---

         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

              Sunday, March 19, 2023, Vol. 27, No. 77

                            Headlines

ALESCO PREFERRED VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches From Ba2
AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2023-1: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating to E Notes
AMMC CLO 26: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on $8.80MM Class F Notes
ARES LXVIII: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating on Class E Notes
ARES LXVIII: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes

BAIN CAPITAL 2023-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
BALBOA BAY 2023-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
BARINGS CLO 2023-I: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
BENCHMARK 2019-B10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Two Tranches to 'CCCsf'
CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on 2 Tranches

CF 2019-CF1 MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Two Tranches
CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2017-C8: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Two Tranches
CIM TRUST 2023-R2: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Class B2 Notes
COLONY MULTIFAMILY 2014-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on X Certs to Caa2
COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class F Certs to 'Caa3'

COMM 2015-CCRE26: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
COMM 2018-HOME: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. HRR Certs to 'BB+sf'
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2000-CMLB1: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Certs to Caa2
CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2023-R03: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 to 26 Tranches
CWMBS 2006-R2: Moody's Cuts Class A-S Debt Rating to Ca

FORTRESS CREDIT XVIII: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $3MM F Notes
FREDDIE MAC 2023-DNA1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on M-2R Notes
GLS AUTO 2023-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
GS MORTGAGE 2023-CCM1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. B-2 Certs
HOME RE 2021-2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-1C Notes to Ba2

IMSCI 2013-3: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class F Certs to CCCsf
IMSCI 2014-5: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Debt
IVY HILL XX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $24MM Class E Notes
JP MORGAN 2011-C3: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Certs to 'Bsf'
JP MORGAN 2014-C21: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Csf'

MADISON PARK LXIII: Fitch Gives 'BB-(EXP)sf' Rating on Cl. E Notes
MADISON PARK LXIII: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $250,000 F Notes
MCAP CMBS 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. G Certificates
MILL CITY 2023-NQM2: Fitch Expects B(EXP)sf Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes
MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C5: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa2

MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'C'
MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS11: Fitch Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to Bsf
MORGAN STANLEY 2023-1: Fitch Gives 'B-(EXP)' Rating on B-5 Certs
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2005-GATE: Fitch Cuts Rating on B Bonds to CCsf
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2007-A: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. C Bonds

OAKTOWN RE V: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Cl. B-1 Notes to Ba2
OHA CREDIT 14: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
ONE HULL STREET: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to 'BB+ (sf)'
PALISADES CENTER 2016-PLSD: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to C
REALT 2016-1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certificates

RR 26: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on $16.5MM Class D Notes
SIXTH STREET XXII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
SLC STUDENT 2003-1: Fitch Affirms B Rating on 6 Tranches
STRUCTURED ASSET 2004-8: Moody's Cuts Cl. M2 Bonds Rating to Ba3
TRAPEZA CDO III: Moody's Upgrades Rating on 2 Tranches to B1

VISIO 2023-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
WELLS FARGO 2016-C35: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class F Debt
WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2023-2: S&P Assigns BB+ (sf) Rating on E Notes
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C13: Moody's Cuts F Certs Rating to Caa1
WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: Moody's Cuts Cl. B Certs Rating to Ba2

[*] Fitch Affirms 37 Classes From 12 National Collegiate Trusts
[*] Fitch Takes Actions on 4 US Trust Preferred CDOs
[*] Moody's Upgrades $255MM of US RMBS Deals Issued 2003-2007
[*] Moody's Upgrades $258.2MM of US RMBS Issued 2006-2007
[*] Moody's Upgrades $36MM of US RMBS Issued 2004-2006

[*] Moody's Upgrades $57MM of US RMBS Deals Issued 2004-2007
[*] S&P Places Various Ratings on Tax-Secured Debt on Watch Neg.
[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 28 Classes From 12 U.S. RMBS Deals

                            *********

ALESCO PREFERRED VIII: Moody's Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches From Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by ALESCO PREFERRED FUNDING VIII, LTD.:

US$70,000,000 Class A-2 Second Priority Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2035, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on February
20, 2020 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

US$50,000,000 Class B-1 Deferrable Third Priority Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2035 (current balance including interest shortfall
of $52,434,056.83), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on February
20, 2020 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

US$5,000,000 Class B-2 Deferrable Third Priority Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes due 2035 (current balance including
interest shortfall of $6,189,707.21), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
previously on February 20, 2020 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

ALESCO PREFERRED FUNDING VIII, LTD., issued in August 2005, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of bank and insurance trust preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes, and the increase in the
transaction's over-collateralization (OC) ratios over the past
year.

The Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes have paid down by approximately
35.5% or $6.1 million and $14.2 million over the past year, using
principal proceeds from the redemption of the underlying assets.
Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for the Class A-2 and
Class B notes have improved to 239.9% and 154.8%, respectively,
from levels a year ago of 211.8.1% and 144.9%, respectively. The
Class A-1A and Class A-1B notes will continue to benefit from the
use of proceeds from redemptions of any assets in the collateral
pool.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $256.0 million, defaulted/deferring par of $73.1 million, a
weighted average default probability of 15.35% (implying a WARF of
1622), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10%.

In addition to base case analysis, Moody's considered additional
scenarios where outcomes could diverge from the base case. The
additional scenarios include deteriorating credit quality of the
portfolio.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in July 2021.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


AMERICREDIT AUTOMOBILE 2023-1: Moody's Gives Ba2 Rating to E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2023-1
(AMCAR 2023-1). This is the first AMCAR auto loan transaction of
the year for AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (AFS; unrated),
wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors Financial Company, Inc.
(Baa3, stable). The notes will be backed by a pool of retail
automobile loan contracts originated by AFS, who is also the
servicer and administrator for the transaction.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2023-1

Class A-1 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned P-1 (sf)

Class A-2-A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-2-B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class A-3 Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

Class C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Class D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Class E Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the quality of the underlying collateral
and its expected performance, the strength of the capital
structure, and the experience and expertise of AFS as the servicer
and administrator.

The definitive rating for the Class D notes, Baa1 (sf) is higher
than the provisional rating for Class D notes, (P)Baa2 (sf).  The
difference is a result of (1) the transaction closing with a lower
weighted average cost of funds (WAC) than Moody's modeled when the
provisional ratings were assigned and (2) the percent of Class A-2
notes that are floating rate, which are subject to a stressed
interest rate assumption, is lower than Moody's modeled when the
provisional ratings were assigned. The WAC assumptions and the
floating-rate percent of the Class A-2 notes, as well as other
structural features, were provided by the issuer.

Moody's median cumulative net loss expectation for the 2023-1 pool
is 9.0% and the loss at a Aaa stress is 33.0%. Moody's based its
cumulative net loss expectation and loss at a Aaa stress on an
analysis of the credit quality of the underlying collateral; the
historical performance of similar collateral, including
securitization performance and managed portfolio performance; the
ability of AFS to perform the servicing functions; and current
expectations for the macroeconomic environment during the life of
the transaction.

At closing, the Class A notes, Class B notes, Class C notes, Class
D, and Class E notes are expected to benefit from 33.10%, 26.60%,
18.45%, 10.60%, and 7.75% of hard credit enhancement, respectively.
Hard credit enhancement for the notes consists of a combination of
overcollateralization, a non-declining reserve account, and
subordination, except for Class E notes which do not benefit from
subordination.  The notes may also benefit from excess spread.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS" published in
November 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Moody's could upgrade the subordinate notes if, given current
expectations of portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are
consistent with higher ratings. In sequential pay structures, such
as the one in this transaction, credit enhancement grows as a
percentage of the collateral balance as collections pay down senior
notes. Prepayments and interest collections directed toward note
principal payments will accelerate this build of enhancement.
Moody's expectation of pool losses could decline as a result of a
lower number of obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of
the vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio
losses also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for
used vehicles, and changes in servicing practices.

Down

Moody's could downgrade the notes if, given current expectations of
portfolio losses, levels of credit enhancement are consistent with
lower ratings. Credit enhancement could decline if excess spread is
not sufficient to cover losses in a given month. Moody's
expectation of pool losses could rise as a result of a higher
number of obligor defaults or deterioration in the value of the
vehicles securing an obligor's promise of payment. Portfolio losses
also depend greatly on the US job market, the market for used
vehicles, and poor servicing. Other reasons for worse-than-expected
performance include error on the part of transaction parties,
inadequate transaction governance, and fraud. Additionally, Moody's
could downgrade the Class A-1 short-term rating following a
significant slowdown in principal collections that could result
from, among other things, high delinquencies or a servicer
disruption that impacts obligor's payments.


AMMC CLO 26: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on $8.80MM Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to AMMC CLO 26 Ltd./AMMC
CLO 26 LLC's fixed- and floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by American Money Management Corp.

The ratings reflect our view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool.

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  AMMC CLO 26 Ltd./AMMC CLO 26 LLC

  Class A-1, $248.00 million: Not rated
  Class A-2, $8.00 million: Not rated
  Class B-1, $33.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-F, $15.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $23.60 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $10.40 million: BB- (sf)
  Class F (deferrable), $8.80 million(i): B- (sf)
  Subordinated A notes, $36.04 million: Not rated
  Subordinated B notes, $0: Not rated

(i)Amount at closing date. Thereafter, the aggregate outstanding
amount of the class F notes may be increased or decreased pursuant
to a note exchange provision under the indenture. Notwithstanding,
the aggregate outstanding amount may not exceed the amount at
closing.



ARES LXVIII: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Ares LXVIII CLO Ltd.

   Entity/Debt       Rating
   -----------       ------
Ares LXVIII
CLO Ltd.

   A-1           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-2           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-1           LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-2           LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   C             LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   D             LT BBB-(EXP)sf Expected Rating
   E             LT BB(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   F             LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   Subordinated  LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Ares LXVIII CLO Ltd., is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) that will be managed by Ares U.S. CLO Management
III LLC-Series A. Net proceeds from the issuance of the secured and
subordinated notes will provide financing on a portfolio of
approximately $500 million of primarily first lien senior secured
loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B/B-', which is in line with that of
recent CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote a
highly speculative credit quality; however, the notes benefit from
appropriate credit enhancement and standard CLO structural
features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of 98%
first-lien senior secured loans and has a weighted average recovery
assumption of 74.23%. Fitch stressed the indicative portfolio by
assuming a higher portfolio concentration of assets with lower
recovery prospects and further reduced recovery assumptions for
higher rating stresses.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 37% of the portfolio balance in aggregate while the
top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity required by industry,
obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with other recent
CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a five-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting to the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, the rated notes can
withstand default and recovery assumptions consistent with their
assigned ratings. The WAL used for the transaction stress portfolio
is 12 months less than the WAL covenant to account for structural
and reinvestment conditions after the reinvestment period. In
Fitch's opinion, these conditions would reduce the effective risk
horizon of the portfolio during stress periods.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
a metric. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are between
'BBB+sf' and 'AAAsf' for class A-1, between 'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf'
for class A-2, between less than 'B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for class D,
between less than 'B-sf' and 'B+sf' for class E.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrade scenarios are not applicable to the class A-1 and A-2
notes, as these notes are in the highest rating category of
'AAAsf'. Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in
recovery rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an
upgrade.

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'A+sf' for class D; and 'BBB+sf' for class E.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
securities and Markets Authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.


ARES LXVIII: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Ares LXVIII
CLO Ltd./Ares LXVIII CLO LLC's floating- and fixed-rate notes. The
transaction is managed by Ares U.S. CLO Management III LLC-Series
A.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 13,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- S&P's view of the collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Ares LXVIII CLO Ltd./Ares LXVIII CLO LLC

  Class A-1, $307.50 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $22.50 million: Not rated
  Class B-1, $30.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-2, $18.75 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $26.25 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $31.25 million: Not rated
  Class E (deferrable), $17.50 million: Not rated
  Class F (deferrable), $0.50 million: B- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $40.70 million: Not rated



BAIN CAPITAL 2023-1: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks to Bain
Capital Credit CLO 2023-1, Limited.

   Entity/Debt             Rating        
   -----------             ------        
Bain Capital
Credit CLO
2023-1, Limited

   A-F                 LT AAAsf  New Rating
   A-L Loans           LT AAAsf  New Rating
   A-N                 LT AAAsf  New Rating
   B                   LT NRsf   New Rating
   C                   LT Asf    New Rating
   D                   LT BBB-sf New Rating
   E                   LT BB-sf  New Rating
   Subordinated Notes  LT NRsf   New Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Bain Capital Credit CLO 2023-1, Limited, is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be managed by Bain
Capital Credit U.S. CLO Manager II, LP. Net proceeds from the
issuance of the secured and subordinated notes will provide
financing on a portfolio of approximately $400 million of primarily
first lien senior secured loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B'/'B-', which is in line with that of
recent CLOs. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
indicative portfolio is 24.7, versus a maximum covenant, in
accordance with the initial expected matrix point of 25.0. Issuers
rated in the 'B' rating category denote a highly speculative credit
quality; however, the notes benefit from appropriate credit
enhancement and standard U.S. CLO structural features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
100% first-lien senior secured loans. The weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) of the indicative portfolio is 75.1% versus a minimum
covenant, in accordance with the initial expected matrix point of
71.0%.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 39.0% of the portfolio balance in aggregate while
the top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity required by industry,
obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with other recent
CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 5.1-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting to the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, the rated notes can
withstand default and recovery assumptions consistent with their
assigned ratings. The WAL used for the transaction stress portfolio
and matrices analysis is 12 months less than the WAL covenant to
account for structural and reinvestment conditions after the
reinvestment period. In Fitch's opinion, these conditions would
reduce the effective risk horizon of the portfolio during stress
periods.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
a metric. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf' for class A, between 'B+sf'
and 'BBB+sf' for class C, between less than 'B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for
class D; and between less than 'B-sf' and 'B+sf' for class E.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrade scenarios are not applicable to class A, as class A are in
the highest rating category of 'AAAsf'.

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'A+sf' for class C, 'A-sf' for class D; and 'BBB+sf'
for class E.


BALBOA BAY 2023-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Balboa Bay
Loan Funding 2023-1 Ltd./Balboa Bay Loan Funding 2023-1 LLC's
floating-rate notes. The transaction is managed by Pacific
Investment Management Company LLC.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 13,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- S&P's view of the collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Balboa Bay Loan Funding 2023-1 Ltd./
  Balboa Bay Loan Funding 2023-1 LLC

  Class A, $248.0 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $56.0 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $22.0 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24.0 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $12.0 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $38.4 million: Not rated



BARINGS CLO 2023-I: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ratings and Rating Outlooks to Barings
CLO Ltd. 2023-I.

   Entity/Debt        Rating        
   -----------        ------        
Barings CLO Ltd.
2023-I

   A              LT AAAsf   New Rating
   B              LT AAsf    New Rating
   C              LT Asf     New Rating
   D              LT BBB-sf  New Rating
   E              LT BB-sf   New Rating
   Subordinated   LT NRsf    New Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Barings CLO Ltd. 2023-I (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be managed by
Barings LLC. Net proceeds from the issuance of the secured and
subordinated notes will provide financing on a portfolio of
approximately $400 million of primarily first lien senior secured
leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B', which is in line with that of recent
CLOs. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the indicative
portfolio is 23.78, versus a maximum covenant, in accordance with
the initial expected matrix point of 24. Issuers rated in the 'B'
rating category denote a highly speculative credit quality;
however, the notes benefit from appropriate credit enhancement and
standard U.S. CLO structural features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
100% first-lien senior secured loans. The weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) of the indicative portfolio is 76.92% versus a minimum
covenant, in accordance with the initial expected matrix point of
71.3%.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 41% of the portfolio balance in aggregate, while the
top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity resulting from the
industry, obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with
other recent CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 5.1-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting to the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, the rated notes can
withstand default and recovery assumptions consistent with their
assigned ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
a metric. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf' for class A, between 'BB+sf'
and 'A+sf' for class B, between 'B+sf' and 'BBB+sf' for class C,
between 'less than B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for class D; and between 'less
than B-sf' and 'B+sf' for class E.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrade scenarios are not applicable to class A-1 and A-2 notes, as
these notes are in the highest rating category of 'AAAsf'.

Variability in key model assumptions, such as increases in recovery
rates and decreases in default rates, could result in an upgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
metrics; the minimum rating results under these sensitivity
scenarios are 'AAAsf' for class B, 'A+sf' for class C, 'A-sf' for
class D; and 'BBB+sf' for class E.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or Credit Opinions from Fitch and/or other
nationally-recognized statistical rating organizations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant groups
within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset
portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for its rating analysis, according to its applicable rating
methodologies, indicates that it is adequately reliable.


BENCHMARK 2019-B10: Fitch Lowers Rating on Two Tranches to 'CCCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed 13 classes of
Benchmark 2019-B10 Mortgage Trust, commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2019-B10. In addition, Fitch assigned Negative
Outlooks to class F and X-F following the downgrades, and
maintained the Negative Outlooks on classes E and X-D.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
BMARK 2019-B10

   A-1 08162VAA6    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-2 08162VAB4    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-3 08162VAD0    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 08162VAE8    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-M 08162VAG3    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 08162VAC2   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 08162VAH1      LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 08162VAJ7      LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   D 08162VAV0      LT BBBsf  Affirmed    BBBsf
   E 08162VAX6      LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   F 08162VAZ1      LT B-sf   Downgrade   BB-sf
   G 08162VBB3      LT CCCsf  Downgrade   B-sf
   X-A 08162VAF5    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 08162VAK4    LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   X-D 08162VAM0    LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   X-F 08162VAP3    LT B-sf   Downgrade   BB-sf
   X-G 08162VAR9    LT CCCsf  Downgrade   B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: The downgrades reflect increased loss
expectations since Fitch's prior rating action driven by higher
losses on the specially serviced loan, 116 University Place and the
larger Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs), St. Louis Galleria (5.3% of
pool) and 3 Park Avenue (5.3%). Fitch's ratings incorporate a base
case loss expectation of 5.9%. Eight loans (20.1% of the pool) have
been designated as Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) including the one
specially serviced loan (0.8% of the pool).

The Negative Outlooks reflect Fitch's concerns with two office
loans within the top 15, 3 Park Avenue and 101 California, which
have experienced declining performance, occupancy and/or have
upcoming rollover.

Specially Serviced Loan: The largest increase in loss since Fitch's
prior rating action is the 116 University Place loan (0.8% of the
pool), which is secured by a 2,626-sf single-tenant retail condo
located in the Greenwich Village neighborhood of Manhattan, New
York. The property is part of a larger, six-story, 18,236-sf
mixed-use residential and commercial condominium building
(non-collateral) that was constructed in 2016.

The loan was transferred to the special servicer in January 2022
due to imminent monetary default. The collateral was 100% leased to
Ferrero U.S.A., which was home to New York City's flagship Nutella
Cafe. The tenant ceased paying rent and vacated the premises and
the space remains dark. A foreclosure suit was filed in October
2022, and the final judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered by
the court on November 2022. The foreclosure sale may now be
scheduled and must occur within one year. A foreclosure sale date
is currently pending.

Fitch's analysis reflects a discount to the most recent appraisal
which equates to a stressed value of $914 psf.

The next largest increase in loss since Fitch's last rating action
is 3 Park Avenue (5.3%), which is secured by a 667,446-sf,
42-story, office and retail condominium building located in the
Murray Hill neighborhood of Midtown Manhattan, New York. The
property comprises office space on floors 14 through 41 and
26,260-sf of multi-level retail space on Park Avenue and 34th
Street. The property was built in 1977 and renovated in 2001. The
property's current largest tenants include Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt (15.2% of NRA; December 2027); P. Kaufmann (8.5% of NRA;
December 2030); Zeta Global Holding Corp (4.2% of NRA; March 2029)
and Return Path Inc. (3.5% of NRA; July 2025).

The decline in occupancy since 2019 was primarily due the former
second largest tenant, TransPerfect Translations (13.7% NRA), which
vacated upon lease expiration in 2019 in addition to the loss of
smaller tenants related to the pandemic. The property is 58.4% as
of October 2022, which is consistent with YE 2021 but below 63.9%
at September 2020 and 85.5% at YE 2019. The borrower requested
pandemic-related relief, and the previously delinquent loan has
since been modified and is current, with deferred reserve deposits
expected to be repaid.

According to CoStar, the property lies within the Murray Hill
Office submarket in New York City. As of 4Q 2022, the average
asking rental rates for the submarket and market were $54.17 psf
and $56.96 psf, respectively. Vacancy rates for the submarket and
market were 20.2% and 12.7%, respectively. The property's average
in-place rent was $55.30 psf as of the October 2022 rent roll.

Fitch's base case loss of 13.4% reflects an 8.00% cap rate to YE
2021 NOI and a stressed value of $199-psf. Fitch reduced the
potential loss by 50% to account for the property's strong
Manhattan location and lower stressed value relative to comparable
properties.

The third largest increase in loss since Fitch's last rating action
is Saint Louis Galleria (5.3%), which is secured by a 465,695-sf of
a 1,180,422-sf regional mall located in Saint Louis, MO. The
property is anchored by a non-collateral Dillard's, Macy's and
Nordstrom. The collateral is anchored by Galleria 6 Cinemas. The
property's occupancy declined to 88.5% as of September 2022 from
100% at YE 2021, 95.7% at YE 2020 and 98.5% at YE 2019. The
declines are driven by multiple tenants vacating either at or prior
to their scheduled lease expirations. The most recent servicer
reported NOI DSCR as of September 2022 declined to 1.54x as of
September 2022 from 1.62x at YE 2021, 1.79x at YE 2020 and 2.25x at
YE 2019.

The most recent servicer-reported inline sales as of the trailing
twelve months (TTM) ended September 2022 (excluding Apple) had
improved to $419 psf from $401 psf at YE 2021, and $294 psf at YE
2020. For the same period, the inline sales including Apple were
$536 psf from $523 psf at YE 2021 compared to $364 psf at YE 2020.
The most recent servicer-reported sales per screen for Galleria 6
Cinemas improved to $172,803 at TTM August 2022, from $101,838 at
TTM September 2021 and $81,767 at YE 2020.

Fitch's analysis is based on a cap rate of 11.50% to reflect the
regional mall exposure and a 5% stress to the YE 2021 NOI.

Minimal Change in Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2023
remittance, the pool's aggregate certificate balance has been
reduced by 1.1% to $1.14 billion from $1.15 billion at issuance.
Twenty-two loans (59.5% of pool) are full-term interest-only and
fifteen loans (29.0% of pool) are partial-term interest only. To
date, the pool has not experienced any realized losses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that could lead to downgrades include an
increase in pool-level losses from underperforming or specially
serviced loans/assets. Downgrades to the super senior 'AAAsf' rated
classes are not likely due to the position in the capital
structure, but may occur should interest shortfalls affect these
classes. Downgrades to the junior 'AAAsf' and 'AA-sf' rated classes
are possible should expected losses for the pool increase
significantly, all of the FLOCs and loans recovering from the
pandemic fail to stabilize or suffer losses, and/or interest
shortfalls occur.

Downgrades to the 'A-sf' and 'BBB-sf' rated classes are possible
should loss expectations increase due to continued performance
declines and/or lack of stabilization of the larger office FLOCs,
additional loans transfer to special servicing and/or the specially
serviced loan experience higher than expected losses upon
resolution. Further downgrades to the distressed rated classes F
and G will occur with further certainty of losses and/or actual
losses are incurred.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment-grade notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include improved
asset performance, particularly on the larger office FLOCs, coupled
with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades of the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf'
categories would only occur with significant improvement in CE
and/or defeasance and with the stabilization of performance on the
FLOCs; however, adverse selection, increased concentrations and
further underperformance of the larger FLOCs could cause this trend
to reverse.

Upgrades to the 'BBB-sf' categories are not likely until the later
years in a transaction and only if the performance of the remaining
pool is stable and/or properties and there is sufficient CE to the
classes. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there is a
likelihood of interest shortfalls.

Upgrades to classes F and G are unlikely unless there is
significant performance improvement on the FLOCs and substantially
higher recoveries than expected on specially serviced loan.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CANTOR COMMERCIAL 2016-C4: Fitch Affirms B-sf Rating on 2 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cantor Commercial Real Estate Mortgage
Trust (CFCRE) series 2016-C4 commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates. The Rating Outlooks for three classes have been
revised to Positive from Stable Outlook.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
CFCRE 2016-C4

   A-3 12531YAM0    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 12531YAN8    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-HR 12531YAP3   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-M 12531YAU2    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 12531YAL2   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 12531YAV0      LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 12531YAW8      LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   D 12531YAE8      LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   E 12531YAF5      LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   F 12531YAG3      LT B-sf   Affirmed    B-sf
   X-A 12531YAQ1    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 12531YAS7    LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   X-E 12531YAB4    LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   X-F 12531YAC2    LT B-sf   Affirmed    B-sf
   X-HR 12531YAR9   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance: Overall pool performance and loss expectations
remain stable from the prior review and since issuance. Fitch has
identified eight Fitch Loans of Concerns (19% of the pool balance),
including one loan in special servicing (0.5%). Fitch's current
ratings incorporate a base case loss of 3.30%.

The Outlook revisions to Positive from Stable reflect the potential
for upgrade with further performance improvement and stabilization
of hotel loans in the Top 15 that include the Hyatt Regency St.
Louis at the Arch (6.6%), Renaissance Cincinnati (4.0%), and the
Marriott University Park (2.5%) and continued stable performance of
office loans in the pool.

Fitch Loans of Concern/Contributors to Loss: The largest increase
in loss since the prior rating action is the Broadstone Plaza II
loan (3.1%), which is secured by a 118,103-sf anchored retail
center located in Folsom, CA. The collateral is contiguous to phase
I of a larger power center known as Broadstone Plaza, which is
anchored by Home Depot, PetSmart, Marshall's, and Ross. Performance
of the center has been affected by the recent departure of Cost
Plus (15% of NRA) in January 2023 reducing property occupancy to
85%.

In addition to the vacancy, the two largest anchor tenants, Ashley
HomeStore (28%) and American Furniture Warehouse (26%) have
near-term lease expirations in 2024. Occupancy at the property had
previously declined in 2018 due to Babies R Us vacating, but the
space was subsequently backfilled by American Furniture Warehouse
in 2019 at comparable rental rates. The non-collateral portion of
the center had a vacant Steinmart that was backfilled by a Bob's
Furniture.

Fitch's expected loss of 9.4% reflects a 9% cap rate and a 30%
stress applied to the YE 2022 NOI to reflect the recent anchor
departure, near-term rollover risks, and high concentration of
furniture tenancy at the property.

The largest contributor to loss is the Home Depot - Elk Grove
Village loan (1.5%), which is secured by a 187,145-sf retail
shopping center located in Elk Grove, IL. The center is anchored by
a Home Depot which occupies 64.1% of the NRA. Home Depot had
previously master leased the entire center through January 2020,
but did not extend the master lease and renewed only for the
occupied portion (64.1%) of the center through 2029. Occupancy for
the center declined to 80% from 90% when Aldi (10% of NRA) vacated
their previously subleased space in January 2020. Staples remains
in their space through April 2026.

As of September 2022, NOI DSCR improved to 1.38x from 1.20x at YE
2020, but remains below NOI DSCR of 1.66x at YE 2019 when the
center was fully occupied. Fitch's analysis incorporates an 23%
loss severity reflecting a value of $74 psf.

The largest Fitch Loan of Concern is the Hyatt Regency St. Louis at
The Arch (6.6%) loan, which is secured by a 910-key, full-service
hotel in St. Louis, MO. The hotel's TTM September 2022 NOI was up
183% from YE 2021 NOI but remains 25% below the pre-pandemic YE
2019 NOI. The hotel had previously reported negative YE 2020 NOI.

As of TTM December 2022, occupancy, ADR and RevPAR improved to
49.4%, $172 and $85, respectively, from TTM June 2021 figures of
21.1%, $122.76 and $25.84. While performance has improved into
2022, performance metrics remain below TTM December 2019 occupancy,
ADR, and RevPAR of 66.3%, $153 and $101, respectively. The hotel
was ranked third out of five competing hotels, with TTM December
2022 occupancy, ADR and RevPAR penetration rates of 99.2%, 100.7%
and 99.9%, respectively.

