to
each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  ALM VI Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-R3                    AAA (sf)             321.50
  A-2-R3                    AA (sf)               51.50
  B-1-R3                    A (sf)                29.50
  B-2-R3                    A (sf)                15.00
  C-R3                      BBB- (sf)             23.00
  D-R3                      BB- (sf)              20.00
  E-R3                      B- (sf)               14.50
  Subordinated notes        NR                    39.00

  New class                 Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X                         AAA (sf)               1.75

  NR--Not rated.


AMCAR 2018-1: Fitch Expects to Rate $28MM Notes 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign the following ratings and Outlooks
to the notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust
2018-1 (AMCAR 2018-1):

  --$181,000,000 class A-1 notes 'F1+sf';

  --$350,000,000 class A-2-A/A-2-B notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$268,580,000 class A-3 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$86,780,000 class B notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$107,730,000 class C notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$105,940,000 class D notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$28,130,000 class E notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Consistent Credit Quality: The 2018-1 pool displays consistent
credit quality relative to recent pools based on the weighted
average (WA) Fair Isaac Corp. (FICO) score of 581 and internal
credit scores. Obligors with FICOs greater than 600 represent over
38% of the pool, the highest level for the platform, to date.

Increased Extended-Term Contracts: Extended-term (61+ month)
contracts total 92.2%, consistent with 2017 transactions but high
relative to the historical range for the platform. The 73-75 month
contracts total 6.5%, which is higher than prior transactions.
Performance data for these contracts are limited due to lack of
seasoning. However, the 73-75 month loans in this pool have
obligors with stronger credit metrics; given this fact and small
pool concentration, Fitch did not apply an additional stress to
these loans.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement: Initial hard credit enhancement (CE)
is consistent with 2017 transactions and totals 35.20%, 27.95%,
18.95%, 10.10% and 7.75% for classes A, B, C, D and E,
respectively. Excess spread is expected to be 7.59% per annum,
slightly lower than 2017-4. Loss coverage for each class of notes
is sufficient to cover respective multiples of Fitch's base case
CNL proxy.

Moderating Performance: Losses on General Motors Financial's (GMF)
managed portfolio and securitizations have been moderating over the
past two years, with CNLs for 2015-2017 vintages tracking higher
than their 2010-2014 predecessors. This trend is more pronounced in
the weaker credit tiers; however, these borrowers comprise a
smaller portion of 2018-1 relative to prior transactions. Fitch
accounted for the weaker performance of recent vintages in the
derivation of its CNL proxy of 10.50%.

Improving Corporate Health: Fitch rates GM and GMF 'BBB' with a
Stable Rating Outlook. The rating upgrade last year reflected the
ongoing fundamental improvement in the company's core business and
credit profile over the past several years.

Consistent Origination/Underwriting/Servicing: AFSI demonstrates
adequate abilities as originator, underwriter and servicer, as
evidenced by historical portfolio and securitization performance.
Fitch deems AFSI capable of adequately servicing the transaction.

Legal Structure Integrity: The legal structure of the transaction
should provide that a bankruptcy of GMF would not impair the
timeliness of payments on the securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Unanticipated increases in the frequency of defaults and loss
severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher
than the base case. This, in turn, could result in Fitch taking
negative rating actions on the notes.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to AMCAR
2018-1 to increased credit losses over the life of the transaction.
Fitch's analysis found that the transaction displays some
sensitivity to increased defaults and credit losses. This shows a
potential downgrade of one to two rating categories under Fitch's
moderate (1.5x base case loss) scenario, especially for the
subordinate bonds. The notes could experience downgrades of three
or more rating categories, potentially leading to distressed
ratings (below Bsf) under Fitch's severe (2.5x base case loss)
scenario.


AMERICAN AIRLINES 2012-2: Fitch Gives 'BB' Rating on Cl. C(R) Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB' rating to American Airlines,
Inc.'s (as successor by merger with US Airways, Inc.) proposed
enhanced equipment trust certificates, series 2012-2:

  --$100,000,000 class C(R) certificates with an expected maturity
of June 2023 'BB'.

Fitch has also taken the following rating actions on the existing
US Airways 2012-2 certificates:

  --$418.1 million class A certificates affirmed at 'A';

  --$127.1 million class B certificates upgraded to 'BBB' from
'BBB-';

  --$100 million class C certificates upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' rating for the class C (R) certificates is based on the
bottom-up approach detailed in Fitch's EETC criteria, which calls
for the rating to be notched up from American Airlines, Inc.'s
(AAL) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB-' with a Stable Outlook.
The rating represents a one notch uplift from AAL's corporate
rating consisting of two notches of uplift for a high affirmation
factor and a one notch downward adjustment for poor recovery
prospects commensurate with the 'RR5' Recovery Ratings.

Transaction Summary:
AAL plans to issue $100 million in class C(R) certificates due in
2023 to refinance the existing class C certificates. The proceeds
will initially be held in escrow and deposited with Natixis
(A/F1/Positive), pending redemption of the Series C Equipment
Notes. The class C(R) certificates will feature an initial expected
tenor and a weighted average life of five years. The total
outstanding debt of US Airways 2012-2 will remain unchanged after
giving effect to the issuance of the class C(R) certificates and
the consequent redemption of the class C certificates.

Collateral Pool:
The transaction is secured by a perfected first priority security
interest in seven Airbus A321-200s and four A330-200s. Fitch
considers the A321-200 aircraft to be high-quality Tier 1
collateral while the A330-200 aircraft is considered solid Tier 2
collateral.

Affirmation Factor:
Fitch considers the affirmation factor (likelihood that the pool
would be retained in a bankruptcy scenario) for this pool of
aircraft to be high. Fitch has revised the affirmation factor to
high from moderate following AAL's recent announcement regarding
its wide-body fleet strategy which impacted Fitch's view of the
A330-200's role in the company's fleet plan.

On April 6, 2018, AAL placed an order of 47 new Boeing 787 widebody
aircraft consisting of 22 787-8s scheduled to begin arriving in
2020 and 25 787-9s scheduled to begin arriving in 2023. The 787-8s
will replace AAL's Boeing 767-300s, while later 787-9 deliveries
will replace Airbus A330-300s and older 777-200 widebody aircraft.
Currently, AAL needs to replace a significant number of older
aircraft. The A330-200s in this pool are significantly newer than
the roughly 80 widebody aircraft in need of replacement.

These announcements made it clear that the A330-200s will play an
important role in the AAL's fleet for the foreseeable future. Even
though the A330-200s will remain a small subset of the AAL's fleet,
Fitch believes they are strategically important for the company
over the next decade and would not be rejected in case of
restructuring. This supports the change of Fitch's affirmation
factor to high from moderate. Prior to the clarification of AAL's
widebody fleet plan there was uncertainty of how A330-200 aircraft
fit into the airline's long term strategy due to the small size of
the A330-200 sub-fleet. Because of this uncertainty, Fitch believed
the affirmation of the pool could be pressured in case of a major
restructuring and resulted in a moderate assessment.

The A330-200s are well-suited for Transatlantic flying, operating
from AAL's hubs in Charlotte (CLT) and Philadelphia (PHL), as well
as acting as a key asset in providing seasonal support for the
company's service to certain high-demand Caribbean destinations,
including Cancun, Punta Cana, and San Juan. In addition, the
A330-200s can take over some routes currently serviced by 767s,
while the incoming 787-8s may service some current A330-200 routes.


Fitch believes the A321-200 aircraft is strategically important to
AAL's narrowbody fleet strategy. Currently, the company operates
219 A321-200s which equates to approximately 23% of the total
fleet. These aircraft in general make good replacements for aging
757-200s that American uses on domestic missions, as they feature a
similar passenger capacity but better operating economics owing to
a lower weight and fuel efficient engines. AAL's fleet of A321s has
an average age of around five years, whereas its 757-200s are
nearly 20 years old on average, meaning that the 757-200s will
start to migrate out of the fleet in greater numbers over the next
decade.

The A321-200 also fits with the recent trend for airlines to
upgauge by flying larger aircraft that operate at lower average
unit costs. The A321s in this pool also benefit from their relative
youth. The average age of the pool stands at just over six years,
compared to AAL's fleet age as a whole, which is currently 10.1
years. If AAL were to re-enter bankruptcy, it would be much more
likely to reject older, less efficient narrowbodies before deciding
to reject this particular pool.

Class A Ratings:
The ratings for the class A certificates are primarily based on
collateral coverage in a stress scenario. Fitch's analysis uses a
top-down approach assuming a rejection of the entire pool in a
severe global aviation downturn. The analysis incorporates a full
draw on the liquidity facility and an assumed
repossession/remarketing cost of 5% of the total portfolio value.
Fitch then applies immediate haircuts to the collateral value.

The 'A' rating is supported by an adequate level of
overcollateralization (OC) when incorporating the latest available
aircraft appraisal data and good-quality collateral, supporting
Fitch's expectations that senior tranche holders should receive
full principal recovery prior to default even in a severe stress
scenario.

In its 'A' level stress analysis, Fitch has opted to apply a 25%
value stress to the A321-200s and a 30% value stress to the
A330-200s in the pool. The 25% value haircut represents the middle
of Fitch's 'A' level stress range for Tier 1 aircraft, while 30%
value haircut represents low end of Fitch's 'A' level stress range
for Tier 2 aircraft.

Fitch's 'A' level stress scenario produces a maximum LTV of 81.4%
when stress rates are applied two years in the future (as
stipulated in Fitch's EETC criteria for airlines with corporate
ratings in the BB category or higher) supporting the 'A' rating.

Class B Ratings:
The upgrade of the class B certificates reflects the aforementioned
change in the affirmation factor and by steady values for both
types of aircraft in the underlying collateral pool. The 'BBB'
rating for the B-tranche represents a four-notch uplift compared
with AAL's stand-alone credit profile, based on a high affirmation
factor, presence of a liquidity facility and superior recovery
prospects. Prior to the revision in affirmation factor, Fitch
applied only a three-notch uplift to the class B certificates. The
'BBB' rating is also supported by the class B certificate holders'
right in certain cases to purchase all of the class A certificates
at par plus accrued and unpaid interest.

Class C Ratings:
The upgrade of the class C certificates reflects the aforementioned
change in the affirmation factor and steady values for both types
of aircraft in the underlying collateral pool. The 'BB' rating for
the B-tranche represents a one-notch uplift compared with AAL's
stand-alone credit profile, based on a high affirmation factor, and
recovery prospects commensurate with Fitch's 'RR5' Recovery
Ratings. Prior to the revision in affirmation factor, Fitch did not
apply an uplift to the class C certificates. The 'BB' rating is
also supported by the class C certificate holders' right in certain
cases to purchase all of the class A certificates and the class B
certificates at par plus accrued and unpaid interest.

Corporate Rating:
Fitch affirmed AAL's corporate rating at 'BB-' in December 2017.
The Rating Outlook is Stable. The 'BB-' rating is supported by
AAL's market position as the largest airline in the U.S., its
dominant position in key hubs, and by the solid financial results
that the company has produced since emerging from bankruptcy and
merging with US Airways in December 2013. Credit metrics have been
pressured over the past year by higher fuel and labor costs and by
an intensely competitive environment that has kept a lid on unit
revenue growth. Fitch expects AAL's leverage to remain in the high
4x range through 2018, which Fitch considers to be high for the
rating. In addition, full-year margins will remain pressured due to
higher fuel costs. However, Fitch expects metrics to improve over
the longer-term as cost pressures ease and higher jet fuel prices
are passed through to customers, bringing credit metrics to a level
that are more supportive of the current rating.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The 'A' rating on the class A certificates is in line with Fitch's
ratings on class A certificates of EETCs issued by many airlines,
including Air Canada, Spirit and American. LTVs for this
transaction are in line with those of other certificates rated at
'A'. The collateral pool is weak when compared to the majority of
aircraft pools backing EETC transactions rated by Fitch. However,
it is comprised of core aircraft for AAL's operations supporting a
high affirmation factor and the 'A' rating.

The 'BBB' rating on the class B certificates is in line with
Fitch's ratings on several of AAL's EETC transactions. The ratings
on the class B certificates represent a four-notch uplift from
AAL's corporate rating of 'BB-'. Fitch considers the three-notch
uplift due to the high affirmation factor (two notches) and the
presence of the liquidity facility (one notch) to be comparable to
those seen in the other recent Fitch-rated transactions. The
recovery prospects of the class B certificates are superior to
those of the majority of the tranches rated by Fitch's bottom-up
approach and warrant an additional uplift by one notch.

The one-notch uplift from AAL's IDR for the class C certificates is
driven by a high affirmation factor (two notches) and low recovery
rates (one notch downward adjustment) and is comparable to the
one-notch uplift that Fitch applies to class C certificates in
several other EETC transactions. For instance, the American
Airlines 2013-1, the Air Canada 2013 and the Air Canada 2015-1 C
tranches each receive one notch of ratings uplift from the airline
IDR based on a similar analysis.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include a harsh downside scenario in which AAL declares bankruptcy,
chooses to reject the collateral aircraft, and where the aircraft
are remarketed in the midst of a severe slump in aircraft values.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Senior tranche ratings are primarily driven by a top-down analysis
based on the value of the collateral. Therefore, a negative rating
action could be driven by an unexpected decline in collateral
values. Potential risks for the A320 family and A330 family
aircraft include the introduction of the updated NEO models, which
could pressure secondary market values. The A tranche could be
upgraded to 'A+' if AAL's credit profile continues to improve.

The ratings of the subordinated tranches are influenced by Fitch's
view of AAL's corporate credit profile. Fitch will consider either
a negative or a positive rating action if AAL's credit profile
changes in Fitch's view. Additionally, the ratings of the
subordinated tranches may be changed should Fitch revise its view
of the affirmation factor which may impact the currently
incorporated uplift or if the recovery prospects change
significantly due to an unexpected decline in collateral values.

Fitch may upgrade the B tranche to 'BBB+' and the C tranche to
'BB+' if AAL is upgraded to 'BB'. However, both subordinated
tranches might not be downgraded if AAL were downgraded to 'B+', as
Fitch's EETC criteria allows for a wider notching differential for
'BB' and 'B' category rated airlines. Alternatively, both
subordinated tranches could be downgraded by one notch if
collateral values were to weaken and recovery prospects were to
fall.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity Facility: Class A, and B certificates benefit from a
dedicated 18-month liquidity facility which will be provided by
Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen Girozentrale (Helaba) (A+/F1+/Stable).


FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned the following rating:

American Airlines (American Airlines Inc.'s (as successor by merger
with US Airways, Inc) Pass Through Trust Certificates, Series
2012-2

  --Class C(R) certificates 'BB'.

Fitch has taken the rating actions as follows:
US Airways Pass Through Trust Certificates, Series 2012-2

  --Class A certificates affirmed at 'A';

  --Class B certificates upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-';

  --Class C certificates upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'.

Fitch currently Rates American Airlines Inc. as follows:

American Airlines Group Inc.

  --Long-Term IDR 'BB-';

  --Senior unsecured notes 'BB-'/'RR4'.

American Airlines, Inc.

  --Long-Term IDR 'BB-';

  --Senior secured credit facilities 'BB+'/'RR1'.

  --Series 2016 revenue bonds issued by the New York Transportation
Development Corporation 'BB'.


AMERICAN AIRLINES 2012-2C(R): Moody's Rates Class C Certs 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 rating to the new $100
million Class C Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates, Series
2012-2C(R) due June 3, 2023 that American Airlines, Inc. American
Airlines will use the proceeds to refinance the existing Class C
Certificates of US Airways Series 2012-2 EETC, which mature on June
3, 2018. Moody's also affirmed its A3 and Ba1 ratings assigned to
the Class A and Class B certificates, respectively of the US
Airways Series 2012-2 EETC. The Ba3 Corporate Family Rating and
stable outlook of American Airlines Group Inc. (together with
American Airlines, Inc., "American") are unaffected by this rating
action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the 2012-2 EETC reflect the credit quality of
American; the typical benefits of EETCs, including the
applicability of Section 1110, cross-default and
cross-collateralization of the equipment notes; 18 month liquidity
facilities on the Class A and Class B series of certificates;
cross-subordination pursuant to the Intercreditor Agreement; and
Moody's belief that the A321s and A330-200s that collateralize the
certificates will remain in the company's fleet through the Class A
scheduled final payment date of June 3, 2025.

The respective notching on the Class A and Class B certificates is
six and two above the Ba3 Corporate Family rating. The Ba3 rating
on the new Class C(R) is level with the CFR. The notching for each
class reflects Moody's belief of 1) the importance of the aircraft
to American's network and 2) that the aircraft in this transaction
will be younger than the average age of their respective types in
the fleet during the transaction's remaining term through 2025.
These factors lower the expected probability of default of the
Certificates under an American Airlines insolvency scenario.

Moody's estimates the respective peak loans-to value (LTV) of the
Class A, Class B and Class C(R) at about 58%, 78% and 98%,
respectively over the remaining life of the transaction through
June 2025, (before priority claims for repossession and remarketing
costs and liquidity facilities). The LTVs on the senior classes
support the notching of each tranche. The Ba3 rating on the new
Class C(R) is the same as the rating on the existing Class C and
one notch higher than the B1 rating Moody's assigns to senior
unsecured debt obligations of American Airlines Group Inc. The
rating of the Class C(R) balances the security interest of the
obligation against the loan to value of almost 100%, which
indicates no equity cushion. Moody's expects the LTV of the Class C
will improve to about 80% following the maturity of the Class B on
June 3, 2021. Changes in the EETC ratings can result from any
combination of changes in the underlying credit quality or ratings
of American, in Moody's opinion of the importance of particular
aircraft models to the airline's network, or in Moody's estimates
of aircraft market values, which will affect estimates of
loan-to-value and thus equity cushions.

American Airlines Group, Inc. is the holding company for American
Airlines, Inc. and American Eagle Airlines. The companies operate
an average of nearly 6,700 flights a day to nearly 350 airports
across 50 countries. The company reported $42.2 billion of revenue
in 2017.

Assignments:

Issuer: American Airlines, Inc.

Senior Secured Enhanced Equipment Trust, Jun 3, 2023, Assigned Ba3

Affirmations:

Issuer: US Airways, Inc. (assumed by American Airlines, Inc.)

Senior Secured Enhanced Equipment Trust, Jun 3, 2025, Affirmed A3

Senior Secured Enhanced Equipment Trust, Jun 3, 2021, Affirmed Ba1


ANTHRACITE 2005-HY2: Moody's Keeps 'C' Rating on 5 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Anthracite 2005-HY2 Ltd. Commercial
Mortgage-Related Securities, Series 2005-HY2:

Cl. B, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 12, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

The Cl. B, Cl. C-FL, Cl. C-FX, Cl. D-FL, Cl. D-FX, and the Cl. E-FL
are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings of on the transaction because key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings.
While the credit quality of the asset pool has improved since last
review, as evidenced by WARF, this did not result in the upgrade of
any outstanding Moody's rated notes. The rating action is the
result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and Re-Remic)
transactions.

Anthracite 2005-HY2 is a static cash transaction backed by a
portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) (100.0%
of the pool balance). As of the March 20, 2018 trustee report, the
aggregate note balance of the transaction, including preferred
shares, has decreased to $357.6 million from $478.1 million at
issuance, with principal pay-down directed to the senior most
outstanding class of notes. The pay-down was mainly the result of
regular amortization.

As of the March 20, 2018 trustee report, the par balance of the
collateral, including defaulted securities, is $8.4 million, which
represents a current under-collateralization of $349.2 million.

The collateral pool contains two CMBS assets totaling $3.5 million
(42.2% of the collateral pool balance) listed as defaulted
securities as of the March 20, 2018 trustee report. There have been
material realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, and
Moody's expects moderate-to-high losses to occur on the defaulted
securities.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CDO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), a primary measure of credit quality with
credit assessments completed for all of the collateral; weighted
average life (WAL); weighted average recovery rate (WARR); number
of asset obligors; and pair-wise asset correlation. These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 4218,
compared to 7748 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 (57.8% compared to 22.5% at last
review), and Caa1-Caa3 (42.2% compared to 77.5% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.1 years, same as that at last review.
The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the underlying
collateral and look-through CMBS collateral.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.

Moody's modeled 4 obligors, compared to 6 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 41.8%, compared to
47.6% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The servicing decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of Rated Notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. The Rated
Notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the recovery rates
of the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Holding all
other parameters constant, increasing the recovery rate of 100% of
the collateral pool by +10% would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the Rated Note of zero notches upward (e.g., one
notch up implies a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2). There would
be no further movement on the Rated Notes with a decrease in
recovery rates as the current mean recovery rates are 0%; as
evidenced by WARR.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


APIDOS CLO XXIX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Apidos CLO
XXIX/Apidos CLO XXIX LLC's $443.50 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 7, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Apidos CLO XXIX/Apidos CLO XXIX LLC
   Class                 Rating         Amount
                                       (mil. $)(i)
  X                     AAA (sf)         2.50
  A-1A                  AAA (sf)       307.50
  A-1B                  NR              17.50
  A-2                   AA (sf)         55.00
  B (deferrable)        A (sf)          35.00
  C (deferrable         BBB- (sf)       25.00
  D (deferrable)        BB- (sf)        18.50
  Subordinated notes    NR              52.50

  NR--Not rated.


ARES XXXIR: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Ares XXXIR
CLO Ltd.'s $1.0688 billion floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 8, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Ares XXXIR CLO Ltd.

  Class                   Rating          Amount
                                        (mil. $)
  A-1                     AAA (sf)        737.50
  A-2                     NR               81.20
  B                       AA (sf)         131.30
  C (deferrable)          A (sf)           81.30
  D (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)        65.60
  E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)         53.10
  Subordinated notes      NR              108.55

  NR--Not rated.


BANK 2018-BNK12: Fitch Expects to Rate Class X-F Certs 'B-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on BANK 2018-BNK12
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2018-BNK12.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assign Rating Outlooks as
follows:

  --$33,530,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$76,220,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$36,500,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$135,000,000d class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$318,028,000d class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$599,278,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$123,066,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$83,470,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$39,596,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$40,665,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$37,455,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$22,473,000ab class X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$8,561,000ab class X-F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$37,455,000a class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$22,473,000a class E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$8,561,000a class F 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not expected to be rated by Fitch:

  --$24,613,456ab class X-G;

  --$24,613,456a class G;

  --$45,058,497.70ac RR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.
(b) Notional amount and interest-only.
(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.
(d)The initial certificate balances of class A-3 and class A-4 are
unknown and expected to be $453,028,000 in aggregate. The
certificate balances will be determined based on the final pricing
of those classes of certificates. The expected class A-3 balance
range is $60,000,000 to $210,000,000 and the expected class A-4
balance range is $243,028,000 to $393,028,000. Fitch's certificate
balances for classes A-3 and A-4 are assumed at the midpoint of the
range for each class.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of May 8, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 63 loans secured by 95
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$901,169,954 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed to
the trust by: Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC; Wells Fargo Securities,
LLC; and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 78.9% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 83.3% and asset summary reviews
on 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool exhibits
better leverage metrics than other recent Fitch-rated multiborrower
transactions. The pool's Fitch debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
of 1.60x is stronger than the YTD 2018 average of 1.25x and 2017
average of 1.26x. The pool's Fitch loan-to-value (LTV) of 89.8% is
lower than the YTD 2018 and 2017 averages of 103.6% and 101.6%,
respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion and
multifamily cooperative loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of
1.18x and 108.5%, respectively.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Four loans comprising 23.3%
of the transaction received an investment-grade credit opinion.
Fair Oaks Mall (8.9% of the pool) received a credit opinion of
'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. 181 Fremont Street (6.4% of the
pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*'. The
Gateway (6.1% of the pool) received a stand-alone credit opinion of
'BBBsf*'. Apple Campus 3 (1.9% of the pool) received a credit
opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. Net of these loans,
the pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV are 1.68x and 96.8%, respectively.

Co-op Collateral: The transaction contains a total of 22 loans
(11.9% of the pool) secured by multifamily cooperatives located
primarily within the greater New York City metro area. The weighted
average (WA) Fitch DSCR and LTV of the co-op loans as rentals are
4.39x and 33.2%, respectively. The pool's Fitch DSCR and LTV net of
co-op loans are 1.18x and 108.5%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 16.5% below the most recent
year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period.
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2018-BNK12 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could
result.


BB-UBS TRUST 2012-TFT: S&P Cuts Class E Certs Rating to BB (sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on the class D and E
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from BB-UBS Trust
2012-TFT, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on five other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P said, "For the rating actions on the pooled principal- and
interest-paying classes, our expectation of credit enhancement was
more or less in line with the lowered and affirmed rating levels.
The downgrades on classes D and E primarily reflect our revised
analysis on the Tucson Mall loan ($205.5 million, 37.2%),
specifically the higher-than-expected occupancy cost, declining
cash flows, and declining in-line sales per sq. ft., which we
accounted for when deriving our valuation.

"The affirmed 'BB (sf)' rating on the class TE raked certificates
reflects our re-evaluation of the Town East Mall loan. Class TE
derives 100% of its cash flow from a subordinate non-pooled
component of the loan.

"The affirmation on the class X-A interest-only (IO) certificates
is based on our criteria for rating IO securities, in which the
ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than that of the
lowest-rated reference class. The notional balance on class X-A
references class A."

This is a large-loan transaction backed by three uncrossed
fixed-rate IO mortgage loans, all maturing in May 2020. S&P's
property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of the three loans
in the pool, secured by three super regional malls, using the
reported 2013 through year-to-date Sept. 30, 2017, operating data,
most rent rolls, and tenant sales reports provided by the master
servicer.

As of the April 6, 2018, trustee remittance report, the trust
consisted of three fixed-rate IO loans with an aggregate pooled
trust balance of $552.9 million and an aggregate trust balance of
$567.8 million, same as at issuance. The pooled trust has not
incurred any principal losses to date.

Details on the three loans are as follows:

-- The Tucson Mall loan is the largest loan in the pool, with a
trust balance of $205.5 million (37.2% of the pooled trust
balance). In addition, the equity interest in the mortgage borrower
secures mezzanine debt totaling $40.5 million. The IO loan pays a
per annum fixed interest rate of 3.567%. The loan is secured by
667,561 sq. ft. of a 1.3 million-sq.-ft., two-level enclosed
regional mall in Tucson, Ariz. According to the September 2017 rent
roll, the collateral was 91.5% occupied, and the five largest
tenants made up 30.0% of the net rentable area (NRA). In addition,
tenants accounting for 9.0%, 16.5%, and 8.5% of the NRA have leases
that expire in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. S&P Global
Ratings calculated in-line sales of approximately $332 per sq. ft.
using the September 2017 tenant sales report, down from $385 per
sq. ft. calculated at issuance. S&P said, "Based on our analysis,
we calculated the property's occupancy cost to be approximately
21.2%, reflecting the lower base rent, expense reimbursements, and
in-line sales per sq. ft. Our expected-case valuation, which
included an occupancy cost adjustment down to 16.0% and using a
7.50% S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate, yielded a 77.5% S&P
Global Ratings pooled trust loan–to-value (LTV) ratio and a 2.67x
S&P Global Ratings debt service coverage (DSC)."

