/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCR_Public/180909.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, September 9, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 251

                            Headlines

AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. B(sf) Rating on F Notes
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 2018-3: Fitch to Rate Class B-5 Certs Bsf
APIDOS CLO XVI: S&P Hikes Class D Debt Rating to BB+
CARLYLE US 2018-2: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on $27MM Cl. D Notes
CITIGROUP 2016-C2: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on 3 Cert. Classes

COMM 2014-TWC: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class F Certs
FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2017-1: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to BB+(sf)
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-5: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Cl. B5 Certs
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-5: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 on Class B-4 Debt
GREYWOLF CLO VII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class D Notes

GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC34: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
JP MORGAN 2018-8: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
MORGAN STANLEY 2018-BOP: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class F Certs
MSC 2011-C3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class G Certs

NEUBERGER BERMAN 29: S&P Gives (P)BB- Rating on $20MM Class E Notes
NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-3: DBRS Rates 10 Note Classes 'Bsf'
PREFERRED TERM XXVIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on C-1 Notes to B3
SILVER SPRING: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on $20.7MM Class E Notes
STWD MORTGAGE 2018-URB: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating on Class F Certs

TOWD POINT 2017-5: Moody's Hikes Class B2 Debt Rating to Ba1
TOWD POINT: Moody's Takes Action on $783.9MM RMBS Issued 2015-2016
VOYA CLO 2013-3: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on E-RR Notes
WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS4: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class X-F Certs
WFRBS 2013-C18: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs

WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C18: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'Bsf'
[*] Moody's Takes Action on 6 Tranches From 4 US RMBS Deals

                            *********

AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-3: S&P Assigns Prelim. B(sf) Rating on F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to American
Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2018-3's $256.20 million
asset-backed notes.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 5,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 64.9%, 58.3%, 48.4%, 41.2%,
35.6%, and 32.2% credit support for the class A, B, C, D, E, and F
notes, respectively, based on break-even stressed cash flow
scenarios (including excess spread). These credit support levels
provide coverage of approximately 2.35x, 2.10x, 1.70x, 1.37x,
1.20x, and 1.10x S&P's 27.00%-28.00%% expected net loss range for
the class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes, respectively.

-- S&P said, "The timely interest and principal payments made to
the preliminary rated notes by the assumed legal final maturity
dates under our stressed cash flow modeling scenarios that we
believe are appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings. The
expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario, all else
being equal, our ratings on the class A, B, and C notes would not
be lowered from our preliminary 'AAA (sf)', 'AA (sf)', and 'A (sf)'
ratings during the first year; the rating on the class D notes
would remain within one rating category of our preliminary 'BBB
(sf)' rating during the first year; and the rating on the class E
and F notes are expected to default from our preliminary 'BB- (sf)'
and 'B (sf)' ratings by their legal final maturity date with
approximately 74%-100% and 0% of principal repayment, respectively.
These potential rating movements are within the limits specified in
our credit stability criteria."

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction.

-- The backup servicing arrangement with Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

-- The transaction's payment and credit enhancement structures.

-- The transaction's legal structure.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  American Credit Acceptance Receivables Trust 2018-3

  Class       Rating       Amount (mil. $)(i)
  A           AAA (sf)                 102.20
  B           AA (sf)                   30.80
  C           A (sf)                    47.60
  D           BBB (sf)                  32.20
  E           BB- (sf)                  25.20
  F           B (sf)                    18.20

(i)The actual size of these tranches will be determined on the
pricing date.


AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 2018-3: Fitch to Rate Class B-5 Certs Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate American International Group, Inc.'s
(AIG) PSMC 2018-3 Trust (PSMC 2018-3) as follows:

  -- $314,885,000 class A-1 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $314,885,000 class A-2 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $236,163,000 class A-3 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $236,163,000class A-4 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,744,000 class A-5 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,744,000class A-6 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $62,978,000 class A-7 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $62,978,000 class A-8 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,673,000 class A-9 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,673,000 class A-10 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $251,907,000 class A-11 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $78,722,000 class A-12 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

-- $251,907,000 class A-13 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $78,722,000 class A-14 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $346,558,000 class A-15 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $346,558,000 class A-16 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,233,000 class A-17 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,745,000 class A-18 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,233,000 class A-19 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,745,000 class A-20 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $204,675,000 class A-21 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,488,000 class A-22 certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $204,675,000 class A-23 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,488,000 class A-24 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $110,210,000 class A-25 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $110,210,000 class A-26 exchangeable certificates 'AAAsf';
Outlook Stable;

  -- $346,558,000 class A-X1 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $314,885,000 class A-X2 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $236,163,000 class A-X3 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $15,744,000 class A-X4 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62,978,000 class A-X5 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,673,000 class A-X6 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $346,558,000 class A-X7 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,233,000 class A-X8 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $15,745,000 class A-X9 notional certificates 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $204,675,000 class A-X10 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,488,000 class A-X11 notional exchangeable certificates
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8,521,000 class B-1 certificates 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $6,112,000 class B-2 certificates 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,260,000 class B-3 certificates 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $3,149,000 class B-4 certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $926,000 class B-5 certificates 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $927,015 class B-6 certificates.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
585 prime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) acquired by subsidiaries of
AIG from various mortgage originators with a total balance of
approximately $370.45 million of the cut-off date. The 'AAAsf'
rating on the class A notes reflects the 6.45% subordination
provided by the 2.30% class B-1, 1.65% class B-2, 1.15% class B-3,
0.85% class B-4, 0.25% class B-5 and 0.25% class B-6 notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The pool consists of
high-quality 30-year fixed-rate fully amortizing Safe Harbor
Qualified Mortgage (SHQM) loans to borrowers with strong credit
profiles, relatively low leverage and large liquid reserves. The
loans are seasoned an average of three months. The pool has a
weighted average (WA) original FICO score of 776, which is
indicative of very high credit-quality borrowers. Approximately
86.2% of the borrowers have original FICO scores above 750. In
addition, the original WA CLTV ratio of 73.8% represents
substantial borrower equity in the property and reduced default
probability.AIG as Aggregator (Neutral): AIG is a global insurance
corporation that has issued four previous RMBS transactions to
date. The first two transactions were issued in 2017 under Credit
Suisse's CSMC shelf, and the remaining two transactions were issued
in 2018 using their recently created depositor, Pearl Street
Mortgage Company (PSMC). This will be the third transaction issued
under the PSMC shelf.
In 2013, AIG established the Residential Mortgage Lending (RML)
group to establish relationships with mortgage originators and
acquire prime jumbo loans on behalf of funds owned by AIG. Fitch
conducted a full review of AIG's aggregation processes and believes
that AIG is an above average aggregator of mortgages for
residential mortgage-backed securitizations. In addition to the
satisfactory operational assessment, a due diligence review was
completed on 100% of the pool
Third-Party Due Diligence Results (Positive): A loan-level due
diligence review was conducted on 100% of the pool in accordance
with Fitch's criteria and focused on credit, compliance and
property valuation. 28.7% of the loans received an 'A' grade, and
the remainder were graded 'B' (71.1%) and 'C' (< 0.5%). No loans
were graded  'D' The loans that were graded 'C'; were determined to
be non-material to the transaction. In Fitch's view, the results of
the diligence indicate acceptable controls and adherence to
underwriting guidelines. No adjustment was made to the expected
losses.  

Top Tier Representation and Warranty Framework (Positive): ): Fitch
considers the transaction's representation, warranty, and
enforcement (RWE) mechanism framework to be consistent with Tier I
quality. As a result of the Tier I RWE framework and the 'A';
Fitch-rated counterparty supporting the repurchase obligations of
the RWE providers, the pool's 'AAAsf'; expected loss was reduced by
24 bps.

Straightforward Deal Structure (Positive): The mortgage cash flow
and loss allocation are based on a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest structure, whereby the subordinate classes
receive only scheduled principal and are locked out from receiving
unscheduled principal or prepayments for five years. The lockout
feature helps maintain subordination for a longer period should
losses occur later in the life of the deal. The applicable credit
support percentage feature redirects subordinate principal to
classes of higher seniority if specified credit enhancement (CE)
levels are not maintained.

CE Floor (Positive): To mitigate tail risk, which arises as the
pool seasons and fewer loans are outstanding, a subordination floor
of 1.00% of the original balance will be maintained for the
certificates. Additionally, there is no early stepdown test that
might allow principal prepayments to subordinate bondholders
earlier than the five-year lockout schedule.

Geographic Concentration (Neutral): Approximately 35.1% of the pool
is located in California, which is in line with or slightly lower
than other recent Fitch-rated transactions. In addition, the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) concentration is minimal, as
the top three MSAs account for only 28% of the pool. The largest
MSA concentration is in the Los Angeles MSA (10.1%), followed by
the San Francisco MSA (10.0%) and the Washington, D.C. MSA (8.1%).
As a result, no geographic concentration penalty was applied.

DUE DILIGENCE

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC) and Opus Capital Markets
Consultants, LLC (Opus). The third-party due diligence described in
Form 15E focused on credit, compliance and valuation.  Fitch
considered this information in its analysis and it did not have an
effect on Fitch's analysis or conclusions. Fitch believes the
overall results of the review generally reflected strong
underwriting controls.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 9.4%. The analysis indicates there is some
potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to &'CCCsf'.


APIDOS CLO XVI: S&P Hikes Class D Debt Rating to BB+
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on the class A-2AR, A-2BR,
B-R, C-R, and D notes from Apidos CLO XVI. S&P said, "At the same
time, we affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A-1R notes and
our 'B (sf)' rating on the class E notes from the same transaction.
We also removed our ratings on the upgraded classes and on class E
from CreditWatch, where we placed them with positive implications
on June 8, 2018."

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 9, 2018, trustee report.

The upgrades reflect the transaction's nearly $195 in paydowns to
the class A-1R notes since S&P's June 2017 rating actions. These
paydowns resulted in improved reported overcollateralization (O/C)
ratios since the April 7, 2017, trustee report, which S&P used for
its June 2017 rating actions. Additionally, S&P expects these
ratios to further improve after incorporating the effects of the
July 2018 paydown on the senior notes:

-- The class A O/C ratio improved to 140.40% from 132.11%.
-- The class B O/C ratio improved to 124.07% from 119.79%.
-- The class C O/C ratio improved to 114.99% from 112.66%.
-- The class D O/C ratio improved to 108.03% from 107.05%.
-- The class E O/C ratio improved to 104.58% from 104.22%.