Fitch's analysis incorporates a 26% stress to the property's YE
2019 NOI to account for continued performance recovery and
comparable performance relative to its competitive set.

Increasing Credit Enhancement (CE): CE has increased since issuance
due to amortization and loan repayments, with 13.5% of the original
pool balance repaid. Since Fitch's prior rating action in March
2022, three loans (2.5% of the prior review balance) had prepaid in
full with yield maintenance. The transaction has not realized any
losses to date. Interest shortfalls are currently affecting the
non-rated class G. Eleven loans (34.8%) are full-term IO and the
remaining 35 loans (65.2%) are amortizing.

Alternative Loss Considerations: While loss expectations are stable
and CE has improved, prior to any upgrades, Fitch would incorporate
an additional pool-level sensitivity scenario to test for the
resiliency of the current ratings by applying higher cap rates and
NOI stresses. This additional scenario supported the affirmations
and the Rating Outlook revisions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades would occur with an increase in pool level losses from
underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades to the
'AA-sf' and 'AAAsf' categories are not likely due to the position
in the capital structure, but may occur should interest shortfalls
affect the classes;

Downgrades to the 'BBB-sf' and A-sf' category would occur should
overall pool losses increase significantly and/or one or more large
loans have an outsized loss, which would erode CE. Downgrades to
the 'B-sf' and 'BB-sf' categories would occur should loss
expectations increase and if performance of the FLOCs fail to
stabilize or additional loans default and/or transfer to the
special servicer.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that could lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
Upgrades of the 'A-sf' and 'AA-sf' categories would occur with
significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance and performance
improvement of the hotel loans within the Top 15 that include the
Hyatt Regency St. Louis at the Arch, Renaissance Cincinnati, and
the Marriot University Park along with continued stabilization of
the pool; however, adverse selection, increased concentrations and
further underperformance of the FLOCs could cause this trend to
reverse.

Upgrades to the 'BBB-sf' category would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
is likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to the 'B-sf' and
'BB-sf' categories are not likely until the later years in a
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable and there is sufficient CE to the classes.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CF 2019-CF1 MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Two Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings for CF 2019-CF1 Mortgage
Trust commercial mortgage pass-through certificates, series
2019-CF1.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
CF 2019-CF1

   A-1 12529MAA6    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-2 12529MAB4    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-3 12529MAD0    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 12529MAE8    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-5 12529MAF5    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-S 12529MAJ7    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 12529MAC2   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 12529MAK4      LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 12529MAL2      LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   D 12529MCY2      LT BBBsf  Affirmed    BBBsf
   E 12529MCZ9      LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   F 12529MDA3      LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   G 12529MDB1      LT B-sf   Affirmed    B-sf
   X-A 12529MAG3    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 12529MAH1    LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   X-D 12529MCV8    LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   X-F 12529MCW6    LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   X-G 12529MCX4    LT B-sf   Affirmed    B-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The affirmations and
Stable Outlooks reflect that overall pool performance and base case
loss expectations have remained relatively stable since Fitch's
prior review and from issuance. Fitch's ratings incorporate a base
case loss of 3.70%.

Performance has stabilized for the majority of loans affected by
the pandemic. Two loans (3.7% of the pool balance) have been
identified as Loans of Concern (FLOCs). There are currently no
loans in special servicing. Seven loans (29.6%) are on the master
servicer's watchlist for declines in occupancy, performance
declines due to the pandemic, upcoming rollover and/or deferred
maintenance.

The largest contributor to overall loss expectations is the 394
Broadway (2.8% of the pool) loan, which is secured by a 32,285 sf
six-story mixed-use office/retail building, with ground floor
retail space and five office units on the upper floors, located in
the SoHo/Tribeca neighborhood of Manhattan. The loan was previously
transferred to the special servicer in July 2021 due to imminent
monetary default and returned to master servicer in November 2021
and the loan remains current.

Occupancy has significantly improved since the pandemic lows;
however, the property does face near term lease rollover risks. The
property is 100% occupied as of September 2022, up from 83% at YE
2021 and 67% at YE 2020. Upcoming rollover includes 50% of the NRA
(three leases) in 2023 and 16.7% (1 lease) in 2026. The tenants in
the property are the Andrew Kreps Gallery (16.7% of NRA; through
August 2028), Hawthorne Lab (16.7%; MtM), Too Good To Go (16.7%;
September 2023), RevCore (16.7%; January 2023), Rutter (16.7%; May
2023), and Stink Digital (16.7%; November 2026).

Servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for this
loan was 0.72x as of September 2022, 0.92x as of YE 2021 and 1.36x
at issuance. Fitch's base case loss expectation of 24% reflects a
9% cap rate and 10% stress on the pre-pandemic YE 2019 NOI. Fitch's
analysis gives credit for the recent occupancy improvements in
addition to the strong Manhattan location and excellent access to
public transit.

The next largest contributor to overall loss expectations is the
625 North Michigan Avenue loan (7.7%), which is secured by a
289,594 sf urban office property located in downtown Chicago along
the Magnificent Mile. The largest tenants in the property are
Northwestern University (28.4% of NRA; through July 2030), Solomon
Cordwell Buenz & Associates (13.6%; August 2024), SS Research
(4.6%; May 2025), and Golub & Company (4.6%; Dec. 2023). Occupancy
fell to 82.4% as of September 2022 from 85% in Dec. 2021 and 89% in
December 2020 as a number of tenants vacated including Azul
Partners (0.8%; June 2022), Interactive Financial Advisors (1.1%;
July 2022), Ses-Imagotag (1.1%; November 2024), and Siebert Willams
Shank & Co. (0.5%; April 2022).

The servicer-reported DSCR as of the September 2022 was 1.90x
compared with 2.05x at YE 2021 and 2.02x at YE 2020. Near-term
rollover includes 9.1% of the collateral NRA (3 leases) in 2023,
18.5% (five leases) in 2024, and 7.6% (four leases) in 2025.
Fitch's base case loss expectation of 7% reflects a 10% cap rate
and 10% stress on the YE 2021 NOI to account for declining
occupancy and upcoming rollover.

Minimal Change to Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the February 20232
distribution date, the pool's aggregate balance has been paid down
by 0.94% to $655.8 million from $662 million at issuance. Two loans
(1.16% of current pool) are fully defeased. Seventeen full-term
interest-only loans comprise 68.5% of the pool and 15 loans
representing 25.2% of the pool had a partial interest-only
component at issuance, but only six loans (9.1%) have an
interest-only period remaining. Interest shortfalls are currently
affecting class NR-RR.

Property Type Concentration: The highest concentration is office
(41.1%), followed by multifamily (15.2%), hotel (19.6%), and Mixed
Use (9.6%).

Investment-Grade Credit Opinion Loans: At issuance, four loans
totaling 24.0% of the pool were given standalone investment-grade
credit opinions: 3 Columbus Circle (7.6% of the pool), 65 Broadway,
(6.1% of the pool), Fairfax Multifamily Portfolio (5.3% of the
pool), and Amazon Distribution Livonia (5.2% of the pool), each
received a credit opinion of 'BBB-sf*' on a standalone basis. 65
Broadway is no longer considered a credit opinion loan due to a
decline in performance.

Pari Passu Loans: Eight loans comprising 41.6% of the pool are part
of a pari passu loan combination: 3 Columbus Circle (7.6% of the
pool), SSTII Self Storage Portfolio II (7.1%), 65 Broadway (6.1%),
Fairfax Multifamily Portfolio (5.3%), AC by Marriott San Jose
(5.3%), Atrium Two (4.4%), Stern Multifamily Portfolio (3.1%), and
Shelbourne Global Portfolio II (2.7%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

- Sensitivity factors that could lead to downgrades include an
increase in pool-level losses from underperforming and specially
serviced loans/assets.

- Downgrades to the 'AAAsf' and 'AA-sf' classes are not likely due
to the continued expected amortization and sufficient CE relative
to loss expectations, but may occur should interest shortfalls
affect these classes.

- Downgrades to the 'A-sf', 'BBBsf' and 'BBB-sf' classes would
occur should expected losses for the pool increase substantially,
with continued underperformance of the FLOCs and/or the transfer of
loans to special servicing.

- Downgrades to the 'BB-sf' and 'B-sf' classes would occur should
loss expectations increase as FLOC performance declines or fails to
stabilize.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

- Sensitivity factors that could lead to upgrades include stable to
improved asset performance, coupled with additional paydown and/or
defeasance.

- Upgrades to the 'AA-sf' and 'A-sf' classes may occur with
significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance, and with the
stabilization of performance on the FLOCs; however, adverse
selection and increased concentrations could cause this trend to
reverse.

- Upgrades to classes 'BBBsf' and 'BBB-sf'' may occur as the number
of FLOCs are reduced, and there is sufficient CE to the classes.
Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were any
likelihood of interest shortfalls.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CFCRE COMMERCIAL 2017-C8: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Two Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 15 classes of CFCRE Commercial Mortgage
Trust 2017-C8 (CFCRE 2017-C8) Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates.

   Entity/Debt         Rating             Prior
   -----------         ------             -----
CFCRE 2017-C8

   A-3 12532CAZ8    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 12532CBA2    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-M 12532CBB0    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 12532CAY1   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 12532CBC8      LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 12532CBD6      LT A-sf   Affirmed     A-sf
   D 12532CAA3      LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   E 12532CAC9      LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf
   F 12532CAE5      LT CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf
   X-A 12532CBE4    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 12532CBF1    LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   X-C 12532CBG9    LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   X-D 12532CAJ4    LT BBB-sf Affirmed   BBB-sf
   X-E 12532CAL9    LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf
   X-F 12532CAN5    LT CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Slight Increase In Loss Expectations: The elevated loss
expectations are driven by an increase in expected losses to the
Pershing Square Building loan (8.2%) and the specially serviced 340
Bryant (3%) asset. There are a total of six Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs; 10.7% of pool). Four loans (9.7%) are currently in special
servicing, two of which are performing (6.2%). Despite loss
increases on these loans, the majority of the pool continues to
exhibit generally stable performance. Fitch's current ratings
reflect a base case loss of 5.8%.

Largest Contributor to Loss: The largest contributor to loss is the
340 Bryant loan (3%), which is secured by a 62,270 sf, class B
office building located in the heart of the SOMA district of San
Francisco, CA. The loan transferred to special servicing in
September 2022 due to monetary default. The borrower has
communicated their intention to transition the title to the lender.
The special servicer is proceeding with foreclosure. Property
occupancy declined from 100% in 2020 to 23% as of YE 2021 and into
2022 as a result of WeWork (formerly 76.6% of the NRA) terminating
their lease. WeWork has not paid rent since December 2020 and paid
a termination fee of approximately $5 million. The sole remaining
tenant Logitech (23.4%) has a lease expiring in April 2023 that is
not expected to be renewed. Fitch modeled a loss of 37% which
reflects a recovery value of $317 psf.

The second largest contributor to loss is the Pershing Square
Building loan (8.2%), which is secured by a 153,381 sf mixed use
retail (25%)/office (75%) property located in the "Historic Core"
neighborhood of downtown Los Angeles, CA. Occupancy has declined to
72% as of September 2022, from 90% in 2020. Upcoming rollover at
the property includes 9.5% of the NRA in 2023, followed by 10% in
2024 and 4.2% in 2025. The servicer reported YE 2021 IO NOI debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) was 1.75x compared with 2.09x at YE
2020.

Fitch modeled a loss of approximately 13%, which utilized a 9.5%
cap rate and a 15% haircut to the YE 2021 NOI to reflect upcoming
rollover concerns.

The next largest contributor to loss is the Flats East Bank Phase I
loan (4.1%), which is secured by a 128,070-sf mixed-use property
located in downtown Cleveland, along the Lake Erie lakefront. The
collateral includes the 150-key Aloft Cleveland Downtown, with
33,166 sf of ground floor retail space and a 174-space surface
parking lot. The property was developed concurrently with a large
18-story office property, which is not part of the collateral. The
loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 as a result of
the pandemic. According to servicer updates, the special servicer
and borrower are finalizing a settlement agreement.

Performance has begun to stabilize post pandemic. Per the September
2022 STR report, the subject hotel had occupancy, ADR and RevPAR
rates of 60%, $160 and $95, respectively. RevPar is up 59% yoy. The
subject outperforms its competitive set in all three metrics. Fitch
modeled a loss of approximately 13%, which reflects a value of $152
psf.

Change to Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the February 2023
distribution date, the pool's aggregate principal balance was
reduced by 16.4% to $536.9 million from $644.7 million at issuance.
There have been $2.7 million in realized losses to date, and
interest shortfalls are currently affecting the non-rated class.
Six loans (26%) are full-term IO, while no loans remain in their
partial IO periods. The pool matures in 2026 and 2027.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to classes A-3 through A-M are not likely due to their
position in the capital structure and the high CE; however,
downgrades to these classes may occur should interest shortfalls
occur. Downgrades to classes B, C, and D would occur if loss
expectations increase significantly and/or should CE be eroded.
Downgrades to classes E and F would occur if the performance of the
FLOCs continues to decline and/or fail to stabilize, or should
losses from specially serviced loans/assets be larger than expected
or more certain.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades to classes B and C would likely occur with significant
improvement in CE and/or defeasance; however, adverse selection and
increased concentrations, or the underperformance of the FLOCs,
could reverse this trend. An upgrade to class D is unlikely and
would be limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or further
adverse selection. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there were a likelihood for interest shortfalls. An upgrade to
classes E and F is not likely until the later years in the
transaction and only if the performance of the remaining pool is
stable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CIM TRUST 2023-R2: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating on Class B2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to CIM Trust 2023-R2 (CIM
2023-R2).

   Entity/Debt       Rating                 Prior
   -----------       ------                 -----
CIM 2023-R2

   A1            LT AAAsf New Rating   AAA(EXP)sf
   A2            LT AAsf  New Rating   AA(EXP)sf
   M1            LT Asf   New Rating   A(EXP)sf
   M2            LT BBBsf New Rating   BBB(EXP)sf
   B1            LT BBsf  New Rating   BB(EXP)sf
   B2            LT Bsf   New Rating   B(EXP)sf
   B3            LT NRsf  New Rating   NR(EXP)sf
   B4            LT NRsf  New Rating   NR(EXP)sf
   AIOS          LT NRsf  New Rating   NR(EXP)sf
   C             LT NRsf  New Rating   NR(EXP)sf
   R             LT NRsf  New Rating   NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch has rated the residential mortgage-backed notes issued by CIM
Trust 2023-R2 (CIM 2023-R2) as indicated above. The notes are
supported by one collateral group that consists of 4,343 loans with
a total balance of approximately $447.4 million, which includes
$16.1 million, or 3.6%, of the aggregate pool balance in
noninterest-bearing deferred principal amounts as of the cutoff
date.

The pool generally consists of seasoned performing loans (SPLs) and
reperforming loans (RPLs). Approximately 4% of the pool is seasoned
at less than 24 months as of the cutoff date and was therefore
considered to be a new origination by Fitch.

Distributions of P&I and loss allocations are based on a
traditional senior-subordinate, sequential structure. The
sequential-pay structure locks out principal to the subordinated
notes until the most senior notes outstanding are paid in full. The
servicers will not be advancing delinquent monthly payments of
P&I.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 11.2% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
10.5% on a national level as of January 2023, down 1.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic showed
signs of moderating with a decline in 3Q22. Driven by strong gains
in 1H22, home prices rose 9.2% yoy nationally as of October 2022.

Distressed Performance History (Negative): The collateral pool
consists primarily of peak-vintage loans, SPLs and RPLs. Of the
pool, 2.3% was 30 days delinquent as of the cutoff date, and 14.2%
are current but have had recent delinquencies or incomplete pay
strings. Approximately 83.5% of the loans have been paying on time
for at least the past 24 months. Roughly 60.3% have been modified.

Low Leverage (Positive): The pool consists of loans with a weighted
average (WA) original combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of 82.5%.
All seasoned loans received an updated property valuation, 99.9%
received a broker price opinion (BPO) valuation, and the remining
0.1% received form 2055 and an automated valuation model (AVM)
value. This translates to a WA sustainable LTV (sLTV) of 51.2% in
the base case. This indicates low leverage borrowers and added
strength compared to recently rated RPL transactions.

No Servicer P&I Advancing (Mixed): The servicer will not advance
delinquent monthly payments of P&I, which reduces liquidity to the
trust. P&I advances made on behalf of loans that become delinquent
and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation proceeds to the trust.
Due to the lack of P&I advancing, the loan-level loss severity (LS)
is less for this transaction than for those where the servicer is
obligated to advance P&I. Structural provisions and cash flow
priorities, together with increased subordination, provide for
timely payments of interest to the 'AAAsf' and 'AAsf' rated
classes.

Sequential-Pay Structure (Positive): The transaction's cash flow is
based on a sequential-pay structure whereby the subordinate classes
do not receive principal until the senior classes are repaid in
full. Losses are allocated in reverse-sequential order. The
provision to reallocate principal to pay interest on the 'AAAsf'
and 'AAsf' rated notes prior to other principal distributions is
highly supportive of timely interest payments to those classes in
the absence of servicer advancing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) at
the national level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and
30.0%, in addition to the model-projected 42.3% at 'AAAsf'. The
analysis indicates that there is some potential rating migration
with higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home prices
would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all the rated classes. Specifically,
a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full category upgrade
for the rated class excluding those being assigned ratings of
'AAAsf'.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch's analysis incorporated two criteria variations from the
"U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."

The first variation is that a due diligence compliance review was
not completed on 100% of RPLs and SPLs from unknown originators.
Approximately 0.5% by loan count (two loans) did not receive a due
diligence compliance review. The properties are located in New
York, which is included in Freddie Mac's "Do not Purchase" list of
states. Given this, Fitch applied a 100% LS adjustment to account
for any related risks. Additionally, these loans received a credit
and property review and were graded 'A' in both reviews. This
variation had no rating impact, as the number of loans affected
represents a very small portion of the overall pool and did not
lead to a category-level rating change.

The second variation is related to the primary valuation type for
new-origination first lien loans. Per the criteria, Fitch expects
to receive a full appraisal as primary valuation for all
new-origination first lien loans. Approximately 0.4% of the pool by
loan count (18 loans) is seasoned less than 24 months and did not
receive a full appraisal. These loans received a drive-by, AVM or
stated value as the primary valuation type. All of the 18 loans
received recent, updated BPOs and a property valuation due
diligence review. Fitch used the lower of the original valuation
and the updated valuation in its LTV calculations and analysis.
This variation had no rating impact, as the number of loans
affected represents a very small portion of the overall pool and
did not lead to a category-level rating change.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by SitusAMC and Clayton. A third-party regulatory
compliance review was completed on 99.95% of the loans in this
transaction. The remaining .05% (two loans) are residential
properties for business purpose that did not receive a compliance
review. The scope of the due diligence review was consistent with
Fitch criteria for RPL collateral and also included a property
valuation review in addition to the regulatory compliance and pay
history review. All loans received an updated tax and title search
and review of servicing comments. Additionally, the pool includes
45 loans seasoned less than 24 months that received a full new
origination due diligence, which includes credit, compliance and
property valuation review.

Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a result,
made the following adjustments to its analysis: increased the LS
due to HUD-1 issues, increased liquidation timelines for loans
missing modification agreements, increased LS due to outstanding
delinquent property taxes or liens, and treated loans found to have
a prior lien as a second lien. These adjustments resulted in an
increase in the 'AAAsf' expected loss of approximately 1.25%.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


COLONY MULTIFAMILY 2014-1: Moody's Cuts Rating on X Certs to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on one class and
downgraded the rating on one class in Colony Multifamily Mortgage
Trust 2014-1, Commercial Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2014-1
as follows:

Cl. F, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. X*, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 17, 2022
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. F was upgraded primarily due to an increase in
credit support resulting from loan paydowns and amortization. The
pool has paid down 27% since Moody's last review and 90% since
securitization. In addition, the entire pool is secured by either
multifamily or manufactured housing properties and the remaining
loans have amortized 26% since securitization.

The rating on one IO class, Cl. X, was downgraded based on the
credit quality of its referenced classes resulting from principal
paydowns of higher quality reference classes. The IO Class
references all P&I classes including Class G, which is not rated by
Moody's.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 6.5% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 6.4% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.6% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or a significant improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology" published
in July 2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 23, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate pooled certificate balance has decreased by 89.7% to
$32.5 million from $315.9 million at securitization. The pooled
certificates are collateralized by 52 mortgage loans ranging in
size from less than 1% to 5.6% of the pool, with the top ten loans
constituting 41.5% of the pool. The remaining loans in the pool
have terms to maturity ranging from 112 months to 182 months, with
a weighted average time to maturity of 166 months.

Loans representing 84% of the current pool balance had an original
loan balance below $2 million and the average current principal
balance of the remaining loans is approximately $625,000. Smaller
loans have historically exhibited higher default and severity rates
compared to properties typically found in CMBS securitizations.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 35, compared to 46 at Moody's last review.

As of the February 2023 remittance report, all loans (excluding one
specially serviced loans representing 2.6% of the pool) were
current on their debt service payments. One loan ($0.8 million –
2.6% of the pool) is currently in special servicing.

Twenty-eight loans, constituting 52.5% of the pool, are on the
master servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Fourteen loans have been liquidated from the pool since
securitization, resulting in an aggregate realized loss of $6.1
million (for an average loss severity of 40%).

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this
transaction, Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's
adjust the MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects
capitalization (cap) rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap
rates and market cap rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan
balance that reflects each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV
reported in this publication reflects the MLTV before the
adjustments described in the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2021 operating results for 55% of the
pool, and partial year 2022 operating results for 18% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced loan). Moody's weighted average
conduit LTV is 88%, compared to 92% at Moody's last review. Moody's
conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 33% to the most recently available NOI. Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.2%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.27X and 1.44X,
respectively, compared to 1.38X and 1.38X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.


COMM 2013-CCRE6: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class F Certs to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on seven
classes in COMM 2013-CCRE6 Mortgage Trust, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2013-CCRE6 ("COMM 2013-CCRE6") as
follows:

Cl. B, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022 Affirmed
Aa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022 Affirmed
A2 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022
Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022 Downgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Cl. PEZ, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022 Affirmed
Aa3 (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2022
Affirmed A1 (sf)

* Reflects interest-only classes.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on five P&I classes were downgraded due to higher
anticipated losses and the increased risk of potential interest
shortfalls driven primarily from the specially serviced loans. Two
loans, representing 100% of the pool, are in special servicing and
failed pay off at their respective original maturity in March 2023.
Furthermore, interest shortfalls may increase if the performance of
the specially serviced loans decline further.

The ratings on one IO class, Cl. X-B, was downgraded based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PEZ, was downgraded based
on the credit quality of its referenced exchangeable classes.

Moody's regard e-commerce competition as a social risk under
Moody's ESG framework. The rise in e-commerce and changing consumer
behavior presents challenges to brick-and-mortar discretionary
retailers.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of  23.3% of
the current pooled balance, compared to 5.7% at Moody's last
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.9%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 3.4% at Moody's last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced that it expects
will generate a loss and estimates a loss given default based on a
review of broker's opinions of value (if available), other
information from the special servicer, available market data and
Moody's internal data. The loss given default for each loan also
takes into consideration repayment of servicer advances to date,
estimated future advances and closing costs. Translating the
probability of default and loss given default into an expected loss
estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss from specially
serviced and troubled loans to the most junior class(es) and the
recovery as a pay down of principal to the most senior class(es).

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the March 10, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to $240 million
from $1.49 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by two mortgage loans ranging in size from 45.8% to
54.2% of the pool

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 2, compared to 11 at Moody's last review.

Two loans, constituting 100% of the pool, are currently in special
servicing. The largest specially serviced loan is the Federal
Center Plaza Loan ($130.0 million -- 54.2% of the pool), which is
secured by two adjacent office buildings totaling 725,000 square
feet (SF) in Washington, DC. The property is well-located between
the US Capitol and Washington Monument, two blocks from two
separate metro stations (Federal Center SW and L'Enfant Plaza). At
securitization the property was 100% leased and federal government
agencies Department of State (DOS) and Federal Emergency Management
Agency(FEMA) leased 54% and 42% of the property NRA. While DOS
vacated the property at its lease expiration in 2021, FEMA extended
its lease at the property to 2027. As of September 2022, the
property was 75% leased and federal government agencies FEMA and
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) leased
approximately 71% of the total NRA while the remaining tenant base
is granular with no single tenant occupying more than 5% of the
NRA. The loan transferred to special servicing in December 2022 due
to imminent monetary default. The borrower requested a transfer to
special servicing as a result of its inability to pay off the loan
at its scheduled maturity date in March 2023.  The special servicer
is presently negotiating a possible loan extension with the
borrower.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Avenues Loan
($110.0 million -- 45.8% of the pool), which is secured by an
approximately 599,000 SF retail component of a 1.1 million SF
super-regional mall in Jacksonville, Florida. At securitization,
the mall contained five anchors: Dillard's, Belk, J.C. Penney,
Sears and Forever 21. However, the boxes occupied by Dillard's,
Belk and J.C. Penney are owned by their respective tenants and are
not included as collateral for the loan. Sears closed its store in
December 2019. As a result of Sears' closure of its store in
December 2019, the collateral's occupancy decreased to 58% in
December 2020 from 80% in December 2019. As of June 2022, the
collateral's occupancy was 63% and inline occupancy was 69%,
compared to the inline occupancy of 70% as of June 2019 and 81% as
of March 2018. The property's cash flow has generally declined
since securitization due to lower revenue and high operating
expenses. The performance of the mall was further negatively
impacted by the coronavirus pandemic.  The loan transferred to
special servicing in November 2022 due to the upcoming maturity in
February 2023. As of the March 2023 payment date, the loan is
current, and in cash management. Moody's has estimated an aggregate
loss of $47.8 million (a 20% expected loss on average) from these
specially serviced loans.

As of the March 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $471,703. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls
will continue because of the exposure to specially serviced loans.


Interest shortfalls are caused by special servicing fees, including
workout and liquidation fees, appraisal entitlement reductions
(ASERs), loan modifications and extraordinary trust expenses.


COMM 2015-CCRE26: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class F Certs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed nine classes of
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.'s COMM 2015-CCRE26 Mortgage Trust
commercial mortgage pass-through certificates.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
COMM 2015-CCRE26

   A-3 12593QBD1    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 12593QBE9    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-M 12593QBG4    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 12593QBC3   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 12593QBH2      LT AAsf   Upgrade     AA-sf
   C 12593QBJ8      LT Asf    Upgrade      A-sf
   D 12593QBK5      LT BBB-sf Affirmed   BBB-sf
   E 12593QAL4      LT BB+sf  Affirmed    BB+sf
   F 12593QAN0      LT B-sf   Affirmed     B-sf
   X-A 12593QBF6    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-C 12593QAC4    LT BBB-sf Affirmed   BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving Loss Expectations: The upgrades of classes B and C
reflect improving overall pool performance, improving credit
enhancement (CE) and better than expected recoveries on the
disposition of four loans ($28.1 million balance), including two in
special servicing, which were disposed with deminimus losses to the
trust. At Fitch's prior rating action, these four loans were
modeled with a $3.2 million combined loss to the trust.

Fitch's current ratings reflect a base case loss of 5.20%. Nine
loans (20.7% of pool) were designated Fitch Loans of Concern
(FLOCs). As of February 2023, no loans are delinquent or specially
serviced.

Fitch Loans of Concern: The largest contributor to loss
expectations, Rosetree Corporate Center (4.4%), is secured by a
268,156-sf suburban office property located in Media, PA
(approximately 22 miles from Philadelphia, PA). The loan, which is
sponsored by Keystone Property Group, previously transferred to
special servicing in June 2021 for imminent monetary default but
returned to the master servicer in December 2021 as a corrected
mortgage.

FXI, Inc. (previously 15.9% NRA; 20.8% base rents) vacated at the
end of its lease term in September 2019. As a result, occupancy and
servicer-reported NOI DSCR have declined, most recently reporting
at 69% and 0.82x as of the YTD September 2022 down from 88% and
1.39x at issuance. The loan is currently amortizing after the
initial two-year IO period expired in September 2017. Near-term
rollover includes approximately 10% NRA by 2023.