-- The Fashion Place loan is the second-largest loan in the pool,
with a trust balance of $202.0 million (36.5%). In addition, the
equity interest in the mortgage borrower secures mezzanine debt
totaling $24.7 million. The loan pays a 3.318% fixed interest rate
per year. The loan is secured by 421,206 sq. ft. of a 1.02
million-sq.-ft. enclosed regional mall in Murray, Utah, a suburb of
Salt Lake City. According to the September 2017 rent roll, the
collateral space was 97.8% occupied, and the five largest tenants
made up 21.9% of the NRA. In addition, tenants accounting for 6.8%,
6.4%, and 8.8% of the NRA have leases that expire in 2018, 2019,
and 2020, respectively. S&P said, "We calculated in-line sales of
approximately $548 per sq. ft. using the September 2017 tenant
sales data, which is relatively flat from $549 per sq. ft. at
issuance. Our expected-case valuation, reflecting relatively stable
performance and using a 6.50% S&P Global Ratings capitalization
rate, yielded a 60.2% S&P Global Ratings pooled trust LTV ratio and
a 3.21x S&P Global Ratings DSC."

-- The Town East Mall loan is the smallest loan in the pool, with
a whole loan balance of $160.3 million that consists of a $145.4
million senior pooled trust component (26.3% balance) and a $14.8
million subordinate non-pooled trust component that supports the
class TE raked certificates. The loan pays a 3.567% fixed interest
rate per year. The loan is secured by 416,516 sq. ft. of a 1.22
million-sq.-ft. enclosed regional mall in Mesquite, Texas. Based on
the September 2017 rent roll, the collateral space was 95.7%
occupied, and the five largest tenants made up 23.9% of the NRA. In
addition, tenants accounting for 19.4%, 6.5%, and 10.6% of the NRA
have leases that expire in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. S&P
said, "We calculated in-line sales of approximately $433 per sq.
ft., up slightly from $407 per sq. ft. at issuance. Our
expected-case valuation reflecting relatively stable performance
and using a 7.25% S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate, yielded
an overall S&P Global Ratings LTV ratio and DSC of 65.5% and 3.06x,
respectively, on the pooled trust balance."

  RATINGS LIST

  BB-UBS Trust 2012-TFT
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2012-TFT
                                     Rating
  Class       Identifier       To          From
  A           05490AAA1        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
  X-A         05490AAL7        AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
  B           05490AAC7        AA (sf)     AA (sf)
  C           05490AAE3        A (sf)      A (sf)
  D           05490AAG8        BBB (sf)    BBB+ (sf)
  E           05490AAJ2        BB (sf)     BBB- (sf)
  TE          05490AAS2        BB (sf)     BB (sf)


BEAR STEARNS 2007-TOP26: DBRS Confirms C Rating on 2 Cert Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited downgraded two classes of the Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-TOP26 issued by Bear Stearns
Commercial Mortgage Trust, Series 2007-TOP26 (the Trust) as
follows:

-- Class A-J downgraded to C (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class B downgraded to C (sf) from CCC (sf)

Additionally, DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the following
classes:

-- Class AM at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at C (sf)
-- Class D at C (sf)

All trends are Stable, with the exception of Classes A-J, B, C and
D, which have ratings that do not carry trends. Class E was
previously downgraded to D (sf) with the March 2018 remittance as a
loss was realized to the Trust and, as such, no rating action was
made for Class E for this review.

The rating downgrades reflect DBRS's outlook for the remaining
loans in the transaction, particularly for the second largest loan
remaining in the pool, Prospectus ID#2 – One AT&T Center (33.0%
of the current pool balance). As at the April 2018 remittance, the
pool experienced a collateral reduction of 84.8% from issuance,
with 15 loans remaining out of the original 237 loans in the
transaction. To date, 28 loans have liquidated from the Trust,
resulting in a total loss of $91.8 million. Only 12 loans (65.2% of
pool) are reporting YE2016 financials, with even less reporting
YE2017 financials and based on the most recent year-end figures,
the weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for
the pool was 2.31 times with a WA debt yield of 14.2% and WA exit
debt yield of 22.6%.

According to the April 2018 remittance, three loans (2.7% of the
pool) are on the servicer's watch list and five loans (42.3% of the
pool), are in special servicing. DBRS expects realized losses
associated with the defaulted loans will flow through into Class
A-J.

The pool is concentrated by loan size, with the two largest loans
cumulatively representing 79.2% of the current pool balance. These
loans include Prospectus ID#1 – One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza (46.2%
of the pool) and the previously mentioned One AT&T Center loan,
which is in special servicing.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza loan
as investment grade. With this review, DBRS has confirmed that the
performance of the loan remains consistent with investment-grade
characteristics.

The One AT&T Center loan is secured by a 1.5 million square foot
Class A office building located in downtown St. Louis, Missouri.
This loan was transferred to special servicing in March 2017 for
imminent default as the loan was not expected to repay at maturity.
The loan could not refinance given performance declines related to
the departure of the single tenant, AT&T, which did not exercise
its renewal option and fully vacated the property in September 2017
after years of gradual move-outs. A receiver was appointed in July
2017 and the property has been real estate owned since late 2017.
According to the May 2017 appraisal, the subject's value was
reported at $11.7 million, which is a drastic decline from the
issuance value of $207 million, and well below the current trust
exposure of approximately $113.0 million. According to an April
2018 news article published by the “St. Louis Post-Dispatch”,
an affiliate of real estate development firm CRG Group has tendered
an offer to purchase the building. The article also noted that the
building would require significant capital to execute a
redevelopment project, with financing contingent on the purchaser's
ability to show solid leasing commitments. DBRS has received
confirmation of this proposed purchase from the special servicer
and will continue to monitor for developments. The special
servicer's commentary noted that the loan is expected to be
resolved by October 2018. In the analysis for this review, DBRS
assumed a full loss to the trust for the loan.

Notes: All figures are in U.S dollars unless otherwise noted.


BLUEMOUNTAIN 2016-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from BlueMountain CLO
2016-1 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally
issued in 2016 that is managed by BlueMountain Capital Management
LLC. The replacement notes will be issued via a proposed
supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 4, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the June 4, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

Based on provisions in the supplemental indenture:

-- The replacement class A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, and E-R notes are
expected to be issued at lower spreads than the original notes.

-- The non-call period will be extended to June 2019.

-- The weighted average life test date will be extended to 6.5
years after the refinancing's closing.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  BlueMountain CLO 2016-1 Ltd.  
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-R                       AAA (sf)             263.50
  B-R                       AA (sf)               59.50
  C-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                29.75
  D-R (deferrable)          BBB (sf)              18.70
  E-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              19.55
  Sub. notes (deferrable)   NR                    33.00

  NR--Not rated.


BOSS REAL ESTATE: Taps JK Realty as Real Estate Agent
-----------------------------------------------------
Boss Real Estate Holdings, LLC, seeks approval from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona to hire a real estate
agent.

The Debtor proposes to employ JK Realty in connection with the sale
of its real properties located at 2828 and 2816 South Country Club
Drive, Mesa, Arizona.

A commission of $100,000 will be paid to the seller's agent.  No
commission will be paid to the buyer's agent from the sales
proceeds.

Jeffrey Dorsten, a real estate agent employed with JK Realty,
disclosed in a court filing that he and his firm do not represent
any interests adverse to the Debtor and its estate.

The firm can be reached through:

     Jeffrey Dorsten
     JK Realty
     1760 E. Pecos Road, Suite 501
     Gilbert, AZ 85295
     Phone: (480) 733-8500

                  About Boss Real Estate Holdings

Boss Real Estate Holdings, LLC's primary asset is certain real
property located at 2816 South Country Club Drive and 2828 South
Country Club Drive, Mesa, Arizona 85210, where it operates a car
wash, a lube shop, and a small convenience store -- the Mesa Car
Wash.

Boss Real Estate Holdings filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.
Ariz. Case No. 17-03716) on April 10, 2017.  The Hon. Brenda Moody
Whinery presides over the case.  Ronald J. Ellett, Esq., at Ellet
Law Offices, P.C., serves as bankruptcy counsel.  In the petition
signed by Michael Harris, member/manager, the Debtor estimated $1
million to $10 million in both assets and liabilities.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the Debtor's case.


BSCMS 2006-PWR13: Fitch Upgrades Class D Certs Rating at 'Csf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two classes and affirmed 11 classes of
Bear Stearns Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2006-PWR13
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Defeasance: The transaction has paid down 97% to $100.2 million
from $2.9 billion at issuance. Three loans totaling 47% of the pool
balance or $47.2 million are defeased. Class B and C are 100%
covered by defeased collateral. The upgrades reflect the defeasance
and paydown since Fitch's last rating action.

Better than Expected Recoveries: First Industrial Portfolio ($47.5
million) has been disposed of, resulting in a loss of $7.2 million,
which was significantly better than expected.

Concentrated Pool: Only 15 out of the original 305 loans remain.
Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch performed a
sensitivity analysis that ranked the remaining loans based on the
perceived likelihood of repayment. This includes defeased loans,
fully amortizing loans, balloon loans, and losses assumed on the
specially serviced assets. The ratings reflect this sensitivity
analysis.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated eleven loans (50% of
the pool balance) as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC), including five
loans (27%) currently in special servicing. Risks surrounding the
performing FLOCs include loans past their ARD dates, fluctuating
property performance, low debt service coverage ratios, and
secondary market locations.

Maturity Schedule: Two loans (6.1% of the current pool balance)
have passed their September 2016 ARD dates and have final
maturities in July 2036. Both loans are considered FLOCs and are
fully leased to Rite Aid Corporation (B\Rating Watch Evolving) with
near-term lease expirations in December 2019. The remaining five
(19.1%) non-specially serviced or non-defeased loans mature between
June 2020 and September 2026.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes B and C are due to the class
balances being fully covered by defeased collateral. A downgrade to
the distressed class D will occur if losses are realized. An
upgrade is unlikely unless recoveries from the specially serviced
assets are significantly greater than expected.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

  --$14.4 million class B upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$29.1 million class C upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'CCCsf';
assigned Outlook Stable.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  --$40 million class D at 'Csf'; RE 95%.

  --$16.8 million class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

Classes F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N and O are affirmed at 'Dsf'/RE 0%
due to realized losses.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-1A, A-M and A-J have paid in
full. Fitch does not rate the fully depleted class P. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only classes X-1 and
X-2.


BWAY 2013-1515: S&P Affirms BB- (sf) Rating on Class G Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on 10 classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from BWAY 2013-1515, a U.S.
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P said, "For the affirmations, our expectation of credit
enhancement was more or less in line with the affirmed rating
levels. Our analysis also considered the long-term tenancy,
substantially completed base-building renovations and tenant
improvements (TIs), the property's location, and the relatively
strong market fundamentals.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class X-A and X-B interest-only
(IO) certificates based on our criteria for rating IO securities,
in which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class. Class X-A's notional
balance references classes A-1 and A-2. Class X-B's notional
balance references classes B, C, D, and E.

"In addition, we reviewed the transaction's insurance provision and
providers and determined that they are, for the most part,
consistent with our property insurance criteria and normal market
standards. However, upon review of the recent insurance
certificates provided by the master servicer, we noted that one of
the insurers is not rated by S&P Global Ratings. We generally
expect insurance providers to be rated by S&P Global Ratings no
lower than two rating categories below the highest-rated securities
backed by the loan, with a floor of 'BBB' rating category. As such,
we increased our minimum credit enhancement levels at each rating
category.

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
12-year, fixed-rate partial IO mortgage loan secured by 1515
Broadway, a 1.8 million-sq.-ft. (excluding the 72,355-sq.-ft.
parking garage) class A office building in midtown Manhattan. S&P
said, "Our property-level analysis included a re-evaluation of the
office property that secures the mortgage loan in the trust and
considered the stable servicer-reported net operating income and
occupancy for the past six years (2012 through 2017), as well as
the issuer credit rating on the largest tenant, Viacom Inc.
(BBB-/Watch Negative/A-3). We then derived our sustainable in-place
net cash flow, which we divided by a 6.25% S&P Global Ratings
capitalization rate to determine our expected-case value. This
yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings loan-to-value ratio and debt
service coverage (DSC) of 82.9% and 1.28x, respectively, on the
trust balance."

According to the April 12, 2018, trustee remittance report, the
partial IO amortizing mortgage loan has a trust and whole loan
balance of $867.0 million, down from $900.0 million at issuance.
The loan pays a fixed interest rate of 3.93375% annually. The
mortgage loan was IO for the first 36 months; it's now amortizing
based on a 30-year schedule and matures on March 6, 2025. To date,
the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 1.38x
on the trust balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 2017, and
occupancy was 98.3% according to the Dec. 31, 2017, rent roll.
Based on the December 2017 rent roll, Viacom comprises 1.5 million
sq. ft. (79.2% of the total net rentable area [NRA]). As part of
the Viacom lease extension through June 2031, the landlord must
complete an estimated $56.1 million in base-building renovations,
as well as contribute approximately $77.9 million for TIs. It is
S&P's understanding from the master servicer that the base-building
renovations were completed earlier this year, and approximately
$16.0 million of the sponsor's TIs obligations is left to be spent
by Viacom. In addition, 2.3% and 0.4% of the NRA have leases that
expire in 2019 and 2020, respectively.

  RATINGS LIST

  BWAY 2013-1515
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-1515
                                       Rating
  Class            Identifier        To            From
  A-1              05604FAA3         AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
  A-2              05604FAC9         AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
  X-A              05604FAE5         AAA (sf)      AAA (sf)
  X-B              05604FAG0         BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
  B                05604FAJ4         AA- (sf)      AA- (sf)
  C                05604FAL9         A- (sf)       A- (sf)
  D                05604FAN5         BBB (sf)      BBB (sf)
  E                05604FAQ8         BBB- (sf)     BBB- (sf)
  F                05604FAS4         BB (sf)       BB (sf)
  G                05604FAU9         BB- (sf)      BB- (sf)


CEDAR FUNDING IX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Cedar Funding IX CLO
Ltd./Cedar Funding IX CLO LLC's $425.50 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Cedar Funding IX CLO Ltd./Cedar Funding IX CLO LLC  
  Class                      Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                        AAA (sf)                 297.00
  A-2                        NR                        32.00
  B                          AA (sf)                   51.25
  C (deferrable)             A (sf)                    28.50
  D (deferrable)             BBB- (sf)                 28.00
  E (deferrable)             BB- (sf)                  20.75
  Subordinated notes         NR                        53.00

  NR--Not rated.


CIM TRUST 2018-J1: DBRS Finalizes 'BB' Rating on Class B-4 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized the following provisional ratings on the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-J1 (the
Certificates) issued by CIM Trust 2018-J1 (the Trust):

-- $338.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.2 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.2 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $200.4 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $200.4 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $200.4 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $137.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $137.8 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $137.8 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $253.7 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $253.7 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $253.7 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.3 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.3 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.3 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class A-21 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-22 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-23 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-24 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.2 million Class A-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.2 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $338.2 million Class A-IO4 at AAA (sf)
-- $200.4 million Class A-IO5 at AAA (sf)
-- $200.4 million Class A-IO6 at AAA (sf)
-- $200.4 million Class A-IO7 at AAA (sf)
-- $137.8 million Class A-IO8 at AAA (sf)
-- $137.8 million Class A-IO9 at AAA (sf)
-- $137.8 million Class A-IO10 at AAA (sf)
-- $253.7 million Class A-IO11 at AAA (sf)
-- $253.7 million Class A-IO12 at AAA (sf)
-- $253.7 million Class A-IO13 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-IO14 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-IO15 at AAA (sf)
-- $84.6 million Class A-IO16 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.3 million Class A-IO17 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.3 million Class A-IO18 at AAA (sf)
-- $53.3 million Class A-IO19 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class A-IO20 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class A-IO21 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.9 million Class A-IO22 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-IO23 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-IO24 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-IO25 at AAA (sf)
-- $4.8 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.7 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $3.8 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.2 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO6, A-IO7, A-IO8,
A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11,
A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14, A-IO15, A-IO16, A-IO17, A-IO18, A-IO19,
A-IO20, A-IO21, A-IO22, A-IO23, A-IO24 and A-IO25 are interest-only
certificates. The class balances represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12,
A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-22, A-23, A-24, A-IO2, A-IO3,
A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO8, A-IO9, A-IO10, A-IO11, A-IO12, A-IO13, A-IO14,
A-IO17, A-IO20, A-IO23, A-IO24 and A-IO25 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a combination of
exchange certificates as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11,
A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-16, A-17 and A-18 are super-senior
certificates. These classes benefit from additional protection from
senior support certificates (Classes A-19, A-20 and A-21) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 5.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf) and BB (sf) ratings reflect
4.25%, 2.50%, 1.50% and 0.65% of credit enhancement, respectively.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 530 loans with a total principal balance of $380,008,740
as of the Cut-off Date (April 1, 2018).

The mortgage loans were originated by Quicken Loans, Inc. (18.1%),
Guild Mortgage Company (13.7%), New Penn Financial, LLC (9.9%),
Guaranteed Rate, Inc. (8.8%), JMAC Lending, Inc. (8.5%) and various
other originators, each comprising no more than 7.0% of the pool by
principal balance. On or prior to the Closing Date, the Sellers,
Chimera Funding TRS LLC and Chimera Residential Mortgage Inc., will
acquire the mortgage loans from Bank of America, National
Association. Through bulk purchases, BANA acquired the mortgage
loans underwritten either to its jumbo whole loan acquisition
guidelines (94.5%) or pursuant to Fannie Mae's Automated
Underwriting System (AUS) (5.5%).

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing will service 100% of the mortgage
loans, directly or through subservices. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will
act as Master Servicer, Securities Administrator and Custodian.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB will serve as Trustee.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets and well-qualified borrowers.

This transaction employs a representations and warranties (R&W)
framework that contains certain weaknesses, such as unrated R&W
providers, unrated entities (the Sellers) providing a backstop and
sunset provisions on the backstop. To capture the perceived
weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator scores for all loans in
this pool. A lower originator score results in increased default
and loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.

Notes:  All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CIM TRUST 2018-J1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class B-4 Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 28
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
CIM Trust 2018-J1 ("CIM 2018-J1"). The ratings range from Aaa (sf)
to Ba2 (sf).

CIM 2018-J1 is the first prime issuance by Chimera Investment
Corporation (the sponsor) in 2018. The mortgage loans for this
transaction have been acquired by the affiliates of the sponsor,
Chimera Funding TRS LLC. and Chimera Residential Mortgage Inc. (the
sellers) from Bank of America National Association (BANA).

Approximately 94.5% of the loans by balance, were acquired by BANA
through its jumbo whole loan purchase program from various mortgage
loan originators or sellers underwritten to various originators or
Chimera acquisition criteria. All other mortgage loans (5.5% by
loan balance), were high balance conforming loans acquired by BANA
through its whole loan purchase program from United Shore Financial
Services LLC and loan Depot.com, LLC, which were originated
pursuant to Fannie Mae guidelines with no overlays. All of the
loans are designated as qualified mortgages (QM) either under the
QM safe harbor or the GSE temporary exemption under the Ability-to-
Repay (ATR) rules.

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (SMS) will service all the loans and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2) will be the master servicer. The
servicer will be primarily responsible for funding certain
servicing advances and delinquent scheduled interest and principal
payments for the mortgage loans, unless the servicer determines
that such amounts would not be recoverable. The master servicer is
obligated to fund any required monthly advances if the servicer
fails in its obligation to do so. The master servicer and servicer
will be entitled to be reimbursed for any such monthly advances
from future payments and collections (including insurance and
liquidation proceeds) with respect to those mortgage loans.

The CIM 2018-J1 transaction is a securitization of 530 primarily
30-year, fixed rate, first prime residential mortgage loans with an
unpaid principal balance of $380,008,739. The pool consists of
94.5% by loan balance prime jumbo mortgage loans and 5.5% by loan
balance GSE-eligible high balance mortgage loans.

The securitization has a shifting interest structure with a
five-year lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination
floor and a subordinate floor.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIM Trust 2018-J1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.40%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.75% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings.

Moody's loss estimates are based on a loan-by-loan assessment of
the securitized collateral pool as of the cut-off date using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Moody's final
loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator
assessments and the financial strength of the Representation and
warranty (R&W) providers.

Moody's bases the definitive ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, the assessments of the aggregators, originators
and servicers, the strength of the third party due diligence and
the R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

The CIM 2018-J1 transaction is a securitization of 530 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$380,008,740. The loans in this transaction have strong borrower
characteristics with a weighted average original FICO score of 769
and a weighted-average original loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of
69.13%. In addition, 25.9% of the borrowers are self-employed and
refinance loans comprise 47.2% of the aggregate pool. The pool has
a high geographic concentration with 48.8% of the aggregate pool
located in California and 16.2% located in the San
Francisco-Oakland-Hayward MSA. Loans located in Texas and Florida
comprise 7.4% of the pool. The characteristics of the loans
underlying the pool are generally comparable to other recent prime
RMBS transactions backed by 30-year mortgage loans that Moody's has
rated.

Origination

There are 19 originators in the transaction, some of which may have
limited history of securitizing prime jumbo mortgages. The largest
originators in the pool with more than 5% by balance are Quicken
Loans Inc (18.14%), Guild Mortgage Company (13.70%), New Penn
Financial, LLC (10.20%), Guaranteed Rate, Inc. (8.82%), JMAC
Lending Inc. (8.50%), Home Point Financial Corporation (6.29%),
Sierra Pacific Mortgage Company, Inc., (5.52%), United Shore
Financial Services (5.37%), and Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC. (
5.33%). After considering the prime jumbo acquisition criteria of
CIM 2018-J1, Moody's increased or decreased the base case and Aaa
loss expectations for different originators based on their adequacy
of their respective underwriting guidelines. Finally, no
adjustments were made to the base case and Aaa loss expectations
for the GSE-eligible loans.

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Three third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that the sponsor gave us. These firms
conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data integrity and
regulatory reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool. In addition a
tax/title review was conducted on 16 aged loans (by AMC) and a FICO
refresh was ordered on 127 loans which were aged between 6 months
from origination and March 2017. The TPR results indicated
compliance with the originators' and aggregators' underwriting
guidelines for the vast majority of the loans, no material
compliance issues, and no material appraisal defects.

Each originator will provide comprehensive loan level reps and
warranties for their respective loans. BANA will assign each
originator's R&W to the sellers, who will in turn assign to the
depositor, which will assign to the trust. To mitigate the
potential concerns regarding the originators' ability to meet their
respective R&W obligations, the sellers will backstop the R&Ws for
all originators loans. The sellers obligation to backstop third
party R&Ws will terminate 5 years after the closing date, subject
to certain performance conditions. The sellers will also provide
the gap reps. While Moody's acknowledges the sellers relatively
weak financial strength, the collateral pool benefits from the
diversity of the originators. The R&W framework is adequate in part
because the results of the independent TPRs revealed a high level
of compliance with underwriting guidelines and regulations, as well
as overall adequate appraisal quality. These results give us a
clear indication that the loans do not breach the R&Ws the
originators have made and that the originators are unlikely to face
material repurchase requests in the future. The loan-level R&Ws are
strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the baseline set of
credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US RMBS. Among other
considerations, the R&Ws address property valuation, underwriting,
fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the presence of title
and hazard insurance, the absence of material property damage, and
the enforceability of mortgage.

Tail Risk and Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 1.35% of the closing pool balance,
which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time. Additionally there is a
subordination lock-out amount which is 1.25% of the closing pool
balance.

Exposure to Extraordinary expenses

Extraordinary trust expenses in this transaction are deducted from
Net WAC as opposed to available distribution amount. However, the
extraordinary trust expenses of the servicer will not be subject to
the foregoing maximum amount of $300,000/annum. Moody's believes
there is a very low likelihood that the rated certificates in CIM
2018-J1 will incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or
indemnification payments from potential future lawsuits against key
deal parties. First, the loans are prime quality, 100% Qualified
Mortgages and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well
defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on an
ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
must review loans for breaches of representations and warranties
when certain clearly defined triggers have been breached which
reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.
Furthermore, the issuer has disclosed the results of a credit,
compliance and valuation review of 100% of the mortgage loans by
independent third parties (AMC, Opus and Clayton Services LLC).

Other Considerations

In CIM 2018-J1, the controlling holder has the option to hire at
its own expense the independent reviewer upon the occurrence of a
review event. If there is no Controlling Holder (no single entity
holds a majority of the Class Principal Amount of the most
subordinate class of certificates outstanding), the trustee will
appoint an independent reviewer at the cost of the trust. However,
if the controlling holder does not hire the independent reviewer,
the holders of more than 50% of the aggregate voting interests of
all outstanding certificates may direct (at their expense) the
trustee to appoint an independent reviewer. In this transaction,
controlling holder can be the depositor or a seller (or an
affiliate of these parties). If the controlling holder is
affiliated with the depositor, seller or Sponsor, then the
controlling holder may not be motivated to discover and enforce R&W
breaches for which its affiliate is responsible.

Unlike other prime jumbo transactions, the controlling holder,
which can be an affiliate of the sponsor, can terminate both the
servicer and master servicer without cause. However, in the case of
the termination of the servicer, the master servicer must consent
to the depositor's selection of a successor servicer, and the
successor servicer must have a net worth of at least $25 million
and be Fannie or Freddie approved. In addition, the servicing fees
payable to the successor servicer cannot exceed 25bps. And in the
case of the termination of the master servicer, the trustee will be
required to select a successor master servicer subject to certain
criteria such as a rating agency confirmation and financial
stability requirements.

The servicer will not commence foreclosure proceedings on a
mortgage loan unless the servicer has notified the controlling
holder at least five business days in advance of the foreclosure
and the controlling holder has not objected to such action. If the
controlling holder objects, the servicer has to obtain three
appraisals from the appraisal firms as listed in the pooling and
servicing agreement. The cost of the appraisal is borne by the
controlling holder. If the controlling holder fails to purchase the
mortgage loan within the time frame , the controlling holder
forfeits any foreclosure rights thereafter. Moody's considers this
credit neutral because a) the appraiser is chosen by the servicer
from the approved list of appraisers, b) the fair value of the
property is decided by the servicer, based on third party
appraisals, and c) the controlling holder will pay the fair price
and accrued interest.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


COLD STORAGE 2017-ICE3: Moody's Affirms Ba1 on Cl. HRR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in Cold Storage Trust 2017-ICE3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2017-ICE3 as follows:

Cl. A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. HRR, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings were affirmed because the transaction's key metrics,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl
Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 2018 distribution date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance was $1.30 billion, unchanged from at
securitization. The transaction is secured by a floating rate,
interest-only mortgage loan collateralized by a portfolio of 54
cold-storage facilities located across 17 US states (CA, WA, TX,
KS, IL, PA, GA, CO, NE, IA, NC, AL, KY, OH, VA, AZ and UT).
Construction dates range between 1950 and 2016 and reflect an
average age of 17.3 years. The loan sponsor is Lineage Logistics, a
leading temperature-controlled storage, logistics, and warehousing
company.

The 54 properties comprising the loan collateral are 100% leased
through a master lease agreement to the operating company Lineage
Logistics Holdings, LLC, an affiliate of the loan sponsor. The
master lease commenced in April 2017 with a base rent of $151.0
million per annum, subject to annual increases equal to the greater
of 2% or CPI, not to exceed 3.5%.

Moody's stabilized net cash flow (NCF) is $166.1 million, the same
as at securitization. Moody's trust LTV ratio is 80.3%, and Moody's
stressed DSCR for the trust is at 1.39X. The trust has not
experienced any losses or interest shortfalls since securitization.


