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         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, October 7, 2018, Vol. 22, No. 279

                            Headlines

AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Notes
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2018-10: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on E Notes
ATLAS SENIOR XII: S&P Rates $24.25MM Class E Notes 'BB-'
BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2016-SS1: S&P Affirms B- Rating in F Certs
BANK 2017-BNK7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs

BANK 2018-BNK14: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating on $26.2MM Class F Certs
BBCMS 2016-ETC: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certificates
BENCHMARK 2018-B6: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class J-RR Certs
BLUEMOUNTAIN 2018-3: S&P Assigns Prelim B- Rating on F Notes
CARLYLE US 2016-4: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D-R Notes

CATAMARAN CLO 2018-1: S&P Rates $19.25MM Class E Notes 'BB-'
CIFC FUNDING 2014-V: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F-R2 Notes
CIFC FUNDING 2018-IV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
CIM TRUST 2018-INV1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
CIM TRUST 2018-INV1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt

COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class K Debt to Caa1
COMM 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
COMM 2012-CCRE5: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class F Certs
COMM 2018-HCLV: S&P Rates $33.2MM Class F Certificates 'B-'
CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Cl. C Certs

CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C4: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class D Certs
CSAIL 2015-C1: Fitch Affirms BB Ratings on 2 Tranches
CSAIL 2017-CX9: Ftich Affirms BB- Ratings on 3 Tranches
CSMC TRUST 2018-RPL9: Fitch to Rates $13.8MM Class B-2 Notes 'B'
DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2018-3: S&P Rates $10.1MM Class B-2 Notes 'B'

DRYDEN 45: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $35.8MM Class E-R Notes
FINANCE OF AMERICA 2018-HB1: Moody's Rates Class M4 Debt '(P)Ba3'
FIRST INVESTORS: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on 2017-1 Cl. E Notes
FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-5: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
FREMF MORTGAGE 2012-KF01: Moody's Lowers Class X Debt Rating to B3

GE COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on 2 Tranches
GLS AUTO 2018-3: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on $30.24MM D Notes
GOLDENTREE LOAN IX: S&P Gives Prelim B-(sf) Rating on F-R-2 Notes
GREEN TREE 1994-03: Moody's Lowers Class B-2 Debt Rating to Ca
GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ9: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs

GS MORTGAGE 2018-3PCK: S&P Rates $18.9MM Class HRR Certs 'B+'
HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 5-2015: S&P Gives Prelim. B- Rating on F-RR Notes
JEFFERSON MILL: Moody's Rates $18.5MM Class E-R Notes 'Ba3'
JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Debt Classes
JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC18: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 5 Cert. Classes

JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Certs to Ba3
JP MORGAN 2014-C18: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on $19.2MM Cl. E Certs
JP MORGAN 2018-9: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
KEY COMMERCIAL 2018-S1: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Class E Certs
KKR CLO 23: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $28.7MM Class E Notes

LCM XVII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on $20MM Class E-R Notes
LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Note Classes
LNR CDO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 14 Tranches
MANITOULIN USD 2018-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class D Notes
MERRILL LYNCH 2003-D: Moody's Lowers Class B-2 Debt Rating to Caa3

MILL CITY 2018-3: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on Class B2 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Moody's Lowers Class X Debt Rating to B3
MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. L Debt
MORGAN STANLEY 2007-10XS: Moody's Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to C
MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C8: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs

MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C31: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
NEUBERGER BERMAN CLO 29: S&P Rates $20MM Class E Notes 'BB-'
OCTAGON INVESTMENT 39: Moody's Rates $12MM Class F Notes '(P)B3'
PRESTIGE AUTO 2018-1: S&P Rates $18.5MM Class E Notes 'BB'
PURCHASING POWER 2018-A: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on D Certs

RAIT CRE I: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-8: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to B-4 Debt
SLIDE 2018-FUN: S&P Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
STACR 2018-SPI3: Fitch Rates 2 Certificate Classes 'B+'
STWD 2018-URB: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Certs

TICP CLO XI: Moody's Rates $22.4MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
TOWD POINT 2018-5: Fitch Gives BB Rating on $25.9MM Class B1 Notes
UBS REAL 2012-C4: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on $25.5MM Class E Certs
UNISON GROUND 2013-1: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
VIBRANT CLO III: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $24MM D-RR Notes

VIBRANT CLO X: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $25.5MM Class D Notes
WELLFLEET CLO 2018-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Debt
WHITEHORSE LTD XII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $18MM Class E Notes
ZAIS CLO 1: S&P Assigns Prelim B- Rating on Class E-R Notes

[*] DBRS Reviews 966 Classes From 61 US RMBS Transactions
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $202MM Option ARM RMBS Issued 2004-2005
[*] Moody's Takes Action on $450.6MM RMBS Issued 2004-2007
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 90 Classes From 18 US RMBS Deals
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on Five CDO Transactions


                            *********

AMERICAN CREDIT 2018-3: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by American Credit Acceptance Receivables
Trust 2018-3 (ACAR 2018-3):

-- $102,200,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $30,800,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $47,600,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $32,200,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $25,200,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)
-- $18,200,000 Class F Notes rated B (sf)

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of overcollateralization,
subordination, amounts held in the reserve fund and excess spread.
Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
DBRS-projected expected cumulative net loss assumption under
various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested. For this transaction, the ratings address the
payment of timely interest on a monthly basis and the payment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

-- ACAR 2018-3 provides for Class A, B, C and D coverage multiples
that are slightly below the DBRS range of multiples set forth in
the criteria for this asset class. DBRS believes that this is
warranted, given the magnitude of expected loss and the structural
features of the transaction.

-- The capabilities of American Credit Acceptance, LLC (ACA) with
regard to originations, underwriting and servicing.

-- DBRS has performed an operational review of ACA and considers
the entity to be an acceptable originator and servicer of subprime
automobile loan contracts.

-- The ACA senior management team has considerable experience,
with an average of 18 years in banking, finance and auto finance
companies, as well as an average of approximately five years of
company tenure.

-- ACA has completed 23 securitizations since 2011, including two
transactions in 2018.

-- ACA maintains a strong corporate culture of compliance and a
robust compliance department.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and the consistent
performance of ACA's auto loan portfolio.

-- Considerable availability of historical performance data and a
history of consistent performance on the ACA portfolio.

The ratings also consider the statistical pool characteristics:

-- The pool is seasoned approximately seven months and contains
ACA originations from Q1 2012 through Q3 2018.

-- The average remaining life of the collateral pool is
approximately 63 months.

-- The weighted-average FICO score of the pool is 545.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions that address
the true sale of the assets to the Issuer, the non-consolidation of
the special-purpose vehicle with ACA, that the trust has a valid
first-priority security interest in the assets and the consistency
with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance"
methodology.

The ACAR 2018-3 transaction represents the 24th securitization
completed by ACA since 2011 and will offer both senior and
subordinate rated securities. The receivables securitized in ACAR
2018-3 are subprime automobile loan contracts secured primarily by
used automobiles, light-duty trucks, vans, motorcycles and
minivans.

The rating on the Class A Notes reflects the 65.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement provided by the subordinated notes in the pool,
the Reserve Fund (1.50%) and overcollateralization (8.5%). The
ratings on the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F Notes
reflect 54.00%, 37.00%, 25.50%, 16.50% and 10.00% of initial hard
credit enhancement, respectively. Additional credit support may be
provided from excess spread available in the structure.


ANCHORAGE CAPITAL 2018-10: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Anchorage Capital CLO
2018-10 Ltd./Anchorage Capital CLO 2018-10 LLC's fixed- and
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured term loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Anchorage Capital CLO 2018-10 Ltd./
  Anchorage Capital CLO 2018-10 LLC  

  Class                     Rating          Amount
                                           (mil. $)
  A-1A                      AAA (sf)        187.90
  A-1B-1                    AAA (sf)         35.00
  A-1B-2                    AAA (sf)          3.10
  A-2                       NR               26.00
  B                         AA (sf)          35.50
  C (deferrable)            A (sf)           33.00
  D (deferrable)            BBB- (sf)        26.50
  E (deferrable)            BB- (sf)         16.00
  Subordinated notes        NR               45.40

  NR--Not rated.


ATLAS SENIOR XII: S&P Rates $24.25MM Class E Notes 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Atlas Senior Loan Fund
XII Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund XII LLC's $436.50 million
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Atlas Senior Loan Fund XII Ltd./Atlas Senior Loan Fund XII LLC

  Class                   Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  X                       AAA (sf)                1.50
  A-1                     AAA (sf)              300.00
  A-2                     NR                     25.00
  B                       AA (sf)                53.75
  C (deferrable)          A (sf)                 33.75
  D (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)              23.25
  E (deferrable)          BB- (sf)               24.25
  Subordinated notes      NR                     51.50

  NR--Not rated.


BAMLL COMMERCIAL 2016-SS1: S&P Affirms B- Rating in F Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on eight classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from BAMLL Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-SS1, a U.S. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction.

S&P said, "For the affirmations on the principal- and
interest-paying certificates, our expectation of credit enhancement
was in line with the affirmed rating levels.

"We affirmed our ratings on the class X-A and X-B interest-only
(IO) certificates based on our criteria for rating IO securities in
which the rating on the IO securities would not be higher than that
of the lowest-rated reference class. The notional balance on class
X-A references the class A balance, and the notional balance on
class X-B references the class B and C balances.  

"This is a stand-alone (single-borrower) transaction backed by a
fixed-rate IO mortgage loan secured by a
501,650-net-rentable-sq.-ft. office property and a 965-stall free
standing parking garage in Boston. Our property-level analysis
included a re-evaluation of the office property that secures the
mortgage loan in the trust and considered the stable
servicer-reported net operating income and occupancy for 2016,
2017, and year-to-date June 30, 2018. We then derived our
sustainable in-place net cash flow, which we divided by a 7.10% S&P
Global Ratings weighted average capitalization rate to determine
our expected-case value. This yielded an overall S&P Global Ratings
loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC) of 95.3% and
1.69x, respectively, on the trust balance."

As of the Sept. 17, 2018, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust balance of $166.0 million, which is the
same as at issuance, pays an annual fixed interest rate of 4.24%,
and matures on Dec. 11, 2025. To date, the trust has not incurred
any principal losses.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported 1.88x DSC on
the trust balance for year-end 2017. According to the June 30,
2018, rent roll, the collateral property is 100%-occupied by a
single tenant, an affiliate of State Street Corp., until Dec. 31,
2029.

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  BAMLL Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2016-SS1

  Class     Rating
  A         AAA (sf)
  B         AA- (sf)
  C         A- (sf)
  D         BBB- (sf)
  E         BB- (sf)
  F         B- (sf)
  X-A       AAA (sf)
  X-B       A- (sf)



BANK 2017-BNK7: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed all ratings of the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-BNK7
(the Certificates) issued by BANK 2017-BNK7:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-SB at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-E at BB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class X-F at B (sf)
-- Class F at B (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating confirmations reflect the overall stable performance of
the transaction, which has remained in line with DBRS's
expectations since issuance. The subject transaction closed in
September 2017 and originally consisted of 65 fixed-rate loans
secured by 83 commercial and multifamily properties with an
original trust balance of $1,213 million. As of the August 2018
remittance, there has been a collateral reduction of 0.3% since
issuance, due to scheduled loan amortization, with all 65 loans
remaining in the pool.

Five of the largest 13 loans in the pool, representing 24.9% of the
pool balance (General Motors Building (Prospectus ID#1; 9.3% of the
pool), Westin Building Exchange (Prospectus ID#5; 5.6% of the
pool), The Churchill (Prospectus ID#8; 4.1% of the pool), Overlook
at King of Prussia (Prospectus ID#9; 3.4% of the pool) and Moffett
Place B4 (Prospectus ID#13; 2.6% of the pool)), exhibit credit
characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow ratings.
Furthermore, 19 loans, representing 9.4% of the pool, are secured
by cooperative properties and are very low-leverage with minimal
term and refinance default risk. Twenty-three loans, representing
52.1% of the pool, including seven of the largest 15 loans, are
structured with interest-only (IO) payments for the full term and
an additional 12 loans, representing 20.7% of the pool, have
partial IO periods.

As of the August 2018 remittance, there was one loan (38-50 West
9th Street Corp.; Prospectus ID#34), representing 0.6% of the pool
balance, listed on the servicer’s watch list. The loan was placed
on the watch list for the lack of financial reporting since
issuance, with the servicer's commentary suggesting covenant
default letters had been sent to the sponsor. It is noteworthy that
the recently released September 2018 remittance showed a total of
six loans on the servicer's watch list, including the 38-50 West
9th Street Corp. loan. All six loans are secured by cooperative
properties, with most being monitored for non-reporting of property
financials, a common occurrence for this property type and time
since closing for the transaction. As the September 2018 reporting
suggests those loans were all added to the watch list in December
2017, DBRS has requested clarification from the servicer.

As of the August 2018 remittance, there were nine loans,
representing 24.7% of the pool balance, reporting year-end 2017
financials, with 34 loans representing 58.4% of the pool, reporting
a partial-year 2018 figure. Four of the loans reporting YE2017
financials are in the top 15, representing 19.9% of the pool. In
general, the YE2017 figures reported for those loans are in line
with DBRS's expectations at issuance. The limited financial
reporting for the deal is not uncommon, given the recent vintage
and fourth-quarter closing date. DBRS will continue to monitor for
updated financials as the deal continues to season.

With this review, DBRS has also confirmed that the performance of
all five shadow-rated loans remains in line with the
investment-grade shadow rating. For additional information on those
loans, please see the loan commentary in the DBRS Viewpoint
platform, for which information has been provided below.

Classes X-A, X-B, X-D, X-E, X-F and X-G are interest-only (IO)
certificates that reference a single rated tranche or multiple
rated tranches. The IO rating mirrors the lowest-rated applicable
reference obligation tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior
in the waterfall.

The rating assigned to Class F materially deviates from the higher
ratings implied by the quantitative results. DBRS considers a
material deviation to be a rating differential of three or more
notches between the assigned rating and the rating implied by the
quantitative results that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. The deviations are warranted given the sustainability
of loan performance not yet demonstrated.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


BANK 2018-BNK14: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating on $26.2MM Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings and Rating
Outlooks to BANK 2018-BNK14 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2018-BNK14:

  -- $53,700,000 class A-1 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $111,800,000 class A-2 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $46,900,000 class A-SB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $313,000,000 class A-3 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $391,921,000 class A-4 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $917,321,000b class X-A 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $252,263,000b class X-B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $155,616,000 class A-S 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $47,505,000 class B 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $49,142,000 class C 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57,332,000ab class X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,210,000ab class X-F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,104,000ab class X-G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $32,761,000a class D 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24,571,000a class E 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $26,210,000a class F 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,104,000a class G 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated by Fitch:

  -- $44,228,600a class H;

  -- $44,228,600ab class X-H;

  -- $68,971,505.34c RR Interest.

(a) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

(b) Notional amount and interest-only.

(c) Vertical credit risk retention interest representing no less
than 5% of the estimated fair value of all classes of regular
certificates issued by the issuing entity as of the closing date.

The ratings are based on information provided by the issuer as of
Sept. 26, 2018.

Since Fitch published its expected ratings on Sept. 12, 2018, the
balances for class A-3 and class A-4 were finalized. At the time
the classes were assigned, the class A-3 balance range was
$94,000,000 - $350,000,000 and the expected class A-4 balance range
was $354,921,000 - $610,921,000. The final class sizes for class
A-3 and A-4 are $313,000,000 and $391,921,000, respectively.
Additionally, there will be no cashflow generated from the class C
to the X-B notes. As such, the rating of the class X-B is 'AA-sf',
which is a change from the expected rating of 'A-sf' for the class
X-B. The classes reflect the final ratings and deal structure.

The certificates represent the beneficial ownership interest in the
trust, primary assets of which are 62 loans secured by 136
commercial properties having an aggregate principal balance of
$1,379,430,107 as of the cut-off date. The loans were contributed
to the trust by: Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Bank of America, NA, Morgan
Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC Bank, NA and National
Cooperative Bank, NA.

Fitch reviewed a comprehensive sample of the transaction's
collateral, including site inspections on 72.8% of the properties
by balance, cash flow analysis of 90.6% and asset summary reviews
on 90.6% of the pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Fitch Leverage than Recent Transactions: The pool's Fitch
leverage is lower than average compared with other Fitch-rated,
fixed-rate, multiborrower transactions. Specifically, the pool's
Fitch DSCR of 1.33x is superior to the 2017 and 2018 YTD averages
of 1.26x and 1.23x, respectively. The pool's Fitch LTV of 96.0% is
also superior to the 2017 and 2018 YTD averages of 101.6% and
102.9%, respectively. Excluding investment-grade credit opinion and
multifamily cooperative loans, the pool has a Fitch DSCR and LTV of
1.17x and 107.7%, respectively.

Property Type Concentration: The pool has a relatively high
exposure to retail properties, which at 39.4% of the pool, far
exceeds 2017 and 2018 YTD average concentrations of 24.8% and
27.7%, respectively. However, a large portion of this includes
credit opinion loans: Aventura Mall (7.3% of the pool), 685 Fifth
Avenue Retail (7.3% of the pool) and Millennium Partners Portfolio
(3.6% of the pool).

Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans, representing 23.9% of the pool,
have investment-grade credit opinions, which is well above both the
2017 average of 11.7% and 2018 YTD average of 10.9%. Aventura Mall
(7.3% of the pool) has an investment-grade credit opinion of 'Asf*'
on a stand-alone basis. Millennium Partners Portfolio (3.6% of the
pool) and Pfizer Building (2.2% of the pool) have investment-grade
credit opinions of 'A-sf*' on a stand-alone basis. 685 Fifth Avenue
Retail (7.3% of the pool) and 1745 Broadway (3.6% of the pool) have
investment-grade credit opinions of 'BBB-sf*' on a stand-alone
basis. Combined, the five loans have a weighted average (WA) Fitch
DSCR and LTV of 1.26x and 67.1%, respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For this transaction, Fitch's NCF was 14.7% below the most recent
year's NOI for properties for which a full-year NOI was provided,
excluding properties that were stabilizing during this period.
Unanticipated further declines in property-level NCF could result
in higher defaults and loss severities on defaulted loans and in
potential rating actions on the certificates.

Fitch evaluated the sensitivity of the ratings assigned to the BANK
2018-BNK14 certificates and found that the transaction displays
average sensitivities to further declines in NCF. In a scenario in
which NCF declined a further 20% from Fitch's NCF, a downgrade of
the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB+sf' could result. In a more
severe scenario, in which NCF declined a further 30% from Fitch's
NCF, a downgrade of the junior 'AAAsf' certificates to 'BBB-sf'
could result.


BBCMS 2016-ETC: S&P Affirms B- Rating on Class F Certificates
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on seven classes of
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from BBCMS 2016-ETC
Mortgage Trust, a U.S. commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction.

For the affirmations on the principal- and interest-paying
certificates, our expectation of credit enhancement was in line
with the affirmed rating levels.

S&P affirmed its rating on the class X interest-only (IO)
certificates based on its criteria for rating IO securities, in
which the ratings on the IO securities would not be higher than
that of the lowest-rated reference class. Class X's notional
balance references classes A, B, and C.  

This is a stand-alone (single borrower) transaction backed by a
portion of a fixed-rate IO whole loan secured by 1.3 million sq.
ft. of a 1.8 million sq. ft. open air retail center known as Easton
Town Center in Columbus, Ohio. S&P said, "Our property-level
analysis included a re-evaluation of the retail property that
secures the whole loan and considered the relatively stable
servicer-reported net operating income and occupancy for the past
five-plus years (2013 through the trailing 12 months ended June 30,
2018). In addition, we considered the borrower's higher reported
real estate taxes ($10.2 million in 2017 compared to $7.4 million
in 2016) and our estimate of occupancy cost ratio for comparable
in-line tenants of approximately 15.0% based on our calculation of
$625 per sq. ft. in sales as of Dec. 31, 2017. We then derived our
sustainable in-place net cash flow (NCF), which we divided by a
6.36% S&P Global Ratings' weighted average capitalization rate to
determine our expected-case value." This yielded an overall S&P
Global Ratings' loan-to-value ratio and debt service coverage (DSC)
of 93.3% and 1.86x, respectively, on the whole loan balance.

According to the Sept. 14, 2018, trustee remittance report, the IO
mortgage loan has a trust balance of $512.5 million and a whole
loan balance of $700.0 million. The whole loan comprised of six
promissory notes: two senior pari passu notes totaling $150.0
million that are in the trust, two senior pari passu notes totaling
$187.5 million that are held outside the trust, and two subordinate
notes totaling $362.5 million that are in the trust. The whole loan
pays an annual fixed interest rate of 3.6159% and matures on Aug.
5, 2026. To date, the trust has not incurred any principal losses.

The master servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., reported a DSC of 1.82x
on the whole loan balance for the six months ended June 30, 2018,
and collateral occupancy was 91.4% according to the June 30, 2018,
rent roll. Based on the June 2018 rent roll, the five largest
tenants make up 20.0% of the collateral's total net rentable area
(NRA). In addition, 3.2%, 10.4%, and 9.5% of the NRA have leases
that expire in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively.

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  BBCMS 2016-ETC Mortgage Trust Commercial mortgage pass-through
  certificates

  Class     Rating
  A         AAA (sf)
  B         AA- (sf)
  C         A- (sf)
  D         BBB- (sf)
  E         BB- (sf)
  F         B- (sf)
  X         A- (sf)


BENCHMARK 2018-B6: DBRS Assigns Prov. B Rating on Class J-RR Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-B6 to be
issued by Benchmark 2018-B6 Mortgage Trust:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-AB at AAA (sf)
-- Class X-A at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class X-B at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class X-D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F-RR at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G-RR at BB (sf)
-- Class J-RR at B (sf)

Classes X-D, D, E-RR, F-RR, G-RR, NR-RR, VRR, S and R will be
privately placed. The X-A, X-B and X-D balances are notional.

All trends are Stable.

The collateral consists of 55 fixed-rate loans, secured by 248
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. Trust assets contributed from six loans,
representing 32.4% of the pool, are shadow-rated investment grade
by DBRS. Proceeds for the shadow-rated loans are floored at their
respective rating within the pool. When the combined 32.4% of the
pool has no proceeds assigned below the rating floor, the resulting
pool subordination is diluted or reduced below that rated floor.
When the cut-off loan balances were measured against the DBRS
Stabilized net cash flow and their respective actual constants,
five loans, representing 4.1% of the total pool, had a DBRS Term
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a
threshold indicative of a higher likelihood of mid-term default.
Additionally, to assess refinance risk given the current
low-interest-rate environment, DBRS applied its refinance constants
to the balloon amounts. This resulted in 28 loans, representing
59.5% of the pool, having whole loan refinance (Refi) DSCRs below
1.00x and 19 loans, representing 44.1% of the pool, having whole
loan Refi DSCRs below 0.90x. Aventura Mall, Workspace and TriBeCa
House Conduit, which represent 15.7% of the transaction balance and
are three of the pool's loans with a DBRS Refi DSCR below 0.90x,
are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS and have a large piece of
subordinate mortgage debt outside the trust.

Six loans – Aventura Mall, Moffett Towers II, West Coast
Albertsons Portfolio, 636 11th Avenue, Workspace and TriBeCa House
Conduit – representing a combined 30.1% of the pool, exhibit
credit characteristics consistent with investment-grade shadow
ratings. Aventura Mall exhibits credit characteristics consistent
with a BBB (high) shadow rating, Moffett Towers II exhibits credit
characteristics consistent with a BBB shadow rating, West Coast
Albertsons Portfolio exhibits credit characteristics consistent
with an A (high) shadow rating, 636 11th Avenue exhibits credit
characteristics consistent with a BBB (low) shadow rating,
Workspace exhibits credit characteristics consistent with an AA
(low) shadow rating and TriBeCa House Conduit exhibits credit
characteristics consistent with an BBB (high)shadow rating. Nine
loans, representing 26.4% of the pool, are located in urban and
super-dense urban gateway markets with increased liquidity that
benefit from consistent investor demand, even in times of stress.
Urban markets represented in the deal include Chicago, San
Francisco and New York City. Furthermore, there is limited rural
and tertiary concentration with only eight loans, representing 6.7%
of the pool.

Nine loans, representing 24.7% of the transaction balance, are
secured by properties that are either fully or primarily leased to
a single tenant. This includes four of the largest 15 loans:
Moffett Towers II, West Coast Albertsons Portfolio, 636 11th Avenue
and 1800 Vine Street. Loans secured by properties occupied by
single tenants have been found to suffer higher loss severities in
an event of default.

The deal is concentrated by property type, with 20 loans,
representing 48.4% of the pool, secured by office properties. Of
the office property concentration, 30.5% of the loans are located
in urban and super dense urban markets and no loan secured by an
office property is located in a tertiary or rural market. Two of
these loans – Moffett Towers II and Workspace – representing
20.9% of the office concentration and 10.1% of the total pool
balance, are shadow-rated investment grade by DBRS.

The transaction's weighted-average (WA) DBRS Refi DSCR is 0.90x,
indicating higher refinance risk on an overall pool level. In
addition, 28 loans, representing 59.5% of the pool, have DBRS Refi
DSCRs below 1.00x, including seven of the top ten loans and ten of
the top 15 loans. Nineteen of these loans, comprising 44.1% of the
pool, have DBRS Refi DSCRs less than 0.90x, including five of the
top ten loans and eight of the top 15 loans. These credit metrics
are based on whole-loan balances. When measured against A-note
balances only, the pool WA DBRS Refi DSCR rises significantly to
0.99x. Three of the pool's loans with a DBRS Refi DSCR below 0.90x
– Aventura Mall, Workspace and TriBeCa House Conduit – which
represent 15.7% of the transaction balance, are shadow-rated
investment grade by DBRS and have large pieces of subordinate
mortgage debt outside the trust. The pool's DBRS Refi DSCRs for
these loans are based on a WA stressed refinance constant of 9.76%,
which implies an interest rate of 9.12%, amortizing on a 30-year
schedule. This represents a significant stress of 4.48% over the WA
contractual interest rate of the loans in the pool.

Classes X-A, X-B and X-D are interest-only (IO) certificates that
reference a single rated tranche or multiple rated tranches. The IO
rating mirrors the lowest-rated reference tranche adjusted upward
by one notch if senior in the waterfall.

Notes: With regard to due diligence services, DBRS was provided
with the Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form-15E), which contains the
description of the information that the third party reviewed in
conducting the due diligence services and a summary of the findings
and conclusions. While DBRS did not require due diligence services
outlined in Form-15E, DBRS did use the Data File outlined in the
Independent Accountant's Report in its analysis to determine the
ratings.


BLUEMOUNTAIN 2018-3: S&P Assigns Prelim B- Rating on F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to BlueMountain
CLO 2018-3 Ltd.'s floating-rate notes. This is a proposed reissue
of BlueMountain CLO 2014-3 Ltd., which was refinanced in April
2017, with the assets being transferred in the form of
participations.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
term loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 26,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  BlueMountain CLO 2018-3 Ltd./BlueMountain CLO 2018-3 LLC

  Class                 Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  X                     AAA (sf)                   3.00
  A-1                   AAA (sf)                 363.00
  A-2                   NR                        24.00
  B                     AA (sf)                   69.00
  C (deferrable)        A (sf)                    36.00
  D (deferrable)        BBB- (sf)                 36.00
  E (deferrable)        BB- (sf)                  21.00
  F (deferrable)        B- (sf)                   10.00
  Subordinated notes    NR                        51.20

  NR--Not rated.


CARLYLE US 2016-4: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of CLO refinancing notes to be issued by Carlyle US CLO
2016-4, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$302,500,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$72,500,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$38,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$27,000,000 Class C-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class D-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, (if any), may
differ from a provisional rating.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

Carlyle CLO Management L.L.C. will manage the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer intends to issue the Refinancing Notes on October 22,
2018 in connection with the refinancing of all classes of secured
notes previously issued on December 1, 2016. On the Refinancing
Date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from the issuance of the
Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.


In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2905

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.12 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


CATAMARAN CLO 2018-1: S&P Rates $19.25MM Class E Notes 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Catamaran CLO 2018-1
Ltd.'s floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Catamaran CLO 2018-1 Ltd.
  Class                Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)                 244.00
  A-2                  NR                         8.00
  B                    AA (sf)                   52.00
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                    24.00
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)                 20.00
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)                  19.25
  Subordinated notes   NR                        40.35

  NR--Not rated.



CIFC FUNDING 2014-V: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class F-R2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to four classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by CIFC Funding 2014-V, Ltd.:

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$320,500,000 Class A-1-R2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1-R2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class A-2-R2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-2-R2 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$22,250,000 Class E-R2 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class E-R2 Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$11,000,000 Class F-R2 Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class F-R2 Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

CIFC Asset Management LLC manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected
losses posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.


The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on September 27, 2018
in connection with the refinancing of all classes of the secured
notes previously partially refinanced on October 17, 2016 and
originally issued on December 30, 2014. On the Second Refinancing
Date, the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing
Notes, along with the proceeds from the issuance of three other
classes of secured notes and additional subordinated notes, to
redeem in full the Refinanced Original Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, the three
other classes of secured notes and additional subordinated notes, a
variety of other changes to transaction features will occur in
connection with the refinancing. These include: extension of the
reinvestment period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call
period; changes to certain collateral quality tests; and changes to
the overcollateralization test levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $550,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2970

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Spread (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


CIFC FUNDING 2018-IV: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by CIFC Funding 2018-IV, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$512,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$95,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$36,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2
(sf)

US$48,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned
Baa3 (sf)

US$45,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)


US$16,000,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)


The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred
to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Rated Notes address the expected losses
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

CIFC 2018-IV is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 90% ramped as of the closing
date.

CIFC CLO Management II LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued one class of
subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $800,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2874

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.35%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


CIM TRUST 2018-INV1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class B-5 Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-INV1 (the
Certificates) issued by CIM Trust 2018-INV1 (the Trust):

-- $358.2 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $358.2 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $326.4 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $326.4 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $244.8 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $244.8 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.3 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.3 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $65.3 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $65.3 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $261.1 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $81.6 million Class A-12 at AAA (sf)
-- $31.8 million Class A-13 at AAA (sf)
-- $31.8 million Class A-14 at AAA (sf)
-- $358.2 million Class A-IO1 at AAA (sf)
-- $358.2 million Class A-IO2 at AAA (sf)
-- $326.4 million Class A-IO3 at AAA (sf)
-- $244.8 million Class A-IO4 at AAA (sf)
-- $16.3 million Class A-IO5 at AAA (sf)
-- $65.3 million Class A-IO6 at AAA (sf)
-- $31.8 million Class A-IO7 at AAA (sf)
-- $10.2 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $11.4 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $10.6 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $8.6 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $3.9 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Classes A-IO1, A-IO2, A-IO3, A-IO4, A-IO5, A-IO6 and A-IO7 are
interest-only certificates. The class balances represent notional
amounts.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-9, A-11, A-12, A-13, A-IO2
and A-IO3 are exchangeable certificates. These classes can be
exchanged for a combination of exchange certificates as specified
in the offering documents.

Classes A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-11 and A-12 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior support certificates (Classes A-13 and A-14)
with respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 12.20% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 9.70%, 6.90%, 4.30%, 2.20% and 1.25% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of prime,
first-lien, fixed-rate, agency eligible, investment property
residential mortgages funded by the issuance of the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-INVI (the Certificates). The
Certificates are backed by 1,472 loans with a total principal
balance of $407,991,627 as of the Cut-Off Date (September 1,
2018).

The pool is composed of 100% fully amortizing fixed-rate
conventional mortgages with original terms to maturity of primarily
30 years. All of the loans in the pool are conventional mortgages
either made to investors for business purposes or as cash out
refinancing for personal use. The personal use loans (9.9% of the
pool) are subject to the Qualified Mortgage and Ability-to-Repay
rules (together, the Rules), and the remainder (91.1% of the pool)
are not subject to the Rules.

All the mortgage loans in the portfolio were eligible for purchase
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

The originators for the aggregate mortgage pool are Caliber Home
Loans, Inc. (26.4%), AmeriHome Mortgage (14.9%), Home Point (11.7%)
and various other originators, each comprising less than 11.0% of
the mortgage loans.

The loans will be serviced or sub-serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing (92.3%) and TIAA, FSB (7.7%).

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will act as the Master Servicer, Custodian
and Securities Administrator. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
will serve as Trustee.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets, well-qualified borrowers and
satisfactory third-party due diligence on all the loans.