Fitch's base case loss of 42.3% reflects a 10.50% cap rate and a
15% total haircut to the YE 2021 NOI to account for the low
occupancy and low DSCR.

The second largest contributor to loss expectations is the cross
collateralized Hotel Lucia and Hotel Max (6.2%). Hotel Lucia is
secured by a 127-key, full service unflagged boutique hotel located
in Portland, OR, and Hotel Max is secured by a 163-key, full
service unflagged boutique hotel located in downtown Seattle. The
loans, which are sponsored by Gordon Sondland, transferred to
special servicing in June 2020 for payment default. The loans were
subsequently modified and cross collateralized and returned to the
master servicer as corrected loans in November 2021.

Hotel Lucia had occupancy and servicer-reported NOI DSCR of 56% and
0.27x as of the TTM ended September 2022, up from 33% and -0.54x at
YE 2020 but still down from 78% and 1.22x at YE 2019. Hotel Lucia
was outperforming its competitive set with a RevPAR penetration
rate of 103.9% as of the TTM ended June 2022. Hotel Max had
occupancy and servicer-reported NOI DSCR of 64% and 1.16x as of the
TTM ended September 2022, up from 55% and -0.53x at YE 2020 but
still down from 86% and 1.88x at YE 2019. Hotel Max was
underperforming its competitive set with a RevPAR penetration rate
of 84.3% as of the TTM ended September 2022.

Fitch's base case loss of 9.9% reflects an 11.25% cap rate and 15%
total haircut to the YE 2019 NOI to account for the slow recovery
from the pandemic. Fitch's analysis gives credit for the recent
servicer provided valuations. This translates to an approximate
combined stressed value of $162,000 per key.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Due to increasing CE, improving
performance of the overall pool and better than expected recoveries
on the disposition of four loans, Fitch's analysis included a
scenario to test for positive rating actions. This included higher
cap rates and NOI stresses for the entire pool. The upgrades of
classes B and C reflect this analysis.

High Office Concentration: Loans secured by office properties
comprise 39.8% of the pool, including four (9.5%) that were
designated FLOCs and the largest loan in the pool, Prudential Plaza
(11.5%). Fitch remains concerned with performance of these loans
and refinance risk at loan maturity in 2025.

Increasing Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2023 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by 13.8% to
$940.5 million from $1.1 billion at issuance. Since Fitch's prior
rating action, four loans with a $28.1 million balance were
disposed with deminimus losses to the trust. Five loans(17.0%) are
full-term IO and 22 (60.1%) were structured with a partial-term IO
component at issuance. All 22 are in their amortization periods.
Eight loans (5.6%) are fully defeased. Cumulative interest
shortfalls of $272,516 are currently affecting the non-rated class
H.

Credit Opinion Loan: 11 Madison Avenue (7.4%) received a
standalone, investment grade credit opinion of 'A-sf*' at issuance.
Performance is strong and in-line with Fitch's expectations at
issuance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades of classes rated in the 'AAAsf', 'AAsf' and 'Asf'
categories are not likely due to sufficient CE and the expected
receipt of continued amortization but could occur if interest
shortfalls affect the class. Classes D, X-C, E and F would be
downgraded if performance of the FLOCs deteriorates further or
additional loans, primarily loans secured by office properties,
become FLOCs.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment-grade notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades of classes B and C would occur with continued improvement
in CE and/or defeasance and continued stable to improving
performance of the overall pool. Upgrades of classes D, X-C, E and
F may occur with significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance
but would be limited based on sensitivity to concentrations or the
potential for future concentration. Classes would not be upgraded
above 'Asf' if there is a likelihood for interest shortfalls.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



COMM 2018-HOME: Fitch Lowers Rating on Cl. HRR Certs to 'BB+sf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded one class and affirmed four classes of
COMM 2018-HOME Mortgage Trust (COMM 2018-HOME) commercial mortgage
pass through certificates. The Rating Outlook was revised to
Negative from Stable for classes C and D. The Outlook is Negative
for class HRR.

   Entity/Debt         Rating             Prior
   -----------         ------             -----
COMM 2018-HOME

   A 20048JAA8     LT AAAsf  Affirmed     AAAsf
   B 20048JAE0     LT AA-sf  Affirmed     AA-sf
   C 20048JAG5     LT A-sf   Affirmed      A-sf
   D 20048JAJ9     LT BBB+sf Affirmed    BBB+sf
   HRR 20048JAL4   LT BB+sf  Downgrade   BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Property Cash Flow Decline: The downgrade and Negative Outlooks
reflect sustained performance declines and ongoing concerns at The
Gateway property, which represents approximately 30% of the
transaction. Although property performance may improve from the
current levels, recovery to issuance expectations is unlikely.

Annualized servicer reported Net Cash Flow (NCF) as of YTD
September 2022 for the property was $23.1 million, significantly
lower than the issuer's $37.3 million NCF at issuance. Fitch's
issuance NCF was $31.2 million. Effective gross income declined
13.3% due to lower rents; average rent per unit is currently
$2,744, in line with $2,738 at YE 2021, but significantly below
$3,049 at issuance. Total operating expenses increased 9.8%
primarily due to increasing repairs and maintenance and
professional fees.

The property, located in the Financial District submarket of San
Francisco, CA, is anticipated to continue to experience rental
growth, but at a slower pace than the national average. Performance
consistent with issuance expectations is not expected in the near
term. As such, Fitch's NCF was based on income from the YE 2022
rent roll and annualized September 2022 expenses, which have
increased 19.2% since YE 2021. However, consideration was given to
the potential for further rental rate improvement given the
continued strong occupancy levels. Occupancy improved to 94.5% as
of September 2022 from 91.4% at YE 2021 and 92.3% at YE 2020,
compared with 97% at issuance. As of September 2022, servicer
reported NCF DSCR was 1.86x compared with 2.03x at YE 2021, 2.59x
at YE 2020 and 3.01x at YE 2019.

Fitch requested additional details on ongoing rental concessions,
increasing operating expenses and the strategy to improve
performance at The Gateway; however, details were not provided.
Further downgrades to classes C, D and HRR are expected if
performance does not improve.

TriBeCa House: Occupancy improved to 98.6% as of the December 2022
rent roll from 83.6% at YE 2020 and 93% at issuance. As of YTD June
2022, the servicer reported NCF debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
was 2.51x compared with 1.36x at YE 2021, 2.13x at YE 2020 and
2.62x at YE 2019. Fitch's NCF was based on annualized servicer
reported YTD June 2022 NCF of $18.7 million, which exceeds issuance
expectations of $17.5 million.

Aalto57: Occupancy improved to 96.5% as of YE 2022 from 76.3% at YE
2020 and 96% at issuance. As of YE 2022, the servicer reported NCF
DSCR was 2.18x compared with 1.90x at YE 2021, 2.11x at YE 2020 and
2.54x at YE 2019. YE 2022 servicer reported NCF was $9.3 million
for Aalto57, slightly below Fitch's issuance cash flow of $10.2
million. Fitch deemed issuance cashflow sustainable, as performance
has recovered post pandemic and is expected to continue to
improve.

Low Trust Leverage: The Fitch stressed DSCR and loan-to-value for
the transaction were 1.11x and 80.9%, respectively, with a trust
debt psf of $327,103.

Collateral Characteristics: The TriBeCa House loan is secured by
the fee interest in two adjacent class A multifamily properties
located in the TriBeCa neighborhood of Manhattan, conveniently
accessible by multiple subway lines. 50 Murray Street consists of
388 units and was built in 1964. 53 Park Place consists of 115
units and was built in 1921.

The properties were renovated for $12 million ($23,842/unit) in
2017 and have shared amenities, including a 24- hour attended
lobby, media room and lounge, game room, children's playroom,
outdoor basketball court, rooftop deck and laundry and bike storage
facilities. Commercial tenants include Equinox, Church Street
Parking, Starbucks and Apple Bank.

The Gateway loan is secured by the fee interest in 1,254-unit class
A multifamily property located in San Francisco's financial
district. Built between 1965 and 1967 and subsequently renovated in
2018, just prior to issuance, the property consists of four
high-rise buildings, 58 two-story townhome units, 71,970 sf of
ground floor retail space, a parking garage and Sydney Walton Park.
Amenities include unobstructed views of the San Francisco Bay, a
916-stall parking garage, a fitness center, two swimming pools
courtyard/sundeck, doorman and nearby tennis club. The largest
commercial tenant, Safeway (24.5% of commercial NRA), is the
financial district's only full-service grocery store.

The Aalto57 loan is secured by the leasehold interest in the
169-unit multifamily rental component of a class A multifamily
property located in the affluent Sutton Place neighborhood of
Manhattan's Upper East Side. The property was built in 2016 and is
LEED Silver certified. Amenities include a 24-hour attended lobby
and doormen, resident lounge with terrace and fire pit, conference
center and business center, indoor basketball court, children's
playroom, fitness center and bike storage. The collateral also
includes commercial tenants Whole Foods, Bank of America, Starbucks
and the NYC School Construction Authority.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is secured by three loans, all of which
are secured by multifamily properties. Therefore, the transaction
is more susceptible to single-event risks related to the markets
and/or sponsors.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to classes C, D and HRR are expected if cashflow fails
to improve at The Gateway within the next 12-24 months.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

While considered unlikely, should the properties demonstrate
significant performance improvement, future upgrades are possible.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 2000-CMLB1: Moody's Cuts Cl. X Certs to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
interest-only class (IO) in Commercial Mortgage Leased-Backed
Certificates 2000-CMLB1 (CMLBC 2001-CMLB1).

Cl. X, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2022
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on the IO class was downgraded due to the decline in the
credit performance resulting from principal paydowns of higher
quality reference classes. The IO class is the only outstanding
Moody's-rated class in this transaction.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

An IO class may be subject to ratings upgrades if there is an
improvement in the credit quality of its referenced classes,
subject to the limits and provisions of the updated IO
methodology.

An IO class may be subject to ratings downgrades if there is (i) a
decline in the credit quality of the reference classes and/or (ii)
paydowns of higher quality reference classes, subject to the limits
and provisions of the updated IO methodology.

The ratings of Credit Tenant Lease (CTL) deals (reference classes)
are primarily based on the senior unsecured debt rating (or the
corporate family rating) of the tenants leasing the real estate
collateral supporting the bonds. Other factors that are also
considered are Moody's dark value of the collateral (value based on
the property being vacant or dark), which is used to determine a
recovery rate upon a loan's default and the rating of the residual
insurance provider, if applicable. Factors that may cause an
upgrade of the ratings include an upgrade in the rating of the
corporate tenant or significant loan paydowns or amortization which
results in a lower loan to dark value ratio. Factors that may cause
a downgrade of the ratings include a downgrade in the rating of the
corporate tenant or the residual insurance provider.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Credit Tenant Lease and Comparable Lease Financings"
published in June 2020.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 97% to $16.3 million
from $476.3 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by nine mortgage loans. Five of the loans,
representing 27% of the pool, are CTL loans secured by properties
leased to five corporate credit tenants. Four loans, representing
73% of the pool, have defeased and are collateralized with U.S.
Government securities.

The CTL pool, excluding defeasance, consists of five loans secured
by properties leased to five tenants. The largest exposure is
Kohl's Corporation ($1.98 million – 12.1% of the pool; senior
unsecured rating: Ba2 -- stable outlook). Three of the five
corporate tenants (11% of the pool) have a Moody's investment grade
rating. The bottom-dollar weighted average rating factor (WARF) for
this pool (including defeasance) is 306. WARF is a measure of the
overall quality of a pool of diverse credits. The bottom-dollar
WARF is a measure of default probability.


CONNECTICUT AVENUE 2023-R03: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 to 26 Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to 62
classes of credit risk transfer (CRT) residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) to be issued by Connecticut Avenue Securities
Trust 2023-R03, and sponsored by Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae).

The securities reference a pool of mortgages loans acquired by
Fannie Mae, and originated and serviced by multiple entities.

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Connecticut Avenue Securities Trust 2023-R03

Cl. 2M-1, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2A, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2B, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2C, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1A, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1B, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A1, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I1*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I2*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I3*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-A4, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2A-I4*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B1, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I1*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I2*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I3*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-B4, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-I4*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C1, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I1*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C2, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I2*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I3*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-C4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2C-I4*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D1, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D2, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D3, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D4, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-D5, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F1, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F2, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2E-F5, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-X1*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X2*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X3*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-X4*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y1*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y2*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y3*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-Y4*, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J1, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J2, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-J4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K1, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K2, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K3, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2-K4, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2Y, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2M-2X*, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1Y, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2B-1X*, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

*Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based on the credit quality of the mortgage loans,
the structural features of the transaction, the GSE's oversight of
originators and servicers, and the third-party review.

Moody's expected loss for this pool in a baseline scenario-mean is
1.33%, in a baseline scenario median is 1.08% and reaches 6.05% at
a stress level consistent with Moody's Aaa ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Moody's Approach to Rating US RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings up. Losses could decline from Moody's original
expectations as a result of a lower number of obligor defaults or
appreciation in the value of the mortgaged property securing an
obligor's promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends
greatly on the US macro economy and housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's original expectations
as a result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration
in the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's
promise of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on
the US macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


CWMBS 2006-R2: Moody's Cuts Class A-S Debt Rating to Ca
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of one bond and
downgraded the rating of one bond from two US residential
mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by FHA-VA mortgages
issued by multiple issuers.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/40hGq51

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series
2006-R2

Cl. A-S*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 30, 2020
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: GSMPS Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-LT1

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

*Reflects Interest Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrade is a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and an increase in credit enhancement available to
the bonds.

The rating downgrade of Class. A-S, an interest only bond from
CWMBS Reperforming Loan REMIC Trust Certificates, Series 2006-R2,
reflects the updated performance of the underlying collateral and
bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was " US FHA-VA RMBS Surveillance
Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.

An IO bond may be upgraded or downgraded, within the constraints
and provisions of the IO methodology, based on lower or higher
realized and expected loss due to an overall improvement or decline
in the credit quality of the reference bonds.


FORTRESS CREDIT XVIII: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $3MM F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to two
classes of notes to be issued and one class of loans to be incurred
by Fortress Credit BSL XVIII Limited (the "Issuer" or "Fortress
Credit BSL XVIII").  

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Up to US$248,000,000 Class A-T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2036, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$40,000,000 Class A-L Loans maturing 2036, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$3,000,000 Class F Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2036, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The notes and loans listed are referred to herein, collectively, as
the "Rated Debt."

On the closing date, the Class A-T Notes and Class A-L Loans have a
principal balance of $208,000,000 and $40,000,000, respectively. At
any time, the Class A-L Loans may be converted in whole or in part
to Class A-T Notes, thereby decreasing the principal balance of the
Class A-L Loans and increasing, by the corresponding amount, the
principal balance of the Class A-T Notes. The aggregate principal
balance of the Class A-L Loans and Class A-T Notes will not exceed
$248,000,000, less the amount of any principal repayments. Neither
Class A-T Notes nor any other Notes may be converted into Class A-L
Loans.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Fortress Credit BSL XVIII is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued
notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated senior
secured corporate loans. At least 92.5% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans, cash and eligible investments, and
up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans, first
lien last out loans, senior unsecured loans, senior secured bonds
and senior secured notes, provided that no more than 5.0% of the
portfolio may consist of senior secured bonds and senior secured
notes. Moody's expect the portfolio to be approximately 90% ramped
as of the closing date.

FC BSL CLO Manager II LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Debt, the Issuer will issue seven other
classes of secured notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $400,000,000

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3094

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): SOFR + 4.00%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.08 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Debt is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Debt is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Debt.


FREDDIE MAC 2023-DNA1: S&P Assigns BB-(sf) Rating on M-2R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Freddie Mac STACR REMIC
Trust 2023-DNA1's notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by fully
amortizing, first-lien, fixed-rate residential mortgage loans
secured by one- to four-family residences, planned-unit
developments, condominiums, cooperatives, and manufactured housing
to mostly prime borrowers.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The credit enhancement provided by the subordinated reference
tranches, as well as the associated structural deal mechanics;

-- The REMIC structure that reduces the counterparty exposure to
Freddie Mac for periodic principal and interest payments but, at
the same time, pledges the support of Freddie Mac (a highly rated
counterparty) to cover shortfalls, if any, on interest payments and
to make up for any investment losses;

-- The issuer's aggregation experience and the alignment of
interests between the issuer and noteholders in the transaction's
performance, which, in S&P's view, enhances the notes' strength;

-- The enhanced credit risk management and quality control
processes Freddie Mac uses in conjunction with the underlying R&W
framework; and

-- The potential impact current and near-term macroeconomic
conditions may have on the performance of the mortgage borrowers in
the pool. On April 17, 2020, we updated our mortgage outlook and
corresponding archetypal foreclosure frequency levels to account
for the potential impact the COVID-19 pandemic may have on the
overall credit quality of collateralized pools. While COVID-19
pandemic-related performance concerns have waned, given our current
outlook for the U.S. economy considering the impact of the
Russia-Ukraine military conflict, supply-chain disruptions, and
rising inflation and interest rates, we continue to maintain our
updated 'B' foreclosure frequency for the archetypal pool at
3.25%."

  Ratings Assigned

  Freddie Mac STACR REMIC Trust 2023-DNA1

  Class A-H, $14,105,662,939: Not rated
  Class M-1A, $282,000,000: BBB+ (sf)
  Class M-1AH(i), $15,744,864: Not rated
  Class M-1B, $99,000,000: BBB- (sf)
  Class M-1BH(i), $5,210,702: Not rated
  Class M-2, $148,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2A, $74,000,000: BB (sf)
  Class M-2AH(i), $4,158,027: Not rated
  Class M-2B, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2BH(i), $4,158,027: Not rated
  Class M-2R, $148,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2S, $148,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2T, $148,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2U, $148,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2I, $148,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2AR, $74,000,000: BB (sf)
  Class M-2AS, $74,000,000: BB (sf)
  Class M-2AT, $74,000,000: BB (sf)
  Class M-2AU, $74,000,000: BB (sf)
  Class M-2AI, $74,000,000: BB (sf)
  Class M-2BR, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2BS, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2BT, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2BU, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2BI, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2RB, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2SB, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2TB, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class M-2UB, $74,000,000: BB- (sf)
  Class B-1, $82,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-1A, $41,000,000: B+ (sf)
  Class B-1AR, $41,000,000: B+ (sf)
  Class B-1AI, $41,000,000: B+ (sf)
  Class B-1AH(i), $14,827,162: Not rated
  Class B-1B, $41,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-1BH(i), $14,827,162: Not rated
  Class B-1R, $82,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-1S, $82,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-1T, $82,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-1U, $82,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-1I, $82,000,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-2H(i)(ii), $74,436,216: Not rated
  Class B-3H(i), $37,218,109: Not rated

(i)Reference tranche only and will not have corresponding notes.
Freddie Mac retains the risk of these tranches.
(ii)Class B-2H is deemed to bear interest solely for the purposes
of calculating modification gain or loss amounts.



GLS AUTO 2023-1: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to GLS Auto Receivables
Issuer Trust 2023-1's automobile receivables-backed notes series
2023-1.

The note issuance is an ABS securitization backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The availability of approximately 56.30%, 47.74%, 37.38%,
27.63% and 22.98% of credit support (hard credit enhancement and
haircut to excess spread) for the class A (A-1 and A-2), B, C, D
and E notes, respectively, based on final post-pricing stressed
break-even cash flow scenarios (including excess spread). These
credit support levels provide at least 3.20x, 2.70x, 2.10x, 1.55x,
and 1.30x our 17.50% expected cumulative net loss (ECNL) for the
class A, B, C, D and E notes, respectively.

-- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.60x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, its 'AAA
(sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'BBB- (sf)', and 'BB- (sf)' ratings on
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, are within its
credit stability limits.

-- S&P said, "The timely payment of interest and principal by the
designated legal final maturity dates under our stressed cash flow
modeling scenarios, which we believe are appropriate for the
assigned ratings. The collateral characteristics of the subprime
automobile loans, including the representation in the transaction
documents that all contracts in the pool have made at least one
payment, our view of the credit risk of the collateral, and our
updated macroeconomic forecast and forward-looking view of the auto
finance sector."

-- The series' bank accounts at UMB Bank N.A., which do not
constrain the ratings.

-- S&P's operational risk assessment of Global Lending Services
LLC (GLS), as servicer, and our view of the company's underwriting
and backup servicing arrangement with UMB Bank.

-- S&P's assessment of the transaction's potential exposure to
environmental, social, and governance credit factors that are in
line with its sector benchmark.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structure.

  Ratings Assigned

  GLS Auto Receivables Issuer Trust 2023-1

  Class A-1, $50.90 million: A-1+ (sf)
  Class A-2, $97.89 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $44.73 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $42.77 million: A (sf)
  Class D, $42.43 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E, $26.70 million: BB- (sf)



GS MORTGAGE 2023-CCM1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. B-2 Certs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates the residential mortgage-backed certificates issued by
GS Mortgage Backed Securities Trust 2023-CCM1 (GSMBS 2023-CCM1).

   Entity/Debt       Rating                   Prior
   -----------       ------                   -----
Goldman Sachs
Mortgage Backed
Securities
2023-CCM1

   A-1           LT AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
   A-2           LT AAsf   New Rating     AA(EXP)sf
   A-3           LT Asf    New Rating      A(EXP)sf
   B-1           LT BB-sf  New Rating    BB-(EXP)sf
   B-2           LT B-sf   New Rating    B-(EXP)sf
   B-3           LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   M-1           LT BBB-sf New Rating    BBB-(EXP)sf
   R             LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   RISK RETEN    LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
   X             LT NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The certificates are supported by 629 nonprime loans all of which
have been originated by Cross Country Mortgage and have a total
balance of approximately $275 million, as of the cutoff date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 10.4% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
10.5% on a national level as of January 2023, down 1.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in 3Q22. Driven by
the strong gains seen in 1H22, home prices rose 7.7% YoY nationally
as of November 2022.

Nonprime Credit Quality (Mixed): The collateral consists of 629
loans, totaling $275 million and seasoned approximately six months
in aggregate (calculated as the difference between origination date
and cutoff date). The borrowers have a moderate credit profile (734
Fitch FICO) and 52% DTI, which takes into account converted debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) to DTI values and moderate leverage
(77% sLTV). The pool consists of 33% of loans where the borrower
maintains a primary residence, while 67% is an investor property or
second home.

Additionally, 100% of the loans were originated through a retail
channel. 38% are non-qualified mortgages and for the remainder
Ability-to-Repay (ATR) does not apply. A portion of the loans had a
prior delinquency but were treated as current for the life of the
loan as the prior delinquencies were the result of servicing
transfers.

Loan Documentation (Negative): Approximately 93% of the pool was
underwritten to less than full documentation. 32% was underwritten
to a 12-month or 24-month bank statement program for verifying
income, which is not consistent with Appendix Q standards and
Fitch's view of a full documentation program.

A key distinction between this pool and legacy Alt-A loans is that
these loans adhere to underwriting and documentation standards
required under the CFPB's ATR Rule (Rule), which reduces the risk
of borrower default arising from lack of affordability,
misrepresentation or other operational quality risks due to rigor
of the Rule's mandates with respect to the underwriting and
documentation of the borrower's ATR. Additionally, 9% is an Asset
Depletion product, 49% is DSCR product and the rest is a mix of
alternative documentation products.

Modified Sequential-Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes principal pro rata among the senior certificates while
shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until all senior
classes are reduced to zero. If a cumulative loss trigger event or
delinquency trigger event occurs in a given period, principal will
be distributed sequentially to class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates
until they are reduced to zero.

Limited Advancing (Mixed): The deal is structured to three months
of servicer advances for delinquent principal and interest. The
limited advancing reduces loss severities as there is a lower
amount repaid to the servicer when a loan liquidates and
liquidation proceeds are prioritized to cover principal repayment
over accrued but unpaid interest. The downside to this is the
additional stress on the structure side as there is limited
liquidity in the event of large and extended delinquencies.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper market value declines (MVDs) at
the national level. The analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and
30.0% in addition to the model projected 41.8% at 'AAA'. The
analysis indicates that there is some potential rating migration
with higher MVDs for all rated classes, compared with the model
projection. Specifically, a 10% additional decline in home prices
would lower all rated classes by one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Fitch was provided with Form ABS Due Diligence-15E (Form 15E) as
prepared by situsAMC. The third-party due diligence described in
Form 15E focused on a credit, compliance and property valuation
review. Fitch considered this information in its analysis and, as a
result, Fitch made the following adjustment(s) to its analysis:

- A 5% Probability of Default (PD) credit was applied at the loan
level for all loans graded either 'A' or 'B';

- Fitch lowered its loss expectations by approximately 50bps as a
result of the diligence review.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


HOME RE 2021-2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Cl. M-1C Notes to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 tranches
from five mortgage insurance credit risk transfer transactions
issued in 2020 and 2021. These transactions were issued to transfer
to the capital markets the credit risk of private mortgage
insurance (MI) policies issued by Arch Mortgage Insurance Company
and United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company, and Mortgage
Guaranty Insurance Corporation, the ceding insurers, on a portfolio
of residential mortgage loans.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3Z78zuF

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bellemeade Re 2020-2 Ltd

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Bellemeade Re 2020-3 Ltd

Cl. M-1C, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to A3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Bellemeade Re 2021-3 Ltd.

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2021 Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Cl. M-1A, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2021
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Issuer: Home Re 2020-1 Ltd.

Cl. M-1C, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Home Re 2021-2 Ltd.

Cl. M-1A, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2021 Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Cl. M-1B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2021
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Cl. M-1C, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2021
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions are primarily driven by the increased levels of
credit enhancement available to the bonds and the decreased level
of expected losses. The prepayments and the sequential pay
structure have benefited the bonds by paying down bonds and
building up credit enhancement.

On the closing date, the issuer and the ceding insurer entered into
a reinsurance agreement providing excess of loss reinsurance on
mortgage insurance policies issued by the ceding insurer on a
portfolio of residential mortgage loans. Proceeds from the sale of
the notes were deposited into the reinsurance trust account for the
benefit of the ceding insurer and as security for the issuer's
obligations to the ceding insurer under the reinsurance agreement.
The funds in the reinsurance trust account are also available to
pay noteholders, following the termination of the trust and payment
of amounts due to the ceding insurer. Funds in the reinsurance
trust account are used to purchase eligible investments and are
subject to the terms of the reinsurance trust agreement.

Following the instruction of the ceding insurer, the trustee
liquidates assets in the reinsurance trust account to (1) make
principal payments to the note holders as the insurance coverage in
the reference pool reduces due to loan amortization or policy
termination, and (2) reimburse the ceding insurer whenever it pays
MI claims after the unfunded coverage levels are written off. While
income earned on eligible investments is used to pay interest on
the notes, the ceding insurer is responsible for covering any
difference between the investment income and interest accrued on
the notes' coverage levels.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk posed by
borrowers enrolled in payment relief programs. Moody's increased
both Moody's MILAN model-derived median expected losses and Moody's
Aaa losses to reflect the performance deterioration observed
following the COVID-19 outbreak. Moody's also considered an
additional scenario based on higher collateral loss expectations.

Moody's updated loss expectation on the pool incorporates, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicers.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of the transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


IMSCI 2013-3: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class F Certs to CCCsf
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four and affirmed one class of
Institutional Mortgage Canada Inc.'s (IMSCI) Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates 2013-3. Fitch has assigned a Positive
Rating Outlook for class D and a Stable Outlook for classes C and E
following the upgrades. All currencies are denominated in Canadian
Dollars (CAD).

   Entity/Debt         Rating         Prior
   -----------         ------         -----
IMSCI 2013-3

   C 45779BBC2     LT AAAsf Upgrade    Asf
   D 45779BBD0     LT Asf   Upgrade    BBsf
   E 45779BBE8     LT BBsf  Upgrade    Bsf
   F 45779BAV1     LT CCCsf Upgrade    CCsf
   G 45779BAW9     LT Dsf   Affirmed   Dsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: The upgrades reflect the increased
credit enhancement (CE) since Fitch's prior rating action due to
the repayment of 16 loans ($54.6 million balance at Fitch's prior
rating action) and continued amortization. As of the February 2023
distribution date, the pool balance has been reduced by 93.4% to
$16.6 million from $250.4 million at issuance, which includes 2.1%
in realized losses. Cumulative interest shortfalls of $209,610 are
impacting classes F, G, H. Fitch has affirmed class G at 'Dsf' due
to incurred losses.