S&P said, "The collateral portfolio's credit quality has improved
slightly since our last rating actions. Collateral obligations with
ratings in the 'CCC' category have decreased, to $15.40 million
reported as of the July 9, 2018, trustee report from $21.36 million
reported as of the April 7, 2017, trustee report. Over the same
period, the par amount of defaulted collateral has decreased to
$5.74 million from $7.84 million, and the transaction has benefited
from a drop in the weighted average life due to collateral
seasoning, to 4.23 years from 4.99 years.

"The upgrades reflect the improved credit support at the prior
rating levels; the affirmations reflect our view that the credit
support available is commensurate with the current rating levels.

"Although the cash flow results indicated a lower rating for the
class E notes, we view the overall credit seasoning, the relatively
stable credit quality of the portfolio, and the significant
paydowns to the senior class A-1R notes as improvements to the
transaction and also considered the improving O/C ratios, which
currently have a significant cushion over their minimum
requirements. However, any increase in portfolio asset defaults
and/or par losses could lead to potential negative rating actions
on the class E notes in the future.

"Our review of this transaction included a cash flow analysis,
based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in the
aforementioned trustee report, to estimate future performance. In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest and/or ultimate
principal to each of the rated tranches. The results of the cash
flow analysis--and other qualitative factors as
applicable--demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated
outstanding classes have adequate credit enhancement available at
the rating levels associated with these rating actions.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."

  RATINGS RAISED
  Apidos CLO XVI
                    Rating
  Class         To          From
  A-2AR         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
  A-2BR         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)/Watch Pos
  B-R           AA+ (sf)    A (sf)/Watch Pos
  C-R           A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
  D             BB+ (sf)    BB (sf)/Watch Pos

  RATINGS AFFIRMED
  Apidos CLO XVI
                    Rating    
  Class         To            From
  A-1R          AAA (sf)    AAA (sf)
  E             B (sf)      B (sf)/Watch Pos


CARLYLE US 2018-2: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on $27MM Cl. D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Carlyle U.S. CLO 2018-2
Ltd./Carlyle U.S. CLO 2018-2 LLC's $552.00 million floating-rate
notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Carlyle U.S. CLO 2018-2 Ltd./Carlyle U.S. CLO 2018-2 LLC

  Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                   AAA (sf)              375.00
  A-2                   AA (sf)                61.60
  B (deferrable)        A (sf)                 55.40
  C (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)              33.00
  D (deferrable)        BB- (sf)               27.00
  Subordinated notes    NR                     59.55

  NR--Not rated.


CITIGROUP 2016-C2: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on 3 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial Mortgage-Pass
Through Certificates, Series 2016-C2 issued by Citigroup Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C2 (CGCMT 2016-C2) as follows:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E-1 at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class E-2 at BB (sf)
-- Class F-1 at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class EF at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)
-- Class F-2 at B (high) (sf)
-- Class G-1 at B (sf)
-- Class EFG at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (low) (sf)
-- Class G-2 at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The ratings reflect the overall stable performance of the
transaction since issuance. The deal closed in August 2016 with 44
fixed-rate loans for a total trust balance of $609.2 million. As of
the August 2018 remittance report, the pool exhibited a collateral
reduction of 0.9% since issuance as a result of scheduled loan
amortization with a current outstanding trust balance of $603.7
million. All loans reported YE2017 cash flow figures, which
resulted in a weighted-average (WA) debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) and WA debt yield of 2.24 times (x) and 10.99%,
respectively, compared with the DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS Debt Yield
of 1.72x and 9.3%, respectively. The largest top 15 loans in the
pool reported a WA DSCR and WA debt yield of 2.34x and 10.88%,
respectively.

Seven loans, representing 19.8% of the pool, are secured by hotels,
including three of the largest ten loans. The loans backed by hotel
properties have a WA DSCR and WA DBRS debt yield of 1.71x and
11.21%, respectively.

As of the August 2018 remittance, there are no loans on the
servicer's watch list.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated the Vertex Pharmaceuticals HQ loan
(Prospectus ID#1, 9.9% of the pool balance) as investment grade.
DBRS confirmed that the performance of this loan remains consistent
with investment-grade characteristics. In addition, DBRS also
confirmed the shadow rating of Opry Mills (Prospectus ID#2, 9.9% of
the pool balance) as non-investment grade.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


COMM 2014-TWC: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the following classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-TWC issued by COMM
2014-TWC Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance. The loan is secured by two office
condominium units, totaling 1.1 million square feet (sf), within
the larger 2.9 million sf Time Warner Center, a mixed-use complex
in Manhattan, New York. The collateral consists of 19 floors in the
South Tower and six floors in the North Tower and is located on the
southwest corner of Central Park. The subject is a trophy-quality
Class A office property offering unobstructed views of the park
from all floors. There is significant cash equity of $669 million
behind the subject's $675 million mortgage loan provided by the
sponsors that funded the $1.3 billion acquisition of the subject.
The sponsor group includes The Related Companies, Government of
Singapore Investment Corporation and Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority. The loan was structured with a three-year term plus
three one-year extension options.

At issuance, the property was 100% occupied by Time Warner Realty
(TWR) and Time Warner Cable (TWC); however, it was known at
issuance that both tenants would vacate upon their respective lease
expirations. TWC vacated the property in December 2016 as it
relocated to Stamford, Connecticut (where its parent company,
Charter Communications, is located). TWR's lease is set to expire
in January 2019 (ahead of the full extended loan maturity date in
February 2020); however, servicer commentary noted TWR is expected
to vacate sometime after its lease expiration and eventually move
to the new 30 Hudson Yards development. According to the "New York
Post," Deutsche Bank will be moving from its regional headquarters
on Wall Street to Columbus Circle and, while no lease information
is disclosed, a term sheet has been signed for 1.1 million sf.

Per the March 2018 rent roll, the collateral is 87.5% occupied,
following TWC's recent vacancy, at an average rental rate of $71.75
per sf (psf). As per the loan agreement, the borrower was required
to increase the rollover reserve account to $50.0 million at the
time of the first loan extension option in early 2017. DBRS
confirmed that the current balance of the rollover reserve is $80.0
million. Cushman and Wakefield's Q1 2018 Market beat reports that
office properties within the Sixth Avenue/Rock Center submarket
reported an average vacancy and asking rent of 8.3% and $85.88 psf,
respectively. The sponsor group anticipates spending approximately
$25.3 million ($153 psf) in tenant improvement (TI) and leasing
costs (LC) for the TWC space and for the TWR space, the expected
total leasing package is estimated at $149.1 million ($158 psf).
DBRS considered the anticipated leasing costs provided by the
servicer and considered the projected reserve balance in its
analysis. The sponsor group can lease the space to Deutsche Bank at
a rental rate well above market given the superb location and
considerable TI and LC projections.

Per the YE2017 financials, the loan reported an amortizing
debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.39 times (x), in comparison
with the YE2016 DSCR of 2.97x and DBRS Term DSCR at issuance of
2.57x. The decline in cash flow performance is attributable to a
12.4% decline in effective gross income resulting from TWC's
vacancy and an 8.4% increase in real estate taxes year over year.

Classes X-CP and X-EXT are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT 2017-1: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to BB+(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on four classes and affirmed
its ratings on one class from Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-1.

The rating actions reflect FCAT 2017-1's collateral l performance
to date and our expectations regarding the transaction's future
collateral performance, structure, and credit enhancement. S&P
said, "Additionally, we incorporated secondary credit factors,
including credit stability, payment priorities under various
scenarios, and sector- and issuer-specific analysis. Considering
these factors, we believe the notes' creditworthiness remains
consistent with the raised and affirmed ratings."

FCAT series 2017-1 is currently performing better than S&P's
initial expectations. As a result, S&P lowered its loss expectation
on this transaction.

  Table 1
  Collateral Performance (%)
  As of the August 2018 distribution date

                                Pool    Current    60+ day
  Series                Mo.   factor        CNL    delinq.
  2017-1                 18    62.25       4.67       4.29

(i) Mo.--Month.
CNL--cumulative net loss.  
CNL Expectations (%)

  Table 2

                 Original lifetime         Revised lifetime
  Series                 CNL exp.      CNL exp. (May 2018)
  2017-1              13.00-13.50              12.75-13.25

CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectations.  

This transaction contains a sequential principal payment structure
in which the notes are paid principal by seniority. It also has
credit enhancement in the form of a nonamortizing reserve account,
overcollateralization, subordination for the higher-rated tranches,
and excess spread. The transaction's reserve amount and
overcollateralization are at their specified targets.

In addition, since the transaction closed, the credit support has
increased as a percentage of the amortizing pool balance. The
raised and affirmed ratings reflect S&P's view that the total
credit support as a percentage of the amortizing pool balance,
compared with its expected remaining losses is commensurate with
each raised or affirmed rating.

  Table 3 Hard Credit Support (%)
  As of the August 2018 distribution date

                 Total hard    Current total hard
             credit support        credit support
  Class      at issuance(i)     (% of current)(i)
  A                   47.73                 79.16
  B                   33.50                 56.29
  C                   22.00                 37.83
  D                   12.86                 23.13
  E                    5.75                 11.71

(i)Calculated as a percentage of the total gross receivable pool
balance, consisting of a reserve account, overcollateralization,
and, if applicable, subordination.

S&P said, "We incorporated cash flow analysis to assess the
loss-coverage level, which gave credit to excess spread. Our
various cash-flow scenarios included forward-looking assumptions on
recoveries, timing of losses, and voluntary absolute prepayment
speeds that we believe are appropriate, given the transaction's
performance to date.

"Aside from our break-even cash-flow analysis, we also conducted
sensitivity analyses for this series to determine the impact that a
moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would have on our ratings if
losses began trending higher than our revised base-case loss
expectation. In our view, the results demonstrated that all of the
classes have adequate credit enhancement at the raised or affirmed
rating levels.

"We will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in our view, to cover our cumulative net loss
expectations under our stress scenarios for each of the rated
classes."

  RATINGS RAISED
  Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-1
                      Rating
  Class          To            From
  B              AAA (sf)      AA (sf)
  C              AA (sf)       A (sf)
  D              A- (sf)       BBB (sf)
  E              BB+ (sf)      BB- (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED
  Flagship Credit Auto Trust 2017-1

  Class          Rating A              AAA (sf)


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-5: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Cl. B5 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-5 (the
Certificates) issued by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-5 (the
Trust):

-- $445.1 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $404.7 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $238.7 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $64.7 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.2 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.9 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $303.5 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $101.2 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $165.9 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $323.7 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.5 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $445.1 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $11.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.2 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $6.0 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.8 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.4 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Class A-X-1 is an interest-only certificate. The class balance
represents a notional amount.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a combination of
initial exchangeable certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior support certificates (Class A-11) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.20%, 2.90%, 1.65%, 0.85% and 0.55% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 726 loans with a total principal balance of $476,060,786
as of the Cut-off Date* (September 1, 2018).