This transaction employs a representations and warranties (R&W)
framework that contains certain weaknesses, such as unrated R&W
providers, unrated entities (the Sellers) providing a back-stop and
sunset provisions on the back-stop. To capture the perceived
weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator scores for all loans in
this pool. A lower originator score results in increased default
and loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


CIM TRUST 2018-INV1: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 19
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by
CIM Trust 2018-INV1. The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B2 (sf).

CIM 2018-INV1, the second rated issue from Chimera Trust in 2018,
is a prime RMBS securitization of fixed-rate investment property
mortgage loans secured by first liens on agency-eligible non-owner
occupied residential properties with original terms to maturity
between 10 and 30 years. All of the loans are underwritten in
accordance with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae guidelines, which take
into consideration, among other factors, the income, assets,
employment and credit score of the borrower. All the loans were run
through one of the government-sponsored enterprises' (GSE)
automated underwriting systems (AUS) and received an "Approve" or
"Accept" recommendation.

The mortgage loans for this transaction were acquired by the
affiliates of the sponsor, Chimera Funding TRS LLC and Chimera
Residential Mortgage Inc. (the sellers) from Bank of America,
National Association (BANA). BANA acquired the mortgage loans
through its whole loan purchase program from various originators.

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) and TIAA, FSB will
service 92% and 8% of the aggregate balance of the mortgage pool,
respectively, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2) will be the master
servicer. The servicers will be primarily responsible for funding
certain servicing advances and delinquent scheduled interest and
principal payments for the mortgage loans, unless the servicer
determines that such amounts would not be recoverable. The master
servicer is obligated to fund any required monthly advances if the
servicer fails in its obligation to do so. The master servicer and
servicer will be entitled to reimbursements for any such monthly
advances from future payments and collections (including insurance
and liquidation proceeds) with respect to those mortgage loans.

CIM 2018-INV1 has a shifting interest structure with a five-year
lockout period that benefits from a senior subordination floor and
a subordinate floor. Moody's coded the cash flow to each of the
certificate classes using Moody's proprietary cash flow model. In
its analysis of tail risk, Moody's considered the increased risk
from borrowers with more than one mortgage in the pool.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CIM Trust 2018-INV1

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 1.00%
in a base scenario and reaches 11.20% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa ratings.

Its loss estimates are based on a loan-by-loan assessment of the
securitized collateral pool as of the cut-off date using Moody's
Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for risks related to mortgaged
properties in Homeownership associations (HOAs) in super lien
states. Its final loss estimates also incorporate adjustments for
originator assessments and the strength of the representation and
warranty (R&W) framework.

Moody's bases its definitive ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, its assessments of the aggregators, originators
and servicers, the strength of the third party due diligence and
the R&W framework of the transaction.

Collateral Description

The CIM 2018-INV1 transaction is a securitization of 1,472
investment property mortgage loans secured by first liens on
one-to-four family residential investment properties, planned unit
developments and condominiums with an unpaid principal balance of
$407,991,627. The majority of the loans have a 30-year original
term (96% by balance); 15-year term loans make up about 3% of the
pool and 20-year term loans make up about 1%. The mortgage pool has
a WA seasoning of four months. The loans in this transaction have
strong borrower characteristics with a weighted average original
FICO score of 768 and a weighted-average original combined
loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 67.6%. In addition, 31% of the
borrowers are self-employed and refinance loans comprise about 41%
of the aggregate pool. The pool has a high geographic concentration
with 43% of the aggregate pool located in California and 17%
located in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA MSA. The
characteristics of the loans underlying the pool are generally
comparable to other recent prime RMBS transactions backed primarily
by 30-year mortgage loans that Moody's has rated.

Origination

Loans in the pool were originated by 10 different originators. The
largest originators in the pool with more than 10% by balance are
Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (26%), Amerihome Mortgage Company, LLC
(15%), Home Point Financial Corporation (12%) and Sierra Pacific
Mortgage Company, Inc. (11%).

Third Party Review and Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Two third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, property valuation, data
integrity and regulatory compliance reviews on 100% of the mortgage
pool. The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
and aggregators' underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of
the loans, no material compliance issues, and no material appraisal
defects.

Each originator will provide comprehensive loan level reps and
warranties for their respective loans. BANA will assign each
originator's R&W to the sellers, who will in turn assign to the
depositor, which will assign to the trust. To mitigate the
potential concerns regarding the originators' ability to meet their
respective R&W obligations, the sellers will backstop the R&Ws for
all originators loans. The sellers obligation to backstop third
party R&Ws will terminate 5 years after the closing date, subject
to certain performance conditions. The sellers will also provide
the gap reps. While Moody's acknowledges the sellers relatively
weak financial strength, the collateral pool benefits from the
diversity of the originators and the sellers' backtop. The R&W
framework is adequate in part because the results of the
independent TPRs revealed a high level of compliance with
underwriting guidelines and regulations, as well as overall
adequate appraisal quality. These results give confidence that the
loans do not systemically breach the R&Ws the originators have made
and that the originators are unlikely to face material repurchase
requests in the future. The loan-level R&Ws are strong and, in
general, either meet or exceed the baseline set of credit-neutral
R&Ws Moody's identified for US RMBS. Among other considerations,
the R&Ws address property valuation, underwriting, fraud, data
accuracy, regulatory compliance, the presence of title and hazard
insurance, the absence of material property damage, and the
enforceability of mortgage.

Tail Risk and Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
senior subordination floor of 2.20% of the closing pool balance,
which mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from
eroding credit enhancement over time. Additionally there is a
subordination lock-out amount which is 1.00% of the closing pool
balance.

Exposure to Extraordinary expenses

Extraordinary trust expenses in this transaction are deducted from
net WAC. Moody's believes there is a very low likelihood that the
rated certificates in CIM 2018-INV1 will incur any losses from
extraordinary expenses or indemnification payments from potential
future lawsuits against key deal parties. Firstly, the loans are of
prime quality and were originated under a regulatory environment
that requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis,
which reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could
form the basis of a lawsuit. Secondly, the transaction has
reasonably well-defined processes in place to identify loans with
defects on an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent
breach reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations
and warranties when certain clearly defined triggers have been
breached which reduces the likelihood that parties will be sued for
inaction. Furthermore, the issuer has disclosed the results of a
credit, compliance and valuation review of 100% of the mortgage
loans by independent third.

Other Considerations

In CIM 2018-INV1, the controlling holder has the option to hire at
its own expense the independent reviewer upon the occurrence of a
review event. If there is no Controlling Holder (no single entity
holds a majority of the Class Principal Amount of the most
subordinate class of certificates outstanding), the trustee will
appoint an independent reviewer at the cost of the trust. However,
if the controlling holder does not hire the independent reviewer,
the holders of more than 50% of the aggregate voting interests of
all outstanding certificates may direct (at their expense) the
trustee to appoint an independent reviewer. In this transaction,
the controlling holder can be the depositor or a seller (or an
affiliate of these parties). If the controlling holder is
affiliated with the depositor, seller or Sponsor, then the
controlling holder may not be motivated to discover and enforce R&W
breaches for which its affiliate is responsible.

The servicer will not commence foreclosure proceedings on a
mortgage loan unless the servicer has notified the controlling
holder at least five business days in advance of the foreclosure
and the controlling holder has not objected to such action. If the
controlling holder objects, the servicer has to obtain three
appraisals from the appraisal firms as listed in the pooling and
servicing agreement. The cost of the appraisals are borne by the
controlling holder. The controlling holder will be required to
purchase such mortgage loan at a price equal to the highest of the
three appraisals plus accrued and unpaid interest on such mortgage
loan as of the purchase date. If the servicer cannot obtain three
appraisals there are alternate methods for determining the purchase
price. If the controlling holder fails to purchase the mortgage
loan within the time frame, the controlling holder forfeits any
foreclosure rights thereafter. Moody's considers this credit
neutral because a) the appraiser is chosen by the servicer from the
approved list of appraisers, b) the fair value of the property is
decided by the servicer, based on third party appraisals, and c)
the controlling holder will pay the fair price and accrued
interest.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.


COMM 2007-C9: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class K Debt to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on one class and
affirmed the ratings on four classes in COMM 2007-C9 Mortgage
Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-C9 as follows:

Cl. K, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Upgraded to
Caa3 (sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. M, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. N, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)

Cl. XS, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. K was upgraded based primarily on an increase in
credit support resulting from loan amortization and paydowns. The
deal has paid down 39% since Moody's last review and 98% since
securitization.

The ratings on the three P&I Classes, Cl. L, Cl. M and Cl. N, were
affirmed because the ratings are consistent with Moody's expected
loss plus realized losses.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. XS, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 29.2% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 18.5% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 3.2% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 3.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating COMM 2007-C9 Mortgage
Trust, Cl. K, Cl. L, Cl. M, and Cl. N was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating COMM 2007-C9
Mortgage Trust, Cl. XS were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan
and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 73% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 27% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior classes and the recovery as a pay down of principal to
the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 10, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $68.2 million
from $2.89 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by six mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
8% to 29% of the pool.

One loan, constituting 14% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Eighteen loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $72.2 million (for an average loss
severity of 23%). Four loans, constituting 73% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Grants Pass Shopping Center -- A note Loan ($19.9 million --
29.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 279,000 square foot (SF)
community shopping center in Grants Pass, Oregon. The loan first
transferred to special servicing in 2011 and was modified and
bifurcated into a $20 million A-Note and a $4.9 million B-Note. The
loan was subsequently transferred back to the master servicer,
however, it returned to special servicing in April 2017. A second
loan modification was approved, including a nine month extension.
The loan was current as of the September 2018 distribution date and
performing under the terms of the modification. As of March 2018,
the property was 75% leased, compared to 82% as December 2017.
However, following the departure of JC Penney, physical occupancy
would be approximately 67%, assuming no other tenants changes. The
borrower is now in negotiations with TJ Maxx to lease the vacated
JC Penney space. Moody's assumed a significant loss on the $4.9
million B-Note.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Intercontinental
Center Loan ($18.1 million -- 26.6% of the pool), which is secured
by a 197,000 SF office building in Houston, Texas. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2017 for maturity default.
The property's occupancy was recently 63%, compared to 68% in March
2017, and down from 100% at year-end 2015. The special serviced
indicated that the borrower had requested a DPO (discounted payoff)
and it has been approved.

The third largest specially serviced loan is The Western Plaza Loan
($7.1 million -- 10.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 68,400
SF retail center located in Jacksonville, North Carolina. The loan
was transferred to special servicing after Office Max (23,400 SF)
and one other tenant vacated the property. The property is located
in an area affected by Hurricane Florence and Moody's will continue
to monitor the loan as more information becomes available. The
special servicer has indicated that the borrower has requested a
DPO.

The largest non-specially serviced loan is the 1130 Rainier Avenue
South Loan ($9.3 million -- 13.6% of the pool), which is secured by
a 62,000 SF office building in Seattle, Washington. The property
served as the corporate headquarters for an agriculture company
until the tenant vacated in May 2017. The borrower was able to find
a new tenant for 20,400 SF or 33% of GLA. The loan has passed its
anticipated repayment date (ARD) in June 2017 and has a final
maturity date in 2037. The loan is on the servicer's watchlist and
due to the lower occupancy Moody's has identified this as a
troubled loan.

The second non-specially serviced loan is the Revere Golf Club Loan
($8.9 million -- 13.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 36- hole
golf course located in Henderson, Nevada, built in 1999 and
renovated in 2002. A loan modification in June 2014 included $8.1
million principal forgiveness and increased the loan term by 22
months. The financial performance has improved since the loan
modification was completed, however, due the overall poor
historical performance Moody's has identified this as a troubled
loan.

Moody's has assumed a high default probability for these two
non-specially serviced loans, constituting 27% of the pool, and has
estimated an aggregate loss of $19.9 million (a 29% expected loss
on average) from these specially serviced and troubled loans.


COMM 2010-C1: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on 10 classes in
COMM 2010-C1 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2010-C1 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed Aa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. XS-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. XW-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. XW-B, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2017 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The ratings on the three IO classes, Cl. XS-A, Cl. XW-A and Cl.
XW-B were affirmed based on the credit quality of the referenced
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 0.1% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 0.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.02% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 0.11% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating COMM 2010-C1 Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1, Cl.
A-3, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, and Cl. G were "Approach to
Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating COMM 2010-C1 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2010-C1, Cl. XS-A, Cl. XW-A and
Cl. XW-B were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017,
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 63% to $313.1
million from $857 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 15 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 35% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 95% of
the pool.

There are no loans currently on the master servicer's watchlist or
in special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2017 and partial year 2018 operating
results for 100% of the pool. Moody's weighted average conduit LTV
is 64%, compared to 66% at Moody's last review. Moody's conduit
component excludes loans with structured credit assessments,
defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and troubled loans.
Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted average haircut of
12% to the most recently available net operating income (NOI).
Moody's value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of
9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.78X and 1.59X,
respectively, compared to 1.78X and 1.57X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 59% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Fashion Outlets of Niagara Falls Loan ($108.5
million -- 34.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 525,663 square
feet (SF) fashion outlet center located in Niagara, New York. The
property is located approximately five miles east of the Niagara
Falls and the Canadian border. As of March 2018, the property was
91% leased, compared to June 30, 2017, the property was 92% leased.
The loan has amortized 11.3% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 58% and 1.64X, respectively, compared to 56% and
1.68X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the Harrison Loan ($38.3 million --
12.2% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property located
in New York, New York. The property was constructed in 2009 and
contains approximately 90,000 SF of ground floor retail space. The
property was 97% leased as of March 2018, compared to 100% leased
in June 2017. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 69% and 1.29X,
respectively, compared to 68% and 1.31X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Auburn Mall Loan ($37.2 million --
11.2% of the pool), which is secured by a portion of a 588,000 SF
regional mall located in Auburn, Massachusetts. The property is
anchored by Sears and Macy's, though Macy's owns its improvements
and is excluded as part of the loan's collateral. As of March 2018
the property was 98% leased compared to 83% in June 2017. The loan
has amortized 11.2% since securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 62% and 1.74X, respectively, compared to 64% and 1.68X at
the last review.


COMM 2012-CCRE5: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Class F Certs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on twelve classes in COMM 2012-CCRE5
Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2012-CCRE5:

Cl. A-2, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Upgraded to A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Baa1
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. F, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Cl. PEZ, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 20, 2018 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are driven by the correction of prior errors. In
the prior rating actions on Class PEZ and Class X-B taken on July
20, 2018, Moody's did not account for upgrades of other classes in
the transaction to which these two bonds are linked.

Class PEZ -- an exchangeable security whose rating is determined
based on the weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
exchangeable classes to which it is linked, Class A-M, Class B and
Class C -- should have been upgraded based on the July 20 upgrades
of Class B to Aa1 (sf) from Aa2 (sf) and Class C to A1 (sf) from A2
(sf). Class X-B, an interest-only security which references Class
B, should have been upgraded based on the July 20 upgrade of Class
B to Aa1 (sf) from Aa2 (sf). These errors have been corrected, and
the upgrade actions reflect the correct linkages for these two
bonds.

The ratings on the P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on Class X-A, an interest-only bond, was affirmed based
on the credit quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 3.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 3.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating COMM 2012-CCRE5 Mortgage Trust,
Cl. A-2, Cl. A-SB, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-M, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D,
Cl. E, Cl. F, and Cl. G were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The principal methodology used in rating
COMM 2012-CCRE5 Mortgage Trust, Cl. PEZ was "Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015. The
methodologies used in rating COMM 2012-CCRE5 Mortgage Trust, Cl.
X-A and Cl. X-B were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 23% to $876.8
million from $1.13 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 47 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 10% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 53% of the pool. Two loans, constituting
10.6% of the pool, have investment-grade structured credit
assessments. Nine loans, constituting almost 20% of the pool, have
defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 17, the same as at Moody's last review.

Four loans, constituting 13.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and partial year 2018 operating results for 17% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 97%, unchanged from Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 13% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.4%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.60X and 1.11X,
respectively, unchanged from the last review. Moody's actual DSCR
is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's
stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the
agency applied to the loan balance.

The largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the 200
Varick Street Loan ($61.9 million -- 7.1% of the pool), which is
secured by a 12-story, 430,000 square foot (SF) office property
located in lower Manhattan. As of December 2017, the property was
over 99% leased. The property's occupancy has remained roughly the
same for a number of years. The loan has amortized over 11% since
securitization. Moody's structured credit assessment and stressed
DSCR are aa3 (sca.pd) and 1.70X, respectively, unchanged from the
last review.

The second largest loan with a structured credit assessment is the
Ritz-Carlton South Beach Loan ($31.0 million -- 3.5% of the pool),
which is secured by a beachfront land parcel in Miami Beach,
Florida. The land is subject to a long-term ground lease which is
set to expire in 2128. The improvements include a 375-room luxury
hotel. While Moody's DSCR figures reflect the cash flow from the
ground lease, Moody's considered the value of the ground and the
improvements when assessing the risk of the loan. Moody's
structured credit assessment and stressed DSCR are aaa (sca.pd) and
1.01X, respectively, unchanged from the last review.

The top three conduit loans represent 23% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the Eastview Mall and Commons Loan ($90.0 million
-- 10.3% of the pool), which represents a pari-passu portion of a
mortgage loan which is secured by a 725,000 SF portion of a 1.4
million super-regional mall and an 86,000 SF portion of a 341,000
SF adjacent retail power center located in Victor, New York,
approximately 15 miles southeast of Rochester. The malls
non-collateral anchors includes Macy's, Von Maur, JC Penney, and
Lord & Taylor. The mall was 93% leased as of June 2017, compared
with 95% in January 2017. As of June 2017, inline occupancy was 85%
leased. Sears (a non-collateral tenant) recently announced a store
closure at this location. Taking into account Sears departure, the
property would be approximately 84% leased. Performance has
continued to decline from securitization due to base rent
decreasing while expenses are increasing. Since 2015, base rent has
decreased by 4% while expenses have increased by 10%. The mall is
considered the dominant mall in the area. Moody's LTV and stressed
DSCR are 116% and 0.86X, respectively, unchanged from the prior
review.

The second largest loan is the Metroplex Loan ($57.9 million --
6.6% of the pool), which is secured by an 18 story, 404,000 SF
office property in the Mid-Wilshire office submarket of Los
Angeles, California. As of April 2018, the property was 90% leased,
compared to 91% in December 2017 and 90% in December 2016. The
property has upcoming lease rollover in 2019, 2020 and 2021 when
approximately 35%, 17% and 6% of leases expire. The loan has
amortized approximately 10% since securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 109% and 0.91X, respectively, compred to 110% and
0.91X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Widener Building Loan ($52.8 million
-- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by an 18-story multi-tenant
class B office building. The building has approximately 423,000 SF
of office space with 32,000 SF of ground floor retail space. As of
December 2017, the property was 100% leased, unchanged from the
prior year. Property performance dropped in 2017 due to a
significant increase in the repairs and maintenance expense. There
is limited short-term lease rollover, when approximately 13% of
leases expire between 2019 and 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 97% and 1.01X, respectively, compared to 97% and 1.00X at the
last review.


COMM 2018-HCLV: S&P Rates $33.2MM Class F Certificates 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to COMM 2018-HCLV Mortgage
Trust's commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2018-HCLV.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by a two-year, floating-rate commercial mortgage
loan totaling $325.0 million, with five, one-year extension
options. The loan is secured by a first lien on the borrower's fee
and leasehold interests in the Hughes Center, a 68-acre mixed-use
campus consisting of 10 class A office buildings (1.4 million sq.
ft.) and 10 retail buildings (111,000 sq. ft.) located in Las
Vegas.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the underlying collateral's
credit characteristics, the trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's
terms, and our overall qualitative assessment of the transaction.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  COMM 2018-HCLV Mortgage Trust

  Class          Rating(i)       Amount ($)
  A              AAA (sf)       123,508,000
  B              AA- (sf)        27,447,000
  C              A- (sf)         20,585,000
  D              BBB- (sf)       25,250,000
  E              BB- (sf)        34,308,000
  F              B- (sf)         33,211,000
  G              NR              44,441,000
  VRR            NR              16,250,000(ii)

(i)The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii)Non-offered eligible vertical interest.
NR--Not rated.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C2: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Cl. C Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on two classes
and affirmed the ratings on eight classes in Credit Suisse
Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C2 as follows:

Cl. A-J, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed
Caa1 (sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed Caa2
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. A-X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Cl. A-J and Cl. B were upgraded primarily due to
loan paydowns and overall pool performance. The pool has paid down
92% since securitization.

The ratings on seven P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO Class, Cl. A-X, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 38.2% of the
current balance, compared to 40.2% at Moody's last review. Moody's
base expected loss plus realized losses is now 7.8% of the original
pooled balance, compared to 8.0% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2, Cl. A-J, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E,
Cl. F, Cl. G, Cl. H, and Cl. J was "Moody's Approach to Rating
Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July
2017. The methodologies used in rating Credit Suisse Commercial
Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C2, Cl. A-X were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published
in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 92% to $276.9
million from $3.3 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 11 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 46% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 4, the same as at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 1% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Thirty-nine loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $151.3 million (for an average
loss severity of 31%). Six loans, constituting 44% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan
is the Metro Square 95 Office Park Loan ($48 million -- 17.3% of
the pool), which is secured by a seven-building office campus
located in Jacksonville, Florida, just south of the Jacksonville
CBD. The property was 86% leased as of March 2018. Major tenants at
the property include Wells Fargo, Skate World, and Baptist Medical.
Wells Fargo renewed their lease in December 2015 through 2020. The
loan transferred to special servicing in September 2011 for
imminent default after the borrower submitted a financial hardship
letter. The borrower was unable to meet the conditions of the
proposed loan modification and the lender is now moving toward
foreclosure. The special servicer indicated a foreclosure sale is
scheduled for August 2018.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 300-318 East
Fordham Road - A Note Loan ($30 million -- 10.8% of the pool),
which is secured by a street level retail space in the Bronx, New
York. The loan was previously modified in 2012, bifurcating the
original loan balance of $47 million into a $30 million A-Note and
a $17.7 million B-Note. The loan transferred back to special
servicing for the second time due to delinquency in April 2015.
Ongoing litigation between the borrower and lender has precluded
the special servicer from obtaining an updated appraisal for the
property.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Duke University
Medical Complex Loan ($12.7 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a 79,902 SF office building built in 2001 located in
Durham, NC. Duke University, which occupied 41,899 SF (53% of the
GLA) vacated at its lease expiration in 2017. The loan transferred
to the special servicer in May 2015 due to imminent monetary
default. A foreclosure sale was completed in March 2018. The
special servicer indicated a 24,518 SF lease was recently executed
with a new tenant. The special servicer is now completing the
build-out and determining a timeline to go to market.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by office
and industrial properties. Moody's estimates an aggregate $84.4
million loss for the specially serviced loans (69% expected loss on
average).

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 82% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 123%, the same as at Moody's last
review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured
credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced
and troubled loans. Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.21X and 0.85X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

As of the September 17, 2018 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $102.3 million. Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls
are caused by special servicing fees, including workout and
liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan
modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.

The top three performing conduit loans represent 55% of the pool
balance. The largest loan is the Two North LaSalle Loan ($127.4
million -- 46.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 26-story,
691,410 square foot (SF) Class A office building in Chicago's
downtown loop. The structure was built in 1978 and renovated in
2001. Following a loan modification, the loan was returned to the
master servicer as a performing loan in March 2017. As part of the
modification, the borrower contributed $22 million of new equity,
$19 million into a TI/LC reserve and the remaining $3 million into
an interest reserve. Furthermore, the maturity date was extended by
three years, with two additional extension options, and the
interest rate was reduced. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 132%
and 0.76X, respectively, unchanged from the prior review.

The second largest loan is the University Commons Loan ($23.4
million -- 8.4% of the pool), which is secured by 227,689 SF retail
property located in Burlington, North Carolina. The property was
97% leased as of September 2017. The loan is fully amortizing and
has amortized 29% since securitization. Performance has been
stable. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 80% and 1.21X,
respectively, compared to 85% and 1.15X at Moody's last review.

The third largest loan is the Chamberlain Plaza Loan ($1.8 million
-- 0.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 29,630 SF retail center
located in Louisville, Kentucky. As of August 2018, the property
was 82% leased. The loan is fully amortizing and has amortized 40%
since securitization. Performance has been stable. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 88% and 1.27X, respectively, unchanged from the
prior review.


CREDIT SUISSE 2007-C4: Moody's Affirms Ca Rating on Class D Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on five classes
in Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust Series 2007-C4,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C4 as
follows:

Cl. C, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2017 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. F, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were affirmed because the ratings
are consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 59.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 60.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 11.3% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 11.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 90% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 8% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 96% to $88.0 million
from $2.08 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 10 mortgage loans ranging in size from 1% to 36%
of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of five, compared to a Herf of nine at Moody's last
review.

Two loans, constituting 8% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Sixty loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in or
contributing to an aggregate realized loss of $183 million (for an
average loss severity of 40%). Six loans, constituting 90% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. The largest specially
serviced loan is the Lakeview Plaza ($31.2 million -- 36.5% of the
pool), which is secured by a 177,000 square foot (SF) grocery
anchored retail center located in Brewster, New York. The property
was previously anchored by an A&P supermarket (with a January 2019
lease expiration date), which vacated the property upon company
bankruptcy. ACME has since assumed the lease obligations and
extended through 2029 and currently operates at the property. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2014 and the
property is now real estate owned (REO).

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Egizii Portfolio
Loan ($19.4 million -- 22.7% of the pool), which is secured by a
portfolio of seven distinct properties (one industrial and six
office properties) located in Springfield and Pana, Illinois. The
loan transferred to special servicing in January 2013 due to
monetary default. The loan has been deemed non-recoverable by the
master servicer and the property has become REO. The portfolio was
a combined 42% leased as of August 2018.

The third specially serviced loan is the Northridge Shopping Center
Loan ($8.8 million -- 10.3% of the pool), which is secured by an
approximately 75,000 SF neighborhood retail center located in Sandy
Springs, Georgia. The largest tenant, Kroger, vacated upon lease
expiration and the anchor space has been vacant since. The loan
transferred to special servicing on May 16, 2017 due to monetary
default. The lender is proceeding forward with foreclosure.

The remaining three specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $47.9 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (62% expected loss on
average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 8% of the pool, and has estimated an
aggregate loss of $3.1 million (a 48% expected loss based on a 67%
probability default) from these troubled loans.

The top three loans not in special servicing represent 10.2% of the
pool balance. The largest loan is the Franklin Plaza Shopping
Center Loan ($4.4 million A Note -- 5.1% of the pool and $2.2
million B Note -- 2.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 30,000
SF anchored retail center located in Monroe Township, New Jersey,
approximately 40 miles southwest from New York City. The loan
previously transferred to special servicing in November 2011. The
loan remained with the special servicer until June 2017. The
modified B Note is $2.2 million. The loan is currently performing
under the modified terms; however, Moody's has identified both the
A Note and the B Note as troubled loans.

The second largest loan is the Citibank FSB Branch -- Valrico Loan
($1.4 million -- 1.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 4,400 SF
single tenant property formerly occupied by CitiBank. The former
CitiBank space is subleased to Keller Williams realty. The property
is located 12 miles west of downtown Tampa. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 93% and 1.13X, respectively, compared to 96% and
1.11X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the National City Bank Loan ($0.9 million
-- 1.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 3,475 SF single tenant
retail property currently leased to Chase Bank. The property is
shadow anchored by a Kroger and a Wal-Mart. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 86% and 1.21X, respectively, compared to 88% and
1.19X at the last review.


CSAIL 2015-C1: Fitch Affirms BB Ratings on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 16 classes of Credit Suisse USA CSAIL
2015-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates. In addition,
the Rating Outlook for four classes has been revised to Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: While the pool overall has exhibited
stable performance, Fitch's loss expectations have increased due to
the performance decline of three loans in the top 15, which have
been designated as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC) and together
represent 17.1% of the pool. The Courtyard Midtown East is a hotel
property in New York City and the Westfield Trumbull and Westfield
Wheaton are two regional malls in Trumbull, CT and Wheaton, MD,
respectively, with common sponsorship. All three assets have
exhibited performance challenges due to increased market
competition. There have been no realized losses or loans
transferred to special servicing since issuance.

Limited Credit Enhancement Improvement: As of the September 2018
distribution, the pool's aggregate pool balance has paid down by
2.3% since issuance. Five loans (29.7% of the pool) are full-term
interest only, and an additional six loans (9.9% of the pool)
remain in their interest-only periods and will not begin amortizing
for at least another 12 months. Mitigating the limited amortization
is the increase in defeased collateral since the last rating
action. There are now five fully defeased loans, representing 4.6%
of the pool, up from two defeased loans, representing 1.0% of the
pool, at the last rating action.

Retail and Regional Mall Concentration: Retail properties comprise
25.8% of the pool, including five loans in the top 15 (16.3% of the
pool). Of the top 15 retail exposure, one loan is secured by an
open-air outlet center in Chesterfield, MO operated by Simon
Properties (2.2% of the pool) and three loans are secured by
enclosed regional malls, including two operated by Westfield (10.1%
of the pool) in Trumbull, CT and Wheaton, MD and one operated by
Rouse Properties (2.0% of the pool) in Eureka, CA. These properties
are mainly located in secondary and tertiary markets.

The two largest regional malls, Westfield Trumbull and Westfield
Wheaton, both of which are FLOCs, have exhibited fluctuating sales
and occupancy and both face competition from nearby malls owned by
the same sponsor. Fitch performed an additional sensitivity on
these two malls, which assumed a potential outsized loss of 25% on
each of the loans. The Negative Outlooks on classes E, F, X-E and
X-F reflect this analysis.

Westfield Trumbull (6.5% of the pool) is anchored by Macy's,
JCPenney, Lord and Taylor, Target and LA Fitness. JCPenney recently
executed a renewal option through May 2022. The next major upcoming
lease roll is Macy's in December 2018. Fitch has not yet received
an update on Macy's plans, but the tenant has two extension options
remaining. Total mall sales have dipped to $238 psf for YE2017 from
$258 psf for the TTM ended March 2017. At issuance, total mall
sales were $224 psf. Westfield owns a competing mall located 9.5
miles away that is anchored by Macy's Target, JCPenney and Sears.
In addition, GGP/Brookfield is developing a new luxury mall 16
miles from the subject that is scheduled to open in 2019. It will
be anchored by Nordstrom and Boomingdales.

Westfield Wheaton (3.6% of the pool) is anchored by Macy's,
JCPenney, Target and Costco. There are also groundlease outparcels
occupied by Giant Foods and Sears Outlet. Total mall sales have
also declined in the past year, to $354 psf at YE2017 from $367 psf
for the TTM ended March 2017 and $484 psf at issuance. Westfield
owns a competing mall located 6.6 miles away from the subject,
which is anchored by Macy's, Nordstrom and Sears.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks to classes E, F, X-E and X-F have been revised
to Negative from Stable based on increased loss projections since
the last rating action, largely due to the Westfield Trumbull and
Westfield Wheaton loans. Fitch's analysis included an additional
sensitivity stress which assumed a potential outsized loss of 25%
on each of these loans. Rating downgrades are possible if the
performance of these properties decline significantly. The Rating
Outlooks for classes A-1 through D remain Stable as the remaining
pool continues to exhibit stable performance overall.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $14.8 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $270 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $405.3 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $74.6 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $905.9 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $84.9 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.7 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $66.7 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $53.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.2 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $62.2 million* class X-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $24.3 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable;

  -- $24.3 million* class X-E at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to
Negative from Stable;

  -- $15.2 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable;

  -- $15.2 million* class X-F at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable.

  - Notional amount and interest only

Fitch does not rate the class NR or X-NR certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the class X-C certificate.


CSAIL 2017-CX9: Ftich Affirms BB- Ratings on 3 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 19 classes of CSAIL 2017-CX9 Commercial
Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through certificates,
series 2017-CX9 (CSAIL 2017-CX9).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Generally Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: Loss
expectations remain stable, given mostly stable pool-level
performance. With the exception of two loans in special servicing,
collateral level performance remains in line with issuance
expectations.

Limited Change to Credit Enhancement: There has been minimal change
to credit enhancement since issuance. The pool was securitized in
September 2018 and has amortized by only 0.35%. Twelve loans
representing 61.4% of the pool are full-term interest-only and
eight loans representing 12.4% of the pool are partial interest
only.

Special Serviced Loans: Two loans (3.82%) have transferred to
special servicing since issuance. Acropolis Gardens (2.92%), a 618
unit Co-Operative located in Astoria, Queens, transferred in July
2018 due to imminent monetary default. The loan is 60 days
delinquent. There are multiple lawsuits filed by the shareholders
of the Coop related to matters ranging from fraud, misapplication
of proceeds, to failure to fix life/safety issues.