COMM 2014-CCRE14: Moody's Lowers Class E Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
and downgraded the ratings on two classes in COMM 2014-CCRE14
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2014-CCRE14:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. PEZ, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 21, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eight P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on Cl. E and Cl. F were downgraded due to anticipated
losses from specially serviced loans.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ, was affirmed due to
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the exchangeable
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 4.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.9% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating COMM 2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust,
Cl. A-2, Cl. A-SB, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-M, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D,
Cl. E, and Cl. F were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The principal methodology used in rating
COMM 2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust, Cl. PEZ was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015. The
methodologies used in rating COMM 2014-CCRE14 Mortgage Trust, Cl.
X-A were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS"
published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 6.5% to $1.29
billion from $1.38 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 57 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 12% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 57% of the pool. Three loans, constituting
28.0% of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit
assessments. Six loans, constituting 4.7% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

Five loans, constituting 5.6% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Six loans, constituting 6.9% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is 175 West Jackson
($39.2 million -- 3.0% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion of a $274.4 million first mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a Class A, 22-story office building totaling 1.45
million square feet (SF) and located within the CBD of Chicago,
Illinois. The loan transferred to special servicing in March 2018
for imminent default, in connection with the borrowers request to
modify the loan. The modification request included a loan
assumption. As of March 2018, the property was 71% leased, compared
to 84% in November 2016 and 92% at securitization. This loan was
included in the conduit component and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 114.3% and 0.85X, respectively.

The second largest specially serviced loan is McKinley Mall ($26.1
million -- 2.0% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion
of a $35.5 million first mortgage loan. The loan recently
transferred to special servicing in April 2018. The property lost
anchor tenant Macy's in 2017. Current anchors include: Sears, JC
Penney, and The Bon-Ton Store, however, Bon-Ton has recently
announced the closure of its store as part of its liquidation. The
property's revenue has declined year over year and the net
operating income (NOI) is below that of securitization.

The remaining four specially serviced loans are secured by
multifamily properties in North Dakota. Moody's estimates an
aggregate $35.2 million loss for the specially serviced loans.

Moody's received full or partial year 2017 operating results for
96% of the pool, and full year 2016 operating results for 94% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 106%, compared to 108% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced loans (except for the 175 West Jackson Loan).
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
17% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.0%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.35X and 1.00X,
respectively, compared to 1.34X and 0.98X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.
The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 60
Hudson Street Loan ($155.0 million -- 12.0% of the pool), which
represents a pari-passu portion of a $280.0 million mortgage loan.
The loan is secured by a 24-story, mission critical
telecommunications and data center building located in the Tribeca
neighborhood of New York City. The property is widely regarded as
one of the world's most connected telecommunications and data
center buildings. As of February 2018, the property was 76% leased,
unchanged from February 2017 and August 2016. Moody's structured
credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and 1.81X,
respectively.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
625 Madison Avenue loan ($110.0 million, 8.5% of the pool), which
represents a pari-passu portion of a $195 million first mortgage
loan. The loan is secured by the fee interest in a 0.81-acre parcel
of land located at 625 Madison Avenue between East 58th and East
59th Street in New York City. The fee interest is subject to a
ground lease pursuant to which the ground tenant constructed,
developed and owns the improvements that sit on top of the ground.
The improvements consist of a 17-story, mixed-use building, and the
ground tenant's interest in the improvements is not collateral for
the 625 Madison Avenue loan. The collateral is also encumbered with
$195 million of mezzanine debt. Moody's structured credit
assessment is aa2 (sca.pd).

The third loan with a structured credit assessment is the Saint
Louis Galleria loan ($95.0 million, 7.4% of the pool), which
represents a portion a $215 million mortgage loan. The loan is
componentized in to three notes: (i) Note A-1, having a par balance
of $100 million; (ii) Note A-2, having a par balance of $95
million; and (iii) Note A-1B, having a par balance of $20 million.
Note A-1 sits pari passu to Note A-2 and Note A-1B sits subordinate
to both Note A-1 and Note A-2. Only Note A-2 has been contributed
to the this transaction. The loan is secured by a 467,440 square
foot (SF) component of a 1.18 million SF, Class A, super-regional
mall located in St. Louis, Missouri. The mall is anchored by
Dillard's, Macy's and Nordstrom, none of which are part of the loan
collateral. The property, including non-collateral tenants, was 98%
leased as of December 2016 while inline space was 94% leased. As of
December 2017, comparable inline sales (


COMM 2015-CCRE23: DBRS Confirms 'B(low)' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited upgraded the rating on one class of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-CCRE23 issued by
COMM 2015-CCRE23 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class CM-B to AA (sf) from A (sf)

Additionally, DBRS confirmed the remaining ratings as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-M at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations and upgrade for Class CM-B reflect the
overall healthy performance of the transaction since issuance, with
a collateral reduction of 2.0% for the pooled certificates since
issuance as a result of scheduled amortization, as well as the
partial prepayment and partial defeasance for the Courtyard by
Marriott Portfolio loan (Prospectus ID #2, 7.5% of the pool), which
resulted in a full repayment of the Class CM-A certificates in Q1
2018. As of the April 2018 remittance, all 83 loans remain in the
pool. To date, 81 loans, representing 97.6% of the current pool
balance, reported YE2016 financials, with a weighted-average (WA)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.22 times (x) and debt yield
of 11.0%. Based on the same financials, the top 15 loans
(representing 47.3% of the current pool balance) reported a WA DSCR
and debt yield of 2.19x and 8.2%, respectively. In comparison, the
DBRS WA DSCR at issuance for the top 15 loans was 1.89x,
representing a WA net cash flow growth of 12.9% over the DBRS
issuance figures. There are two loans, representing 1.6% of the
current pool balance, that are fully defeased.

As of the April 2018 remittance, there are four loans, representing
1.7% of the current pool, that are on the servicer's watch list.
All loans on the watch list are being monitored for declining cash
flow performance. There is one loan, DoubleTree Norwalk (Prospectus
ID #20, 1.1% of the current pool balance) in special servicing.
This loan was transferred to the Special Servicer for imminent
default caused by declining cash flow performance and the Special
Servicer expects foreclosure in May 2018. In its analysis for this
review, DBRS assumed a loss severity in excess of 50.0%.

The Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio loan was secured by the fee and
leasehold interest in 49 hotels, the fee interest in nine hotels
and the leasehold interest in seven hotels at issuance. In early
2018, a release was processed for 13 properties at a combined
release price of $95.5 million, $62.0 million of which was defeased
and the remainder prepaid. This release was contemplated at
issuance and was structured in the original documents. At issuance,
the trust loan consisted of a $33.5 million A-1 piece and $100.0
million A-2A piece of the whole Senior A-note debt of $315.0
million, as well as the controlling subordinate B-note debt of
$355.0 million. The A-1 piece and B-note debt were included in the
trust as non-pooled rake bonds, while the A-2A piece is pooled in
the trust. The prepayment funds resulted in the payoff of the A-1
note, with the remaining $62.0 million in defeasance allocated
across the A-2A, A-2B, A-2C and B-notes.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Courtyard by Marriott Portfolio
loan as investment grade and with this review, confirmed the
performance of the loan remains consistent with investment-grade
loan characteristics.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


COMM 2018-COR3: Fitch Issues Presale & Expects to Rate Transaction
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a presale report on German American
Capital Corp.'s COMM Mortgage Securities Trust 2018-COR3 commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2018-COR3.

Fitch expects to rate the transaction and assigns Rating Outlooks
as follows:

  --$11,703,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$17,303,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$201,500,000a class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$473,751,000a class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$760,850,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$56,593,000 class A-M 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$51,561,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$49,047,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$51,561,000bc class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$47,340,000bc class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$47,340,000c class D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$11,767,000cd class E-RR 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$20,122,000cd class F-RR 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$18,864,000cd class G-RR 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following class is not expected to be rated:

  --$46,531,811cd class H-RR.

(a) The initial certificate balances of class A-2 and class A-3 are
unknown and are expected to be $675,251,000 in aggregate plus or
minus 5%. The certificate balances will be determined based on the
final pricing of those classes of certificates. The expected class
A-2 balance range is $100,000,000 to $303,000,000 and the expected
class A-3 balance range is $372,251,000 to $575,251,000.
(b) Notional amount and interest only.
(c) Privately placed and pursuant to rule 144A.
(d) Horizontal risk retention (HRR) interest representing at least
5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity.

The expected ratings are based on information provided by the
issuer as of April 30, 2018.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 41 loans secured by 44
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,006,082,811 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by German American Capital Corporation, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, National Association, LoanCore Capital Markets LLC and Citi
Real Estate Funding Inc.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 81.2% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 89.7%, and asset summary reviews
of 100% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Higher Fitch Leverage Relative to Recent Transactions: The
transaction has lower Fitch coverage and higher Fitch leverage
relative to recent Fitch-rated multiborrower transactions. The
pool's Fitch DSCR of 1.19x is below the 2018 year-to-date (YTD)
average of 1.25x and the 2017 average of 1.26x. The pool's Fitch
LTV of 109.2% is higher than the 2018 YTD average of 103.6% and the
2017 average of 101.6%, respectively.

Very Limited Amortization: Twenty-five loans (80.3% of the pool)
are full-term interest-only and eight (10.6% of the pool) are
partial interest-only. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity,
the pool will pay down by 2.9%, which is below the 2018 YTD average
of 7.4% and the 2017 average of 7.9%.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loan: The fourth largest loan, 1001
North Shoreline (6.4% of the pool), has a credit opinion of
'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. The loan has a Fitch DSCR of
1.25x and Fitch LTV of 71%. Net of this loan, the pool's Fitch DSCR
and LTV are 1.18x and 111.6%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 18.5% below the most recent
year's NOI (for properties for which a full year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period).
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the COMM
2018-COR3 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'A-sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBBsf'
could result.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by Deloitte & Touche LLP. The third-party due diligence
described in Form 15E focused on a comparison and re-computation of
certain characteristics with respect to each of the mortgage loans.
Fitch considered this information in its analysis and it did not
have an effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions.


CPS AUTO 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating on Class A Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. discontinued-withdrew the existing provisional rating on
the following class of notes that were to be issued by CPS Auto
Securitization Trust 2018-1 (the Issuer):

-- $50,500,000 Class A Notes rated BB (low) (sf)

DBRS simultaneously assigned a new provisional rating to the
following class of notes to be issued by CPS Auto Securitization
Trust 2018-1:

-- $40,000,000 Class A Notes rated BB (low) (sf)

The assignment of the new provisional rating is consistent with the
cash flow modeling assumptions for the respective rating category.
The new provisional rating corresponds with an updated structure,
credit enhancement and collateral pool analyzed by DBRS.

The rating is based on a review by DBRS of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed rating and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
amounts held in the reserve fund and excess cash flows.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption under
various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested.

-- For this transaction, the rating addresses the payment of timely
interest and the payment of principal by the legal final maturity
date.

-- Pursuant to the terms of the transaction, interest which is due
but not paid on any payment date will be payable on the next
payment date with interest on such unpaid amounts.

-- Failure to pay interest on any payment date will not constitute
an event of default.

-- The consistent performance of the DBRS-rated Underlying
Securitization Transactions and the stability and migration of
outstanding ratings.

-- Pursuant to the DBRS Internal Assessment Global Policy, DBRS has
relied on public ratings issued by other credit rating agencies for
the assessment of certain tranches of Underlying Securitization
Transactions not rated by DBRS.

-- DBRS has excluded CPS Auto Receivables Trust 2013-C and CPS Auto
Receivables Trust 2014-A in the initial rating analysis. Pursuant
to the DBRS methodology “Rating U.S. Structured Finance
Transactions,” generally the highest rating assigned in a
residual re-securitization may not exceed the lowest outstanding
rating in the pool of primary transactions.

-- The capabilities of Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. (CPS) with
regard to originations, underwriting and servicing of the
fixed-rate subprime motor vehicle retail installment contracts and
installment loan agreements that secure each Initial Underlying
Securitization Transaction.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of CPS and considers
the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of subprime
automobile loan contracts with an acceptable backup servicer.

-- The CPS senior management team has considerable experience and a
successful track record within the auto finance industry, having
managed the company through multiple economic cycles.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool
data for CPS originations, performance of the CPS auto loan
portfolio and performance of the Underlying Securitization
Transactions.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the collateral to the Issuer, the
non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with CPS, that the
trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
collateral and the consistency with the DBRS “Legal Criteria for
U.S. Structured Finance.”

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the current credit
enhancement of 72.85% with initial hard credit enhancement of
74.73% of provided by the Reserve Account (0.32%) and Measured
Credit Enhancement (74.41%). Additional credit support may be
provided from excess cash flow available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


CREDIT SUISSE 2006-C4: S&P Affirms CCC+ Rating on Class B Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class A-J commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction. In addition, we affirmed our rating
on the class B certificates from the same transaction.

S&P said, "Our rating actions follow our analysis of the
transaction, primarily using our criteria for rating U.S. and
Canadian CMBS transactions, which included a review of the credit
characteristics and performance of the remaining assets in the
pool, the transaction's structure, and the liquidity available to
the trust.

"The raised rating on the class A-J certificates reflects our
expectation of the available credit enhancement for the class,
which we believe is greater than our most recent estimate of the
necessary credit enhancement for the rating level, our views
regarding the current and future performance of the transaction's
collateral, and the significant reduction in trust balance.

"The affirmation on the class B certificates reflects our
expectation that the available credit enhancement for this class is
within our estimate of the necessary credit enhancement required
for the current rating and our views regarding the current and
future performance of the transaction's collateral.

"While available credit enhancement levels suggest a further
positive rating movement on the class A-J certificates and a
positive rating movement on the class B certificates, our analysis
also considered the bonds' susceptibility to reduced liquidity
support from the three specially serviced assets ($13.1 million,
16.1%) and the fact that the largest performing loan, The Edge at
Avenue North ($51.9 million, 63.9%), previously defaulted, had its
loan terms modified, and is currently on the master servicers'
combined watchlist."

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

As of the April 17, 2018, trustee remittance report, the collateral
pool balance was $81.3 million, which is 1.9% of the pool balance
at issuance. The pool currently includes nine loans, of which six
are residential co-operative mortgage loans ($9.8 million, 12.0%)
and three are real estate-owned (REO) assets, down from 360 loans
at issuance. Three of these assets are with the special servicer
($13.1 million, 16.1%), and five loans ($53.8 million, 66.2%) are
on the master servicers' combined watchlist.

S&P calculated a 1.34x S&P Global Ratings weighted average debt
service coverage (DSC) and 111.9% S&P Global Ratings weighted
average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio using a 7.06% S&P Global Ratings
weighted average capitalization rate. The DSC, LTV, and
capitalization rate calculations exclude the three specially
serviced assets ($13.1 million, 16.1%).

The top 10 nondefeased loans have an aggregate outstanding pool
trust balance of $80.7 million (99.3%). Adjusting the
servicer-reported numbers, we calculated an S&P Global Ratings
weighted average DSC and LTV of 1.27x and 112.8%, respectively, for
seven of the top 10 nondefeased loans. The remaining assets are
specially serviced and discussed below.

To date, the transaction has experienced $458.0 million in
principal losses, or 10.7% of the original pool trust balance. S&P
expects losses to reach approximately 10.9% of the original pool
trust balance in the near term, based on losses incurred to date
and additional losses S&P expects upon the eventual resolution of
the three specially serviced assets.

CREDIT CONSIDERATIONS

As of the April 17, 2018, trustee remittance report, three assets
in the pool were with the special servicers. S&P also considered
the largest loan in the pool which appears on the master servicers'
combined watchlist, details of which are as follows:

-- The Edge at Avenue North ($51.9 million, 63.85%), the largest
performing loan, was transferred to the special servicer in May
2016, was returned to master servicing in March 2017 as a corrected
mortgage loan, and is currently on the master servicers' combined
watchlist. The loan is secured by a 799-unit student housing
property located in Philadelphia, Pa. This loan is scheduled to
mature in December 2018, but is able to extend to December 2019.
The reported DSC and occupancy as of December 2016 was 0.54x and
83.0%, respectively.

-- The Downer Avenue asset ($9.6 million, 11.9%) is the largest
specially serviced asset in the pool and is the second-largest
asset in the pool. The asset has a $12.5 million reported total
exposure. The asset is a 63,289-sq.-ft. mixed-use property located
in Milwaukee, Wis. The loan was transferred to the special servicer
on Dec. 19, 2013, due to imminent default and the property became
REO on Sept. 14, 2015. The special servicer is working to resolve
existing litigation with the former borrower before taking the
asset to market. The reported DSC as of December 2016 was 0.64x. An
appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $6.3 million is in effect
against this asset. S&P expects a moderate loss (26%-59%) upon this
asset's eventual resolution.

-- The Highwood Retail asset ($1.8 million, 2.21%), has a $2.1
million reported total exposure. The asset is an 11,992-sq.-ft.
retail property located in Highwood, Ill. The loan was transferred
to the special servicer on July 15, 2016, due to maturity default
and the property became REO on Aug. 30, 2017. The reported
occupancy as of December 2017 was 100%. An ARA of $66,479 is in
effect against this asset. S&P expects a moderate loss upon this
asset's eventual resolution.

-- The Zeppe's Plaza asset ($1.6 million, 2.0%), has a $2.0
million reported total exposure. The asset is a 21,047-sq.-ft.
mixed use property located in Bedford Heights, Ohio. The loan was
transferred to the special servicer on May 15, 2015, due to payment
default and the property became REO on Jan. 30, 2018. The servicer
has engaged a management and leasing broker for the property. The
reported DSC and occupancy as of December 2017 was 0.64x and 45.4%,
respectively. An ARA of $1.1 million is in effect against this
asset. S&P expects a moderate loss upon this asset's eventual
resolution.

S&P estimated losses for the three specially serviced assets,
arriving at a weighted-average loss severity of 55.5%.

  RATINGS LIST

  Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2006-C4
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-C4
                                         Rating
  Class       Identifier        To           From
  A-J         22545MAG2         BBB+ (sf)    BB+ (sf)
  B           22545MAH0         CCC+ (sf)    CCC+ (sf)



DLJ COMMERCIAL 2000-CKP1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on Cl. S Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one interest
only (IO) class in DLJ Commercial Mortgage Trust 2000-CKP1 as
follows:

Cl. S, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of its referenced classes. The IO Class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Moody's ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress.. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now
6.4% of the original pooled balance, the same as at the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

An IO class may be subject to ratings upgrades if there is an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes,
subject to the limits and provisions of the updated IO
methodology.

An IO class may be subject to ratings downgrades if there is (i) a
decline in the credit quality of the reference classes and/or (ii)
paydowns of higher quality reference classes, subject to the limits
and provisions of the updated IO methodology.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 10, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by almost 100% to
$655,012 from $1.29 billion at securitization. The outstanding
principal and interest (P&I) class, Class B-4, is not rated by
Moody's. The certificates are collateralized by one mortgage loan.

Fifty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in or contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $82
million (for an average loss severity of 38%).

The remaining loan is the Colony Square Apartments Loan ($655,012),
which is secured by 184-unit apartment complex located in
Shreveport, Louisiana. The property was 81% leased as of September
2017, down from 85% leased as of September 2016. The loan is fully
amortizing, has amortized 65% since securitization and matures in
October 2020. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 20% and greater
than 4.00X, respectively. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and a 9.25% stressed rate applied to the loan balance.


FANNIE MAE 2018-C03: Fitch Says 46 Classes Non-Investment Grade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigns the following ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Fannie Mae's risk transfer transaction, Connecticut Avenue
Securities, series 2018-C03:

  --$251,415,000 class 1M-1 notes 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1M-2A notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1M-2B notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1M-2C notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$606,354,000 class 1M-2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1A-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1A-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1A-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1A-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB+sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1B-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1B-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1B-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1B-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1C-I1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1C-I2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1C-I3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1C-I4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1E-A1 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1E-A2 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1E-A3 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$204,090,000 class 1E-A4 exchangeable notes 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-B1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-B2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-B3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-B4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-C1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-C2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-C3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$201,132,000 class 1E-C4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1E-D1 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1E-D2 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1E-D3 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1E-D4 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1E-D5 exchangeable notes 'BB-sf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1E-F1 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1E-F2 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1E-F3 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1E-F4 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1E-F5 exchangeable notes 'Bsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1X-1 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1X-2 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1X-3 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$405,222,000 class 1X-4 notional exchangeable notes 'BB-sf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1Y-1 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1Y-2 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1Y-3 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$402,264,000 class 1Y-4 notional exchangeable notes 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

  --$29,874,114,644 class 1A-H reference tranche;

  --$13,233,228 class 1M-1H reference tranche;

  --$10,742,091 class 1M-AH reference tranche;

  --$10,586,582 class 1M-BH reference tranche;

  --$10,586,582 class 1M-CH reference tranche;

  --$192,259,000 class 1B-1 notes;

  --$10,119,056 class 1B-1H reference tranche;

  --$155,675,428 class 1B-2H reference tranche.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
(AAA/Stable) subject to the credit and principal payment risk of
the mortgage loan reference pools of certain residential mortgage
loans held in various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS. The 'BBB-sf'
rating for the 1M-1 notes reflects the 4.05% subordination provided
by the 0.69% class 1M-2A, the 0.68% class 1M-2B, the 0.68% class
1M-2C, the 0.65% class 1B-1 and its corresponding reference
tranche, as well as the 0.50% 1B-2H reference tranche.

Connecticut Avenue Securities, series 2018-C03 (CAS 2018-C03) is
Fannie Mae's 26th risk transfer transaction issued as part of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's Conservatorship Strategic Plan for
2013 to 2018 for each of the government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) to demonstrate the viability of multiple types of risk
transfer transactions involving single-family mortgages.

The CAS 2018-C03 transaction consists of 127,544 loans with
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 60% and less than or equal
to 80%.

The notes are general senior unsecured obligations of Fannie Mae
but are subject to the credit and principal payment risk of a pool
of certain residential mortgage loans (reference pool) held in
various Fannie Mae-guaranteed MBS.

While the transaction structure simulates the behavior and credit
risk of traditional RMBS mezzanine and subordinate securities,
Fannie Mae will be responsible for making monthly payments of
interest and principal to investors based on the payment priorities
set forth in the transaction documents.

Given the structure and counterparty dependence on Fannie Mae,
Fitch's ratings on the 1M-1 and 1M-2 notes will be based on the
lower of: the quality of the mortgage loan reference pool and
credit enhancement (CE) available through subordination, or Fannie
Mae's Issuer Default Rating (IDR). The notes will be issued as
uncapped LIBOR-based floaters and carry a 12.5-year legal final
maturity. This will be an actual loss risk transfer transaction in
which losses borne by the noteholders will not be based on a fixed
loss severity (LS) schedule. The notes in this transaction will
experience losses realized at the time of liquidation or
modification that will include both lost principal and delinquent
or reduced interest.

Under the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into
receivership if it determines that Fannie Mae's assets are less
than its obligations for more than 60 days following the deadline
of its SEC filing, as well as for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA
could repudiate any contract entered into by Fannie Mae if the
termination of such contract would promote an orderly
administration of Fannie Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the
U.S. government will continue to support Fannie Mae; this is
reflected in Fannie Mae's current rating. However, if at some
point, Fitch observes that support is reduced and receivership
likely, Fannie Mae's ratings could be downgraded and the
1M-1,1M-2A,1M-2B, and 1M-2C notes' ratings affected.

The 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, 1M-2C and 1B-1 notes will be issued as
LIBOR-based floaters. Should the one-month LIBOR rate fall below
the applicable negative LIBOR trigger value described in the
offering memorandum, the interest payment on the interest-only
notes will be capped at the excess of: (i) the interest amount
payable on the related class of exchangeable notes for that payment
date over (ii) the interest amount payable on the class of
floating-rate related combinable and recombinable (RCR) notes
included in the same combination for that payment date. If there
are no floating-rate classes in the related exchange, then the
interest payment on the interest-only notes will be capped at the
aggregate of the interest amounts payable on the classes of RCR
notes included in the same combination that were exchanged for the
specified class of interest-only RCR notes for that payment date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The reference mortgage loan
pool consists of high-quality mortgage loans acquired by Fannie Mae
between Sept. 1, 2017 and Nov. 30, 2017. The reference pool will
consist of loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 60%
and less than or equal to 80%. Overall, the reference pool's
collateral characteristics are similar to recent CAS transactions
and reflect the strong credit profile of post-crisis mortgage
originations.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Fitch
found that Fannie Mae has a well-established and disciplined
process in place for the purchase of loans and views its
lender-approval and oversight processes for minimizing counterparty
risk and ensuring sound loan quality acquisitions as positive. Loan
quality control (QC) review processes are thorough and indicate a
tight control environment that limits origination risk. Fitch has
determined Fannie Mae to be an above-average aggregator for its
2013 and later product. Fitch accounted for the lower risk by
applying a lower default estimate for the reference pool.

12.5-Year Hard Maturity (Positive): The notes benefit from a
12.5-year legal final maturity. Thus, any credit or modification
events on the reference pool that occur beyond year 12.5 are borne
by Fannie Mae and do not affect the transaction. Fitch accounted
for the 12.5-year hard maturity in its default analysis and applied
a reduction to its lifetime default expectations.

Clean Pay History for Loans in Disaster Areas (Positive): Fannie
Mae will not remove loans in counties designated as natural
disaster areas by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
However, any loans with a prior delinquency were removed from the
reference pool, per the eligibility criteria. Therefore, all loans
in the reference pool in the disaster areas have had clean pay
histories since the occurrence of the natural disaster events.

Solid Alignment of Interests (Positive): While the transaction is
designed to transfer credit risk to private investors, Fitch
believes that it benefits from a solid alignment of interests.
Fannie Mae will retain credit risk in the transaction by holding
the 1A-H senior reference tranche, which has an initial loss
protection of 4.05%, as well as the first loss 1B-2H reference
tranche, sized at 0.50%. Fannie Mae is also retaining a vertical
slice or interest of at least 5% in each reference tranche (1M-1H,
1M-AH, 1M-BH, 1M-CH and 1B-1H).

Limited Size and Scope of Third-Party Diligence (Neutral): Fitch
received third-party due diligence on a loan production basis, as
opposed to a transaction-specific review. Fitch believes that
regular, periodic third-party reviews (TPRs) conducted on a loan
production basis are sufficient for validating Fannie Mae's quality
control processes. Fitch views the results of the due diligence
review as consistent with its opinion of Fannie Mae as an
above-average aggregator; as a result, no adjustments were made to
Fitch's loss expectations based on due diligence.

HomeReady Exposure (Negative): Approximately 1.9% of the reference
pool was originated under Fannie Mae's HomeReady program, which
targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers in high-cost
or underrepresented communities, and provides flexibility for a
borrower's LTV, income, down payment and mortgage insurance
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
HomeReady loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV and
property value), which is reflected in increased CE.

Receivership Risk Considered (Neutral): Under the Federal Housing
Finance Regulatory Reform Act, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) must place Fannie Mae into receivership if it determines
that Fannie Mae's assets are less than its obligations for more
than 60 days following the deadline of its SEC filing, as well as
for other reasons. As receiver, FHFA could repudiate any contract
entered into by Fannie Mae if it is determined that the termination
of such contract would promote an orderly administration of Fannie
Mae's affairs. Fitch believes that the U.S. government will
continue to support Fannie Mae; this is reflected in its current
rating of Fannie Mae. However, if, at some point, Fitch views the
support as being reduced and receivership likely, the ratings of
Fannie Mae could be downgraded and the 1M-1, 1M-2A, 1M-2B, 1M-2C,
and 1M-2 notes' ratings affected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected sMVD. It indicates there is some potential rating
migration with higher MVDs, compared with the model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities, which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 12%, 12% and 36% would potentially reduce the
'BBBsf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, and to 'CCCsf', respectively.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with due diligence information from AMC
Diligence, LLC (AMC) and Adfitech. The due diligence focused on
credit and compliance reviews, desktop valuation reviews and data
integrity. AMC and Adfitech examined selected loan files with
respect to the presence or absence of relevant documents. Fitch
received certification indicating that the loan-level due diligence
was conducted in accordance with Fitch's published standards. The
certification also stated that the company performed its work in
accordance with the independence standards, per Fitch's criteria,
and that the due diligence analysts performing the review met
Fitch's criteria of minimum years of experience. Fitch considered
this information in its analysis and the findings did not have an
impact on the analysis.