Flagstar Bank, FSB is the originator and servicer of the mortgage
loans and the sponsor of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
will act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator,
Certificate Registrar and Custodian. Wilmington Trust, National
Association will serve as Trustee. IngletBlair, LLC will act as the
Representation and Warranty (R&W) Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years. Approximately
33.2% of the pool is agency-eligible mortgage loans which were
eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Unique to this transaction, the servicing fee payable to the
Servicer comprises three separate components: the base servicing
fee, the aggregate delinquent servicing fee and the aggregate
incentive servicing fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency
status of the related loan and will be paid from interest
collections before distribution to the securities. The base
servicing fee will reduce the net weighted-average coupon (WAC)
payable to certificate holders as part of the aggregate expense
calculation. However, the delinquent and incentive servicing fees
will not be included in the reduction of Net WAC and will thus
reduce available funds entitled to the certificate holders (except
for the Class B-6-C Net WAC). To capture the impact of such
potential fees, DBRS ran additional cash flow stresses based on its
60+-day delinquency and default curves, as detailed in the Cash
Flow Analysis section of the related report.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets and well-qualified borrowers.

This transaction exhibits certain challenges such as limited
third-party due diligence as well as a R&W framework that contains
materiality factors, an unrated R&W provider, knowledge qualifiers
and sunset provisions that allow for certain R&Ws to expire within
three to six years after the Closing Date. The framework is
perceived by DBRS to be limiting compared with traditional lifetime
R&W standards in certain DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the
perceived weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator score in this
pool. A lower originator score results in increased default and
loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-5: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 on Class B-4 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 16
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by
Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-5 ("FSMT 2018-5"). The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)B2 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a single pool of fixed rate high
balance agency eligible (32.44%), conventional agency balance with
conforming limits (0.78%), non-agency jumbo (54.77%), and
non-agency Jumbo Express (12.00%) loans originated by Flagstar
Bank, FSB, with an aggregate stated principal balance of
$476,060,786.

Flagstar is the servicer of the pool, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the
master servicer and Wilmington Trust, National Association will
serve as the trustee.

Servicing compensation in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure similar to previous Flagstar
Mortgage Trust transactions. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base servicing fee of $20.50
for all performing loans and increases according to certain
delinquent and incentive fee schedules. The Class B-6-C (NR) is
first in line to absorb any increase in servicing costs above the
base servicing costs. Moreover, the transaction does not have a
servicing fee cap.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-5

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary credit analysis

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Its final loss
estimates also incorporate adjustments for the third-party review
(TPR) scope and results, and the financial strength of
representation & warranty (R&W) provider. Its expected loss for
this pool in a base case scenario is 0.40% and reaches 6.45% at a
stress level consistent with its Aaa (sf) scenario.

Collateral description

The FSMT 2018-5 transaction is a securitization of 726 first lien
residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of
$476,060,786. This transaction has approximately three months
seasoned loans and strong borrower characteristics. The non-zero
weighted-average primary-borrower original FICO score is 769 and
the weighted-average original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV)
is 69.7%. There are however a relatively high percentage of
self-employed borrowers (32.8% by loan balance) in the aggregate
pool. Two of the loans are currently delinquent, however Moody's
believes the loans will be removed from the pool before closing.

For the first time, Flagstar is including their Jumbo Express loans
in one of their securitizations. Loans in the Jumbo Express program
are run through Fannie Mae's Desktop Underwriter (DU) automated
underwriting system (AUS) and receive a designation of
"Approve/Ineligible" due to their acceptable credit worthiness and
reserves but ineligible loan balance. For the Jumbo Express
program, Flagstar follows Fannie Mae guidelines in terms of
documentation of income, employment and assets. Delegated
underwriting is not permitted for this program and loans in the
program must adhere to the Ability to Repay requirements under
Appendix Q. Flagstar completes a 100% quality check to make sure
loans originated through the Jumbo Express program comply with
Qualified Mortgage criteria. The new product allows for
underwriting of loans using DU for loan amounts up to $679,650,
which is the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac limit in high cost areas.
Moody's did not make an adjustment in its analysis to account for
the presence of loans underwritten under Flagstar's Jumbo Express
program.

Flagstar originated and will service the loans in the transaction.
Moody's considers Flagstar an adequate originator and servicer of
prime jumbo and conforming mortgages and its loss estimates did not
include an adjustment for origination or servicing arrangement
quality.

Third-party review and representation & warranties

The compliance, credit, property valuation, and data integrity
portion of the third party review (TPR) was conducted on a random
sample of loans of 219 loans (30% of the initial pool by loan
count). Compared to the Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-4 transaction,
the sample percentage remained the same. Compared to the Flagstar
Mortgage Trust 2018-3INV and Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-2
transactions, the sample size increased from 20% to 30% by initial
loan count. With sampling, there is a risk that loans with grade C
or grade D issues remain in the pool and that data integrity issues
were not corrected prior to securitization for all of the loans in
the pool. Moreover, vulnerabilities of the R&W framework, such as
the weaker financial strength of the R&W provider, may be amplified
due to the limited TPR sample. Moody's made an adjustment to loss
levels to account for this risk.

Flagstar, as the originator, makes the loan-level representation
and warranties (R&Ws) for the mortgage loans. The loan-level R&Ws
are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the baseline set
of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's has identified for US RMBS. Further,
R&W breaches are evaluated by an independent third party using a
set of objective criteria. Similar to JPMMT transactions, the
transaction contains a "prescriptive" R&W framework. The originator
makes comprehensive loan-level R&Ws and an independent reviewer
will perform detailed reviews to determine whether any R&Ws were
breached when loans become 120 days delinquent, the property is
liquidated at a loss above a certain threshold, or the loan is 30
to 119 days delinquent and is modified by the servicer. These
reviews are prescriptive in that the transaction documents set
forth detailed tests for each R&W that the independent reviewer
will perform. However, Moody's made an adjustment to its loss
levels to incorporate the weaker financial strength of the R&W
provider, which is amplified due to the smaller sample size used in
the due diligence review. Moody's also considered in its analysis
the materiality tests that may absolve the R&W provider from being
required to repurchase the loan. For example, data integrity
exceptions within a 10% threshold will not require Flagstar to
repurchase a loan, even if such exception causes the loan to fail
to comply with the sponsor's underwriting guidelines.

Servicing arrangement

Moody's considers the overall servicing arrangement for this pool
to be adequate.

Servicing compensation for loans in this transaction is based on a
fee-for-service incentive structure. The fee-for-service incentive
structure includes an initial monthly base fee of $20.5 for all
performing loans and increases according to certain delinquent and
incentive fee schedules. By establishing a base servicing fee for
performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans, the
fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The fee-for-service
compensation is reasonable and adequate for this transaction. It
also better aligns the servicer's costs with the deal's performance
and structure.

The Class B-6-C (NR) is first in line to absorb any increase in
servicing costs above the base servicing costs. Delinquency and
incentive fees will be deducted from the Class B-6-C interest
payment amount first and could result in interest distribution
shortfalls and certificate writedown amounts to the certificates
depending on the magnitude of the delinquency and incentive fees.

Trustee and master servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The custodian functions will be performed by Wells Fargo. The
paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo, rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells Fargo, as
master servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight, and
termination of servicers and for the appointment of successor
servicers. In addition, Wells Fargo is obligated to make servicing
advances if the servicer is unable to do so.

Tail risk & subordination floor

This deal has a shifting-interest structure, with a subordination
floor to protect against losses that occur late in the life of the
pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk). When the total
senior subordination is less than 1.25% of the original pool
balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any principal and all
principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In addition, if the
subordinate percentage drops below 6.50% of current pool balance,
the senior distribution amount will include all principal
collections and the subordinate principal distribution amount will
be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves benefit from a floor.
When the total current balance of a given subordinate tranche plus
the aggregate balance of the subordinate tranches that are junior
to it amount to less than 0.85% of the original pool balance, those
tranches do not receive principal distributions. Principal those
tranches would have received are directed to pay more senior
subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Based on an analysis of scenarios where the largest five to 10
loans in the pool default late in the life of the transaction,
Moody's viewed the 1.25% senior floor as credit neutral. Moody's
viewed the 0.85% subordination floor as slightly below credit
neutral in its rating analysis however close enough where no
adjustment was made.

Transaction structure

The securitization has a shifting interest structure that benefits
from a senior subordination floor and a subordinate floor. Funds
collected, including principal, are first used to make interest
payments and then principal payments to the senior bonds, and then
interest and principal payments to each subordinate bond. As in all
transactions with shifting interest structures, the senior bonds
benefit from a cash flow waterfall that allocates all unscheduled
principal collections to the senior bond for a specified period of
time, and increasing amounts of unscheduled principal collections
to the subordinate bonds thereafter, but only if loan performance
satisfies delinquency and loss tests.

All certificates (except Class B-6-C) in this transaction are
subject to a net WAC cap. Class B-6-C will accrue interest at the
net WAC minus the aggregate delinquent servicing and aggregate
incentive servicing fee. For any distribution date, the net WAC
will be the greater of (1) zero and (2) the weighted average net
mortgage rates minus the capped trust expense rate.

Realized losses are allocated reverse sequentially among the
subordinate and senior support certificates and on a pro-rata basis
among the super senior certificates.

Exposure to extraordinary expenses

Certain extraordinary trust expenses (such as fees paid to the
reviewer, servicing transfer costs) in the FSMT 2018-5 transaction
are deducted directly from the available distribution amount. The
remaining trust expenses (which have an annual cap of $300,000 per
year) are deducted from the net WAC. Moody's believes there is a
very low likelihood that the rated certificates in FSMT 2018-5 will
incur any losses from extraordinary expenses or indemnification
payments from potential future lawsuits against key deal parties.
First, the loans are prime quality, 100 percent qualified mortgages
and were originated under a regulatory environment that requires
tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which reduces
the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form the
basis of a lawsuit. Second, the transaction has reasonably well
defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on an
ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach reviewer
(Inglet Blair, LLC), named at closing must review loans for
breaches of representations and warranties when certain clear
defined triggers have been breached, which reduces the likelihood
that parties will be sued for inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has
disclosed the results of a compliance, credit, valuation and data
integrity review covering a sample of the mortgage loans by an
independent third party (Clayton Services LLC). Moody's did not
make an adjustment for extraordinary expenses because most of the
trust expenses will reduce the net WAC as opposed to the available
funds.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


GREYWOLF CLO VII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Greywolf CLO VII Ltd.'s
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a $455.30 million broadly syndicated
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) managed by Greywolf Loan
Management L.P. (Greywolf). This is Greywolf's second CLO in 2018,
which will bring its total CLO assets under management to $2.22
billion.