The upgrades of class C to 'AAAsf' and class D to 'Asf' reflect the
high CE and greater certainty of repayment due to the class
positions in the capital structure. The Positive Outlook on class D
indicates the class will be upgraded with continued increase in CE
from amortization and loan repayments.

Concentrated Pool: The pool is highly concentrated with four of the
original 38 loans remaining. Due to the concentrated nature of the
pool, Fitch's analysis consisted of repayment and recovery
expectations on the remaining loans.

The largest loan in the pool, Marche Terrebone (43.6% of the pool),
is secured by a 41,197-sf shopping center located in Terrebonne,
Quebec. The largest tenants include Dollarama (21.7% of the NRA)
and Familiprix (14.1%). Per servicer updates, all tenants are open
at the property and are current on rent payments following pandemic
related forced closures and non-payment of rents.

The loan maintained an NOI DSCR of 1.57x for the YE 2021 reporting
period. The loan is past its initial anticipated repayment date
(ARD) of February 1, 2023. Per updates from the servicer, the loan
is expected to repay on or before its May 1, 2023 hard maturity
date. The loan has remained current since issuance, and is partial
recourse (25%) to the sponsor.

The remaining three loans (56.4% of the pool), secured by
multifamily properties in Fort McMurray, AB, are considered Fitch
Loans of Concern (FLOCs). All three properties and have experienced
cash flow deterioration since issuance and a low debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR), primarily caused by the declining Alberta
energy sector. Performance deterioration was further exacerbated by
the Fort McMurray wildfires in 2016, floods in 2020, and
pandemic-related impacts.

Lunar & Whimbrel Apartments (20.8% of the pool) occupancy as of
October 2023 reported at 83% and 97%, respectively, with NOI DSCR
at 0.71x as of YE 2021. Snowbird and Skyview Apartments (19.5%)
occupancy reported at 91% and 89%, respectively, with NOI DSCR at
0.62x. Parkland & Gannet Apartments (16.2%) occupancy reported at
75% and 83%, respectively, with NOI DSCR at 0.21x as of YE 2021.

All three loans are 100% recourse to the sponsor, Lanesborough REIT
(LREIT), and were granted forbearance with loan maturity most
recently extended to February 2024, after failing to pay off at
their original May 2018 maturity date. The loans remain current
under the terms of the forbearance, which include mandatory
six-month principal repayments. The curtailments paid in February
2022, August 2022, and February 2023 totaled $1.95 million for the
three loans, with one payment remaining in August 2023.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

- Downgrades to classes C and D are not likely due to the position
in the capital structure but may occur should interest shortfalls
affect these classes or if a high proportion of the pool defaults
and expected losses increase significantly;

- Downgrades to classes E and F may occur and be one category or
more should overall pool losses increase, loans fail to pay at
maturity, and/or the FLOCs continue to experience further
performance deterioration and/ or transfer to special servicing;

- Downgrades to class G are not possible as losses have already
been incurred.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

- Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
An upgrade of class D would likely occur with improvement in CE
and/or defeasance; however, adverse selection and increased
concentrations, further underperformance of the FLOCs or higher
than expected losses on the specially serviced loans could cause
this trend to reverse;

- Upgrades to classes E and F would occur with improved asset
performance or higher certainty of maturity of loans in the pool.
Adverse selection, increased concentrations, or deteriorating
delinquency on the remaining loans would reverse this trend.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


IMSCI 2014-5: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Debt
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two and affirmed five classes of
Institutional Mortgage Securities Canada Inc. (IMSCI) 2014-5.
Additionally, Fitch has revised the Rating Outlooks on classes D, E
and F to Positive from Stable. The Rating Outlook on class C
remains Positive following the upgrade. All currencies are
denominated in Canadian dollars (CAD).

   Entity/Debt         Rating            Prior
   -----------         ------            -----
Institutional
Mortgage
Securities
Canada Inc.
2014-5

   A-2 45779BCB3   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 45779BCC1     LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   C 45779BCD9     LT AAsf   Upgrade     Asf
   D 45779BCE7     LT Asf    Upgrade     BBBsf
   E 45779BCF4     LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   F 45779BCG2     LT BBsf   Affirmed    BBsf
   G 45779BCH0     LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Credit Enhancement (CE): The upgrades and Positive
Outlooks reflect improved CE, primarily from maturing loans and
continued amortization since the last rating action, as well as
Fitch's expectation of substantial loan repayments in the pool from
upcoming maturities. All of the loans in the pool mature by July
2024.

As of the February 2023 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance has been reduced 82.5% to $54.7 million from
$311.8 million at issuance. All loans in the pool are currently
amortizing.

Alternative Loss Consideration: Due to the significant upcoming
maturity concentration in the pool, Fitch performed a look-through
analysis, which grouped the remaining loans based on their current
status and collateral quality and ranked them by their perceived
likelihood of repayment and recovery prospects.

The upgrade of classes C and D reflects expected paydown from loans
with low leverage and have strong performance metrics. The
affirmation of class G reflects its reliance on the Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs), Burnhamthorpe Square Pooled Loan (9.3%) and Nelson
Ridge Pooled Loan (7.0%).

Improved Loss Expectations: The upgrades and outlook revisions also
consider improved loss expectations compared to the prior rating
action. Two loans (16.3%) have been designated FLOCs for high
vacancy and underperformance. As of February 2023, there were no
loans in special servicing.

The largest FLOC is Burnhamthorpe Square (9.3% of the pool), an
office park in Etobicoke, ON in the Toronto metro, where the
largest tenant (Canada Bread Company - 18.4% NRA) vacated in April
2020, prior to their December 2020 lease expiration. In addition,
tenants accounting for approximately 23% of NRA have leases
scheduled to expire in 2023 and 2024. As of the September 2022 rent
roll, the property was 65% occupied. The concerns over the recent
decline in performance are mitigated by the loan's low leverage.
This loan is scheduled to mature in April 2023.

The second largest FLOC is Nelson Ridge (7.0%), secured by a
225-unit multifamily property in Fort McMurray, AB, which
transferred to special servicing in early 2016 due to a decline in
operating performance. The property was affected by the decline in
oil prices, and occupancy declined to a low of only 45% in 2015.
Subsequently, the property was affected by the area wildfires in
May 2016; however, the loan returned to master servicing in January
2017. The loan was scheduled to mature in December 2018 and is
currently in forbearance through May 2023. Per the terms of the
most recent modification, the borrower will make four scheduled
curtailment payments between December 2021 and May 2023. According
to the servicer, the property was 84% occupied in March 2022 and
reported a YE 2021 NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 0.72x.
No credit was given to the recourse due to concerns over the
sponsor's ability to continue to fund debt service shortfalls.

Canadian Loan Attributes: The ratings reflect strong Canadian
commercial real estate loan performance, including a low
delinquency rate and low historical losses of less than 0.1%, as
well as positive loan attributes such as short amortization
schedules, additional guarantors and recourse to the borrowers.
There are seven loans remaining, of which four loans comprising
approximately 80.5% of total pool balance have full or partial
recourse provisions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to classes A-2 and B are not likely due to the position
in the capital structure, but may occur should interest shortfalls
affect these classes. Downgrades to classes C, D and E are possible
if there is an increase in FLOCs and/or should loans transfer to
special servicing. Classes F and G could be downgraded should loss
expectations from FLOCs grow more certain.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades to the 'AAsf' and 'Asf' rated classes would occur should
performing loans dispose at their scheduled maturities. Upgrades to
the 'BBB-sf' and 'BBsf' rated classes would occur if it were to
become more likely that Milton Crossroads West pay at its scheduled
maturity in May 2024. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if
there is a likelihood of interest shortfalls. An upgrade to the
'Bsf' rated class is not likely unless the Burnhamthorpe Square
Pooled Loan pays at its scheduled maturity.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


IVY HILL XX: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on $24MM Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Ivy Hill Middle Market
Credit Fund XX Ltd./Ivy Hill Middle Market Credit Fund XX LLC's
floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by middle-market speculative-grade
(rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans. The transaction
is managed by Ivy Hill Asset Management L.P, a wholly owned
portfolio company of Ares Capital Corp.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  Ivy Hill Middle Market Credit Fund XX Ltd./
  Ivy Hill Middle Market Credit Fund XX LLC

  Class A, $232.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $36.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $36.00 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $24.00 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $24.00 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $42.31 million: Not rated



JP MORGAN 2011-C3: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Certs to 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed four classes of Deustche Bank Securities
COMM 2010-C1 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates (COMM
2010-C1).

Fitch has downgraded class D and affirmed the remaining six classes
of J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp.,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, series 2011-C3
(JPMCC 2011-C3). A Negative Outlook was assigned to class D
following the downgrade.

   Entity/Debt         Rating           Prior
   -----------         ------           -----
COMM 2010-C1

   D 12622DAK0     LT BBsf  Affirmed    BBsf
   E 12622DAL8     LT CCCsf Affirmed    CCCsf
   F 12622DAM6     LT CCsf  Affirmed    CCsf
   G 12622DAN4     LT CCsf  Affirmed    CCsf

JPMCC 2011-C3

   B 46635TAU6     LT Asf   Affirmed    Asf
   C 46635TAX0     LT BBBsf Affirmed    BBBsf
   D 46635TBA9     LT Bsf   Downgrade   BBsf
   E 46635TBD3     LT CCCsf Affirmed    CCCsf
   G 46635TBK7     LT CCsf  Affirmed    CCsf
   H 46635TBN1     LT Csf   Affirmed    Csf
   J 46635TBR2     LT Csf   Affirmed    Csf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

COMM 2010-C1: The affirmations reflect the continued stable
performance post-modification, stabilizing sales to pre-pandemic
figures, improved occupancy and additional loan amortization since
Fitch's last rating action.

There is one loan remaining in the pool, Fashion Outlets of Niagara
Falls, sponsored by The Macerich Company, which was previously
transferred to special servicing in July 2020 for imminent maturity
default. The loan returned to the master servicer as a corrected
mortgage loan on March 31, 2021.

The loan is secured by an outlet mall with collateral originally
consisting of approximately 525,663 sf located in Niagara, NY near
the U.S. and Canada border. The property is heavily reliant on
tourism; prior to the pandemic, the property suffered from
significantly lower sales since issuance along with fluctuating
occupancy.

The loan was modified by the special servicer in December 2020.
Modification terms included an extension of the maturity date to
Oct. 6, 2023; the borrower also pledged an additional 181,447 sf in
non-collateral (expansion property) to the loan. The expansion
property is connected to the main building of the existing
collateral, total collateral square feet is now 707,110 sf. No
other payment terms were modified, and the borrower is responsible
for all fees.

Per the December 2022 rent roll, occupancy of the original
collateral was reported to be 90.4%. The YE 2022 in-line sales were
$305 psf, reflecting a 5.6% decline from $323 psf at YE 2021, but
flat from pre-pandemic YE 2019 in-line sales of $305 psf; at
issuance, in-line sales were $520 psf. Fitch's loss and recovery
analysis considered the most recent valuation from the servicer, as
well as the continued amortization of the loan through the extended
maturity date. Fitch's loss expectations are based on the most
recent broker opinion of value with an applied stress, which
resulted in an implied cap rate of approximately 19%.

JPMCC 2011-C3: The downgrade reflects a greater certainty of losses
on the two remaining regional malls in the pool, both sponsored by
The Pyramid Companies and were modified in October 2020. The
modifications extended their loan term by 36 months to
January/February 2024 and converted the remaining payments to
interest-only. The downgrade and Negative Outlook also reflect
refinance concerns at their upcoming 2024 extended maturity dates
given the lower quality and underperforming nature of these
regional mall assets in the current environment.

The Holyoke Mall loan (76.4% of pool), which is secured by a 1.3
million-sf portion of a 1.5 million-sf regional mall in Holyoke,
MA, was transferred to special servicing in May 2020 due to
imminent default.

Collateral occupancy declined further to 61.5% as of the December
2022 rent roll, from 70% at YE 2021 and YE 2020, 78% at YE 2019,
73.6% at YE 2018 and 88.1% at YE 2017. Major tenants that
previously vacated during 2018 include Sears (13.5% of NRA), Babies
"R" Us (2.7%) and A.C. Moore (1.7%). No co-tenancies were
triggered. Forever 21 also downsized its space by 2.8% in July
2018. Best Buy (3.8%) and JCPenney (11.2%) extended their leases
through January 2025 and October 2025, respectively. New tenants
that opened between 2018 and 2019 include Round 1 Bowling &
Amusement (3.9%), Flight Fit N Fun (1.6%), Charlotte Russe (0.6%)
and 110 Grill (0.5%).

YE 2022 inline sales improved to $607 psf ($485 psf excluding
Apple), from $423 psf ($342 psf excluding Apple) at YE 2020, and
are comparable with pre-pandemic sales of $604 psf ($481 psf) in
2019 and $568 psf ($464 psf) in 2018. Macy's reported estimated
sales of $151 psf for 2022, down from $275 at issuance. Target
reported estimated sales of $305 psf for 2022, up from $284 psf at
issuance. JCPenney reported actual sales of $82 psf in 2020, down
from $161 psf at issuance

Fitch's loss and recovery analysis was based on a discount to the
most recent valuation provided by the servicer with an implied cap
rate of approximately 18% to the YE 2021 NOI. Recoveries were also
reviewed using a sensitivity assumption applying an outsized loss
of 50%.

The Sangertown Square loan (23.6% of pool) is secured by an 894,127
sf-regional mall located in New Hartford, NY. The loan transferred
to special servicing in May 2020 due to imminent default.

Collateral occupancy improved to 79.3% as of January 2023, up from
60% as of December 2020, but remains below 95% at YE 2019 after
JCPenney (16.8% of NRA) closed in September 2020 and Macy's (15.6%)
closed in April 2021. Sears previously vacated in 2015, but the
space was backfilled by Boscov's; however, cash flow has been
negatively affected as Sears paid approximately $1.2 million in
expense reimbursements annually, whereas Boscov's pays none.

YE 2022 inline sales improved to $342 psf, up from $238 at YE 2020,
$326 as of TTM September 2018, $319 psf at TTM October 2017 and an
average of $363 psf between 2007 and 2009. Anchor sales as of YE
2022 were as follows: Boscov's ($135 psf, up from $118 psf in
2018), Target ($387 psf est.) and Dick's ($273 psf, up from $183 at
YE 2020 and $178 psf at issuance). YE 2022 total mall sales
increased by 24.2% to $128.7 million from $103.58 million at YE
2020 but remained below the $139.16 million at YE 2019.

Fitch's loss and recovery analysis was based on the most recent
valuation provided by the servicer with an implied cap rate of
approximately 33%.

High Expected Losses; Insufficient CE to Junior Classes: Both
transactions' expected losses remain stable from the previous Fitch
rating actions. The transactions are concentrated with either one
or two mall assets remaining. All loans have been modified and
losses are expected to impact or significantly erode credit
enhancement to the junior classes with distressed ratings.

High CE to Senior Classes: Both transactions' most senior bonds
have a high likelihood of recovery given the amortization and
de-levering, and/or performance stabilization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades are possible if performance of the malls deteriorate
further and/or the loans default prior to the extended maturity
dates. Ratings will be downgraded to 'Dsf' as losses are incurred.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades are not expected but are possible with significantly
improved performance and/or better recoveries than expected on the
remaining assets.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


JP MORGAN 2014-C21: Fitch Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'Csf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four and affirmed nine classes of J.P.
Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust, series 2014-C21
(JPMBB 2014-C21). The Rating Outlooks for two classes has been
revised to Negative from Stable.

   Entity/Debt          Rating           Prior
   -----------          ------           -----
JPMBB 2014-C21
  
   A-4 46642EAX4    LT AAAsf Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-5 46642EAY2    LT AAAsf Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-S 46642EBC9    LT AAAsf Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 46642EAZ9   LT AAAsf Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 46642EBD7      LT AA-sf Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 46642EBE5      LT BBBsf Affirmed    BBBsf
   D 46642EAJ5      LT CCCsf Downgrade   Bsf
   E 46642EAL0      LT CCsf  Downgrade   CCCsf
   EC 46642EBF2     LT BBBsf Affirmed    BBBsf
   F 46642EAN6      LT Csf   Downgrade   CCsf
   X-A 46642EBA3    LT AAAsf Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 46642EBB1    LT AA-sf Affirmed    AA-sf
   X-C 46642EAE6    LT CCsf  Downgrade   CCCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Mall Refinance Concerns; Upcoming Loan Maturities: The downgrades
and Negative Outlooks reflect increased pool loss expectations from
the sustained underperformance and refinance concerns with three
regional mall loans (15% of pool) as well as a higher certainty of
loss given the concentration of loan maturities in 2024.

Fitch's current ratings reflect a base case loss of 9.9%. The
analysis incorporated a full recognition of losses on all loans in
the pool to reflect imminent refinance risk as loans approach
maturity. Nine loans (31.2% of the pool) are considered Fitch Loans
of Concern (FLOCs).

The affirmations and Stable Outlooks reflect continued increased
credit enhancement (CE) since Fitch's last rating action. The
higher loss expectations on the three regional mall loans were
offset by better than expected recoveries from the disposition of
the REO Charlottesville Fashion Center, a 362,332-sf portion of a
576,749-sf regional mall located in Charlottesville, VA, since the
prior rating action with a realized loss of $15.7 million (53% loss
severity).

Alternative Loss Consideration: Due to significant upcoming
maturity as all of the remaining loans in the pool mature by July
2024, Fitch performed an additional paydown scenario that
considered the Miami International Mall, Westminster Mall and The
Shops at Wiregrass loans as the last remaining loans in the pool. A
portion of class C and classes D, E and F would be reliant on these
three loans for ultimate repayment; this scenario supported the
Negative Outlook revisions. While the largest loan in the pool,
Showcase Mall in Las Vegas, NV (11.3%), may face refinance
challenges given the limited liquidity in the current environment,
Fitch's analysis assumed the ultimate recovery of this loan.

FLOCs: The largest increase in loss since the last rating action
and largest contributor to Fitch's loss expectations is the
Westminster Mall loan (5.1% of the pool), which is secured by a
771,844-sf portion of a 1.4 million-sf regional mall located in
Westminster, CA. The loan is sponsored by Washington Prime Group,
who is currently working with the city of Westminster on a proposal
to convert the subject into a mixed-use lifestyle center.

The updated plans include up to 600,000 square feet of retail,
3,000 residential units (10% designated affordable), hotel, and 17
acres of park space. Washington Prime Group will work with Shopoff
Realty Investments who purchased the vacant Sears building and
surrounding lot along with the Macy's building and adjacent land
for $95 million in 2022. Macy's will continue to operate at this
location under a lease-back agreement.

Collateral occupancy as of September 2022 was 80.8% compared with
88% at September 2021, 90% at YE 2020 and 95% at YE 2019.Total mall
occupancy fell to 72% at September 2022 from 77% at September 2021,
and 79.6% at YE 2019. Occupancy dropped significantly after the
non-collateral Sears (15.2% of total mall) vacated in April 2018.
Property- level NOI for the annualized September 2022 period
declined 42% from YE 2021 and 72% from YE 2020.

The servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
decreased to 0.29x as of September 2022 from 0.49x as of YE 2021,
1.02x as of YE 2020 and 1.34x as of YE 2019. Fitch's analysis
applied a 15% cap rate and 5% stress to the YE 2021 NOI resulting
in a 77% modeled loss.

The next largest increase in loss since the last rating action and
second largest contributor to Fitch's loss expectations is the
Miami International Mall loan (6.6%), which is secured by the
306,855-sf collateral portion of a 1.1 million-sf regional mall
located approximately 12 miles northwest of downtown Miami, FL and
10 miles west of Miami International Airport. The property features
three non-collateral tenants, Macy's (2/28 lease expiration),
JCPenney (2/28) and Kohl's (2/28), along with a vacant
Seritage-owned Sears space that closed in November 2018. Large
collateral tenants include H&M (7.4% of NRA; 1/25 lease
expiration), Old Navy (5.5%; 1/25), Forever 21 (4.2%; 1/24), and
Victoria's Secret (3.7%; 1/23 but remains open). All other tenants
comprise less than 3% of NRA individually.

The subject has substantial nearby competition, including the
Taubman-owned Dolphin Mall located one mile to the west and the
Simon-owned Dadeland Mall located eight miles to the south. The
Dolphin Mall is an outlet center that is complementary to the
subject while Dadeland Mall has a higher end tenant profile
including Nordstrom and Saks Fifth Avenue.

Collateral occupancy declined to 73% as of September 2022 down from
75% as of December 2021, 83% as of YE 2020, 91% at YE 2019 and 95%
at issuance. Annualized September 2022 NOI DSCR was 2.52x compared
to 2.37x at YE 2021, 2.75x at YE 2020, and 3.08x at YE 2019.
Fitch's analysis applied a 15% cap rate to the YE 2021 NOI
resulting in a 25% modeled loss.

The third largest contributor to Fitch's loss expectations is The
Shops at Wiregrass (3.3%) loan, which is secured by a 456,637-sf
portion of a 759,880-sf outdoor shopping center located in Wesley
Chapel, FL. The property suffered declining cash flow during the
pandemic, but is recovering to pre-pandemic levels; collateral
occupancy increased to 84% as of September 2022 compared with 76%
as of YE 2020, 87% as of YE 2019, and 93.7% as of YE 2018.
Servicer-reported NOI DSCR increased to 1.36x as of September 2022
compared with 1.15x as of YE 2021, 0.42x as of YE 2020 and 1.15x as
of YE 2019. Fitch's analysis applied a 15% cap rate and 5% stress
to the annualized September 2022 NOI resulting in a 35% modeled
loss.

Increasing Credit Enhancement at the top of the Capital Structure:
As of the February 2023 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance was reduced by 27.7% to $914.8 million from
$1.265 billion at issuance. Fifteen loans (17.5% of the pool) are
fully defeased. Since Fitch's last rating action, four loans
prepaid with yield maintenance which allowed for increased CE on
classes A-4 through B. There was a decline in CE for classes C
through F due to losses being realized from the liquidation of the
REO Charlottesville Fashion Center asset in August 2022.

Six loans (27.3%) are full-term interest-only and all loans
originally structured with a partial interest-only period have
begun to amortize. All of the remaining loans are scheduled to
mature by July 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in
pool-level losses from underperforming or specially serviced loans.
Downgrades to the 'AAAsf' category are not expected given their
high CE relative to expected losses and continued amortization, but
may occur if interest shortfalls occur or if a high proportion of
the pool defaults and expected losses increase considerably.

Downgrades to the 'AA-sf' and 'BBBsf' categories would occur should
overall pool expected losses increase significantly and/or one or
more large loans, primarily the Miami International Mall,
Westminster Mall and The Shops at Wiregrass, have an outsized loss,
which would erode CE. Downgrades are also possible if the Showcase
Mall defaults at maturity and the ultimate recovery prospects
decline. Downgrades to the 'CCCsf', 'CCsf' and 'Csf' categories
would occur with a greater certainty of loss and/or as further
losses are realized.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment-grade notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Sensitivity factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to
improved asset performance coupled with pay down and/or defeasance.
Upgrades to the 'AA-sf' and 'BBBsf' categories would likely occur
with significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance; however,
adverse selection, increased concentrations and/or further
underperformance of the FLOCs could cause this trend to reverse.
Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood
of interest shortfalls.

Upgrades to the 'CCCsf', 'CCsf' and 'Csf' categories are unlikely
absent significant performance improvement on the FLOCs.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MADISON PARK LXIII: Fitch Gives 'BB-(EXP)sf' Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings and Rating Outlooks to
Madison Park Funding LXIII, Ltd.

   Entity/Debt         Rating
   -----------         ------
Madison Park
Funding LXIII,
Ltd.

   A-1             LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating

   A-2             LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating

   B               LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

   C               LT A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating

   D               LT BBB-(EXP)sf Expected Rating

   E               LT BB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating

   F               LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

   Subordinated
   Notes           LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Madison Park Funding LXIII, Ltd. (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that will be managed by
Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC. Net proceeds from the issuance
of the secured and subordinated notes will provide financing on a
portfolio of approximately $600 million of primarily first-lien
senior secured leveraged loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Asset Credit Quality (Negative): The average credit quality of the
indicative portfolio is 'B'/B-', which is in line with that of
recent CLOs. Issuers rated in the 'B' rating category denote a
highly speculative credit quality. However, the notes benefit from
appropriate credit enhancement and standard CLO structural
features.

Asset Security (Positive): The indicative portfolio consists of
99.25% first-lien senior secured loans and has a weighted average
recovery assumption of 74.56%. Fitch stressed the indicative
portfolio by assuming a higher portfolio concentration of assets
with lower recovery prospects and further reduced recovery
assumptions for higher rating stresses.

Portfolio Composition (Positive): The largest three industries may
comprise up to 37% of the portfolio balance in aggregate, while the
top five obligors can represent up to 12.5% of the portfolio
balance in aggregate. The level of diversity required by industry,
obligor and geographic concentrations is in line with other recent
CLOs.

Portfolio Management (Negative): The transaction has a five-year
reinvestment period and reinvestment criteria similar to other
CLOs. Fitch's analysis was based on a stressed portfolio created by
adjusting to the indicative portfolio to reflect permissible
concentration limits and collateral quality test levels.

Cash Flow Analysis (Positive): Fitch used a customized proprietary
cash flow model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls
and assess the effectiveness of various structural features of the
transaction. In Fitch's stress scenarios, the rated notes can
withstand default and recovery assumptions consistent with their
assigned ratings. The weighted average life (WAL) used for the
transaction stress portfolio is 12 months less than the WAL
covenant to account for structural and reinvestment conditions
after the reinvestment period. In Fitch's opinion, these conditions
would reduce the effective risk horizon of the portfolio during
stress periods.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Variability in key model assumptions, such as decreases in recovery
rates and increases in default rates, could result in a downgrade.
Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to potential changes in such
a metric. The results under these sensitivity scenarios are as
severe as between 'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf' for class A-1, between
'BBB+sf' and 'AA+sf' for class A-2, between 'BB+sf' and 'A+sf' for
class B, between 'Bsf' and 'BBB+sf' for class C, between less than
'B-sf' and 'BB+sf' for class D, and between less than 'B-sf' and
'B+sf' for class E.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrade scenarios are not applicable to the class A-1 and class A-2
notes; and as these notes are in the highest rating category of
'AAAsf'.

For other classes, variability in key model assumptions, such as
increases in recovery rates and decreases in default rates, could
result in an upgrade. Fitch evaluated the notes' sensitivity to
potential changes in such metrics; the minimum rating results under
these sensitivity scenarios are 'AAAsf' for class B, 'A+sf' for
class C, 'Asf' for class D and 'BBB+sf' for class E.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
securities and Markets Authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.


MADISON PARK LXIII: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $250,000 F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to two
classes of notes to be issued by Madison Park Funding LXIII, Ltd.
(the "Issuer").

Moody's rating action is as follows:

US$369,000,000 Class A-1 Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2035,
Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

US$250,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Junior Notes due 2035,
Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

The notes listed are referred to herein, collectively, as the
"Rated Notes."

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on Moody's methodology and
considers all relevant risks, particularly those associated with
the CLO's portfolio and structure.

Madison Park Funding LXIII, Ltd. is a managed cash flow CLO. The
issued notes will be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
senior secured corporate loans. At least 96% of the portfolio must
consist of first lien senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 4% of the portfolio may consist of not
senior secured loans. Moody's expect the portfolio to be
approximately 80% ramped as of the closing date.

Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (the "Manager") will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of the assets on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's five year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk assets.

In addition to the Rated Notes, the Issuer will issue five classes
of floating rate notes and one class of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Par amount: $600,000,000

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3030

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 7.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 47.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the Rated Notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the Rated Notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the Rated Notes.