The other specially serviced loan, Central Avenue Hotels (0.90%),
is secured by a portfolio of four limited service hotels located in
Hot Springs, AR. The loan transferred in February 2018 for imminent
default due to the borrower falling behind on two of the four
franchise payments. Per servicer updates, the loan is paid through
September 2018. Fitch will continue to monitor the loans and
provide further updates as received.

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: Five loans, representing
29.3% of the pool, were given investment-grade credit opinions at
issuance. 245 Park Avenue (6.3%) and 85 Broad Street (5.2%) both
have 'BBB-sf' credit opinions. West Town Mall (3.5%) has a 'BBBsf'
credit opinion, while Two Independence Square (6.4%) and Building
Exchange (7.9%) have credit opinions of A-sf' and 'AAAsf',
respectively.

Lodging Exposure: Hospitality properties represent 25.7% of the
pool by balance, which is higher than the YE 2017 averages. Hotel
properties demonstrate more performance volatility and, therefore,
have higher default probabilities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to relatively
stable performance and recent issuance. Negative rating actions or
downgrades to the non-investment-grade classes are possible if a
prolonged workout of the Acropolis Gardens loan results in
significant trust expenses or impairment of the collateral value.
Upgrades are possible in the future with improved performance,
significant paydown or defeasance.

Fitch affirms the following classes and Outlooks:

  -- $17.9 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $223.3 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $93.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $89.4 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $134 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $14.2 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $97.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $41.1 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $28.8 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $29.8 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.5 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.2b million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  -- $670a million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $70a million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.5a million class X-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $700c million class V1-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $73c million class at V1-B 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.1c million class V1-D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18.3c million class V1-E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The following classes are not rated:

  -- $23.6b million class NR;

  -- $33.2c million class V1-F;

  -- $855.6c million class V2-A.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.

(b) Horizontal credit risk retention interest representing 3.9% of
the pool balance (as of the closing date).

(c) Exchangeable classes.


CSMC TRUST 2018-RPL9: Fitch to Rates $13.8MM Class B-2 Notes 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate CSMC 2018-RPL9 Trust (CSMC 2018-RPL9)
as follows:

  -- $702,513,000 class A-1 notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $123,974,000 class A-2 exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $123,974,000 class A-2A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $123,974,000 class A-2-IO notional notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $826,487,000 class A exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $43,635,000 class M-1 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36,447,000 class M-2 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $34,908,000 class M-3 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20,534,000 class B-1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,860,000 class B-2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $25,359,000 class B-3 notes;

  -- $25,462,705 class B-4 notes;

  -- $1,463,404 class SA notes;

  -- $1,026,692,705 class PT exchangeable notes.

Fitch expects to rate Credit Suisse's CSMC 2018-RPL9 Trust (CSMC
2018-RPL9) residential re-performing loan (RPL) transaction, as
indicated. The notes are supported by one collateral group that
consists of 4,663 seasoned performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $1.03 billion, which includes $85.3
million, or 8.3%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts, as of the cut-off
date. Principal and interest (P&I) and loss allocations are based
on a traditional senior subordinate, sequential structure. The
transaction is expected to close on Oct. 3, 2018.

The 'AAAsf' rating on the class A-2A notes reflects the 19.50%
subordination provided by the 4.25% class M-1, 3.55% class M-2,
3.40% class M-3, 2.00% class B-1, 1.35% class B-2, 2.47% class B3,
and 2.48% class B4 notes.
Fitch's ratings on the notes reflect the credit attributes of the
underlying collateral, the quality of the representation (rep) and
warranty framework, minimal due diligence findings and the
sequential pay structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Credit Quality (Positive): The notes and certificates are
backed by a pool of high-quality RPL mortgage loans. The pool has a
weighted average FICO score of 677, which is on the lower end of
recently rated RPL transactions, but the pool benefits from a
moderate current loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of just 69.7% and a
sustainable LTV of 75.1%. In addition, 88.5% of the pool has been
clean current for 36 months, while an additional 10.7% of the pool
has been clean current for 24 months. This is most evidenced by
Fitch's 'AAAsf' loss expectation of 16.25%.

Clean Current Loans (Positive): Although 95.4% of the pool has been
modified, nearly all of the borrowers have been paying on time for
the past 24 months. In addition, borrowers that have been current
for at least the past 36 months received a 35% reduction to Fitch's
'AAAsf' probability of default (PD) while those that have been
current between 24 months and 36 months received a 26.25%
reduction.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure, whereby the subordinate
classes do not receive principal until the senior classes are
repaid in full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling $85.3 million (8.3% of the pool) are
outstanding on 1,526 loans. Fitch included the deferred amounts
when calculating the borrower's LTV and sLTV despite the lower
payment and amounts not being owed during the term of the loan. The
inclusion resulted in higher PDs and LS than if there were no
deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower default behavior for these
loans will resemble that of the higher LTVs, as exit strategies
(that is, sale or refinancing) will be limited relative to those
borrowers with more equity in the property.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severities
(LS) are less for this transaction than for those where the
servicer is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and
cash flow priorities, together with increased subordination,
provide for timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' rated
classes.

Servicing Transfer Post-Close (Neutral): Within two months
following the closing date, approximately 67% of the pool that is
not currently being serviced by SPS ('RPS1-') will be transferred
to SPS. In its analysis, Fitch ran the entire pool with SPS as the
servicer. This did not have a material impact on Fitch's loss
expectations.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty, and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism
construct for this transaction to generally be consistent with what
it views as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge
qualifiers and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result
of third-party due diligence findings. Fitch increased its 'AAAsf'
expected loss expectations by roughly 118 bps to account for a
potential increase in defaults arising from weaknesses in the reps.


Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): The sponsor, DLJ Mortgage
Capital, Inc.'s (DLJ), as rep provider will only be obligated to
repurchase a loan due to breaches prior to the payment date in
October 2019. Thereafter, a reserve fund will be available to cover
amounts due to noteholders for loans identified as having rep
breaches. Amounts on deposit in the reserve fund, as well as the
increased level of subordination, will be available to cover
additional defaults and losses resulting from rep weaknesses or
breaches occurring on or after the payment date in March.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): Operational risk is well
controlled in this transaction. CS has an experienced RMBS history
and an 'acceptable' aggregator assessment from Fitch. The loans in
the securitization pool are seasoned over 10 years on average and
the results of third-party due diligence identified exceptions
typical for loans of similar collateral and age; however, the
findings had minimal impact on the final overall pool. The pool has
evidenced strong performance with over 99% of the pool having no
delinquencies in past 24 months. While CS's Tier 2 representation
and warranty framework receives a penalty in Fitch's loss model,
the issuer's retention of at least 5% of the bonds helps ensure an
alignment of interest between issuer and investor.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria, as
described in its report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This
incorporates a review of the originators' lending platforms, as
well as an assessment of the transaction's R&Ws provided by the
originators and arranger, which were found to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated one criteria variation from "U.S.
RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria", which is described here.

The variation to the "U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and
Non-Performing Loan Rating Criteria" relates to the expectation
that Fitch will receive 100% compliance due diligence for
re-performing pools. For 62% of the pool (by loan count) that was
originated by one originator, Fitch only received a 20% due
diligence sample. For 38% of the pool (by loan count) that was
originated by multiple originators, Fitch received 100% due
diligence, except for 94 loans, which are extremely seasoned and
closed prior to the effective date of the HOEPA rules that
generally cover predatory lending. Fitch is comfortable on the
sample due diligence on the 62% cohort because the entire cohort
was acquired from a single originator through a bulk purchase. The
originator was acquired by a large bank before the bank sold the
portfolio to Credit Suisse. As a mitigant, Fitch received updated
tax and title searches, pay string reviews, BPOs and custodial
reviews on roughly 100% of the pool, including the 62% cohort.
Further, 88.5% of the pool has been clean current for 36 months,
while an additional 10.7% of the pool has been clean current for 24
months. Fitch did not make any adjustment to its loss expectations
as a result of the diligence scope.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20%, and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 7.9% at the base case. The analysis indicates there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with
the model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivities to determine the stresses to
MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC), Mission Global and Opus,
which were engaged to perform a regulatory compliance and data
integrity third-party due diligence review on the loans.
Additionally, Fitch was provided with Form 15E from Residential
RealEstate Review Management Inc. (RRR), which was engaged to
perform a pay history review and tax, title and lien review. The
third-party due diligence described in Form 15E focused on:
regulatory compliance review and 24-month pay-history review.

The results of the reviews indicated that 497 loans or 22% of the
loans subject to due diligence were graded 'D,' which is
substantially higher than the industry average for Fitch reviewed
transactions. The majority of the 'D' grade exceptions were due to
missing documentation that did not prevent successful testing for
predatory lending, and the exceptions did not carry assignee
liability. Fitch did not make any loss adjustments for these
findings. However, adjustments were applied to 109 loans for which
predatory lending compliance could not be tested with confidence.
Additionally, adjustments were made on 21 loans that are currently
delinquent but did not receive a servicing comment review. These
adjustments are common for RPL transactions and increased expected
losses by approximately 25bps.


DEEPHAVEN RESIDENTIAL 2018-3: S&P Rates $10.1MM Class B-2 Notes 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Deephaven Residential
Mortgage Trust 2018-3's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is a residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction backed by first-lien, fixed- and
adjustable-rate, and interest-only residential mortgage loans
secured by single-family residences, planned-unit developments,
two- to four-family residences, and condominiums to both prime and
nonprime borrowers. The pool has 749 loans, which are primarily
non-qualified mortgage loans.

The ratings reflect:

-- The pool's collateral composition,
-- The credit enhancement provided for this transaction,
-- The transaction's associated structural mechanics,
-- The transaction's representation and warranty framework, and
-- The mortgage aggregator.
  
  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Deephaven Residential Mortgage Trust 2018-3

  Class     Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  A-1       AAA (sf)      205,438,000.00
  A-2       AA (sf)        22,175,000.00
  A-3       A (sf)         45,653,000.00
  M-1       BBB (sf)       19,076,000.00
  B-1       BB (sf)        15,001,000.00
  B-2       B (sf)         10,109,000.00
  B-3       NR              8,641,497.00
  XS        NR                  Notional(i)
  A-IO-S    NR                  Notional(i)
  R         NR                       N/A

(i)Notional amount equals the loans' aggregate stated principal
balance.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


DRYDEN 45: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $35.8MM Class E-R Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of CLO refinancing notes to be issued by Dryden 45 Senior
Loan Fund.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$401,375,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-1-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$14,625,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-2-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$79,300,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$29,900,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$37,000,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$35,800,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

US$7,500,000 Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030 (the "Class F-R Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation.
The issued notes will be collateralized primarily by a portfolio of
broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

PGIM, Inc. will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer.


RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer intends to issue the Refinancing Notes on October 24,
2018 in connection with the refinancing of all classes of the
secured notes previously issued on September 14, 2016. On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer will use proceeds from the issuance of
the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one
class of subordinated notes that will remain outstanding.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, a variety of
other changes to transaction features will occur in connection with
the refinancing. These include: extension of the reinvestment
period; extensions of the stated maturity and non-call period;
changes to certain collateral quality tests; changes to the asset
quality matrix; and changes to the overcollateralization test
levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $648,624,858

Defaults: $1,957,497

Diversity Score: 90

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2810

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


FINANCE OF AMERICA 2018-HB1: Moody's Rates Class M4 Debt '(P)Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Finance
of America Structured Securities Trust 2018-HB1. The ratings range
from (P)Aaa (sf) to (P)Ba3 (sf).

The certificates are backed by a pool that includes 2,117 inactive
home equity conversion mortgages and 120 real estate owned
properties. The servicer for the deal is Finance of America Reverse
LLC. The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Finance of America Structured Securities Trust 2018-HB1

Class A, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Class M1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Class M2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Class M3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Class M4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The collateral backing FASST 2018-HB1 consists of first-lien
inactive HECMs covered by Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
insurance secured by properties in the US along with Real-Estate
Owned (REO) properties acquired through conversion of ownership of
reverse mortgage loans that are covered by FHA insurance. If a
borrower or their estate fails to pay the amount due upon maturity
or otherwise defaults, the sale of the property is used to recover
the amount owed. Finance of America acquired the mortgage assets
from Ginnie Mae sponsored HECM mortgage backed (HMBS)
securitizations. All of the mortgage assets are covered by FHA
insurance for the repayment of principal up to certain amounts.
There are 2,237 mortgage assets with a balance of $399,031,339. The
assets are in either default, due and payable, referred,
bankruptcy, foreclosure or REO status. Loans that are in default
may move to due and payable; due and payable loans may move to
foreclosure; and foreclosure loans may move to REO. 14.8% of the
assets are in default of which 0.6% (of the total assets) are in
default due to non-occupancy, 14.2% (of the total assets) are in
default due to taxes and insurance. 34.0% of the assets are due and
payable, 40.5% of the assets are in foreclosure and 6.3% were in
bankruptcy status. Finally, 4.1% of the assets are REO properties
and were acquired through foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of
foreclosure on the associated loan. If the value of the related
mortgaged property is greater than the loan amount, some of these
loans may be settled by the borrower or their estate.

Compared to the Nationstar HECM Loan Trust transactions and FASST
2017-HB1, FASST 2018-HB1 has loans that have a lower LTV and a
greater proportion of properties in non-judicial states.

Approximately, 11.7% of the mortgage assets by unpaid principal
balance are backed by properties in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico HECMs
pose additional risk due to the poor state of the Puerto Rican
economy, the uncertainty in the housing market, the aftermath of
Hurricane Maria that led to a mass exodus, and the bureaucratic
foreclosure process. In addition, Puerto Rico has a tax exoneration
policy that exempts many seniors from property taxes. Due to the
territory's bureaucratic tax exoneration process, it may require a
significant amount of time to liquidate Puerto Rican HECMs with tax
delinquencies. Moody's applied additional stress in its analysis to
account for the risk posed by properties in Puerto Rico.

Of note, the pool contains 105 properties ($14.3 million),
representing 3.6% of the pool balance, that are located in North or
South Carolina, which could be impacted by Hurricane Florence.
Similar to what was done post Hurricane Maria, FAR will order
property inspection reports for properties in FEMA designated
areas. In addition, there are property level reps & warranties that
no mortgaged property has suffered damages due to fire, flood,
windstorm, earthquake, tornado, hurricane, or any other damages.

Its credit ratings reflect state-specific foreclosure timeline
stresses as well as potential extended timelines for loans in
bankruptcy.

Servicing

Finance of America Reverse LLC will be the named servicer under the
sale and servicing agreement. Finance of America has the necessary
processes, staff, technology and overall infrastructure in place to
effectively oversee the servicing of this transaction. Finance of
America will use Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. (RMS) and
Compu-Link Corporation, d/b/a Celink (Celink) as sub-servicers to
service the mortgage assets. RMS will subservice 51.8% of the pool
and Celink 48.2%. Based on an operational review of Finance of
America, it has strong sub-servicing monitoring processes, a
seasoned servicing oversight team and direct system access to the
sub-servicers core systems.

On November 30, 2017, RMS' corporate parent Ditech Holding Corp.
filed a pre-packaged plan of reorganization under chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. The restructuring was approved by
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York on January 17, 2018 and an order confirming such approval was
entered on January 18, 2018. Ditech successfully completed the
restructuring and emerged from chapter 11 bankruptcy on February 9,
2018. Although RMS was not included in the bankruptcy filing, there
is still uncertainty as to the overall impact Ditech's financial
condition going forward may have on RMS and its servicing
operations.

To mitigate the risk, Finance of America has engaged Celink as a
backup subservicer for RMS and Celink will assume RMS's
sub-servicing duties should RMS fail to perform its obligations
under its sub-servicing agreement. The sub-servicing agreement
between Finance of America and RMS will automatically terminate at
the end of each thirty (30) day period reducing the operational
risk should RMS go into bankruptcy. If RMS is terminated as
sub-servicer, Celink will complete a servicing transfer of the
loans in the pool from RMS within 90 days following termination.
Celink has mapped RMS' portfolio for easier transfer. Moody's has
taken these factors into consideration in its analysis and
increased foreclosure timelines by three months for loans
subserviced by RMS.

Of note, Finance of America recently disclosed that an affiliate
company of Finance of America Reverse LLC failed to comply with a
profitability covenant in its financing arrangements. The terms of
the financing arrangements contained cross-default provisions
whereby a default by the affiliate company resulted in a default of
FAR's own financing arrangements. FAR recently addressed this
cross-default risk by amending its financing arrangements to remove
such cross-default provisions. Nevertheless, a default of FAR's
affiliate could have a negative impact on FAR, its parent company
or other affiliates.

Transaction Structure

The securitization has a sequential liability structure amongst six
classes of notes with overcollateralization and structural
subordination. All funds collected, prior to an acceleration event,
are used to make interest payments to the notes, then principal
payments to the Class A notes, then to a redemption account until
the amount on deposit in the redemption account is sufficient to
cover future principal and interest payments for the subordinate
notes up to their expected final payment dates. The subordinate
notes will not receive principal until the beginning of their
respective target amortization periods (in the absence of an
acceleration event). The notes benefit from overcollateralization
and structural subordination as credit enhancement and an interest
reserve account for liquidity.

The transaction is callable on or after six months with a 1.0%
premium and on or after 12 months without a premium. The mandatory
call date for the Class A notes is in September 2020. For the Class
M1 notes, the expected final payment date is in February 2021. For
the Class M2 notes, the expected final payment date is in April
2021. For the Class M3 notes, the expected final payment date is in
June 2021. For the Class M4 notes, the expected final payment date
is in August 2021. For the Class M5 notes, the expected final
payment date is in February 2022. For each of the subordinate
notes, there are various target amortization periods that conclude
on the respective expected final payment dates. The legal stated
maturity of the transaction is 10 years.

Available funds to the transaction are expected to primarily come
from the liquidation of REO properties and receipt of FHA insurance
claims. These funds will be received with irregular timing. In the
event that there are insufficient funds to pay interest in a given
period, the interest reserve account may be utilized. Additionally,
any shortfall in interest will be classified as a cap carryover.
These cap carryover amounts will have priority of payments in the
waterfall and will also accrue interest at the respective note
rate.

Certain aspects of the waterfall are dependent upon Finance of
America remaining as servicer. Servicing fees and servicer related
reimbursements are subordinated to interest and principal payments
while Finance of America is servicer. However, servicing advances
(i.e. taxes, insurance and property preservation) will instead have
priority over interest and principal payments in the event that
Finance of America defaults and a new servicer is appointed.

Its analysis considers the expected loss to investors by the legal
final maturity date, which is ten years from closing, and not by
certain acceleration dates that may occur earlier. Moody's noted
the presence of automatic acceleration events for failure to pay
the Class A notes by the Class A mandatory call date, failure to
pay the classes of Class M notes by their expected final payment
dates, and the failure to pay the classes of Class M notes their
targeted amortization amounts. The occurrence of any of these
acceleration events would not by itself lead us to bring the
outstanding rating to a level consistent with impairment, because
such event would not necessarily be indicative of an economic
distress. Furthermore these acceleration events lack effective
legal consequences other than changing payment priorities and
interest rates, which are modeled in its analysis. Liquidation of
the collateral would require 100% consent of any class of notes
that would not be paid in full.

Third-Party Review

A third party firm conducted a review of certain characteristics of
the mortgage assets on behalf of Finance of America. The review
focused on data integrity, FHA insurance coverage verification,
accuracy of appraisal recording, accuracy of occupancy status
recording, borrower age documentation, identification of excessive
corporate advances, documentation of servicer advances, and
identification of tax liens. Also, broker price opinions (BPOs)
were ordered for 304 properties in the pool.

The TPR firm conducted an extensive data integrity review. Certain
data tape fields, such as the MIP rate, the current UPB, current
interest rate, and marketable title date were reviewed against
Finance of America's servicing system. However, a significant
number of data tape fields were reviewed against imaged copies of
original documents of record, screen shots of HUD's HERMIT system,
or HUD documents. Some key fields reviewed in this manner included
the original note rate, the debenture rate, foreclosure first legal
date, and the called due date.

Reps & Warranties (R&W)

Finance of America is the loan-level R&W provider. Finance of
America is unrated. This risk is mitigated by the fact that a
third-party due diligence firm conducted a review on the loans for
evidence of FHA insurance.

Finance of America represents that the mortgage loans are covered
by FHA insurance that is in full force and effect. Finance of
America provides further R&Ws including those for title, first lien
position, enforceability of the lien, regulatory compliance, and
the condition of the property. Finance of America provides a no
fraud R&W covering the origination of the mortgage loans,
determination of value of the mortgaged properties, and the sale
and servicing of the mortgage loans. Although certain
representations are knowledge qualified, the transaction documents
contain language specifying that if a representation would have
been breached if not for the knowledge qualifier then Finance of
America will repurchase the relevant asset as if the representation
had been breached.

Upon the identification of an R&W breach, Finance of America has to
cure the breach. If Finance of America is unable to cure the
breach, Finance of America must repurchase the loan within 90 days
from receiving the notification. Moody's believes the absence of an
independent third party reviewer who can identify any breaches to
the R&W makes the enforcement mechanism weak in this transaction.

When analyzing the transaction, Moody's reviewed the transaction's
exposure to large potential indemnification payments owed to
transaction parties due to potential lawsuits. In particular,
Moody's assessed the risk that the acquisition trustee would be
subject to lawsuits from investors for a failure to adequately
enforce the R&Ws against the Seller. Moody's believes that FASST
2018-HB1 is adequately protected against such risk in part because
a third-party data integrity review was conducted on a significant
random sample of the loans. In addition, the third-party due
diligence firm verified that all of the loans in the pool are
covered by FHA insurance.

Trustees

The acquisition and owner trustee for the FASST 2018-HB1
transaction is Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB. The paying
agent and cash management functions will be performed by U.S. Bank
National Association. U.S. Bank National Association will also
serve as the claims payment agent and as such will be the HUD
mortgagee of record for the mortgage assets in the pool.

Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and Re-Performing
Loans," published in August 2016 and "Moody's Global Approach to
Rating Reverse Mortgage Securitizations," published in May 2015.

Its quantitative asset analysis is based on a loan-by-loan modeling
of expected payout amounts and timing of payouts given the
structure of FHA insurance and with various stresses applied to
model parameters depending on the target rating level. However, the
modeling assumptions are different for the Puerto Rico portion of
the pool and the portion of the pool that are in bankruptcy.

FHA insurance claim types: Funds come into the transaction
primarily through the sale of REO properties and through FHA
insurance claim receipts. There are uncertainties related to the
extent and timing of insurance proceeds received by the trust due
to the mechanics of the FHA insurance. HECM mortgagees may suffer
losses if a property is sold for less than its appraised value.

The amount of insurance proceeds received from the FHA depends on
whether a sales based claim (SBC) or appraisal based claim (ABC) is
filed. SBCs are filed in cases where the property is successfully
sold within the first six months after the servicer has acquired
it. ABCs are filed six months after the servicer has obtained
marketable title if the property has not yet been sold. For an SBC,
HUD insurance will cover the difference between (i) the loan
balance and (ii) the higher of the sales price and 95.0% of the
latest appraisal, with the transaction bearing losses if the sales
price is lower than 95.0% of the latest appraisal. For an ABC, HUD
only covers the difference between the loan amount and 100% of the
appraised value, so failure to sell the property at the appraised
value results in loss.

Moody's expects ABCs to have higher levels of losses than SBCs. The
fact that there is a delay in the sale of the property usually
implies some adverse characteristics associated with the property.
FHA insurance will not protect against losses to the extent that an
ABC property is sold at a price lower than the appraisal value
taken at the six month mark of REO. Additionally, ABCs do not cover
the cost to sell properties (broker fees) while SBCs do cover these
costs. For SBCs, broker fees are reimbursable up to 6.0%
ordinarily. Its base case expectation is that properties will be
sold for 13.5% less than their appraisal value for ABCs. To make
this assumption, Moody's considered industry data and the
historical experience of Finance of America. Moody's stressed this
percentage at higher credit rating levels. In a Aaa scenario,
Moody's assumed that these ABC appraisal haircuts could reach up to
30.0%.

In its asset analysis, Moody's also assumed there would be some
losses for SBCs, albeit lower amounts than for ABCs. Based on
historical performance, in the base case scenario Moody's assumed
that SBCs would suffer 1.0% losses due to a failure to sell the
property for an amount equal to or greater than 95.0% of the most
recent appraisal. Moody's stressed this percentage at higher credit
rating levels. In a Aaa scenario, Moody's assumed that SBC
appraisal haircuts could reach up to 11.0% (i.e., 6.0% below
95.0%).

Under its analytical approach, each loan is modeled to go through
both the ABC and SBC process with a certain probability. Each loan
will thus have both ABC and SBC sales disposition payments and
associated insurance payments (four payments in total). All
payments are then probability weighted and run through a modeled
liability structure. Moody's considered industry data and the
historical experience of Finance of America in its analysis. For
the base case scenario, Moody's assumed that 85% of claims would be
SBCs and the rest would be ABCs. Moody's stressed this assumption
and assumed higher ABC percentages for higher rating levels. At a
Aaa rating level, Moody's assumed that 85% of insurance claims
would be submitted as ABCs.

Liquidation process: Each asset is categorized into one of four
categories: default, due and payable, foreclosure and REO. In its
analysis, Moody's assumes loans that are in referred status to be
either in the foreclosure or REO category. The loans are assumed to
move through each of these stages until being sold out of REO.
Moody's assumed that loans would be in default status for six
months. Due and payable status is expected to last six to 12 months
depending on the default reason. REO disposition is assumed to take
place in six months for SBCs and 12 months for ABCs.

The timeline for foreclosure status is based on the state in which
the related property is located. To arrive at the base case
foreclosure timeline, Moody's considered the FHA foreclosure
diligence time frames (per HUD guidelines as of February 5, 2016)
and the historical foreclosure timeline information provided by
FAR. Moody's stresses state foreclosure timelines by a
multiplicative factor for various rating levels (e.g., state
foreclosure timelines are multiplied by 1.6x for its Aaa level
rating stress).

Debenture interest: The receipt of debenture interest is dependent
upon performance of certain actions within certain timelines by the
servicer. If these timeline and performance benchmarks are not met
by the servicer, debenture interest is subject to curtailment. Its
base case assumption is that 95.0% of debenture interest will be
received by the trust. Moody's stressed the amount of debenture
interest that will be received at higher rating levels. Its
debenture interest assumptions reflect the requirement that Finance
of America reimburse the trust for debenture interest curtailments
due to servicing errors or failures to comply with HUD guidelines.
However, the transaction documents do not specify a required time
frame within which the servicer must reimburse the trust for
debenture interest curtailments. As such, there may be a delay
between when insurance payments are received and when debenture
interest curtailments are reimbursed. Its debenture interest
assumptions take this into consideration.

Additional model features: Moody's incorporated certain additional
considerations into its analysis, including the following:

In most cases, the most recent appraisal value was used as the
property value in its analysis. However, for seasoned appraisals
Moody's applied a 15.0% haircut to account for potential home price
depreciation between the time of the appraisal and the cut-off
date.

Mortgage loans with borrowers that have significant equity in their
homes are likely to be paid off by the borrowers or their heirs
rather than complete the foreclosure process. Moody's estimated
which loans would be bought out of the trust by comparing each
loan's appraisal value (post haircut) to its UPB. However, Finance
of America's historical data has shown that even loans with
original LTVs between 65-85% have incurred some losses the longer
it takes to resolve. Hence, Moody's applied a slight haircut to
cash flows derived from these positive equity loans under its based
case scenario and scaled it up for higher rating levels.

Moody's assumed that foreclosure costs will average $4,500 per
loan, two thirds of which will be reimbursed by the FHA. Moody's
then applied a negative adjustment to this amount based on the TPR
results.

Moody's increased timeline calculations for taxes and insurance
defaulted loans to reflect historical data.

Moody's estimated monthly tax and insurance advances based on
cumulative tax and insurance advances to date.

Moody's also ran additional stress scenarios that were designed to
mimic expected cash flows in the scenario where Finance of America
is no longer the servicer. Moody's assumed the following in such a
scenario:

Servicing advances and servicing fees: while Finance of America
subordinates their recoupment of servicing advances, servicing
fees, and MIP payments; a replacement servicer will not subordinate
these amounts.

Finance of America indemnifies the trust for lost debenture
interest due to servicing errors or failure to comply with HUD
guidelines. In an event of bankruptcy, Finance of America will not
have the financial capacity to do so.

A replacement servicer may require an additional fee and thus
Moody's assumes a 25bps strip will take effect if the servicer is
replaced.

One third of foreclosure costs will be removed from sales proceeds
to reimburse a replacement servicer for such advances (one third of
foreclosure costs are not reimbursable under FHA insurance). This
is typically on the order of $1,500 per loan.

Moody's has increased foreclosure timelines by three months for RMS
subserviced loans in its analysis. Celink is backup servicer for
RMS. If RMS is terminated as subservicer by FAR it will take 90
days for transfer servicing from RMS to Celink.

To account for potential extension of timelines due to chapter 13
bankrupt loans, Moody's extended the timeline by an additional 21
months in the base case scenario and scaled it up for higher rating
levels.

Furthermore, to account for risks posed by Puerto Rico loans,
Moody's considered the following:

To account for delays in the foreclosure process in Puerto Rico due
to the hurricanes, Moody's used five years as its full stress
foreclosure timeline and scaled the impact down the rating levels.


For properties located in Puerto Rico, Moody's assumed that all
insurance claims would be submitted as an ABC as a result of the
hurricanes. In addition, Moody's assumed that properties will sell
significantly lower than their appraised values. Moody's also
increased the amount of non-reimbursable expenses that Moody's
expects would be incurred by a replacement servicer following a
servicer termination event. Furthermore, Moody's assumed increased
foreclosure costs taking into consideration historical data.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of stress could
drive the ratings up. Transaction performance depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
improve from its original expectations resulting in appreciation in
the value of the mortgaged property and faster property sales.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of stresses could drive the
ratings down. Transaction performance depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Property markets could
deteriorate from its original expectations resulting in
depreciation in the value of the mortgaged property and slower
property sales.


FIRST INVESTORS: S&P Affirms BB- Rating on 2017-1 Cl. E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on 11 classes and affirmed
its ratings on seven classes from five First Investors Auto Owner
Trust (FIAOT) transactions, series 2014-2, 2014-3, 2015-1, 2015-2,
and 2017-1.

The collateral pools for the FIAOT transactions comprise auto loan
receivables that were originated to mainly subprime borrowers.

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect each transaction's collateral
performance to date and our expectations regarding future
collateral performance, as well as each transaction's structure and
credit enhancement levels. Additionally, we incorporated secondary
credit factors, including credit stability, payment priorities
under various scenarios, and sector and issuer-specific analyses.
Considering these factors, we believe the notes' creditworthiness
is consistent with the raised and affirmed ratings.

"These transactions are generally performing weaker than our
original or prior expectations. We revised our expected cumulative
net losses (CNLs) for series 2014-2, 2014-3, 2015-1, 2015-2, and
2017-1.

"Nonetheless, since each transaction closed, the credit support for
each class has increased as a percentage of the amortizing pool
balance and is, in our view, adequate to support the raised or
affirmed ratings."

  Table 1
  Collateral Performance (%)
  As of the September 2018 distribution date

                     Pool   Current        60+ days
  Series   Month   factor       CNL   delinquencies
  2014-2      49    12.34     11.45            5.25
  2014-3      46    14.99     10.83            4.84
  2015-1      41    19.83      9.60            4.54
  2015-2      37    27.13      9.31            4.71
  2017-1      19    56.52      5.53            3.86

  CNL--Cumulative net loss.

  Table 2
  CNL Expectations (%)
  As of the September 2018 distribution date

               Initial            Prior           Current
              lifetime         lifetime          lifetime
  Series      CNL exp.      CNL exp.(i)          CNL exp.
  2014-2     7.50-8.00     11.00-11.50        11.50-12.00
  2014-3     7.50-8.00     10.55-11.05        11.25-11.75
  2015-1     8.25-8.50      9.40-10.00        10.50-11.00
  2015-2     8.25-8.50      9.75-10.25        11.50-12.00
  2017-1     9.75-10.25     9.75-10.25        12.25-12.75
      
(i) As of April 2017 for series 2014-2 through series 2015-2.
Series 2016-1 and 2016-2 were last revised in December 2017 and are
not part of this review.
CNL exp.--Cumulative net loss expectation.

Each transaction contains a sequential principal payment structure
in which the notes are paid principal by seniority. Each also has
credit enhancement in the form of a nonamortizing reserve account,
overcollateralization, subordination for the higher-rated tranches,
and excess spread. The credit enhancement for each of the
transactions is at the specified target. The credit enhancement
levels have grown for all of the outstanding classes as a
percentage of their current collateral balances and are a major
consideration behind the upgrades and affirmations.