The ratings reflects:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Greywolf CLO VII Ltd./Greywolf CLO VII LLC
  Class                  Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                    AAA (sf)              272.25
  A-2                    AA (sf)                69.75
  B (deferrable)         A (sf)                 27.00
  C (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)              27.00
  D (deferrable)         BB- (sf)               15.30
  Subordinated notes     NR                     44.00

  NR--Not rated.


GS MORTGAGE 2015-GC34: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust (GSMS) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2015-GC34.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sufficient Credit Enhancement to Offset Higher Loss Expectations:
The rating affirmations reflect sufficient credit enhancement to
the classes to offset Fitch's higher loss expectations. While the
majority of the pool continues to exhibit performance and
volatility consistent with issuance expectations, the increase in
loss expectations reflects the continued underperformance of
several of the Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs; 23.1% of pool).

As of the August 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has paid down by 1.5% to $835.4 million from
$848.4 million at issuance. The pool has experienced no realized
losses since issuance. Three loans (8.6% of pool) are full-term
interest only and 16 loans (49.7%) still have a partial
interest-only component during their remaining loan term, compared
to 62.5% of the original pool at issuance.

High Concentration of Fitch Loans of Concern: Fitch has designated
10 loans (23.1% of pool) as FLOCs, including four of the top 15
loans (16.4%), one of which is in special servicing (8.3%).

The largest FLOC, Hammons Hotel Portfolio (8.3%), which is the
third largest loan, transferred to special servicing in July 2016
due to the borrower and its parent company filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. However, the loan remains current, and the collateral
hotels have continued to demonstrate stable performance trends
since issuance. The second largest FLOC, Bluejay Grocery Portfolio
(3.3%), is a portfolio of four single tenant grocery stores located
in secondary and tertiary markets in Wisconsin, Indiana and New
York. Two of the collateral grocery stores (Marsh Kokomo in Kokomo,
IN and Copps Madison in Madison, WI) closed in 2017, reducing total
physical portfolio occupancy to 48.9% as of May 2018 from 100% at
issuance. The portfolio also has exposure to the recent bankruptcy
filing of Tops Markets, LLC, which occupies the Tops Lockport store
in Lockport, NY.

The third largest FLOC, Woodlands Corporate Center and 7049
Williams Road Portfolio (2.8%), a portfolio of eight office/flex
properties located in suburban Buffalo, NY, experienced declining
occupancy after several tenants vacated at lease expiration in 2016
and 2017 and faces the possible rollover of its largest and third
largest tenants in the first half of 2019. The fourth largest FLOC,
Regalia Mansfield/Dolce (2%), a multifamily property in Mansfield,
TX, has been negatively impacted by the new construction of three
multifamily properties nearby.

The other FLOCs outside of the top 15 (7.9%) include a portfolio of
three Hyatt-flagged hotel properties in Austin, San Antonio and
Dallas, TX (Hyatt Place Texas Portfolio; 1.6%) with performance
declines following the completion of renovations at each of the
properties in early 2017; a multifamily property in Southfield, MI
(Carnegie Park; 1.5%) that suffered performance declines following
fire damage to 40 of the 176 units in February 2017; an office
property in Blue Ash, OH (Pfeiffer Woods; 1.3%) with substantial
performance declines following the departure of two major tenants
totaling approximately 55% of the total NRA between December 2016
and March 2017; a Manhattan office property (222 East 59th Street;
0.9%) that has yet to provide 2017 financials; a retail center in
Albuquerque, NM (Coors Central Shopping Center; 0.8%) with exposure
to National Stores, Inc., which recently filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy and is the parent company of the property's largest
tenant, Fallas Paredes; and a multifamily property in Columbus, OH
(Canterbury Apartments; 0.7%) with performance declines due to
decreased occupancy and higher operating expenses since issuance.

Pool and Loan Concentrations: The top 10 loans comprise 55.7% of
the current pool by balance. Loans secured by office and retail
properties represent 24.5% and 23.1% of the pool, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Rating Outlooks for classes E and F reflect potential
rating downgrades due to the high concentration of FLOCs, several
of which have experienced further performance declines since
Fitch's last rating action in September 2017 (particularly the
Pfeiffer Woods loan). Downgrades are possible if the performance of
the FLOCs continues to decline. The Rating Outlooks for classes A-1
through D and the interest-only classes X-A, X-B and X-D remain
Stable due to relatively stable performance of the majority of the
pool and expected continued paydown. Rating upgrades may occur with
improved pool performance and additional paydown or defeasance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $17.3 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $185 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $284.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.4 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $621.2 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48.8 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40.3 million** class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48.8 million** class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 million** class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.4 million** class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52 million* class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.3 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $8.5 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative.

Notional amount and interest-only.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEZ
certificates, and class PEZ certificates may be exchanged for class
A-S, B, and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class G certificates.


JP MORGAN 2018-8: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-8 (the Certificates) issued
by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-8 as follows:

-- $939.0 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $939.0 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $879.1 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $879.1 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $659.3 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $659.3 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $219.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $219.8 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $175.8 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $175.8 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.0 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.0 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $59.9 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $59.9 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $520.0 million Class A-15 at AAA (sf)
-- $520.0 million Class A-16 at AAA (sf)
-- $139.4 million Class A-17 at AAA (sf)
-- $139.4 million Class A-18 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-19 at AAA (sf)
-- $359.1 million Class A-20 at AAA (sf)
-- $939.0 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $939.0 million Class A-X-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $879.1 million Class A-X-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $659.3 million Class A-X-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $219.8 million Class A-X-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $175.8 million Class A-X-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $44.0 million Class A-X-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $59.9 million Class A-X-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $520.0 million Class A-X-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $139.4 million Class A-X-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $17.5 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $11.5 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $7.0 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $3.0 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-X-1, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4, A-X-5, A-X-6, A-X-7, A-X-8,
A-X-9 and A-X-10 are interest-only notes. The class balances
represent notional amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-11, A-13,
A-15, A-17, A-19, A-20, A-X-2, A-X-3, A-X-4 and A-X-5 are
exchangeable certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a
combination of depositable certificates, as specified in the
offering documents.

Classes A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-15,
A-16, A-17, A-18, A-19 and A-20 are super-senior certificates.
These classes benefit from additional protection from the senior
support certificate (Classes A-13 and A-14) with respect to loss
allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.00% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.40%, 2.65%, 1.50%, 0.80% and 0.50% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

The Certificates are backed by 1,874 loans with a total principal
balance of $998,971,305 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 1, 2018).

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs)
with original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years.
Approximately 65.0% of the loans in the pool are conforming
mortgage loans originated by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, National
Association (JPMCB), AmeriHome Mortgage Company (AmeriHome) and
loanDepot.com LLC (loanDepot), which were eligible for purchase by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. For conforming loans, JPMCB generally
delegates underwriting authority to correspondent lenders and does
not subsequently review those loans. Details on the underwriting of
conforming loans can be found in the Key Probability of Default
Drivers section of the related rating report.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are JPMCB (53.9%),
AmeriHome (15.1%), loanDepot (8.1%) and various other originators,
each comprising less than 5.0% of the mortgage loans. Approximately
3.7% of the loans sold to the mortgage loan seller were acquired by
MAXEX Clearing LLC (MaxEx), which purchased loans from the related
originators or an unaffiliated third party that directly or
indirectly purchased such loans from the related originators.

The loans will be serviced or sub-serviced by JPMCB (53.9%), Cenlar
FSB (23.1%), New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a Shell point Mortgage
Servicing (18.8%) and various other servicers, each comprising less
than 5.0% of the mortgage loans.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo; rated AA by DBRS) will act as
the Master Servicer and Securities Administrator. Wells Fargo and
JPMCB will act as the Custodians. U.S. Bank Trust National
Association will serve as Delaware Trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance
LLC will serve as the Representations and Warranties (R&W)
Reviewer.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate shifting-interest cash
flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and a
satisfactory third-party due diligence review.

This transaction employs an R&W framework that contains certain
weaknesses, such as materiality factors, some unrated R&W
providers, knowledge qualifiers and sunset provisions that allow
for certain R&Ws to expire within three to six years after the
Closing Date. The framework is perceived by DBRS to be limiting
compared with traditional lifetime R&W standards in certain
DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the perceived weaknesses in
the R&W framework, DBRS reduced the originator scores in this pool.
A lower originator score results in increased default and loss
assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


MORGAN STANLEY 2001-TOP3: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Capital I Trust (MSDW) commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates series 2001-TOP3.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Loss expectations remain unchanged since
Fitch's last rating action. The affirmation of class E reflects the
pool concentration and the collateral quality of the remaining
loans. The composition of the pool is unchanged since Fitch's last
rating action.

Slight Increase in Credit Enhancement: As of the August 2018
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
reduced by 98.4% to $16.9 million from $1.03 billion at issuance.
The credit enhancement to class E has increased slightly as a
result of scheduled amortization since Fitch's last rating action.
Per the servicer reporting, three loans (15.5% of the pool) are
defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting classes G
through N.

Pool Concentration: There are only 10 loans remaining. The largest
three loans make up 69.9% of the pool, and 71.9% of pool is secured
by retail properties. Approximately 99% of the pool matures in
2021. The largest loan in the pool (27.4%) is secured by a 56,963
square foot retail property in Belle Harbor, NY. The property was
previously 100% occupied by A&P (Waldbaum's), but is now leased to
Stop & Shop through May 2021 (co-terminus with the loan's
maturity). The year-end 2017 debt service coverage ratio was
reported to be 1.45x.

Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs): There are two FLOCs (42.5%), both
of which are secured by vacant single-tenant grocery stores. The
largest FLOC is secured by a 56,777 square-foot (sf) property
located in Indianapolis, IN. The subject was formerly 100% occupied
by Marsh Supermarket, but the tenant filed for bankruptcy in May
2017 and has since vacated. The borrower is in the process of
finding a replacement tenant. The second largest FLOC is secured by
a 48,119 sf retail property formerly occupied by Kash n' Kary,
which went dark in 2013 but continues to pay rent through 2020.