While Fitch was provided due diligence from a third-party, Form 15E
was not provided to or reviewed by Fitch in relation to this rating
action.


FIRST INVESTORS 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B(sf) Rating on F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to First
Investors Auto Owner Trust 2018-1's $161.64 million asset-backed
notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 3, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 43.0%, 37.4%, 29.0%, 22.7%,
18.6%, and 14.1% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
(including excess spread).

-- These credit support levels provide approximately 3.50x, 3.00x,
2.30x, 1.75x, 1.40x, and 1.10x coverage of S&P's 11.75%-12.25%
expected cumulative net loss (CNL) range for the class A, B, C, D,
E, and F notes, respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate for the
preliminary ratings.

S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, the ratings on the class A and B
notes would not drop by more than one rating category, and the
ratings on the class C and D notes would not drop by more than two
rating categories. The class E and F notes (rated 'BB- (sf)' and 'B
(sf)') will remain within two rating categories of the assigned
preliminary rating during the first year, but will eventually
default under the 'BBB' stress scenario. These potential rating
movements are consistent with our rating stability criteria."

The collateral characteristics of the pool being securitized with
direct loans accounting for approximately 44% of the statistical
pool. These loans historically have lower losses than the
indirect-originated loans.

Prefunding will be used in this transaction in the amount of
approximately $30 million, approximately 19% of the pool. The
subsequent receivables are expected to be transferred into the
trust within three months from the closing date.

First Investors Financial Services Inc.'s (First Investors')
28-year history of originating and underwriting auto loans, and
17-year history of self-servicing auto loans, as well as its track
record of securitizing auto loans since 2000.

First Investors' 13 years of origination static pool data,
segmented by direct and indirect loans.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s experience as the committed back-up
servicer.

The transaction's sequential payment structure, which builds credit
enhancement based on a percentage of receivables as the pool
amortizes.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  First Investors Auto Owner Trust 2018-1
  Class   Rating     Type           Interest     Amount
                                    rate(i)    (mil. $)
  A-1    AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed         86.34
  A-2    AAA (sf)    Senior         Fixed         17.91
  B      AA (sf)     Subordinate    Fixed         12.26
  C      A (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed         16.35
  D      BBB (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed         13.09
  E      BB- (sf)    Subordinate    Fixed          8.18
  F      B (sf)      Subordinate    Fixed          7.53

  (i)The actual coupons of the tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


FLAGSHIP 2018-2: S&P Assigns Initial BB- Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Flagship
Credit Auto Trust 2018-2's $223.06 million automobile
receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction
backed by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 9, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 47.2%, 40.0%, 30.7%, 24.0%,
and 20.3% credit support (including excess spread) for the class A,
B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow
scenarios. These credit support levels provide coverage of
approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.40x S&P's
12.50%-13.00% expected cumulative net loss range for the class A,
B, C, D, and E notes, respectively. These break-even scenarios
cover total cumulative gross defaults (using a recovery assumption
of 40%) of approximately 79%, 67%, 51%, 40%, and 34%,
respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made under stressed
cash flow modeling scenarios that are appropriate to the assigned
ratings.

-- S&P said, "The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, our ratings on the class A and B
notes would not be lowered by more than one rating category from
our preliminary 'AAA (sf)' and 'AA (sf)' ratings, respectively,
throughout the transaction's life, and our ratings on the class C
and D notes would not be lowered more than two rating categories
from our preliminary 'A (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)' ratings, respectively.
The rating on the class E notes would remain within two rating
categories of our preliminary 'BB- (sf)' rating within the first
year, but the class would eventually default under the 'BBB' stress
scenario after receiving 45%-46% of its principal. The above rating
movements are within the one-category rating tolerance for 'AAA'
and 'AA' rated securities during the first year and three-category
tolerance over three years; a two-category rating tolerance for
'A', 'BBB', and 'BB' rated securities during the first year; and a
three-category tolerance for 'A' and 'BBB' rated securities over
three years. The 'BB' rated securities are permitted to default
under a 'BBB' stress scenario."

-- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

-- The characteristics of the collateral pool being securitized.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2018-2
  Class       Rating      Type         Interest       Amount
                                       Rate(ii)      (mil. $)
  A           AAA (sf)    Senior          Fixed        137.79
  B           AA (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed         23.71
  C           A (sf)      Subordinate     Fixed         27.67
  D           BBB (sf)    Subordinate     Fixed         20.90
  E           BB- (sf)    Subordinate     Fixed         12.99

(i)The actual coupons of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


FLAGSTAR TRUST 2018-2: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating on Class B-4 Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-2 ("FSMT 2018-2"). The ratings range
from Aaa (sf) to B3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a single pool of fixed rate
non-agency jumbo mortgages (57.2% of the aggregate pool) and agency
eligible high balance conforming residential fixed rate mortgages
(42.8% of the aggregate pool), originated by Flagstar Bank, FSB,
with an aggregate stated principal balance of $704,069,156.

Flagstar Bank, FSB ("Flagstar") is the servicer of the pool, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Well Fargo") is the master servicer and
Wilmington Trust, National Association will serve as the trustee.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure similar to the Flagstar
Mortgage Trust 2018-1 transaction. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base servicing fee of $20.50
for all performing loans and increases according to certain
delinquent and incentive fee schedules. The Class B-6-C (NR) is
first in line to absorb any increase in servicing costs above the
base servicing costs. Moreover, the transaction does not have a
servicing fee cap.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-2

Cl. A-1, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary credit analysis

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using the US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Our final loss
estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator assessments,
third-party review (TPR) scope and results, and the financial
strength of representation & warranty (R&W) provider. Moody's
expected loss for this pool in a base case scenario is 0.50% and
reaches 6.20% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa (sf)
scenario.

Collateral description

The FSMT 2018-2 transaction is a securitization of 1,097 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$704,069,156. This transaction has approximately three months
seasoned loans and strong borrower characteristics. The non-zero
weighted-average primary-borrower original FICO score is 767 and
the weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
is 65.6%. More than 42.4% of the borrowers have more than 24
months' liquid reserves. There are however a relatively high
percentage of self-employed borrowers (33.6% by loan balance) in
the aggregate pool.

Flagstar Bank, FSB originated and will service the loans in the
transaction. Moody's considers Flagstar an adequate originator and
servicer of prime jumbo and conforming mortgages and the loss
estimates did not include an adjustment for origination or
servicing arrangement quality.

Third-party review and representation & warranties

The credit, property valuation, and data integrity portion of the
third party review (TPR) was conducted on a random sample of loans
of 222 loans (20% by loan count) by an independent TPR firm.
Compared to the Flagstar 2018-1 transaction, the sample size of the
TPR review is significantly reduced. The sample size has been
reduced from 100% for compliance review and collateral desktop
analyses (CDAs). In the areas of credit, valuation and data
integrity, the TPR previously covered 332 loans (44% by loan
count). With sampling, there is a risk that loans with grade C or
grade D issues remain in the pool and that data integrity issues
were not corrected prior to securitization for all of the loans in
the pool. Moreover, vulnerabilities of the R&W framework, such as
the weaker financial strength of the R&W provider, may be amplified
due to the limited TPR sample. Moody's made an adjustment to loss
levels to account for this risk.

Flagstar Bank, FSB as the originator, makes the loan-level
representation and warranties (R&Ws) for the mortgage loans. The
loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed
the baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's has identified for
US RMBS. Further, R&W breaches are evaluated by an independent
third party using a set of objective criteria. Similar to JPMMT
transactions, the transaction contains a "prescriptive" R&W
framework. The originator makes comprehensive loan-level R&Ws and
an independent reviewer will perform detailed reviews to determine
whether any R&Ws were breached when loans become 120 days
delinquent, the property is liquidated at a loss above a certain
threshold, or the loan is 30 to 119 days delinquent and is modified
by the servicer. These reviews are prescriptive in that the
transaction documents set forth detailed tests for each R&W that
the independent reviewer will perform. However, Moody's made an
adjustment to the loss levels to incorporate the weaker financial
strength of the R&W provider, which is amplified due to the smaller
sample size used in the due diligence review. Moody's also
considered the materiality tests that may absolve the R&W provider
from being required to repurchase the loan. For example, data
integrity exceptions within a 10% threshold will not require
Flagstar to repurchase a loan, even if such exception causes the
loan to fail to comply with the sponsor's underwriting guidelines.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base fee of $20.5 for all
performing loans and increases according to certain delinquent and
incentive fee schedules. By establishing a base servicing fee for
performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans, the
fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The fee-for-service
compensation is reasonable and adequate for this transaction. It
also better aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance
and structure. The Class B-6-C (NR) is first in line to absorb any
increase in servicing costs above the base servicing costs.
Delinquency and incentive fees will be deducted from the Class
B-6-C interest payment amount first and could result in interest
shortfall to the certificates depending on the magnitude of the
delinquency and incentive fees.

Trustee and master servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The custodian functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells
Fargo, as master servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight,
and termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. In addition, Wells Fargo is obligated to make servicing
advances if the servicer is unable to do so.

Tail risk & subordination floor

This deal has a shifting-interest structure, with a subordination
floor to protect against losses that occur late in the life of the
pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk). When the total
senior subordination is less than 0.75% of the original pool
balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any principal and all
principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In addition, if the
subordinate percentage drops below 6.25% of current pool balance,
the senior distribution amount will include all principal
collections and the subordinate principal distribution amount will
be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves benefit from a floor.
When the total current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus
the aggregate balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior
to it amount to less than 0.55% of the original pool balance, those
tranches do not receive principal distributions. Principal those
tranches would have received are directed to pay more senior
subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Based on an analysis of scenarios where the largest five to 10
loans in the pool default late in the life of the transaction,
Moody's viewed the 0.75% senior floor as credit neutral. Moody's
viewed the 0.55% subordination floor as credit neutral in our
rating analysis.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all prepayments
to the senior bond for a specified period of time, and increasing
amounts of prepayments to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but
only if loan performance satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

The senior support NAS certificates (Class A-14) will only receive
their pro-rata share of scheduled principal payments allocated to
the senior bonds for five years, whereas all prepayments allocated
to the senior bonds will be paid to the super senior certificates,
leading to a faster buildup of super senior credit enhancement.
After year five, the senior support NAS bond will receive an
increasing share of prepayments in accordance with the shifting
percentage schedule.

On or prior to the accretion termination date (the earlier of (1)
the distribution date on which Class A-10 has been reduced to zero
and (2) the distribution date where the aggregate balance of
subordinate certificates has been reduced to zero), the
accretion-directed certificate (Class A-10) will be entitled to
receive as monthly principal distribution the accrued interest that
would otherwise be distributable to the accrual certificate (Class
A-12).

All certificates (except Class B-6-C) in this transaction are
subject to a net WAC cap. Class B-6-C will accrue interest at the
net WAC minus the aggregate delinquent servicing and aggregate
incentive servicing fee. For any distribution date, the net WAC
will be the greater of (1) zero and (2) the weighted average net
mortgage rates minus the capped trust expense rate.

Realized losses are allocated reverse sequentially among the
subordinate and senior support certificates and on a pro-rata basis
among the super senior certificates.

Exposure to extraordinary expenses

Certain extraordinary trust expenses (such as fees paid to the
reviewer, servicing transfer costs) in the FSMT 2018-2 transaction
are deducted directly from the available distribution amount. The
remaining trust expenses (which have an annual cap of $300,000 per
year) are deducted from the net WAC. Moody's believes there is a
very low likelihood that the rated certificates in FSMT 2018-2 will
incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or indemnification
payments from potential future lawsuits against key deal parties.
First, the loans are prime quality, 100 percent qualified mortgages
and were originated under a regulatory environment that requires
tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces
the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the
basis of a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well
defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on an
ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
(Inglet Blair, LLC), named at closing must review loans for
breaches of representations and warranties when certain clear
defined triggers have been breached, which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a compliance, credit, valuation and data
integrity review covering a sample of the mortgage loans by an
independent third party (Clayton Services LLC). Moody's did not
make an adjustment for extraordinary expenses because most of the
trust expenses will reduce the net WAC as opposed to the available
funds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


GRACE 2014-GRCE: Fitch Affirms Class F Certs at 'BB-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for all classes of GRACE
2014-GRCE Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Trophy Office Collateral in Prime Manhattan Location: The Grace
Building is a well-known, 1.5 million square foot Class A office
tower with an iconic design. It is located on Bryant Park, a highly
desirable Manhattan location.

Leasing Activity: As of the March 2018 rent roll, the property was
94.2% occupied, up from 90.2% in September 2017 and 85% in March
2017. Property occupancy dipped after The Interpublic Group (6.3%
of net rentable area [NRA]) vacated at its February 2016 lease
expiration and Sybase Inc. (2%) vacated at its October 2016 lease
expiration. The borrower has since been able to sign new tenants
and extend existing leases. Bank of America recently signed a lease
for space (8.1% of the NRA) that will be vacated by the current
largest tenant HBO.

Rollover Risk: Leases representing 25.3% of the NRA are scheduled
to roll in 2018. The largest tenant, HBO, occupies 350,105sf (22.5%
of the NRA) on a lease scheduled to expire in December 2018. It is
considered likely that HBO will be moving to 30 Hudson Yards with
its parent company Time Warner in the next year. The second largest
tenant occupies 115,119sf (7.4% NRA) on a lease scheduled to expire
in April 2019, and this space is already being marketed for lease.
In total, approximately 45% of the NRA is scheduled to roll ahead
of the loan's maturity date in June 2021.

Institutional Sponsorship: The loan is sponsored by an affiliate of
Trizec Properties, Inc. (controlled by a partnership of Brookfield
Office Properties Inc.) and an affiliate of The Swig Company, LLC,
who originally developed the property in 1971. CBRE acts as the
property's leasing agent on behalf of the owners.

New Assignment of Special Servicer: Fitch withdrew its ratings of
Talmage, LLC on Feb. 9, 2018, and Talmage, LLC subsequently
resigned as special servicer on the transaction. Following numerous
inquiries to the remaining transaction parties, Fitch was notified
on May 7, 2018 that the directing certificate holder has appointed
CWCapital Asset Management, LLC as replacement special servicer,
effective May 8, 2018. The affirmations reflect the replacement of
the former special servicer by a qualified Fitch-rated special
servicer.

Interest Only: The seven-year loan (maturing in June 2021) is
interest-only for the entire loan term at a fixed rate of 3.61%.

Additional Debt: The sponsor may incur (one-time) additional
mezzanine debt secured by a pledge of equity interests in the
borrower, subject to the satisfaction of certain performance
thresholds.

Single Asset Concentration: The transaction is secured by a single
asset and is more susceptible to single event risk related to the
market, sponsor or the largest tenants occupying the property.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The affirmations are based on the stable collateral performance,
the asset's excellent market location and recent leasing activity.
The affirmations are also based on the appointment of CWCapital as
special servicer following the resignation of the previous special
servicer, Talmage LLC. While negative rating actions are not
expected, they could occur should leasing activity or market
conditions decline.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch affirmed the ratings as follows:

  --$520,598,000 class A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$74,078,000 class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$594,676,000* class X-A at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$51,324,000 class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$18,000,000 class D at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$96,000,000 class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$115,000,000 class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$25,000,000 class G at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

*Notional amount and interest-only


GS TRUST 2013-GC13: Fitch Affirms Class E Certs Ratings at 'BBsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2013-GC13 and revised Rating Outlooks on three of the classes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Significant Percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern: The Outlook
Negatives on classes D through F and X-B primarily reflect concerns
over the Crossroads Center loan as well as the significant
percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), which total 18.4% of
the pool. Eight loans, including three of the top six loans in the
pool, have been designated FLOCs. The largest FLOC is the
Crossroads Center loan (8.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
766,213 sf portion of a regional mall located about 50 miles
outside of Minneapolis in Saint Cloud, MN. The mall is anchored by
JCPenney, Macy's, Scheels All Sports and a non-collateral Target.
Collateral anchor Sears (16.5% of NRA) recently went dark.
Comparable in-line sales were reported at $375 psf for TTM
September 2017, down from $412 psf at YE 2026.

The second largest FLOC is the Plaza America III & IV loan (7.8%),
which is secured by 469,071 sf office property located in Reston,
VA. The property has seen decreased revenue as tenants have
vacated, renewed, and/or downsized at the property. The
servicer-reported NOI declined by 37% between YE 2016 and YE 2017.
Further, the second largest tenant (19.3% of the NRA) is expected
to vacate at its lease expiration in July 2018. The third largest
FLOC is the Holiday Inn - 6th Avenue loan (6.4%), which is secured
by a 226-key full-service hotel located in the Chelsea neighborhood
of midtown Manhattan. The hotel continues to perform well below
issuance levels due to increased competition in the area.

Other FLOCs consist of loans secured by an industrial property
(1.7% of the pool) that has seen significant occupancy issues; two
multifamily properties (1.4% of the pool) including a Houston
property that suffered significant damage from Hurricane Harvey,
and two mixed use properties (1.1% of the pool) with occupancy
and/or tenant roll issues.

Fitch will continue to monitor all FLOCS.

Stable Performance: The affirmations reflect the stable performance
of the majority of the underlying loans and increasing credit
enhancement to the classes. As of the April 2018 distribution date,
the pool's aggregate principal balance was reduced by 10.8% to
$1.19 billion, down from $1.33 billion at issuance. Three loans
have paid in full. There have been no realized losses to date. Four
loans (2% of the pool) are currently defeased.

Concentrations: The transaction is concentrated. The three largest
loans comprise 32.9% of the pool and the Top 10 comprises 64.6%.
Loans secured by office properties comprise the highest
concentration of loans at 33.3%. Retail properties comprise the
next largest percentage at 29.3%, including two regional malls
(19.9%) in the top four loans. Loans secured by New York City
properties comprise 30% of the pool.

Interest Only Loans: There is a high percentage of fully interest
only loans in the pool at 24.9%, including two of the top three
loans.

Maturity Schedule: There are limited scheduled loan maturities
until 2020 (13.2%) and 2023 (86.8%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook Negatives on classes D through F and X-B primarily
reflects concern over the Crossroads Center loan as well as the
significant percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern at 18.4%. The
Negative Outlooks reflect an additional sensitivity scenario, which
applied an outsized loss of 40% on the Crossroads Center loan; the
scenario indicated potential downgrades to classes D through F and
X-B. A 25% loss scenario to the Crossroads Center loan would not
result in a Negative Outlook on class D.

The Outlooks on classes A-1 through E remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the majority of the underlying pool.
Upgrades to classes B and below may be limited due to the minimal
upcoming scheduled loan maturities prior to 2020.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks where
indicated:

  --$145.3 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

  --$135 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

  --$420.3 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

  --$89.2 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

  --$98.4 million** class A-S at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;

  --$88.4 million** class B at 'AA-sf', Outlook Stable;

  --$50 million** class C at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;

  --$236.8 million** class PEZ at 'Asf', Outlook Stable;

  --$76.7 million class D at 'BBB-sf', Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  --$30 million class E at 'BBsf', Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  --$13.3 million class F at 'Bsf', Outlook Negative;

  --$888.1million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$30 million* class X-B at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

*Notional amount and interest only.

**Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged for
class PEZ certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged
for up to the full certificate principal amount of the class A-S,
class B and class C certificates.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the
interest-only class X-C or class G certificates.


JP MORGAN 2018-4: DBRS Finalizes 'B' Rating on Class B-5 Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-4 (the Certificates) issued
by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-4 as follows:

-- $692.3 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $692.3 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $648.1 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $648.1 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $518.5 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $518.5 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $129.6 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $129.6 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $99.3 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $99.3 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.3 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.3 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.2 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.2 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $408.3 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $408.3 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $110.2 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $110.2 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $692.3 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $692.3 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $648.1 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $518.5 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $129.6 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $99.3 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $30.3 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.2 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $408.3 million Class A-X-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $110.2 million Class A-X-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $11.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $12.2 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $9.9 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $5.2 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $2.2 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, A-X-5, A-X-6, A-X-7, A-X-8,
A-X-9 and A-X-10 are interest-only notes. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-11, A-13,
A-15, A-17, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4 and A-X-5 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a combination of
depositable certificates, as specified in the offering documents.

Classes A-10, A-12, A-16 and A-18 are super-senior certificates.
These classes benefit from additional protection from the senior
support certificate (Class A-14) with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.00% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.50%, 2.85%, 1.50%, 0.80% and 0.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 1,242 loans with a total principal
balance of $736,498,182 as of the Cut-Off Date (April 1, 2018).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs)
with original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years.
Approximately 65.7% of the pool are conforming mortgage loans,
originated by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, National Association (JPMCB),
Quicken Loans, Inc. (Quicken) and loanDepot.com LLC (loanDepot),
which were eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. For
conforming loans, JPMCB generally delegates underwriting authority
to correspondent lenders and does not subsequently review those
loans. Details on the underwriting of conforming loans can be found
in Key Probability of Default Drivers section in the related
report.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are JPMCB (42.8%),
Quicken (13.8%), loanDepot (11.8%), United Shore Financial Services
(USFS, 7.4%), FirstBank (6.7%) and various other originators, each
comprising less than 5.0% of the mortgage loans. Approximately 0.7%
of the loans sold to the mortgage loan seller were acquired by
MAXEX Clearing LLC (MaxEx), which purchased loans from the related
originators or an unaffiliated third party that directly or
indirectly purchased such loans from the related originators.

The loans will be serviced or sub-serviced by JPMCB (42.8%), New
Penn Financial, LLC (New Penn) d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(SMS, 33.1%), Cenlar FSB (Cenlar, 22.5%) and various other
servicers, each comprising less than 5.0% of the mortgage loans.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA by DBRS) will act as
the Master Servicer and Securities Administrator. Wells Fargo and
JPMCB will act as the Custodians. U.S. Bank Trust National
Association will serve as Delaware Trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance
LLC will serve as the representations and warranties (R&W)
Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

This transaction employs an R&W framework that contains certain
weaknesses, such as materiality factors, some unrated R&W
providers, knowledge qualifiers and sunset provisions that allow
for certain R&Ws to expire within three to six years after the
Closing Date. The framework is perceived by DBRS to be limiting
compared with traditional lifetime R&W standards in certain
DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the perceived weaknesses in
the R&W framework, DBRS reduced the originator scores in this pool.
A lower originator score results in increased default and loss
assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.

Notes:  All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


JPMBB 2014-C21: Metro West & Waterbury Crossing Loans Sold at Loss
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A. Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2014-C21 (JPMBB
2014-C21) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Overall Stable Performance; Minor Pool Losses: Outside the Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs), the remaining pool has had relatively
stable performance since issuance. As there have been no material
changes to the pools metrics since issuance, the original rating
analysis was considered in affirming the transaction. One loan
(2.88% of the pool balance) is currently defeased, and $534,702 in
interest shortfalls is currently affecting class NR.

The pool balance has been reduced by 3.8% since issuance; it
declined to $1.22 billion as of April 2018 from $1.26 billion at
issuance. This includes $7.7 million in losses (0.6% of the
original pool balance), which has been absorbed by the class NR
certificates, due to two loans that were liquidated while in
special servicing in the past six months: the $6.9 million Metro
West Office Portfolio Loan was liquidated in November 2017 with a
$3.8 million loss (or 42% of the outstanding balance) and the $7.5
million Waterbury Crossing loan was liquidated in March 2018 with a
$3.9 million loss (49%).

Specially Serviced Loans: As of the April 2018 remittance, two
loans (1.1% of the pool balance) were delinquent and in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan, Lockport
Professional Park (0.54%), is secured by an 81,492 square foot (sf)
medical office complex located In Lockport, NY, approximately 30
miles northeast of Buffalo. The property has experienced cash flow
reductions due to occupancy declines, which fell to 66% as of
December 2017 from 81% in December 2016. The loan transferred to
special servicing in May 2015 as the borrower refused to repay
protective tax advances. Foreclosure was filed in October 2015, and
a receiver was appointed in November 2015. Foreclosure has been
stalled due to ongoing litigation.

The second specially serviced loan, Shuman Office Building (0.53%),
collateral was sold on April 20, 2018 as part of an REO sale while
with the special servicer. Final liquidated proceeds including loss
amounts have been requested by Fitch and are pending from the
servicer. The loan was secured by a 96,200-sf office building
located in Naperville, IL and transferred to the special servicer
in December 2015 following a major tenant vacancy in mid-2015. The
most recent appraised value provided by the servicer was $5.7
million as of June 2017, compared with the outstanding principal
balance of $6.5 million with an additional $1.12 million in special
servicer advances.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has also identified three
non-specially serviced loans (8.4%) as FLOCs, all of which are
within the top 20 loans. The largest FLOC is the Westminster Mall
loan (4.23% of the pool), which is secured by a regional shopping
center in Orange County, CA (anchored by Macy's, Target and
JCPenney). The loan has been flagged due to the recent departure of
Sears, which vacated in April 2018. The vacated space is not part
of the collateral but may trigger co-tenancy clauses of collateral
tenants. In addition, property net operating income (NOI) has
declined 23% since issuance, despite increased collateral
occupancy. Fitch's analysis includes a stressed scenario that
considers higher losses on the loan should property performance
continue to decline. The ratings, including the Negative Outlook on
class E, class F and class X-C, reflect this analysis.

The other two non-specially serviced FLOCs are The Remington (2.2%)
and 200 West Monroe (2.1%). The Remington is secured by a 286-unit
multifamily property in Victoria, TX, which has been flagged due to
a 21% decline in NOI since issuance. The 200 West Monroe loan is
secured by a 536,000-sf office building in the Chicago CBD and has
been flagged due to significant declines in occupancy and property
cash flow.

Retail Concentration and Mall Exposure: Loans backed by retail
properties represent 30.4% of the pool, including four within the
top 15. These retail properties include regional shopping centers
such as Miami International Mall, Westminster Mall and Wiregrass
Shopping Center, which reflect direct or indirect exposure to
anchor tenants such as JCPenney, Macy's and Sears.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for classes A-1 through D remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the pool and continued amortization.
Upgrades may be possible with improved pool performance and
additional paydown or defeasance. The Negative Outlook on class E,
class F, and the interest only class X-C reflects Fitch's concerns
surrounding the Westminster Mall loan, which has experienced a
major anchor departure and declining NOI since issuance. Fitch ran
an additional sensitivity scenario which reflected an outsized loss
of 40% on this loan. Based on the stress scenario, this component
of the transaction now carries greater volatility.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings, and revised the Rating
Outlooks on the following classes as indicated:

  --$20.5 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$59.4 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$325 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;
  --$357.2 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$82.5 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$914.2 million(a) class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$90.1 million(a) class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$69.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$90.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$45.8 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$205.5 million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$25.3 million(a)(b) class X-C at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative
from Stable;

  --$74.3 million(b) class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$25.3 million(b) class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  --$17.4 million(b) class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.
(b) Privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.

Class A-S, class B, and class C certificates may be exchanged for a
related amount of class EC certificates, and class EC certificates
may be exchanged for class A-S, class B, and class C certificates.

Class A-1 has paid in full. Fitch does not rate the $49.2 million
NR class, or the $66.6 million interest-only class X-D.


JPMCC 2007-CIBC20: Moody's Hikes Class C Debt Rating to B3
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
and upgraded the rating on one class in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-CIBC20, Commercial
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CIBC20.

Cl. C, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of Cl. C was upgraded based primarily on an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The
deal has paid down 27% since Moody's last review.

The ratings of the remaining five P&I classes were affirmed because
the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized
losses.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 47.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 33.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 9.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 9.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 95% to $126.3
million from $2.54 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1.9% to 34.4% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of five, compared to eight at Moody's last review.