  Table 3
  Hard Credit Support (%)
  As of the September 2018 distribution date

                                                   Current
                          Total hard            total hard
                      credit support    credit support(ii)
  Series      Class   at issuance(i)        (% of current)
  2014-2      C                 7.05                 61.20
  2014-2      D                 1.50                 16.22
  2014-3      C                 8.32                 59.42
  2014-3      D                 1.50                 13.92
  2015-1      B                17.51                 90.81
  2015-1      C                 9.46                 50.22
  2015-1      D                 2.11                 13.17
  2015-2      A-2              24.75                 93.98
  2015-2      B                19.90                 76.10
  2015-2      C                12.30                 48.08
  2015-2      D                 5.95                 24.67
  2015-2      E                 1.50                  8.28
  2017-1      A(iii)           26.65                 51.96
  2017-1      B                20.85                 41.70
  2017-1      C                12.25                 26.48
  2017-1      D                 5.50                 14.54
  2017-1      E                 1.50                  7.46

  (i) Consists of a reserve account, overcollateralization, and
subordination for the higher-rated tranches and excludes excess
spread, which can also provide additional enhancement.
(ii) Calculated as a percent of the total gross receivables pool
balance.
(iii) Class A consists of the class A-1 and A-2 notes.

S&P said, "We incorporated cash flow analysis to assess the loss
coverage levels, giving credit to excess spread. Our various cash
flow scenarios included forward-looking assumptions on recoveries,
timing of losses, and voluntary absolute prepayment speeds that we
believe are appropriate given each transaction's performance to
date. Aside from our break-even cash flow analysis, we also
conducted sensitivity analyses for these series to determine the
impact that a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario would have on our
ratings if losses began trending higher than our revised base-case
loss expectation.

"In our view, the results demonstrated that all of the classes have
adequate credit enhancement at the raised or affirmed rating
levels. We will continue to monitor the performance of all of the
outstanding transactions to ensure that the credit enhancement
remains sufficient, in our view, to cover our cumulative net loss
expectations under our stress scenarios for each of the rated
classes."

  RATINGS RAISED

  First Investors Auto Owner Trust
                           Rating
  Series    Class     To          From
  2014-2    C         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
  2014-2    D         AAA (sf)    BBB (sf)
  2014-3    C         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
  2014-3    D         A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
  2015-1    B         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
  2015-1    C         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
  2015-1    D         A+ (sf)     BBB (sf)
  2015-2    B         AAA (sf)    AA+ (sf)
  2015-2    C         AAA (sf)    AA (sf)
  2015-2    D         A+ (sf)     A- (sf)
  2017-1    B         AA+ (sf)    AA (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  First Investors Auto Owner Trust
  Series   Class      Rating
  2015-2   A-2        AAA (sf)
  2015-2   E          BB (sf)
  2017-1   A-1        AAA (sf)
  2017-1   A-2        AAA (sf)
  2017-1   C          A (sf)
  2017-1   D          BBB (sf)
  2017-1   E          BB- (sf)



FLAGSTAR MORTGAGE 2018-5: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Cl. B-5 Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. finalized its provisional ratings on the Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-5 (the Certificates) issued
by Flagstar Mortgage Trust 2018-5 (the Trust), as follows:

-- $439.7 million Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $399.7 million Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- $235.8 million Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- $64.0 million Class A-4 at AAA (sf)
-- $20.0 million Class A-5 at AAA (sf)
-- $80.0 million Class A-6 at AAA (sf)
-- $299.8 million Class A-7 at AAA (sf)
-- $99.9 million Class A-8 at AAA (sf)
-- $163.9 million Class A-9 at AAA (sf)
-- $319.8 million Class A-10 at AAA (sf)
-- $40.0 million Class A-11 at AAA (sf)
-- $439.7 million Class A-X-1 at AAA (sf)
-- $10.8 million Class B-1 at AA (sf)
-- $6.1 million Class B-2 at A (sf)
-- $5.9 million Class B-3 at BBB (sf)
-- $3.8 million Class B-4 at BB (sf)
-- $1.4 million Class B-5 at B (sf)

Class A-X-1 is an interest-only certificate. The class balance
represents a notional amount.

Classes A-1, A-2, A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are exchangeable
certificates. These classes can be exchanged for a combination of
initial exchangeable certificates as specified in the offering
documents.

Classes A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-10 are
super-senior certificates. These classes benefit from additional
protection from senior support certificates (Class A-11) with
respect to loss allocation.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Certificates reflect the 6.50% of
credit enhancement provided by subordinated Certificates in the
pool. The AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf) and B (sf) ratings
reflect 4.20%, 2.90%, 1.65%, 0.85% and 0.55% of credit enhancement,
respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of first-lien,
fixed-rate, prime residential mortgages. The Certificates are
backed by 719 loans with a total principal balance of $470,243,665
as of the Cut-off Date (September 1, 2018).

Flagstar Bank, FSB is the originator and servicer of the mortgage
loans and the sponsor of the transaction. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
will act as the Master Servicer, Securities Administrator,
Certificate Registrar and Custodian. Wilmington Trust, National
Association will serve as Trustee. IngletBlair, LLC will act as the
Representation and Warranty (R&W) Reviewer.

The pool consists of fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages with
original terms to maturity of primarily 30 years. Approximately
32.7% of the pool are agency-eligible mortgage loans which were
eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

The transaction employs a senior-subordinate, shifting-interest
cash flow structure that is enhanced from a pre-crisis structure.

Unique to this transaction, the servicing fee payable to the
Servicer comprises three separate components: the base servicing
fee, the aggregate delinquent servicing fee and the aggregate
incentive servicing fee. These fees vary based on the delinquency
status of the related loan and will be paid from interest
collections before distribution to the securities. The base
servicing fee will reduce the net weighted-average coupon (WAC)
payable to certificate holders as part of the aggregate expense
calculation. However, the delinquent and incentive servicing fees
will not be included in the reduction of Net WAC and will thus
reduce available funds entitled to the certificate holders (except
for the Class B-6-C Net WAC). To capture the impact of such
potential fees, DBRS ran additional cash flow stresses based on its
60+-day delinquency and default curves, as detailed in the Cash
Flow Analysis section of the related report.

The ratings reflect transactional strengths that include
high-quality underlying assets and well-qualified borrowers.

This transaction exhibits certain challenges such as limited
third-party due diligence as well as a R&W framework that contains
materiality factors, an unrated R&W provider, knowledge qualifiers
and sunset provisions that allow for certain R&Ws to expire within
three to six years after the Closing Date. The framework is
perceived by DBRS to be limiting compared with traditional lifetime
R&W standards in certain DBRS-rated securitizations. To capture the
perceived weaknesses, DBRS reduced the originator score in this
pool. A lower originator score results in increased default and
loss assumptions and provides additional cushions for the rated
securities.


FREMF MORTGAGE 2012-KF01: Moody's Lowers Class X Debt Rating to B3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on one
interest-only class of CMBS securities, issued by FREMF 2012-KF01
Mortgage Trust, Multifamily Mortgage Pass- Through Certificates,
Series 2012-KF01 and downgraded the ratings on one interest-only
class of related Structured Pass-Through Certificates issued by
Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates, Series K-F01.

Issuer: FREMF 2012-KF01 Mortgage Trust

Cl. X, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Issuer: Freddie Mac Structured Pass-Through Certificates (SPCs),
Series K-F01

Cl. X, Downgraded Guaranteed Rating to B3 (sf); Underlying Rating
Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Assigned
Guaranteed Rating B1 (sf); previously on Dec 7, 2017 Underlying
Rating Affirmed B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

SPC Class X issued by the SPC Trust represents a pass-through
interest in REMIC Class X issued by the REMIC Trust. At
securitization there were four principal and interest classes,
Classes A, B, C and D, issued by the REMIC Trust (the "P&I REMIC
Classes"); due to paydowns and amortization, the only P&I REMIC
Class that remains outstanding is Class D, which is not rated by
Moody's. An additional SPC Class, Class A, was also issued by the
SPC Trust and has been paid down in full. The two trusts are
interrelated given that the aggregate certificate amount as of the
August 2018 remittance statement of $27,420,682 is comprised of
$27,420,682 in P&I REMIC Classes, and the $27,420,682 notional
amount of the Class X SPC references the remaining balance of the
REMIC Trust.

The interest-only REMIC Class X is the only outstanding class in
the REMIC Trust that is rated by Moody's. The notional balance of
REMIC Class X references the P&I REMIC Classes in the REMIC Trust,
which are collateralized by a pool of two remaining floating rate
loans. REMIC Class X was acquired and guaranteed by Freddie Mac and
subsequently deposited into the SPC Trust to back SPC Class X that
was offered to investors. As a result, any guarantee payments made
by Freddie Mac on the REMIC Class X will be passed through to the
holders of the corresponding SPC Class X. Freddie Mac also
guarantees the SPC Class X itself. Moody's rates Freddie Mac's
senior unsecured debt Aaa.

The REMIC Class X was downgraded based on the decline in credit
quality of its referenced classes, resulting from an increase in
expected losses for the loan in special servicing.

The Underlying Rating on SPC Class X was downgraded based on the
underlying credit risk of the related REMIC Class X without credit
for the guarantee provided by Freddie Mac.

Under the transaction documents, Freddie Mac guarantees timely
payment of interest on REMIC Class X and SPC Class X. However,
Moody's notes that the Freddie Mac guarantees on the interest-only
SPC Class X do not provide additional enhancement. Freddie Mac's
guarantee does not cover any loss of yield on this interest-only
class following a reduction of notional amount due to a reduction
of the principal balance of the P&I REMIC Classes. Therefore, the
Guaranteed Rating and the Underlying Rating on SPC Class X reflect
only the class' underlying credit risk without credit for the
guarantees.

In the downgrade of the Guaranteed Ratings on the SPC Class X,
Moody's considered the repack nature of the structure, the credit
quality of the underlying collateral, and, other than with respect
to the Underlying Ratings, the guarantees that Freddie Mac provides
for the benefit of the SPCs.

Given the repack nature of the structure, SPC note holders are
exposed to the credit risk of the underlying SPC assets, namely,
the rated REMIC Class X. The SPC Trust contains a separate
pass-through pool, designated as Pass-Through Pool X, which holds
the corresponding rated REMIC Class X. All cash flows received by
REMIC Class X are applied to make pass-through payments to the
corresponding SPC Class X. Repayment of the rated SPC Class X
depends primarily on the performance of the rated REMIC Class X, as
well as any payments made by Freddie Mac pursuant to its
guarantees.

Moody's considered the repack nature of the structure, the credit
quality of the underlying collateral, and, other than with respect
to the Underlying Ratings, the guarantees that Freddie Mac provides
for the benefit of this SPC Class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 21.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 4.7% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 0.4% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 0.1% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


An IO class may be subject to ratings upgrades if there is an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes,
subject to the limits and provisions of the updated IO methodology.


An IO class may be subject to ratings downgrades if there is (i) a
decline in the credit quality of the reference classes and/or (ii)
paydowns of higher quality reference classes, subject to the limits
and provisions of the updated IO methodology.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating REMIC Class X were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

The methodologies used in rating SPC Class X Guaranteed Rating were
"Rating Transactions Based on the Credit Substitution Approach:
Letter of Credit-backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debts" published in
May 2017, "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities"
published in June 2015, and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

The methodologies used in rating SPC Class X Underlying Rating were
"Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in
June 2015 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the August 27, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 98% to $27.42
million from $1.37 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans.

The only specially serviced loan is Carriage House ($7.84 million
-- 28.6% of the pool), which is secured by a 65 unit (132 bed)
garden-style student rental property located in Storrs Mansfield,
Connecticut, approximately 1 mile from the University of
Connecticut. The loan transferred to special servicing in March
2018 when the borrower requested a modification, which was
initially rejected. Foreclosure was initiated in June 2018 and a
receiver was appointed. The property has immediate capital repair
needs and the property's financial performance has declined
significantly since securitization. Moody's assumed a large loss on
this loan.

The only other loan in the pool is Marquis at Stonegate ($19.58
million -- 71.4% of the pool), which is secured by 19, three-story
buildings making up a 308 unit garden-style apartment complex
located in Fort Worth, Texas. Common area amenities include a
swimming pool, BBQ grills, outdoor dining area, courtyard,
volleyball court, clubhouse, covered parking, business center, &
fitness center. As of June 2018, the property was 91% leased,
compared to 92% in June 2017. Performance dropped slightly in 2017
due to an increase in expenses. The loan is performing and has a
maturity date in July 2019. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 79%
and 1.27X, respectively, unchanged from the prior review.


GE COMMERCIAL 2007-C1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited changed the trend on two classes of the Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C1 issued by GE
Commercial Mortgage Corporation, Series 2007-C1, to Stable from
Negative. In addition, the classes have been confirmed as follows:

-- Class A-M at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class A-MFX at BB (low) (sf)

The rating confirmations and Stable trend assignments reflect
DBRS's outlook for the remaining seven loans in the transaction,
particularly for the two largest loans remaining in the pool, which
collectively represent 65.6% of the pool balance in Prospectus ID
#4 – Skyline Portfolio (39.5% of the pool balance) and Prospectus
ID #7 – JP Morgan Portfolio (26.1% of the pool balance). As of
the September 2018 remittance, there are seven of the original 197
loans remaining in the pool. Since issuance, the pool has
experienced collateral reduction of 87.0% as a result of scheduled
amortization, successful loan repayments and principal recoveries
and losses from loans liquidated out of the pool. To date, 55 loans
have been liquidated, for a total realized loss of $424.3 million
since issuance.

DBRS previously assigned Negative trends to the two rated classes
to reflect concerns with the outlook for the former largest loan in
the pool, Prospectus ID #1 – 666 Fifth Avenue. That loan had
previously been modified with an A/B split and DBRS was expecting a
full loss of the B note, with a high likelihood of a partial loss
on the A note, as well. However, that loan was repaid with the
August 2018 remittance, with the B note written off as a 100% loss
and the A note repaid in full. In addition to this significant pay
down, there have also been three recent liquidations that
collectively resulted in losses of $16.5 million, wiping out the
remainder of the unrated Class D certificates and reducing the
balance of the unrated Class C certificates by approximately 50%.
In general, those losses were in line with DBRS's expectations.

The Skyline Portfolio loan, which is now the largest remaining loan
in the pool, is secured by a portfolio of eight Class A and Class B
office properties in Falls Church, Virginia. The portfolio has been
real estate owned (REO) since late 2016 after the borrower
defaulted in April 2016 and the loan was transferred to special
servicing for the second time. Per the September 2017 appraisal,
the portfolio was valued at a total of $301.9 million, an increase
over the last valuation from November 2016, when the as-is value
was estimated at $201.0 million. The portfolio has been
occupancy-challenged for several years, suffering from a soft
submarket and falling government-sector demand. The special
servicer is focusing efforts toward selling the One Skyline Tower
property (39.1% of the appraised value for the portfolio) and plans
to evaluate strategies for the remainder of the portfolio when that
transaction is finalized. Based on the appraised value, DBRS
expects a loss severity in excess of 70% will be realized at
liquidation.

The second-largest loan, JP Morgan Portfolio, was previously
secured by two properties in a 40-story, Class A office property
and accompanying parking garage located in Phoenix, Arizona, and a
17-story office property in Houston, Texas. A partial loan sale was
completed in March 2018 and the Phoenix property was released, with
only the Houston property remaining, which has been REO since
February 2018. As part of the partial loan sale, a $62.1 million
pay down was applied to the trust with the April 2018 remittance.
The most recent appraisal obtained for the Houston property
estimated an as-is value of $52.0 million as of December 2017.
Given the remaining trust exposure of approximately $139.5 million
for this loan as of the September 2018 remittance, DBRS assumed a
loss severity in excess of 69.0% for this review.

As of the September 2018 remittance, there were a total of six
loans in special servicing, representing 78.2% of the current pool
balance. Two of the loans were transferred in early 2017, whereas
the reminder of the loans have been in special servicing at one
point or another since as early as 2010. Five of the six assets,
representing 38.8% of the pool balance, are REO, with the remaining
specially-serviced loan currently in the process of foreclosure.

The only non-specially serviced loan, Wellpoint Office Tower (21.8%
of the pool balance), is secured by a Class A office building in
Woodland Hills, California, within the Los Angeles MSA. The
property is fully occupied by a single tenant in Anthem Blue Cross
of California, but that tenant is expected to vacate at lease
expiry in December 2019. The lease expiration date is coterminous
with the scheduled maturity date, and as such, DBRS expects the
loan will default on or before that date unless a buyer is secured
or a new lease is signed within the near term. The loan was
analyzed with a stressed cash flow scenario for this review and
will be monitored closely for developments.


GLS AUTO 2018-3: S&P Gives Prelim. BB- Rating on $30.24MM D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust 2018-3&P Global Ratings assigned
its preliminary ratings to GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust
2018-3's automobile receivables-backed notes series 2018-3.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction
backed by subprime auto loan receivables.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 27,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 50.70%, 40.74%, 32.32%, and
25.79% of credit support for the class A, B, C, and D notes,
respectively, based on stressed cash flow scenarios (including
excess spread). These credit support levels provide coverage of
approximately 2.50x, 2.00x, 1.55x, and 1.22x S&P's 19.50%-20.50%
expected cumulative net loss (ECNL) for the class A, B, C, and D
notes, respectively.

-- S&P said, "The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress
scenario (1.55x our expected loss level), all else being equal, our
rating on the class A and B notes will remain within one rating
category of the assigned preliminary 'AA (sf)' and 'A (sf)' ratings
and our rating on the class C notes will remain within two rating
categories of the assigned preliminary 'BBB (sf)' rating. The class
D notes will remain within two rating categories of the assigned
preliminary 'BB- (sf)' rating during the first year but will
eventually default under the 'BBB' stress scenario. These rating
movements are within the limits specified by our credit stability
criteria."

-- S&P's analysis of over four years of origination static pool
data and securitization performance data on Global Lending
Services' (GLS') four Rule 144A securitizations.

-- The collateral characteristics of the subprime automobile loans
securitized in this transaction, including the representation in
the transaction documents that all contracts in the pool have made
a least one payment.

-- The notes' underlying credit enhancement in the form of
subordination, overcollateralization (O/C), a reserve account, and
excess spread for the class A, B, C, and D notes.

-- The timely interest and principal payments made to the notes
under S&P's stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which it
believes are appropriate for the assigned preliminary ratings.
  
  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust 2018-3

  Class       Rating    Amount (mil. $)(i)
  A           AA (sf)               171.82
  B           A (sf)                 50.40
  C           BBB (sf)               35.76
  D           BB- (sf)               30.24

(i) The interest rates and actual sizes of these tranches will be
determined on the pricing date.


GOLDENTREE LOAN IX: S&P Gives Prelim B-(sf) Rating on F-R-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Goldentree
Loan Opportunities IX Ltd./Goldentree Loan Opportunities IX LLC's
$588.55 million floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans that are governed by collateral quality tests.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 27,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Goldentree Loan Opportunities IX Ltd./Goldentree Loan   
  Opportunities IX LLC

  Class                 Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X-R-2                 AAA (sf)               8.30
  A-R-2                 AAA (sf)             402.25
  A-J-R2                NR                    27.25
  B-R-2                 AA (sf)               61.00
  C-R-2                 A (sf)                41.50
  D-R-2                 BBB- (sf)             39.25
  E-R-2                 BB- (sf)              25.75
  F-R-2                 B- (sf)               10.50
  Subordinated notes    NR                    57.00

  NR--Not rated.


GREEN TREE 1994-03: Moody's Lowers Class B-2 Debt Rating to Ca
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
tranches and upgraded the rating of one tranche, from six
transactions, backed by manufactured housing loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1994-03

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1994-06

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1994-07

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2002 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1994-08

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: Green Tree Financial Corporation MH 1995-01

B-2, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2003 Downgraded to
Ca (sf)

Issuer: OMI Trust 2000-C

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying pools
and reflect Moody's updated loss expectations on the pools. The
ratings downgraded are due to the total writedowns and unpaid
interest amounts on the bonds. The rating upgraded is a result of
an increase in credit enhancement available to the bond and a
decrease in expected losses on the bond.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to macroeconomic
uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate. The
unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in August 2018 from 4.4% in August
2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of 3.5% to
4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central scenario could
lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices are another key
driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects house prices to
continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than Moody's expects or
decreases could lead to negative rating actions. Finally,
performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent on
servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing transfers
or other policy or regulatory change can impact the performance of
these transactions.


GS MORTGAGE 2012-GCJ9: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed nine classes of GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2012-GCJ9 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increase in Loss Expectations: Fitch's base case loss expectations
have increased since issuance. Six of the Top 15 (20%) loans have
seen drops in year-end 2017 NOI DSCR since issuance. This includes
Gansevoort Park Avenue (5.5%) and Miami Center (4.7%), which have
seen declines in NOI DSCR by 54% and 29%, respectively. There are
12 loans on the master servicer's watchlist (25.6%), and eight
loans are identified as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) (17.7%).
Three of the FLOCs are specially serviced loans (1.9%); one of
which is current, one is in foreclosure and one is in REO. The
remaining five FLOCs are Top 15 loans (15.8%) that have declining
performance and/or vacancy issues. Fitch's base case loss includes
additional stresses on these loans; however, the affirmations
reflect sufficient credit enhancement due to significant paydown
since issuance.

Increased Credit Enhancement: The pool has paid down 20.9% from
amortization and the payoff or disposition of seven loans since
issuance. Of the remaining loans, 59 were amortizing as of
September 2018 (80.2% of the pool balance), all partial IO loans
are now amortizing. There are 13 defeased loans (9%). Since Fitch's
2017 review, the number eight loan, The Point Shopping Center
(2.5%), has been defeased and class A-2 has paid off.

Fitch Loans of Concern: Gansevoort Park Avenue (5.5%) is a hotel
property located in New York, NY and is the fifth largest loan in
the pool. Year-end 2017 cash flow was approximately 56% below bank
underwriting. The decline can primarily be attributed to a
substantial decrease in food and beverage revenue, despite
relatively flat expenses for this category, and an increase in real
estate taxes, which have more than doubled since issuance. At
issuance food and beverage accounted for 40% of total revenue. The
drastic decline in food and beverage revenue was primarily caused
by the closing of rooftop restaurant/bar. Since changing ownership
in late 2017, the restaurant/bar has rebranded and reopened. In
addition to the decline in food and beverage revenues, some of the
decline in revenue can be attributed to increased competition.
Given the property's location, strong asset quality and recent
acquisition for $800,000 per room. Fitch recognized that the
applied losses are mitigated and considered this when affirming the
junior classes in the transaction.

Miami Center (4.7%) is an office property located in Miami, Florida
and is the sixth largest loan in the pool. Per year-end 2017
reporting, occupancy has declined to 67% from 83.7% at issuance,
resulting in a 28.8% decline in NOI DSCR. In 2017, the borrower
invested $20 million dollars in renovations into the property,
which have since been completed. While the borrower hoped these
improvements would attract new tenants, occupancy has not yet
improved. As of June 2018, occupancy was 69%.

Signature Office Place (2.1%) is an office property in Greensboro,
NC and the 10th largest loan in the pool. The loan is considered a
FLOC due to declining occupancy and NOI (down 30% and 39%
respectively since issuance). Per June 2018 reporting, occupancy
was 77%.

Hanes Commons (1.7%) is a retail property in Winston Salem, NC and
the number 13 loan in the pool. Babies R US (19.7% NRA) has vacated
the property and the borrower has yet to find a replacement.

Abbott's Park (1.7%) is a multifamily property located in
Fayettville, NC and is the 14th largest loan in the pool. Since
issuance, NOI DSCR has declined and remained near 1.00x. The
reported NOI DSCR was 1.01x at YE 2017 from compared with 1.39x at
issuance. Per servicer commentary, the borrower has offered rent
concessions to attract new tenants. Due to its proximity to Fort
Bragg, the property has a military personnel tenant concentration.
By law, when these military tenants are deployed their leases are
terminated. Additionally, Fayetteville was affected by Hurricane
Florence; however, details on any potential damage are not yet
available.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlook on class F has been revised to Negative from
Stable given continued declines in loan-level performance for
several of the top 15 loans in the pool. Rating Outlooks on all
other classes remain Stable given increased credit enhancement from
paydown and defeasance since issuance. Downgrades are possible if
the larger loans of concern Gansevoort Park Avenue and Miami
Center's performance continues to deteriorate, or if additional
loans default. Upgrades in the near term are not expected, but are
possible in the event the underperforming loans' performance
stabilizes or credit enhancement increases.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and Revised Outlooks as
indicated:

  -- $601.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $90 million class A-AB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $792.8 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $111.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $90.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57.3 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $57.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27.8 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $22.6 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable.

Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G and X-B certificate.

Class A-1 and A-2 certificates have paid in full.


GS MORTGAGE 2018-3PCK: S&P Rates $18.9MM Class HRR Certs 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to GS Mortgage Securities
Corp. Trust 2018-3PCK's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates.

The note issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by A $375.0 million initial three-year
interest-only floating-rate first-mortgage loan with two
consecutive one-year extension options.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsor's and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  GS Mortgage Securities Corp. Trust 2018-3PCK  
  Class       Rating               Amount ($)

  A           AAA (sf)            198,900,000
  X-A         AAA (sf)            198,900,000(i)
  B           AA- (sf)             44,200,000
  C           A- (sf)              33,100,000
  X-C         A- (sf)              33,100,000(i)
  D           BBB- (sf)            40,900,000
  X-D         BBB- (sf)            40,900,000(i)
  E           BB- (sf)             39,000,000
  X-E         BB- (sf)             39,000,000(i)
  HRR         B+ (sf)              18,900,000

  (i)Notional balance.


HIGHBRIDGE LOAN 5-2015: S&P Gives Prelim. B- Rating on F-RR Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
X-RR, A1-RR, B1-RR, B2-RR, C-RR, D-RR, E-RR, and F-RR replacement
notes from Highbridge Loan Management 5-2015 Ltd./Highbridge Loan
Management 5-2015 LLC, a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
originally issued in January 2015 and refinanced in June 2017 that
is managed by HPS Investment Partners LLC. The replacement notes
will be issued via a proposed supplemental indenture. At closing,
the issuer name will change to HPS Loan Management 5-2015 Ltd., and
the co-issuer name will change to HPS Loan Management 5-2015 LLC.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 25,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 16, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Issue the replacement class A1-RR, B1-RR, C-RR, E-RR, and F-RR
notes at higher spreads than the original notes.

-- Issue the replacement class D-RR notes at a lower spread than
the original notes.

-- Issue the replacement class B2-RR notes at a fixed coupon,
replacing the current floating spread.

-- Issue new class X-RR and A2-RR notes. Extend the stated
maturity, reinvestment period, and weighted average life test dates
each by 4.75 years.

S&P said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance (see table). In
line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied
forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of
defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various interest rate
and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered
the transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate
principal, or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Highbridge Loan Management 5-2015 Ltd.

  Replacement class         Rating               Amount
                                                (mil. $)
  X-RR                      AAA (sf)              4.250
  A1-RR                     AAA (sf)            295.000
  A2-RR                     NR                   30.000
  B1-RR                     AA (sf)              25.625
  B2-RR                     AA (sf)              25.625
  C-RR (deferrable)         A (sf)               33.750
  D-RR (deferrable)         BBB- (sf)            27.500
  E-RR (deferrable)         BB- (sf)             20.000
  F-RR (deferrable)         B- (sf)               8.750
  Subordinated notes        NR                   46.250

  NR--Not rated.


JEFFERSON MILL: Moody's Rates $18.5MM Class E-R Notes 'Ba3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to seven classes of
CLO refinancing notes issued by Jefferson Mill CLO Ltd.:

Moody's rating actions are as follows:

US$4,000,000 Class X-R Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the
"Class X-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$256,000,000 Class A-R Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the
"Class A-R Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$48,000,000 Class B-R Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2031 (the
"Class B-R Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$20,400,000 Class C-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C-R Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$24,100,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D-R Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$18,500,000 Class E-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E-R Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

US$7,400,000 Class F-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class F-R Notes"), Assigned B3 (sf)

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.

Shenkman Capital Management, Inc. manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings on the Refinancing Notes address the expected loss
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes on September 27, 2018
in connection with the refinancing of all classes of the secured
notes previously issued on July 28, 2015. On the Refinancing Date,
the Issuer used proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing
Notes, along with the proceeds from the issuance of additional
subordinated notes, to redeem in full the Refinanced Original
Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional
subordinated notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features will occur in connection with the refinancing. These
include: extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the
stated maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral
quality tests; and changes to the overcollateralization test
levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 80

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.06 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


JP MORGAN 2006-CIBC15: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 2 Debt Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series
2006-CIBC15

Cl. A-M, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Downgraded to
B3 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 6, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on Cl. A-M and Cl. A-J were affirmed because the rating
is consistent with Moody's expected loss plus realized losses. Cl.
AJ has already experienced a 45% realized loss as a result of
previously liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 55.4% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 51.3% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 19.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 20.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2006-CIBC15, Cl. A-M
and Cl. A-J was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp. Series 2006-CIBC15, Cl. X-1 were "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 77% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced loan that it
expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default
based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if available),
other information from the special servicer, available market data
and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan
also takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to
date, estimated future advances (if applicable) and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced loans to the most junior class and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 93% to $151.0
million from $2.1 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 16 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 15.5% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 81.5% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, compared to nine at Moody's last review.

There are no loans on the master servicer's watchlist. The
watchlist includes loans that meet certain portfolio review
guidelines established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC)
monthly reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of
a transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which
loans have material issues that could affect performance.

Thirty-six loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing
to an aggregate realized loss of $332.8 million (for an average
loss severity of 30.9%). Eleven loans, constituting 76.8% of the
pool, are currently in special servicing. All of the remaining
specially serviced asset are already REO.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Marriott -- Jackson Loan
($23.4 million -- 15.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 303-key
full-service Marriott hotel located in Jackson, Mississippi. The
loan was transferred to the special servicer in June 2016 for
maturity default. Hotel amenities include meeting space and ball
rooms, full-service restaurant, fitness center, and outdoor pool. A
high-rise 586-space parking garage is attached to the subject
property. The property's financial performance has continued to
decline since 2011.

The second largest specially serviced exposures are the FGP
Portfolio I -- A Note Loan ($16.0 million -- 10.6% of the pool) and
the FGP Portfolio I - B Note ($8.3 million -- 5.5% of the pool).
The loan was initially secured by a portfolio of 12 industrial
properties, of which nine have been released. The original loan was
first transferred to the special servicer in July 2009 due to
imminent default as a result of tenant departures. The loan was
modified in July 2011, including the creation of a hope note. The
loan subsequently returned to master servicer, however, the loan
was transferred back to the special servicer in June 2016 for
maturity default. Only three REO properties remain and due to the
tenant concentration Moody's analysis incorporated a Lit/Dark
approach.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Rockwell
Automation Loan ($15.3 million -- 10.2% of the pool), which is
secured by a 130,000 SF industrial property located in Shirley, New
York, approximately 70 miles east of New York City on Long Island.
The loan was transferred to the special servicer in November 2013
due to imminent default stemming from the departure of the
property's sole tenant, Rockwell Automation. The property is
currently fully vacant.

The remaining eight specially serviced loans are secured by a mix
of property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $83.7 million
loss for the specially serviced loans (72% expected loss on
average).

As of the September 12, 2018 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $25.5 million and impact both the
remaining P&I classes. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls will
continue because of the exposure to specially serviced loans and/or
modified loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing
fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement
reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust
expenses.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 65% of the
pool, and partial year 2018 operating results for 100% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced loans). For the five non-specially
serviced loans, Moody's weighted average conduit LTV is 67.7%.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 17% to the most recently available net operating
income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 10.7%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.25X and 1.81X,
respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the
loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on
Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan
balance.

The top three performing non-specially serviced loans represent
21.3% of the pool balance. The largest performing loan is the
Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc. Loan ($16.4 million -- 10.8% of the
pool), which is secured by a one million SF industrial property
located in Dillon, South Carolina, approximately 65 miles northwest
of Myrtle Beach. The property is 100% leased to Harbor Freight
Tools through June 2034. The loan is amortizing and has paid down
31% since securitization. The property is located in an area
affected by Hurricane Florence and Moody's will continue to monitor
the loan as more information becomes available. Moody's analysis
incorporated a Lit/Dark approach to account for the single-tenant
exposure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 81% and 1.52X,
respectively, compared to 83% and 1.31X at the last review.