The remainder of the non-defeased collateral primarily consists of
retail and self-storage properties located in secondary and
tertiary markets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

No further upgrades to class E are likely without significant
defeasance or paydown. The rating of class E has been capped at
'BBsf' due to the quality of the remaining collateral and the
concentrated nature of the pool. Class E could be subject to
downgrade should loans fail to repay at maturity and transfer to
special servicing. Class E could be upgraded with significant
paydown or defeasance. The remaining classes have realized losses
and will remain at 'Dsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $12.1 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $7.1 million class F at 'Dsf'; RE 50%;

  -- $0 class G at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class H at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class J at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class K at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class L at 'Dsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $0 class M at 'Dsf'; RE 0%.

The class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C, D and X-2 certificates have
paid in full. Fitch does not rate the class N certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-1
certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2018-BOP: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of the Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2018-BOP issued by Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2018-BOP:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-CP at A (sf)
-- Class X-EXT at A (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Class X-CP and Class X-EXT balances are notional. Class X-CP
will be equal to the B-2 portion of the Class B certificates, the
C-2 portion of the Class C certificates and the D-2 portion of the
Class D certificates. Class X-EXT will be equal to the Class B,
Class C and Class D certificates.

The subject loan is secured by the fee-simple interest in a
portfolio of 12 suburban office properties comprising nearly 1.8
million square feet (sf) of suburban office space located in four
different states on the east coast of the United States. Nine
properties within the portfolio (81.7% of the net rentable area
(NRA); 82.6% of the loan) are primarily concentrated in the
Washington, D.C. metro area, which is composed of the District of
Columbia, Northern Virginia (two properties) and suburban Maryland
(seven properties), and total 1.3 million sf (81.0% of DBRS Base
Rent). The three remaining portfolio properties are located in
Florida (two properties) and Georgia (one property) and total
330,907 sf in the Orlando (13.5% of DBRS Base Rent) and Atlanta
(5.5% of DBRS Base Rent) metro areas. Built between 1970 and 2007,
the portfolio properties are positioned in markets that are
beginning to benefit from an expansion away from government demand,
which has steadily been generated by diverse thriving local
economies. Moreover, the portfolio benefits from tenant diversity
across the government, legal, technology, health-care, financial
services, education and research and development sectors as
evidenced by its granular rent roll. Although none of the subject
properties are centered in what DBRS would consider urban markets,
these assets are generally located within dense suburban markets
that benefit from favorable vehicular accessibility, public
transportation availability and favorable proximity to their
respective central business districts.

The loan is sponsored by Brookfield Strategic Real Estate Partners
II (BSREP II), a large-scale global real estate opportunity fund
with $9.0 billion of committed capital to invest in a diversified
portfolio of high-quality assets in North America, Europe,
Australia, Brazil and other select markets. BSREP II is the second
private fund investment vehicle of its kind created by the
owner-operator, Brookfield Property Partners (NYSE: BPY; TSX:
BPY.UN) (Brookfield). Brookfield is a global real estate company
that invests in and operates best-in-class office, retail,
industrial, multifamily, hospitality, triple-net lease, and
self-storage and student-housing assets. Brookfield's entire
commercial real estate portfolio exceeds 260 assets and 129 million
sf worldwide with a weighted-average (WA) occupancy of 92.3%. The
Brookfield Properties office portfolio maintains an interest in 147
properties in gateway markets around the globe in downtown cores
and select suburban markets that include New York, Washington,
D.C., Houston, Los Angeles, Toronto, Calgary, Ottawa, London,
Berlin, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth, making Brookfield the global
leader in the ownership and management of office property.
Brookfield is led by Richard Clark, Senior Managing Partner and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Mr. Clark has been with Brookfield
and its predecessors since 1984 and is a key player in the global
commercial property landscape. Since his appointment to the
leadership role of CEO in 2009, Mr. Clark has grown Brookfield's
market value to $16 billion from $8 billion.

Brookfield acquired the portfolio through two separate
transactions: the WRIT Montgomery County Portfolio in 2016 for
$234.1 million and the TA Realty Portfolio in 2017 for an allocated
purchase price of $107 million. The WRIT Montgomery Portfolio
comprises the Wayne Plaza, 6110 Executive Blvd, Jefferson Plaza,
West Gude Office Park, One Metro Square and One Central Plaza
properties. The TA Realty Portfolio comprises the University
Corporate Center I, University Corporate Center III, Winward
Concourse, Montrose Metro I, Arlington Square and Prince Street
Plaza properties. The Sponsor has already invested a total of $8.6
million into select properties to improve their competitive
position and to stabilize below-market level occupancy. As an
example, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service occupied
100.0% of Arlington Square prior to relocating in 2014. Since
acquiring the property in 2017 and after the previous owner
renovated the lobby into an open two-story design, the sponsor has
already invested an additional $2.3 million into the property to
attract new tenants with above-market rents. These efforts have
increased occupancy to 30.7% from 0.0%.

As of June 27, 2018, the portfolio reported occupancy of 79.9%,
which equates to approximately 379,763 sf available for
lease. Much of the portfolio's stable performance is attributable
to its highly granular rent roll with more than 240 tenants, none
of which accounts for more than 3.4% of the total NRA. The
portfolio's largest six tenants, representing a combined 16.2% of
the NRA and 14.8% of the DBRS Base Rent, include many large
corporations, foundations, defense contractors and government
entities such as Bank of America, N.A.; Siemens Real Estate
Corporation; The Henry M. Jackson Foundation; Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc.; Northrup Grumman Space & Mission Systems; Montgomery
County, Maryland; and IQ Solutions, Inc. There are five
investment-grade tenants that lease 252,269 sf (14.0% of the NRA)
across the entire portfolio and generate 11.6% of the DBRS Base
Rent.

Total debt proceeds of $278.4 million ($155 psf) were used to pay
off $259.4 million ($144 psf) of existing debt, fund
upfront reserves of approximately $8.3 million and cover roughly
$9.5 million in closing costs. Upfront reserves included $4.7
million for existing tenant improvement/leasing commission
obligations, $1.1 million for upfront real estate tax reserves and
$2.6 million for existing free rent obligations as well as deferred
maintenance, insurance, environmental and replacement reserves. The
Mortgage Loan Amount is $223.4 million and is secured by the
Borrowers' fee-simple interest and first-lien position in the
12-property suburban office portfolio. The interest-only (IO)
payments due on the Mortgage Loan are based on a floating-rate
one-month LIBOR, plus a 157 basis-point (bps) spread, capped at
4.5% for a two-year term, plus three one-year successive extension
options. Coterminous with the Mortgage Loan are two Mezzanine
Loans: a $30 million Senior Mezzanine Loan that accrues interest at
a rate of one-month LIBOR, plus a 400 bps spread and a $25 million
Junior Mezzanine Loan that accrues interest at a rate of one-month
LIBOR, plus a 510 bps spread, totaling $55 million. Newman Knight
Frank has determined the as-is value of the portfolio to be $361.6
million ($201 psf), based on a direct capitalization method using a
WA cap rate of 8.44%. The DBRS value is substantially lower at
$283.9 million ($158 psf) and was calculated by applying a WA cap
rate of 9.0% to the DBRS net cash flow, resulting in a DBRS
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 78.7% on the mortgage debt, which is
indicative of modest-leverage financing. However, the DBRS LTV
inclusive of all mezzanine debt is much higher at 98.1%.

Classes X-CP and X-EXT are IO certificates that reference a single
rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the
lowest-rated applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted
upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.


MSC 2011-C3: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class G Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings of all classes of Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C3 issued by MSC
2011-C3 Mortgage Trust as follows:

-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-J at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AAA (sf)
-- Class C at AA (sf)
-- Class D at A (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (sf)
-- Class F at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-B at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class G at B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction since issuance, when the collateral consisted of 63
fixed-rate loans secured by 76 properties, with an original trust
balance of $1.5 billion. As of the July 2018 remittance, 44 loans
remain in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of $905.0
million, representing a collateral reduction of 39.4% since
issuance due to scheduled loan amortization and loan repayments.

As of the July 2018 remittance, approximately 93.2% of the pool
reported YE2017 financials, with a weighted-average (WA) debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and debt yield of 1.86 times (x) and
13.4%, respectively, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR and DBRS
Debt Yield figures at issuance of 1.70x and 10.8%, respectively. In
addition to the overall improved credit metrics for the underlying
loans, the pool also benefits from defeasance, as three loans
collectively representing 1.5% of the pool have been fully defeased
as of the July 2018 remittance. Two loans, representing 15.6% of
the current pool, mature in 2019 and reported a WA exit debt yield
of 16.3%, as based on the most recent year-end cash flows for each.
In addition, the largest loans in the pool are performing quite
well. Per the YE2017 financials, the top 15 loans, which
collectively represent 52.8% of the pool, reported a WA DSCR of
1.91x, compared with the WA DBRS Term DSCR at issuance of 1.55x,
representing net cash flow (NCF) growth of 26.2% over DBRS NCF
figures derived at issuance.

According to the July 2018 remittance, there are four loans,
representing 13.2% of the pool, on the servicer's watch list
(including the largest loan in the pool) and no loans in special
servicing. The largest loan, Park City Center (Prospectus ID#1,
10.3% of the pool), is secured by a regional mall in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania (owned and operated by GGP), and was added to the
servicer's watch list in April 2018 because anchor tenant Bon-Ton
(14.7% of the net rentable area) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
and, as of July 2018, is in the process of closing the store as
part of the chain's liquidation. This loan also matures in June
2019 and does have some refinance risk due to its secondary
location and high concentration of anchor tenants reporting
declining sales; however, in-place cash flows have been quite
strong for the life of the loan, with the most recent full-year
reporting showing a YE2017 DSCR of 2.47x and an implied exit debt
yield of 16.9%. The pool has significant exposure to higher-risk
enclosed malls, as three loans, representing 23.4% of the pool, are
secured by regional malls in secondary markets. Belden Village
(Prospectus ID#2, 6.7% of the pool) and Oxmoor Center (Prospectus
ID#3, 6.3% of the pool) both mature in 2021 and currently report
strong refinance metrics and benefit from low leverage. For
additional information on all three of these malls, please see the
loan commentary on the DBRS Viewpoint platform for which
information is provided below.

At issuance, DBRS shadow-rated Washington Tower (Prospectus ID#13,
4.3% of the pool) and 420 East 72nd Street Coop (Prospectus ID#33,
1.2% of the pool) investment grade. DBRS confirmed that the
performance of these loans remains consistent with investment-grade
characteristics. Park City Center was also shadow-rated investment
grade at issuance, but DBRS has removed the shadow rating with this
review to reflect a more conservative scenario, given the anchor
tenant's departure near the 2019 maturity date.

Classes X-A and X-B are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable reference obligation
tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

The ratings assigned to Classes D, E, F and G materially deviate
from the higher ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS
considers a material deviation to be a rating differential of three
or more notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied
by the quantitative results that is a substantial component of a
rating methodology. The deviations are warranted given uncertain
loan level event risk.