MCAP CMBS 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Cl. G Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one class and affirmed three classes of
MCAP CMBS Issuer Corporation's commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates, series 2014-1. The Rating Outlook for the affirmed
class F has been revised to Positive from Stable. All currencies
are denominated in Canadian dollars (CAD).

   Entity/Debt            Rating          Prior
   -----------            ------          -----
MCAP CMBS Issuer
Corporation 2014-1

   D 55280LAJ7        LT AAAsf Affirmed   AAAsf
   E 55280LAE8        LT AAAsf Upgrade    Asf
   F 55280LAF5        LT BBBsf Affirmed   BBBsf
   G 55280LAG3        LT Bsf   Affirme    Bsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Credit Enhancement: The upgrade to class E and the Outlook
revision to Positive from Stable on class F reflect the strong
credit enhancement (CE) to the bonds, along with the stable
performance on the remaining loans in the pool and continued
scheduled amortization. Since the prior rating actions, the
specially serviced loan, 1121 Centre Street NW loan ($3.2 million)
was disposed from the pool with a full loss in May 2022, which only
affected the non-rated class H.

As of the February 2023 distribution date, the pool's aggregate
principal balance had paid down by 93.1% to $12.2 million from $224
million at issuance. The pool has a weighted average amortization
term of 25 years, which represents faster amortization than U.S.
conduit loans. The remaining loans in the pool have scheduled
maturities between August 2024 and October 2024.

Stable Performance; Pool Concentration: Overall pool performance
and loss expectations have remained generally stable since the last
rating action. The pool is highly concentrated with three loans
remaining. Due to the concentrated nature of the pool, Fitch
performed a paydown analysis that grouped the remaining loans based
on their perceived likelihood of repayment and expected losses.

The upgrades and Positive Outlook revision reflect this paydown
analysis. The upgrade of class E and reflects the reliance on two
full recourse, amortizing balloon loans maturing in 2024 for
repayment, both of which are secured by single tenant properties
with stable performance and leases that extend beyond the loan
term. The Outlook revision to Positive from Stable on class F,
reflects the reliance on a partial recourse, low leveraged,
performing balloon loan (3571-3609 Sheppard Ave East; 50.7%) that
matures in 2024.

The largest loan, 3571-3609 Sheppard Ave East, which is secured by
a 37,890-sf mixed use property with retail and office space in
Scarborough, ON. The YE 2021 NOI declined 1.4% from YE 2020 and
occupancy has remained relatively unchanged at 96.5%, according to
the March 2022 rent roll, compared with 96.4% in June 2021 and up
from 83.9% in March 2020. The property is anchored by Rexall Pharma
Plus (29.8% of NRA leased through May 2026). At issuance, the loan
carried a partial recourse (50%) guarantee from the sponsors, Grand
Alms Future Ltd. & Accessible Lifestyle Consultants Inc.

The other two non-specially serviced loans in the pool include the
175 rue de Rotterdam loan (39.7%), which is backed by a
warehouse/office building in Saint Augustin de Desmaures, QC that
is fully leased to single tenant Strongco Limited Partnership
through August 2029, and the 5498 Boulevard Henri-Bourassa Est loan
(9.7%), which is secured by a single-tenant bank on a long-term
lease in Montreal, QC.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Factors that lead to downgrades include an increase in pool-level
losses from underperforming loans. However, any potential losses
could be mitigated by loan recourse provisions. Downgrades of
classes D and E are not likely due to the high CE and reliance on
performing low leverage, amortizing loans. Downgrades to classes F
and G would occur should loss expectations increase due to
additional loan defaults or transfers to special servicing.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance coupled with paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades
to class F and G may occur should CE and/or defeasance increase
significantly. Future upgrades could be limited due to the small
remaining class size of the junior certificates and the pool
concentration.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MILL CITY 2023-NQM2: Fitch Expects B(EXP)sf Rating on Cl. B-2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed notes
to be issued by Mill City Mortgage Loan Trust 2023-NQM2 (MCMLT
2023-NQM2).

   Entity/Debt        Rating        
   -----------        ------        
MCMLT 2023-NQM2

   A-1            LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating
   A-2            LT AA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-3            LT A(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   M-1            LT BBB(EXP)sf Expected Rating
   B-1            LT BB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-2            LT B(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-3            LT NR(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   XS             LT NR(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-IO-S         LT NR(EXP)sf  Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The notes are supported by 584 loans with a total interest-bearing
balance of approximately $325 million as of the cut-off date.

Loans in the pool were originated primarily by HomeXpress Mortgage
Corp. (HX), Excelerate Capital, and Oaktree Funding Corp. The loans
are serviced by Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 7.4% above a long-term sustainable level (vs. 10.5%
on a national level as of January 2023, down 1.7% since last
quarter). The rapid gain in home prices through the pandemic has
seen signs of moderating with a decline observed in 3Q22. Driven by
the strong gains seen in H1 2022, home prices rose 9.2% yoy
nationally as of October 2022.

Non-Qualified Mortgage (QM) Credit Quality (Negative): The
collateral consists of 584 loans, totaling $325 million, and
seasoned approximately 10 months in aggregate. The borrowers have a
moderate credit profile (732 FICO and 50% DTI) and leverage (76%
sLTV). The pool consists of 44.4% of loans where the borrower
maintains a primary residence, while 55.6% is an investor property
or second home. Additionally, 9.5% of the loans were originated
through a retail channel. Additionally 47.9% are NonQM.

Loan Documentation (Negative): Approximately 94.9% of the pool was
underwritten to less than full documentation, and 38.4% was
underwritten to a 12- or 24-month bank statement program for
verifying income. This is not consistent with Appendix Q standards
and Fitch's view of a full documentation program.

A key distinction between this pool and legacy Alt-A loans is that
these loans adhere to underwriting and documentation standards
required under the CFPB's Ability to Repay Rule (Rule), which
reduces the risk of borrower default arising from lack of
affordability, misrepresentation or other operational quality risks
due to rigor of the rule's mandates with respect to the
underwriting and documentation of the borrower's ability to repay.
Additionally, 2.1% of the pool is Asset Depletion product, 1.9% CPA
or PnL, and 48.5% DSCR.

Limited Advancing (Mixed): The servicers will be advancing
delinquent monthly payments of principal and interest for only the
initial 90 days. Because P&I advances made on behalf of loans that
become delinquent and eventually liquidate reduce liquidation
proceeds to the trust, the loan-level loss severities (LS) are less
for this transaction than for those where the servicer is obligated
to advance P&I.

Modified Sequential-Payment Structure (Mixed): The structure
distributes principal pro rata among the senior certificates while
shutting out the subordinate bonds from principal until all senior
classes are reduced to zero. If a cumulative loss trigger event or
delinquency trigger event occurs in a given period, principal will
be distributed sequentially to class A-1, A-2 and A-3 certificates
until they are reduced to zero.

The limited advancing reduces loss severities, as a lower amount is
repaid to the servicer when a loan liquidates and liquidation
proceeds are prioritized to cover principal repayment over accrued
but unpaid interest. The downside to this is the additional stress
on the structure, as there is limited liquidity in the event of
large and extended delinquencies.

ESG Transaction parties and Operational Risks (Negative): The
transaction has an ESG score of '4' for Transaction Parties and
Operational Risk which has an impact on the transaction due to the
adjustment for the Representations & Warranties framework without
other operational mitigants.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

The defined negative rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10.0%, 20.0% and 30.0% in addition to the
model projected 39.8% at 'AAA'. The analysis indicates that there
is some potential rating migration with higher MVDs for all rated
classes, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

The defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modeling process uses the modification of
these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

MCMLT 2023-NQM2 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Transaction
Parties & Operational Risk due to the representations &warranty
framework without sufficient mitigants which has a negative impact
on the credit profile, and is relevant to the rating[s] in
conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C5: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on eight
classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of America Merrill Lynch Trust
2012-C5 ("MSBAM 2012-C5"), Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2012-C5 as follows:

Cl. C, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022 Affirmed
A1 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022 Affirmed
B3 (sf)

Cl. PST, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022
Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Cl. X-C*, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 13, 2022
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on six P&I classes, Cl. C through Cl. H, were
downgraded due to a high Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the
pool as well as interest shortfall risks stemming from tenant
concentration concerns on the largest remaining loan and the two
loans in special servicing (29% of the pool) that have been deemed
non-recoverable. The largest loan in the pool (Legg Mason Tower –
70% of the pool) is secured by an office property with significant
single tenant concentration (44% of the property's NRA expiring in
August 2024). This loan may be at heightened risk of default after
the current tenant's lease expiration date if the borrower is
unable to re-lease the space. Cl. C has paid down 59% from its
original principal balance and any principal proceeds will be first
distributed pro-rata to Cl. C and Cl. PST (which represents an
exchangeable portion of Cl. C). Despite the hyper-amortization of
the Legg Mason loan, Cl. C and Cl. PST may still be outstanding
upon the lease expiration of the largest tenant.

The rating on one IO class, Cl. X-C, was downgraded due to both
principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes and a
decline in the credit quality of its reference classes. The IO
class references all P&I classes including Cl. J, which is not
rated by Moody's.

The rating on the exchangeable class (Cl. PST) was downgraded due
to principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes and a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced exchangeable
class.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 19.8% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 17.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 2.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 2.8% at the last review.


FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization or a
significant improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 86% to $191 million
from $1.35 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by four remaining mortgage loans.

As of the February 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $3.0 million. While interest shortfalls impact up
to Cl. E, the class received 93% of its monthly interest due as of
the February 2023 remittance report. The shortfalls at Cl. E were
caused by the servicer's reimbursement from outstanding loan
advances on the specially serviced loans.

One loan has been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.5 million (for a loss severity of
19%). Two loans, constituting 29% of the pool, are currently in
special servicing and both special serviced loans have been deemed
non-recoverable by the master servicer as of the February 2023
remittance report.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Distrikt Hotel Loan
($33.0 million -- 17.3% of the pooled balance), which is secured by
the leasehold interest in a 32 story, full-service hotel located in
the Times Square neighborhood of New York, New York. The property
operates under a Hilton flag as part of their "Tapestry
Collection." The collateral is subject to a ground lease with an
expiration in April 2111 with a current ground lease payment of
$825,000, increasing to 907,500 in years 11 through 15 with
subsequent increases thereafter. The property's performance has
generally declined since 2013, due to lower revenue per available
room (RevPAR). The August 2022 trailing twelve month (TTM)
occupancy, ADR and RevPAR were 66.1%, $180.10 and $119.00,
respectively, compared to 93.9%, $192.85 and $181.03 for the same
period ending March 2020. The loan transferred to special servicing
in April 2020 due to imminent monetary default in relation to the
coronavirus outbreak and is last paid through the September 2020
payment date. The special servicer commentary indicates a receiver
is in-place and they are currently pursuing legal remedies. The
most recently reported appraisal value in November 2022 was 30%
above the outstanding loan balance, however, the loan has accrued
over $6 million in outstanding loan advances.

The other specially serviced loan is the Chatham Village Loan
($22.3 million -- 11.7% of the pool), which is secured by a retail
property on the south side of Chicago, Illinois. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2021 due to payment
default and is last paid through January 2022. The property had
faced declining net operating income (NOI) since 2014 and the
property was 77% leased as of September 2021, compared to 79% in
March 2020 and 92% at securitization. The most recent appraisal
value from August 2022 was 30% lower than the outstanding loan
amount and the loan has accrued approximately $1.5 million in loan
advances. Special servicer commentary indicates that foreclosure
was initiated, however, the borrower filed bankruptcy.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $30.7 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (56% expected loss on average).

The two performing loans represent 71% of the pool balance.

The largest performing loan is the Legg Mason Tower Loan ($132.7
million -- 69.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 24-story,
612,613 SF, Class A multi-tenant office building located in the
Harbor East waterfront of Baltimore, Maryland. The property is part
of a three unit condominium structure that includes office space,
18,988 SF of ground and second floor retail space, and a 1,145
space subterranean parking garage shared with the adjacent Four
Seasons Hotel Baltimore. The property was 99% leased as of
September 2022 compared to 100% in September 2020 and 85% at
securitization. The largest tenant, Legg Mason, had previously
downsized its space from 374,598 SF to 269,2756 SF (currently 44%
of NRA expiring in August 2024). Legg Mason reportedly subleases at
least an additional 46,981 SF to other tenants. Legg Mason had
previously subleased their space in 2009 to various tenants such as
Johns Hopkins University (still subleasing) and One Main Financial
(signed a direct lease for 18% of NRA). Franklin Templeton, which
acquired Legg Mason during 2020, announced that it will lease
office space at the Wills Wharf development along the Baltimore
waterfront. The loan benefits from amortization and has amortized
26% since securitization. The loan has passed its anticipated
repayment date (ARD) date of July 2022 and is now in its
hyper-amortization period with a legal final maturity in July 2027.
After the ARD the interest rate increased to the greater of (i)
4.550% plus 3.000% and (ii) the sum of (x) the then applicable
treasury rate plus (y) then current five-year mid swap rate spread,
but in no event will the revised interest rate exceed 9.550%. The
property faces significant rollover risk stemming from the largest
tenant, however, the loan reported a 2.00X NOI DSCR in September
2022 (based on its 25-year amortization period prior to the ARD)
and is expected to amortize further based on the property's current
net cash flow and ARD structure. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
134% and 0.81X, respectively compared to 97% and 1.03X at the last
review.

The other performing loan is the CVS - Charlotte, NC Loan ($2.9
million -- 1.5% of the pool), which is secured by a single tenant
retail building 100% occupied by CVS with a lease expiration in
January 2030. The property is located in Charlotte, North Carolina.
The loan has amortized 19% since securitization and matures in July
2025. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 83% and 1.20X,
respectively, compared to 84% and 1.19X at the last review.


MORGAN STANLEY 2012-C6: Moody's Lowers Rating on 2 Tranches to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on one class and
downgraded the ratings on nine classes in Morgan Stanley Bank of
America Merrill Lynch Trust 2012-C6, Commercial Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2012-C6 as follows:

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Affirmed Aa1
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Downgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. G, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. H, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Affirmed Ca
(sf)

Cl. PST, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

Cl. X-C*, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Nov 8, 2022 Affirmed
Caa3 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating on Cl. B was affirmed because of its significant credit
support and the expected principal recovery from the remaining
loans in the pool. Cl. B has already paid down 98% from its
original principal balance and as the senior most class
outstanding, any principal proceeds will be first distributed to
this class.

The ratings on six P&I classes, Cl. C through Cl. H, were
downgraded due to a decline in pool performance as well as higher
anticipated losses and increased interest shortfall risk from the
significant exposure to loans in special servicing. All five
remaining loans (100% of the pool) are in special servicing. The
largest loan in the pool, 1880 Broadway/15 Central Park West Retail
(69% of the pool), was unable to refinance at its maturity date in
September 2022 and will likely face significant declines in net
operating income (NOI) after the departure of its largest tenant
(54% of the property's NRA). Furthermore, the most recent appraisal
value reported as of the February 2023 remittance statement valued
the property 37% below the outstanding loan balance resulting in an
appraisal reduction amount of $55.4 million. Due to the appraisal
reduction and exposure to other loans in special servicing interest
shortfalls are likely to increase.

The rating on the interest-only (IO) class X-B was downgraded due
to principal paydowns of higher quality referenced classes and a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

The rating on the interest-only (IO) class X-C was downgraded due
to a decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes. The
IO Class X-C references P&I classes Cl. D through Cl. J. Cl. J is
not rated by Moody's.

The rating on the exchangeable class, Cl. PST, was downgraded due
to principal paydowns of higher quality reference classes and
decline in the credit quality of its referenced exchangeable
classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 51.3% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 35.2% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 8.9% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 7.5% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, or a
significant improvement in pool performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, an increase in realized and
expected losses from specially serviced and troubled loans or
interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "Large Loan and Single Asset/Single
Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology"
published in July 2022.

Moody's analysis incorporated a loss and recovery approach in
rating the P&I classes in this deal since 100% of the pool is in
special servicing. In this approach, Moody's determines a
probability of default for each specially serviced and troubled
loan that it expects will generate a loss and estimates a loss
given default based on a review of broker's opinions of value (if
available), other information from the special servicer, available
market data and Moody's internal data. The loss given default for
each loan also takes into consideration repayment of servicer
advances to date, estimated future advances and closing costs.
Translating the probability of default and loss given default into
an expected loss estimate, Moody's then applies the aggregate loss
from specially serviced to the most junior classes and the recovery
as a pay down of principal to the most senior classes.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 84% to $182 million
from $1.12 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by five mortgage loans, all of which are in special
servicing. Loans representing 89% of the pool are in foreclosure or
real estate owned (REO) and 11% were nonperforming past maturity.

No loans have liquidated from the pool with a loss, however, an
aggregate realized loss of $6.9 million has been incurred due to
the servicer reimbursement for prior loan advances on delinquent
loans.

The largest specially serviced loan is the 1880 Broadway/15 Central
Park West Retail Loan ($125.0 million -- 68.6% of the pool), which
is secured by an 84,000 SF, four-level (two levels below grade),
multi-tenant retail condominium located on the Upper West Side of
Manhattan. The property had been 100% leased to four tenants since
securitization. However, the former largest tenant, Best Buy,
vacated ahead of their January 2023 lease expiration, which reduced
the property's occupancy to 46%. Best Buy represented just over 40%
of the property's base rent in 2021. The loan transferred to
special servicing in September 2022 after it was unable to pay off
at its September 2022 maturity date. The special servicer has
initiated foreclosure proceedings in November 2022. A December 2022
appraisal valued the property approximately 59% lower than at
securitization and 37% below the outstanding loan balance. As of
the February 2023 remittance statement an appraisal reduction
amount of $55.4 million was reported and this appraisal reduction
will likely cause interest shortfalls to increase.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the 300 West Adams
Loan ($20.7 million -- 11.3% of the pool), which is secured by a
leasehold interest in a 253,000 SF, 12-story, landmarked office
building located in downtown Chicago. The property is located in
the CBD West Loop and across the street from the Willis Tower. The
property is subject to a 99-year ground lease which commenced in
September 2012. The ground lease payment started at $1.1 million
per year, with 3% increases year-over-year until 2042 when it's
capped at $2.5 million. The property was 61% leased as of December
2022 compared to 77% in September 2020 and 97% in 2018. The decline
in occupancy and increased expenses has caused a significant
decline in NOI. The loan transferred to special servicing in
January 2021 and has been REO since October 2021. As of the October
2022 remittance statement, the master servicer has recognized a 23%
appraisal reduction based on the outstanding loan balance. The loan
has amortized 17% since securitization. Special servicer commentary
indicated a 2022 purchase and sale agreement failed to materialize
and the property is expected to be marketed for sale again during
2023. Moody's expects a significant loss from this loan.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the 470 Broadway Loan
($17.4 million -- 9.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 6,600
SF, 2-story, single tenant retail building in the SoHo neighborhood
of New York City. The property was previously fully leased to Aldo
until the tenant declared bankruptcy in May 2020. Subsequently, the
lease was rejected at this location and the property remains
vacant. The loan transferred to special servicing in May 2020 and
the property became REO in October 2022. The loan has amortized 15%
since securitization, however, an updated appraisal was completed
in June 2022 valuing the property significantly below the loan
balance and the master servicer has deemed the loan as
non-recoverable. Moody's expects a significant loss from this
loan.

The fourth largest specially serviced loan is The Palmdale Gateway
Loan ($9.9 million -- 5.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
grocery anchored retail center located in Palmdale, California,
approximately 63 miles northeast of Los Angeles. The five-one story
buildings were constructed in 1986 and total 100,000 SF. The
property was 95% leased as of September 2022 compared to 89% leased
as of June 2022, and 90% at securitization. The loan failed to pay
off at its scheduled maturity date in October 2022 and transferred
to special servicing in October 2022. The loan has amortized over
19% since securitization and had an NOI DSCR of 2.14x as of June
2022. The loan faces significant lease rollover as the two largest
tenants (combining for 46% of the NRA) have lease expirations in or
prior to April 2025. The special servicer is in the process of
setting up cash management and indicated they will dual track the
foreclosure process while discussing workout alternatives with the
borrower.

The fifth largest specially serviced loan is the 152 Geary Street
Loan ($9.3 million -- 5.1% of the pool), which is secured by an
8,100 SF, 3-story, retail building in San Francisco, California.

The loan transferred to special servicing in June 2020 due to
payment default as the single tenant was not paying rent. The loan
is last paid through its March 2020 payment date and has amortized
19% since securitization. The borrower recently signed a new lease
with a replacement tenant for approximately 78% of the NRA and the
tenant is expected to take occupancy by June 2023. As of the
February 2023 remittance report, a recent appraisal valued the
property above the outstanding loan balance and no appraisal
reduction has been recognized on this loan. Special servicer
commentary states they are dual tracking legal remedies while
having ongoing discussions with the borrower to either payoff the
loan in full or possible forbearance.

Moody's estimates an aggregate $94 million loss for the specially
serviced loans.

As of the February 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $2.6 million, however, these are expected to
increase due to the appraisal reduction on the 1880 Broadway/15
Central Park West Retail Loan. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.


MORGAN STANLEY 2016-UBS11: Fitch Hikes Rating on 2 Tranches to Bsf
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded three classes and affirmed 11 classes of
Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 2016-UBS11 commercial mortgage
pass-through certificates.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
MSC 2016-UBS11

   A-3 61767FAZ4    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 61767FBA8    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-S 61767FBD2    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 61767FAY7   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 61767FBE0      LT AAsf   Upgrade     AA-sf
   C 61767FBF7      LT Asf    Upgrade     A-sf
   D 61767FAJ0      LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   E 61767FAL5      LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf
   F 61767FAN1      LT CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf
   X-A 61767FBB6    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-B 61767FBC4    LT Asf    Upgrade     A-sf
   X-D 61767FAA9    LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   X-E 61767FAC5    LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf
   X-F 61767FAE1    LT CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Loss Expectations: Overall Fitch's loss expectations of the
pool remain stable. The upgrades reflect the stabilized performance
and continued recovery of Fitch Loans of Concern (FLOCs) at the
prior review. No loans have been identified as FLOCs at the current
review. All the remaining loans in the pool are performing with no
loans in special servicing. Fitch's current ratings incorporate a
base case loss expectation of 1.90%.

Improved Credit Enhancement: Credit enhancement (CE) has improved
since the prior rating action due to the payoff of one loan and
continued scheduled amortization. As of the February 2023
distribution date, the pool has been paid down by 20.1% to $575.5
billion from $719.8 billion at issuance. Nine loans (13.0%) have
been fully defeased. Three loans (22.8%) are full-term
interest-only (IO) and six loans (19.2%) are partial-term IO, all
of which have begun amortizing. All of the remaining loans are
scheduled to mature in 2026. Class G is experiencing interest
shortfalls.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to the super-senior classes, A-1 through A-S and X-A,
are not likely due to high CE, but possible if interest shortfalls
occur or if a high proportion of the pool defaults and expected
losses increase significantly. Downgrades to classes B, C, D, X-B
and X-D may occur should overall pool losses increase. Downgrades
to classes E and X-E would occur should loss expectations increase
due to an increase in specially serviced loans and/or the
disposition of a specially serviced loan/asset at a high loss.
Downgrades to the 'CCCsf'-rated classes F and X-F will occur if
losses are considered probable or inevitable or as additional
losses are realized.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Rating Outlook changes. However, for
some transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades of classes B, C and X-B may occur with significant
improvement in CE or defeasance. Upgrades to classes D and X-D
would also consider these factors, but would be limited based on
sensitivity to concentrations or the potential for future
concentration. Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there
were likelihood for interest shortfalls. Upgrades to classes E,
X-E, F and X-F are not likely until the later years in a
transaction, and only if the performance of the remainder of the
pool is stable, and if there is sufficient credit enhancement,
which would likely occur when the non-rated class is not eroded and
the senior classes payoff.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MORGAN STANLEY 2023-1: Fitch Gives 'B-(EXP)' Rating on B-5 Certs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned expected ratings to Morgan Stanley
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2023-1 (MSRM 2023-1).

   Entity/Debt       Rating        
   -----------       ------        
MSRM 2023-1

   A-1           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-1-IO        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-2           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-2-IO        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-3           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-4           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-4-IO        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-5           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-6           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-6-IO        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-7           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-8           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-8-IO        LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-9           LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-10          LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   A-10-IO       LT AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-1           LT AA-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-2           LT A-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-3           LT BBB-(EXP)sf Expected Rating
   B-4           LT BB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
   B-5           LT B-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   B-6           LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
   R             LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fitch expects to rate the residential mortgage-backed certificates
issued by Morgan Stanley Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2023-1
(MSRM 2023-1).

This is the 11th post-crisis transaction off the Morgan Stanley
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust shelf; the first transaction was
issued in 2014. This is the ninth MSRM transaction that comprises
loans from various sellers and is acquired by Morgan Stanley in its
prime-jumbo aggregation process.

The certificates are supported by 360 prime-quality loans with a
total balance of approximately $356.06 million as of the cutoff
date. The pool consists of 100% fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) from
various mortgage originators. The servicers for this transaction
are Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS) and First National Bank
of Pennsylvania. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) will be the
master servicer.

Of the loans, 100.0% qualify as safe-harbor qualified mortgage
(SHQM) or SHQM average prime offer rate (APOR) loans. There are no
high-priced QM loans or non-QM loans in the pool.

There is no exposure to LIBOR in this transaction. The collateral
comprises 100% fixed-rate loans, and the certificates are fixed
rate and capped at the net weighted average coupon (WAC).

Like other prime transactions, this transaction utilizes a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure with subordination
floors to protect against tail risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Updated Sustainable Home Prices (Negative): Due to Fitch's updated
view on sustainable home prices, Fitch views the home price values
of this pool as 9.4% above a long-term sustainable level (versus
10.5% on a national level as of January 2023, down 1.7% since last
quarter). Underlying fundamentals are not keeping pace with the
growth in prices, resulting from a supply/demand imbalance driven
by low inventory, favorable mortgage rates, and new buyers entering
the market. These trends have led to significant home price
increases over the past year, with home prices rising 9.2% YoY
nationally as of October 2022.

High Quality Mortgage Pool (Positive): The collateral consists of
30-year, fixed-rate fully amortizing loans, seasoned at
approximately 13.8 months in aggregate as determined by Fitch.
61.9% of the loans were originated through the sellers' retail
channels. The borrowers in this pool have strong credit profiles (a
764 FICO, as determined by Fitch) and relatively low leverage (a
74.4% sustainable loan-to-value ratio [sLTV], as determined by
Fitch). A total of 139 loans are over $1 million, and the largest
loan totals $2.5 million. Fitch considered 100% of the loans in the
pool to be fully documented loans. Lastly, 11 loans in the pool
comprise nonpermanent residents, and none of the loans in the pool
were made to foreign nationals.

Approximately 38% of the pool is concentrated in California with
moderate MSA concentration. The largest MSA concentration is in the
Los Angeles MSA (12.9%), followed by the San Francisco MSA (5.4%)
and the Riverside MSA (5.0%). The top three MSAs account for 23% of
the pool. There was no adjustment for geographic concentration.

Shifting-Interest Structure and Full Advancing (Mixed): The
mortgage cash flow and loss allocation are based on a
senior-subordinate, shifting-interest structure whereby the
subordinate classes receive only scheduled principal and are locked
out from receiving unscheduled principal or prepayments for five
years. The lockout feature helps to maintain subordination for a
longer period should losses occur later in the life of the deal.
The applicable credit support percentage feature redirects
subordinate principal to classes of higher seniority if specified
credit enhancement (CE) levels are not maintained.

The servicers will provide full advancing for the life of the
transaction (the servicers are expected to advance delinquent P&I
on loans that enter a coronavirus forbearance plan). Although full
P&I advancing will provide liquidity to the certificates, it will
also increase the loan-level loss severity (LS) since the servicers
look to recoup P&I advances from liquidation proceeds, which
results in less recoveries.

Nationstar is the master servicer and will advance if the servicers
are unable to. If the master servicer is not able to advance, then
the securities administrator (Citibank) will advance.