One loan, constituting 2.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-five loans have been liquidated from the pool at a loss,
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $189.4 million (for
an average loss severity of 44%). Four loans, constituting 33.1% of
the pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Holiday Inn -- Harrisburg West ($12.7 million
-- 10.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 238-key,
limited-service, hotel located in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania,
approximately 6 miles west of Harrisburg. The loan was transferred
to the special servicer in July 2016 after the borrower indicated
that they would be unable to support the cash flow waterfall. The
property's occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR for the 12 month period ended
January 2018 was 45.7%, $76, and $35, respectively.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Gannttown Loan
($12.4 million -- 9.8% of the pool), which is secured by a 107,587
SF grocery-anchored retail center located in Turnersville, New
Jersey approximately 17 miles southeast of the Philadelphia CBD.
The loan transferred to the special servicer in September 2013 for
imminent payment default and the property became REO in January
2016. The property was 67% leased as of January 2018, unchanged
from Moody's last review.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Ultra Plaza Loan
($9.5 million -- 7.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 166,727
SF, formerly grocery-anchored retail center located in Highland,
Indiana. The loan was transferred to the special servicer in August
2017 for maturity default. The borrower reported that Ultra Foods
(68% of the NRA) has vacated the building. The store closed as a
result of Ultra's parent company, Central Grocers, filing for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2017. The property was only 26% leased
as of December 2017.

The remaining one specially serviced loan is secured by a
hospitality property. Moody's has also assumed a high default
probability for one poorly performing loan, constituting 13.5% of
the pool. Moody's estimates an aggregate $53.6 million loss for the
specially serviced and troubled loans (a 91% expected loss on
average).

The largest performing loan exposures are the Clark Tower -- A Note
Loan ($43.4 million -- 34.4% of the pool) and Clark Tower - B Note
Loan ($16.99 million -- 13.5% of the pool), which are secured by a
657,245 SF, 34-story, office building located in East Memphis,
Tennessee. The original $60.75 million loan transferred to the
special servicer in September 2013 due to imminent default and was
subsequently modified. As part of the modification, the original
loan was bifurcated into the $43.5 million A-Note and a $16.99
million B-Note. The modification also extended the loan and reduced
the interest rate to 5.0%. The loan returned to the master servicer
in March 2016 and the loan is currently performing under the terms
of the modification. The property was 62% leased as of September
2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR on the A-Note are 132% and
0.80X, respectively, the same as Moody's last review. Moody's
actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt
service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25%
stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance. Moody's
identified the $16.99 million B-Note as a troubled loan and assumed
a significant loss.

The next largest performing loan is the Columbus Corporate Office
Loan ($18.6 million -- 14.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
single-tenant, Class B, office building located in Novi, Michigan,
approximately 23 miles northwest of the Detroit CBD. The property
is 100% leased to the Henry Ford Health System through August 2019.
The tenant is a part of the Henry Ford Health System, which
provides comprehensive medical services at this location. Moody's
analysis incorporated a Lit/Dark approach to account for the
single-tenant concentration. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 98%
and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 100% and 1.10X at the last
review.

The remaining two performing loans represent 4.3% of the pool. Both
loans are fully amortizing and secured by retail properties.


JPMCC 2007-LDP1O: Fitch Affirms Default Rating on $81MM B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 24 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates, series 2007-LDP10 (JPMCC 2007-LDP10).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Expected Losses and Specially Serviced Loan Concentration:
Fourteen of the remaining 21 loans, representing 96.5% of the pool
balance, have transferred to special servicing. Repayment of the
senior-most class is largely reliant on proceeds from specially
serviced loans and losses are considered inevitable on the
remaining classes.

Pool Concentration/Adverse Selection: The pool is concentrated with
21 of the original 223 loans remaining. Fourteen of these are in
special servicing, which includes one loan (39.67% of the pool)
that was previously modified into an A/B note structure and another
loan (5.91% of the pool) previously modified into an A/B/C note
structure.

Lack of Resolutions: The largest asset, Lafayette Property Trust,
28% of the pool balance, has been in special servicing since
November 2014. The collateral was originally a portfolio of nine
office properties in Alexandria, VA, of which only one remains. The
most recently reported appraised value for the remaining asset is
well below the outstanding debt, indicating the potential for
near-to-full loss. The second largest loan in the pool, Skyline
Portfolio Note A & B, represents 40% of the pool balance and
transferred to special servicing for the second time in June 2016.
The average aging for loans in special servicing is 19 months.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Downgrades to the distressed classes to 'Dsf' are likely as
defaults are incurred. Although credit enhancement for class A-M
remains high, upgrades are not expected due to the high expected
losses. Losses to this class remain possible.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  --$72.1 million class A-M at 'CCCsf'; RE 90%;

  --$200.7 million class A-J at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  --$58.8 million class A-JS at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  --$100 million class A-JFX at 'Csf'; RE 0%;

  --$54.6 million class B at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$26.5 million class B-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class C at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class C-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class D at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class D-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class E at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class E-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class F at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class F-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class G-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class H-S at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class P at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-1S, A-2, A-2S, A-2SFX, A-2SFL, A-3, A-3S, A-1A and
A-MS certificates have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the fully
depleted class NR certificates. Fitch previously withdrew the
rating on the interest-only class X certificates and the class
A-JFL certificates.


LENDMARK FUNDING 2018-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following notes
issued by Lendmark Funding Trust 2018-1 (Series 2018-1):

-- $196,246,000 Series 2018-1, Class A (the Class A Notes) rated
    AA (sf)

-- $17,024,000 Series 2018-1, Class B (the Class B Notes) rated A

    (sf)

-- $17,427,000 Series 2018-1, Class C (the Class C Notes) rated
    BBB (sf)

-- $19,303,000 Series 2018-1, Class D (the Class D Notes) rated
    BB (sf)

RATING RATIONALE/DESCRIPTION

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date.

-- Lendmark Financial Services, LLC's (Lendmark) capabilities with
regard to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of
Lendmark's consumer loan portfolio. DBRS has used a hybrid approach
in analyzing the Lendmark portfolio that incorporates elements of
static pool analysis, employed for assets such as consumer loans,
and revolving asset analysis, employed for such assets as credit
card master trusts.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with Lendmark and that the trust has a
valid first-priority security interest in the assets and is
consistent with the DBRS methodology “Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance.”

The Series 2018-1 transaction represents the fifth securitization
of a portfolio of non-prime and subprime personal loans originated
through Lendmark's branch network.

Credit enhancement in the transaction consists of
overcollateralization, subordination, excess spread and a Reserve
Account. The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 27.30% of
initial hard credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes
in the pool, the Reserve Account (0.50%) and overcollateralization
(6.75%). The ratings on the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes and
the Class D Notes reflect 20.95%, 14.45% and 7.25% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


LENDMARK FUNDING 2018-1: S&P Gives Prelim BB(sf) Rating on D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Lendmark
Funding Trust 2018-1's $268.097 million personal consumer
loan-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction
backed by personal consumer loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 3, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 47.9%, 41.7%, 36.4%, and
30.5% credit support to the class A, B, C, and D  notes,
respectively, in the form of subordination, overcollateralization,
a reserve account, and excess spread. These credit support levels
are sufficient to withstand stresses commensurate with the notes'
preliminary ratings that are based on our stressed cash flow
scenarios.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal, its  ratings on the class A, B, C,
and D notes will remain within two rating categories of the
assigned preliminary 'A(sf)', 'A-(sf)', 'BBB- (sf)', and 'BB (sf)'
ratings, respectively, in the next 12 months, based on its credit
stability criteria.

-- The timely interest and full principal payments expected to be
made under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate to the
assigned preliminary ratings.

-- The characteristics of the pool being securitized and
receivables expected to be purchased during the revolving period.

-- The operational risks associated with Lendmark Financial
Services LLC's decentralized business model.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Lendmark Funding Trust 2018-1

  Class     Rating      Type            Interest        Amount
                                        rate           (mil. $)(i)
  A         A (sf)      Senior          Fixed          196.246
  B         A- (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           17.024
  C         BBB- (sf)   Subordinate     Fixed           17.427
  D         BB (sf)     Subordinate     Fixed           19.303

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


MAGNETITE XX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes and one class of rated structured notes issued by Magnetite
XX, Limited.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

U.S.$352,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$60,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$34,700,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

U.S.$33,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$25,300,000 Class E Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

U.S.$8,000,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

U.S.$45,000,000 Rated Structured Notes (composed of components
representing U.S.$32,965,000 of Class C Notes and U.S.$12,035,000
of Subordinated Notes due 2031, Assigned A3 (sf) with respect to
the ultimate receipt of the Aggregate Security Balance.

The A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class D
Notes, the Class E Notes and the Class F Notes are referred to
herein, collectively as the "Rated Notes."

The Rated Structured Notes' structure includes several notable
features. The Rated Structured Notes promise the repayment of the
Aggregate Security Balance and do not bear a stated rate of
interest. In addition to the Rated Structured Notes, the Issuer
issued one class of residual structured notes that Moody's did not
rate. Any proceeds from the Underlying Components will be first
applied to the payment of principal of the Rated Structured Notes
until its principal is reduced to zero and second, distributed to
the Residual Structured Notes. While the Rated Structured Notes are
outstanding, the Issuer cannot re-price or refinance the Class C
Notes, without satisfaction of certain conditions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Moody's rating of the Rated Structured Notes addresses only the
ultimate repayment of the Aggregate Security Balance of the Rated
Structured Notes by the holders of the Rated Structured Notes.
Moody's rating of the Rated Structured Notes does not address any
other payments or additional amounts that a holder of the Rated
Structured Notes may receive pursuant to the underlying documents.

Magnetite XX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as of the closing date.

BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Rated Structured Notes and
Residual Structured Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the Rated Notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions for the Issuer's portfolio:

Par amount: $550,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2941

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.05%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes and the Rated Structured Notes
is subject to uncertainty. The performance of the Rated Notes and
the Rated Structured Notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes and the Rated Structured Notes. In addition, the
performance of the Rated Structured Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the Underlying Components.

The rating on the Rated Structured Notes, which combines cash flows
from the Underlying Components, is subject to a higher degree of
volatility than the other rated notes of the Issuer, primarily due
to the uncertainty of cash flows from the Subordinated Notes.
Moody's applied haircuts to the cash flows from the Subordinated
Notes based on the target rating of the Rated Structured Notes.
Actual distributions from the Subordinated Notes that differ
significantly from Moody's assumptions can lead to a faster (or
slower) speed of reduction in the Aggregate Security Balance,
thereby resulting in better (or worse) ratings performance than
previously expected.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the notes. This sensitivity
analysis includes increased default probability relative to the
base case assumptions.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes (shown
in terms of the number of notch difference versus the current model
output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2941 to 3382)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Class F Notes: 1

Rated Structured Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2941 to 3823)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -2

Rated Structured Notes: -2


MARANON LOAN 2018-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Maranon Loan Funding
2018-1 Ltd./Maranon Loan Funding 2018-1 LLC's $556.14 million
fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by middle-market speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
middle-market speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are
governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Maranon Loan Funding 2018-1 Ltd./Maranon Loan Funding 2018-1 LLC
  Class               Rating     Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                 AAA (sf)            319.00
  A-2                 AAA (sf)             40.00
  B                   AA (sf)              53.40
  C-1                 A (sf)               18.95
  C-2                 A (sf)               31.05
  D                   BBB- (sf)            48.44
  E                   BB- (sf)             45.30
  Subordinated notes  NR                   69.24

  NR--Not rated.


MARATHON CLO VI: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on D-R2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class X,
A-1-R2, A-2-R2, B-R2, C-R2, and D-R2 replacement notes from
Marathon CLO VI Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in 2014 and partially refinanced in May 2017,
that is managed by Marathon Asset Management L.P. The replacement
notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 3, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the May 14, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes:

-- The transaction will add class X notes. The replacement class
A-1-R2, B-R2, and C-R2 will be issued at a lower spread than the
refinanced class.

-- The replacement class A-2-R2 and D-R2 will be issued at a
higher spread than the refinanced class.

-- The class E notes will be redeemed and not reset. The
reinvestment period and stated maturity date will be extended two
and three years, respectively.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Marathon CLO VI Ltd.
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X                         AAA (sf)               8.75
  A-1-R2                    AAA (sf)             284.05
  A-2-R2                    AA (sf)               70.65
  B-R2                      A (sf)                28.30
  C-R2                      BBB- (sf)             25.20
  D-R2                      BB- (sf)              21.40
  Subordinated notes        NR                    61.40

  NR--Not rated.


MSBAM 2013-C11: Moody's Lowers Class E Certs Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on ten classes
and downgraded the ratings on three classes in Morgan Stanley Bank
of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C11, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C11 as follows:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-AB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed A3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. PST, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Apr 28, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on eight investment grade P&I Classes were affirmed
because the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on three P&I Classes, Cl. E, Cl. F and Cl. G, were
downgraded due to anticipated losses from specially serviced and
troubled loans as well as an increase in Moody's LTV on the three
largest conduit loans. The three largest conduit loans are each
secured by regional malls.

The rating on IO Class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the credit
performance of the referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PST, was affirmed due to
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the exchangeable
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 7.4% of the
current balance, compared to 6.5% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 6.3% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 5.9% at Moody's last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley Bank of America
Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C11, Cl. A-2, Cl. A-AB, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4,
Cl. A-S, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, and Cl. G were
"Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodology
used in rating Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2013-C11, Cl. PST was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged
Securities" published in June 2015. The methodologies used in
rating Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust 2013-C11,
Cl. X-A were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 14.5% to $732.2
million from $856.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 35 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 13.7% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 69.7% of the pool. One loan, constituting
2.3% of the pool, has an investment-grade structured credit
assessment. Three loans, constituting 3.0% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 14, compared to 15 at Moody's last review.

Seven loans, constituting 7.7% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

There are no loans that have been liquidated from the pool. One
loan, the Matrix Corporate Center ($59.8 million -- 8.2% of the
pool), is currently in special servicing. The loan is secured by a
1.05 million square foot (SF) office complex located just outside
of Danbury, Connecticut, 33 miles northeast of Stamford,
Connecticut. The securitization loan balance of $85.0 million has
paid down over 29% since securitization. The loan transferred to
special servicing in February 2016 due to imminent non-monetary
default and a receiver was appointed with borrower consent. The
property was only 16% leased as of September 2017 and is by far the
largest office building within its submarket. Several tenants
vacated in 2016 and 2017 including the former largest tenant,
Boehringer Ingleheim, which occupied 19.3% of the net rentable area
(NRA) and vacated in February 2017. Due to the continued
deteriorating performance of the collateral, Moody's expected loss
has increased from last review.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans secured by vacant standalone retail properties.
These two troubled loans constitute less than 2% of the pool.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 90% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 99.7%, compared to 97.4% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 19.7% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.58X and 1.10X,
respectively, compared to 1.59X and 1.09X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The loan with a structured credit assessment is the University
Towers Cooperative Loan ($17.0 million -- 2.3% of the pool), which
is secured by three 15-story coop apartment buildings, containing
549 units, and is located in the Fort Greene section of Brooklyn,
New York. The property is across the street from Long Island
University, a block from Fulton Street and 6 blocks north of
Barclays Center on Atlantic Avenue. The property was 95% occupied
as of December 2017, compared to 96% in December 2016 and 97% at
securitization. Moody's structured credit assessment is aaa
(sca.pd), the same as at last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 33.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Westfield Countryside Loan ($100 million --
13.7% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion in a
$155.0 million mortgage loan. The loan is secured by a 465,000
square foot (SF) component of an approximately 1.26 million square
foot (SF) super-regional mall located in Clearwater, Florida
approximately 20 miles west of the Tampa. The mall is anchored by
Dillard's, Macy's, Sears, and JC Penney, all of which are
non-collateral. The total mall was 93% leased as of December 2017,
however, occupancy is expected to drop after Sears recently
announced that they will close in the second half of 2018. In 2014,
Sears had downsized at this location to accommodate a
37,000-square-foot Whole Foods Market and was left with 100,000 SF
of space. The net operating income (NOI) declined in 2017 as
compared to both 2016 and 2015. The decline was due to both a
decrease in revenue and an increase in operating expenses. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 112.4% and 0.96X, respectively, compared
to 100.9% and 0.96X at Moody's last review.

The second largest loan is the Mall at Tuttle Crossing Loan ($91.6
million -- 12.5% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu
portion in a $120.5 million loan. The loan is secured by a 385,000
square foot (SF) component of an approximately 1.13 million square
foot (SF) super-regional mall located in Dublin, Ohio approximately
17 miles northwest of Columbus. The mall is currently anchored by
JC Penney, Sears and Macy's (all three of which are
non-collateral). A Macy's Home Store (20% of total mall NRA) closed
in 2017. The total mall was 82% leased as of December 2017,
compared to 87% in December 2016 and 88% in December 2015. Several
national brands including Abercrombie & Fitch, The Limited, Men's
Wearhouse and Panera Bread vacated in 2017. In 2017, the total
comparable tenant sales declined by approximately 8% as compared to
the prior year. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 88.2% and 1.23X,
respectively, compared to 80.5% and 1.24X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Southdale Center Loan ($51.9 million
-- 7.1% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion in a
$146.5 million loan. The loan is secured by a 635,000 square foot
component of a 1.23 million square foot super-regional mall located
in Edina, Minnesota, approximately 9 miles south of the
Minneapolis. While the property is located only six miles away from
the Mall of America, the property serves local consumers, while the
Mall of America is considered to be a tourist shopping destination.
The mall is currently anchored by a non-collateral Macy's,
Herberger's and 12-screen American Multi-Cinema movie theater.
However, Herberger's parent company, Bon-Ton, recently announced
plans to liquidate all of their stores. Additionally, both JC
Penney (non-collateral) and Gordmans (44,087 SF) closed their
stores in 2017. The December 2017 in-line occupancy was 82%,
compared to 84% in December 2016. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
113.1% and 0.91X, respectively, compared to 104.6% and 0.93X at
Moody's last review.


MSC 2006-TOP23: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Pass Thru Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class, downgraded one class and
affirmed 10 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust (MSCI)
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2006-TOP23.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade to class C reflects defeased collateral and increased
credit enhancement from the disposition of the REO assets. The
downgrade to the distressed class F reflects the loss expectations
from the remaining loans. The affirmations reflect the pool
concentration, high credit enhancement to offset losses and the
collateral quality of the remaining loans. As of the April 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 96% to $67.4 million from $1.61 billion at issuance.

Pool Concentration: The pool is concentrated with only 13 loans, of
which one (4.2%) is defeased. Loans secured by retail properties
account for 69.6% of the pool.

Specially Serviced Loan; Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest loan
(30.4%) in the pool is in special servicing. It is secured by a
127,325 square foot office property located in White Plains, NY.
The loan transferred to the special servicer in September 2017 for
imminent default. The two largest tenants at the property occupy
95.7% of the total net rentable area (NRA). The largest tenant, The
Dannon Company, occupies 57% with lease expiration in April 2018.
The company had extended their lease from September 2017 and
continues to negotiate another extension with the borrower. The
second largest tenant, Interactive Data, occupies 36.4% of the NRA
with lease expiration in Oct 2019. The loan matures in June 2018
and has remained current. There are five other Fitch Loans of
Concern (30.5%) due to single tenant exposure and maturity risk.

Loan Maturities; ARD Loans: Of the non-specially serviced loans,
two loans (14.5%) mature in 2018, one loan (5.3%) in 2019 and seven
loans (40.5%) mature in 2021. There are three ARD loans (23.8%),
two of which are being cash managed as they are past their ARD of
June 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlooks on classes C and D reflect the increasing
credit enhancement, continued amortization, and expected continued
paydown of the pool. An upgrade to class D is unlikely due to the
pool's significant concentration and the quality of the remaining
collateral; however, downgrades could occur if losses on the loans
default at maturity and losses exceed Fitch's expectations.
Distressed classes E and F may be subject to further downgrades as
additional losses are realized or if losses exceed Fitch's
expectations.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch upgrades the following class:

  --$2.3 million class C to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch downgrades the following class:

  --$12.1 million class F to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

Fitch affirms the following classes:

  --$26.2 million class D at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$14.1 million class E at 'CCCsf'; RE 75%;

  --$12.7 million class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 million class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 million class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class N at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  --$0 class O at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-AB, A-4, A-M, A-J and B certificates
have paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class P certificates.
Fitch previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X
certificates.


NRMLT 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes 'B' Rating on 10 Classes of Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series 2018-2 (the Notes) issued by New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2 (NRMLT or the Trust):

-- $319.5 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A-1B at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A-1C at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A1-IOA at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A1-IOB at AAA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A1-IOC at AAA (sf)
-- $344.0 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $319.5 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B1-IO at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B-1B at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B-1C at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B-1D at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)
-- $24.5 million Class B1-IOC at AA (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B-2B at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B-2C at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B-2D at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B2-IOA at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B2-IOB at A (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B2-IOC at A (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B3-IO at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B-3D at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B-4A at BB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B-4B at BB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B-4C at BB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B4-IOB at BB (sf)
-- $11.7 million Class B4-IOC at BB (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-5 at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-5A at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-5B at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-5C at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B-5D at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B5-IOA at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B5-IOB at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B5-IOC at B (sf)
-- $7.5 million Class B5-IOD at B (sf)
-- $19.2 million Class B-7 at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, B1-IO, B1-IOA, B1-IOB,
B1-IOC, B2-IO, B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B3-IO, B3-IOA, B3-IOB,
B3-IOC, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B4-IOC, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B5-IOC and B5-IOD
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, A-2, A, B-1A,
B-1B, B-1C, B-1D, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B1-IOC, B-2A, B-2B, B-2C, B-2D,
B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B-3A, B-3B, B-3C, B-3D, B3-IOA, B3-IOB,
B3-IOC, B-4A, B-4B, B-4C, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B4-IOC, B-5A, B-5B, B-5C,
B-5D, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B5-IOC, B5-IOD and B-7 are exchangeable
notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of initial
exchangeable notes as specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 25.00% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 19.25%,
15.50%, 10.75%, 8.00% and 6.25% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 3,628 loans with a total principal balance of
$425,956,677 as of the Cut-Off Date (April 1, 2018).

All but ten loans are significantly seasoned with a
weighted-average (WA) age of 164 months. As of the Cut-Off Date,
93.0% of the pool is current, 6.6% is 30 days delinquent under the
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) delinquency method and 0.5% is
in bankruptcy (all bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days
delinquent). Approximately 69.8% and 76.3% of the mortgage loans
have been zero times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for the past 24
months and 12 months, respectively, under the MBA delinquency
method. The portfolio contains 35.8% modified loans. The
modifications happened more than two years ago for 78.5% of the
modified loans. In accordance with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) Qualified Mortgage (QM) rules, 0.2% of the
loans are designated as QM Safe Harbor and 0.1% as QM Rebuttable
Presumption. The majority of the loans in the pool (99.7%) are not
subject to the QM rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor IX LLC (NRZ), acquired the loans prior to
the Closing Date in connection with the termination of various
securitization trusts. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2018-2 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute the loans to
the Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp, through
a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5% eligible
vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued (other
than the residual notes) to satisfy the credit risk retention
requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans were
originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 58.7% of the pool is serviced by Nationstar
Mortgage LLC (Nationstar), 19.7% by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC; 9.6%
by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; 6.3% by PNC Mortgage; 4.6% by
Specialized Loan Servicing LLC; 0.8% by New Penn Financial, LLC
d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (SMS); and 0.3% by Fay
Servicing, LLC. Nationstar will act as the Master Servicer and SMS
will act as the Special Servicer.

The Seller will have the option to repurchase any loan that becomes
60 or more days delinquent under the MBA method or any REO property
acquired in respect of a mortgage loan at a price equal to the
principal balance of the loan (Optional Repurchase Price), provided
that such repurchases will be limited to 10% of the principal
balance of the mortgage loans as of the Cut-Off Date.

Unlike other seasoned re-performing loan securitizations, the
Servicers in this transaction will advance principal and interest
on delinquent mortgages to the extent such advances are deemed
recoverable. The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting
interest cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis
structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.

Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance, title/lien, payment history and data
integrity. Updated Home Data Index and/or broker price opinions
were provided for the pool; however, a reconciliation was not
performed on the updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


NRMLT 2018-2: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class B-4 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 31
classes of notes issued by New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust
2018-2 ("NRMLT 2018-2"). The NRMLT 2018-2 transaction is a $426.0
million securitization of first lien, seasoned performing and
re-performing mortgage loans with weighted average seasoning of 164
months, a weighted average updated LTV ratio of 57.4% and a
weighted average updated FICO score of 692. Based on the OTS
methodology, 84.1% of the loans by scheduled balance have been
current every month in the past 24 months. Additionally, 35.8% of
the loans in the pool have been previously modified. Nationstar
Mortgage LLC (Nationstar Mortgage), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
(Ocwen), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), PNC Mortgage,
Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS), New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint), and Fay Servicing, LLC
(Fay) will act as primary servicers. Nationstar Mortgage will act
as master servicer and successor servicer and Shellpoint will act
as the special servicer.

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-2

Cl. A-1 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1A Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1B Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-1C Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2 Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1A Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1B Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1C Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1D Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2 Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2A Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2B Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2C Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-2D Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3A Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3B Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3C Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-3D Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4A Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4B Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-4C Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5 Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B-5A Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B-5B Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B-5C Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B-5D Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. B-7 Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The losses on the collateral pool equal 4.85% in an expected
scenario and reach 23.35% at a stress level consistent with the Aaa
ratings on the senior classes. Moody's based the expected losses
for the pool on the estimates of (1) the default rate on the
remaining balance of the loans and (2) the principal recovery rate
on the defaulted balances. The final expected losses for the pool
reflect the third party review (TPR) findings and our assessment of
the representations and warranties (R&Ws) framework for this
transaction. Also, the transaction contains a mortgage loan sale
provision, the exercise of which is subject to potential conflicts
of interest. As a result of this provision, Moody's increased the
expected losses for the pool.

To estimate the losses on the pool, Moody's used an approach
similar to the surveillance approach. Under this approach, Moody's
applies expected annual delinquency rates, conditional prepayment
rates (CPRs), loss severity rates and other variables to estimate
future losses on the pool. Moody's assumptions on these variables
are based on the observed rate of delinquency on seasoned modified
and non-modified loans, the collateral attributes of the pool
including the percentage of loans that were delinquent in the past
24 months, and the observed performance of recent New Residential
Mortgage Loan Trust issuances rated by Moody's. For this pool,
Moody's used default burnout and voluntary CPR assumptions similar
to those detailed in our "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" for
Alt-A loans originated before 2005. Moody's then aggregated the
delinquencies and converted them to losses by applying
pool-specific lifetime default frequency and loss severity
assumptions

Collateral Description

NRMLT 2018-2 is a securitization of seasoned performing and
re-performing residential mortgage loans which the seller, NRZ
Sponsor IX LLC, has previously purchased in connection with the
termination of various securitization trusts. The transaction is
comprised of 3,628 loans of which 9.9% by principal balance are
ARMs. For the loans in the pool, 64.2% by balance have never been
modified and have been performing while 35.8% of the loans were
previously modified but are now current and cash flowing.

The updated value of properties in this pool were provided by a
third party firm using a home data index (HDI) and/or an updated
broker price opinion (BPO). BPOs were provided for a sample of
1,864 out of the 3,628 properties contained within the
securitization. HDI values were provided for 3,614 of the
properties contained within the securitization. The weighted
average updated LTV ratio on the collateral is 57.4%, implying an
average of 42.6% borrower equity in the properties. The LTV is
calculated using the lower of the updated BPO and HDI when both
values are available.