The second largest performing loan is the 70 Jewett City Road Loan
($9.0 million -- 6.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 638,000
SF industrial property located in Norwich, Connecticut. The
property is 100% leased to Bob's Discount Furniture which runs
through August 2027. Moody's analysis incorporated a Lit/Dark
approach to account for the single-tenant exposure. The loan is
fully amortizing and has paid down 44% since securitization.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 45% and 2.40X, respectively.

The third largest performing loan is the TI Automotive Loan ($6.7
million -- 4.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 133,000 SF
industrial property located in Lavonia, Georgia, approximately 90
miles northwest of Atlanta. The property is 100% leased to TI Group
Automotive System LLC which runs through May 2020. Moody's analysis
incorporated a Lit/Dark approach to account for the single-tenant
exposure. The loan is amortizing and has paid down 33% since
securitization. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 68% and 1.60X,
respectively.


JP MORGAN 2007-CIBC18: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 5 Cert. Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on nine classes
in J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-CIBC18
as follows:

Cl. A-M, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Downgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFL, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-MFX, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017
Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-J, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2017 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on three P&I classes, Cl. A-M, Cl. A-MFL and Cl. A-MFX,
were affirmed because the transaction's key metrics, including
Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index
(Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on five P&I classes, Cl. A-J, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, and
Cl. E, were affirmed because the ratings are consistent with
Moody's expected loss.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X, was affirmed based on the credit
quality of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 51.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 48.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.1% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp. Series 2007-CIBC18, Cl. A-M,
Cl. A-MFL, Cl. A-MFX, Cl. A-J, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, and Cl. E was
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.
Series 2007-CIBC18, Cl. X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large
Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017
and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only
(IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 42% of the pool is in
special servicing and Moody's has identified additional troubled
loans representing 24% of the pool. In this approach, Moody's
determines a probability of default for each specially serviced and
troubled loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a
loss given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value
(if available), other information from the special servicer,
available market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given
default for each loan also takes into consideration repayment of
servicer advances to date, estimated future advances and closing
costs. Translating the probability of default and loss given
default into an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the
aggregate loss from specially serviced and troubled loans to the
most junior class(es) and the recovery as a pay down of principal
to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 12, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to $613.9
million from $3.9 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 24 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 33.0% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 83.3% of the pool.

Two loans, constituting 8.5% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Forty-one loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to
an aggregate realized loss of $277 million (for an average loss
severity of 49%). Sixteen loans, constituting 42% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing.

The largest specially serviced loan is The Plaza at PPL Center
($65.0 million -- 10.7% of the pool). The loan is secured by a six
unit mixed use property located in Allentown, Pennsylvania that was
built in 2003. The loan transferred to special servicing in
December 2016 due to the Borrower's inability to refinance. The
main tenant, PPL Service Corporation, subsequently vacated as its
lease expiration in April 2018. The special servicer indicated they
are pursuing foreclosure and a receiver has engaged a local broker
to begin the leasing process. As of June 2018, the property was
only 10% leased.

The second largest specially serviced loan is Southside Works
($44.6 million -- 7.4% of the pool), which is secured by a 251,400
square foot (SF) mixed used property located in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The property consists of office, multifamily and
retail space. The loan was transferred to special servicing in
February 2017 due to maturity default as a result of the Borrower's
inability to obtain refinancing. As of April 2017, the property was
only 74% occupied and the property is no longer producing
sufficient cash flow to fund all required debt service and
operating expenses.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the former Kimco PNP -
Century Center ($27.8 million -- 4.6% of the pool), which is
secured by a neighborhood retail center located in Modesto,
California. The property is approximately 215,000 SF and was built
in 1979 and renovated in 1996. The loan was transferred to special
servicing in February 2010 after the borrower disclosed its
inability to make debt service payments. In December 2013, major
tenant Raley's went dark, lowering physical occupancy to 34.3%.
Foreclosure was completed in December 2016 and the property is now
REO. Recent leasing has improved the property's occupancy and as of
May 2018, the property was 82% occupied.

The remaining 13 specially serviced loans are secured by a mix of
property types. Moody's estimates an aggregate $177.9 million loss
for the specially serviced loans (70% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for five poorly
performing loans, constituting 24.0% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $106.6 million (a 72% expected loss on
average) from these troubled loans.

The largest performing loan is the 131 South Dearborn Loan -- A
Note ($200 million -- 33.0% of the pool), which is secured by a 1.5
million SF, 37-story, Class A office building located in Chicago's
Central Loop office submarket. The loan represents a participation
interest in a $400.0 million first mortgage loan. The property is
also known as the Citadel Center, and formerly known as the
JPMorgan Center. The property is situated along the east-side of
South Dearborn Street, between Adams and Marble Place. The property
has large 64,000 SF floor plates on floors 1-10 and 34,000 SF floor
plates between floors 11-37. In May 2014, the property was
transferred to the special servicer due to imminent default, after
the borrower requested a loan modification due to the Seyfarth
Shaw's early lease termination and JPMorgan's decision to downsize
their space requirements at the property. The loan was subsequently
modified in June 2016 via an A-Note/ B-Note split, which carved out
a $72.0 million B-note from the original $472.0 million first
mortgage. The modification also resulted in the formation of a new
ownership structure, a joint-venture between Angelo Gordon and
Hines. The property was 75% leased as of September 2017. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR on the A Note are 123.7% and 0.81X,
respectively, compared to 118.2% and 0.85X at the last review.
Moody's identified the $36 million B Note included in the trust as
a troubled loan and assumed a significant loss.

The second largest performing loan is LaGuardia Plaza Hotel - A
note Loan ($47.6 million -- 7.9% of the pool), which is secured by
a 358 key hotel located near LaGuardia Airport. The hotel underwent
a $5 million renovation that was completed in 2015 and included a
complete refurbishment of over 190 guest rooms and all public
space. Amenities include a health and fitness center, heated indoor
pool, restaurant and business center. The loan was previously in
special servicing, but returned to the master servicer in 2015
after a loan modification was executed. The modification included,
among other items, a term extension and an A/B note split. For the
trailing twelve month period ending June 2017, the occupancy and
RevPAR was 81% and $117, respectively. The loan is currently
performing under the terms of the modification. Due to the
historical performance issues, Moody's has identified both the A
note and the $12.1 million B note as troubled loans.


JP MORGAN 2011-C5: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Certs to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on seven classes
and downgraded the ratings on four classes in J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C5, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2011-C5 as follows:

Cl. A-3, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed A1
(sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed Baa3
(sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 14, 2017
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I classes Cl. E, Cl. F and Cl. G were
downgraded due to anticipated losses and realized losses from
specially serviced and troubled loans that were higher than Moody's
had previously expected.

The ratings on the remaining P&I classes were affirmed because the
transaction's key metrics, including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the
transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are within acceptable
ranges.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-A was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the IO class, Cl. X-B was downgraded due to the
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 5.6% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.0% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial
Mortgage Securities Trust 2011-C5, Cl. A-3, Cl. A-S, Cl. A-SB, Cl.
B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, Cl. F, and Cl. G were "Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and
Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in
rating J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2011-C5, Cl. X-A and Cl. X-B were "Approach to Rating US and
Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017, "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 37% to $651 million
from $1.03 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 27 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 21% of the pool, with the top ten loans constituting 73% of
the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 12, the same as at Moody's last review.

Three loans, constituting 4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, contributing to an
aggregate realized loss of $5 million (for an average loss severity
of 32%). Two loans, constituting 7% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the
LaSalle Select Portfolio loan ($36 million -- 6% of the pool),
which is secured by a portfolio of four office buildings located in
suburban Atlanta, Georgia. The loan transferred to special
servicing in December 2017 for imminent default. Portfolio
occupancy is expected to fall to 28% after the departure of a major
tenant this year.

The second specially serviced loan is secured by a retail property
in Fairview Heights, Illinois which represents 2% of the pool. The
property is currently REO and was 72% occupied as of February 2018.
Moody's estimates an aggregate $22 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (47% expected loss on average).

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for one poorly
performing loan, constituting 2% of the pool, and has estimated a
moderate expected loss from this troubled loan.

Moody's received full year 2016 operating results for 98% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2017 operating results for 38% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 80%, compared to 78% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 14.4% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a weighted average
capitalization rate of 9.5%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.81X and 1.33X,
respectively, compared to 1.90X and 1.36X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 42% of the pool balance. The
largest loan is the InterContinental Hotel Chicago Loan ($135
million -- 21% of the pool), which is secured by a 792-key
full-service hotel located on North Michigan Avenue in Chicago,
Illinois. The property includes over 25,000 square feet (SF) of
meeting space, a steakhouse restaurant, full service spa, and an
indoor pool. The occupancy fell to 67% for the year ended June 2018
compared to 72% in 2017 and 77% at securitization. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 103% and 1.08X, respectively, compared to 101%
and 1.10X at the last review.

The second largest loan is the SunTrust Bank Portfolio I Loan ($74
million -- 11% of the pool), which is secured by 94 bank branch
properties and two-single tenant office buildings located in
several Eastern U.S. states from Maryland to Florida. The
properties are 100% leased to Sun Trust as part of a master lease
agreement which had an initial term ended December 2017. Following
the master lease renewal twenty-seven properties have been released
from the loan collateral with a commensurate principal curtailment.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 67% and 1.46X, respectively,
compared to 57% and 1.72X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Asheville Mall Loan ($67 million --
10% of the pool), which is secured by a 324,000 SF component of a
larger regional mall located in Asheville, North Carolina. The mall
anchors include Dillard's (non-collateral), JC Penney
(non-collateral), Belk (non-collateral) and Barnes and Noble. The
total mall was 92% leased as of December 2017. Sears closed its
store at the mall in summer 2018 and the owner of the former Sears
space has announced plans for a redevelopment of the non-collateral
dark anchor space and adjoining land. The loan sponsor is CBL &
Associates Properties, Inc., a retail REIT based in Tennessee.
Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.31X, respectively,
compared to 81% and 1.27X at the last review.


JP MORGAN 2014-C18: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on $19.2MM Cl. E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 14 classes of J.P. Morgan Chase
Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust (JPMBB) commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates series 2014-C18.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Generally Stable Performance & Loss Expectations: Loss expectations
have remained consistent since the last rating action and the
majority of the pool continues to perform in-line with
expectations. . No loans have been delinquent, and none are in
special servicing. Three loans (5.08% of the pool) are on the
servicer's watchlist, and four loans (2.93% of the pool) are fully
defeased. The three loans on the servicer's watchlist have fallen
below a 1.1x DSCR threshold. However, the loans remain current, and
performance is expected to improve..

The fourth-largest loan in the pool, Waterstone Retail Portfolio
(6.3% of the pool), is considered to be a Fitch Loan of Concern
(FLOC). The loan is collateralized by 15 retail properties, where
Southeastern Grocers' subsidiaries account for approximately 22% of
the portfolio's NRA. In March 2018, Southeastern Grocers filed for
bankruptcy, but, in May 2018, it announced that it completed its
financial restructuring and had emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
While the company has strengthened its balance sheet (decreased
debt by $600 million by exchanging it for equity), it is
responsible for a significant piece of the portfolio's NRA and,
thus, is considered a cause for concern.

The fifth-largest loan in the pool, Meadows Mall (5.5% of the
pool), is also considered to be a FLOC. Meadows Mall is a
945,043-sf regional mall located in Las Vegas, NV. The collateral
consists of the 308,190 sf of in-line space. The collateral has had
declines in both occupancy and NOI since issuance.

Increased Credit Enhancement: Since the last rating action, credit
enhancement has continued to increase. This is due to continued
paydown form scheduled amortization and loan repayments (class A-1
has paid in full since the last rating action). To date, the pool
has paid down 10.15%.

Pool and Retail Concentration: The pool is more concentrated by
loan size and property type when compared with the average
transactions from 2014. Currently, the 10-largest loans represent
59.74% of the total pool balance.,. In addition, the pool has an
above-average concentration of retail properties. Five of the 10
largest assets are retail properties and , retail currently
represents 39.52% of the pool's balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the pool and continued amortization.
Upgrades may occur with improved pool performance and additional
paydown or defeasance. Downgrades to the classes are possible
should overall pool performance decline.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $39.2 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $23.5 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $87.5 million class A-4A1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $87.5 million class A-4A2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $267 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $67.4 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $55.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $627.1 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69.4 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $37.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $161.6 million class EC at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $56.3 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.2 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for a related
amount of class EC certificates, and class EC certificates may be
exchanged for class A-S, B and C certificates.

Fitch does not rate the class NR and X-C certificates. Fitch
previously withdrew the rating on the interest-only class X-B
certificates. Class A-1 has paid in full.


JP MORGAN 2018-9: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating on Class B-5 Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to 25
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by J.P.
Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-9. The ratings range from Aaa (sf) to B3
(sf).

The certificates are backed by 884 predominantly 30-year,
fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total balance of
$513,899,725 as of the September 1, 2018 cut-off date. Similar to
prior JPMMT transactions, JPMMT 2018-9 includes conforming mortgage
loans (68% by loan balance) mostly originated by JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. and Quicken Loans, Inc. underwritten to the government
sponsored enterprises guidelines in addition to prime jumbo
non-conforming mortgages purchased by J.P. Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Corp. from various originators and aggregators.

Chase, Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing and Cenlar, FSB will be the
servicers on the conforming loans. Shellpoint and Fifth Third Bank
will service the majority of the prime jumbo loans. In a departure
from previous JPMMT transactions, the servicing fee for loans
serviced by Chase and Shellpoint will be based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $20 per loan and
additional fees for delinquent or defaulted loans. All other
servicers will be paid a monthly flat servicing fee equal to
one-twelfth of 0.25% of the remaining principal balance of the
mortgage loans. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. will be the master servicer
and securities administrator. U.S. Bank Trust National Association
will be the trustee. Pentalpha Surveillance LLC will be the
representations and warranties breach reviewer. Distributions of
principal and interest and loss allocations are based on a typical
shifting interest structure that benefits from senior and
subordination floors.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2018-9

Cl. A-1, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-20, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Cl. B-5, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE
Summary Credit Analysis and Rating Rationale

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.40%
in a base scenario and reaches 5.85% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings.

Moody's calculated losses on the pool using its US Moody's
Individual Loan Analysis (MILAN) model based on the loan-level
collateral information as of the cut-off date. Loan-level
adjustments to the model results included adjustments to
probability of default for higher and lower borrower debt-to-income
ratios (DTIs), for borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties,
self-employed borrowers, and for the default risk of Homeownership
association (HOA) properties in super lien states. Its final loss
estimates also incorporate adjustments for originator assessments
and the financial strength of Representation & Warranty (R&W)
providers.

Moody's bases its definitive ratings on the certificates on the
credit quality of the mortgage loans, the structural features of
the transaction, its assessments of the aggregators, originators
and servicers, the strength of the third party due diligence and
the representations and warranties (R&W) framework of the
transaction.

Collateral Description

JPMMT 2018-9 is a securitization of a pool of 884 predominantly
30-year, fully-amortizing fixed-rate mortgage loans with a total
balance of $513,899,725 as of the cut-off date, with a weighted
average (WA) remaining term to maturity of 357 months, and a WA
seasoning of 3 months. The borrowers in this transaction have high
FICO scores and sizeable equity in their properties. The WA current
FICO score is 768 and the WA original combined loan-to-value ratio
(CLTV) is 71.0%. The characteristics of the loans underlying the
pool are generally comparable to other JPMMT transactions backed by
prime mortgage loans that Moody's has rated.

In this transaction, about 68% of the pool by loan balance was
underwritten to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's guidelines
(conforming loans). The conforming loans in this transaction have a
high average current loan balance at $549,231. The high conforming
loan balance of loans in JPMMT 2018-9 is attributable to the large
number of properties located in high-cost areas, such as the metro
areas of New York City, Los Angeles and San Francisco. Chase,
United Shore Financial Services and Quicken Loans, Inc. originated
about 56%, 11% and 11% of the pool, respectively. The remaining
originators each account for less than 10% of the principal balance
of the loans in the pool.

The mortgage loans in the pool were originated mostly in California
(43% by loan balance). The sponsor is in the process of determining
the number of loans backed by properties located in counties
affected by the recent and ongoing California wildfires and
Hurricane Florence. Once determined, the sponsor will order
post-disaster inspection reports for properties in areas designated
for individual assistance by FEMA. To the extent any properties
sustained material damage from the natural disasters, the sponsor
will repurchase the affected loans from the pool.

Servicing Fee Framework

The servicing fee for loans serviced by Chase and Shellpoint (80%
of the mortgage pool by balance) will be based on a step-up
incentive fee structure with a monthly base fee of $20 per loan and
additional fees for servicing delinquent and defaulted loans. All
other servicers will be paid a monthly flat servicing fee equal to
one-twelfth of 0.25% of the remaining principal balance of the
mortgage loans.

While this fee structure is common in non-performing mortgage
securitizations, it is unique to rated prime mortgage
securitizations which typically incorporate a flat 25 basis point
servicing fee rate structure. By establishing a base servicing fee
for performing loans that increases with the delinquency of loans,
the fee-for-service structure aligns monetary incentives to the
servicer with the costs of the servicer. The servicer receives
higher fees for labor-intensive activities that are associated with
servicing delinquent loans, including loss mitigation, than they
receive for servicing a performing loan, which is less
labor-intensive. The fee-for-service compensation is reasonable and
adequate for this transaction because it better aligns the
servicer's costs with the deal's performance. Furthermore, higher
fees for the more labor-intensive tasks make the transfer of these
loans to another servicer easier, should that become necessary. By
contrast, in typical RMBS transactions a servicer can take actions,
such as modifications and prolonged workouts, that increase the
value of its mortgage servicing rights.

The incentive structure includes an initial monthly base servicing
fee of $20 for all performing loans and increases according to the
delinquent and incentive fee schedules outlined in the exhibit.

The delinquent and incentive servicing fees will be deducted from
the available distribution amount and Class B-6 net WAC. The
transaction does not have a servicing fee cap, so, in the event of
a servicer replacement, any increase in the base servicing fee
beyond the current fee will be paid out of the available
distribution amount. The exhibit outlines the incentive servicing
fee structure.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Four third party review (TPR) firms verified the accuracy of the
loan-level information that Moody's received from the sponsor.
These firms conducted detailed credit, valuation, regulatory
compliance and data integrity reviews on 100% of the mortgage pool.
The TPR results indicated compliance with the originators'
underwriting guidelines for the vast majority of loans, no material
compliance issues, and no appraisal defects. The loans that had
exceptions to the originators' underwriting guidelines had strong
documented compensating factors such as low DTIs, low LTVs, high
reserves, high FICOs, or clean payment histories. The TPR firms
also identified minor compliance exceptions for reasons such as
inadequate RESPA disclosures (which do not have assignee liability)
and TILA/RESPA Integrated Disclosure (TRID) violations related to
fees that were out of variance but then were cured and disclosed.
Moody's did not make any adjustments to its expected or Aaa (sf)
loss levels due to the TPR results.

JPMMT 2018-9's R&W framework is in line with that of other JPMMT
transactions where an independent reviewer is named at closing, and
costs and manner of review are clearly outlined at issuance. Its
review of the R&W framework takes into account the financial
strength of the R&W providers, scope of R&Ws (including qualifiers
and sunsets) and enforcement mechanisms.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association (rated Aa2) is the R&W provider for
approximately 56% (by loan balance) of the pool. Moody's made no
adjustments to the loans for which Chase, USAA Federal Savings Bank
(a subsidiary of USAA Capital Corporation which is rated Aa1) and
Fifth Third Bank, Ohio (rated A3) provided R&Ws since they are
highly rated entities. In contrast, the rest of the R&W providers
are unrated and/or financially weaker entities. Moody's applied an
adjustment to the loans for which these entities provided
R&Ws.JPMMAC will not backstop any R&W providers who may become
financially incapable of repurchasing mortgage loans. JPMMAC is the
R&W provider for loans originated by FirstBank, loanDepot.com, LLC,
NexBank SSB, and Wintrust Mortgage.

For loans that JPMMAC acquired via the MAXEX platform, MAXEX under
the assignment, assumption and recognition agreement with JPMMAC,
will make the R&Ws. The R&Ws provided by MAXEX to JPMMAC and
assigned to the trust are in line with the R&Ws found in the JPMMT
transactions. Five Oaks Acquisition Corp. will backstop the
obligations of MaxEx with respect to breaches of the mortgage loan
representations and warranties made by MaxEx.

Trustee and Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is U.S. Bank Trust National Association.
The custodian's functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. The paying agent and cash
management functions will be performed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
rather than the trustee. In addition, Wells Fargo, as Master
Servicer, is responsible for servicer oversight, and termination of
servicers and for the appointment of successor servicers. In
addition, Wells Fargo is committed to act as successor if no other
successor servicer can be found.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

This deal has a standard shifting-interest structure, with a
subordination floor to protect against losses that occur late in
the life of the pool when relatively few loans remain (tail risk).
When the total senior subordination is less than 1.15% of the
original pool balance, the subordinate bonds do not receive any
principal and all principal is then paid to the senior bonds. In
addition, if the subordinate percentage drops below 6.00% of
current pool balance, the senior distribution amount will include
all principal collections and the subordinate principal
distribution amount will be zero. The subordinate bonds themselves
benefit from a floor. When the total current balance of a given
subordinate tranche plus the aggregate balance of the subordinate
tranches that are junior to it amount to less than 0.85% of the
original pool balance, those tranches do not receive principal
distributions. Principal those tranches would have received are
directed to pay more senior subordinate bonds pro-rata.

Transaction Structure

The transaction uses the shifting interest structure in which the
senior bonds benefit from a number of protections. Funds collected,
including principal, are first used to make interest payments to
the senior bonds. Next, principal payments are made to the senior
bonds. Next, available distribution amounts are used to reimburse
realized losses and certificate write-down amounts for the senior
bonds (after subordinate bond have been reduced to zero I.e. the
credit support depletion date). Finally, interest and then
principal payments are paid to the subordinate bonds in sequential
order.

Realized losses are allocated in a reverse sequential order, first
to the lowest subordinate bond. After the balance of the
subordinate bonds is written off, losses from the pool begin to
write off the principal balance of the senior support bond, and
finally losses are allocated to the super senior bonds.

In addition, the pass-through rate on the bonds is based on the net
WAC as reduced by the sum of (i) the reviewer annual fee rate and
(ii) the capped trust expense rate. In the event that there is a
small number of loans remaining, the last outstanding bonds' rate
can be reduced to zero.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS," published in February 2015.


KEY COMMERCIAL 2018-S1: DBRS Gives (P)BB Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the following classes of
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-S1 to be
issued by Key Commercial Mortgage Trust 2018-S1:

-- Class A-1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-3 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A-S at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (sf)
-- Class X at AA (sf)

The Class X balance is notional.

The collateral consists of 31 fixed-rate loans secured by 40
commercial and multifamily properties. The transaction is a
sequential-pay pass-through structure. The conduit pool was
analyzed to determine the provisional ratings, reflecting the
long-term probability of loan default within the term and its
liquidity at maturity. When the cut-off balances loan balances were
measured against the DBRS Stabilized Net Cash Flow, one loan,
representing 1.5% of the pool, has a DBRS Term Debt-Service
Coverage Ratio (DSCR) below 1.15 times (x), a threshold indicative
of a higher likelihood of mid-term default. To assess refinance
risk given the current low interest rate environment, DBRS applied
its refinance constants to the balloon amounts. This resulted in
five loans, representing 10.0% of the pool by allocated loan
balance, having refinance DSCRs below 1.00x, a threshold indicative
of a higher likelihood of maturity default. These credit metrics
are based on whole-loan balances.

The deal exhibits ample property type diversification, with no
single property type accounting for more than 20.4% of the pool by
allocated loan balance. The largest concentrations include Retail,
Self-Storage, Manufactured Housing Community (MHC) and Office
properties, which account for 20.4%, 18.6%, 17.1% and 15.8% of the
pool by allocated loan balance, respectively. Only four loans,
representing 9.3% of the pool by allocated loan balance, are
secured by multifamily properties and only one loan, representing
5.0% of the pool by allocated loan balance, is secured by a hotel
property. Additionally, only one loan, representing 5.5% of the
aggregate pool balance, is secured by a property that is fully
leased to a single tenant.

The pool exhibits relatively low refinance risk, as indicated by a
strong DBRS Refi DSCR of 1.20x. Nine loans, representing 31.8% of
the pool by allocated loan balance, have a DBRS Refi DSCR in excess
of 1.25x. Excluding Hillcrest Plaza, which individually contributes
a DBRS Refi DSCR of 2.65x, the deal still exhibits a favorable DBRS
Refi DSCR of 1.16x. Only one loan, representing 3.4% of the pool,
is interest only (IO) for the full term and total scheduled pool
amortization is high at 15.0%.

The pool has a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
properties considered to be in less favorable markets, with 11
loans, representing 37.5% of the pool by allocated loan balance,
secured by properties considered to be in tertiary or rural
markets. Five of the top ten loans specifically are in markets
considered by DBRS to be tertiary or rural. The pool additionally
suffers from a relatively high concentration of loans secured by
non-traditional property types, with 14 loans, representing 40.7%
of the pool by allocated loan balance, secured by self-storage, MHC
or hospitality properties. The majority of these loans, 77.6% by
allocated loan balance, are structured without IO periods and
benefit from full-term amortization.

Of the 18 loans sampled by DBRS, five loans, representing 25.1% of
the pool by allocated loan balance (35.0% of the DBRS sample), are
secured by properties considered by DBRS to be of Below Average or
Average (-) property quality. DBRS increased the probability of
default of these loans to account for the elevated risk.
Additionally, the five loans have a weighted-average (WA) DBRS Exit
Debt Yield of 11.9%, which is greater than the pool's WA DBRS Exit
Debt Yield of 11.6%.

The pool is relatively concentrated based on loan size, as there
are only 31 loans, and it has a concentration profile similar to a
pool of 24 equally sized loans. The ten largest loans represent
52.9% of the pool by allocated loan balance and the largest three
loans represent 20.3% of the pool by allocated loan balance.
Excluding the top six loans, which account for 36.1% of the pool by
allocated loan balance, no single loan accounts for more than 5.0%
of the pool by allocated loan balance. While the concentration
profile is like a pool of 24 equally sized loans -- which is
typically worse than most fixed-rate conduit transactions -- the
transaction benefits from favorable property type diversification.

Class X is an IO certificate that reference a single rated tranche
or multiple rated tranches. The IO ratings mirror the lowest-rated
reference tranche adjusted upward by one notch if senior in the
waterfall.


KKR CLO 23: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $28.7MM Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to five
classes of notes to be issued by KKR CLO 23 Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$305,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$47,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$26,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$32,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$28,750,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the
Class D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

KKR CLO 23 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans
and unsecured loans. Moody's expects the portfolio to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

KKR Financial Advisors II, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue one other
class of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3040

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 49.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.22 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


LCM XVII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- Rating on $20MM Class E-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
X-R, A-1A-RR, B-RR, C-RR, D-R, and E-R replacement notes from LCM
XVII L.P., a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) originally issued
in 2014 that is managed by LCM Asset Management LLC. The
replacement notes will be issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 25,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 5, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. S&P said, "At that time, we anticipate withdrawing
the ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, we
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw our
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes."

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Extend the reinvestment period by five years to Oct. 15, 2023.

-- Extend the stated maturity by five years to Oct. 15, 2031.

-- Re-establish a non-call period, which is expected to end Oct.
15, 2020.

Add new class X-R notes, which are expected to be repaid with
interest proceeds. S&P said, "Our review of this transaction
included a cash flow analysis, based on the portfolio and
transaction as reflected in the trustee report, to estimate future
performance. In line with our criteria, our cash flow scenarios
applied forward-looking assumptions on the expected timing and
pattern of defaults, and recoveries upon default, under various
interest rate and macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our
analysis considered the transaction's ability to pay timely
interest or ultimate principal, or both, to each of the rated
tranches."

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions
as it deems necessary.

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  LCM XVII L.P.

  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  X-R                       AAA (sf)              5.00
  A-1A-RR                   AAA (sf)            254.24
  A-1B-RR                   NR                   10.26
  A-2-RR                    NR                   58.00
  B-RR                      AA (sf)              57.50
  C-RR                      A (sf)               30.00
  D-R                       BBB- (sf)            30.00
  E-R                       BB- (sf)             20.00
  Subordinated notes        NR                   59.88

  NR--Not rated.


LNR CDO 2002-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 3 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO 2002-1 Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2002-1:

Cl. E-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E-FXD, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jun 16, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

The Cl. E-FL, Cl. E-FX, and Cl. E-FXD notes are referred to herein
as the "Rated Notes".

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the Rated Notes because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO and
Re-Remic) transactions.

LNR CDO 2002-1 is a static cash transaction. The transaction is
wholly backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As of the August
24, 2018 trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the
transaction, including preferred shares, is $628.9 million compared
to $800.6 million at issuance, as a result of the combination of
pay-down to the senior most outstanding classes of notes, and
capitalization of deferred interest. The deal is currently
under-collateralized by $500.9 million as a result of implied
losses to the underlying collateral.

The pool contains three assets totaling $10.0 million (100.0% of
the collateral pool balance) that are listed as impaired securities
as of the trustee's August 24, 2018 report. While there have been
realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's
expects moderate/significant losses to occur on the impaired
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), number of asset obligors; and
pair-wise asset correlation. These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collaterals it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5086,
compared to 5377 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 0.0% compared to 25.9% at last
review; Ba1-Ba3 and 0.0% compared to 2.3% at last review; and
Caa1-Ca/C and 100.0% compared to 74.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 3.4 years, compared to 1.6 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, same as that at last review.


Moody's modeled 3 obligors, compared to 7 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 42.4%, compared to
58.5% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


LNR CDO 2006-1: Moody's Affirms C Rating on 14 Tranches
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by LNR CDO IV Ltd. Collateralized Debt Obligations,
Series 2006-1:

Cl. A, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. B-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. B-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. C-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. D-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. E, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. F-FL, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. F-FX, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C
(sf)

Cl. G, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. H, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. J, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


Cl. K, Affirmed C (sf); previously on May 24, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


The Cl. A, Cl. B-FL, Cl. B-FX, Cl. C-FL, Cl. C-FX, Cl. D-FL, Cl.
D-FX, Cl. E, Cl. F-FL, Cl. F-FX, Cl. G, Cl. H, Cl. J, and Cl. K
notes are referred to herein as the "Rated Notes".

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the Rated Notes because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with the existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation transactions.


LNR CDO IV is a static cash transaction. The transaction is wholly
backed by a portfolio of commercial mortgage backed securities
(CMBS) (100.0% of the pool balance). As of the August 28, 2018
trustee report, the aggregate note balance of the transaction,
including preferred shares, is $1.8 billion compared to $1.6
billion at issuance, as a result of the combination of pay-down to
the senior most outstanding class of notes, and capitalization of
defaulted and deferred interest. The deal is currently
under-collateralized by $1.5 billion as a result of realized losses
to the underlying collateral.

The pool contains six assets totaling $41.4 million (86.9% of the
collateral pool balance) that are listed as impaired securities as
of the trustee's August 28, 2018 report. While there have been
realized losses on the underlying collateral to date, Moody's
expects moderate/significant losses to occur on the impaired
securities.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average rating
factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the weighted
average recovery rate (WARR), number of asset obligors; and
pair-wise asset correlation. These parameters are typically modeled
as actual parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed
deals.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO pool.
Moody's has updated its assessments for the collaterals it does not
rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-dollar WARF of 5808,
compared to 8299 at last review. The current ratings on the
Moody's-rated collateral and the assessments of the non-Moody's
rated collateral follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 0.0% compared to 2.5% at last
review; Ba1-Ba3 and 0.0% compared to 2.3% at last review; B1-B3 and
64.4% compared to 19.1% at last review; and Caa1-Ca/C and 35.6%
compared to 76.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.0 years, compared to 1.2 years at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying CMBS look-through assets.

Moody's modeled a fixed WARR of 0.0%, compared to 1.6% at last
review.

Moody's modeled 4 obligors, compared to 8 at last review.

Moody's modeled a pair-wise asset correlation of 33.4%, compared to
57.6% at last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted an
additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the ratings assigned to the Rated Notes. This
sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the extent of growth
in the current macroeconomic environment. Commercial real estate
property values are continuing to move in a positive direction
along with a rise in investment activity and stabilization in core
property type performance. Limited new construction, moderate job
growth and the decreased cost of debt and equity capital have aided
this improvement.