CE Floor (Positive): A CE or senior subordination floor of 1.80%
has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and loss
exposure for senior tranches as the pool size declines and
performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection and
small loan count concentration. A junior subordination floor of
1.10% has been considered to mitigate potential tail-end risk and
loss exposure for subordinate tranches as the pool size declines
and performance volatility increases due to adverse loan selection
and small loan count concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Fitch incorporates a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs than assumed at the MSA level.
Sensitivity analyses were conducted at the state and national
levels to assess the effect of higher MVDs for the subject pool as
well as lower MVDs, illustrated by a gain in home prices.

This defined stress sensitivity analysis demonstrates how the
ratings would react to steeper MVDs at the national level. The
analysis assumes MVDs of 10%, 20% and 30%, in addition to the model
projected MVD, which is 41.1% in the 'AAAsf' stress. The analysis
indicates that there is some potential rating migration with higher
MVDs, compared with the model projection. Specifically, a 10%
additional decline in home prices would lower all rated classes by
one full category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

This defined positive rating sensitivity analysis demonstrates how
the ratings would react to positive home price growth of 10% with
no assumed overvaluation. Excluding the senior class, which is
already rated 'AAAsf', the analysis indicates there is potential
positive rating migration for all of the rated classes.
Specifically, a 10% gain in home prices would result in a full
category upgrade for the rated class excluding those being assigned
ratings of 'AAAsf'.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in up- and down
environments. The results should only be considered as one
potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch relied on an independent third-party due diligence review
performed on 100% of the pool. The third-party due diligence was
generally consistent with Fitch's "U.S. RMBS Rating Criteria."
SitusAMC, Clayton, and Covius were engaged to perform the review.
Loans reviewed under this engagement were given compliance, credit
and valuation grades, and assigned initial grades for each
subcategory. Minimal exceptions and waivers were noted in the due
diligence reports. Refer to the Third-Party Due Diligence section
of the presale report for more detail.

Fitch also utilized data files that were made available by the
issuer on its SEC Rule 17g-5 designated website. Fitch received
loan-level information based on the American Securitization Forum's
(ASF) data layout format, and the data are considered to be
comprehensive. The ASF data tape layout was established with input
from various industry participants, including rating agencies,
issuers, originators, investors and others to produce an industry
standard for the pool-level data in support of the U.S. RMBS
securitization market. The data contained in the ASF layout data
tape were reviewed by the due diligence companies, and no material
discrepancies were noted.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2005-GATE: Fitch Cuts Rating on B Bonds to CCsf
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the class B notes of National
Collegiate Trust (NCT) 2005-GATE to 'CCsf' from 'Asf'/Rating
Outlook Positive.

The downgrade corrects an error in which Fitch previously
referenced in its analysis an incorrect legal final maturity date
of April 2033 for the class B bonds.

The current rating action is based on the correct legal final
maturity for the class B bonds of April 18, 2023. The current
rating of 'CCsf' reflects a probable default of the bonds under the
transaction documents as Fitch does not expect the full principal
balance of the bonds to be repaid by the class B's legal final
maturity on April 18, 2023.

   Entity/Debt            Rating          Prior
   -----------            ------          -----
National
Collegiate Trust
2005-GATE

   B 63544AAQ1        LT CCsf  Downgrade    Asf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Performance: The NCT 2005-GATE trust is collateralized
by private student loans originated by Bank of America
(AA/F1+/Stable) under First Marblehead Corp's GATE Program. Fitch
has maintained its assumption of a constant default rate (CDR) at
3.50%. A base-case recovery rate of 14% for NCT 2005-GATE was
assumed in the analysis, which was determined to be appropriate
based on historical transaction performance.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC; the excess of the trust's asset balance
over the bond balance) and excess spread. There is currently no
cash release from 2005-GATE. Liquidity support is provided by a
reserve account sized at about USD1 million.

Operational Capabilities: Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency (PHEAA) services 100% of NCT 2005-GATE. Fitch believes PHEAA
is an acceptable servicer of private student loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

No rating sensitivities were run for NCT 2005-GATE due to the
probable default of the bonds on the April 2023 payment date.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

No rating sensitivities were run for NCT 2005-GATE as the current
rating of 'CCsf' reflects a probable default on the legal final
maturity date of the outstanding bonds.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Under the 'U.S. Private Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria,' dated
Dec. 21, 2021, assigned ratings differing from model-implied
ratings by more than three notches constitutes a criteria
variation. The model-implied rating for NCT 2005-GATE's class B
notes without accounting for the risk of full principal non-payment
by the legal final maturity is 'AAAsf'. The assigned rating of
'CCsf' is 17 notches below model-implied ratings as a consequence
of the probable default at legal final maturity.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 2007-A: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Cl. C Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all notes of National Collegiate Trust
2006-A (NCT 2006-A) and National Collegiate Trust 2007-A (NCT
2007-A). At the same time, Fitch revised the Rating Outlook for NCT
2006-A's class B and NCT 2007-A's class B and class C to Stable
from Positive.

The affirmation of NCT 2006-A's class A-2 and B bonds and NCT
2007-A's class A, B and C bonds reflects credit enhancement (CE)
levels commensurate to Fitch's stresses at the relevant rating
scenarios and stable asset performance.

The outlook revision on NCT 2007-A's class B and class C follows a
decrease in available excess spread to the bonds, mainly as a
consequence of transaction fees representing an increasingly high
share of transaction payments, and increased asset concentration
with collateral balances amount USD12 million or less for both
transactions. In Fitch's view, these factors combined limit the
upgrade potential of the aforementioned bonds.

   Entity/Debt         Rating           Prior
   -----------         ------           -----
The National
Collegiate
Trust 2006-A

   A-2 63544JAB5   LT AAAsf Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 63544JAC3     LT Asf   Affirmed      Asf

The National
Collegiate
Trust 2007-A

   A 63543YAA5     LT AAAsf  Affirmed   AAAsf
   B 63543YAB3     LT BBBsf  Affirmed   BBBsf
   C 63543YAC1     LT Bsf    Affirmed     Bsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Performance:

NCT 2006-A and 2007-A are collateralized by private student loans
originated by Bank of America (AA/F1+/Stable) under First
Marblehead Corp.'s GATE Program, including originations by CHELA
Funding II, LLC.

Fitch has maintained its assumption of a constant default rate
(CDR) at 3.50%. A base-case recovery rate of 30% was assumed for
both transactions, which was determined to be appropriate based on
historical transaction performance.

Payment Structure:

CE is provided by overcollateralization (OC; the excess of the
trust's asset balance over the bond balance) and excess spread. For
NCT 2006-A, cash may be released from the trust at the greater of
(i) 104% total parity, and (ii) the percentage equivalent of
(outstanding notes + $5.3 million)/ (outstanding notes), currently
at 211.96%. However, due to a Turbo Trigger currently in effect, no
cash is being released from NCT 2006-A. There is currently no cash
release from NCT 2007-A.

Liquidity support is provided to NCT 2006-A and NCT 2007-A by a
reserve account sized at about USD one million.

Operational Capabilities:

Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) services
100% of NCT 2007-A, and 88% of NCT 2006-A. FirstMark services the
remaining 12% of NCT 2006-A. Fitch believes all servicers are
acceptable servicers of private student loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

NCT 2006-A

Current Ratings: 'AAAsf'/'Asf'

Expected impact on the note rating of increased defaults (class
A-2/B):

- Increase base case defaults by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Increase base case defaults by 25%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Increase base case defaults by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'.

Expected impact on the note rating of reduced recoveries (class
A-2/B):

- Reduce base case recoveries by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Reduce base case recoveries by 20%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Reduce base case recoveries by 30%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'.

Expected impact on the note rating of increased defaults and
reduced recoveries (class A-2/B):

- Increase base case defaults and reduce base case recoveries each
by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Increase base case defaults and reduce base case recoveries each
by 25%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Increase base case defaults and reduce base case recoveries each
by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'.

NCT 2007-A

Current Ratings: 'AAAsf'/'BBBsf'/'Bsf'

Expected impact on the note rating of increased defaults (class
A/B/C):

- Increase base case defaults by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'B+sf'/'CCCsf';

- Increase base case defaults by 25%: 'AAAsf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf';

- Increase base case defaults by 50%: 'AA+sf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf'.

Expected impact on the note rating of reduced recoveries (class
A/B/C):

- Reduce base case recoveries by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'BB-sf'/'CCCsf';

- Reduce base case recoveries by 20%: 'AAAsf'/'B+sf'/'CCCsf';

- Reduce base case recoveries by 30%: 'AAAsf'/'Bsf'/'CCCsf'.

Expected impact on the note rating of increased defaults and
reduced recoveries (class A/B/C):

- Increase base case defaults and reduce base case recoveries each
by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'Bsf'/'CCCsf';

- Increase base case defaults and reduce base case recoveries each
by 25%: 'AA+sf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf';

- Increase base case defaults and reduce base case recoveries each
by 50%: 'A+sf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

NCT 2006-A

Current Ratings: 'AAAsf'/'Asf'

- Decrease base case defaults by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Increase base case recoveries by 30%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf';

- Decrease base case defaults and increase base case recoveries
each by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'.

NCT 2007-A

Current Ratings: 'AAAsf'/'BBBsf'/'Bsf'

- Decrease base case defaults by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'Asf'/'CCCsf';

- Increase base case recoveries by 30%: 'AAAsf'/'BBsf'/'CCCsf';

- Decrease base case defaults and increase base case recoveries
each by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'A+sf'/'CCCsf'.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Under the 'U.S. Private Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria', dated
Dec. 21, 2021, assigned ratings differing from model-implied
ratings by more than three notches constitutes a criteria
variation.

The model-implied rating for NCT 2006-A's class B is 'AAAsf'. Fitch
assigned a rating of 'Asf' to class B, which is five notches below
the model-implied rating. The criteria variation and the difference
between the model implied rating and the assigned rating reflect an
expected decrease in available excess spread to the bonds, mainly
as a consequence of transaction fees representing an increasingly
high share of transaction payments, and increased asset
concentration with collateral balance amounting to about USD9.0
million, as of the February 2023 payment date.

The model-implied rating for NCT 2007-A's class B is 'BB-sf'. Fitch
assigned a rating of 'BBBsf' to class B, which is four notches
above the model-implied rating. The criteria variation and the
difference between the model implied rating and the assigned rating
reflect the continued stable performance of the assets and CE
levels still considered commensurate with investment grade
ratings.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


OAKTOWN RE V: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Cl. B-1 Notes to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four tranches
from two mortgage insurance credit risk transfer transactions
issued in 2020. These transactions were issued to transfer to the
capital markets the credit risk of private mortgage insurance (MI)
policies, by National Mortgage Insurance Corporation (Oaktown Re),
and Enact Mortgage Insurance Corporation (Triangle Re), the ceding
insurers, on a portfolio of residential mortgage loans.


The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Oaktown Re V Ltd.

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Triangle Re 2020-1 Ltd.

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. M-2, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 25, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions are primarily driven by the increased levels of
credit enhancement available to the bonds and the decreased level
of expected losses. The prepayments and the sequential pay
structure have benefited the bonds by paying down bonds and
building up credit enhancement.

On the closing date, the issuer and the ceding insurer entered into
a reinsurance agreement providing excess of loss reinsurance on
mortgage insurance policies issued by the ceding insurer on a
portfolio of residential mortgage loans. Proceeds from the sale of
the notes were deposited into the reinsurance trust account for the
benefit of the ceding insurer and as security for the issuer's
obligations to the ceding insurer under the reinsurance agreement.
The funds in the reinsurance trust account are also available to
pay noteholders, following the termination of the trust and payment
of amounts due to the ceding insurer. Funds in the reinsurance
trust account were used to purchase eligible investments and were
subject to the terms of the reinsurance trust agreement.

Following the instruction of the ceding insurer, the trustee
liquidates assets in the reinsurance trust account to (1) make
principal payments to the note holders as the insurance coverage in
the reference pool reduces due to loan amortization or policy
termination, and (2) reimburse the ceding insurer whenever it pays
MI claims after the unfunded coverage levels are written off. While
income earned on eligible investments is used to pay interest on
the notes, the ceding insurer is responsible for covering any
difference between the investment income and interest accrued on
the notes' coverage levels.

In Moody's analysis Moody's considered the additional risk posed by
borrowers enrolled in payment relief programs. Moody's increased
Moody's MILAN model-derived median expected losses by 15% and
Moody's Aaa losses by 5% to reflect the performance deterioration
observed following the COVID-19 outbreak. Moody's also considered
an additional scenario based on higher collateral loss
expectations.

Moody's updated loss expectation on the pool incorporates, amongst
other factors, Moody's assessment of the representations and
warranties frameworks of the transactions, the due diligence
findings of the third-party reviews received at the time of
issuance, and the strength of the transaction's originators and
servicers.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating US RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of this transaction. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


OHA CREDIT 14: S&P Assigns BB- (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to OHA Credit Funding 14
Ltd./OHA Credit Funding 14 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Oak Hill Advisors L.P., a subsidiary
of T. Rowe Price.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Ratings Assigned

  OHA Credit Funding 14 Ltd./OHA Credit Funding 14 LLC

  Class A, $320.00 million: Not rated
  Class B, $56.25 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $32.75 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $28.50 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $17.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $45.00 million: Not rated



ONE HULL STREET: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to 'BB+ (sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on the class D notes from Hull
Street CLO Ltd. to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf). At the same time, S&P
lowered its ratings on the class E and class F notes from the same
transaction to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'. This U.S. CLO transaction
is managed by First Eagle Private Credit Advisors LLC.

The rating actions follow its review of the transaction's
performance using data from the January 2023 trustee report.

Since S&P's May 2022 rating actions on Hull Street CLO Ltd., the
class C-R notes have received full payment of principal and
interest and the class D notes received paydowns totaling $8.8
million. As a result, the class D overcollateralization ratio test
increased to 172.52% as of the January 2023 trustee report from
127.66% in the April 2022 trustee report.

However, the portfolio became concentrated and experienced par loss
during this period, and its overall credit quality has decreased by
some metrics since our May 2022 rating actions. Assets rated in the
'CCC' category have increased to $10.30 million (33.10% of current
portfolio) from $10.14 million (17.90% of portfolio as of April
2021), while defaulted assets have decreased to zero from $1.48
million (2.60% of portfolio). The trustee-reported weighted average
life of the portfolio has also decreased to 1.53 years from 1.99
years, as assets in the portfolio mature and the proceeds were used
to pay down the class C-R and D notes. The class E and class F
notes continue to defer interest and maintain a deferred interest
balance. Due to par losses, credit deterioration and interest
deferrals, the class E overcollateralization ratio decreased to
72.38% from 83.93%.

S&P sadi, "Our upgrade of the class D notes reflects the
significantly improved credit support for this tranche, owing to
its continued paydown and senior position in the current capital
structure.

"We lowered our rating on the class E and class F notes to 'D (sf)'
due to the classes' current credit enhancement levels and
insufficient coverage. The downgrades also reflect our view that
there is a virtual certainty of nonpayment of principal, accrued
interest, and deferred interest due on the stated maturity date.

"The current portfolio is now highly concentrated, with only 15
remaining obligors. Given the lack of diversification, we did not
generate cash flows for this transaction. Instead, our analysis and
rating decisions examined other metrics, such as the credit quality
of the remaining assets and the subordination levels of the rated
notes. We will continue to review whether, in our view, the ratings
assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement
available to support them and will take rating actions as we deem
necessary."



PALISADES CENTER 2016-PLSD: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2 Tranches to C
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on three
classes and affirms the rating on one class of Palisades Center
Trust 2016-PLSD, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2016-PLSD as follows:

Cl. A, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jan 6, 2023
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2022 Downgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2022 Downgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. D, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2022 Downgraded to C
(sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by the correction of an error and
also reflects recent developments relating to the underlying loan.
The special servicer commenced foreclosure proceedings on the loan
in February, as reflected in the February 2023 remittance report.
All the outstanding classes have been impacted by monthly interest
shortfalls since the December 2022 remittance report, due to the
appraisal reduction amount triggered by the significant recent
decline in the appraisal value. In this rating action Moody's also
considered the high Moody's LTV ratio for the first mortgage
balance of 213%, as well as the credit support of each class and
senior-sequential structure. Moody's also analyzed loss and
recovery scenarios to reflect the loan's recovery value, the
current cash flow at the property and timing to ultimate
resolution.

The rating action also reflects the correction of a prior error. In
previous rating actions the expected principal recoveries and
losses were not appropriately considered in the liquidation
analysis.

The property's net cash flow (NCF) was $25.1 million for the
trailing twelve-month period ending September 2022, which
represents a significant increase from the property's COVID low of
$16.2 million in 2020, but remained well below the levels in 2019.
Based on the total loan's interest-only debt service payment the
loan would have an NCF DSCR of 1.41 as of September 2022 and the
loan has been fully cash managed due to its prior maturity
default.

Moody's regard e-commerce competition as a social risk under
Moody's ESG framework. The rise in e-commerce and changing consumer
behavior presents challenges to brick-and-mortar discretionary
retailers.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or a significant improvement in
the loan's performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
further decline in actual or expected performance of the loan.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Large Loan and
Single Asset/Single Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Securitizations Methodology" published in July 2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 2023 payment date, the transaction's aggregate
certificate balance remains unchanged since securitization at
approximately $389 million. The whole loan of $419 million has a
split loan structure represented by the trust loan component of
$389 million and a companion loan component of $30 million (not
included in the trust) that is securitized in JPMDB 2016-C2. The
trust includes notes A, B, C and D. The $229 million senior trust A
note and the $30 million companion loan component in JPMDB 2016-C2
are pari passu. The trust notes B, C and D are junior to the trust
note A and the companion loan component.  Additionally, there is
$142 million of mezzanine debt held outside the trust.

The loan first transferred to special servicing in 2020 and the
original April 2021 maturity date was eventually extended to
October 2022. The loan modification also included a 6-month
principal and interest forbearance. The loan returned to the master
servicer in May 2021, however, the loan returned to special
servicing for imminent default ahead of its October 2022 maturity
date and was again unable to payoff at its already extended
maturity date.  The loan received an additional 30-day forbearance
period that expired on November 8, 2022. The special servicer
commenced foreclosure proceedings in February 2023. The loan is
last paid through its May 2022 payment date and now has outstanding
P&I advances of $10.1 million.

The most recent appraisal valued the property 49% below the
appraised value in August 2020 and 75% below the appraisal at
securitization. The most recent value is significantly below the
outstanding loan balance and as a result the servicer has
recognized an appraisal reduction amount (ARA) of $212 million as
of the February 2023 remittance statement. Due to the appraisal
reduction and delinquent payments all the outstanding classes were
impacted with interest shortfalls as of the February 2023
remittance date. As of the February 2023 remittance statement
cumulative interest shortfalls were $2.5 million and impact up to
Cl. A. Moody's anticipates interest shortfalls will likely continue
due to the significant ARA and the property's poor performance.

The property's performance was already declining prior to 2020 but
was further significantly impacted by the coronavirus pandemic and
performance has remained well below levels at securitization. The
property's NCF increased year over year to $25.0 million in 2021
from its low of $16.2 million NCF in 2020, however, the 2021 NCF
was still 32% lower than in 2019 and approximately 44% below the
2016 NCF. The NCF for the trailing twelve-month period ending
September 30, 2022 was in-line with NCF from 2021. The property's
NCF in 2019 was $36.9 million, down from $40.5 million in 2018 and
$44.9 million in 2016.

The Palisades Center is located approximately 3.5 miles northwest
of the Tappan Zee Bridge and 18 miles northwest of New York City.
The property is managed by the loan's sponsor, Pyramid Management
Group, LLC, a privately held real estate management and development
company headquartered in Syracuse, New York.

The Palisades Center contains several occupied anchors comprised of
Macy's (201,000 square feet (SF)), Home Depot (132,800 SF), Target
(130,140 SF), BJ's Wholesale Club (118,076 SF), Dick's Sporting
Goods (94,745 SF) and Burlington Coat Factory (54,609 SF). Anchor
collateral for the loan does not include the Macy's space. Other
larger collateral tenants include a 21-screen AMC Palisades Center
Cinema, Barnes and Noble, Best Buy, Dave and Busters, DSW, and
Autobahn Indoor Speedway.

The property's occupancy rate has declined since securitization. In
July 2017, JC Penney closed and vacated their three-level 157,000
SF anchor space, which is part of the loan collateral. The JC
Penney space remains vacant. In addition, Lord & Taylor (120,000
SF) closed in January 2020 and Bed Bath and Beyond (45,000 SF with
lease expiring in January 2022) closed in June 2020. As of March
2022, the property was 74% occupied.


REALT 2016-1: Fitch Affirms Bsf Rating on Class G Certificates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Real Estate Asset Liquidity Trust's
(REAL-T) commercial mortgage pass-through certificates series
2016-1. In addition, Fitch has revised the Rating Outlook on two
classes to Positive from Stable.

   Entity/Debt         Rating            Prior
   -----------         ------            -----
REAL-T 2016-1

   A-1 75585RMW2   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-2 75585RMY8   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 75585RNC5     LT AAsf   Affirmed    AAsf
   C 75585RNE1     LT Asf    Affirmed    Asf
   D 75585RNG6     LT BBBsf  Affirmed    BBBsf
   E 75585RNJ0     LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   F 75585RNL5     LT BBsf   Affirmed    BBsf
   G 75585RNM3     LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement: As of the February 2023 distribution
date, the pool's aggregate balance has been reduced by 34% to
$264.8 million, from $401.0 million at issuance. Since Fitch's last
rating action, three loans (7.4% of the balance at issuance) were
repaid in full at or prior to maturity. There are no interest-only
loans in the pool. The transaction does not have any losses to
date. The Outlook revision to Positive on classes B and C reflects
the expected increase in credit enhancement (CE) as the pool
continues to amortize and the likelihood of repayment of loans at
maturity.

Overall Stable Performance and Loss Expectations: The overall pool
performance remains stable from Fitch's prior rating action. Six
loans (19.4% of the pool have been designated as Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOC) due to concerns related to lack of updated
financials, occupancy, delay in refinancing and/or scheduled tenant
rollover. All loans remain current and there are no loans in
special servicing as of the February reporting period. Fitch's
current ratings incorporate a base case loss of 3.5%.

The largest FLOC is Toronto Congress Center (6.9%), the second
largest loan in the pool, secured by a 471,268-sf mixed use
building, which is part of a larger convention and trade show venue
located in Toronto, ON, within close proximity to the Toronto
Pearson International Airport. The loan has been flagged as a FLOC
given performance metrics declined significantly during the
coronavirus pandemic. The 2020 YE NOI debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) declined to 0.55x compared with 2.18x at YE 2019.

The loan did receive COVID-related relief in mid-2020 but has since
paid back the relief; the loan reported current throughout the
pandemic and the property is open and operating. The loan is now
performing under the original issuance terms. Fitch has requested
an update on recent performance. Fitch applied a 30% haircut to YE
2019 NOI to reflect current underperformance of the asset and
expectations for stabilization in the near-term.

The second largest FLOC is Ste Catherine Street Retail Montreal
(6.2%), which consists of 35,219 sf of retail located in the center
of one of the major retail areas in Canada, with street frontage on
Rue de la Montagne and Rue Ste Catherine Ouest. Both tenants
formerly occupying the property, Forever 21 (86% of NRA) and Fossil
(14% of NRA) vacated prior to their scheduled lease expiration
dates in 2025 and 2023, respectively. According to prior servicer
commentary, the Forever 21 space was quickly backfilled with a
month-to-month lease for Ardene but according to web searches, it
appears Ardene is no longer occupying the space. Fitch modeled a
loss of approximately 29% on the loan, which reflects a 30% haircut
to the YE 2019 NOI and is in line with Fitch's prior dark value
analysis for the property. The borrower is working to re-tenant the
vacant space and continues to pay debt service.

There are three loans with near-term maturities (3.6% of the pool).
The loans are expected to extended for a short term past their
respective scheduled maturity dates. One loan (1.2%), secured by a
51-unit multifamily property located in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan,
has already been extended past its originally scheduled September
2022 maturity date. All three loans remain current and continue to
amortize.

Canadian Loan Attributes and Historical Performance: The ratings
reflect strong historical Canadian commercial real estate loan
performance, as well as positive loan attributes, such as short
amortization schedules, recourse to the borrower and additional
guarantors. Approximately 79.7% of the loans in the pool reflect
full or partial recourse.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to classes A-1 through C are not likely due to the
position in the capital structure, but may occur should interest
shortfalls affect these classes. Downgrades to classes D and E are
possible should expected losses for the pool increase significantly
or performance does not stabilize for certain FLOCs. Downgrades to
classes F and G may occur should loss expectations increase from
performance decline of the FLOCs and/or loans transfer to special
servicing pre- or post-maturity.

Fitch has identified both a baseline and a worse-than-expected,
adverse stagflation scenario based on fallout from the
Russia-Ukraine war whereby growth is sharply lower amid higher
inflation and interest rates; even if the adverse scenario should
play out, Fitch expects virtually no impact on ratings performance,
indicating very few rating or Outlook changes. However, for some
transactions with concentrations in underperforming retail
exposure, the ratings impact may be mild to modest, indicating some
changes on sub-investment grade notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Factors that lead to upgrades would include stable to improved
asset performance, particularly on the FLOCs, coupled with
additional paydown and/or defeasance. Upgrades to classes D and E
could occur with significant improvement in CE and/or defeasance.
Upgrades of classes F and G are not likely without stabilization of
performance on the FLOCs; however, adverse selection and increased
concentrations could cause this trend to reverse. Classes would not
be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood of interest
shortfalls.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


RR 26: S&P Assigns Prelim BB-(sf) Rating on $16.5MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to RR 26
Ltd./RR 26 LLC's floating-rate notes.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term loans.
The transaction is managed by Redding Ridge Asset Management LLC.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 13,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The diversification of the collateral pool;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  RR 26 Ltd./RR 26 LLC

  Class A-1, $310.00 million: Not rated
  Class A-2, $60.75 million: AA (sf)
  Class B-1 (deferrable), $29.75 million: A+ (sf)
  Class B-2 (deferrable), $5.00 million: A (sf)
  Class C-1 (deferrable), $23.00 million: BBB (sf)
  Class C-2 (deferrable), $6.25 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $16.50 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $50.00 million: Not rated



SIXTH STREET XXII: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating on E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Sixth Street
CLO XXII Ltd./Sixth Street CLO XXII LLC's floating-rate notes. The
transaction is managed by Sixth Street CLO XXII Management LLC.

The note issuance is a CLO securitization governed by investment
criteria and backed primarily by broadly syndicated
speculative-grade (rated 'BB+' or lower) senior secured term
loans.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 14,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect:

-- S&P's view of the collateral pool's diversification;

-- The credit enhancement provided through subordination, excess
spread, and overcollateralization;

-- The experience of the collateral manager's team, which can
affect the performance of the rated notes through portfolio
identification and ongoing management; and

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Sixth Street CLO XXII Ltd./Sixth Street CLO XXII LLC

  Class A, $248.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $52.00 million: AA (sf)
  Class C (deferrable), $24.80 million: A (sf)
  Class D (deferrable), $22.40 million: BBB- (sf)
  Class E (deferrable), $12.80 million: BB- (sf)
  Subordinated notes, $41.59 million: Not rated



SLC STUDENT 2003-1: Fitch Affirms B Rating on 6 Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings on SLM Student Loan Trust
2003-4 and 2003-7 along with SLC Student Loan Trust 2004-1, 2005-1,
2005-3, and 2006-2. Fitch has also revised the Rating Outlook on
the SLC 2006-2 class A-6 notes to Negative from Stable.