Third-Party Review ("TPR") and Representations & Warranties
("R&W")

Two third party due diligence providers, AMC and Recovco, conducted
a compliance review on a sample of 1,878 and 77 seasoned mortgage
loans respectively for the securitization pool. In addition, AMC
reviewed 11 newly refinanced mortgage loans originated by Fay. For
the seasoned loans, the regulatory compliance review consisted of a
review of compliance with the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
as implemented by Regulation Z, the federal Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA) as implemented by Regulation X, the
disclosure requirements and prohibitions of Section 50(a)(6),
Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, federal, state and local
anti-predatory regulations, federal and state specific late charge
and prepayment penalty regulations, and document review. For the
newly issued loans, AMC also reviewed compliance with Dodd-Frank
provisions implemented on October 3, 2015 and ATR/QM regulations.

AMC found that 1,711 out of 1,878 seasoned loans had compliance
exceptions with 806 loans having rating agency C or D level
exceptions. Recovco identified three loans with grade D exceptions
in its review of 77 loans and AMC identified one loan with a grade
C property valuation exception in its review of the 11 newly
originated loans. Also, based on information provided by the
seller, there were additional loans were dropped from the
securitization due to compliance exceptions. The C or D level
exceptions broadly fell into four categories: missing final HUD-1
settlement statements/HUD errors, Texas (TX50(a)(6)) cash-out loan
violations, other state compliance exceptions (including North
Carolina CHL Tangible Net Benefit violations), and missing
documents or missing information.

Moody's applied a small adjustment to the loss severities to
account for the C or D level missing final HUD-1 settlement
statement and HUD errors. For these types of issues, borrowers can
raise legal claims in defense against foreclosure as a set off or
recoupment and win damages that can reduce the amount of the
foreclosure proceeds. Such damages can include up to $4,000 in
statutory damages, borrowers' legal fees and other actual damages.
Moody's also applied small adjustments to loss severities for
TX50(a)(6) violations, North Carolina CHL Tangible Net Benefit
exceptions, and other state law compliance exceptions. Moody's did
not apply an adjustment for missing documents or missing
information identified by the diligence provider in part because
Moody's separately received and assessed a title report and a
custodial report for the mortgage loans in the pool.

AMC and Recovco reviewed the findings of various title search
reports covering 798 and 77 mortgage loans respectively in the
preliminary sample population in order to confirm the first lien
position of the related mortgages. Overall, AMC's review confirmed
that 780 mortgages were in first lien position. For the 18
remaining loans reviewed by AMC, proof of first lien position could
only be confirmed using the final title policy as of loan
origination. Recovco reported that all of the 77 mortgage loans
reviewed were in first-lien position. Given the relatively clean
title/lien results, Moody's did not apply any adjustments based on
the results of this review.

The seller, NRZ Sponsor IX LLC, is providing a representation and
warranty for missing mortgage files. To the extent that the
indenture trustee, master servicer, related servicer or depositor
has actual knowledge of a defective or missing mortgage loan
document or a breach of a representation or warranty regarding the
completeness of the mortgage file or the accuracy of the mortgage
loan documents, and such missing document, defect or breach is
preventing or materially delaying the (a) realization against the
related mortgaged property through foreclosure or similar loss
mitigation activity or (b) processing of any title claim under the
related title insurance policy, the party with such actual
knowledge will give written notice of such breach, defect or
missing document, as applicable, to the related seller, indenture
trustee, depositor, master servicer and related servicer. Upon
notification of a missing or defective mortgage loan file, the
related seller will have 120 days from the date it receives such
notification to deliver the missing document or otherwise cure the
defect or breach. If it is unable to do so, the related seller will
be obligated to replace or repurchase the mortgage loan.

Moody's did not apply an adjustment for missing documents or
missing information identified by AMC in part because Moody's
separately received and assessed a title report and a custodial
report for the mortgage loans in the pool. Moody's reviewed a draft
of the custodial report and identified seven loans with note
instrument issues. Even though this exception and the missing file
exceptions noted in the compliance review are protected by the R&W
framework, Moody's assumed that 0.2% (seven out of 3,628) of the
projected defaults will have missing document breaches that will
not be effectively remedied and will result in higher loss
severities. This adjustment is due in part to our view of the
financial strength of the R&W provider.

Trustee, Custodian, Paying Agent, Servicers, Master Servicer,
Successor Servicer and Special Servicer

The transaction indenture trustee is Wilmington Trust, National
Association. The custodian functions will be performed by Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.,
and U.S. Bank National Association. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Citibank, N.A. In
addition, Nationstar Mortgage, as master servicer, is responsible
for servicer oversight, termination of servicers, and the
appointment of successor servicers. Having Nationstar Mortgage as a
master servicer mitigates servicing-related risk due to the
performance oversight that it will provide. Nationstar Mortgage
will serve as the designated successor servicer for the transaction
and Shellpoint will serve as the special servicer. As the special
servicer, Shellpoint will be responsible for servicing mortgage
loans that become 60 or more days delinquent.

Nationstar Mortgage (58.7%), Ocwen (19.7%), Wells Fargo (9.6%), PNC
Mortgage (6.3%), SLS (4.6%), Shellpoint (0.8%), and Fay (0.3%) will
act as the primary servicers of the collateral pool. Ocwen
Financial Corporation (the parent company of Ocwen) currently has a
Corporate Family Rating is Caa1 with a negative outlook. Ocwen's
ratings reflect the regulatory scrutiny the company is experiencing
and the company's very weak profitability, largely due to the
impact of high legal, regulatory and servicing expenses. In NRMLT
2018-2, the risk of Ocwen bankruptcy is mitigated by Nationstar
Mortgage's role as master servicer and designated successor
servicer.

Transaction Structure

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to increasingly receive principal
prepayments after an initial lock-out period of five years,
provided two performance tests are met. To pass the first test, the
delinquent and recently modified loan balance cannot exceed 50% of
the subordinate bonds outstanding. To pass the second test,
cumulative losses cannot exceed certain thresholds that gradually
increase over time.

Because a shifting interest structure allows subordinated bonds to
pay down over time as the loan pool shrinks, senior bonds are
exposed to tail risk, i.e., risk of back-ended losses when fewer
loans remain in the pool. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor that helps to reduce this tail risk.
Specifically, the subordination floor prevents subordinate bonds
from receiving any principal if the amount of subordinate bonds
outstanding falls below 6.25% of the closing principal balance.
There is also a provision that prevents subordinate bonds from
receiving principal if the credit enhancement for the Class A-1
Note falls below its percentage at closing, 25.00%. These
provisions mitigate tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time.

Other Considerations

The transaction contains a mortgage loan sale provision, the
exercise of which is subject to potential conflicts of interest.
The servicers in the transaction may sell mortgage loans that
become 60 or more days delinquent according to the MBA methodology
to any party in the secondary market in an arms-length transaction
and at a fair market value. For such sale to take place, the
servicer must determine, in its reasonable commercial judgment,
that such sale would maximize proceeds on a present value basis. If
the sponsor or any of its subsidiaries is the purchaser, the
servicers must obtain at least two additional independent bids. The
transaction documents provide little detail on the method of
receipt of bids and there is no set minimum sale price. Such lack
of detail creates a risk that the independent bids could be weak
bids from purchasers that do not actively participate in the
market. Furthermore, the transaction documents provide little
detail regarding how servicers should conduct present value
calculations when determining if a note sale should be pursued. The
two largest servicers in the transaction, Nationstar Mortgage and
Ocwen, have commercial relationships with the sponsor outside of
the transaction and the special servicer, Shellpoint, is an
affiliate of the sponsor. These business arrangements could lead to
conflicts of interest. Moody's took this into account and adjusted
our losses accordingly.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the indenture trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the seller. Moody's believes that NRMLT
2018-2 is adequately protected against such risk primarily because
nearly all of the loans in this transaction are more than 10 years
seasoned and the weighted average seasoning is approximately 14
years. Although some loans in the pool were previously delinquent
and modified, the loans all have a substantial history of payment
performance. This includes payment performance during the recent
recession. As such, if loans in the pool were materially defective,
such issues would likely have been discovered prior to the
securitization. Furthermore, third party due diligence was
conducted on a significant random sample of the loans for issues
such as data integrity, compliance, and title. As such, Moody's did
not apply adjustments in this transaction to account for
indemnification payment risk.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from our original expectations
as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
better-than-expected performance include changes to servicing
practices that enhance collections or refinancing opportunities
that result in prepayments.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above our original expectations as
a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.


ORION HEALTHCORP: Committee Taps Pachulski Stang as Legal Counsel
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The official committee of unsecured creditors of Orion Healthcorp,
Inc., seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of New York to hire Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP as
its legal counsel.

The firm will advise the committee regarding its duties under the
Bankruptcy Code; represent the committee in its consultations with
the company and its affiliates; review any proposed asset sale;
investigate the Debtors' financial condition; assist in the
preparation of a bankruptcy plan; and provide other legal services
related to the Debtors' Chapter 11 cases.

The firm will charge these hourly rates:

     Partners         $650 - $1,295
     Of Counsel       $595 - $1,025
     Associates       $495 - $595
     Paralegals       $350 - $375

Ilan Scharf, Esq., a partner at Pachulski, disclosed in a court
filing that the firm is a "disinterested person" as defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In accordance with Appendix B-Guidelines for reviewing fee
applications filed by attorneys in larger Chapter 11 cases, Mr.
Scharf disclosed that his firm has not agreed to any variations
from, or alternatives to, its standard or customary billing
arrangements; and that no Pachulski professional has varied his
rate based on the geographic location of the Debtors' cases.  

Mr. Scharf also disclosed that his firm did not represent the
committee in the 12-month period prior to the petition date.

Pachulski anticipates submitting a budget at the time it files its
interim fee applications, according to Mr. Scharf.

The firm can be reached through:

     Ilan D. Scharf, Esq.
     Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
     780 Third Avenue, 34th Floor
     New York, NY 10017-2024
     Telephone: (212) 561-7700
     Facsimile: (212) 561-7777
     E-mail: ischarf@pszjlaw.com

                      About Orion HealthCorp

Constellation Healthcare Technologies, Inc., is a healthcare
services organization providing outsourced revenue cycle
management, practice management, and group purchasing services to
U.S. physicians. Orion Healthcorp, et al. --
http://www.orionhealthcorp.com/-- are a consolidated enterprise of
several companies aggregated through a series of acquisitions,
which operate the following businesses: (a) outsourced revenue
cycle management for physician practices, (b) physician practice
management, (c) group purchasing services for physician practices,
and (d) an independent practice association business, which is
organized and directed by physicians in private practice to
negotiate contracts with insurance companies on their behalf while
those physicians remain independent and which also provides other
services to those physician practices. Orion has locations in
Houston, Texas; Jericho, New York; Lakewood, Colorado;
Lawrenceville, Georgia; Monroeville, Pennsylvania; and Simi Valley,
California.

Constellation Healthcare Technologies, Inc., along with certain of
its subsidiaries, including Orion Healthcorp, Inc., on March 16,
2018, initiated voluntary proceedings under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code to facilitate an orderly and efficient sale of its
businesses.  The lead case is In re Orion Healthcorp, Inc.
(E.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-71748).

The Debtors have liabilities of $245.9 million.

The Hon. Carla E. Craig is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped DLA Piper US LLP as counsel; Hahn & Hessen LLP,
as conflicts counsel; FTI Consulting, Inc., as restructuring
advisor; Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc., as investment banker; and
Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC as claims and noticing agent.

The Office of the U.S. Trustee on April 4, 2018, appointed three
creditors to serve on the official committee of unsecured creditors
in the Chapter 11 cases.


PSMC 2018-2: Fitch Expects to Rate Class B4 Certs at 'BBsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate American International Group, Inc.'s
(AIG) PSMC 2018-2 Trust (PSMC 2018-2) as follows:

  --$364,928,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$364,928,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$273,696,000 class A-3 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$273,696,000 class A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$18,246,000 class A-5 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$18,246,000 class A-6 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$72,986,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$72,986,000 class A-8 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$36,493,000 class A-9 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$36,493,000 class A-10 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$291,942,000 class A-11 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$91,232,000 class A-12 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$291,942,000 class A-13 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$91,232,000 class A-14 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$401,421,000 class A-15 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$401,421,000 class A-16 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$54,739,000 class A-17 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$18,247,000 class A-18 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  --$54,739,000 class A-19 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$18,247,000 class A-20 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$401,421,000 class A-X1 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$364,928,000 class A-X2 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$273,696,000 class A-X3 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$18,246,000 class A-X4 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$72,986,000 class A-X5 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$36,493,000 class A-X6 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$401,421,000 class A-X7 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$54,739,000 class A-X8 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$18,247,000 class A-X9 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  --$9,874,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$7,084,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$4,937,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$3,220,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$1,503,000 class B-5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  --$1,288,369 class B-6 certificates.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
682 prime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) acquired by subsidiaries of
AIG from various mortgage originators with a total balance of
approximately $446.33 million of the cut-off date.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A notes reflects the 6.50%
subordination provided by the 2.30% class B-1, 1.65% class B-2,
1.15% class B-3, 0.75% class B-4, 0.35% class B-5 and 0.30% class
B-6 notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of
high-quality, 30-year, fixed-rate fully amortizing Safe Harbor
Qualified Mortgage (SHQM) loans to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, relatively low leverage and large liquid reserves. The
loans are seasoned an average of five months.

The pool has a weighted average (WA) original FICO score of 773,
which is indicative of very high credit-quality borrowers.
Approximately 80.5% of the borrowers have original FICO scores
above 750. In addition, the original WA CLTV ratio of 73.6%
represents substantial borrower equity in the property and reduced
default probability.

AIG as Aggregator (Neutral): AIG is a global insurance corporation
that has issued three previous RMBS transactions to date. The first
two transactions were issued in 2017 under Credit Suisse's CSMC
shelf and the third transaction was issued in March 2018 using
their recently created depositor, Pearl Street Mortgage Company
(PSMC). This will be the second transaction issued under the PSMC
shelf.

In 2013, AIG established the Residential Mortgage Lending (RML)
group to establish relationships with mortgage originators and
acquire prime jumbo loans on behalf of funds owned by AIG. Fitch
conducted a full review of AIG's aggregation processes and believes
that AIG meets industry standards needed to aggregate mortgages for
residential mortgage-backed securitization. In addition to the
satisfactory operational assessment, a due diligence review was
completed on 100% of the pool.

Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): A loan-level due
diligence review was conducted on 100% of the pool in accordance
with Fitch's criteria and focused on credit, compliance and
property valuation. 28.4% of the loans received an 'A' grade and
the remainders were graded 'B' (70.7%) and 'C' (0.9%). No loans
were graded 'D.' The loans that were graded 'C' were determined to
be non-material to the transaction. In Fitch's view, the results of
the diligence indicate acceptable controls and adherence to
underwriting guidelines and no adjustment was made to the expected
losses.

Top Tier Representation and Warranty Framework (Positive): Fitch
considers the transaction's representation, warranty and
enforcement (RW&E) mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I
quality. As a result of the Tier I RW&E framework and the 'A'
Fitch-rated counterparty supporting the repurchase obligations of
the RW&E providers, the pool's expected loss at the 'AAAsf' level
was reduced by 24 basis points.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the
pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor
of 1.00% of the original balance will be maintained for the
certificates. Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that
might allow principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders
earlier than the five-year lockout schedule.

Geographic Concentration (Neutral): Approximately 35.7% of the pool
is located in California, which is in line or slightly lower than
other recent Fitch-rated transactions. In addition, the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) concentration is minimal, as
the top-three MSAs account for only 27% of the pool. The largest
MSA concentration is in the San Francisco MSA (10.5%) followed by
the Los Angeles MSA (9.7%) and the Atlanta MSA (6.8%). As a result,
no geographic concentration penalty was applied.

Extraordinary Expense Treatment (Neutral): The trust provides for
expenses, including indemnification amounts and costs of
arbitration, to be paid by the net WA coupon of the loans, which
does not affect the contractual interest due on the certificates.
Furthermore, the expenses to be paid from the trust are capped at
$300,000 per annum, which can be carried over each year, subject to
the cap until paid in full.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 8.2%. The analysis indicates there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.


RBS COMMERCIAL 2013-SMV: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes of commercial
mortgage pass-through certificates from RBS Commercial Funding Inc.
2013-SMV Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction. In addition, S&P affirmed its ratings on four other
classes from the same transaction.

S&P said, "For the upgrades and affirmations, our expectation of
credit enhancement was in line with the raised or affirmed rating
levels.

"We affirmed our rating on the class X-A certificates and raised
our rating on the class X-B interest-only (IO) certificates based
on our criteria for rating IO securities in which the rating on the
IO securities would not be higher than the lowest-rated reference
class. The notional balance on class X-A references the class A
balance, and the notional balance on the class X-B references the
balances on the class B and C certificates."

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
fixed-rate IO mortgage loan secured by The Shops at Mission Viejo,
a 1.16 million-sq.-ft. super-regional mall in Mission Viejo, Calif.
Of the total mall, 931,054 net rentable sq. ft. serve as collateral
for the loan. S&P said, "Our property-level analysis included a
re-evaluation of the collateral property that secures the mortgage
loan in the trust and considered the servicer-reported net
operating income and occupancy for the past five years (2013
through 2017). Our analysis also considered the tenant rollover
risk, specifically in 2020 and 2021, as well as the property's
occupancy costs, which we calculated to be approximately 15.4%
based on information provided by the master servicer. In addition,
we took into consideration the Proposition 13-related risk we noted
at issuance. Based on our understanding, we expect that the owner
could pass through most of any increase in real estate taxes to the
tenants if the property were sold or transferred. We then derived
our sustainable in-place net cash flow, which we divided by a 6.75%
S&P Global Ratings capitalization rate to determine our
expected-case value. This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings
loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC) of 66.8% and
2.76x, respectively, on the trust balance."

According to the April 13, 2018, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan had a trust balance of $295.0 million, pays an annual
fixed interest rate of 3.61%, and matures on Feb. 1, 2023.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 2.91x
on the trust balance for year-end 2017. According to the Sept. 30,
2017, rent roll, the collateral was 94.4% occupied, and the five
largest tenants comprised 54.1% of the collateral's total net
rentable area (NRA). In addition, 3.2%, 4.7%, 25.3%, and 20.3% of
the NRA have leases that expire in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021,
respectively.

  RATINGS LIST

  RBS Commercial Funding Inc. 2013-SMV Trust
  Commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series 2013-SMV
                                         Rating
  Class        Identifier       To                From
  A            74932BAA1        AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)
  X-A          74932BAC7        AAA (sf)          AAA (sf)
  X-B          74932BAE3        A+ (sf)           A (sf)
  B            74932BAG8        AA+ (sf)          AA (sf)
  C            74932BAU7        A+ (sf)           A (sf)
  D            74932BAL7        BBB (sf)          BBB- (sf)
  E            74932BAN3        BBB- (sf)         BBB- (sf)
  F            74932BAQ6        BB+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)


RSO 2015-CRE4: Moody's Upgrades Class C Notes to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings on the following
notes issued by Resource Capital Corp. 2015-CRE4, Ltd.:

Cl. B, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 4, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 4, 2017 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

The Cl. B Notes and the Cl. C Notes are referred to herein as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has upgraded the ratings of two classes of Rated Notes due
to greater than expected pre-payments on high credit risk
collateral resulting in the full amortization of the Cl. A Notes
since last review. This material amortization more than offset any
deterioration in credit quality of the outstanding pool, as
evidenced by WARF and the reduction in obligors. The Cl. B Notes
are now the senior-most outstanding class of notes in the
transaction. The rating action is the result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial real estate collateralized debt
obligation (CRE CDO CLO) transactions.

RSO 2015-CRE4 is a static cash flow commercial real estate
collateralized loan obligation (CRE CLO) transaction that is backed
by a portfolio of commercial real estate whole loans and senior
participations (100% of the collateral pool balance). The
transaction has a permitted companion loan acquisition period that
ended in August 2017, whereby principal prepayments, subject to
collateral and transaction performance metrics, were permitted to
purchase companion notes with respect to certain eligible
pari-passu participations within the existing collateral pool. As
of the trustee's April 11, 2018 report, the aggregate note balance
of the transaction, including preferred shares, has decreased to
$129.8 million, from $312.9 million at issuance, as a result of
pay-downs and pre-payments of the underlying collateral.

No assets has defaulted as of the trustee's April 11, 2018 report.

Moody's has identified the following parameters as key indicators
of the expected loss within CRE CLO transactions: weighted average
rating factor (WARF), a primary measure of credit quality with
credit assessments completed for all of the collateral; weighted
average life (WAL); weighted average recovery rate (WARR); number
of asset obligors; and pair-wise asset correlation. These
parameters are typically modeled as actual parameters for static
deals and as covenants for managed deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CLO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collateral it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5287,
compared to 4728 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: B1-B3 (0.0% compared to 3.3% at last
review), and Caa1-Caa3 (100.0% compared to 96.7% at last review).

Moody's modeled a WAL of 2.2 years, compared to 3.1 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying loan pool.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 58.2%, compared to 58.4% at last
review.

Moody's modeled 8 obligors, compared to 13 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 35.0%, same as
that at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The servicing decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the Rated Notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes in any one or combination
of the key parameters may have rating implications on certain
classes of Rated Notes. However, in many instances, a change in key
parameter assumptions in certain stress scenarios may be offset by
a change in one or more of the other key parameters. The Rated
Notes are particularly sensitive to changes in the recovery rates
of the underlying collateral and credit assessments. Holding all
other parameters constant, reducing the recovery rates of 100% of
the collateral pool by -10% would result in an average modeled
rating movement on the Rated Notes of zero to eight notches
downward (e.g., one notch down implies a ratings movement of Baa3
to Ba1). Increasing the recovery rate of 100% of the collateral
pool by +10% would result in an average modeled rating movement on
the Rated Notes of zero notches upward (e.g., one notch up implies
a ratings movement of Baa3 to Baa2).

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


SEMT 2018-5: Moody's Gives B2 Rating to Class B-4 Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-5 ("SEMT 2018-5"). The certificates are
backed by one pool of prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans,
including 194 agency-eligible high balance mortgage loans. The
assets of the trust consist of 577 fully amortizing, fixed rate
mortgage loans, substantially all of which have an original term to
maturity of 30 years except for 3 loans which have an original term
to maturity of 20 years. The borrowers in the pool have high FICO
scores, significant equity in their properties and liquid cash
reserves. CitiMortgage Inc. will serve as the master servicer for
this transaction. There are three servicers in this pool:
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (94.55%), Homestreet Bank (3.94%),
First Republic Bank (1.50%).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-5

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.40%
in a base scenario and reaches 4.60% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings. Moody's loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to Moody's Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-5 transaction is a securitization of 577 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $ 380,087,081. There are 122 originators in this pool,
including United Shore Financial Services (19.63%). None of the
originators other than United Shore contributed 10% or more of the
principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level third
party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit underwriting,
property value and regulatory compliance. In addition, Redwood
Residential Acquisition Corporation ("Redwood") has agreed to
backstop the rep and warranty repurchase obligation of all
originators other than First Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood. Moody's considers
Redwood, the mortgage loan seller, as a stronger aggregator of
prime jumbo loans compared to its peers. As of February 2018
remittance report, there have been no losses on Redwood-aggregated
transactions that Moody's has rated to date, and delinquencies to
date have also been very low.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have
strong credit profile demonstrated by strong credit scores, high
down payment percentages and significant liquid reserves. Similar
to SEMT transactions Moody's rated recently, SEMT 2018-5 has a
weighted average FICO at 770 and a percentage of loan purpose for
home purchase at 58.0%, in line with SEMT transactions issued
earlier this year, where weighted average original FICOs were
slightly above 770 and purchase money percentages were ranging from
40% to 60%.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration Moody's expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2018-5 will incur any losses from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the loans are prime
quality and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the
subordinate classes and provides a back-stop to the representations
and warranties of all the originators except for FRB, has a strong
alignment of interest with investors, and is incentivized to
actively manage the pool to optimize performance. Third, historical
performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has been very strong to
date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably well defined processes
in place to identify loans with defects on an ongoing basis. In
this transaction, an independent breach reviewer must review loans
for breaches of representations and warranties when a loan becomes
120 days delinquent, which reduces the likelihood that parties will
be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.10% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 577 loans, the TPR firms conducted
a review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity and limited review for 26 First Republic Bank, Homestreet
Bank, and Primelending loans. For the 26 loans, Redwood Trust
elected to conduct a limited review, which did not include a TPR
firm check for TRID compliance.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believes that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase the Aaa loss.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's notes that
there are 18 loans with escrow holdback in total, including 2 loans
where the initial escrow holdback amount is greater than 10%. In
the event escrow funds greater than 10% have not been disbursed
within six months of the closing date, the seller shall repurchase
the affected escrow holdback mortgage loan, on or before the date
that is six months after the closing date at the applicable
repurchase price. Given that the small number of such loans and
that the seller has the obligation to repurchase, Moody's did not
make an adjustment for these loans.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago were originated by various participating financial
institution originators. For these mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago
will provide the loan-level R&Ws that are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2018-5 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US
RMBS.

Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as master servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage Inc. is committed to
act as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


SENECA PARK CLO: Moody's Downgrades Class F Notes to Caa1
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Seneca Park CLO, Ltd.:

U.S.$64,500,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

U.S.$25,000,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2026, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

U.S.$42,000,000 Class C-R Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2026, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on April 17, 2017
Assigned A1 (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the rating on the following notes:

U.S.$8,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on June 19, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

In addition, Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

U.S.$429,750,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on April 17, 2017 Assigned Aaa
(sf)

U.S.$43,750,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on June 19, 2014 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$40,500,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on June 19, 2014 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Seneca Park CLO, Ltd., originally issued in June 2014, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in July 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade and affirmation actions reflect the benefit of the
limited period of time remaining before the end of the deal's
reinvestment period in July 2018, and the expectation that
deleveraging will commence shortly. On the other hand, the
downgrade action on the Class F notes reflects the specific risks
to the junior notes posed by par loss and spread compression
observed in the underlying CLO portfolio. Based on the trustee's
April 2018 report, the total collateral par balance is $682.7
million, or $7.3 million less than the $700 million initial par
amount targeted during the deal's ramp-up. Furthermore, the
trustee-reported weighted average spread (WAS) has been decreasing
and the current level is 3.31%.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread, including as a result of losing the net interest
benefit of LIBOR floors, or because market conditions make it
difficult for the deal to source assets of appropriate credit
quality in order to maintain its WAS target, would reduce the
effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

8) Exposure to assets with low credit quality and weak liquidity:
The historical default rate of assets rated Caa3 with a negative
outlook, Caa2 or Caa3 on review for downgrade or the worst Moody's
speculative grade liquidity (SGL) rating, SGL-4, is higher than the
average. Exposure to such assets subject the notes to additional
risks if these assets default.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the current public ratings of
the notes. Here is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on all of the rated
notes (by the difference in the number of notches versus the
current model output, for which a positive difference corresponds
to lower expected loss):

Moody's Adjusted WARF -- 20% (2300)

Class A-R: 0

Class B-1-R: 0

Class B-2-R: 0

Class C-R: +2

Class D: +3

Class E: +1

Class F: +3

Moody's Adjusted WARF + 20% (3450)

Class A-R: 0

Class B-1-R: -1

Class B-2-R: -1

Class C-R: -2

Class D: -2

Class E: -1

Class F: -2

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $676.9 million, defaulted par of
$11.0 million, a weighted average default probability of 20.57%
(implying a WARF of 2875), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 49.08%, a diversity score of 74 and a weighted average
spread of 3.28% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


SEQUOIA TRUST 2018-CH2: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 on Class B-5 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH2 ("SEMT 2018-CH2"), except for the
interest-only classes. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans.