MANITOULIN USD 2018-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned the following provisional ratings to the
Muskoka Series 2018-1 Class B Guarantee Linked Notes (the Class B
Notes), the Muskoka Series 2018-1 Class C Guarantee Linked Notes
(the Class C Notes) and the Muskoka Series 2018-1 Class D Guarantee
Linked Notes (the Class D Notes; and together with the Class B
Notes and Class C Notes, the Notes) contemplated to be issued by
Manitoulin USD Limited (Manitoulin or the Issuer) referencing the
executed Junior Loan Portfolio Financial Guarantee (the Financial
Guarantee) to be dated on or about September 27, 2018, between
Manitoulin as Guarantor and the Bank of Montreal (rated AA with a
Stable trend by DBRS) as Beneficiary with respect to a portfolio of
primarily U.S. and Canadian senior secured and senior unsecured
loans:

-- Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Class C Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BB (sf)

The provisional ratings on the Notes address the timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Scheduled Termination Date (as defined in the Financial Guarantee
referenced above). The payment of the interest due to the Notes is
subject to the Beneficiary's ability to pay the Guarantee Fee
Amount (as defined in the Financial Guarantee referenced above).

To assess portfolio credit quality, for each corporate obligor in
the portfolio, DBRS relies on DBRS ratings and public ratings from
other rating agencies or DBRS may provide a credit estimate,
internal assessment or ratings mapping of the Beneficiary's
internal ratings model. Credit estimates, internal assessments and
ratings mappings are not ratings; rather, they represent an
abbreviated analysis, including model-driven or statistical
components of default probability for each obligor that is used in
assigning a rating to the facility sufficient to assess portfolio
credit quality.

On the Effective Date (as defined in the Financial Guarantee
referenced above), the Issuer will utilize the proceeds of the
issue of the Notes to make a deposit into the Cash Deposit Accounts
with the Cash Deposit Bank. DBRS may review the ratings on the
Notes in the event of a downgrade of the Cash Deposit Bank below
certain thresholds, as defined in the transaction documents.

Following the delivery of an Enforcement Notice (as defined in the
Terms and Conditions of the Notes), amounts payable will be applied
in accordance with the Post-Enforcement Priority of Payments (as
defined in the Terms and Conditions of the Notes), which could
affect DBRS's ratings of the Notes at that time.

The ratings reflect the following:

(1) The draft Financial Guarantee to be dated on or about September
27, 2018.
(2) The integrity of the transaction structure.
(3) DBRS's assessment of the portfolio quality.
(4) Adequate credit enhancement to withstand projected collateral
loss rates.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.


MERRILL LYNCH 2003-D: Moody's Lowers Class B-2 Debt Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
tranches from Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-D
transaction, backed by Prime Jumbo mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust MLCC 2003-D

Cl. B-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 13, 2014
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Apr 13, 2012
Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Cl. X-B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 27, 2017 Confirmed
at Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades are due to the erosion of credit enhancement
available to the bonds and reflect the recent performance and
Moody's updated loss expectation on the underlying pool.

The downgrade of the rating of Cl. X-B reflects the nonpayment of
interest for an extended period of 14 months. The nonpayment of
interest is due to the use of interest otherwise distributable to
this bond to cover basis risk shortfalls on other Class B bonds and
the rating of C (sf) addresses the loss of interest attributable to
credit related reasons.

The principal methodology used in rating Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors Trust MLCC 2003-D Cl. B-2 and Cl. B-3 was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. The
methodologies used in rating Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust
MLCC 2003-D Cl. X-B were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in August 2018 from 4.4% in
August 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


MILL CITY 2018-3: DBRS Gives Prov. B(low) Rating on Class B2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned provisional ratings to the Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2018-3 (the Notes) to be issued by Mill City
Mortgage Loan Trust 2018-3 (the Trust) as follows:

-- $54.5 million Class A1A at AAA (sf)
-- $195.1 million Class A1B at AAA (sf)
-- $249.7 million Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- $272.9 million Class A2 at AA (sf)
-- $300.8 million Class A3 at A (sf)
-- $326.6 million Class A4 at BBB (sf)
-- $23.2 million Class M1 at AA (sf)
-- $27.9 million Class M2 at A (sf)
-- $25.8 million Class M3 at BBB (sf)
-- $39.8 million Class B1 at BB (low) (sf)
-- $21.3 million Class B2 at B (low) (sf)

Classes A1, A2, A3 and A4 are exchangeable notes. These classes can
be exchanged for combinations of exchange notes as specified in the
offering documents.

The AAA (sf) ratings on the Notes reflect 41.40% of credit
enhancement provided by subordinated notes in the pool. The AA
(sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (low) (sf) and B (low) (sf) ratings
reflect 35.95%, 29.40%, 23.35%, 14.00% and 9.00% of credit
enhancement, respectively.

Other than the specified classes above, DBRS does not rate any
other classes in this transaction.

This transaction is a securitization of a portfolio of primarily
first-lien, seasoned, performing and re-performing residential
mortgages funded by the issuance of asset-backed notes. The Notes
are backed by 2,319 loans with a total principal balance of
approximately $426,064,874 as of the Cut-Off Date (August 31,
2018).

The loans are approximately 133 months seasoned. As of the Cut-Off
Date, 93.9% of the pool is current, 3.7% is 30 days delinquent,
1.2% is 60 days delinquent and 1.3% is 90+ days delinquent under
the Mortgage Bankers Association delinquency method. There are 105
loans (3.1% of the pool) that are in bankruptcy, including all of
the 90+ day’s delinquent loans and a portion of the current, 30
days delinquent and 60 days delinquent loans. Approximately 33.5%
of the pool has been zero times 30 (0 x 30) days delinquent for the
past 24 months, 63.6% has been 0 x 30 for the past 12 months and
77.1% has been 0 x 30 for the past six months.

Modified loans comprise 81.0% of the portfolio. The modifications
happened more than two years ago for 74.3% of the modified loans.
Within the pool, 829 loans have non-interest-bearing deferred
amounts, which equates to 8.4% of the total principal balance. In
accordance with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Qualified
Mortgage (QM) rules, 6.1% of the loans are designated as QM Safe
Harbor, 0.2% as QM Rebuttable Presumption and 1.6% as non-QM
(including one loan for which the QM designation is not available).
Approximately 92.0% of the loans are not subject to the QM rules.

Approximately 4.3% of the pool comprises non-first-lien loans.

Through a series of transactions, Mill City Holdings, LLC (Mill
City) will acquire the mortgage loans on the Closing Date. Prior to
the Closing Date, the loans were held in one or more trusts that
acquired the mortgage loans between September 2015 and May 2018.
Such trusts are entities of which the Representation Provider or an
affiliate thereof holds an indirect interest. Upon acquiring the
loans, Mill City, through a wholly owned subsidiary (the
Depositor), will contribute loans to the Trust. As the Sponsor,
Mill City, through a majority-owned affiliate, will acquire and
retain a 5.0% eligible vertical interest in each class of
securities to be issued (other than any residual certificates) to
satisfy the credit risk retention requirements under Section 15G of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. These loans were originated and previously serviced by
various entities through purchases in the secondary market. As of
the Cut-Off Date, the loans are serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing, LLC (80.4%); Fay Servicing, LLC (14.4%); Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (4.0%); and Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC
(1.3%).

There will not be any advancing of delinquent principal or interest
on any mortgages by the servicers or any other party to the
transaction; however, the servicers are obligated to make advances
in respect of taxes and insurance, reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in the course of servicing and disposing of properties.

The transaction employs a sequential-pay cash flow structure.
Principal proceeds can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the
Notes, but such shortfalls on Class M2 and more subordinate bonds
will not be paid until the more senior classes are retired.

The lack of principal and interest advances on delinquent mortgages
may increase the possibility of periodic interest shortfalls to the
Note holders; however, principal proceeds can be used to pay
interest to the Notes sequentially, and subordination levels are
greater than expected losses, which may provide for timely payment
of interest to the rated Notes.

A satisfactory third-party due diligence review was performed on
the portfolio with respect to regulatory compliance, payment
history and data capture as well as a title and lien review.
Updated broker price opinions or exterior appraisals were provided
for all loans in the pool except one; however, a reconciliation was
not performed on the updated values.

The transaction employs a relatively weak representations and
warranties framework that includes a 13-month sunset, an unrated
provider (CVI CVF III Lux Master S.a.r.l.), certain knowledge
qualifiers and fewer mortgage loan representations relative to DBRS
criteria for seasoned pools. Mitigating factors include (1)
significant loan seasoning and relatively clean performance history
in recent years, (2) a comprehensive due diligence review and (3) a
representations and warranties enforcement mechanism, including a
delinquency review trigger and a breach reserve account.

The DBRS ratings of AAA (sf) and AA (sf) address the timely payment
of interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
related Notes. The DBRS ratings of A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (low) (sf)
and B (low) (sf) address the ultimate payment of interest and full
payment of principal by the legal final maturity date in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the related Notes.


MORGAN STANLEY 1999-RM1: Moody's Lowers Class X Debt Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on one class
and affirmed the rating on one class in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc. 1999-RM1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 1999-RM1 as follows:

Cl. N, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2018 Downgraded
to B2 (sf)

CL. X, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2018 Affirmed C (sf)


RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the P&I class, Cl. N, was downgraded due to
anticipated losses from the specially serviced loan that was higher
than Moody's had previously expected.

The rating on the IO class was affirmed based on the credit quality
of the referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 54.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 12.6% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.8% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 1.7% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating Morgan Stanley Capital I
Inc.1999-RM1, Cl. N was "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017. The
methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc.1999-RM1,
Cl. X were "Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO)
Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 99.8% to $1.65
million from $859.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by one mortgage loan constituting 100% of the pool.


Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 1, the same as at Moody's last review.

Twelve loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $14.4 million (for an average loss
severity of 24.4%). The one remaining loan, the Claremot Commons
Loan ($1.65 million), which is secured by a 37,000 square foot (SF)
anchored retail center located in Claremont, North Carolina. The
property is currently anchored by a Lowes Foods grocery store,
which occupies approximately 87% of the net rentable area (NRA)
under a lease set to expire in March 2019. Following the original
lease expiration of March 2017, the tenant has been extending their
lease at a reduced rent for a 12 month period at a time. The loan
transferred to special servicing in May 2018 due to imminent
maturity default. The Special Servicer is pursuing foreclosure,
which is expected by the end of November 2018.

As of the September 17, 2018 remittance statement cumulative
interest shortfalls were $12.5 million. Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to
specially serviced loans. Interest shortfalls are caused by special
servicing fees, including workout and liquidation fees, appraisal
entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications and
extraordinary trust expenses.


MORGAN STANLEY 2003-IQ4: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Cl. L Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one and
affirmed the ratings on two classes in Morgan Stanley Capital I
Trust 2003-IQ4 as follows:

Cl. K, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2017 Affirmed B1
(sf)

Cl. L, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2017 Affirmed Caa3
(sf)

Cl. X-1, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 2, 2017 Affirmed C (sf)


RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. K was upgraded due to an increase in credit
support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The deal has
paid down over 63% since last review and 99% since securitization.


The rating on Cl. L was affirmed due to realized losses. Cl. L has
already experienced a 19% realized loss as a result of previously
liquidated loans.

The rating on the IO Class, Cl. X-1, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of their referenced classes.

Moody's does not anticipate losses from the remaining collateral in
the current environment. However, over the remaining life of the
transaction, losses may emerge from macro stresses to the
environment and changes in collateral performance. Its ratings
reflect the potential for future losses under varying levels of
stress. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 1.6%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 1.7% at last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust
2003-IQ4, Cl. K and Cl. L were "Approach to Rating US and Canadian
Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017 and "Moody's Approach
to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS"
published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating Morgan
Stanley Capital I Trust 2003-IQ4, Cl. X-1 were "Approach to Rating
US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion CMBS" published in July 2017,
"Moody's Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower CMBS" published in July 2017, and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the September 17, 2018 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 99.3% to
$5.02 million from $727.8 million at securitization. The
certificates are collateralized by nine mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 23% of the pool.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 6, the same as at last review.

One loan, constituting 0.8% of the pool, is on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Seven loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $11.97 million (for an average loss
severity of 35.3%). There are no loans that are currently in
special servicing.

Moody's received full year 2017 operating results for 100% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2018 operating results for 49% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 25.1%, compared to 27.1% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 20.7% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI). Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.9%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.36X and greater
than 4.00X, respectively. Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's
NCF and the loan's actual debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is
based on Moody's NCF and a 9.25% stress rate the agency applied to
the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 64.3% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Plainview Commons Loan ($1.15 million --
22.9% of the pool), which is secured by a retail property located
in Plainview, New York (Nassau county). The property was 94% leased
as of December 2017 and has historically been well leased. The
fully amortizing loan has paid down over 66% and is scheduled to
pay-off in February 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 29.4%
and 3.86X, respectively, compared to 35.0% and 3.24X at the last
review.

The second largest loan is the is the Boardwalk Plaza Loan ($1.11
million -- 22.2% of the pool), which is secured by a 49,000 square
foot (SF) anchored retail property located east of Detroit. The
property was 100% leased as of March 2018 and has historically been
well occupied. Three new tenants for 7,600 SF of space signed new
leases in 2018. The fully amortizing loan has paid down about 66%
and is scheduled to pay-off in February 2023. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 24.6% and greater than 4.00X, respectively.

The third largest loan is the Garden West Apartments Loan ($0.96
million -- 19.1% of the pool), which is secured a 122 unit, garden
style apartment complex in Yuba City, California located
approximately 42 miles north of Sacramento. The property was 93%
occupied as of December 2017, slightly down from 97% in December
2016. The fully amortizing loan has paid down over 66% and is
scheduled to pay-off in January 2023. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 25.1% and greater than 4.00X, respectively.


MORGAN STANLEY 2007-10XS: Moody's Lowers Rating on 4 Tranches to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of twelve
tranches from Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10XS
transaction, backed by Alt-A mortgage loans.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10XS

Cl. A-2, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-4, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-6, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-7, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-8, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-11, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-13, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-14, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-15, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-16, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. A-17, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2010
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrades are due to the erosion of credit enhancement
available to the bonds and reflect the recent performance and
Moody's updated loss expectation on the underlying pool.

The factors that Moody's considers in rating an IO bond depend on
the type of referenced securities or assets to which the IO bond is
linked. Generally, the ratings on IO bonds reflect the linkage and
performance of the respective transactions, including expected
losses on the collateral, and pay-downs or write-offs of the
related reference bonds. The downgrade of the ratings of Cl. A-5
and Cl. A-7 reflect their linkage to Cl. A-4 and Cl. A-6
respectively. However, the downgrade of the ratings of Cl. A-11,
Cl. A-13, Cl. A-15, and Cl. A-17 to C (sf) reflects the nonpayment
of interest for an extended period of 2 or more years. For these
bonds, the coupon rate is subject to a calculation that has reduced
the required interest distribution to zero. The reduction to zero
is generally attributed to weak performance and/or rate reduction
on the collateral due to underlying loan modifications. Because the
coupon on these bonds is subject to changes in interest rates
and/or collateral composition, there is a remote possibility that
they may receive interest in the future. The rating of C (sf)
addresses the loss of interest attributable to credit related
reasons.

The principal methodology used in rating Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Loan Trust 2007-10XS Cl. A-2, Cl. A-4, Cl. A-6, Cl. A-8, Cl. A-14,
and Cl. A-16 was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in
January 2017. The methodologies used in rating Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-10XS Cl. A-5, Cl. A-7, Cl. A-11, Cl. A-13,
Cl. A-15, and Cl. A-17 were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June
2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in August 2018 from 4.4% in
August 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.


MORGAN STANLEY 2013-C8: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 12 classes of Morgan Stanley Capital I,
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2013-C8.

Fitch has issued a focus report on this transaction. The report
provides a detailed and up-to-date perspective on key credit
characteristics of the MSBAM 2013-C8 transaction and property-level
performance of the related trust loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Slight Increase in Loss Expectations: The rating affirmations
reflect the generally stable performance of the majority of the
pool. Current loss expectations are slightly higher than issuance
due to the Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOC), but are offset by
increased credit enhancement from loan amortization and payoffs.

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the September 2018 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been reduced by
17.95% to $893 million from $1.1 billion at issuance. Four loans
totaling 9.71% of the pool balance are defeased. The pool's
aggregate pool-level NOI for the non-defeased loans has increased
3.6% above prior year reporting. There is one specially serviced
loan (0.54% of the pool balance).

Fitch Loans of Concern: Five loans totaling 7.9% of the pool
balance are designated as a FLOC, including three of the top-20
loans. The five current FLOCs include three office properties, a
hotel located in Columbus, MS and a regional mall located in
Anderson, SC. Fitch spoke to a property management representative
at the Anderson, SC mall and was told there was no damage incurred
from Hurricane Florence. The six loans have been designated as
FLOC's for reasons including; occupancy declines, significant
upcoming rollover concerns and Low DSCRs. One asset (0.54%)
transferred to special servicing in April 2018 for non-monetary
default. According to servicer updates, counsel has engaged the
borrower to cure the defaults.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Strong Credit Metrics: As of the September 2018 distribution, the
pool's weighted average DSCR was 2.51x based on borrower reporting,
and the weighted average stressed debt yield was 12.75%. The
weighted average Fitch stressed LTV is 78.9%.

Loan Concentration: The top-10 loans comprise 61.4% of the pool,
which is above the average concentration for similar-vintage
Fitch-rated transactions. The highest property type concentration
in the pool is retail at 40.5%, including two regional malls (4.5%)
in the top 15, followed by loans secured by office properties at
31.3% and loans secured by self-storage properties at 9.4%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Rating Outlooks on all classes, except for class F, are
due to the generally stable performance of the pool, continued
amortization and sufficient credit enhancement relative to expected
losses. Rating upgrades may occur with improved pool performance
and additional paydown or defeasance. The Negative Rating Outlook
on class F reflects the potential for downgrade should the FLOCs
continue to experience performance issues. Fitch's analysis
includes an additional sensitivity stress related to the concerns
with the regional mall in Anderson, SC. Rating downgrades to the
non-investment-grade classes are possible should this loan
default.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $89.6 million class ASB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $126.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $336 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $108.1 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $659.7 million* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $68.3 million* class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $42.7 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $0 class PST at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $19.9 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $12.8 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

  - Notional amount and interest-only.

The class A-1 and A-2 certificates have been fully repaid. The
class A-S, B and C certificates may be exchanged for a related
amount of the class PST certificate, and vice versa. Fitch does not
rate the class G and H certificates.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-C31: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 17 classes of Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust Series 2016-C31 (MSBAM 2016-C31)
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations reflect
the overall stable performance of the majority of the pool, and the
minimal change in loss expectations since issuance. Four loans
(6.5% of the pool) are considered Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs),
including the fourth largest loan in the pool (4.8%) and two
specially serviced loans (0.9%).

The largest FLOC, Vintage Park (4.8%), is secured by a 341,107-sf
open-air anchored shopping center located in Houston, TX. Occupancy
declined to 88.4%, as of the June 2018 rent roll, from 94.5% at YE
2015. While in line sales have improved overall with YE 2017
average inline sales reported at $474 psf compared to $408 psf at
issuance, movie theater sales have declined substantially over the
period to $440,038 per screen in YE 2017 compared to $714,810 per
screen at YE 2016 following the sale of the former Alamo Drafthouse
(6.9% of NRA) to the Star Cinema chain in December 2016. Further,
the servicer reported the YE 2017 NOI DSCR declined to 1.37x from
1.63x at YE 2016 due to a decline in revenue. Per the servicer, the
property did not suffer any damage from Hurricane Harvey. The loan
is scheduled to begin amortizing in February 2019.

Three additional loans are considered FLOCs. One is a loan secured
by a full-service hotel (0.8%) located in Atlanta, GA that has seen
declining cash flow. The second is a loan secured by a flex/R&D
property (0.5%) Albuquerque, NM that transferred to special
servicing in November 2017 after the sponsor affiliated
single-tenant reportedly fell behind in its rental payments, the
loan is currently 90 days delinquent. The third is an REO suburban
office property located in Hampton, VA that defaulted in January
2018 soon after it experienced an occupancy decline; the loan
became REO in June 2018. Fitch will continue to monitor all FLOCs.

Minimal Credit Enhancement Improvement Since Issuance: As of the
August 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal
balance has been reduced by only 1.3% to $940.6 million from $953.2
million at issuance. No loans have paid off or defeased since
issuance. Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the pool is
expected to pay down by 13.9%, which is above the average for
transactions of a similar vintage. Five loans (11.0%), including
two loans in the top 10, are full-term, interest only, while 13
loans (33.2%) remain in their partial interest-only periods. The
majority of the loans are scheduled to mature in 2026 (93.3%), with
limited maturities scheduled in 2021 (3.1%), 2023 (2.1%) and 2025
(1.5%).

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentrations: Loans secured by office properties represent
40.2% of the pool, including eight loans (33.9%) in the top 15.
Loans backed by retail properties represent 34.6% of the pool,
including four (16.6%) loans in the top 15. The sixth largest loan
(4.4%) is secured by a portfolio of three outlet malls sponsored by
Simon Property Group, L.P.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks for all classes remain Stable due to the
overall stable performance of the pool. Fitch does not foresee
positive or negative ratings migration until a material economic or
asset-level event changes the transaction's portfolio level
metrics.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $37.5 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $27.6 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69.7 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $17.8 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $210.0 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $292.0 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.5 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $45.3 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $44.1 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52.4 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.0 million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.7 million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $654.6 million class X-A* at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $110.8 million class X-B* at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $52.4 million class X-D* at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.0 million class X-E* at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $10.7 million class X-F* at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

  - Notional amount and interest-only.

Fitch does not rate the class G or interest-only class X-G
certificates. The class D, E, F and G certificates and the
interest-only class X-D, X-E, X-F and X-G certificates are
privately placed pursuant to Rule 144A.


NEUBERGER BERMAN CLO 29: S&P Rates $20MM Class E Notes 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Neuberger Berman Loan
Advisers CLO 29 Ltd./Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 29 LLC's
fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction backed by primarily broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans that are governed by
collateral quality tests.

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote

  RATINGS ASSIGNED
  Neuberger Berman Loan Advisers CLO 29 Ltd.

  Class                Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1                  AAA (sf)                305.000
  A-2                  AAA (sf)                 20.000
  B-1                  AA (sf)                  45.000
  B-2                  AA (sf)                   5.000
  C (deferrable)       A (sf)                   40.000
  D (deferrable)       BBB- (sf)                25.000
  E (deferrable)       BB- (sf)                 20.000
  Subordinated notes   NR                       48.875

  NR--Not rated.


OCTAGON INVESTMENT 39: Moody's Rates $12MM Class F Notes '(P)B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to seven
classes of notes to be issued by Octagon Investment Partners 39,
Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$372,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$15,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$69,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$27,600,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$37,800,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$30,600,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

US$12,000,000 Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2030 (the "Class F Notes"), Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes, and the Class
F Notes are referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."


Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

Octagon 39 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up to 10% of the
portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured loans.
Moody's expects the portfolio to be approximately 85% ramped as of
the closing date.

Octagon Credit Investors, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2780

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


PRESTIGE AUTO 2018-1: S&P Rates $18.5MM Class E Notes 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Prestige Auto
Receivables Trust 2018-1's (PART 2018-1's) $407.83 million
automobile receivables-backed notes series 2018-1.

The note issuance is an asset-backed securities transaction backed
by subprime auto loan receivables.

The ratings reflect:

-- The availability of approximately 48.5%, 42.5%, 33.1%, 26.5%,
and 22.3% of credit support for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes,
respectively (based on stressed cash flow scenarios, including
excess spread), which provides coverage of more than 3.50x, 3.00x,
2.30x, 1.75x, and 1.50x S&P's 13.00%-13.75% expected cumulative net
loss range for the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.
These credit support levels are commensurate with the assigned 'AAA
(sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB (sf)', and 'BB (sf)' ratings on
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes.

-- S&P's expectation that under a moderate, or 'BBB', loss
scenario, all else equal, our ratings on the class A, B, and C
notes would not decline by more than one rating category, and its
ratings on the class D and E notes would not decline by more than
two rating categories (all else being equal). These potential
rating movements are consistent with its credit stability
criteria.

-- The credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
overcollateralization, a reserve account, and excess spread.

-- The timely interest and ultimate principal payments made under
the stressed cash flow modeling scenarios, which are consistent
with the assigned ratings.

-- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
subprime auto loans.

-- Prestige Financial Services Inc.'s securitization performance
history since 2001.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Prestige Auto Receivables Trust 2018-1  

  Class       Rating          Amount (mil. $)
  A-1         A-1+ (sf)                70.000
  A-2         AAA (sf)                130.000
  A-3         AAA (sf)                 51.480
  B           AA (sf)                  39.360
  C           A (sf)                   55.760
  D           BBB (sf)                 42.640
  E           BB (sf)                  18.590


PURCHASING POWER 2018-A: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on D Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. discontinued the rating of A (sf) on the Class A Loans
issued by Purchasing Power Funding 2017-A, LLC (PPF 2017-A) due to
repayment in full. DBRS also removed from Under Review with
Developing Implications the four publicly rated securities issued
by Purchasing Power Funding 2018-A, LLC (PPF 2018-A; together, with
PPF 2017-A, the Transactions), where they were placed on July 2,
2018. The four securities include Class A, Series 2018-A; Class B,
Series 2018-A; Class C, Series 2018-A; and Class D, Series 2018-A.
Subsequently, DBRS confirmed the ratings of the same four classes
of the PPF 2018-A transaction as follows: Class A, Series 2018-A at
AA (sf); Class B, Series 2018-A at A (high) (sf); Class C, Series
2018-A at BBB (sf); and Class D, Series 2018-A at BB (low) (sf).

These rating actions follow the notification on June 25, 2018, by
Purchasing Power, LLC (the Company) of certain historical
inaccuracies relating to the reporting of deemed collections on
certain of the receivables due to returned merchandise, as well as
certain other errors in reporting the balances of certain of the
receivables of the Transactions (the Reporting Inaccuracies). The
notification stated that as of June 22, 2018, no borrowing base
deficit existed in PPF 2017-A and the overcollateralization test
was in compliance for PPF 2018-A.

On July 10, 2018, as a result of the discovery of the Reporting
Inaccuracies, PPF 2018-A requested a waiver from note holders of
any servicer defaults, seller events of default or any other event
that may have occurred that would have caused a rapid amortization
event. On July 12, 2018, PPF 2018-A received consent from the
required note holders to enter into such a waiver.

Concluding discussions with the Company and the review of corrected
and restated remittance reports and third-party due diligence
reports for the Transactions, DBRS determined that no servicer
defaults, seller events of default or any other event occurred that
would have caused a rapid amortization event.


RAIT CRE I: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on 3 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight classes of RAIT CRE CDO I Ltd.
(RAIT CRE CDO I) with distressed ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect significant portfolio concentration,
adverse selection and the high percentage of Fitch Loans of
Concern. Although credit enhancement is high, the rating of class B
was capped at 'CCCsf' due to the highly distressed nature of the
remaining collateral. Fitch designated 85.2% of the portfolio as
Fitch Loans of Concern, including defaulted loans at 14.1%.

Since the last rating action, approximately 18 loan interests were
either paid in full or disposed, with realized losses totaling
$76.7 million. Paydown over the same period was approximately $145
million, which paid off classes A-1A, A-1B and A-2, as well as a
substantial portion of the now senior class B, which requires
timely interest payments.

The remaining pool consists of interests from approximately 24
different assets.

As of the September 2018 trustee report and per Fitch
categorization, the CDO is substantially invested as follows: whole
loans/A-notes (79.8% of the pool), mezzanine debt (11.1%), and
preferred equity (9.1%). Many of the remaining loans have been
modified, including maturity extensions, since origination.
Further, RAIT affiliates now have ownership interests in six of the
CDO assets, totaling approximately $147.6 million (52.5%). Fitch
expects significant losses upon default for many of the loan
positions as they are significantly overleveraged.

Fitch's base case loss expectation is 71.5%. Under Fitch's
methodology, 100% of the portfolio is modeled to default in the
base case stress scenario, defined as the 'B' stress. In this
scenario, the modeled average cash flow decline is 21.9% from,
generally, trailing 12 month first or second quarter 2018. Modeled
recoveries are 28.5%.

The largest contributor to Fitch's base case loss expectation is an
A-note (13.7% of the pool) secured by a poorly performing regional
mall located in Houston, TX. The mall has not seen notable
improvement since a repositioning in 2010/2011. The most recently
reported occupancy was 70% with cash flow insufficient to cover
debt service. The TTM March 2018 asset manager reported debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 0.27x. Fitch modeled a
substantial loss on this loan in its base case.

The next largest component of Fitch's base case loss expectation is
a whole loan (10.7%) secured by a leasehold interest in a
negatively cashflowing regional mall located near Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina, in an area reportedly impacted my Hurricane
Florence. The mall previously lost anchor tenants Kmart, JC Penney,
and Stein Mart. Further, a movie theater vacated its space in 2016
not long after opening for business. The most recently reported
occupancy was 63%, however, the largest tenant (20% of the NRA)
consists of a temporary tenant expected to vacate at year end. The
TTM March 2018 asset manager reported DSCR was -0.89x. The sponsor
has been covering debt service shortfalls. Fitch modeled a
substantial loss in its base case scenario on this loan.

This transaction was analyzed according to Fitch's 'Surveillance
Criteria for U.S. CREL CDOs', which applies stresses to property
cash flows and DSCR tests to project future default levels for the
underlying portfolio. Recoveries are based on stressed cash flows
and Fitch's long-term capitalization rates. Cash flow modeling was
not performed as it was not expected to provide any additional
analytical value.

The 'CCCsf' and below ratings for classes C through J are based on
a deterministic analysis that considers Fitch's base case loss
expectation for the pool and the current percentage of defaulted
assets and Fitch Loans of Concern, factoring in anticipated
recoveries relative to each class's credit enhancement.

RAIT CRE CDO I is managed by RAIT Partnership, L.P., a subsidiary
of RAIT Financial Trust.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

While recoveries to class B are expected to be substantial given
the significant percentage of whole loans, upgrades to the classes
are highly unlikely given the portfolio's concentration, adverse
selection, and significant percentage of Fitch Loans of Concern.
The classes are subject to further downgrade should realized losses
exceed Fitch's expectations.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following classes:

  -- $74 million class B notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 100%;

  -- $41.5 million class C notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 15%;

  -- $22.5 million class D notes at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $16 million class E notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $500,000 class F notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $12.5 million class G notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.

  -- $17.5 million class H notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%;

  -- $35 million class J notes at 'CCsf'; RE 0%.


SEQUOIA MORTGAGE 2018-8: Moody's Gives (P)Ba3 Rating to B-4 Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Sequoia
Mortgage Trust 2018-8. The certificates are backed by one pool of
prime quality, first-lien mortgage loans, including 169
agency-eligible high balance mortgage loans. The assets of the
trust consist of 668 fully amortizing, fixed-rate mortgage loans.
The borrowers in the pool have high FICO scores, significant equity
in their properties and liquid cash reserves. Nationstar Mortgage
LLC will serve as the master servicer for this transaction. There
are six servicers for this pool: Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
(Shellpoint) (87.4% by loan balance), First Republic Bank (8.6%),
HomeStreet Bank (2.7%), Associated Bank, N.A. (0.8%), TIAA, FSB
(0.3%) and UBS Bank USA (0.2%).

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Sequoia Mortgage Trust 2018-8

Cl. A-1, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-2, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-3, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-4, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-5, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-6, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-7, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-8, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-9, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-10, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-11, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-12, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-13, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-14, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-15, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-16, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-17, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-18, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-19, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-20, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-21, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-22, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-23, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-24, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

Cl. B-1, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

Cl. B-3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-4, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Summary Credit Analysis

Moody's expected cumulative net loss on the aggregate pool is 0.25%
in a base scenario and reaches 3.90% at a stress level consistent
with the Aaa (sf) ratings. Its loss estimates are based on a
loan-by-loan assessment of the securitized collateral pool using
Moody's Individual Loan Level Analysis (MILAN) model. Loan-level
adjustments to the model included: adjustments to borrower
probability of default for higher and lower borrower DTIs,
borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties, self-employed
borrowers, origination channels and at a pool level, for the
default risk of HOA properties in super lien states. The adjustment
to its Aaa stress loss below the model output also includes
adjustments related to aggregation and origination quality. The
model combines loan-level characteristics with economic drivers to
determine the probability of default for each loan, and hence for
the portfolio as a whole. Severity is also calculated on a
loan-level basis. The pool loss level is then adjusted for
borrower, zip code, and MSA level concentrations.

Collateral Description

The SEMT 2018-8 transaction is a securitization of 668 first-lien
residential mortgage loans, with an aggregate unpaid principal
balance of $454,426,513. There are 109 originators in this pool,
including United Shore Financial Services (18.7%), Quicken Loans
Inc. (16.3%) and First Republic Bank (8.6%). None of the
originators other than United Shore Financial Services and Quicken
Loans contributed 10% or more of the principal balance of the loans
in the pool. The loan-level third party due diligence review (TPR)
encompassed credit underwriting, property value and regulatory
compliance. In addition, Redwood has agreed to backstop the rep and
warranty repurchase obligation of all originators other than First
Republic Bank.