NEUBERGER BERMAN 29: S&P Gives (P)BB- Rating on $20MM Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Neuberger
Berman Loan Advisers CLO 29 Ltd.'s fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 5,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 29 Ltd.
  Class                Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)                305.000
  A-2                  AAA (sf)                 20.000
  B-1                  AA (sf)                  45.000
  B-2                  AA (sf)                   5.000
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                   40.000
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)                25.000
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)                 20.000
  Subordinated notes   NR                       48.875

  NR--Not rated.


NEW RESIDENTIAL 2018-3: DBRS Rates 10 Note Classes 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned new ratings to the following Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2018-3 (the Notes) issued by New Residential Mortgage
Loan Trust 2018-3 (NRMLT or the Trust):

-- $477.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A-IO at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A-1A at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A-1B at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A-1C at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A1-IOA at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A1-IOB at AAA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A1-IOC at AAA (sf)
-- $501.2 million Class A-2 at AA (sf)
-- $477.2 million Class A at AAA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B1-IO at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B-1A at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B-1B at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B-1C at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B-1D at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B1-IOA at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B1-IOB at AA (sf)
-- $24.0 million Class B1-IOC at AA (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B2-IO at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B-2A at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B-2B at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B-2C at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B-2D at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B2-IOA at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B2-IOB at A (sf)
-- $25.6 million Class B2-IOC at A (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B3-IO at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B-3A at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B-3B at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B-3C at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B-3D at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B3-IOA at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B3-IOB at BBB (sf)
-- $27.5 million Class B3-IOC at BBB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B-4A at BB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B-4B at BB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B-4C at BB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B4-IOA at BB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B4-IOB at BB (sf)
-- $25.3 million Class B4-IOC at BB (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B-5 at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B-5A at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B-5B at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B-5C at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B-5D at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B5-IOA at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B5-IOB at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B5-IOC at B (sf)
-- $20.5 million Class B5-IOD at B (sf)
-- $45.8 million Class B-7 at B (sf)

Classes A-IO, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, B1-IO, B1-IOA, B1-IOB,
B1-IOC, B2-IO, B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B3-IO, B3-IOA, B3-IOB,
B3-IOC, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B4-IOC, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B5-IOC and B5-IOD
are interest-only notes. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1A, A-1B, A-1C, A1-IOA, A1-IOB, A1-IOC, A-2, A, B-1A,
B-1B, B-1C, B-1D, B1-IOA, B1-IOB, B1-IOC, B-2A, B-2B, B-2C, B-2D,
B2-IOA, B2-IOB, B2-IOC, B-3A, B-3B, B-3C, B-3D, B3-IOA, B3-IOB,
B3-IOC, B-4A, B-4B, B-4C, B4-IOA, B4-IOB, B4-IOC, B-5A, B-5B, B-5C,
B-5D, B5-IOA, B5-IOB, B5-IOC, B5-IOD and B-7 are exchangeable
notes. These classes can be exchanged for combinations of initial
exchangeable notes as specified in the offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect the 24.45% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated Notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings reflect 20.65%,
16.60%, 12.25%, 8.25% and 5.00% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of seasoned
performing and re-performing first-lien residential mortgages. The
Notes are backed by 7,093 loans with a total principal balance of
$631,657,900 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 1, 2018).

All loans are significantly seasoned with a weighted-average (WA)
age of 179 months. As of the Cut-Off Date, 88.7% of the pool is
current, 10.2% is 30 days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) delinquency method and 1.1% is in bankruptcy (all
bankruptcy loans are performing or 30 days delinquent).
Approximately 61.2% and 69.1% of the mortgage loans have been zero
times 30 days delinquent (0 x 30) for the past 24 months and 12
months, respectively, under the MBA delinquency method. The
portfolio contains 53.9% modified loans. The modifications happened
more than two years ago for 75.4% of the modified loans. None of
the loans in the pool are subject to the Qualified Mortgage rules.

The Seller, NRZ Sponsor IX LLC (NRZ), acquired the loans prior to
the Closing Date in connection with the termination of various
securitization trusts. Upon acquiring the loans from the
securitization trusts, NRZ, through an affiliate, New Residential
Funding 2018-3 LLC (the Depositor), will contribute the loans to
the Trust. As the Sponsor, New Residential Investment Corp.,
through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and retain a 5%
eligible vertical interest in each class of securities to be issued
(other than the residual notes) to satisfy the credit risk
retention requirements under Section 15G of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. These loans
were originated and previously serviced by various entities through
purchases in the secondary market.

As of the Cut-Off Date, 38.3% of the pool is serviced by Nation
star Mortgage LLC (Nation star), 19.5% by Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, 18.1% by Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, 17.6% by Select
Portfolio Servicing LLC, 3.0% by New Penn Financial, LLC d/b/a
Shell point Mortgage Servicing (SMS), 2.4% by Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. and 1.0% by PNC Mortgage. Nation star will act as the Master
Servicer, and SMS will act as the Special Servicer.

The Seller will have the option to repurchase any loan that becomes
60 or more days delinquent under the MBA method or any real
estate-owned property acquired in respect of a mortgage loan at a
price equal to the principal balance of the loan (Optional
Repurchase Price), provided that such repurchases will be limited
to 10% of the principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the
Cut-Off Date.

Unlike other seasoned re-performing loan securitizations, the
Servicers in this transaction will advance principal and interest
on delinquent mortgages to the extent such advances are deemed
recoverable. The transaction employs a senior-subordinate,
shifting-interest cash flow structure that is enhanced from a
pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include underlying
assets that have significant seasoning, relatively clean payment
histories and robust loan attributes with respect to credit scores,
product types and loan-to-value ratios. Additionally, historical
NRMLT securitizations have exhibited fast voluntary prepayment
rates.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes an unrated representation
provider (NRZ), certain knowledge qualifiers and fewer mortgage
loan representations relative to DBRS criteria for seasoned pools.

Satisfactory third-party due diligence was performed on the pool
for regulatory compliance, title/lien, payment history and data
integrity. Updated Home Data Index and/or broker price opinions
were provided for the pool; however, reconciliation was not
performed on the updated values.

Certain loans have missing assignments or endorsements as of the
Closing Date. Given the relatively clean performance history of the
mortgages and the operational capability of the servicers, DBRS
believes the risk of impeding or delaying foreclosure is remote.


PREFERRED TERM XXVIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on C-1 Notes to B3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Preferred Term Securities XXVIII, Ltd.:

US$191,000,000 Floating Rate Class A-1 Senior Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $130,772,864.67), Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

US$45,700,000 Floating Rate Class A-2 Senior Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $41,826,432.53), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Floating Rate Class C-1 Mezzanine Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $34,050,908.59), Upgraded to B2 (sf);
previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

US$8,000,000 Fixed/Floating Rate Class C-2 Mezzanine Notes Due
March 22, 2038 (current balance of $7,566,869.07), Upgraded to B2
(sf); previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating on the following notes:

US$44,400,000 Floating Rate Class B Mezzanine Notes Due March 22,
2038 (current balance of $40,636,621.52), Affirmed Baa3 (sf);
previously on May 14, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Preferred Term Securities XXVIII, Ltd., issued in November 2007, is
a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily the result of the deleveraging of
the notes and the increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization (OC) ratios since August 2017. The Class A-1
notes have paid down by approximately 7.7% or $10.9 million since
August 2017, using principal proceeds from the redemption of
underlying assets and the diversion of excess interest proceeds.
The Class A-2, Class B, Class C-1 and Class C-2 notes paid down by
1.2% each, or $0.5 million, $0.5 million, $0.4 million and $0.1
million respectively, due to diversion of excess interests through
the failure of the Class D OC test (reported at 98.3% versus a
trigger of 104.0% on the June 2018 trustee report). Based on
Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-1, Class A-2,
Class B and Class C notes have improved to 211.85%, 160.51%,
129.92%, and 108.71%, respectively, from August 2017 levels of
200.4%, 154.4%, 126.2%, 106.3%, respectively.

The upgrades were tempered by the deterioration of the credit
quality of the underlying portfolio. Based on Moody's calculations,
the weighted average rating factor (WARF) declined to 1089, from
735 in August 2017.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs," published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings, as described:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. Moody's has a stable outlook on the US banking and
insurance sectors.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's current
expectations could have a positive impact on the transaction's
performance. Conversely, asset credit performance weaker than
Moody's current expectations could have adverse consequences on the
transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and excess
interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note repayments
that are faster than Moody's current expectations could have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning with the notes
with the highest payment priority.

4) Resumption of interest payments by deferring assets: A number of
banks have resumed making interest payments on their TruPS. The
timing and amount of deferral cures could have significant positive
impact on the transaction's over-collateralization ratios and the
ratings on the notes.

5) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a large
number of securities whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc™ or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional uncertainties.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDOROM™ to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par of $277.0 million,
defaulted and deferring par of $44.5 million, a weighted average
default probability of 11.7% (implying a WARF of 1089), and a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly models,
qualitative factors are part of rating committee considerations.
Moody's considers the structural protections in the transaction,
the risk of an event of default, recent deal performance under
current market conditions, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, inputs from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding
the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can
influence the final rating decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly TruPS issued by small to
medium sized U.S. community banks and insurance companies that
Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the credit quality of
bank TruPS that do not have public ratings, Moody's uses
RiskCalc™, an econometric model developed by Moody's Analytics,
to derive credit scores. Moody's evaluation of the credit risk of
most of the bank obligors in the pool relies on the latest FDIC
financial data. For insurance TruPS that do not have public
ratings, Moody's relies on the assessment of its Insurance team,
based on the credit analysis of the underlying insurance firms'
annual statutory financial reports.


SILVER SPRING: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on $20.7MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Silver Spring CLO Ltd.:

US$36,900,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 15, 2026, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 17, 2017
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes Due
October 15, 2026, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on July 17, 2017
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$10,000,000 Class C-1-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes Due October 15, 2026, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July
17, 2017 Assigned A3 (sf)

US$11,100,000 Class C-2-R Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes Due October 15, 2026, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on July
17, 2017 Assigned A3 (sf)

US$22,700,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due October 15, 2026, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on February
22, 2016 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

US$256,049,320 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes Due
October 15, 2026, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on July 17, 2017
Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$20,700,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due October 15, 2026, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on February 22,
2016 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

US$4,100,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
Due October 15, 2026, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on February
22, 2016 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Silver Spring CLO Ltd., issued in September 2014, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed primarily by a
portfolio of senior secured loans. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in October 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These rating actions reflect the benefit of the limited period of
time remaining before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in
October 2018, and the expectation that deleveraging will commence
shortly. In addition, the deal has benefited from an improvement in
the credit quality of the portfolio. Based on the trustee's August
2018 report, the weighted average rating factor (WARF) is reported
at 2645, compared to 2888 in August 2017. Nevertheless, the
weighted average spread (WAS) and overcollateralization (OC) levels
have been deteriorating since August 2017. Based on the trustee's
August 2018 report, the. WAS and the Class E overcollateralization
have been reported at 3.15% and 104.63%, respectively, versus
3.41%, and 105.47% in August 2017, respectively.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade of
the ratings:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: CLO performance is subject to
uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy.