SEMT 2018-CH2 is the fourth securitization that includes loans
acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation, a
subsidiary of Redwood Trust, Inc., under its expanded credit prime
loan program called "Redwood Choice". Redwood's Choice program is a
prime program with credit parameters outside of Redwood's
traditional prime jumbo program, "Redwood Select." The Choice
program expands the low end of Redwood's FICO range to 661 from
700, while increasing the high end of eligible loan-to-value ratios
from 85% to 90%. The pool also includes loans with non-QM
characteristics (23.4%), such as debt-to-income ratios up to 50.9%.
Non-QM loans were acquired by Redwood under each of the Select and
Choice programs.

The assets of the trust consist of 718 fixed rate mortgage loans,
all of which are fully amortizing, except for four mortgage loan
that has an interest-only term. The mortgage loans have an original
term to maturity of 30 years except for 8 loans which have an
original term to maturity of 20 years. The loans were sourced from
multiple originators and acquired by Redwood. All of the loans
conform to the Seller's guidelines, except for loans originated by
First Republic Bank, which were originated to conform with First
Republic Bank's guidelines.

The transaction benefits from nearly 100% due diligence of data
integrity, credit, property valuation, and compliance conducted by
an independent third-party firm.

CitiMortgage, Inc. will act as the master servicer of the loans in
this transaction. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, First Republic
Bank and Homestreet Bank will be primary servicers on the deal.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-CH2

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1A, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2A, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2B, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.90%
in a base scenario and reaches 10.50% at a stress level roughly
consistent with Aaa ratings. The MILAN CE may be different from the
credit enhancement that is consistent with a Aaa rating for a
tranche, because the MILAN CE does not take into account the
structural features of the transaction. Moody's took this
difference into account in its ratings of the senior classes. The
MILAN CE may be different from the credit enhancement that is
consistent with a Aaa rating for a tranche, because the MILAN CE
does not take into account the structural features of the
transaction. Moody's took this difference into account in its
ratings of the senior classes. Moody's loss estimates are based on
a loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to our Aaa stress loss above the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregator and originators assessments. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-CH2 transaction is a securitization of 718 first lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of 507,207,000. There are 132 originators in this pool,
including Fairway (5.33%), the remaining contributed less than 5%
of the principal balance of the loans in the pool. The loan-level
third party due diligence review (TPR) encompassed credit
underwriting, property value and regulatory compliance. In
addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and warranty
repurchase obligation of all originators other than First Republic
Bank.

SEMT 2018-CH2 includes loans acquired by Redwood under its Choice
program. Although from a FICO and LTV perspective, the borrowers in
SEMT 2018-CH2 are not the super prime borrowers included in
traditional SEMT transactions, these borrowers are prime borrowers
with a demonstrated ability to manage household finance. On
average, borrowers in this pool have made a 26% down payment on a
mortgage loan of $727,436. In addition, the majority of borrowers
have more than 24 months of liquid cash reserves or enough money to
pay the mortgage for two years should there be an interruption to
the borrower's cash flow. Moreover, the borrowers on average have a
monthly residual income of $15,746.85. The WA FICO is 743, which is
lower than traditional SEMT transactions, which has averaged 772 in
2018 SEMT transactions. The lower WA FICO for SEMT 2018-CH2 may
reflect recent mortgage lates (0x30x3, 1x30x12, 2x30x24) which are
allowed under the Choice program, but not under Redwood's
traditional product, Redwood Select (0x30x24). While the WA FICO
may be lower for this transaction, Moody's does not believe that
the limited mortgage lates demonstrates a history of financial
mismanagement.

Moody's also notes that SEMT 2018-CH2 is the fourth SEMT
transaction to include an increasing number of non-QM loans (156)
compared to SEMT 2018-CH1 (157) and SEMT 2017-CH2 (112).

Redwood's Choice program is in its early stages, having been
launched by Redwood in April 2016. In contrast to Redwood's
traditional program, Select, Redwood's Choice program allows for
higher LTVs, lower FICOs, non-occupant co-borrowers,
non-warrantable condos, limited loans with adverse credit events,
among other loan attributes. Under both Select and Choice, Redwood
also allows for loans with non-QM features, such as interest-only,
DTIs greater than 43%, asset depletion, among other loan
attributes.

However, Moody's notes that Redwood historically has been on
average stronger than its peers as an aggregator of prime jumbo
loans, including a limited number of non-QM loans in previous SEMT
transactions. As of the March 2018 remittance report, there have
been no losses on Redwood-aggregated transactions that we have
rated to date, and delinquencies to date have also been very low.
While in traditional SEMT transactions, Moody's has factored this
qualitative strength into the analysis, in SEMT 2018-CH2, Moody's
has a neutral assessment of the Choice Program until it is able to
review a longer performance history of Choice mortgage loans.

Structural considerations

Similar to recent rated Sequoia transactions, in this transaction,
Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer, or securities
administrator, from advancing principal and interest to loans that
are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which principal and
interest advances are not made are called the Stop Advance Mortgage
Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be removed from the
principal and interest distribution amounts calculations. Moody's
views the SAML concept as something that strengthens the integrity
of senior and subordination relationships in the structure. Yet, in
certain scenarios the SAML concept, as implemented in this
transaction, can lead to a reduction in interest payment to certain
tranches even when more subordinated tranches are outstanding. The
senior/subordination relationship between tranches is strengthened
as the removal of SAML in the calculation of the senior percentage
amount, directs more principal to the senior bonds and less to the
subordinate bonds. Further, this feature limits the amount of
servicer advances that could increase the loss severity on the
liquidated loans and preserves the subordination amount for the
most senior bonds. On the other hand, this feature can cause a
reduction in the interest distribution amount paid to the bonds;
and if that were to happen such a reduction in interest payment is
unlikely to be recovered. The final ratings on the bonds, which are
expected loss ratings, take into consideration our expected losses
on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that in
particular the subordinate tranches could potentially permanently
lose some interest as a result of this feature was considered. As
such, Moody's incorporated some additional sensitivity runs in its
cashflow analysis in which it increases the tranche losses due to
potential interest shortfalls during the loan's liquidation period
in order to reflect this feature and to assess the potential impact
to the bonds.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2018-CH2 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments owing to
potential future lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the
loans are prime quality and were originated under a regulatory
environment that requires tighter controls for originations than
pre-crisis, which reduces the likelihood that the loans have
defects that could form the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood (or
a majority-owned affiliate of the sponsor), who will retain credit
risk in accordance with the U.S. Risk Retention Rules and provides
a back-stop to the representations and warranties of all the
originators except for First Republic Bank, has a strong alignment
of interest with investors, and is incentivized to actively manage
the pool to optimize performance. Third, the transaction has
reasonably well defined processes in place to identify loans with
defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent
breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations
and warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which
reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of 100% of the
mortgage loans in the pool. For 683 loans, the TPR firm conducted a
review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review") and limited review for 35 First Republic
loans, Home Street Bank, and Primelending. For the 35 loans,
Redwood Trust elected to conduct a limited review, which did not
include a TPR firm check for TRID compliance.

For the full review loans, the third party review found that the
majority of reviewed loans were compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines and had no valuation or regulatory defects.
Most of the loans that were not compliant with Redwood's
underwriting guidelines had strong compensating factors.
Additionally, the third party review didn't identify material
compliance-related exceptions relating to the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure (TRID) rule for the full review loans.

For the full review loans, the TPR report identified one loan with
a final grade "D" property valuation-related condition relating to
escrow hold back. The conditions cited by Clayton included the
appraisal was "subject to completion" per plans and specification.
The escrow holdback distribution amount was $7,530. Moody's
believes that such conditions are not material and thus, it did not
make any adjustments for this loan.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed by the TPR firm on the
limited review loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some
of these loans could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's, however
reviewed the initial compliance findings of loans from Homestreet
Bank and Primelending where a full review was conducted and there
were no material compliance findings. As a result, Moody's did not
increase our Aaa loss for the limited review loans originated by
Homestreet Bank or PrimeLending.

The property valuation review conducted by the TPR firm consisted
of (i) a review of all of the appraisals for full review loans,
checking for issues with the comparables selected in the appraisal
and (ii) a value supported analysis for all loans. After a review
of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's found only one loan with a
final grade "D" for escrow holdback distribution amount.

Moody's has received the results of the inspection report or
appraisal confirmation for all the mortgage loans secured by
properties in the areas affected by FEMA disaster areas. The
results indicate that the properties did not receive any material
damage. SEMT 2018-CH2 includes a representation that the pool does
not include properties with material damage that would adversely
affect the value of the mortgaged property.

The originators and Redwood have provided unambiguous
representations and warranties (R&Ws) including an unqualified
fraud R&W. There is provision for binding arbitration in the event
of dispute between investors and the R&W provider concerning R&W
breaches.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
CitiMortgage Inc., as Master Servicer, is responsible for servicer
oversight, and termination of servicers and for the appointment of
successor servicers. In addition, CitiMortgage is committed to act
as successor if no other successor servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


SG RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: S&P Assigns B(sf) Rating on Class B-2 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to SG Residential Mortgage
Trust 2018-1's $139.007 million mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The certificate issuance is a residential mortgage-backed
securities transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and
adjustable-rate, mostly fully amortizing residential mortgage loans
secured by single-family residential properties, planned-unit
developments, condominiums, and two- to four-family residential
properties to both prime and nonprime borrowers. The pool has 254
loans, which are primarily non-qualified mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction;
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics;
-- The representation and warranty framework for this transaction;
and
-- The mortgage aggregator, SG Capital Partners LLC.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  SG Residential Mortgage Trust 2018-1
  Class     Rating(i)        Amount ($)
  A-1       AAA (sf)         76,720,000
  A-2       AA (sf)          11,350,000
  A-3       A (sf)           33,491,000(ii)
  M-1       BBB (sf)          7,917,000(ii)
  B-1       BB (sf)           5,816,000(ii)
  B-2       B (sf)            3,713,000(ii)
  B-3       NR                1,121,475
  B-3-C     NR                1,121,475
  A-IO-S    NR                Notional(iii)
  C         NR                  1,000 (notional)
  XS        NR                Notional(iv)
  XS-1      NR                Notional(iv)
  XS-2      NR                Notional(iv)
  XS-2-C    NR                Notional(iv)
  R         NR                      N/A
  LT-R      NR                      N/A

(i)The collateral and structural information in this report reflect
the term sheet dated April 10, 2018. The ratings assigned to the
classes address the ultimate payment of interest and principal.

(ii)The class A-3 and M-1 balances have decreased, and the class
B-1 and B-2 balances have increased since we published our presale
on April 13, 2018.

(iii)Notional amount will equal to the aggregate scheduled
principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the first day of the
related due period. (iv)Notional amount will equal to the aggregate
certificate principal balance of the class A-1, A-2, A-3, M-1, B-1,
B-2, and B-3 or B-3-C certificates (immediately before such
distribution date). NR--Not rated. N/A--Not applicable.


SGCMS TRUST 2016-C5: Fitch Affirms Class E Certs at 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of Societe Generale
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates series 2016-C5 (SG Commercial Mortgage
Securities Trust 2016-C5).

Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings of the interest-only (IO)
class X-C and class X-D certificates as the bonds are not expected
to receive any cash flow.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: The affirmations are based on the stable
performance of the underlying collateral. There have been no
material changes to the pool since issuance, and therefore the
original rating analysis was used in affirming the transaction.

As of the April 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
balance has been reduced by 1.22% to $727.8 million from $736.8
million at issuance. No loans have transferred to special servicing
since issuance. There are currently no defeased loans, and de
minimis interest shortfalls are affecting class G.

Retail Concentration; Regional Mall Exposure: Twenty eight loans
(31.6% of pool) are secured by retail properties. This includes two
regional malls in the top 15: The Mall at Rockingham Park, the
largest loan (5.5%; exposure to Sears, J.C. Penney and Macy's), in
Salem, NH and Peachtree Mall (3.1%; exposure to J.C. Penney and
Macy's) in Columbus, GA.

At issuance, The Mall at Rockingham Park was assigned an
investment-grade credit opinion on a stand-alone basis. Property
net operating income (NOI) is in-line with issuance levels, with
NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) reporting at 2.29x as of TTM
September 2017 and 2.23x as of year-end (YE) 2016, compared to
2.31x at issuance. Collateral occupancy also remains strong at 95%
as of September 2017, slightly below issuance occupancy of 97%.
Recent tenant sales were not provided and are not required per the
loan agreement, therefore it may be difficult to assess whether
this loan will maintain characteristics in line with a credit
opinion loan. The loan is secured by approximately 540,000 square
feet (sf) of a 1.024 million sf regional mall located in Salem, NH.
The mall is anchored by Lord & Taylor, non-collateral anchors
include Sears, J.C. Penney and Macy's.

Single-Tenant Exposure: Fourteen loans (25.1% of pool) are secured
by properties occupied by a single tenant as defined by Fitch. The
loans in the top 10 that are secured by properties with
single-tenant concentration include 85 Bluxome (5.2%; fully leased
to CollectiveHealth, Inc.), AG Life Time Fitness Portfolio (4%;
Life Time Fitness), 3501 Corporate Parkway (3.9%; Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc.) and East Lake Tower Corporate Center (3.2%; Columbia St.
Mary's, Inc.). Performance for these loans remains in-line with
Fitch's expectations at issuance.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Four loans (6.9% of pool) were designated
as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) due to declining performance,
three of which are secured by hotels (5.2%). The largest FLOC,
Marriot Saddle Brook (2%), secured by a 241-key full service hotel
in Saddle Brook, NJ, was flagged due to low debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR). The net cash flow (NCF) DSCR for YE 2017 fell to
0.81x, from 1.32x at YE 2016 and 1.68x at issuance. Per servicer
updates, the property has been impacted by direct competition of a
Crowne Plaza Hotel which re-opened directly across from the subject
property, and is targeting business at a much lower rate. In
addition, cash flow was temporarily affected by renovations in the
second quarter of 2017 with offline rooms averaging 35 rooms per
day. Performance is expected to improve with the renovations and
aggressive marketing.

The second largest FLOC, Hilton Garden Inn - Houston Bush Airport
(2%), secured by a 182-key limited service hotel in Houston, TX,
was flagged due to low DSCR as a result of declining occupancy and
room revenues. According to the servicer, the property has been
impacted by the general decline in the Houston market's energy
sector. Occupancy fell to 70% in 2016, with revenue per available
room (RevPAR) down to $81 and NCF DSCR at 0.75x, compared to 79%
occupancy, $95 RevPAR and 1.63x DSCR at issuance. Performance has
shown slight improvement in 2017, reporting at 74% occupancy, 87.6%
RevPAR and 1.25x DSCR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to relatively
stable performance with no material changes to pool metrics since
issuance. Fitch does not foresee positive or negative ratings
migration until a material economic or asset-level event changes
the transaction's overall portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  --$21 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$92.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$39.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$165 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$188.9 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$50.7 million class A-M at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$35.9 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$33.2 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$39.6 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --$19.3 million class E at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable;

  --$8.3 million class F at 'B-'; Outlook Stable;

  --Interest-only class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  --Interest-only class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --Interest-only class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  --Interest-only class X-F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch has withdrawn ratings on the following classes:

  --Interest-only class X-C;

  --Interest-only class X-D.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificate or the X-G
interest-only certificate.


SOUND POINT CLO XIX: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Sound Point CLO XIX, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

U.S.$320,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$40,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$20,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$30,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

U.S.$28,500,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$22,500,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the Class B-2 Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Sound Point CLO XIX is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90.0% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10.0% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as of
the closing date.

Sound Point Capital Management, LP will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2619

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2619 to 3012)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -1

Class E Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2619 to 3405)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1


TIDEWATER AUTO 2018-A: S&P Assigns BB(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Tidewater Auto
Receivables Trust 2018-A's $170.788 million automobile
receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 47.3%, 40.5%, 31.8%, 26.1%,
and 22.8% credit support, including excess spread (based on
stressed cash flow scenarios). These credit support levels provide
coverage of approximately 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.30x, 1.93x, and 1.50x
S&P's 12.50%-13.50% expected cumulative net loss range. These
credit support levels are commensurate with the assigned 'AAA
(sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB+ (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings,
respectively.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made under the
stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which are consistent with
the assigned ratings.

-- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination, a cash
collateral account, overcollateralization, excess spread, and a
capitalized interest account.

-- The transaction's ability to withstand 1.75x our expected net
loss level in our "what-if" scenario analysis before becoming
vulnerable to a downgrade.

-- The securitized pool's moderate level of seasoning
(approximately 11 months).

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures, which include a
curable performance trigger.

-- Tidewater Finance Co.'s (Tidewater's) 23-year history in the
subprime auto finance business.

-- Fourteen years of static pool data on Tidewater's 341
(consumers who have recently entered bankruptcy) and non-341 loan
programs. Under the 341 loan program, Tidewater underwrites loans
to consumers who have filed bankruptcy after facing temporary life
events resulting in credit difficulty.

RATINGS ASSIGNED

Tidewater Auto Receivables Trust 2018-A  
Class(i)  Rating   Type         Interest   Amount    Legal final
                                rate (%)  (mil. $)    maturity
A-1     A-1+ (sf)  Senior         2.50     30.700    May 15, 2019
A-2     AAA (sf)   Senior         3.12     79.390    July 15, 2022
B       AA (sf)    Subordinate    3.45     14.456    Nov. 15, 2024
C       A (sf)     Subordinate    3.84     21.963    Nov. 15, 2024
D       BBB+ (sf)  Subordinate    4.30     14.271    Nov. 15, 2024
E       BB (sf)    Subordinate    5.48     10.008    Oct. 15, 2026

(i)Series 2018-A has an unrated class F, which is part of the
overcollateralization and does not provide additional
subordination. Interest and principal payments on class F are
subordinated in the waterfall and are the last items before any
residual amount is distributed.


TRUPS 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to four classes of
notes issued by TruPS Financials Note Securitization 2018-1 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

U.S.$360,790,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2039 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

U.S.$23,700,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed-Floating Rate Notes
due 2039 (the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3
(sf)

U.S.$12,100,000 Class B Mezzanine Deferrable Fixed-Floating Rate
Notes due 2039 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A3
(sf)

U.S.$71,250,000 Class C Mezzanine Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2039 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
(sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, and
the Class C Notes are referred to herein, together, as the "Rated
Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Class C Notes assigned the definitive rating of Ba2 (sf) was
previously assigned the provisional rating of (P) Ba3 (sf) on April
11, 2018. The definitive rating assigned incorporate liability
costs of the Rated Notes which were lower than those assumed at the
time of the provisional rating. The reduced liability costs
increases excess spread available as credit enhancement to the
Rated Notes.

TFINS 2018-1 is a static cash flow CDO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by a portfolio of (1) trust preferred
securities ("TruPS") and subordinated debt issued by US community
banks and their holding companies and (2) TruPS and senior notes
issued by insurance companies and their holding companies. The
portfolio is 100% ramped as of the closing date.

EJF CDO Manager LLC, an affiliate of EJF Capital LLC, will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf
of the Issuer. The Manager will direct the disposition of any
defaulted securities or credit risk securities. The transaction
prohibits any asset purchases or substitutions at any time.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
preferred shares.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority. The transaction also includes an
interest diversion feature beginning on the March 2026 payment date
whereby 60% of the interest at a junior step in the priority of
interest payments is used to pay the principal on the Class A-1 And
Class A-2 Notes until the Class A-1 And Class A-2 Notes' principal
has been paid in full.

The portfolio of this CDO consists of (1) TruPS and subordinated
debt issued by 63 US community banks and (2) TruPS and senior notes
issued by four insurance companies, the majority of which Moody's
does not rate. Moody's assesses the default probability of bank
obligors that do not have public ratings through credit scores
derived using RiskCalc™, an econometric model developed by
Moody's Analytics. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of the
bank obligors in the pool relies on FDIC Q4-2017 financial data.
Moody's assesses the default probability of insurance company
obligors that do not have public ratings through credit assessments
provided by its insurance ratings team based on the credit analysis
of the underlying insurance companies' annual statutory financial
reports. Moody's assumes a fixed recovery rate of 10% for both the
bank and insurance obligations.

Moody's ratings on the Rated Notes took into account a stress
scenario for highly levered bank holding company issuers. The
transaction's portfolio includes subordinated debt issued by a
number of bank holding companies with significant amounts of other
debt on their balance sheet which may increase the risk presented
by their subsidiaries. To address the risk from higher debt burden
at the bank holding companies, Moody's conducted a stress scenario
in which it made adjustments to the RiskCalc credit scores for
these highly leveraged holding companies. This stress scenario was
an important consideration in the assigned ratings.

In addition, Moody's analysis considered the concentrated nature of
the portfolio. There are 14 issuers that each constitute
approximately 2.80% of the portfolio par. Moody's ran a stress
scenario in which it assumed a two notch downgrade for up to 30% of
the portfolio par.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $537,754,000

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 618

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 2.70%

Weighted Average Coupon including fixed hybrid assets (WAC): 6.18%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 10.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 10.54 years

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors were part of the rating committee
consideration. Moody's considers the structural protections in the
transaction, the risk of an event of default, the legal environment
and specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transaction, influenced the final rating decision.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: The transaction's performance could
be negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in
the general economy. Moody's currently has a stable outlook on the
US banking sector and the US P&C insurance sector.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds due to
redemptions will occur and at what pace. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations could have an impact on
the notes' ratings.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The portfolio consists
primarily of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using RiskCalc or credit
assessments. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's obtained a loss distribution for this CDO's portfolio by
simulating defaults using Moody's CDOROM, which used Moody's
assumptions for asset correlations and fixed recoveries in a Monte
Carlo simulation framework. Moody's then used the resulting loss
distribution, together with structural features of the CDO, as an
input in its CDOEdge cash flow model.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of different default
probabilities on the Rated Notes relative to the base case modeling
results, which may be different from the ratings assigned to the
Rated Notes. Here is a summary of the impact of different default
probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Rated Notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the base
case modeling results, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment grade
rating estimates (from WARF of 618 to WARF of 495)

Class A-1 Notes: +1

Class A-2 Notes: +1

Class B Notes: +1

Class C Notes: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade rating estimates (from WARF of 618 to WARF of 802)

Class A-1 Notes: 0

Class A-2 Notes: 0

Class B Notes: 0

Class C Notes: -1


UPLAND CLO: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by Upland CLO, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

U.S.$850,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class X Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$191,000,000 Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class A-1A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$67,000,000 Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1B-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

U.S.$48,250,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

U.S.$19,750,000 Class B-R Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2031 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

U.S.$27,500,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2031 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

U.S.$15,250,000 Class D-R Deferrable Junior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Invesco Senior Secured Management, Inc. manages the CLO. It directs
the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected loss
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflects the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on May 4, 2018 in
connection with the refinancing of all classes of the secured notes
previously issued on May 3, 2016. On the Refinancing Date, the
Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to
redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests and changes to the
overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 75

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2808

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.1%

Weighted Average Spread (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.6%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component
in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Here is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the Refinancing
Notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to
higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held
equal:

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2808 to 3229)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1A-R Notes: 0

Class A-1B-R Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Notes: -2

Class B-R Notes: -2

Class C-R Notes: -1

Class D-R Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2808 to 3650)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches

Class X Notes: 0

Class A-1A-R Notes: -1

Class A-1B-R Notes: -1

Class A-2-R Notes: -3

Class B-R Notes: -4

Class C-R Notes: -2

Class D-R Notes: -1


WBCMT 2005-C20: Moody's Affirms Class F Certs Rating at B2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on two classes
in Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust 2005-C20, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-C20, as follows:

Cl. F, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 11, 2017 Upgraded to B2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on May 11, 2017 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 37.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 17.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 5.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 5.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 97% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior classes and the recovery
as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the April 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99% to $50.2 million
from $3.66 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by three mortgage loans ranging in size from less
than 1% to 97% of the pool. One loan, constituting 2% of the pool,
has defeased and is secured by US government securities.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool with a loss,
resulting in or contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $171
million (for an average loss severity of 74%). One loan,
constituting 97% of the pool, is currently in special servicing.
The specially serviced loan is the NGP Rubicon GSA Pool Loan ($48.7
million -- 97% of the pool), which represents a 50% participation
interest in a mortgage loan secured by a portfolio consisting of
five remaining properties located in various US states. The
portfolio was originally secured by 14 properties with US
government leases. The portfolio most recently transferred to
special servicing on April 23, 2015 for imminent monetary default.
Currently the five properties that remain are located in Suffolk,
Virginia; Providence, Rhode Island; Huntsville, Alabama; Aurora,
Colorado and Lakewood, Colorado. The portfolio is cash managed. As
of March 2018, the properties had an average occupancy of 97%.
Moody's anticipates a moderate loss for this specially serviced
loan.

Moody's received full year 2016 and 2017 operating results for 100%
of the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans).

The sole non-defeased performing loan is the Village Shops Loan
($310,082 -- 0.6% of the pool), which is secured by a retail strip
center constructed in 1985 and located in Salem, Massachusetts.
This is a fully amortizing loan and has paid down 79% since
securitization. The property is 100% leased as of December 2017.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 14.7% and 7.75X, respectively,
compared to are 21.2% and 5.34X, at the last review.


WELLS FARGO 2014-LC16: DBRS Confirms 'B' Rating on Class F Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of all classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-LC16 (the
Certificates) issued by Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust
2014-LC16 (the Trust) as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-C at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class X-D at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited since issuance in 2014, when the collateral consisted of
82 fixed-rate loans secured by 184 commercial properties. As at the
April 2018 remittance, 80 loans remain in the pool with an
aggregate balance of $919.4 million, representing a collateral
reduction of 5.6% as a result of loan repayment and scheduled loan
amortization. Five loans, representing 3.2% of the pool, are fully
defeased.

The pool is concentrated by property type, as 24 loans (42.9% of
the pool) are secured by retail properties (including three
regional malls, representing 20.4% of the pool), while ten loans
(14.3% of the pool) are secured by hotel properties and 12 loans
(13.0% of the pool) are secured by office properties. There are
seven loans, representing 12.1% of the pool, that were structured
with five-year terms and are scheduled to mature in the next 12
months. The most notable upcoming maturities are the two top 15
loans in Soho Beach House (Prospectus ID #2, 5.9% of pool),
scheduled to mature in April 2019, and Massillon Industrial
(Prospectus ID #12, 2.18% of pool), maturing in May 2019.

To date, 60 loans (60.0% of the pool) have reported year-end (YE)
2017 NCF figures, and 13 loans (35.0% of the pool) have reported
partial-year 2017 net cash flow (NCF) figures. As calculated on the
most recent financials available (both partial-year and YE 2017 NCF
figures), the transaction had a weighted-average (WA) debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 1.77 times (x) and
11.5%, respectively, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS
Debt Yield of 1.47x and 9.44%, respectively, for the remaining
loans in the pool, as based on the DBRS NCF figures derived at
issuance. Based on the most recent NCF figures reported (both
partial-year and YE2017), the top 15 loans reported a WA amortizing
DSCR of 1.75x, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR at issuance of
1.51x, which is reflective of a WA NCF growth of 15.9%.

As at the April 2018 remittance, there are ten loans (12.5% of the
pool) on the servicer's watch list and there are no loans in
special servicing. Of the ten loans currently on the servicer's
watch list, two loans (2.8% of the pool) were flagged because of
deferred maintenance found at the collateral properties, two loans
(1.5% of the pool) are secured by hotel properties and were flagged
because of deficient performance as a result of seasonality/market
conditions and six loans (8.2% of the pool) were flagged because of
near-term tenant rollover and/or increased vacancy at the
collateral properties. The largest loan on the watch list, Pacific
Design Center (Prospectus ID #4), accounts for 5.4% of the pool and
is being monitored for high vacancy and cash flow declines from
issuance.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-C and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates
that reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches.
The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference
obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.