The loans were all aggregated by Redwood Residential Acquisition
Corporation (Redwood). Moody's considers Redwood, the mortgage loan
seller, to have strong aggregation and origination practices
compared to peers.

Borrowers of the mortgage loans backing this transaction have a
demonstrated ability to save and to manage credit. In addition, the
66.8% of the borrowers in the pool have more than 24 months of
liquid cash reserves or enough money to pay the mortgage for two
years should there be an interruption to the borrower's cash flow.
Consistent with prudent credit management, the borrowers have high
FICO scores, with a weighted average score of 772. In general, the
borrowers have high income, significant liquid assets and a stable
employment history, all of which have been verified as part of the
underwriting process and reviewed by the TPR firms. Borrowers also
have significant equity in their homes (WA CLTV 68.5%) consistent
with recent SEMT transactions.

Approximately, 1.2% of the mortgage loans by aggregate stated
principal balance are secured by mortgaged properties located in
the areas that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had
designated for federal assistance during the prior 12 months.
Redwood has engaged a third party to inspect these properties.
Regarding Hurricane Florence, approximately 0.2%, 0.6% and 0.9% of
the mortgage loans by aggregate stated principal balance are
located in North Carolina, South Carolina, and along the southern
coast of the Commonwealth of Virgina, respectively. As of September
25, 2018, one of the mortgaged properties is located in an area
currently declared as a disaster area by FEMA as a result of
Hurricane Florence. Redwood ordered an exterior inspection on the
mortgaged property. No material visible damage was detected from
the inspection and the related mortgage was included in the
transaction pool. Representations and warranties as to the mortgage
loans will have been made to the effect that in general, the
mortgage loans will be free of material damage as of the closing
date.

Structural considerations

Similar to recently rated Sequoia transactions, in this
transaction, Redwood is adding a feature prohibiting the servicer,
or securities administrator, from advancing principal and interest
to loans that are 120 days or more delinquent. These loans on which
principal and interest advances are not made are called the Stop
Advance Mortgage Loans ("SAML"). The balance of the SAML will be
removed from the principal and interest distribution amounts
calculations. In its opinion, the SAML feature strengthens the
integrity of senior and subordination relationships in the
structure. Yet, in certain scenarios the SAML feature, as
implemented in this transaction, can lead to a reduction in
interest payments to certain tranches even when more subordinated
tranches are outstanding. The senior/subordination relationship
between tranches is strengthened since the removal of SAML in the
calculation of the senior percentage amount directs more principal
to the senior bonds and less to the subordinate bonds. Further,
this feature limits the amount of servicer advances that could
increase the loss severity on the liquidated loans and preserves
the subordination amount for the most senior bonds. On the other
hand, this feature can cause a reduction in the interest
distribution amount paid to the bonds; and if that were to happen
such a reduction in interest payment is unlikely to be recovered.
The final ratings on the bonds take into consideration its expected
losses on the collateral and the potential reduction in interest
distributions to the bonds. Furthermore, the likelihood that the
subordinate tranches could potentially permanently lose some
interest as a result of this feature was considered.

Moody's believes there is a low likelihood that the rated
securities of SEMT 2018-8 will incur any losses from extraordinary
expenses or indemnification payments owing to potential future
lawsuits against key deal parties. First, the loans are of prime
quality and were originated under a regulatory environment that
requires tighter controls for originations than pre-crisis, which
reduces the likelihood that the loans have defects that could form
the basis of a lawsuit. Second, Redwood, who initially retains the
subordinate classes and provides a back-stop to the representations
and warranties of all the originators except for First Republic
Bank, has a strong alignment of interest with investors, and is
incentivized to actively manage the pool to optimize performance.
Third, historical performance of loans aggregated by Redwood has
been very strong to date. Fourth, the transaction has reasonably
well defined processes in place to identify loans with defects on
an ongoing basis. In this transaction, an independent breach
reviewer must review loans for breaches of representations and
warranties when a loan becomes 120 days delinquent, which reduces
the likelihood that parties will be sued for inaction.

Tail Risk & Subordination Floor

The transaction cash flows follow a shifting interest structure
that allows subordinated bonds to receive principal payments under
certain defined scenarios. Because a shifting interest structure
allows subordinated bonds to pay down over time as the loan pool
shrinks, senior bonds are exposed to increased performance
volatility, known as tail risk. The transaction provides for a
subordination floor of 1.25% of the closing pool balance, which
mitigates tail risk by protecting the senior bonds from eroding
credit enhancement over time.

Third-party Review and Reps & Warranties

Two TPR firms conducted a due diligence review of nearly 100% of
the mortgage loans in the pool. Generally, the TPR firms conducted
a review for credit, property valuation, compliance and data
integrity ("full review loans"). The TPR firms randomly selected 79
mortgage loans for limited review that were originated by First
Republic Bank and PrimeLending.

Generally, for the full review loans, the sponsor or the originator
corrected all material errors identified by following defined
methods of error resolution under the TRID rule or TILA 130(b) as
per the proposed SFIG TRID framework. The sponsor or the originator
provided the borrower with a corrected Closing Disclosure and
letter of explanation as well as a refund where necessary. All
technical errors on the Loan Estimate were subsequently corrected
on the Closing Disclosure. Moody's believes that the TRID
noncompliance risk to the trust is immaterial due to the good-faith
efforts to correct the identified conditions.

No TRID compliance reviews were performed on the limited review
loans. Therefore, there is a possibility that some of these loans
could have unresolved TRID issues. Moody's reviewed the initial
compliance findings of loans from the same originator where a full
review was conducted and there were no material compliance
findings. As a result, Moody's did not increase its Aaa loss.

After a review of the TPR appraisal findings, Moody's notes that
there are 3 loans with final grade 'D' due to escrow holdback
distribution amounts. The review for these loans was incomplete
because the related appraisals were subject to the completion of
renovation work or missing evidence of disbursement of escrow
funds. In the event the escrow funds greater than 10% have not been
disbursed within six months of the closing date, the seller shall
repurchase the affected escrow holdback mortgage loan, on or before
the date that is six months after the closing date at the
applicable repurchase price. Given that the seller has the
obligation to repurchase, Moody's did not make an adjustment for
these loans.

Each of the originators makes the loan-level R&Ws for the loans it
originated, except for loans acquired by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago. The mortgage loans purchased by Redwood from the FHLB
Chicago were originated by various participating financial
institution originators. For these mortgage loans, FHLB Chicago
will provide the loan-level R&Ws that are assigned to the trust.

In line with other SEMT transactions, the loan-level R&Ws for SEMT
2018-8 are strong and, in general, either meet or exceed the
baseline set of credit-neutral R&Ws Moody's identified for US RMBS.


Among other things, the R&Ws address property valuation,
underwriting, fraud, data accuracy, regulatory compliance, the
presence of title and hazard insurance, the absence of material
property damage, and the enforceability of the mortgage.

The R&W providers vary in financial strength, which include some
financially weaker originators. To mitigate this risk, Redwood will
backstop any R&W providers who may become financially incapable of
repurchasing mortgage loans, except for First Republic Bank, which
is one of the strongest originators. Moreover, a third-party due
diligence firm conducted a detailed review on the loans of all of
the originators, which mitigates the risk of unrated and
financially weaker originators.

Trustee & Master Servicer

The transaction trustee is Wilmington Trust, National Association.
The paying agent and cash management functions will be performed by
Citibank, N.A. and the custodian functions will be performed by
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., rather than the trustee. In addition,
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, as master servicer, is responsible for
servicer oversight, and termination of servicers and for the
appointment of successor servicers. In addition, Nationstar
Mortgage LLC is committed to act as successor if no other successor
servicer can be found.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US Prime RMBS" published in February 2015.

Significant weight was put on judgment taking into account the
results of the modeling tools as well as the aggregate impact of
the third-party review and the quality of the servicers and
originators.


SLIDE 2018-FUN: S&P Assigns 'B(sf)' Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to SLIDE 2018-FUN's $362.6
million commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

The certificate issuance is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction backed by one three-year, floating-rate commercial
mortgage loan with an original balance of $365.0 million, and a
current balance of $362.6 million, with two one-year extension
options, secured by the fee simple interest in the Kalahari Resort
and Conventions Poconos, the borrower's interest in the
intellectual property license agreements, and the operating
lessee's leasehold interest in the operating lease and the
property.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the collateral's historical and
projected performance, the sponsors' and manager's experience, the
trustee-provided liquidity, the loan's terms, and the transaction's
structure.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  SLIDE 2018-FUN

  Class       Rating(i)        Amount (mil. $)
  A           AAA (sf)             125,300,000
  X-CP        BBB- (sf)            248,800,000(ii)
  X-EXT       BBB- (sf)            248,800,000(ii)
  B           AA- (sf)              45,300,000
  C           A- (sf)               33,700,000
  D           BBB- (sf)             44,500,000
  E           BB- (sf)              70,200,000
  F           B (sf)                24,865,000
  HRR         B (sf)                18,701,666

  (i) The issuer will issue the certificates to qualified
institutional buyers in line with Rule 144A of the Securities Act
of 1933.
(ii) Notional balance. The class X-CP and X-EXT certificates'
notional amount will be reduced by the aggregate amount of
principal distributions and realized losses allocated to the class
A, B, C, and D certificates.


STACR 2018-SPI3: Fitch Rates 2 Certificate Classes 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates Freddie Mac's transaction, Structured Agency
Credit Risk Securitized Participation Interests Trust Series
2018-SPI3 (STACR 2018-SPI3) as follows:

  -- $106,747,000 class M-1 certificates 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43,669,000 class M-2A certificates 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43,669,000 class M-2B certificates 'B+sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $87,338,000class M-2 exchangeable certificates 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable.

The following classes will not be rated by Fitch:

  -- $0 class X certificates;

  -- $32,348,229 class B-1 certificates;

  -- $32,348,229 class B-2 certificates;

  -- $64,696,458 class B exchangeable certificates;

  -- $0 class R certificate.

The 'BBB-sf' rating for the M-1 certificates reflects the 2.35%
subordination provided by the 0.675% class M-2A certificates, the
0.675% class M-2B certificates, the 0.50% class B-1 certificates
and the 0.50% class B-2 certificates.

This will be the fourth SPI transaction issued by Freddie Mac;
Freddie Mac issued its first STACR SPI deal in 2017. The SPI
program transfers credit risk on conforming and super-conforming
loans to investors. Payments from the loans are used to make
payments on the SPI certificates.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High-Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral pool consists
of 25- to 30-year fully amortizing fixed-rate loans acquired by
Freddie Mac. The weighted average (WA) credit score of 763, WA
original combined loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 82% and WA
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 37% reflect the strong credit profile
of the underlying collateral. The pool is also geographically
diverse, with the top three metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
comprising only 13.8%.

Super-Conforming Loans Included (Positive): The pool consists of
roughly 10% super-conforming loans, i.e. loan amounts greater than
the single-unit property conforming limit of $424,100 but capped at
$636,150 for loans originated in 2017 and $453,100 but capped at
$679,650 for loans originated in 2018. While the WA credit score
and LTVs are comparable to the conforming loan portion,
super-conforming loans benefit from higher property values and
larger loan balances.

Transaction Structure (Neutral): The SPI transaction is
collateralized by participation interests (PIs) in 19,195 mortgage
loans, 96% of which are deposited into participation certificates
(PCs) and 4% are deposited into the SPI trust. Generally, the PI
for loans in the PCs that become 120 days delinquent are
repurchased by Freddie Mac from the PC and deposited into the SPI
trust. Freddie Mac is repaid for these advances to the PC from SPI
cash flows at the top of the waterfall, vis-a-vis the class X
certificates, prior to distribution to the class M-1, M-2A, M-2B,
B-1 and B-2 certificates.

Potential Interest Shortfalls (Negative): Classes M-1, M-2A and
M-2B may be subject to long periods of interest deferral for loans
that become 120 days delinquent due to the stop advance feature and
prioritization of accrued interest distributions to the class X
certificates ahead of the rated classes. Principal collections are
not allowed to cover interest shortfalls except in limited
circumstances.

Delinquent Loans Indemnified by Freddie (Positive): Roughly 60
loans have either multiple prior delinquencies of up to 60 days or
are currently 30 or 60 days past due. If any of the loans become a
constructive defaulted loan (CDL) before October 2021, Freddie Mac
will either repurchase the loan with interest or make an
indemnification payment for the amount of any realized losses
incurred at liquidation. Furthermore, if any of the loans that are
currently 60 days past due (one loan) roll to a 90-day status as of
Aug. 31, 2018, Freddie Mac will repurchase the loan on the October
2018 distribution date. The repurchase obligation is viewed by
Fitch as a strong mitigant to the additional default risk posed by
these loans and no default penalty was applied.

Modification Treatment (Neutral): Rate modifications and expenses
will be absorbed by interest due to the class B-2 and B-1 in that
order and any excess amount may be absorbed on each distribution
date by principal up to 10bps of the aggregate class principal
balance of M-1, M-2A, M-2B, B-1 and B-2 classes, as long as classes
B-1 and B-2 are outstanding. Similar to other STACR actual loss
transactions, principal forbearance is treated as a realized loss
at the time of forbearance and forgiveness advances are made to the
SPI trust by Freddie Mac, which will only be reimbursable to
Freddie Mac if a loan with principal forgiven defaults.

Solid Lender Review and Acquisition Processes (Positive): Freddie
Mac has a well-established and disciplined process in place for the
purchase of loans. Fitch views its lender-approval and oversight
processes for minimizing counterparty risk and ensuring sound loan
quality acquisitions as positive. Loan quality control (QC) review
processes are thorough and indicate a tight control environment
that limits origination risk. Fitch has determined Freddie Mac to
be an above-average aggregator for loans originated in 2013 and
later. Fitch accounted for the lower risk by applying a lower
default estimate for the mortgages.

Strong Alignment of Interests (Positive): Fitch believes the
transaction benefits from a solid alignment of interests. Freddie
Mac will retain the class X certificate as well as approximately 5%
of the initial balance of each of the subordinate certificates.

Mortgage Insurance Guaranteed by Freddie Mac (Positive): 34.4% of
the loans are covered either by borrower-paid mortgage insurance
(BPMI) or lender-paid MI (LPMI). Freddie Mac will guarantee the MI
claim amount. While the Freddie Mac guarantee allows for credit to
be given to MI, Fitch applied a haircut to the amount of BPMI
available due to the automatic termination provision as required by
the Homeowners Protection Act, when the loan balance is first
scheduled to reach 78% LTV. LPMI does not automatically terminate
and remains for the life of the loan.

Satisfactory Due Diligence (Neutral): A third-party due diligence
review was completed on a statistical sample of the entire pool
(352 loans) by Clayton Services LLC (Clayton). Of the 352 loans
reviewed, six loans had material findings and were graded 'C' due
to credit (five) and property value exceptions (one). All six loans
remain in the pool, and four are listed on Schedule I; therefore,
they are subject to Freddie Mac's 36-month repurchase
indemnification. The diligence results generally reflected solid
manufacturing controls and, consequently, no adjustments were made
to Fitch's loss expectations.

Home Possible Exposure (Negative): Approximately 5.0% of the
reference pool was originated under Freddie Mac's Home Possible,
Home Possible Advantage or Home Ready program. Home Possible is a
program that targets low- to moderate-income homebuyers or buyers
in high-cost or underrepresented communities and provides
flexibility for a borrower's LTV, income, down payment and MI
coverage requirements. Fitch anticipates higher default risk for
Home Possible loans due to measurable attributes (such as FICO, LTV
and property value), which is reflected in increased loss
expectations.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its RMBS rating
criteria, as described in its "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." An
assessment of the transaction's reps and warranties was also
completed and found to be consistent with the ratings assigned to
the certificates. Fitch assessed the reps and warranties using the
criteria described in the report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."

A criteria variation was made to Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria." Fifty-seven loans had multiple prior delinquencies of up
to 60 days or are currently delinquent 30 or 60 days. Fitch applies
a default penalty to loans that do not have clean pay histories for
24 months or more. The penalty was not applied to these loans
because Freddie Mac is obligated to repurchase the related loan's
PI or make an indemnification payment if the loans becomes a CDL
before October 2021 and will repurchase on the October 2018
distribution date any 60 day delinquent loan (as of July 30, 2018)
that rolls to 90 days past due by Aug. 31, 2018. Fitch believes
that the additional default risk associated with these delinquent
loans is adequately addressed by the protection provided by Freddie
Mac's repurchase obligation. The variation had no rating impact.

A second variation was made to Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria".
Cashflow analysis was not conducted for this transaction. Due to
the structure and payment waterfall of the transaction a detailed
cashflow analysis was not conducted. For this deal the amount of
credit enhancement required to pass a given rating stress was
directly equal to Fitch's expected loss at that rating stress. This
one to one relationship is due to the sequential nature of the
transaction, interest included in realized loss, no interest on
missed interest and that timely interest payments are not required
for ratings of 'A+sf' or below. The variation had no rating
impact.

MODELING

Fitch analyzed the credit characteristics of the underlying
collateral to determine base case and rating stress loss
expectations, using its residential mortgage loss model, which is
fully described in its criteria report, "U.S. RMBS Loan Loss Model
Criteria."

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the MSA and national levels. The implied
rating sensitivities are only an indication of some of the
potential outcomes and do not consider other risk factors that the
transaction may become exposed to or be considered in the
surveillance of the transaction.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected 24.8% at the 'BBB-sf' level, 21.7% at the 'BBsf' level
and 18.6% at the 'B+sf' level. The analysis indicates that there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted defined rating sensitivities, which determine
the stresses to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full
category, to non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'. For example,
additional MVDs of 11%, 11% and 30% would potentially move the
'BBB-sf' rated class down one rating category, to non-investment
grade, to 'CCCsf', respectively.


STWD 2018-URB: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class E Certs
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to seven
classes of CMBS securities, issued by STWD 2018-URB Mortgage Trust,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-URB:

Cl. A, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Cl. F, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

Cl. X*, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

*Reflects interest-only class

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Certificates are collateralized by a single loan backed by a
first lien commercial mortgage related to a portfolio of 10
full-service hotel properties. Its ratings are based on the credit
quality of the loans and the strength of the securitization
structure.

Moody's approach to rating this transaction involved the
application of both its Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS methodology and its IO Rating methodology. The rating approach
for securities backed by a single loan compares the credit risk
inherent in the underlying collateral with the credit protection
offered by the structure. The structure's credit enhancement is
quantified by the maximum deterioration in property value that the
securities are able to withstand under various stress scenarios
without causing an increase in the expected loss for various rating
levels. In assigning single borrower ratings, Moody's also
considers a range of qualitative issues as well as the
transaction's structural and legal aspects.

The credit risk of commercial real estate loans is determined
primarily by two factors: 1) the probability of default, which is
largely driven by the DSCR, and 2) and the severity of loss in the
event of default, which is largely driven by the LTV of the
underlying loan.

The first mortgage balance of $225,000,000 represents a Moody's LTV
of 117.2%. The Moody's First Mortgage Actual DSCR is 1.85X and
Moody's First Mortgage Actual Stressed DSCR is 1.02X.

Moody's also grades properties on a scale of 0 to 5 (best to worst)
and considers those grades when assessing the likelihood of debt
payment. The factors considered include property age, quality of
construction, location, market, and tenancy. The pool's weighted
average property quality grade is 2.52.

Notable strengths of the transaction include: strong markets,
multiple property pooling, capital investment, and brand
affiliation.

Notable concerns of the transaction include: transitional nature of
six of the ten properties, volatile asset class, age of the
properties, subordinate debt, and lack of amortization.

The principal methodology used in rating STWD 2018-URB Mortgage
Trust, Cl. A, Cl. B, Cl. C, Cl. D, Cl. E, and Cl. F was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower
CMBS" published in July 2017. The methodologies used in rating STWD
2018-URB Mortgage Trust, Cl. X were "Moody's Approach to Rating
Large Loan and Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS" published in July
2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Moody's approach for single borrower and large loan multi-borrower
transactions evaluates credit enhancement levels based on an
aggregation of adjusted loan level proceeds derived from its
Moody's loan level LTV ratios. Major adjustments to determining
proceeds include leverage, loan structure, and property type. These
aggregated proceeds are then further adjusted for any pooling
benefits associated with loan level diversity, other concentrations
and correlations.

Moody's analysis considers the following inputs to calculate the
proposed IO rating based on the published methodology: original and
current bond ratings and credit estimates; original and current
bond balances grossed up for losses for all bonds the IO(s)
reference(s) within the transaction; and IO type corresponding to
an IO type as defined in the published methodology.

These ratings: (a) are based solely on information in the public
domain and/or information communicated to Moody's by the issuer at
the date it was prepared and such information has not been
independently verified by Moody's; (b) must be construed solely as
a statement of opinion and not a statement of fact or an offer,
invitation, inducement or recommendation to purchase, sell or hold
any securities or otherwise act in relation to the issuer or any
other entity or in connection with any other matter. Moody's does
not guarantee or make any representation or warranty as to the
correctness of any information, rating or communication relating to
the issuer. Moody's shall not be liable in contract, tort,
statutory duty or otherwise to the issuer or any other third party
for any loss, injury or cost caused to the issuer or any other
third party, in whole or in part, including by any negligence (but
excluding fraud, dishonesty and/or willful misconduct or any other
type of liability that by law cannot be excluded) on the part of,
or any contingency beyond the control of Moody's, or any of its
employees or agents, including any losses arising from or in
connection with the procurement, compilation, analysis,
interpretation, communication, dissemination, or delivery of any
information or rating relating to the issuer.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously anticipated. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include significant loan pay downs or
amortization, an increase in the pool's share of defeasance or
overall improved pool performance. Factors that may cause a
downgrade of the ratings include a decline in the overall
performance of the pool, loan concentration, increased expected
losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or interest
shortfalls.

Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed and may
have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The ratings do not represent any assessment of (i) the likelihood
or frequency of prepayment on the mortgage loans, (ii) the
allocation of net aggregate prepayment interest shortfalls, (iii)
whether or to what extent prepayment premiums might be received, or
(iv) in the case of any class of interest-only certificates, the
likelihood that the holders thereof might not fully recover their
investment in the event of a rapid rate of prepayment of the
mortgage loans.


TICP CLO XI: Moody's Rates $22.4MM Class E Notes 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by TICP CLO XI, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$252,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$44,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$20,400,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$26,200,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$22,400,000 Class E Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class E Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A Notes, the Class B Notes, the Class C Notes, the Class
D Notes and the Class E Notes are referred to herein, collectively,
as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

TICP XI is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments, and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and unsecured
loans. The portfolio is approximately 75% ramped as of the closing
date.

TICP CLO XI Management, LLC will direct the selection, acquisition
and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer and may
engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during
the transaction's five year reinvestment period. Thereafter, the
Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds
from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain restrictions.


In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2950

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.05%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 48.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


TOWD POINT 2018-5: Fitch Gives BB Rating on $25.9MM Class B1 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has rated Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2018-5 (TPMT
2018-5) as follows:

  -- $476,044,000 class A1A notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $119,011,000 class A1B notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $595,055,000 class A1 exchangeable notes 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $53,639,000 class A2 notes 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $648,694,000 class A3 exchangeable notes 'AAsf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $41,906,000 class M1 notes 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $690,600,000 class A4 exchangeable notes 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable;

  -- $32,686,000 class M2 notes 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25,981,000 class B1 notes 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $18,438,000 class B2 notes 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable.

Fitch will not be rating the following classes:

  -- $23,467,000 class B3 notes;

  -- $23,467,000 class B4 notes;

  -- $23,467,846 class B5 notes;

  -- $838,106,846 class A5 exchangeable notes.

The notes are supported by one collateral group that consists of
3,829 seasoned performing and re-performing mortgages with a total
balance of approximately $851.6 million (which includes $75.1
million, or 8.8%, of the aggregate pool balance in
non-interest-bearing deferred principal amounts) as of the
statistical calculation date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage, seasoned performing and RPLs,
including loans that have been paying for the past 24 months, which
Fitch identifies as "clean current" (70.5%). Additionally, 3.9% of
the pool was 30 days delinquent as of the statistical calculation
date, and the remaining 25.6% of loans are current but have recent
delinquencies or incomplete pay strings, identified as "dirty
current." Of the loans, 95.2% have received modifications.

Low Operational Risk (Positive): The operational risk is well
controlled for in this transaction. FirstKey Mortgage, LLC
(FirstKey) has a well-established track record in RPL activities
and carries an 'average' aggregator assessment from Fitch. The
loans are approximately 144 months seasoned, reducing the risk of
misrepresentation at origination. Additionally, the transaction
benefits from third-party due diligence on nearly 100% of the pool,
and the diligence results generally indicate low risk for an RPL
transaction. While the issuer did not provide reps and warranties
on the loans not diligenced, their retention of at least 5% of the
bonds contributes to the overall low operational risk of the
transaction.

Inclusion of Second Liens (Negative): While the collateral pool
consists primarily of first lien, seasoned RPLs, FirstKey has also
included approximately 5.9% (by unpaid principal balance [UPB]) of
closed-end second lien loans. The expected losses were adjusted for
these loans to account for the increased risk associated with these
collateral types. See the Asset Analysis section of the presale for
additional details on the treatment of these loans.

Low Aggregate Servicing Fee (Mixed): Fitch determined that the
stated servicing fee of 20bps may be insufficient to attract
subsequent servicers under a period of poor performance and high
delinquencies. To account for the potentially higher fee needed to
obtain a subsequent servicer, Fitch's cash flow analysis assumed a
35-bp servicing fee.

Third-Party Due Diligence (Negative): A third-party due diligence
review was conducted and focused on regulatory compliance, pay
history and a tax and title lien search. The third-party review
(TPR) firm's due diligence review resulted in approximately 15% (by
loan count) "C" and "D" graded loans, meaning the loans had
material violations or lacked documentation to confirm regulatory
compliance. See the Third-Party Due Diligence section for
additional details.

Representation Framework (Negative): Fitch considers the
representation, warranty and enforcement (RW&E) mechanism construct
for this transaction to generally be consistent with what it views
as a Tier 2 framework, due to the inclusion of knowledge qualifiers
and the exclusion of loans from certain reps as a result of
third-party due diligence findings. However, the issuer will not be
providing reps and warranties for 6.7% of the loans, which
represents the second liens and any first lien that did not receive
a compliance review. Fitch treated these loans as Tier 5 to account
for this. To account for the Tier 2 and Tier 5 loans, Fitch
increased its 'AAAsf' loss expectations by roughly 170bps to
account for a potential increase in defaults and losses arising
from weaknesses in the reps.

Limited Life of Rep Provider (Negative): FirstKey, as rep provider,
will only be obligated to repurchase a loan due to breaches prior
to the payment date in October 2019. Thereafter, a reserve fund
will be available to cover amounts due to noteholders for loans
identified as having rep breaches. Amounts on deposit in the
reserve fund, as well as the increased level of subordination, will
be available to cover additional defaults and losses resulting from
rep weaknesses or breaches occurring on or after the payment date
in October 2019.

No Servicer P&I Advances (Mixed): The servicer will not be
advancing delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduce
liquidity to the trust. However, as P&I advances made on behalf of
loans that become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce
liquidation proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severity
(LS) is less for this transaction than for those where the servicer
is obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow
priorities, together with increased subordination, provide for
timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated
classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order.
Furthermore, the provision to re-allocate principal to pay interest
on the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal
distributions is highly supportive of timely interest payments to
those classes in the absence of servicer advancing.

Deferred Amounts (Negative): Non-interest-bearing principal
forbearance amounts totaling
$75.1 million (8.8%) of the UPB are outstanding on 952 loans. Fitch
included the deferred amounts when calculating the borrower's loan
to value ratio (LTV) and sustainable LTV (sLTV), despite the lower
payment and amounts not being owed during the term of the loan. The
inclusion resulted in a higher probability of default (PD) and LS
than if there were no deferrals. Fitch believes that borrower
default behavior for these loans will resemble that of the higher
LTVs, as exit strategies (that is, sale or refinancing) will be
limited relative to those borrowers with more equity in the
property.

CRITERIA APPLICATION

Fitch analyzed the transaction in accordance with its criteria
report, "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria." This incorporates a review of
the originators' lending platforms, as well as an assessment of the
transaction's R&Ws provided by the originators and arranger, which
were found to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

Fitch's analysis incorporated three criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Seasoned, Re-Performing and Non-Performing Loan Rating
Criteria." The first variation relates to a 25-bp penalty that was
applied to the expected losses at each rating category to account
for potential delinquencies prior to closing. Fitch analyzed the
collateral pool, which was based on the statistical calculation
date; however, the collateral will be updated and rolled by one
month prior to closing, meaning there will be an additional pay
period between marketing and closing. Fitch analyzed previous Towd
transactions to determine the percentage of loans that typically go
delinquent in the first period, and the 25-bp penalty ensures that
a potential increase in delinquencies before closing is accounted
for. There was no rating impact since the credit enhancement levels
are consistent with Fitch's loss expectations inclusive of the
adjustment.

The second variation is that an updated tax/title review was not
completed on 696 loans, all of which are second liens. While a
tax/title review was not completed, Fitch's analysis already
assumed that these loans were not in first-lien position, and Fitch
assumes 100% LS for all second liens. There was no rating impact
due to this variation.

The third and final variation is that a due diligence compliance
and data integrity review was not completed on 651 loans (606
second lien loans and 45 first lien loans). Fitch's model assumes
100% LS for all second liens and therefore no additional adjustment
was made to Fitch's expected losses. There was no rating impact
since credit enhancement levels are consistent with Fitch's loss
expectations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's analysis incorporates sensitivity analyses to demonstrate
how the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs)
than assumed at both the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and
national levels. The implied rating sensitivities are only an
indication of some of the potential outcomes and do not consider
other risk factors that the transaction may become exposed to or be
considered in the surveillance of the transaction.

Fitch conducted sensitivity analysis determining how the ratings
would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The analysis
assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the
model-projected 39.6% at 'AAAsf'. The analysis indicates there is
some potential rating migration with higher MVDs, compared with the
model projection.

Fitch also conducted sensitivity analysis to determine the stresses
to MVDs that would reduce a rating by one full category, to
non-investment grade, and to 'CCCsf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by WestCor Land Title Insurance Company (WestCor), Clayton
Services LLC, and AMC Diligence, LLC (AMC). The third-party due
diligence described in Form 15E focused on regulatory compliance,
pay history, servicing comments, the presence of key documents in
the loan file and data integrity. In addition, AMC and Westcor were
retained to perform an updated title and tax search, as well as a
review to confirm that the mortgages were recorded in the relevant
local jurisdiction and the related assignment chains. A regulatory
compliance and data integrity review was completed on 97% of the
pool by balance.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis, and, based on
the findings, Fitch made several adjustments to its analysis.

For 215 of the 'C' or 'D' graded loans, Fitch adjusted its loss
expectation at the 'AAAsf' level by approximately 33bps reflecting
missing documents that prevented testing for predatory lending
compliance. The inability to test for predatory lending may expose
the trust to potential assignee liability, which creates added risk
for bond investors. To mitigate this risk, Fitch assumed a 100% LS
for loans in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not
purchase list of 'high cost' or 'high risk'; 21 loans were affected
by this approach. For the remaining 194 loans, where the properties
are not located in the states that fall under Freddie Mac's do not
purchase list, the likelihood of all loans being high cost is low.
However, Fitch assumes the trust could potentially incur notable
legal expenses. Fitch increased its loss severity expectations by
5% for these loans to account for the risk.

Other causes for the remaining 368 'C' and 'D' grades include
missing Final HUD1s that are not subject to predatory lending,
missing state disclosures and other compliance related missing
documents. Fitch believes these issues do not add material risk to
bondholders since the statute of limitations has expired. No
adjustment to loss expectations were made for these 368 loans.

For the 189 loans where a servicing comment review was not
performed or was outdated, Fitch applied 100% PD.

There were 35 loans missing modification documents or a signature
on modification documents. For these loans, timelines were extended
by an additional three months, in addition to the six-month
timeline extension applied to the entire pool.


UBS REAL 2012-C4: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on $25.5MM Class E Certs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms 12 classes of UBS Real Estate Securities Inc.
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series 2012-C4.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement/Stable Loss Expectations: The rating
affirmations reflect increasing credit enhancement due to paydown
and additional defeasance since last rating action. As the majority
of the pool continues to exhibit stable performance, Fitch's loss
expectations remain relatively stable.