   Entity/Debt           Rating          Prior
   -----------           ------          -----
SLM Student Loan
Trust 2003-4

   A-5A 78442GGD2    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   A-5B 78442GGE0    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   A-5C 78442GGF7    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   A-5D 78442GGG5    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   A-5E 78442GGN0    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   B 78442GGM2       LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf

SLC Student Loan
Trust 2004-1

   A-7 784423AG0     LT B-sf  Affirmed    B-sf
   B 784423AH8       LT B-sf  Affirmed    B-sf

SLC Student Loan
Trust 2005-3

   A-4 784420AQ4     LT AAAsf Affirmed   AAAsf
   B 784420AR2       LT Asf   Affirmed     Asf

SLM Student Loan
Trust 2003-7

   A-5A 78442GHH2    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   A-5B 78442GHJ8    LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf
   B 78442GHK5       LT Bsf   Affirmed     Bsf

SLC Student Loan
Trust 2005-1

   A-4 784420AD3     LT AAAsf Affirmed   AAAsf
   B-1 784420AE1     LT Asf   Affirmed     Asf

SLC Student Loan
Trust 2006-2

   A-6 784428AF1     LT AAAsf Affirmed   AAAsf
   B 784428AG9       LT Asf   Affirmed     Asf

SLM 2003-4 and 2003-7: The outstanding class A notes of both trusts
miss their respective legal final maturity dates under Fitch's
credit and maturity stresses. If the class A notes miss their legal
final maturity dates, this would constitute an event of default on
the transaction's indenture, which would result in diversion of
interest from the class B notes to pay class A notes until the
class A notes are paid in full. This would cause an event of
default for the class B notes. All classes from these transactions
are eventually paid in full under Fitch's stressed cashflow
analysis.

All notes for both transactions are rated 'Bsf'/Stable, supported
by qualitative factors such as Navient's ability to call the notes
upon reaching 10% pool factor, and the revolving credit agreement
established by Navient, which allows the servicer to purchase loans
from the trusts.

SLC 2004-1: The outstanding class A notes miss their legal final
maturity dates under both credit and maturity stresses. If the
class A notes miss their legal final maturity date, this
constitutes an event of default on the transaction's indenture,
which would result in diversion of interest from the class B notes
to pay class A notes until the class A notes are paid in full. This
would cause an event of default for the class B notes. Both classes
from this transaction are eventually paid in full under Fitch's
stressed cashflow analysis.

In affirming the rating at 'B-sf' rather than 'CCCsf' or below,
Fitch has considered qualitative factors such as Navient's ability
to call the notes upon reaching 10% pool factor, the time horizon
until the A-7 maturity date, current rate of amortization and the
eventual full payment of principal in modeling. Since there is no
revolving credit facility in place from Navient for SLC 2004-1,
Fitch has affirmed the class A-7 and B notes at 'B-sf', and the
Rating Outlook remains Stable.

SLC 2004-1, 2005-3, and 2006-2: The class A and B notes pass the
credit and maturity stresses in cash flow modeling for their
respective ratings with sufficient hard credit enhancement (CE).
The class A notes are affirmed at 'AAAsf'. The class B notes are
affirmed at 'Asf'. The revision of the Outlook to Negative from
Stable on the class A-6 notes of SLC 2006-2 reflects the decreasing
cushion in the amount of time the notes pay in full under Fitch's
maturity stresses. All other Outlooks remain Stable.

For SLM 2003-4, 2003-7, and SLC 2005-3, Fitch modelled customized
servicing fees instead of Fitch's criteria-defined assumption of
$3.25 per borrower, per month, due to the higher contractual
servicing fees for this transaction.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

U.S. Sovereign Risk: The trust collateral comprises 100% Federal
Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans, with guaranties
provided by eligible guarantors and reinsurance provided by the
U.S. Department of Education (ED) for at least 97% of principal and
accrued interest. The U.S. sovereign rating is currently 'AAA'/
Stable.

Collateral Performance

For all transactions, after applying the default timing curve per
criteria, the effective default rate is unchanged from the
cumulative default rate. Fitch applies the standard default timing
curve in its credit stress cash flow analysis. Additionally,
defaults have remained in line with expectations, while loan
consolidation activity stemming from the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Program waiver, which ended in October 2022, drove the
short-term inflation of CPR and voluntary prepayments are expected
to return to historical levels. The claim reject rate is assumed to
be 0.25% in the base case and 2.00% in the 'AAA' case.

SLC 2004-1: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 8.25% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 24.75% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sustainable constant
default rate (sCDR) of 1.50% and the sustainable constant
prepayment rate (sCPR; voluntary and involuntary prepayments) of
8.00% in cash flow modelling. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and income based repayment (IBR; prior to adjustment)
are 2.91% (2.91% at Jan. 31, 2022), 8.85% (8.22%) and 16.89%
(16.37%). These assumptions are used as the starting point in cash
flow modelling and subsequent declines or increases are modelled as
per criteria.

The 31-60 DPD and the 91-120 DPD have increased from one year ago
and are currently 1.71% for 31 DPD and 1.01% for 91 DPD compared to
1.34% and 0.59% at Jan. 31, 2022 for 31 DPD and 91 DPD,
respectively. The borrower benefit is approximately 0.26%, based on
information provided by the sponsor.

SLC 2005-1: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 8.75% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 26.25% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sCDR of 1.50% and the
sCPR of 6.30% in cash flow modelling. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and IBR are 2.56% (2.71% at Jan. 31, 2022), 8.65%
(7.65%) and 14.57% (14.36%). These assumptions and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling, and subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria.

The 31-60 DPD have declined and the 91-120 DPD have increased from
one year ago and are currently 1.52% for 31 DPD and 0.51% for 91
DPD compared to 2.51% and 0.44% at Jan. 31, 2022 for 31 DPD and 91
DPD, respectively. The borrower benefit is approximately 0.25%,
based on information provided by the sponsor.

SLC 2005-3: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 13.25% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 39.75% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sCDR of 2.00% and the
sCPR of 7.00% in cash flow modelling. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and IBR are 3.67% (3.67% at Feb. 28, 2022), 9.25%
(9.31%) and 21.75% (21.40%). These assumptions and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling, and subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria.

The 31-60 DPD have declined and the 91-120 DPD have increased from
one year ago and are currently 2.14% for 31 DPD and 1.19% for 91
DPD compared to 3.78% and 0.35% at Feb. 28, 2022 for 31 DPD and 91
DPD, respectively. The borrower benefit is approximately 0.16%,
based on information provided by the sponsor.

SLC 2006-2: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 13.00% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 39.00% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sCDR of 2.00% and the
sCPR of 8.00% in cash flow modelling. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and IBR are 3.42% (3.66% at Feb. 28, 2022), 10.68%
(10.65%) and 16.95% (16.97%). These assumptions and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling, and subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria.

The 31-60 DPD have declined and the 91-120 DPD have increased from
one year ago and are currently 3.20% for 31 DPD and 1.02% for 91
DPD compared to 3.90% and 0.71% at Feb. 28, 2022 for 31 DPD and 91
DPD, respectively. The borrower benefit is approximately 0.16%,
based on information provided by the sponsor.

SLM 2003-4: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 16.75% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 50.25% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sCDR of 2.50% and the
sCPR of 9.70% in cash flow modelling. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and IBR are 2.57% (2.47% at Nov. 30, 2021), 10.15%
(9.64%) and 28.82% (28.09%). These assumptions and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling, and subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria.

The 31-60 DPD and the 91-120 DPD have increased from one year ago
and are currently 2.74% for 31 DPD and 1.11% for 91 DPD compared to
2.30% and 0.44% at Nov. 30, 2021 for 31 DPD and 91 DPD,
respectively. The borrower benefit is approximately 0.09%, based on
information provided by the sponsor.

SLM 2003-7: Based on transaction-specific performance to date,
Fitch assumes a cumulative default rate of 18.00% under the base
case scenario and a default rate of 54.00% under the 'AAA' credit
stress scenario. Fitch is maintaining the sCDR of 2.70% and the
sCPR of 9.70% in cash flow modelling. The TTM levels of deferment,
forbearance and IBR are 2.46% (2.74% at Nov. 30, 2021), 10.53%
(9.68%) and 27.17% (26.83%). These assumptions and are used as the
starting point in cash flow modelling, and subsequent declines or
increases are modelled as per criteria.

The 31-60 DPD and the 91-120 DPD have increased from one year ago
and are currently 3.73% for 31 DPD and 1.41% for 91 DPD compared to
2.55% and 0.83% at Nov. 30, 2021 for 31 DPD and 91 DPD,
respectively. The borrower benefit is approximately 0.09%, based on
information provided by the sponsor.

Basis and Interest Rate Risk: Basis risk for the transactions
arises from any rate and reset frequency mismatch between interest
rate indices for Special Allowance Payments (SAP) and the
securities. As of the most recent collection period, 99.99%,
99.97%, 99.57%, 99.88, 85.25%, and 84.10% of the student loans for
SLC 2004-1, SLC 2005-1, SLC 2005-3, SLC 2006-2, SLM 2003-4, and SLM
2003-7, respectively, are indexed to one-month LIBOR, with the rest
indexed to 91-day T-Bill rate. All notes are indexed to three-month
LIBOR plus a spread, with the exception of class A-5B of SLM
2003-7, which is indexed to Euribor. For that class, there is a
currency swap in place and the trust pays a spread over three-month
LIBOR.

Payment Structure: Credit enhancement (CE) is provided by
overcollateralization (OC), excess spread and, for the class A
notes, subordination of the class B notes. As of the most recent
collection period, Fitch's total parity ratios (including the
reserve account) are 100.99% (0.98% CE), 100.56% (0.56% CE),
100.81% (0.80% CE), 100.75% (0.75% CE), 104.41% (4.41% CE), and
101.06% (1.05% CE) for SLC 2004-1, SLC 2005-1, SLC 2005-3, SLC
2006-2, SLM 2003-4, and SLM 2003-7, respectively. Fitch's senior
parity ratios (including the reserve account) are 106.33% (5.96%
CE), 105.61% (5.31% CE), 105.42% (5.14% CE), 105.81% (5.49% CE),
109.77% (8.90% CE), and 105.96% (5.62% CE) for SLC 2004-1, SLC
2005-1, SLC 2005-3, SLC 2006-2, SLM 2003-4, and SLM 2003-7,
respectively.

Liquidity support is provided by reserve accounts currently sized
at their floors of $2,250,000.00, $3,056,269.00, $1,828,029.00,
$3,778,125.00, $3,384,496.00 and $3,761,650.00 for SLC 2004-1, SLC
2005-1, SLC 2005-3, SLC 2006-2, SLM 2003-4 and SLM 2003-7,
respectively. SLC 2005-3, SLC 2006-2, SLM 2003-4, and SLM 2003-7
will continue to release cash as long as 100.00% reported total
parity (excluding the reserve account) is maintained, and SLC
2004-1 and SLC 2005-1 will release cash once 100.00% reported total
parity (excluding the reserve) is reached.

Operational Capabilities: Day-to-day servicing is provided by
Navient Solutions, LLC. Fitch believes Navient to be an adequate
servicer, due to its extensive track record as one of the largest
servicers of FFELP loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

AAAsf' rated tranches of most FFELP securitizations will likely
move in tandem with the U.S. sovereign rating given the strong
linkage to the U.S. sovereign, by nature of the reinsurance
provided by the ED. Aside from the U.S. sovereign rating, defaults,
basis risk and loan extension risk account for the majority of the
risk embedded in FFELP student loan transactions.

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. Fitch conducts credit and maturity stress
sensitivity analysis by increasing or decreasing key assumptions by
25% and 50% over the base case. The credit stress sensitivity is
viewed by stressing both the base case default rate and the basis
spread. The maturity stress sensitivity is viewed by stressing
remaining term, IBR usage and prepayments. The results below should
only be considered as one potential outcome, as the transaction is
exposed to multiple dynamic risk factors and should not be used as
an indicator of possible future performance.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2004-1

Current Ratings: class A-7 'B-sf'; class B 'B-sf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-7 'CCCsf' (Credit and
Maturity Stress); class B 'CCCsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2005-1

Current Ratings: class A-4 'AAAsf'; class B-1 'Asf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-4 'AAAsf' (Credit and
Maturity Stress); class B-1 'AAAsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2005-3

Current Ratings: class A-4 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-4 'AAAsf' (Credit and
Maturity Stress); class B 'AAAsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'BBBsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'Asf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2006-2

Current Ratings: class A-6 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A-6 'AAAsf' (Credit and
Maturity Stress); class B 'AAAsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- Basis Spread increase 0.50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 25%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf';

- IBR Usage increase 50%: class A 'AAAsf'; class B 'Asf'.

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'Bsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-4

Current Ratings: class A 'Bsf'; class B 'Bsf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A 'CCCsf' (Credit and Maturity
Stress); class B 'CCCsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-7

Current Ratings: class A 'Bsf'; class B 'Bsf'

Current Model-Implied Ratings: class A 'CCCsf' (Credit and Maturity
Stress); class B 'CCCsf' (Credit and Maturity Stress)

Credit Stress Rating Sensitivity

- Default increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Default increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis spread increase 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis spread increase 0.50%: class A 'CCCsf; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Rating Sensitivity

- CPR decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- CPR decrease 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term increase 50%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

SLC Student Loan Trust 2004-1

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2005-1

No upgrade credit or maturity stress sensitivity is provided for
the class A notes, as they are at their highest possible current
and model implied ratings.

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class B 'AAAsf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2005-3

No upgrade credit or maturity stress sensitivity is provided for
the class A notes, as they are at their highest possible current
and model implied ratings.

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class B 'AAAsf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf'.

SLC Student Loan Trust 2006-2

No upgrade credit or maturity stress sensitivity is provided for
the class A notes, as they are at their highest possible current
and model implied ratings.

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class B 'AAAsf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class B 'AAAsf'.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-4

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-7

Credit Stress Sensitivity

- Default decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Basis Spread decrease 0.25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

Maturity Stress Sensitivity

- CPR increase 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- IBR usage decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf';

- Remaining Term decrease 25%: class A 'CCCsf'; class B 'CCCsf'.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


STRUCTURED ASSET 2004-8: Moody's Cuts Cl. M2 Bonds Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five bonds
issued by Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-8. The
collateral backing this deal consists of subprime mortgages.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3mU9K2Z

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust 2004-8

Cl. A1, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A2, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A4, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 26, 2004 Assigned
Aaa (sf)

Cl. M1, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2016
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. M2, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2016 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating downgrades are primarily due to a deterioration in
collateral performance.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


TRAPEZA CDO III: Moody's Upgrades Rating on 2 Tranches to B1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Trapeza CDO III, LLC:

US$25,000,000 Class B Third Priority Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes Due 2034 (current balance of $8,077,185.17), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on July 23, 2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

US$31,250,000 Class C-1 Fourth Priority Secured Floating Rate Notes
Due 2034 (current balance of $35,831,390.98, including deferred
interest), Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on July 23, 2015
Upgraded to B3 (sf)

US$31,250,000 Class C-2 Fourth Priority Senior Secured
Fixed/Floating Rate Notes Due 2034 (current balance of
$35,831,390.98, including deferred interest), Upgraded to B1 (sf);
previously on July 23, 2015 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Trapeza CDO III, LLC, issued in June 2003, is a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio of bank trust
preferred securities (TruPS).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions are primarily a result of the deleveraging of
the Class B notes, and continued increase in the transaction's
over-collateralization (OC) ratios.

The Class B notes have paid down by approximately 7.2% or $0.6
million since a year ago, using principal proceeds from the
redemption of the underlying assets and the diversion of excess
interest proceeds. Based on Moody's calculations, the OC ratios for
the Class B and Class C notes have improved to 1045.5% and 105.9%,
respectively, from February 2022 levels of 969.8% and 105.1%,
respectively. The Class B notes will continue to benefit from the
diversion of excess interest and the use of proceeds from
redemptions of any assets in the collateral pool. The upgrades of
the Class C notes also reflect the decreasing amount of Class B to
be paid off before principal proceeds will be used to begin to pay
Class C notes' principal and deferred interest balances.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery rate,
are based on its methodology and could differ from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par (after treating
deferring securities as performing if they meet certain criteria)
of $84.4 million, defaulted/deferring par of $33.4 million, a
weighted average default probability of 5.17% (implying a WARF of
651), and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 10.0%.

In addition to base case analysis, Moody's considered additional
scenarios where outcomes could diverge from the base case. The
additional scenario includes, among others, deteriorating credit
quality of the portfolio.

Methodology Used for the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in July 2021.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Ratings:

The performance of the rated notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the rated notes is sensitive to the performance of
the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The portfolio consists primarily
of unrated assets whose default probability Moody's assesses
through credit scores derived using RiskCalc(TM) or credit
estimates. Because these are not public ratings, they are subject
to additional estimation uncertainty.


VISIO 2023-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B-(sf) Rating on Class B-2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Visio 2023-1
Trust's mortgage-backed notes.

The note issuance is an RMBS securitization backed by
investor-only, business-purpose, first-lien, fixed- and hybrid
adjustable-rate residential mortgage loans secured by single-family
residences, planned unit developments, condominiums, and two- to
four-family residential properties to both prime and non-prime
borrowers. The pool has 655 loans that are exempt from
ability-to-repay rules.

The preliminary ratings are based on information as of March 15,
2023. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final
ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The pool's collateral composition;

-- The transaction's credit enhancement, associated structural
mechanics, geographic concentration, and representation and
warranty framework;

-- The mortgage originator, Visio Financial Services Inc.; and

-- The potential impact current and near-term macroeconomic
conditions may have on the performance of the mortgage borrowers in
the pool. S&P said, "Per our latest macroeconomic update, we
continue to expect the U.S. will fall into recession in 2023.
Recent indicators support our view, as rising prices and interest
rates eat away at private-sector purchasing power. Indeed, of the
leading indicators we track in our Business Cycle Barometer, only
one of the nine indicators was in positive territory through
October: Seven were negative, and one was neutral. Although our
10-year/three-month term spread indicator remained neutral in
September, daily readings have been inverted since Oct. 25."
Moreover, both the 10-year/one-year and 10-year/two-year indicators
have been inverted for, on average, three straight months, which
signals a recession. The average 10-year/three-month indicator is
headed for an inversion in November, with the average through Nov.
22 at -0.35%. If it's inverted for the second straight month, that
would also be a recession signal. While economic momentum has
protected the U.S. economy this year, what's around the bend in
2023 is the bigger worry. Extremely high prices and aggressive rate
hikes will weigh on affordability and aggregate demand. With the
Russia-Ukraine conflict ongoing, tensions over Taiwan escalating,
and the China slowdown exacerbating supply-chain and pricing
pressures, the U.S. economy appears to be teetering toward
recession. As a result, we continue to maintain the revised outlook
per the April 2020 update to the guidance to our RMBS criteria
(which increased the archetypal 'B' projected foreclosure frequency
to 3.25% from 2.50%).

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Visio 2023-1 Trust

  Class A-1, $108,892,000: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2, $16,526,000: AA (sf)
  Class A-3, $21,209,000: A (sf)
  Class M-1, $11,661,000: BBB (sf)
  Class B-1, $11,568,000: BB- (sf)
  Class B-2, $6,978,000: B- (sf)
  Class B-3, $6,795,124: Not rated
  Class XS, notional(ii): Not rated
  Class R, not applicable: Not rated

(i)The class XS notes will have a notional amount equal to the
aggregate unpaid principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the
first day of the related collection period.



WELLS FARGO 2016-C35: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class F Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed 13 classes of Wells Fargo Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2016-C35. The Rating Outlook for class E has been
revised to Negative from Stable.

   Entity/Debt           Rating            Prior
   -----------           ------            -----
WFCM 2016-C35

   A-3 95000FAS5     LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4 95000FAT3     LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4FL 95000FBA3   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-4FX 95000FBC9   LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-S 95000FAV8     LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   A-SB 95000FAU0    LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   B 95000FAY2       LT AA-sf  Affirmed    AA-sf
   C 95000FAZ9       LT A-sf   Affirmed    A-sf
   D 95000FAC0       LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf
   E 95000FAE6       LT Bsf    Affirmed    Bsf
   F 95000FAG1       LT CCCsf  Affirmed    CCCsf
   X-A 95000FAW6     LT AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
   X-D 95000FAA4     LT BBB-sf Affirmed    BBB-sf

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Loss Expectations: Fitch's loss expectations for the pool
have increased since the prior rating action, primarily due to
higher losses on the Mall at Turtle Creek asset. The Outlook
revision on class E reflects the potential for downgrade if there
is additional certainty of loss on the asset and/or realized losses
are higher than expected. Fitch has designated 14 Fitch Loans of
Concern (FLOCs; 22.9% of pool), including five loans (10.4%) in
special servicing. Fitch's current ratings reflect a base case loss
of 6.6%. Losses could increase to 7.6% when factoring an outsized
loss on the Mall at Turtle Creek asset (4.2%); the Negative Outlook
for class E also reflects this sensitivity analysis.

The largest loan in special servicing and largest increase in
expected losses is the Mall at Turtle Creek loan (4.2%). The loan,
sponsored by Brookfield Properties, is secured by 329,398 sf of
inline space within an enclosed mall located in Jonesboro, AR
(approximately 60 miles northwest of Memphis). Non-collateral
anchor tenants include JCPenney, Dillard's and Target. The largest
collateral tenants include Barnes and Noble, Bed Bath & Beyond,
Best Buy and H&M.

In March 2020, a tornado went through the Jonesboro area and caused
significant damage to the mall, including collapsing the walls of
the Best Buy store. None of the non-collateral anchors suffered
major damage, and all have reopened. An insurance settlement has
been reached, the majority of which has been collected by the
servicer. Some of the insurance proceed were released soon after
the storm for the demolition of areas deemed to be unsafe by local
officials.

According to the servicer, the majority of the loan collateral has
been demolished and additional funds will be required to prepare
the site for a redevelopment. The servicer has completed a deed in
lieu of foreclosure (DIL) and the property became REO in January
2023. Fitch's loss expectations are based on a haircut to net
insurance proceeds expected to be received and results in an
approximate 50% loss severity. In addition to its base case
analysis, Fitch performed a sensitivity on the asset, which assumed
a 75% loss severity; this analysis supports the outlook revision
for class E to Negative.

The largest FLOC and second-largest increase in expected losses,
The Mall at Rockingham Park (6.8%), is secured by 540,867 sf of an
approximate one million sf regional mall in Salem, NH. The loan was
designated a FLOC due to low occupancy after departure of
collateral anchor, Lord and Taylor (29.3% NRA and 2.7% of base
rents), which closed this location in December 2020 after filing
for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. As a result, collateral occupancy has
declined to 55% as of September 2022 from 89% as of September 2020.
Servicer-reported NOI debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for this
full-term IO loan was 1.80x as of the YTD September 2022 compared
with 1.87x at YE 2021, 1.98x at YE 2020, 2.11x at YE 2019 and 2.31x
at issuance.

Per the September 2022 rent roll, near-term rollover includes 12.2%
NRA by YE 2023 spread across 33 tenants. In-line tenant sales
continue to remain strong at $890 psf ($530 psf excluding Apple) as
of the TTM ended November 2022 compared with $1,361 psf ($518 psf
excluding Apple) as of the TTM ended November 2021.

The loan is sponsored by Mayflower Realty (joint venture of Simon
Property Group and the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board) and
Institutional Mall Investors. The remaining anchors are Macy's and
JCPenney, which are both non-collateral. Dicks Sporting Goods
subleases a portion of a non-collateral (Seritage owned) former
Sears space. A 12-screen Cinemark theater opened on the Seritage
parcel in December 2019. Fitch's base case loss of approximately
10% reflects a 15% cap rate and 15% total haircut to the YE 2021
NOI.

The Pinnacle II loan (2.3%) is the third largest increase in
expected losses compared with the prior rating action. The loan is
secured by a 230,000-sf office building located in Burbank, CA in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The property is located less
than a half mile from the Warner Brothers Studio who leases
approximately 900,000 sf of space in the area. The subject was
fully occupied by Warner Brothers with a lease expiring in October
2022. Warner Brothers did not renew at expiration. Cash management
has been in place since July 2020 with approximately $9.2 million
swept into reserves as of January 2023.

Fitch's modeled loss of approximately 6% is based on a cap rate of
8.75% and a 30% stress to the YE 2021 NOI, which reflects a
recovery value of $330 psf.

Increased Credit Enhancement (CE): As of the February 2023
distribution date, the pool's principal balance has paid down by
13.95% to $880 million from $1.0 billion at issuance. Since Fitch's
prior rating action, two loans were repaid at or before their
respective maturity dates resulting in approximately $7 million in
paydown; one loan that was previously in special servicing was
disposed with a loss of approximately $500,000. Twenty-two loans
(15.1%) are defeased, up from 15 loans (12.5%) at the prior rating
action. Eight loans (21.6%) are full-term IO, and the remainder of
the pool is amortizing. Three loans (1.7%) mature in the fourth
quarter of 2025, and the remaining loans mature in 2026.

Undercollateralization: The transaction is undercollateralized by
approximately $109,000 due to a WODRA on Hilton Garden Inn W. I65
Airport Blvd loan, which was reflected in the March 2022 remittance
report.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades would occur with an increase in pool-level losses from
underperforming or specially serviced loans. Downgrades to classes
A-3, A-4, A-FL, A-FX, A-SB, A-S and X-A are not likely due to the
position in the capital structure but may occur should interest
shortfalls affect these classes.

Downgrades to classes B and C may occur should expected pool losses
increase significantly and/or the FLOCs suffer losses.

Downgrades to classes D, E and X-D are possible should loss
expectations increase from continued performance decline of the
FLOCs, additional loans default or transfer to special servicing
and/or higher realized losses than expected on the specially
serviced loans/assets, in particular for the Mall at Turtle Creek
asset.

Further downgrades to class F would occur as losses are realized
and/or become more certain.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Upgrades would occur with stable to improved asset performance,
particularly on the FLOCs, coupled with additional paydown and/or
defeasance.

Upgrades to classes B and C would only occur with significant
improvement in CE, defeasance and/or performance stabilization of
FLOCs and other properties affected by the coronavirus pandemic.
Classes would not be upgraded above 'Asf' if there were likelihood
of interest shortfalls.

Upgrades to classes D, E and X-D may occur as the number of FLOCs
are reduced, there is higher than expected recoveries from the
specially serviced loans and there is sufficient CE to the
classes.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


WESTLAKE AUTOMOBILE 2023-2: S&P Assigns BB+ (sf) Rating on E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its ratings to Westlake Automobile
Receivables Trust 2023-2's automobile receivables-backed notes.

The note issuance is an ABS securitization backed by subprime auto
loan receivables.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of:

-- The availability of approximately 45.53%, 39.28%, 33.19%,
24.68%, and 20.88% credit support (hard credit enhancement and
haircut to excess spread) for the class A (A-1, A-2-A, A-2-B, and
A-3, collectively), B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, based on
final post-pricing stressed cash flow scenarios. These credit
support levels provide at least 3.50x, 3.00x, 2.53x, 1.93x, and
1.58x coverage of S&P's expected cumulative net loss of 12.50% for
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively.

-- The expectation that under a moderate ('BBB') stress scenario
(1.75x S&P's expected loss level), all else being equal, its 'AAA
(sf)', 'AA (sf)', 'A+ (sf)', 'BBB+ (sf)', and 'BB+ (sf)' ratings on
the class A, B, C, D, and E notes, respectively, are within its
credit stability limits.

-- The timely payment of interest and principal by the designated
legal final maturity dates under our stressed cash flow modeling
scenarios, which S&P believes are appropriate for the assigned
ratings.

-- The collateral characteristics of the securitized pool of
subprime automobile loans, our view of the credit risk of the
collateral, and S&P's updated macroeconomic forecast and
forward-looking view of the auto finance sector.

-- The series' bank accounts at Wells Fargo Bank N.A., which do
not constrain the ratings.

-- S&P's operational risk assessment of Westlake Services LLC as
servicer and its view of the company's underwriting and the backup
servicing arrangement with Computershare Trust Co. N.A.

-- S&P's assessment of the transaction's potential exposure to
environmental, social, and governance credit factors, which are in
line with its sector benchmark.

-- The transaction's payment and legal structures.