As part of this review, and as part of the DBRS procedure for
transaction reviews three years out from issuance, DBRS has
provided updated analysis and in-depth commentary in the DBRS
Viewpoint platform for all of the top 15 loans in the transaction
as follows:

-- Woodbridge Center (Prospectus ID#1, 12.9% of pool)
-- Montgomery Mall (Prospectus ID#3, 5.9% of pool)
-- Soho Beach House (Prospectus ID#2, 5.9% of pool)
-- Pacific Design Center (Prospectus ID#4, 5.4% of pool)
-- Purgatory Creek Apartments (Prospectus ID#5, 3.4% of pool)
-- Weatherford Ridge (Prospectus ID#6, 3.3% of pool)
-- Harlequin Plaza (Prospectus ID#7, 3.0% of pool)
-- Marketsquare at Montrose (Prospectus ID#8, 2.7% of pool)
-- Delaware State Office Portfolio (Prospectus ID#11, 2.3% of
     pool)
-- Security Self Storage SPX Portfolio (Prospectus ID#10, 2.3% of

     pool)
-- Massilon Industrial (Prospectus ID#12, 2.2% of pool)
-- JL Holdings – Burger King Portfolio – 90 (Prospectus ID#9,

     2.2% of pool)
-- Orchard Falls (Prospectus ID#13, 2.0% of pool)
-- CT Self Storage Portfolio (Prospectus ID#14, 1.9% of pool)
-- Larkings Corner (Prospectus ID#15, 1.9% of pool)

In addition, DBRS has provided updated commentary for the following
non-top 15 loans on the servicer's watch list:

-- Hilton Garden Inn – Covington (Prospectus ID #28, 1.0% of the

     pool)
-- 13140 Coit Road (Prospectus ID #36, 0.8% of the pool)

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


WESTLAKE AUTO 018-2: S&P Assigns Prelim B (sf) Rating on F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Westlake
Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-2's $800.00 million automobile
receivables-backed notes series 2018-2.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of May 3, 2018.
Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 48.7%, 42.1%, 33.3%, 25.7%,
22.0%, and 18.4% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes, respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios
(including excess spread). These provide approximately 3.50x,
3.00x, 2.30x, 1.75x, 1.50x, and 1.10x, respectively, of S&P's
13.00%-13.50% expected cumulative net loss range.

-- The transaction's ability to make timely interest and principal
payments under stressed cash flow modeling scenarios appropriate
for the assigned preliminary ratings.

-- S&P said, "Our expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario, all else being equal and for the transaction's life, our
ratings on the class A and B notes would not be lowered from the
assigned preliminary ratings, our rating on the class C notes would
remain within one rating category of the assigned preliminary
rating, and our rating on the class D notes would remain within two
rating categories of the assigned preliminary rating. Our ratings
on the class E and F notes would remain within two rating
categories of the assigned preliminary rating over one year but
would ultimately default at months 61 and 24, respectively, which
is within the bounds of our credit stability criteria."

-- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
subprime automobile loans.

-- The originator/servicer's long history in the
subprime/specialty auto finance business.

-- S&P's analysis of approximately 10 years (2006-2016) of static
pool data on the company's lending programs.

-- The transaction's payment, credit enhancement, and legal
structures.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-2

  Class      Rating      Type          Interest           Amount
                                       rate(i)           (mil. $)
  A-1        A-1+ (sf)   Senior        Fixed              169.60
  A-2-A/
  A-2-B      AAA (sf)    Senior        Fixed/floating(ii) 304.64
  B          AA (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed               70.93
  C          A (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed               89.89
  D          BBB (sf)    Subordinate   Fixed               84.13
  E          BB (sf)     Subordinate   Fixed               35.47
  F          B (sf)      Subordinate   Fixed               45.34

(i)The interest rate for each class will be determined on the
pricing date.
(ii)The sizes of class A-2-A and A-2-B will be determined at
pricing, and class A-2-B will be a maximum of 50% of the overall
class. The class A-2-B coupon will be expressed as a spread tied to
one-month LIBOR.


WESTLAKE AUTO 2018-2: DBRS Gives Prov. 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
notes to be issued by Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2018-2
(the Issuer):

-- $169,600,000 Class A-1 at R-1 (high) (sf)
-- Class A-2-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2-B at AAA (sf)
-- $70,930,000 Class B at AA (sf)
-- $89,890,000 Class C at A (sf)
-- $84,130,000 Class D at BBB (sf)
-- $35,470,000 Class E at BB (sf)
-- $45,340,000 Class F at B (sf)

The combination of Classes A-2-A and A-2-B is expected to equal
$304.64 million.

The provisional ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the
following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the rating addresses the
timely payment of interest on a monthly basis and principal by the
legal final maturity date for each class.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of the auto
loan portfolio by origination channels.

-- The capabilities of Westlake Services, LLC (Westlake) with
regards to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- The quality and consistency of provided historical static pool
data for Westlake originations and performance of the Westlake auto
loan portfolio.

-- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (rated AA /R-1 (high) with Stable trends
by DBRS) has served as a backup servicer for Westlake since 2003,
when a conduit facility was put in place.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that will
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the
non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with Westlake,
that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest in the
assets and the consistency with the DBRS “Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance.”

The collateral securing the notes consists entirely of a pool of
retail automobile contracts secured by predominantly used vehicles
that typically have high mileage. The loans are primarily made to
obligors who are categorized as subprime, largely because of their
credit history and credit scores.

The ratings on the Class A Notes reflect the 43.50% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Account (1.00%) and overcollateralization (3.00%). The
ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F Notes
reflect 34.90%, 24.00%, 13.80%, 9.50% and 4.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


[*] DBRS Reviews 602 Classes from 67 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 602 classes from 67 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the 602 classes
reviewed, DBRS confirmed 538 ratings, upgraded 58 ratings,
downgraded two ratings and discontinued four ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. For transactions where the ratings have
been confirmed, current asset performance and credit support levels
are consistent with the current ratings. The rating downgrades
reflect the transactions' continued erosion of credit support as
well as negative trends in delinquency and projected loss activity.
The discontinued ratings are the result of full repayment of
principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of “RMBS
Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Model and
Rating Methodology,” published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, Alt-A, subprime,
reperforming and ReREMIC collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect certain risks and historical
performance that constrain the quantitative model output.

-- Banc of America Funding 2014-R7 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
     Securities, Class 2A1

-- Banc of America Funding 2014-R7 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
     Securities, Class 2A6

-- Banc of America Funding 2014-R7 Trust, Resecuritization Trust
     Securities, Class 2A7

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-10, Resecuritization Trust
     Securities, Series 2014-10, Class 4A3

-- GSMSC Resecuritization Trust 2014-5R, Series 2014-5R
     Resecuritization Trust Securities, Class 3A

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R8,
     Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R8,
     Class 3-A4

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R8,
     Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R8,
     Class 3-A
-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R8,
     Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R8,
     Class 3-AF

-- Morgan Stanley Resecuritization Trust 2014-R9,
     Resecuritization Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-R9,
     Class 3-A

-- C-BASS 2007-SP1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2007-SP1, Class M-1

-- C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB7, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB7, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB7, Class B-1

-- C-BASS 2004-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB7, Class B-2

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FFH2, Mortgage

     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FFH2, Class M2

-- First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-FFH2, Mortgage

     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FFH2, Class M3

-- MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WMC1, Mortgage Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC1, Class M-4

-- MASTR Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-WMC1, Mortgage Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2005-WMC1, Class M-5

-- Securitized Asset-Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-EC1,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-EC1,
     Class M-2

-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
     Series 2004-7HE, Class A-1

-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
     Series 2004-7HE, Class A-3

-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
     Series 2004-7HE, Class M-1

-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
     Series 2004-7HE, Class M-2

-- Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-7HE, Asset-Backed Certificates,
     Series 2004-7HE, Class S

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B2

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B2-IO

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B3

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,  

     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B3-IOA

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B3-IOB

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B4
-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B4-IOA

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B4-IOB

-- Bayview Koitere Fund Trust 2017-SPL3, Mortgage-Backed Notes,
     Series 2017-SPL3, Class B5

-- Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series
    2017-1, Asset Backed Securities, Series 2017-1, Class M-1

-- Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series
    2017-1, Asset Backed Securities, Series 2017-1, Class M-2

-- COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class A-3

-- COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class M-1

-- COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-1

-- COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2017-1 Mortgage Pass-
     Through Certificates, Series 2017-1, Class B-2

-- Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2, Mortgage-Backed
     Notes, Series 2005-2, Class M3

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series 2005-HE1, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series 2005-HE1, Class M2

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series 2005-HE1, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series 2005-HE1, Class M3

-- Asset Backed Securities Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust,
     Series 2005-HE1, Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates,
     Series 2005-HE1, Class M4

-- Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1, Asset-Backed Notes,
     Series 2006-1, Class A-4

-- ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2004-HE4,
     Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-HE4,
     Class M-1

-- ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2005-RM1,

     Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-RM1,
     Class M-3

-- BNC Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2007-1, Class A3

-- C-BASS 2004-CB4 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB4, Class A-6

-- C-BASS 2004-CB5 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB5, Class M-1

-- C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class AF-3

-- C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class AF-4

-- C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed  
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class B-1

-- C-BASS 2004-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB6, Class B-2

-- C-BASS 2004-CB8 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB8, Class M-1

-- C-BASS 2004-CB8 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2004-CB8, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB2 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB2, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2005-CB2 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB2, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class M-4

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class B-1

-- C-BASS 2005-CB3 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB3, Class B-2

-- C-BASS 2005-CB4 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed  
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB4, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2005-CB4 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB4, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB4 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB4, Class M-4

-- C-BASS 2005-CB5 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB5, Class M-1

-- C-BASS 2005-CB5 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB5, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2005-CB5 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB5, Class M-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB6, Class A-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB6 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB6, Class M-1

-- C-BASS 2005-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB7, Class M-1

-- C-BASS 2005-CB7 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB7, Class M-2

-- C-BASS 2005-CB8 Trust, C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB8, Class AF-3

-- C-BASS 2005-CB8 Trust, C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB8, Class AF-4

-- C-BASS 2005-CB8 Trust, C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2005-CB8, Class AF-5

-- C-BASS 2006-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2006-CB1, Class AV-1

-- C-BASS 2006-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2006-CB1, Class AF-2

-- C-BASS 2006-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2006-CB1, Class AF-3

-- C-BASS 2006-CB1 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2006-CB1, Class AF-4

-- C-BASS 2006-CB2 Trust, C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed
     Certificates, Series 2006-CB2, Class AV

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home  
     Equity Asset Trust 2006-2, Home Equity Pass-Through
     Certificates, Series 2006-2, Class 1-A-1

-- Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home
     Equity Asset Trust 2006-2, Home Equity Pass-Through  
     Certificates, Series 2006-2, Class 2-A-4

-- Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
     2006-HE1, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-HE1, Class
     M-1

-- Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series
     2006-HE3, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-HE3, Class
     I-A-1

-- Park Place Securities Inc., Series 2004-WHQ2, Asset-Backed
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-WHQ2, Class M-4

-- Park Place Securities Inc., Series 2005-WCH1, Asset-Backed
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WCH1, Class M-4

-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-OP2, Class M-

     1
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-OP2, Class M-

     2
-- Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-OP2,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-OP2, Class M-

     3
-- Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2004-8,

     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-8, Class 5-A6

-- Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Loan Trust
     2005-S3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-S3,
     Class M4

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class II-A-1

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class III-A-1

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class III-A-3

-- Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Y Trust, Mortgage
     Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-Y, Class III-A-4

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


[*] Moody's Hikes $1.1BB of GSE CRT RMBS Issued 2016-2017
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 39 tranches
from two Agency Risk Transfer transactions issued in 2016 and 2017.
These two transactions are both actual-loss credit risk transfer
(CRT) transactions issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2017-C03

Cl. 1A-I1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-I2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-I3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-I4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1B-I1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1B-I2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1B-I3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1B-I4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-A1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1E-A2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1E-A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1E-A4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1E-B1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-B2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-B3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-B4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-D1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-D2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-D3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-D4, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1E-D5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 1M-2B, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X2, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-X4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 10, 2017
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2016-DNA1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-12, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-1F, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-1I, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2F, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2I, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3F, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M-3I, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. MA, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are due to the increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds and a reduction in the expected losses on
the underlying pools owing to strong collateral performance. The
outstanding rated bonds in these transactions have continued to
benefit both from a steady increase in the credit enhancement as a
result of sequential principal distributions among the subordinate
bonds and higher than expected voluntary prepayment rates since
issuance.

The risk transfer transactions provide credit protection against
the performance of a "reference pool" of mortgages guaranteed by
Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. The notes are direct, unsecured
obligations of Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae and are not guaranteed by
nor are they obligations of the United States Government. Unlike a
typical RMBS transaction, note holders are not entitled to receive
any cash from the mortgage loans in the reference pools. Instead,
the timing and amount of principal and interest that Freddie Mac or
Fannie Mae is obligated to pay on the Notes is linked to the
performance of the mortgage loans in the reference pool. Principal
payments to the notes relate only to actual principal received from
the reference pool with pro-rata payments between senior and
subordinate bonds, provided some performance triggers are met, and
sequential among subordinate bonds.

The bonds have benefited from sustained prepayment rates and
continued increases in credit enhancement. The February 2018
remittance data shows a three month average conditional prepayment
rate (CPR) of 8.2% for CAS 2017-C03 and 10.1% for STACR 2016-DNA1.
Although delinquencies underlying the pools have recently risen due
to impact of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, the percentage of loans
that are 60-plus days delinquent is low, at about 31 bps of the
original balance as February 2018. Additionally, there are no net
losses for CAS 2017-C03. The net losses are approximately 0.0011%
of the original pool balance for STACR 2016-DNA1 as of the February
2018 remittance report.

Our updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, our assessment of the representations and warranties
frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence findings of the
third party review received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

The principal methodology used in rating Structured Agency Credit
Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series 2016-DNA1, Cl. M-1, Cl. M-1F, Cl.
M-2, Cl. M-2F, Cl. M-12, Cl. M-3, Cl. M-3F, and Cl. MA; and
Connecticut Avenue Securities, Series 2017-C03, Cl. 1M-2A, Cl.
1M-2B, Cl. 1M-2, Cl. 1E-A1, Cl. 1E-B1, Cl. 1E-A2, Cl. 1E-B2, Cl.
1E-A3, Cl. 1E-B3, Cl. 1E-A4, Cl. 1E-B4, Cl. 1E-D1, Cl. 1E-D2, Cl.
1E-D3, Cl. 1E-D4, and Cl. 1E-D5 was "Moody's Approach to Rating US
Prime RMBS" published in February 2015. The methodologies used in
rating Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) Debt Notes, Series
2016-DNA1, Cl. M-1I, Cl. M-2I, and Cl. M-3I; and Connecticut Avenue
Securities, Series 2017-C03, Cl. 1A-I1, Cl. 1B-I1, Cl. 1A-I2, Cl.
1B-I2, Cl. 1A-I3, Cl. 1B-I3, Cl. 1A-I4, Cl. 1B-I4, Cl. 1-X1, Cl.
1-X2, Cl. 1-X3, and Cl. 1-X4 were "Moody's Approach to Rating US
Prime RMBS" published in February 2015, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 46 Tranches from 19 US RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 44 tranches
and downgraded the rating of two tranches from 19 transactions
issued by various issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2016 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Mar 18, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: RAMP Series 2002-RS2 Trust

Cl. A-I-5, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 12, 2015
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2001-1

Cl. BV-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jul 11, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR1

Cl. A-1, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Speciality Underwriting and Residential Finance 2005-AB3

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A-2C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 30, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Specialty Underwriting and Residential Finance Trust,
Series 2004-BC3

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2012
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 4, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-BC2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2006-W1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-BC1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Cl. A7, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF1

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M5, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2006-WF3

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 12, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-BC1

Cl. A4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-BC3

Cl. 1-A2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-WF1

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-WF2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corporation Trust 2006-BC5

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust, Series TMTS 2004-1HE

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2017 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades are primarily due to the total credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The downgrades are due to the weaker
performance of the underlying collateral and/or the erosion of
enhancement available to the bonds. The actions further reflect the
recent performance of the underlying pools and Moody's updated loss
expectations on the pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 47 Tranches from 16 US RMBS Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of forty-five
tranches and downgraded the ratings of two tranches from 16
transactions, backed by Alt-A, Option ARM, and Prime Jumbo RMBS
loans, issued by Washington Mutual.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR13
Trust

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR7
Trust

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 20, 2011
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2015
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR8
Trust

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 26, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR10

Cl. A-1-B, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR12

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR1

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-2A1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2015
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2015
Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR11

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1C3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. A-1C4, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2016
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR13

Cl. A-1C3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-1C4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR2

Cl. 1-A-1A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-1B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1B, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2A1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2A3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-2B, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR4

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-AR6
Trust

Cl. 1-A-1B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1C, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR8

Cl. 2-A-1B2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1B3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 18, 2015
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1C2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1C3, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 12, 2016
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR9

Cl. A-1B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 26, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-1C3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2016
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010 Downgraded
to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR1

Cl. 1A-1A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. 1A-1B, Upgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2010
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4

Cl. 1A-1A, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 1A-1B, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2015
Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-1A, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 13, 2014
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Ctfs. 2002-AR17 Trust

Cl I-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in the credit
enhancement available to the bonds and reflect the funds received
by the deals in Feb 2018 pursuant to a settlement of claims
concerning trusts created, sponsored, or serviced by Washington
Mutual Bank (WaMu). The rating downgrades are due to the erosion of
credit enhancement available to the bonds. The rating actions
further reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools and
Moody's updated loss expectation on these pools.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in April 2018 from 4.4% in April
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for 2018. Deviations from this central scenario could lead to
rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key driver
of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to continue to
rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or decreases
could lead to negative rating actions. Finally, performance of RMBS
continues to remain highly dependent on servicer procedures. Any
change resulting from servicing transfers or other policy or
regulatory change can impact the performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 33 Tranches from 4 US RMBS Loans
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 33 tranches
from four transactions, backed by prime jumbo RMBS loans. The
transactions are backed by first-lien, fully amortizing, primarily
fixed-rate prime quality residential mortgage loans with strong
credit characteristics.

Oaks Mortgage Trust Series 2015-2 (OAKS 2015-2) is a securitization
of fixed-rate loans sourced from multiple originators under
Barclays, Credit Suisse and Five Oaks Acquisition Corp's
aggregation platforms, and are serviced by Cenlar FSB ("Cenlar"),
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS"), Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing ("SMS"), and PHH Mortgage Corporation ("PHH"). Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. is the master servicer.

SEQUOIA MORTGAGE TRUST 2016-3 (SEMT 2016-3) is a securitization of
fixed rate mortgage loans with an original term to maturity of 30
years. The loans were sourced from multiple originators and
acquired by Redwood Residential Acquisition Corporation, a
subsidiary of Redwood Trust, Inc. and conform with the Seller's
guideline. Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, First Republic Bank and
Cenlar FSB are the primary servicers on the deal with the other
servicers servicing less than 5% of the mortgage loan pool.
CitiMortgage, Inc. is the master servicer.

Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2015-1 (SCOT 2015-1) is a
securitization of fixed-rate mortgage loans with an original term
to maturity of 30 years. The loans are sourced from New Penn
Financial, LLC's origination platform, and from Bank of America's
whole loan aggregation program, and are serviced primarily by
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, with Wells Fargo Bank, NA acting as
the master servicer.

Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2016-1 (SCOT 2016-1) is a two-pool
Y-structure securitization of 15 and 30 year mortgages that are
primarily fixed-rate. The first pool (Group 1) consists of 30-year
fixed and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and the second pool
(Group 2)consists of all 15-year fixed rate mortgages. As of
closing, approximately 1% of the Group 1 loans were 5/1, 7/1 and
10/1 hybrid ARMs. As of closing there were 24 originators in the
transaction of varying size and quality. The largest three
originators in the pool by loan amount are JMAC Lending ,Inc.,
Primelending, A Plainscapital Company and Caliber Home Loans, Inc.
All of the mortgage loans in SCOT 2016-1 are serviced by Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing (SMS), with Wells Fargo Bank, NA acting as the
master servicer.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Oaks Mortgage Trust Series 2015-2

Cl. A-X-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: SEQUOIA MORTGAGE TRUST 2016-3

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2015-1

Cl. A-X-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-9, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-13, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-14, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-20, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-X-22, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 20, 2017
Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015
Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 28, 2015 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2016-1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are primarily due to an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and a decrease in Moody's
projected pool losses (see link below). The actions reflect the
recent strong performance of the underlying pools with minimal, if
any, serious delinquencies to date. As of March 2018, there were no
serious delinquencies ( loans 60 days or more delinquent) in any of
the pools. However SCOT 2015-2 had two loans that were modified in
the past 12 months while SCOT 2016-1 had one such loan.

Further, high voluntary prepayment rates since issuance have
contributed to fast pay downs and large increases in percentage
credit enhancement levels for the upgraded bonds. As of March 2018,
the 3-month average prepayment rates for pools in transactions
issued in 2015 are averaging around 15%. The 3-month average
prepayment rates for transactions issued in 2016 have been on the
lower side due to the prevailing interest rate environment,
averaging at close to 10%. Due to strong prepayments, the pool
factors on pools from transactions issued in 2015 is between
60-65%, while that of transactions issued in 2016 is in the 80-90%
range.

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility as fewer loans remain in pool ("tail risk"). The
transactions provide for a credit enhancement floor to the senior
bonds which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time.

Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools incorporate, amongst
other factors, assessment of the representations and warranties
frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence findings of the
third party reviews received at the time of issuance, and the
strength of the transaction's originators and servicers.

The principal methodology used in rating SEQUOIA MORTGAGE TRUST
2016-3, Cl. B-1, Cl. B-2, Cl. B-3, Cl. B-4; Oaks Mortgage Trust
Series 2015-2, Cl. A-5, Cl. A-6, Cl. B-1, Cl. B-2, Cl. B-3, Cl.
B-4, Cl. B-5; Shellpoint Co-Originator Trust 2015-1, Cl. A-15, Cl.
A-16, Cl. A-20, Cl. B-1, Cl. B-2, Cl. B-3, Cl. B-4; and Shellpoint
Co-Originator Trust 2016-1, Cl. B-1, Cl. B-2 ,Cl. B-3, Cl. B-4, was
"Moody's Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February
2015. The methodologies used in rating Oaks Mortgage Trust Series
2015-2, Cl. A-X-1 , Cl. A-X-2 ,Cl. A-X-3, Cl. A-X-5; and Shellpoint
Co-Originator Trust 2015-1, Cl. A-X-1, Cl. A-X-2, Cl. A-X-9, Cl.
A-X-13, Cl. A-X-14, Cl. A-X-20, Cl. A-X-22, were "Moody's Approach
to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Upgrades Ratings on 35 Tranches from 23 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded ratings of 35 tranches from
23 US residential mortgage backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
Second lien and Prime Jumbo loans, issued by multiple issuers.
Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CSFB Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2005-HF1

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust Revolving Home Equity Loan Asset Backed
Notes, Series 2004-C

Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Master Trust, Series 2003-E

Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-FFA

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2015 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFB

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-FFC

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017 Upgraded to
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FFA

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2003-HE1

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010 Confirmed
at B3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 21, 2010
Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2001-HLTV2

Cl. A-I, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2002-HLTV1

Cl. A-I, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: GMACM Home Loan Trust 2006-HLTV1

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2016
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: GreenPoint Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-4

Cl. A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 4, 2010 Downgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAMP Trust 2005-S2

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 16, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 8, 2008
Downgraded to C (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2004-A6

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 3-A-3, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 4-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 29, 2011
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 5-A-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-SL2

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2010
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust Series 2004-SL2

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 25, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation, Alternative Loan
Trust, Series 2005-S1

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: RFMSII Home Equity Loan Trust 2004-HS1

Cl. A-II, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2017
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Financial Guaranty Insurance Company (Insured
Rating Withdrawn Mar 25, 2009)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2005-A

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2005-S6

Cl. M1, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2004-22SL

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded to
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Terwin Mortgage Trust 2005-5SL

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 7, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2004-Z Trust

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. I-A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. II-A-1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. II-A-2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions reflect the recent performance of the
underlying pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those
pools. Moody's rating upgrades are primarily due to improvement of
credit enhancement available to the bonds and improvement in pool
performances. Further, the rating actions on Cl. M-1 and Cl. M-2 in
GSAMP Trust 2005-S2 are driven by funds received by the transaction
pursuant to a WaMu Settlement in Feburary 2018, as a result of
which losses on Cl. M-2 were reimbursed and Cl. M-1 was paid down
substantially. Cl. M-1 received in $1.38 million in Feb 2018 while
Cl. M-2 was written up to $1.68 million (from $273k in prior
period), improving the subordination percentage on Cl. M-1 to 76.5%
from 17.9% a year ago.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% in March 2018 from 4.5% in March
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


[*] S&P Places Ratings on 8 Tranches From 2 US CLO on Watch Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on eight tranches from two
U.S. collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions on
CreditWatch with positive implications. The CreditWatch placements
follow S&P's surveillance review of U.S. cash flow collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) transactions.

The CreditWatch positive placements resulted from enhanced
overcollateralization due to paydowns to the senior tranches of
these CLO transactions. Both the transactions have exited their
reinvestment periods.

One transaction is from the 2012 vintage, and the other is from the
2013 vintage.

S&P said, "We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placements within
90 days after we complete a comprehensive cash flow analysis and
committee review for each of the affected transactions. We will
continue to monitor the CDO transactions we rate and take rating
actions, including CreditWatch placements, as we deem
appropriate."

  RATINGS PLACED ON CREDITWATCH POSITIVE

  Atlas Senior Loan Fund II Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  C-R         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos    AA+ (sf)
  D-R         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos   BBB+ (sf)
  E           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos    BB+ (sf)

  WhiteHorse VII Ltd.
                       Rating
  Class       To                    From
  A-2L        AA (sf)/Watch Pos     AA (sf)
  A-3L        A (sf)/Watch Pos      A (sf)
  B-1L        BBB (sf)/Watch Pos    BBB (sf)  
  B-2L        BB- (sf)/Watch Pos    BB- (sf)
  B-3L        B (sf)/Watch Pos      B (sf)


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 100 Classes from 27 US RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 100 classes from 27 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2007. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime collateral. The review yielded 40 upgrades, eight
downgrades, 48 affirmations, and four discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical interest shortfalls;
-- Priority of principal payments;
-- Proportion of reperforming loans in the pool;
-- Tail risk; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

The ratings affirmations reflect S&P's opinion that its projected
credit support and collateral performance on these classes has
remained relatively consistent with its prior projections.

S&P said, "On March 16, 2018, we placed our rating on class AV2-4
from FBR Securitization Trust 2005-4, series 2005-4 on CreditWatch
with developing implications due to outstanding questions with the
trustee regarding the reported interest payments to the bond
holders. The rating actions resolve the CreditWatch placements by
raising the current rating on the senior class AV2-4 based off the
response from the trustee, as well as our analysis of our cash flow
projections used in determining the classes' ability to withstand a
higher level of projected losses than previously anticipated.

"We raised our ratings by five or more notches on 13 ratings from
10 transactions due to increased credit support, expected short
duration, and/or decreased delinquencies. A vast majority of the
classes with ratings raised have the benefit of failing cumulative
loss triggers. Since these transactions' cumulative loss triggers
are failing (in effect), the most senior classes in the payment
priority are receiving all scheduled and unscheduled principal
allocations. As a result, we believe these classes have credit
support that is sufficient to withstand losses at higher rating
levels."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/2rn5utc



                            *********

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