As of the September 2018 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced by 13.4% to $1.26 billion from
$1.46 billion at issuance. Fourteen loans (6.5%) have been
defeased. There are two loans in special servicing (1.0%) and seven
loans (10.8% of the remaining pool balance), including the
specially serviced loans, have been designated as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs). The pool has not realized any losses and interest
shortfalls are currently impacting class G. Of the 87 loans
remaining in the pool, 11 (27.8%) have an interest-only period
before beginning to amortize. Seventy loans (50.4%) are amortizing
balloon loans, and six (21.7%) are interest-only for the entire
loan term.

Loans of Concern/Specially Serviced Loans: Eleven loans (6.5%) are
on the servicer's watchlist, one (0.5%) is performing specially
serviced, one (0.5%) is REO, and five (9.9%) are Fitch Loans of
Concern.

Worthington on the Beltway (0.5%) is a multifamily property located
in Houston, Texas that transferred to special servicing in December
2016 after a fire in 2013 damaged 40 units in Building 1 and
repairs were never completed. Litigation is currently pending
regarding the borrower's failure to repair fire damaged units.

Hickory Commons (0.5%) is a retail property located in Memphis, TN
that transferred to special servicing in January 2017 for imminent
default when Burlington Coat Factory (46% NRA) indicated they would
vacate when their lease expired in February 2017. The property
became REO in July 2017 and the special servicer is working to
lease up vacant space and market the property for sale.

Other FLOCs include Newgate Mall (4.6%), a regional mall with a
vacant anchor, declining cash flow, and upcoming tenant rollover;
Sun Development Portfolio (2.5%), a hotel portfolio that
experienced occupancy declines due to PIPs at four of the five
properties that impacted property performance; Courtyard Columbus
at Easton Town Center (1.5%), a hotel that experienced a decline in
cash flow due to a full renovation that took 60 out of 126 rooms
offline; Gaithersburg Office Portfolio (1.1%), an office portfolio
in suburban Maryland with NOI below expectations; and Virginia
College (0.3%), a single-tenant retail building where the single
tenant is vacating ahead of their lease expiration.

Regional Mall Exposure: Two of the top five loans in the pool,
Visalia Mall (5.9%) and Newgate Mall (4.6%) are regional malls with
full-term interest only loans that mature in May and June 2020.
Visalia Mall is a regional mall in Visalia, CA anchored by Macy's,
JC Penney, and Old Navy. The property was 96.2% occupied and
reported a 2Q 2018 IO DSCR of 3.69x. Newgate Mall is a regional
mall in Ogden, UT that is anchored by Dillard's, Burlington Coat
Factory, and Downeast Home. Sears (30.1% of the collateral net
rentable area) went dark in early 2018. In addition, the property
has experienced declining cash flow and is not the dominant mall in
its trade area. Fitch's base case analysis included an additional
20% haircut to reported NOI and a sensitivity analysis assumed a
50% loss on the mall.

Additional Considerations

Single Tenant Exposure: Two of the 10 largest assets, representing
14.8% of the pool, are occupied by a single tenant or present
exposure in excess of 80% of the NRA to a single tenant, creating
risk to property performance.

Maturity Concentration: Both loans collateralized by regional malls
(10.5%) mature in 2020 while the remainder of the pool (89.5%)
matures in 2022.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Negative Outlooks on classes E and F reflect the potential for
outsized losses on Newgate Mall and the specially serviced loans.
Fitch ran a sensitivity scenario assuming a 50% loss severity on
Newgate Mall. In this scenario, classes E and F would be subject to
a downgrade. As the maturity date for Newgate Mall approaches,
Fitch may assume a higher loss severity scenario. As a result,
additional classes may be put on Outlook Negative, or if the loan
defaults, classes may be downgraded. Outlooks for classes A-3
through D remain Stable due to overall stable performance,
increased credit enhancement and continued amortization. Upgrades
may occur with improved pool performance and additional paydown or
defeasance.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $112.1 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $476 million class A-5 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $86.8 million class A-AB 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $145.6 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $970.5 billion* class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $134.7 million* class X-B at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $69.2 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $65.5 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $61.9 million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $25.5 million class E at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative;

  -- $18.2 million class F at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative.

  - Notional amount and interest-only.

Classes A-1 and A-2 have been paid in full. Fitch does not rate the
$51 million class G.


UNISON GROUND 2013-1: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating on 2 Cert. Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Unison Ground Lease Funding, LLC secured
cellular site revenue notes, series 2013-1 and 2013-2 as follows:

  -- $98,000,000 class 2013-1 A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31,000,000 class 2013-1 B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $13,600,000 class 2013-2 A at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $4,400,000 class 2013-2 B at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable.

The affirmations are the result of the stable performance of the
collateral since issuance with no significant changes to the
collateral composition. The Stable Outlooks reflect the limited
prospect for upgrades given the provision to issue additional
notes.

As of the September 2018 distribution date, the aggregate principal
balance of the notes was unchanged at $147 million. These notes do
not amortize during the loan term.

As part of its review, Fitch analysed the financial and site
information provided by the Midland Loan Services.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Long-Term Easements: The ownership interests in the sites consist
of 91.4% perpetual/long-term (30+ years) easements, 8.6% limited
term easements (less than 30 years), and 1.6% fee.

Stable Cash Flow: As of August 2018, Fitch stressed debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.36x, which compares with 1.23x at
issuance. The debt multiple relative to Fitch's net cash flow (NCF)
was 7.72x, which equates to a debt yield of 13%.

Leases to Strong Tower Tenants: Cash flow is derived from 1,226
separate leases across 1,025 sites in markets throughout the United
States and Puerto Rico. Investment grade tenants account for
approximately 58.8% of run-rate revenue. Telephony towers account
for 95.6% of run-rate revenue.

Additional Notes: The transaction allows for the issuance of
additional notes. Such additional notes may rank senior to, pari
passu with, or subordinate to the 2013 notes. Additional notes may
be issued without the benefit of additional collateral, provided
the post-issuance DSCR is not less than 2.0x. The possibility of
upgrades may be limited due to this provision.

Risk of Technological Obsolescence: The notes have a rated final
payment date in 2042, and the long-term tenor of the notes
increases the risk that an alternative technology rendering
obsolete the current transmission of wireless signals through
cellular sites will be developed. Currently, WSPs depend on towers
to transmit their signals and continue to invest in this
technology.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlooks on all classes are expected to remain Stable.
Downgrades are unlikely due to continued cash flow growth from
annual rent escalations and automatic renewal clauses resulting in
higher debt service coverage ratios since issuance. The ratings
have been capped at 'A' and upgrades are unlikely due to the
structure of the security interest in the collateral, specialized
nature of the collateral, and the potential for changes in
technology to affect long-term demand for wireless tower space.


VIBRANT CLO III: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating on $24MM D-RR Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional
ratings to the following notes to be issued by Vibrant CLO III,
Ltd.:

US$320,000,000 Class A-1-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1-RR Notes"), Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$57,500,000 Class A-2-RR Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-2-RR Notes"), Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

US$27,500,000 Class B-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B-RR Notes"), Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

US$31,000,000 Class C-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C-RR Notes"), Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class D-RR Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class D-RR Notes"), Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating, if any, may differ
from a provisional rating.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO). The issued notes are collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of senior secured, broadly syndicated corporate loans.

DFG Investment Advisers, Inc. will manage the CLO. It will direct
the selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure,
and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer intends to issue the Refinancing Notes in October, 2018
in connection with the refinancing of all of the secured notes
previously issued on March 12, 2015 and partially refinanced on
December 20, 2016. On the Second Refinancing Date, the Issuer will
use proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes, along with
the proceeds from the issuance of additional subordinated notes, to
redeem in full the Refinanced Notes.

In addition to the issuance of the Refinancing Notes and additional
subordinated notes, a variety of other changes to transaction
features will occur in connection with the refinancing. These
include: extension of the reinvestment period; extensions of the
stated maturity and non-call period; changes to certain collateral
quality tests; and changes to the overcollateralization test
levels.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: $498,978,100

Defaulted Par: $3,043,800

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2855

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to uncertainty.
The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive to the
performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on
economic and credit conditions that may change. The Manager's
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.


VIBRANT CLO X: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on $25.5MM Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to six classes of
notes issued by Vibrant CLO X, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$320,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$57,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$20,000,000 Class B-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class B-1 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$7,500,000 Class B-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class B-2 Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

US$30,000,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B-1 Notes, the
Class B-2 Notes, the Class C Notes and the Class D Notes are
referred to herein, collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

Vibrant X is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured
corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
first lien senior secured loans, cash, and eligible investments,
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans and
unsecured loans. The portfolio is approximately 70% ramped as of
the closing date.

DFG Investment Advisers, Inc. will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2639

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.20%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.25%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.1 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


WELLFLEET CLO 2018-2: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned ratings to five classes of
notes issued by Wellfleet CLO 2018-2, Ltd.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$325,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031 (the "Class A-1 Notes"), Assigned Aaa (sf)

US$54,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031
(the "Class A-2 Notes"), Assigned Aa2 (sf)

US$24,000,000 Class B Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class B Notes"), Assigned A2 (sf)

US$32,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031 (the "Class C Notes"), Assigned Baa3 (sf)

US$25,000,000 Class D Junior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031 (the "Class D Notes"), Assigned Ba3 (sf)

The Class A-1 Notes, the Class A-2 Notes, the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes are referred to herein,
collectively, as the "Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying
portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal structure, and the
characteristics of the underlying assets.

Wellfleet CLO 2018-2 is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes
will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans, unsecured loans, and first lien last out loans. The
portfolio is approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Wellfleet Credit Partners, LLC will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's five year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments
and proceeds from sales of credit risk assets, subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer issued subordinated
notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $500,000,000

Diversity Score: 70

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.40%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:


The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


WELLS FARGO 2016-NXS6: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed fifteen classes of Wells Fargo
Commercial Mortgage Trust pass-through certificates, series
2016-NXS6.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall pool performance and loss
expectations remain stable since issuance. There have been no
specially serviced loans since issuance. Five loans (3% of pool)
are on the master servicer's watchlist. One loan (0.7%), Fairfield
Inn Avon, which is secured by an 82-room hotel property in the
Cleveland suburb of Avon, OH, has been identified as a Fitch Loan
of Concern due to several rooms being taken offline as the property
undergoes a property improvement plan. The servicer is currently in
the process of setting up a cash management account.

Minimal Change in Credit Enhancement: As of the September 2018
remittance report, the pool's aggregate principal balance has been
paid down by 1.3% to $747.5 million from $757.1 million at
issuance. There have been no realized losses to date.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Pool Concentrations: Nine loans (27.1% of pool) are secured by
office properties. Eighteen loans (26.8%) are secured by retail
properties, which include The Falls (4.6%), a regional lifestyle
center operated by Simon located in Miami, FL and Peachtree Mall
(2.5%), a regional mall operated by Brookfield located in Columbus,
GA. Both properties have exposure to either Macy's and/or JC
Penney; however, none of the anchors at these properties are on any
recent store closing list.

Collateral occupancy at The Falls and Peachtree Mall remains strong
at 96.5% and 96.2%, respectively, as of YE 2017; however, in-line
sales at both of these properties have declined.

At The Falls, comparable in-line sales for tenants, excluding
Apple, occupying less than 10,000 sf have declined to $385 psf as
of TTM June 2017 from $437 psf as of TTM June 2016. At Peachtree
Mall, comparable in-line sales for tenants occupying less than
10,000 sf have declined to $363 psf as of YE 2017 from $382 psf as
of YE 2016.

Limited Amortization: Ten loans (20% of pool) are full-term,
interest-only and 14 loans (28%) are partial term interest-only.
The remaining 26 loans (52%) consist of amortizing balloon loans.
Based on the scheduled balance at maturity, the initial pool is
schedule to pay down by 9%.

Limited Hurricane Exposure: One loan (0.8% of pool) is secured by a
student housing property located in Lillington, NC, within close
proximity to Campbell University. The area has experienced
significant flooding from Hurricane Florence and has been
designated a disaster area by FEMA. Fitch awaits further updates
from the servicer regarding whether or not the property has
sustained any damage.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Outlooks on all classes remain Stable. Fitch does not
foresee positive or negative ratings migration until a material
economic or asset-level event changes the transaction's overall
portfolio-level metrics.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G-10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

  -- $17.4 million class A-1 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $115.8 million class A-2 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $150.0 million class A-3 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $206.0 million class A-4 at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $31.1 million class A-SB at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $48.3 million class A-S at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $520.4a million class X-A at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $120.2a million class X-B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36.0 million class B at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $36.0 million class C at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43.5ab million class at X-D 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.8ab million class at X-E 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $43.5b million class D at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $20.8b million class E at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable;

  -- $8.5b million class F at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable.

(a) Notional amount and interest-only.

(b) Privately placed and pursuant to Rule 144A.

Fitch does not rate the class G, H or interest-only X-FG, and X-H
certificates.


WHITEHORSE LTD XII: S&P Assigns BB- Rating on $18MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to WhiteHorse XII
Ltd./WhiteHorse XII LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a collateralized loan obligation transaction
backed primarily by broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans.

S&P said, "Although the results of the cash flow analysis indicate
minimal cushion on the class A notes, we are comfortable with
assigning our rating due to the transaction's significant
difference in the actual calculated values of the portfolio's
weighted average spread and weighted average recovery rates as
compared to the minimum assumptions that were stressed in our cash
flow analysis. We believe the results of the cash flow analysis
demonstrated, in our view, that all of the rated classes have
adequate credit enhancement available at the rating levels
associated with the assigned ratings."

The ratings reflect:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans that
are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  RATINGS ASSIGNED

  WhiteHorse XII Ltd./WhiteHorse XII LLC

  Class                 Rating       Amount (mil. $)
  X                     AAA (sf)                6.00
  A                     AAA (sf)              283.50
  B                     AA (sf)                58.50
  C                     A (sf)                 29.00
  D                     BBB- (sf)              25.00
  E                     BB- (sf)               18.00
  Subordinated notes    NR                     38.10

  NR--Not rated.


ZAIS CLO 1: S&P Assigns Prelim B- Rating on Class E-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to the class
A1A-R, A1B-R, A2A-R, A2B-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, E-R replacement notes
from Zais CLO 1 Ltd./Zais CLO 1 LLC, a collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) originally issued in March 2014 that is managed by
ZAIS Leveraged Loan Manager LLC. The replacement notes will be
issued via a proposed supplemental indenture.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's opinion that the credit
support available is commensurate with the associated rating
levels.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of Sept. 28,
2018. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

On the Oct. 15, 2018, refinancing date, the proceeds from the
issuance of the replacement notes are expected to redeem the
original notes. At that time, S&P anticipates withdrawing the
ratings on the original notes and assigning ratings to the
replacement notes. However, if the refinancing doesn't occur, S&P
may affirm the ratings on the original notes and withdraw its
preliminary ratings on the replacement notes.

The replacement notes are being issued via a proposed supplemental
indenture, which, in addition to outlining the terms of the
replacement notes, will also:

-- Issue the replacement class A1A-R, A1B-R, A2A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R,
E-R notes at floating spreads.

-- Issue the replacement class A2B-R notes at a fixed coupon.

-- Extend the stated maturity by two years.

-- Extend the reinvestment period by one year and the non-call
period by 1.5 years.

S&P  said, "Our review of this transaction included a cash flow
analysis, based on the portfolio and transaction as reflected in
the trustee report, to estimate future performance. In line with
our criteria, our cash flow scenarios applied forward-looking
assumptions on the expected timing and pattern of defaults, and
recoveries upon default, under various interest rate and
macroeconomic scenarios. In addition, our analysis considered the
transaction's ability to pay timely interest or ultimate principal,
or both, to each of the rated tranches.

"We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and we will take further rating actions
as we deem necessary."

  PRELIMINARY RATINGS ASSIGNED

  Zais CLO 1 Ltd./Zais CLO 1 LLC
  Replacement class         Rating      Amount (mil. $)
  A1A-R                     AAA (sf)             290.00
  A1B-R                     AAA (sf)              25.00
  A2A-R                     AA (sf)               40.00
  A2B-R                     AA (sf)               30.00
  B-R (deferrable)          A (sf)                30.00
  C-R (deferrable)          BBB- (sf)             25.00
  D-R (deferrable)          BB- (sf)              17.25
  E-R (deferrable)          B- (sf)                7.50
  Subordinated notes        NR                    70.00

  NR--Not rated.


[*] DBRS Reviews 966 Classes From 61 US RMBS Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. reviewed 966 classes from 61 U.S. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions. Of the 966 classes
reviewed, DBRS upgraded 210 ratings, confirmed 753 ratings and
discontinued three ratings.

The rating upgrades reflect positive performance trends and
increases in credit support sufficient to withstand stresses at
their new rating levels. The rating confirmations indicate that
current asset performance and credit support levels are consistent
with the current ratings. The discontinued ratings are the result
of full repayment of principal to bondholders.

The rating actions are the result of DBRS's application of its
"RMBS Insight 1.3: U.S. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Model and Rating Methodology," published on April 4, 2017.

The transactions consist of U.S. RMBS transactions. The pools
backing these transactions consist of prime, seasoned,
non-Qualified Mortgage and reperforming collateral.

The ratings assigned to the following securities differ from the
ratings implied by the quantitative model. DBRS considers this
difference to be a material deviation, but in this case, the
ratings of the subject notes reflect certain structural features
and historical performance that constrain the quantitative model
output.

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2013-3 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-3, Class B-3

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2013-3 Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-3, Class B-4

-- J.P. Morgan Mortgage Trust 2014-IVR3, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2014-IVR3, Class B-3

-- Shellpoint Asset Funding Trust 2013-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-1, Class B-3

-- Shellpoint Asset Funding Trust 2013-1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-1, Class B-4

-- CSMLT 2015-2 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2015-2, Class A-IO-S

-- CSMLT 2015-3 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2015-3, Class IO-S-1

-- CSMLT 2015-3 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2015-3, Class IO-S-2

-- CSMLT 2015-3 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2015-3, Class IO-S-3

-- CSMLT 2015-3 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2015-3, Class A-IO-S

-- Ajax Mortgage Loan Trust 2017-B, Mortgage-Backed Notes, Series
2017-B, Class M-1

-- Angel Oak Mortgage Trust I, LLC 2017-3, Mortgage-Backed
Certificates, Series 2017-3, Class A-3

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B2

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B2-IO

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B3

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B3-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B3-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B4

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B4-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B4-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B5

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B5-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B5-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVa Trust 2016-SPL1,
Asset-Backed Notes, Series 2016-SPL1, Class B6

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B2

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B2-IO

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B3

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B3-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B3-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B4

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B4-IOA

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B4-IOB

-- Bayview Opportunity Master Fund IVb Trust 2016-SPL2,
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2016-SPL2, Class B5

-- COLT 2016-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-1 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-1, Class M-1

-- COLT 2016-2 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-2 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-2, Class M-1

-- COLT 2016-2 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-2 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-2, Class M-1X

-- COLT 2016-2 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-2 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-2, Class M-1E

-- COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-3 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-3, Class A-3

-- COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-3 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-3, Class M-1

-- COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-3 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-3, Class B-1

-- COLT 2016-3 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2016-3 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-3, Class B-2

-- Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2016-1,
Asset Backed Securities, Series 2016-1, Class M-1

-- Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2016-1,
Asset Backed Securities, Series 2016-1, Class M-2

-- MetLife Securitization Trust 2017-1, Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Series 2017-1, Class M2

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2016-1, Class M3

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2016-1, Class B1

-- Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-1, Mortgage Backed
Securities, Series 2016-1, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-3, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-3, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-3, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-3, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-3, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-3, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-4, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-4, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-4, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-4, Class M2A

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-4, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-4, Class M2X

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-4, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-4, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-4, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-4, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-5, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-5, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-5, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-5, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-5, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-5, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-6, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-6, Class M2A

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-6, Class M2X

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-6, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-6, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-6, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2016-1, Class A5

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2016-1, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2016-1, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-1, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2016-1, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-2, Class A5

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-2, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-2, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-2, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-2, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class X5

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class X6

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class M2A

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class M2B

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-3, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-3, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-4, Class M1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-4, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-4, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-4, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-4, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-4, Class B3

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-5, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-5, Class M1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-5, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-5, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-5, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-5, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2016-5, Asset Backed Securities,
Series 2016-5, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-5, Asset-Backed Securities,
Series 2017-5, Class A4

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-5, Asset-Backed Securities,
Series 2017-5, Class M1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-5, Asset-Backed Securities,
Series 2017-5, Class B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6, Asset-Backed Securities
Series 2017-6, Class A4

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6, Asset-Backed Securities
Series 2017-6, Class M1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6, Asset-Backed Securities
Series 2017-6, Class M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6, Asset-Backed Securities
Series 2017-6, Class B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2017-6, Asset-Backed Securities
Series 2017-6, Class B2

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-A, Mortgage Backed-Notes,
Series 2014-A, Class B-2

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-A, Mortgage Backed-Notes,
Series 2014-A, Class B-3

-- Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2014-A, Mortgage Backed-Notes,
Series 2014-A, Class B-4

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-2

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B2-IO

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-2A

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B2-IOA

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-2B

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B2-IOB

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-2C

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B2-IOC

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-3

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-3A

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B3-IOA

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-3B

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B3-IOB

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-3C

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-IOC

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-4

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-3, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-3, Class B-5

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-2

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B2-IO

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-2A

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-2B

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-2C

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B2-IOA

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B2-IOB

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B2-IOC

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-3

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-3A

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-3B

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-3C

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B3-IOA

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B3-IOB

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B3-IOC

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-4

-- New Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2016-4, Mortgage-Backed
Notes, Series 2016-4, Class B-5

-- COLT 2018-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2018-1 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-1, Class A-3

-- COLT 2018-1 Mortgage Loan Trust, COLT 2018-1 Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2018-1, Class M-1

-- Freddie Mac Seasoned Credit Risk Transfer Trust, Series 2017-4,
Series 2017-4, Class M

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-2, Class 1-M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-2, Class 1-B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-2, Class 1-B2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-2, Class 2-M2

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-2, Class 2-B1

-- Towd Point Mortgage Trust 2015-2, Asset Backed Notes, Series
2015-2, Class 2-B2

Notes:  All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The Affected Ratings is available at https://bit.ly/2NWiZ0q


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $202MM Option ARM RMBS Issued 2004-2005
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 10 tranches
from 3 transactions, backed by Option ARM loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2

Cl. A-1A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 2, 2017 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Feb 28, 2011
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR10

Cl. A-1-A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cl. A-1-C, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016
Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. A-3, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 18, 2016 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. X, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2017 Downgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR15

Cl. A-1A2, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 29, 2014 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Cl. A-1B2, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B3, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. A-1B4, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are a result of the recent performance of the
underlying pools and reflect Moody's updated loss expectation on
the pools. The rating upgrades are a result of the improving
performance of the related pools and / or an increase in credit
enhancement available to the bonds.

The principal methodology used in rating DSLA Mortgage Loan Trust
2004-AR2 Cl. A-2A and Cl. A-1A; WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-AR10 Cl. A-1-A, Cl. A-1-C, and Cl. A-3;
and WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR15 Cl.
A-1A2, Cl. A-1B2, Cl. A-1B3, and Cl. A-1B4 was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in January 2017. The
methodologies used in rating WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-AR10 Cl. X were "US RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in January 2017 and "Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published
in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in August 2018 from 4.4% in
August 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector.

House prices are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's
expects house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases
than Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating
actions.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds and/or pools.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] Moody's Takes Action on $450.6MM RMBS Issued 2004-2007
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 19 tranches
and downgraded the rating of one tranche from nine transactions,
backed by Alt-A and Option ARM RMBS loans, issued by multiple
issuers.

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-8

Cl. I-1A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. I-2A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa2 (sf)

Cl. A-5, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Issuer: CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-61

Cl. 1-A-1, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A-1, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2016
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series
2007-2

Cl. I-X-1, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 7, 2018
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-14

Cl. 1A1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 23, 2015 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. 2A3, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May 11, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-4

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A8

Cl. A-2A, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B1, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2B2, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Cl. A-3A3, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-1, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 29, 2017 Upgraded
to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: MortgageIT Trust 2004-2

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 15, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 29, 2016 Downgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Trust 2007-AR4

Cl. A-4A, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. Grantor Trust A-4B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. Underlying A-4B, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 18,
2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance of the underlying
pools and Moody's updated loss expectations on those pools. The
rating upgrades are primarily due to an improvement in credit
enhancement available to the bonds and/or an improvement in
underlying pool performance.

The rating downgrade on Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan
Trust, Series 2007-2, Cl. I-X-1, an interest-only bond linked to
Group 1, is driven by the rating of the highest rated outstanding
P&I bond currently - CL. I-A-2 from Group 1 at Ca since the CL
I-A-1 recently paid down.

The principal methodology used in rating MortgageIT Trust 2004-2
Cl. A-1 and Cl. A-2; Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2005-8 Cl. I-1A-1 and
Cl. I-2A-1; Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-WF1 Cl. A-4
and Cl. A-5; CWALT, Inc. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-61 Cl. 1-A-1 and Cl. 2-A-1; GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-14 Cl.
2A3 and Cl. 1A1; HomeBanc Mortgage Trust 2005-4 Cl. M-2; Merrill
Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust 2005-A8 Cl. A-2A, Cl. A-2B1, Cl.
A-3A3, Cl. A-2B2, and Cl. M-1; and Structured Asset Mortgage
Investments II Trust 2007-AR4 Cl. A-4A, Cl. Grantor Trust A-4B, and
Cl. Underlying A-4B was "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology"
published in January 2017. The methodologies used in rating
Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-2 Cl.
I-X-1 were "US RMBS Surveillance Methodology" published in January
2017 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Interest-Only (IO) Securities" published in June 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:


Ratings in the US RMBS sector remain exposed to the high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, and in particular the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate fell to 3.9% in August 2018 from 4.4% in
August 2017. Moody's forecasts an unemployment central range of
3.5% to 4.5% for the 2018 year. Deviations from this central
scenario could lead to rating actions in the sector. House prices
are another key driver of US RMBS performance. Moody's expects
house prices to continue to rise in 2018. Lower increases than
Moody's expects or decreases could lead to negative rating actions.
Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions.


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 90 Classes From 18 US RMBS Deals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed its review of 90 classes from 18 U.S.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions issued
between 2003 and 2008. All of these transactions are backed by
subprime and alternative-A collateral. The review yielded 19
upgrades, 15 downgrades, 53 affirmations, one withdrawal, and two
discontinuances.

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporate various considerations into its decisions to raise,
lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative ratings
suggested by its projected cash flows. These considerations are
based on transaction-specific performance or structural
characteristics (or both) and their potential effects on certain
classes. Some of these considerations include:

-- Collateral performance/delinquency trends;
-- Historical missed interest payments;
-- Priority of principal payments; and
-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The affirmations of ratings reflect our opinion that our
projected credit support and collateral performance on these
classes has remained relatively consistent with our prior
projections.

"We raised nine ratings from four transactions by six or more
notches due to increased credit support. The upgrades on these
classes reflect the classes' ability to withstand a higher level of
projected losses than previously anticipated.

"We lowered our ratings by five or more notches on five classes
from four transactions. Two of these downgrades were based on the
application of our loan modification criteria. The rate loan
modifications on the collateral pool reduced the available interest
paid to these classes. Two other downgrades were due to decreased
credit support as a result of passing triggers. The other downgrade
was after assessing the impact of missed interest payments on that
class. It was based on our cash flow projections used in
determining the likelihood that the missed interest payments would
be reimbursed under various scenarios because this class receives
additional compensation for outstanding missed interest payments."

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

            https://bit.ly/2zANWy7


[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on Five CDO Transactions
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings various rating actions on five collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs) backed by different pools of structured
finance assets.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow our review of the
transactions' performances using data from their respective trustee
reports. All of these transactions currently have less than 20
performing obligors. Due to the increased concentration risk based
on the limited number of obligors, we relied on the supplemental
test calculations for this analysis and did not run cash flows."

ARCap 2004-1 RESECURITIZATION TRUST And ARCap 2004-1
RESECURITIZATION TRUST CLASS E GRANTOR TRUST

ARCap 2004-1 is a multi-tiered structure, which originally issued
10 individually rated notes and seven rated grantor trust
certificates at closing. The class A through G notes were each
repackaged into separate newly formed individual grantor trusts,
each of which issued certificates. Each note receives cash flow
from the underlying commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
collateral, which is directly passed through to the corresponding
grantor trust certificates. Accordingly, the ratings on the grantor
trust certificates are dependent on, and hence match, the ratings
on the corresponding notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions on the class E note and the class E
note from guarantor trust follow our review of the transaction's
performance using the data from the August 2018 trustee report.

"Since our November 2017 rating actions, the transaction has paid
off its class C and D notes and began paying down its class E
notes. Following the paydowns on the Aug. 20, 2018, payment date,
the class E note balance declined to 68.84% of its original balance
from 100% in November 2017. In addition, the class has received all
of its accumulated deferred interest. The class E notes also
benefitted from defaults recovering at a higher amount than
estimated as well as rating upgrades in the underlying collateral
that now allow the class to be backed by higher-quality assets.  

"The rating on the class E note was raised following the increase
in its credit support. Although the top obligor test indicated a
higher rating, our rating action considered the increase in the
concentration risk and the credit quality of the assets backing the
tranche. The rating on the grantor test was raised to match the new
rating on the class E note."

NEWCASTLE CDO V LTD.

S&P said, "The upgrade on the class III notes follows our review of
the transaction's performance using the data from the July 2018
trustee report.

"Since our Nov. 2017 rating action, the class III notes received
principal paydown of $2.08 million that reduced the class' balance
to about 23.28% of its original balance.

"The upgrade follows the increase in the credit support due to the
paydowns and improvement in the credit quality of the assets
backing the note. Although the top obligor test indicated a higher
rating, our rating decision also considered the transaction's
concentration risk and the possibility of the junior note receiving
its current interest from available principal proceeds as long as
the class III coverage tests are passing."

SORIN REAL ESTATE CDO I LTD.

S&P said, "The upgrade and affirmation on the class B and C notes,
respectively, follow our review of the transaction's performance
using the data from the July and August 2018 trustee reports.

"Since our Dec. 2017 rating action, the class B notes received
principal paydown of $1.36 million that reduced the class' balance
to about 43.36% of its original balance. The upgrade of the class B
notes rating reflects the increase in credit support following the
paydowns as well as the improvement in the credit quality of the
assets backing the notes.

"Although our top obligor test results indicated a higher potential
rating, our rating decision factors the increased concentration
risk of the deal and the potential of the junior notes to continue
receiving interest payments from available interest proceeds.

"The rating on class C was affirmed for now. Although the top
obligor test results point to a higher rating, our rating action
considered the continued deferral of a portion of their current
interest and the failure of its coverage tests."

NOMURA CRE CDO 2007-2 LTD.

S&P said, "The downgrades and withdrawals follow our review of the
transaction's performance using the data from the August 2018
trustee report and the event of default condition triggered
following the default in the payment of the interest of the class D
notes on the Aug. 21, 2018, payment date."

Since the total par value of the assets--even assuming 100%
recovery on the existing defaults--is less than outstanding par and
accumulated deferred interest of the class D notes, the rating on
the class D notes was downgraded to 'D (sf)'. Similarly, the
ratings on the class E and F notes were also downgraded to 'D (sf)'
as the transaction does not have sufficient assets to repay the
respective note balances and their respective accumulated deferred
interest.

The three 'D (sf)' ratings were subsequently withdrawn, as it is
unlikely that the classes will be repaid in full.

S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them, and it will take rating actions as it
deems necessary.

  RATINGS RAISED

  ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust
                   Rating
  Class        To         From
  E            B (sf)     CC (sf)

  ARCap 2004-1 Resecuritization Trust Class E
  Grantor trust certificate
                  Rating
  Class        To         From
  E            B (sf)     CC (sf)

  Newcastle CDO V Ltd.
                  Rating
  Class        To         From
  III          BBB- (sf)  BB+ (sf)

  Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd.
                  Rating
  Class        To         From
  B            BBB- (sf)  B- (sf)

  RATINGS LOWERED

  Nomura CRE CDO 2007-2 Ltd.
                  Rating
  Class        To         From
  D            D (sf)     CCC- (sf)
  E            D (sf)     CCC- (sf)
  F            D (sf)     CCC- (sf)

  RATING AFFIRMED

  Sorin Real Estate CDO I Ltd.
  Class        Rating
  C            CC (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
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Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante, Rousel Elaine
Tumanda, Valerie Udtuhan, Howard C. Tolentino, Carmel Paderog,
Meriam Fernandez, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Cecil R. Villacampa,
Sheryl Joy P. Olano, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo
Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

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