2) Collateral Manager: Performance can also be affected positively
or negatively by a) the manager's investment strategy and behavior
and b) differences in the legal interpretation of CLO documentation
by different transactional parties owing to embedded ambiguities.

3) Collateral credit risk: A shift towards collateral of better
credit quality, or better credit performance of assets
collateralizing the transaction than Moody's current expectations,
can lead to positive CLO performance. Conversely, a negative shift
in credit quality or performance of the collateral can have adverse
consequences for CLO performance.

4) Deleveraging: An important source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
proceeds will commence and at what pace. Deleveraging of the CLO
could accelerate owing to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the manager, which could have a
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Note repayments that are
faster than Moody's current expectations will usually have a
positive impact on CLO notes, beginning with those with the highest
payment priority.

5) Recovery of defaulted assets: Fluctuations in the market value
of defaulted assets could result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recovery
realization and whether the Manager decides to work out or sell
defaulted assets create additional uncertainty. Realization of
recoveries that are either materially higher or lower than assumed
in Moody's analysis would impact the CLO positively or negatively,
respectively.

6) Post-Reinvestment Period Trading: Subject to certain
requirements, the deal can reinvest certain proceeds after the end
of the reinvestment period, and as such the manager has the ability
to erode some of the collateral quality metrics to the covenant
levels. Such reinvestment could affect the transaction either
positively or negatively.

7) Weighted Average Spread (WAS): CLO performance can be sensitive
to WAS, which is a key factor driving the amount of excess spread
available as credit enhancement when a deal fails its
over-collateralization or interest coverage tests. A decrease in
excess spread makes it difficult for the deal to source assets of
appropriate credit quality in order to maintain its WAS target, and
reduces the effective credit enhancement available for the notes.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations."

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of $376,375,451, defaulted par of
$12,859,718, a weighted average default probability of 19.56%
(implying a WARF of 2553), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 48.37%, a diversity score of 76 and a weighted average
spread of 3.10% (before accounting for LIBOR floors).

Moody's incorporates the default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating on each CLO
liability reviewed. Moody's derives the default probability from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate for future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the
assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and the collateral manager's latitude for trading the
collateral are also factors.


STWD MORTGAGE 2018-URB: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by STWD 2018-URB Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-URB:

Cl. A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Cl. X*, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

Reflects interest-only class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to a portfolio of 10
full-service hotel properties. Its ratings are based on the credit
quality of the loans and the strength of the securitization
structure.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $225,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 117.2%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 1.85X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.02X.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's weighted
average property quality grade is 2.52.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: portfolio diversity,
strong markets, multiple property pooling, capital investment, and
brand affiliation.

Notable concerns of the transaction include: transitional nature of
six of the ten properties, volatile asset class, age of the
properties, subordinate debt, and lack of amortization.

The principal methodology used in rating STWD 2018-URB Mortgage
Trust, Cl. A, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, and Cl. F was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating STWD
2018-URB Mortgage Trust, Cl. X were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July
2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from its
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


TOWD POINT 2017-5: Moody's Hikes Class B2 Debt Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 6 tranches
issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-5. The transaction is
backed by seasoned performing and re-performing mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-5

Cl. A2, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2017 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are driven by the strong performance of the
underlying loans in the pool. The actions reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on the pool, which incorporate its assessment of
the weak representations and warranties framework of the
transaction, the due diligence findings of the third party review
received at the time of issuance, and the strength of Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. as the transaction's servicer.

The loans underlying the pool have prepaid at a faster rate than
originally anticipated, resulting in an improvement in its future
loss projection on the pool. Moreover, cumulative losses realized
on the pool till date have been small. Moody's bases its expected
losses on a pool of re-performing mortgage loans on its estimates
of 1) the default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and 2)
the principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. Its
estimates of defaults are driven by annual delinquency assumptions
adjusted for roll-rates, prepayments and default burnout factors.
In estimating defaults on the pool, Moody's used an initial
expected annual delinquency rate of 4% and an expected prepayment
rate of 11% based on the collateral characteristics of the pool.

The rating upgrades further reflect the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds, owing to the sequential pay
structure of the transaction. The upgrade of the exchangeable
certificate, Cl. A4, reflects the upgraded ratings of its related
bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non- Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016, and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in July 2018 from 4.3% in July
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


TOWD POINT: Moody's Takes Action on $783.9MM RMBS Issued 2015-2016
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 40 tranches
from 5 RMBS transactions issued by Towd Point Mortgage Trust. The
transactions are backed by seasoned performing and re-performing
mortgage loans with a large percentage of the loans previously
modified.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-1

Cl. A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. AE4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AE5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AE6, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. AE7, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. AE8, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. AE9, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. AE10, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A1 (sf)

Cl. AE11, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa1 (sf)

Cl. AE12, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AE13, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. AE14, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2

Cl. 1-B1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. 1-B2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A3 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-5

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B3, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6

Cl. A4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4B, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A4C, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B1, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. B2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M1A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Cl. M2A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Issuer: Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3

Cl. B1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M1A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M1B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. M2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Cl. M2A, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

Cl. M2B, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2017 Assigned
A2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades are driven by the strong performance of the
underlying loans in the pools. The actions reflect Moody's updated
loss expectations on the pool, which incorporate its assessment of
the weak representations and warranties frameworks of the
transactions, the due diligence findings of the third party review
received at the time of issuance, and the strength of Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. as the transaction's servicer.

The loans underlying the pools have fewer delinquencies and have
prepaid at faster rates than originally anticipated, resulting in
an improvement in its future loss projections on the pools.
Moreover, cumulative losses realized on the pools till date have
been small and are largely driven by modification losses recognized
on principal forborne amounts. Moody's bases its expected losses on
a pool of re-performing mortgage loans on its estimates of 1) the
default rate on the remaining balance of the loans and 2) the
principal recovery rate on the defaulted balances. Its estimates of
defaults are driven by annual delinquency assumptions adjusted for
roll-rates, prepayments and default burnout factors. In estimating
defaults on these pools, Moody's used initial expected annual
delinquency rates of 6% to 8% and expected prepayment rates of 6%
to 8% based on the collateral characteristics of the individual
pools.

The rating upgrades further reflect the increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds, owing to the sequential pay
structure of the transactions. The upgrades of the exchangeable
certificates reflect the upgraded ratings of their related bonds.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans" published in August 2016 and "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in July 2018 from 4.3% in July
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


VOYA CLO 2013-3: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on E-RR Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A-1-RR, A-2-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-RR, and E-RR replacement notes from
Voya CLO 2013-3 Ltd., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in December 2013 that is managed by Voya
Alternative Asset Management LLC. The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Aug. 31,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

S&P said, "On the Sept. 20, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds
from the issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem
the original notes. At that time, we anticipate withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Issue the replacement class A-1-RR, A-2-RR, B-RR, and C-RR
notes at a lower spread than the original notes.

-- Issue the replacement class D-RR and E-RR notes at a higher
spread than the original notes.

-- Change the rated par amount and aggregate ramp-up par amount to
$394.25 million and $421.60 million from $475.20 million and
$500.00 million, respectively.

-- Extend the reinvestment period to Oct. 18, 2023, from Jan. 18,
2018.

-- Extend the non-call period to Oct. 18, 2020, from Jan. 18,
2016.

-- Extend the weighted average life test to nine years from the
Sept. 20, 2018, refinancing date, from Dec. 12, 2021.

-- Extend the legal final maturity date on the rated and
subordinated notes to Oct. 18, 2031, from Jan. 18, 2026.

-- Adopt the use of the non-model version of CDO Monitor for this
transaction. During the reinvestment period, the non-model version
of CDO Monitor may be used to indicate whether changes to the
collateral portfolio are generally consistent with the transaction
parameters we assumed when initially assigning ratings to the
notes.

-- Change the required minimum thresholds for the coverage tests.

-- Incorporate the recovery rate methodology and updated industry
classifications outlined in S&P's CLO criteria update published
Aug. 8, 2016.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
    
  Voya CLO 2013-3 Ltd.

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A-1-RR                    AAA (sf)             262.00
  A-2-RR                    AA (sf)               59.50
  B-RR                      A (sf)                25.25
  C-RR                      BBB- (sf)             25.25
  D-RR                      BB- (sf)              10.00
  E-RR                      B- (sf)               12.25
  Subordinated notes        NR                    67.60

  NR--Not rated.


WELLS FARGO 2015-NXS4: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class X-F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 18 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust Pass-Through Certificates series 2015-NXS4 (WFCM
2015-NXS4).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Loss Expectations: Overall, the pool continues to exhibit generally
stable performance consistent with issuance expectations. However,
Fitch applied a sensitivity analysis to the largest loan, One Court
Square (9.2%), due to concerns with lease rollover. The loan is
collateralized by a single-tenant office property located in Long
Island City, NY. Citibank currently leases all 1.4 million square
feet (sf) of space in the building; however, Citi will be reducing
their footprint by 1 million-sf (70% of net rentable area (NRA)) at
lease-end in May of 2020, months before the loan matures in
September. Per the borrower, the space is currently being marketed
and preliminary discussions have begun with several tenants. The
Negative Outlooks for classes G and X-G reflects the sensitivity
analysis for this loan due to possibility of outsized losses given
the near term lease rollover of Citibank.

As of the August 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 1.5% to $763.1 million from
$774.5 million at issuance. Per the servicer reporting, one loan
(1.6% of the pool) is defeased. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class H. There are currently nine loans (15.48% of the
pool) on the servicer's watchlist, however, only four loans
(11.6%), including one specially serviced loan, are considered
Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC). The largest FLOC is the
aforementioned One Court Square loan. The specially serviced loan
(0.9%) is secured by a 54,972-sf retail property located in Hazlet,
NJ that was previously 78% occupied by Sports Authority. The loan
transferred to the special servicer in November 2016 and
foreclosure is expected to take place in September 2018.

Minimal Changes to Credit Enhancement: The pool has paid down by
1.46% resulting in minimal increases in credit enhancement to the
senior classes. Five of the largest 10 loans, representing 27.8% of
the pool, are full-term interest-only loans. In total, there are
nine full-term interest-only loans representing 31.9% of the pool.
Additionally, there are 19 loans representing 31.48% of the pool
that remain in their partial interest-only period. Based on the
scheduled balance at maturity, the pool will pay down 9.8%, which
is lower than the 2015 and 2014 averages of 12.3% and 12.0%,
respectively.

Pool Concentrations: Compared to other 2015 vintage transactions,
the deal has higher concentration in retail, hotel, and
single-tenant properties. Retail concentration is currently 30.4%
of the pool. Loans collateralized by hotel properties represent
18.4% of the pool and 24% of the pool is securitized by
single-tenant properties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks assigned to classes G and the interest-only
class X-G reflect concerns over the largest loan in the pool, One
Court Square. A downgrade to these classes is possible if a
replacement tenant (or tenants) cannot be found and the loan
becomes delinquent. Conversely, the Outlooks could be revised back
to Stable with positive leasing momentum. The Outlooks on classes
A-1 through F and X-A through X-F remain stable due to the
relatively stable performance of the pool and the continued
paydown.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch affirms the following classes and revises Rating Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $8.7 million class G at 'B-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $8.7 million class X-G at 'B-sf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

Fitch affirms the following classes as indicated:

  -- $12.2 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.8 million class A-2A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.8 million class A-2B at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $100 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $238.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $40.7 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.5 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37.8 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.2 million class D at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.4 million class E at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.4 million class F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $571.4 million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.5 million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.5 million class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.4 million class X-F at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch does not rate the class X-H and class H certificates.


WFRBS 2013-C18: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Certs
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the ratings on the following classes of the
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-C18 (the
Certificates), issued by WFRBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2013-C18
as follows:

-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class PEX at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)

In addition, DBRS changed the trends to Negative on the Class F and
Class E certificates. All other trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance
exhibited since issuance, with Negative trends assigned to the two
junior classes listed above to reflect DBRS's concerns surrounding
two top-ten loans in Hotel Felix Chicago (Prospectus ID #5, 6.6% of
the pool) and Cedar Rapids Office Portfolio (Prospectus ID #9, 2.3%
of the pool), both of which are in special servicing. In addition,
a third loan in the top ten, HIE at Magnificent Mile (Prospectus ID
#10, 2.3% of the pool), has recently suffered from significant
cash-flow declines at the property.

At issuance, the collateral consisted of 67 fixed-rate loans,
secured by 73 commercial properties, with an original trust balance
of $1,038 million. As of the July 2018 remittance, 66 loans remain
in the pool with an aggregate principal balance of $983 million,
representing a collateral reduction of 5.3% since issuance due to
the repayment of one loan and scheduled loan amortization. Per the
July 2017 remittance, approximately 95.4% of the pool reported
year-end (YE) 2017 financials, with a weighted-average (WA)
debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) and WA debt yield of 2.43 times
(x) and 12.9%, respectively. These figures compared with the WA
DBRS Term DSCR and WA DBRS Debt Yield at issuance of 2.14x and
11.3%, respectively. Despite the performance declines for the two
previously mentioned loans in special servicing, overall cash flow
growth has been healthy thanks to strong performers in the top 15,
which reported a WA net cash flow growth of 17.9% as of the YE2017
reporting, with a range of -92.0% and 62.7%. In addition, the pool
also benefits from defeasance, as three loans, collectively
representing 5.7% of the pool, have been fully defeased as of the
July 2018 remittance, with another defeased loan, Sullivan Center
(Prospectus ID #6, 4.0% of the pool), repaid with the recent August
2018 remittance.

As of the July 2018 remittance, there are two loans (7.2% of the
pool) in special servicing and 17 loans (12.0% of the pool) on the
servicer's watch list. Ten of the loans on the watch list are
secured by co-op properties, with a WA loan-to-value of 10.9%.

The largest of the loans in special servicing, Hotel Felix Chicago,
is secured by a 225-key, limited-service boutique hotel located in
the River North district of Chicago, Illinois. The loan transferred
to special servicing in April 2018 due to monetary default
following a decline in performance because of soft market
conditions with an oversupply of limited-service/boutique hotels,
paired with a significant increase in operating expenses, primarily
driven by increased real estate taxes. The loan has since entered
into a short-term forbearance agreement through the end of August
2018 and the special servicer is working with the sponsor to
determine a longer-term workout strategy. Given the performance
declines at the property and the disruption in performance for
hotels in the subject's vicinity, partially driven by ongoing road
construction, DBRS assumed a stressed scenario for this loan in the
analysis to inflate the probability of default.

The second loan in special servicing, Cedar Rapids Office
Portfolio, is secured by two cross-collateralized Class A office
buildings located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The loan was transferred
to special servicing in May 2017 after three technical defaults
were identified and the sponsor requested a loan modification in
response. The servicer has initiated foreclosure, but the process
is currently hung up in the courts, with a discovery period
scheduled through October 2018. Based on the February 2018
appraisal that showed an as-is value of $18.3 million, DBRS assumed
a loss severity in excess of 40.0% in the analysis for this
review.

At issuance, DBRS assigned an investment-grade shadow rating to two
loans: Westfield Garden State Plaza (Prospectus ID#1, 15.3% of the
pool) and The Outlet Collection – Jersey Gardens (Prospectus
ID#3, 14.2% of the pool). DBRS confirmed that the performance of
these loans remains consistent with the investment-grade loan
characteristics.

Class X-A is an interest-only (IO) certificate that references
multiple rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated
applicable reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one
notch if senior in the waterfall.

The rating assigned to Class B materially deviates from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviation is warranted given uncertain loan level
event risk.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C18: Fitch Rates Class F Certs 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes in WFRBS Commercial Mortgage
Trust series 2013-C18 commercial mortgage pass through certificates
and has revised the Outlook on two classes to Negative from
Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Fitch Ratings' loss expectations have
increased since the last rating action as a result of a new default
and ongoing concern over another loan in special servicing. Both
specially serviced loans are in the top 15. The larger of the two
is secured by a hotel in Chicago and has experienced performance
decline due to oversupply and increased expenses, which ultimately
led to default. The other specially serviced loan is secured by a
pair of office buildings in Cedar Rapids, IA. Another loan in the
top 15, which is not in default, is also a Fitch Loan of Concern
(FLOC) and is being monitored for performance decline. This loan is
also secured by a hotel in downtown Chicago and shares a common
sponsor with the larger of the two specially serviced loans.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Mitigating some of the concern
surrounding performance declines is the increased credit support to
the bonds. The pool has experienced 9.1% collateral reduction since
issuance, which has improved credit enhancement. The largest
contributor was the recent payoff of Sullivan Center, previously
the sixth largest loan with a securitized balance of $38.5 million.
The loan was defeased and paid out with the August 2018 remittance
ahead of its November 2018 scheduled maturity. Three other loans,
one of which is fully defeased, are scheduled to mature by YE2018.
These loans represent 5.7% of the pool and can contribute an
additional $53.9 million in principal paydown. The second largest
loan (14.8% of the pool) is scheduled to mature in 2020.

Retail and Hotel Concentration: The pool is concentrated by
property type, with retail properties representing 42.3% of the
underlying collateral and hotels representing an additional 22.1%.
Within the top 15, five loans are secured by retail centers,
including the two largest loans, which are secured by regional
malls and account for 30.7% of the pool balance. The performance of
these assets has been stable since issuance. An additional four
loans (17.9% of the pool) are secured by hotels, including one loan
in special servicing, and another loan that is considered a Fitch
Loan of Concern (FLOC). The performance of these hotels has
declined since issuance because of increased expenses and
over-saturated local markets, which has caused property revenues to
decline.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks for classes E and F were revised to Negative from
Stable due to an increase in Fitch's loss projections. One loan has
transferred to special servicing since the last rating action.
There are now two loans in special servicing, both of which are in
the top 15. Another top 15 loan is a FLOC because of a performance
decline, and shares sponsorship with the larger of the two
specially serviced loans. Improved credit enhancement helps to
mitigate the concern surrounding the recent performance declines.
However, additional defaults or continued performance issues could
result in downgrades to the bonds. Classes could see an upgraded
with marked improvement in asset-level performance, resolution of
specially serviced loans and continued paydown of the senior
bonds.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $57.7 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $140 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $170 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $201 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $63.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $70.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $702.5 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;


  -- $72.7 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 class PEZ at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable;

  -- $7.8 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook to Negative from
Stable.

Notional amount and interest only

The class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for class PEX
certificates, and vice versa. Fitch does not rate the class G
certificate.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on 6 Tranches From 4 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 5 tranches
and downgraded the rating of 1 tranche from 4 transactions issued
by multiple issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chase Funding Trust, Series 2002-2

Cl. IM-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 23, 2018
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. IA-5, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2012
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC1

Cl. S, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 2, 2017 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: MortgageIT Securities Corp., Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series
2005-4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 12, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Park Place Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ3

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2013 Affirmed
C (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
rating upgrades of Class M-2 of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors,
Inc. 2003-WMC1, and Class IM-1 and Class IA-5 of Chase Funding
Trust, Series 2002-2 are a result of the improving performance of
the related pools and/or an increase in credit enhancement
available to the bonds. The rating downgrade of Class S of Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC1, an interest-only tranche
(IO), reflects the reduction in balances of the referenced
securities to which this IO bond is linked.

The rating upgrades of Class M-6 of Park Place Securities, Inc.,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ3 and Class
A-1 of MortgageIT Trust 2005-4 primarily result from the improving
performance of their related pools and/or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds, and also reflect corrections to
the cash flow models previously used by Moody's in rating these
transactions. In prior rating actions for Class M-6 of Park Place
Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-WHQ3, the cash flow model did not properly allocate excess
spread to reimburse projected tranche losses. In prior rating
actions for Class A-1 of MortgageIT Trust 2005-4, the cash flow
modeling underestimated excess spread benefit, as the model
overestimated the tranche's accrued interest. These errors have now
been corrected, and the rating actions reflect these changes.

The principal methodology used in rating Chase Funding Trust,
Series 2002-2 Cl. IA-5 and Cl. IM-1, Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC1 Cl. M-2 , Park Place Securities, Inc.,
Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-WHQ3 Cl. M-6
and MortgageIT Securities Corp., Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series
2005-4 Cl. A-1 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
January 2017. The methodologies used in rating Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors, Inc. 2003-WMC1 Cl. S were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in July 2018 from 4.3% in July
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
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On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
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Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
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The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

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Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
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                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  
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