  Ratings Assigned

  Westlake Automobile Receivables Trust 2023-2

  Class A-1, $273.51 million: A-1+ (sf)
  Class A-2-A, $361.83 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-2-B, $75.00 million: AAA (sf)
  Class A-3, $145.58 million: AAA (sf)
  Class B, $102.60 million: AA (sf)
  Class C, $96.73 million: A+ (sf)
  Class D, $161.21 million: BBB+ (sf)
  Class E, $83.54 million: BB+ (sf)



WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2013-C13: Moody's Cuts F Certs Rating to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on four classes
and downgraded the ratings on five classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2013-C13, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2013-C13 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. B, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed Aa3
(sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed
A3 (sf)

Cl. D, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed
Baa3 (sf)

Cl. E, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed
Ba2 (sf)

Cl. F, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed
B2 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. X-B*, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2022
Affirmed A2 (sf)

* Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the three P&I classes were affirmed because of their
credit support and the transaction's key metrics, including Moody's
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl Index (Herf), are
within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on the four P&I classes were downgraded due to
anticipated losses from the specially serviced and troubled loans.
Specially serviced loans comprise 25% of the pool balance and the
largest loan in special servicing is the 301 South College Street
(22.0% of the pool) which has experienced performance deterioration
as a result of decline in occupancy. Furthermore, all of the
remaining mortgage loans mature by May 2023 and interest shortfalls
may increase if the performance of the specially serviced or
troubled loans declines further or other loans are unable to pay
off at their scheduled maturity dates.

The ratings on the IO class, Cl. X-A, was affirmed based on the
credit quality of the referenced classes.

The ratings on the IO class, Cl. X-B, was downgraded due to a
decline in the credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 11.5% of
the current pooled balance, compared to 1.6% at Moody's last
review. Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 4.6%
of the original pooled balance, compared to 1.2% at the last
review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The methodologies used in rating all classes except interest-only
classes were "US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology" published in July
2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 59% to $352.2
million from $876.7 million at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 46 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 22% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 55.8% of the pool. Four loans,
constituting 2.6% of the pool, have investment-grade structured
credit assessments. Twenty-One loans, constituting 27.7% of the
pool, have defeased and are secured by US government securities.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 8, compared to 14 at Moody's last review.

As of the February remittance report, loans representing 97% were
current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments, 1.5% were 90+ days delinquent, and 1.5% were REO.

Twenty-two loans, constituting 47% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist, of which 3 loans, representing 5% of the
pool, indicate the borrower has received loan modifications in
relation to the coronavirus impact on the property. The watchlist
includes loans that meet certain portfolio review guidelines
established as part of the CRE Finance Council (CREFC) monthly
reporting package. As part of Moody's ongoing monitoring of a
transaction, the agency reviews the watchlist to assess which loans
have material issues that could affect performance.

There have been no loans liquidated from the pool. Three loans,
constituting 25% of the pool, are currently in special servicing.
The largest specially serviced loan is the 301 South College Street
Loan ($77.5 million – 22.0% of the pool), which represents a pari
passu portion of a $159.5 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 988,646 square foot (SF) Class A office tower located
in the central business district of Charlotte, North Carolina. The
property was 99% leased as of March 2020, however, the largest
tenant, Wells Fargo, recently downsized their space significantly.
The tenant previously leased 69% of the net rentable area (NRA),
however the new lease was for 27% of the NRA, which caused
occupancy to drop to 55% as of September 2022.   A reserve is in
place that is trapping excess cash for all terminated space or
space being vacated upon expiration and the current balance is
$14.6 million. The borrower made a significant capital improvement
to the property during the pandemic by renovating /modernizing the
Mall and Plaza level (Lobby-common area) of the building. The loan
transferred to special servicing in January 2023, and matures in
May 2023. The remaining two specially serviced loans are secured by
hotels, where property performance has deteriorated significantly
in relation to business disruptions from the pandemic.  Moody's
estimates an aggregate $38.9 million loss for the specially
serviced loans (44% expected loss on average).

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this
transaction, Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's
adjust the MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects
capitalization (cap) rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap
rates and market cap rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan
balance that reflects each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV
reported in this publication reflects the MLTV before the
adjustments described in the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2022 operating results for 37% of the
pool, and full year 2021 operating results for 99% of the pool
(excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's weighted
average conduit LTV is 82%, compared to 93% at Moody's last review.
Moody's conduit component excludes loans with structured credit
assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and specially serviced and
troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF) reflects a weighted
average haircut of 18.8% to the most recently available net
operating income (NOI), excluding hotel properties that had
significantly depressed NOI in 2021. Moody's value reflects a
weighted average capitalization rate of 9.3%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 2.06X and 1.29X,
respectively, compared to 1.86X and 1.19X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

There are four loans with a structured credit assessment ($9.2
million – 2.6% of the pool), which are secured by multifamily
cooperative properties located in New York.

The top three conduit loans represent 18.5% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the 825-845 Lincoln Road Loan ($30 million –
8.5% of the pool), which is secured by a 38,843 SF retail property
located in Lincoln Road Mall, an eight-block retail corridor within
walking distance from the Atlantic Ocean and some of South Beach's
high-end hotels, including the Ritz-Carlton, The Delano, and The
Shore Club. As of the June 2022 rent roll, the property was 100%
leased to six tenants, including CB2 (15,200 SF, 39% of the NRA),
Urban Outfitters (13,126 SF, 34% of the NRA), and American Eagle
(4,500 SF, 12% of the NRA). The Urban Outfitters space serves as a
flagship store for the retailer. Property performance has improved
from securitization due to higher rental revenues. The loan is
interest only for its entire term and Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR
are 71% and 1.26X, the same as at last review.

The second largest loan is the Bimbo Bakeries Distribution Center
Loan ($22.5 million – 6.4% of the pool), which is secured by a
7.35- acre parcel containing approximately 38,964 SF of warehouse
space, 11,558 SF of office space and 6,444 SF of truck repair
garage space located in Queens, New York. The property is occupied
in its entirety by Bimbo Bakeries USA under Maspeth Holding LLC
through February 2028 with three, 10-year extension options.  The
lease is triple-net with no termination options and an 18-month
renewal notice period. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR is 82% and
1.17X, unchanged from last review.

The third largest loan is the Southport Commons Loan ($12.6 million
– 3.6% of the pool), which is secured by an anchored retail
center containing approximately 200,056 SF located in Indianapolis,
Indiana. The property was built in 2001 and provides approximately
1,182 surface parking.  The property is anchored by Kohl's (43.28%
NRA) and shadow anchored by Target and Home Depot, which are not
part of the collateral. Property performance has declined since
2019 as a result of a decline in occupancy. Moody's LTV and
stressed DSCR are 92% and 1.11X, respectively, compared to 86% and
1.21X at the last review.


WFRBS COMMERCIAL 2014-C20: Moody's Cuts Cl. B Certs Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings on three classes
and downgraded the ratings on six classes in WFRBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2014-C20 as follows:

Cl. A-4, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 16, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-5, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 16, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

Cl. A-S, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SB, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 16, 2022 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SFL, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. A-SFX, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Cl. B, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2022
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Cl. C, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on May 16, 2022
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Cl. X-A*, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on May 16, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

*  Reflects Interest-Only Classes

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the P&I class were affirmed because of their
significant credit support and the transaction's key metrics,
including Moody's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, Moody's stressed debt
service coverage ratio (DSCR) and the transaction's Herfindahl
Index (Herf), are within acceptable ranges.

The ratings on five P&I classes, Cl. A-S, Cl. A-SFL, Cl. A-SFX, Cl.
B and Cl. C, were downgraded due to higher expected losses and
increased interest shortfall risk due to the significant exposure
to specially serviced and poorly performing loans that may have
heightened maturity default risk. Specially serviced loans
represent over 26% of the pool and have each recognized appraisal
reductions of at least 37% of their respective loan balance as of
the February 2023 remittance statement. The three specially
serviced loans include the Woodbridge Center Loan (14.3% of the
pool), Sugar Creek I & II loan (7.2%) and Brunswick Square loan
(4.8%) all of which are already real estate owned (REO) or in
foreclosure. As a result of the significant appraisal reductions
and declining performance of these loans, Moody's anticipates
interest shortfalls will continue and may increase from their
current levels. Furthermore, two of the three largest performing
loans (Worldgate Centre – 6.7% and Savoy Retail & 60th Street
Residential – 3.8%) have most recent DSCRs below 0.75X and all of
the remaining mortgage loans mature within the next 15 months.

The rating on the IO class was downgraded based on a decline in the
credit quality of its referenced classes.

Moody's regard e-commerce competition as a social risk under
Moody's ESG framework. The rise in e-commerce and changing consumer
behavior presents challenges to brick-and-mortar discretionary
retailers.

Moody's rating action reflects a base expected loss of 23.7% of the
current pooled balance, compared to 21.8% at Moody's last review.
Moody's base expected loss plus realized losses is now 15.7% of the
original pooled balance, compared to 14.9% at the last review.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The performance expectations for a given variable indicate Moody's
forward-looking view of the likely range of performance over the
medium term. Performance that falls outside the given range can
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker
than Moody's had previously expected. Additionally, significant
changes in the 5-year rolling average of 10-year US Treasury rates
will impact the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment and may
lead to future rating actions.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significant amount of loan paydowns or amortization, an increase in
the pool's share of defeasance or an improvement in pool
performance.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the performance of the pool, loan concentration, an
increase in realized and expected losses from specially serviced
and troubled loans or interest shortfalls.

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING THE RATING ACTION

The principal methodology used in rating all classes except
interest-only classes was "US and Canadian Conduit/Fusion
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitizations Methodology" published
in July 2022.

DEAL PERFORMANCE

As of the February 17, 2023 distribution date, the transaction's
aggregate certificate balance has decreased by 35% to $820.4
million from $1.25 billion at securitization. The certificates are
collateralized by 75 mortgage loans ranging in size from less than
1% to 14.3% of the pool, with the top ten loans (excluding
defeasance) constituting 52.9% of the pool. Sixteen loans,
constituting 11.5% of the pool, have defeased and are secured by US
government securities. The pool contains seven low leverage
cooperative loans, constituting 3.6% of the pool balance, that were
too small to credit assess; however, have Moody's leverage that is
consistent with other loans previously assigned an investment grade
Structured Credit Assessments.

Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure the diversity of loan
sizes, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Loan
concentration has an important bearing on potential rating
volatility, including the risk of multiple notch downgrades under
adverse circumstances. The credit neutral Herf score is 40. The
pool has a Herf of 18, compared to 19 at Moody's last review.

As of the February 2023 remittance report, loans representing 74%
were current or within their grace period on their debt service
payments and 26% were in foreclosure or real estate owned (REO).

Thirteen loans, constituting 16.4% of the pool, are on the master
servicer's watchlist. The watchlist includes loans that meet
certain portfolio review guidelines established as part of the CRE
Finance Council (CREFC) monthly reporting package. As part of
Moody's ongoing monitoring of a transaction, the agency reviews the
watchlist to assess which loans have material issues that could
affect performance.

Two loans have been liquidated from the pool, resulting in an
aggregate realized loss of $1.7 million (for an average loss
severity of 21%). Three loans, constituting 26.3% of the pool, are
currently in special servicing. All of the specially serviced loans
have transferred to special servicing since June 2020.

The largest specially serviced loan is the Woodbridge Center Loan
($117.5 million -- 14.3% of the pool), which represents a
pari-passu portion of a $226.0 million senior mortgage loan. The
loan is secured by a 1.1 million square foot (SF) component of a
two-story, regional mall in Woodbridge, New Jersey. The mall's
anchors now include Macy's, Boscov's, JCPenney, and Dick's Sporting
Goods. Two anchor spaces are currently vacant following the
December 2019 closure of Lord and Taylor (120,000 SF) and the April
2020 closure of Sears (274,100 SF). Macy's, JCPenny and the former
Lord & Taylor space are not included as collateral for the loan.
Other major tenants include Boscov's, Dick's Sporting Goods, Dave &
Busters and Seaquest. As of December 2022, collateral occupancy was
70%, compared to 68% in December 2021, 69% in December 2020, 97% in
December 2019 and 97% at securitization. Inline occupancy was 86%
as of December 2022 compared to 79% as of December 2021. Property
performance has declined annually since 2015 and the 2021 net
operating income (NOI) was nearly 46% lower than in 2014. The NOI
further declined in 2022 due to lower revenues and the 2022 NOI was
35% lower than in 2021. As a result, the 2022 NOI DSCR was below
1.00X. The property was closed temporarily in 2020 due to the
pandemic and the loan transferred to special servicing in June
2020. The loan is last paid through its March 2022 payment date, a
receiver was appointed in October 2021 and foreclosure is currently
being pursued. The property faces significant competition with
seven competitive regional and super regional centers located
within a 20 miles radius. The property was appraised in January
2023 at a value significantly below the outstanding loan balance
and the master servicer subsequently recognized an appraisal
reduction of $92 million or 78% of the outstanding loan amount. Due
to the continued decline in performance, Moody's anticipates a
significant loss on this loan.

The second largest specially serviced loan is the Sugar Creek I &
II Loan ($58.9 million -- 7.2% of the pool), which is secured by
two adjacent, eight-story office buildings totaling 409,168 SF
located in Sugarland, Texas, 20 miles southwest of the Houston CBD.
The asset is also encumbered with $8.6 million of mezzanine
financing held outside the trust, which is currently in default.
Both buildings are of Class-A quality with Sugar Creek-I
constructed in 2000 and Sugar Creek-II completed in 2008.
Collateral for the loan also includes a four-story 1,198-space
parking garage in addition to 326 surface parking spaces. The
largest tenant, Noble Drilling Services Inc. (originally 41% of the
net rentable area (NRA)), reduced their space by 52,075 SF in
January 2019 as part of their 10-year renewal. The company filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in July 2020 and occupies approximately
72,508 SF (18% of NRA) at the property as of December 2022. The
loan transferred to special servicing in October 2020 for imminent
monetary default. As of December 2022, the properties were 57%
leased compared to 68% in June 2020, 67% at year-end 2019, and 93%
in 2018. As of the February remittance statement the loan is last
paid through its November 2022 payment date. The property was
appraised in December 2022 at a value below the outstanding loan
balance and the master servicer subsequently recognized an
appraisal reduction of $22 million or 38% of the outstanding loan
amount. The property became real estate owned (REO) in February
2023.

The third largest specially serviced loan is the Brunswick Square
loan ($39.5 million -- 4.8% of the pool), which represents a
pari-passu portion of a $64.7 million mortgage loan. The loan is
secured by a 293,000 SF component of a 760,000 SF enclosed regional
mall located in East Brunswick, New Jersey. The property is
anchored by JCPenney and Macy's, both of which own their respective
improvements. Collateral junior anchors include Barnes & Noble, Old
Navy, Forever 21 and a 13-screen Starplex Cinemas, however, the
mall does not contain a food court. As of December 2022, the
property was 95% occupied, compared to 88% as of December 2020. In
June 2021, the loan's original sponsor, Washington Prime Group
(WPG) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the Brunswick Square Mall
was identified as a non-core asset by WPG. The loan transferred to
special servicing a second time in July 2021 due to imminent
monetary default and is last paid through its May 2022 payment
date. Special servicer commentary indicates a receiver was
appointed during 2021 and the property is now REO. The property's
NOI has declined significantly in recent years due to lower revenue
and the NOI DSCR was 0.67X as of June 2022. The property was
appraised in April 2022 at a value below the outstanding loan
balance and the master servicer subsequently recognized an
appraisal reduction of $22 million, nearly 56% of the outstanding
loan amount. Due to the continued decline in performance, Moody's
anticipates a significant loss on this loan.

Moody's has also assumed a high default probability for two poorly
performing loans, constituting 2.2% of the pool, and has estimated
an aggregate loss of $163.0 million (a 70% expected loss on
average) from these specially serviced and troubled loans.

As of the February 2023 remittance statement cumulative interest
shortfalls were $10.4 million. Moody's anticipates interest
shortfalls will continue because of the exposure to specially
serviced loans and/or modified loans. Interest shortfalls are
caused by special servicing fees, including workout and liquidation
fees, appraisal entitlement reductions (ASERs), loan modifications
and extraordinary trust expenses.

The credit risk of loans is determined primarily by two factors: 1)
Moody's assessment of the probability of default, which is largely
driven by each loan's DSCR, and 2) Moody's assessment of the
severity of loss upon a default, which is largely driven by each
loan's loan-to-value ratio, referred to as the Moody's LTV or MLTV.
As described in the CMBS methodology used to rate this
transaction, Moody's make various adjustments to the MLTV. Moody's
adjust the MLTV for each loan using a value that reflects
capitalization (cap) rates that are between Moody's sustainable cap
rates and market cap rates. Moody's also use an adjusted loan
balance that reflects each loan's amortization profile. The MLTV
reported in this publication reflects the MLTV before the
adjustments described in the methodology.

Moody's received full year 2021 operating results for 97% of the
pool, and full or partial year 2022 operating results for 95% of
the pool (excluding specially serviced and defeased loans). Moody's
weighted average conduit LTV is 105%, compared to 104% at Moody's
last review. Moody's conduit component excludes loans with
structured credit assessments, defeased and CTL loans, and
specially serviced and troubled loans. Moody's net cash flow (NCF)
reflects a weighted average haircut of 16% to the most recently
available net operating income (NOI)(excluding the Worldgate Center
loan and the Savoy Retail & 60th Street Residential loan). Moody's
value reflects a weighted average capitalization rate of 10.1%.

Moody's actual and stressed conduit DSCRs are 1.40X and 1.12X,
respectively, compared to 1.43X and 1.12X at the last review.
Moody's actual DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and the loan's actual
debt service. Moody's stressed DSCR is based on Moody's NCF and a
9.25% stress rate the agency applied to the loan balance.

The top three conduit loans represent 16.1% of the pool balance.
The largest loan is the Worldgate Center Loan ($54.8 million --
6.7% of the pool), which is secured by a 229,326 SF shopping center
in Herndon, Virginia. The collateral for the loan also includes a
two-level subterranean parking garage and surface parking totaling
1,170 parking spaces. The property was developed in 1990 and was
anchored by Worldgate Sport & Health flagship facility (108,670 SF)
and AMC Worldgate 9 Theaters (38,238 SF). As of June 2022, the
property was 97% leased, compared to 98% at year-end 2020. The loan
transferred to special servicing in June 2020 due to imminent
monetary default stemming from the coronavirus impact on the
property. However, the loan was returned to the master servicer in
August 2020 without a modification and was brought current in
September 2020. As of September 2022, the servicer reported NOI
DSCR at 0.55X, compared to 1.41X at year-end 2019. Property
performance declined significantly when the former largest tenant,
Worldgate Sport & Health (55% of total base rent) stopped paying
rents and was evicted. The Worldgate fitness facility has changed
management companies, moving from Sport & Health to WTS
International. The space was renovated for $4 million during 2021
and has since re-opened. The loan is currently cash managed and on
the servicer's watch list due to low DSCR. The loan has paid down
approximately 16% since securitization and has been current since
returning from special servicing. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are
145% and 0.71X, respectively, compared to 133% and 0.77X at the
last review.

The second largest loan is the Rockwell -- ARINC HQ Loan ($45.5
million -- 5.5% of the pool), which is secured by three office
buildings that are part of a six-building office complex located in
Annapolis, Maryland. The collateral contains approximately 271,000
SF of NRA and is 100% triple-net leased to ARINC, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, through March 2029. The lease does
not contain any termination options and is fully guaranteed by
Rockwell Collins. The loan has paid down almost 5% since
securitization and has a loan maturity date in April 2024. Moody's
LTV and stressed DSCR are 103% and 1.23X, respectively, compared to
105% and 1.21X at the last review.

The third largest loan is the Savoy Retail & 60th Street
Residential Loan ($31.3 million -- 3.8% of the pool), which is
secured by a mixed-use retail and residential development located
on Third Avenue between 60th Street and 61st Street in New York,
New York. The collateral includes the Savoy Retail Condo and the
60th Street Residential. The retail portion is comprised of
approximately 36,000 SF of retail space and approximately 12,000 SF
of subterranean garage containing 70 spaces. 60th Street
Residential is comprised of four abutting 4-story walk-up
residential buildings. As of September 2022, the total collateral
was reported to be 48% leased compared to 76% in September 2021 and
87% at year-end 2019. The two largest retail tenants, Zavo
Restaurant and Dylan's Candy Bar, have vacated their spaces
resulting in declines in revenue and NOI. The loan has paid down
10% since securitization and the NOI DSCR was only 0.31X as of
September 2022. Moody's LTV and stressed DSCR are 147% and 0.65X,
respectively, compared to 137% and 0.68X at the last review.


[*] Fitch Affirms 37 Classes From 12 National Collegiate Trusts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on March 10, 2023, affirmed 37 classes of notes and
maintained the Rating Watch Negative (RWN) on five classes of notes
from 12 National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (NCSLTs).

   Entity/Debt       Rating                        Prior
   -----------       ------                        -----
National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2004-2/
NCF Grantor
Trust 2004-2

   B 63543PBA3   LT CCsf  Affirmed                  CCsf
   C 63543PBB1   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2005-1/
NCF Grantor
Trust 2005-1

   A-5 1
   63543PBM7     LT BBsf  Rating Watch Maintained   BBsf

   A-5 2
   63543PBN5     LT BBsf  Rating Watch Maintained   BBsf

   B 63543PBK1   LT CCsf  Affirmed                  CCsf

   C 63543PBL9   LT Dsf   Affirmed                  Dsf  

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2007-1

   A-4
   63543XAD1     LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   B 63543XAF6   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   C 63543XAG4   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   D 63543XAH2   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2007-2

   A-4
   63543LAD7     LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   B 63543LAF2   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   C 63543LAG0   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   D 63543LAH8   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2006-3

   A-5
   63543VAE3     LT CCsf  Affirmed                  CCsf

   B 63543VAG8   LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

   C 63543VAH6   LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

   D 63543VAJ2   LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2006-1

   A-5
   63543PCD6     LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

   B 63543PCF1   LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

   C 63543PCG9   LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2005-2/
NCF Grantor
Trust 2005-2

   A-5-1
   63543PBU9     LT CCCsf Affirmed                 CCCsf

   A-5-2
   63543PBY1     LT CCCsf Affirmed                 CCCsf

   B 63543PBW5   LT Csf   Affirmed                 Csf

   C 63543PBX3   LT Csf   Affirmed                 Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2005-3/
NCF Grantor
Trust 2005-3

   A-5-1
   63543TAE8     LT Bsf   Rating Watch Maintained    Bsf

   A-5-2
   63543TAF5     LT Bsf   Rating Watch Maintained    Bsf

   B 63543TAJ7   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   C 63543TAK4   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2006-2

   A-4
   63543MAD5     LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   B 63543MAF0   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   C 63543MAG8   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2003-1

   A-7
   63543PAG1     LT BBsf  Rating Watch Maintained   BBsf

   B-1
   63543PAJ5     LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   B-2
   63543PAK2     LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2004-1

   A-4
   63543PAP1     LT CCsf  Affirmed                  CCsf

   B-1
   63543PAS5     LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

   B-2
   63543PAT3     LT Csf   Affirmed                  Csf

National
Collegiate
Student Loan
Trust 2006-4

   A-4
   63543WAD3     LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   B 63543WAF8   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   C 63543WAG6   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

   D 63543WAH4   LT Csf   Affirmed                   Csf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

For all tranches with ratings of 'B-sf' or higher, Fitch maintains
a rating cap at current rating of 'BBsf' or 'Bsf' on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN). This reflects the pending litigation between the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the trusts, which
could have a negative credit impact on the transactions. Fitch will
resolve the RWN as soon as additional clarity is available on the
outcome of the ongoing litigation, as well as any other pending
litigation involving the trusts and the transactions parties, which
may be more than six months from the date of this review.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Collateral Performance:

The NCSLT trusts are collateralized by private student loans
originated by First Marblehead Corporation. At deal inception, all
loans were guaranteed by The Education Resources Institute (TERI);
however, no credit is given to the guaranty since TERI filed for
bankruptcy on April 7, 2008. Fitch has maintained its assumption of
constant default rate (CDR) at 4.00% on the transactions with
outstanding ratings of 'B-sf' or higher (NCSLT 2003-1, 2005-1 and
2005-3). Recovery rate was assumed to be 0% in light of recent
lawsuit uncertainty between the trusts and defaulted borrowers.

Payment Structure:

All trusts are under-collateralized as total parity is less than
100%. Based on Fitch's calculations, senior reported parity as of
Feb. 27, 2023 distribution date is 492.88%, 80.92%, 788.96%,
140.83%, 210.79%, 126.08%, 78.53%, 181.41%, 142.35%, 120.99%, and
112.56% for NCSLT 2003-1, 2004-1, 2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-3, 2006-1,
2006-2, 2006-3, 2006-4, 2007-1 and 2007-2. Senior notes benefit
from subordination provided by the junior notes.

Operational Capabilities:

Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) services
roughly 98% of the trusts, with Nelnet servicing the rest. US Bank
N.A. acts as special servicer for the trusts. Fitch believes all
servicers are acceptable servicers of private student loans.

A lawsuit to call a servicer default under the transaction
documents against PHEAA was initiated by some of the holders of the
beneficial interest in the NCSLT trusts. Despite the uncertainty on
the outcome of pending litigations between transaction parties,
including PHEAA, Fitch believes such risk is addressed by the
rating cap at current ratings of 'BBsf' or 'Bsf' and Fitch's
conservative assumptions on defaults and recoveries.

Ongoing Litigation Risk:

The CFPB filed an action on Sept. 18, 2017 and a proposed consent
order against the NCSLT issuers for illegal student loan debt
collection practices. According to the CFPB, consumers were sued
for collection on private student loan debt that the companies
could not prove was owed or which obligations were beyond the
statutes of limitation for legal action. As a result, on Sept. 22,
2017, Fitch placed all the notes with a rating of 'B-sf' or higher
on RWN for all Fitch-rated NCSLT issuers involved in the proposed
consent judgment, due to the uncertainty around any possible
negative credit impact on the transactions.

ESG - Customer Welfare - Fair Messaging, Privacy & Data Security:
The trusts must comply with consumer protection-related regulatory
requirements such as fair/transparent lending, data security, and
safety standards.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN on the notes rated 'B-sf' or
higher as soon as additional information is available on the
outcome of the ongoing litigation between the CFPB and the NCSLT
trusts. Should the litigation result in unforeseen monetary
expenses, this could result in negative rating actions, depending
on the type, timing and size of such expenses.

Fitch increased base case default rates by 10%, 25% and 50%, in
accordance with its U.S. Private Student Loan ABS Rating Criteria,
and there was no change to expected ratings due to the rating cap
on the trusts following the ongoing litigation risk.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Positive rating actions are not likely until there is resolution of
the outstanding litigation between the CFPB and the NCSLT trusts.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2003-1, 2004-1, 2004-2,
2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-3, 2006-1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2006-4, 2007-1 and
2007-2 have an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Customer Welfare -
Fair Messaging, Privacy & Data Security. This is due to compliance
with consumer protection related regulatory requirements, such as
fair/transparent lending, data security, and safety standards,
which has a negative impact on the credit profile and is highly
relevant to the rating, resulting in capping the ratings at 'BBBsf'
as well as placing the non-distressed notes on Rating Watch
Negative.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


[*] Fitch Takes Actions on 4 US Trust Preferred CDOs
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings, on March 10, 2023, affirmed the ratings on 23
classes, upgraded one class, and revised Rating Outlooks to two
classes from four collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Rating
actions and performance metrics for each CDO are reported in the
accompanying rating action report.

   Entity/Debt          Rating            Prior
   -----------          ------            -----
Preferred Term
Securities XXIV,
Ltd./Inc.
  
   A-1 74043CAA5    LT AAsf   Affirmed    AAsf
   A-2 74043CAB3    LT BBB+sf Affirmed    BBB+sf
   B-1 74043CAC1    LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   B-2 74043CAE7    LT BB-sf  Affirmed    BB-sf
   C-1 74043CAG2    LT Csf    Affirmed    Csf
   C-2 74043CAJ6    LT Csf    Affirmed    Csf
   D 74043CAL1      LT Csf    Affirmed    Csf

Preferred Term
Securities XXVI,
Ltd./Inc.

   A-1 74042QAA5    LT AAsf   Affirmed     AAsf
   A-2 74042QAB3    LT Asf    Affirmed     Asf
   B-1 74042QAC1    LT BB+sf  Affirmed     BB+sf
   B-2 74042QAE7    LT BB+sf  Affirmed     BB+sf
   C-1 74042QAG2    LT CCCsf  Affirmed     CCCsf
   C-2 74042QAJ6    LT CCCsf  Affirmed     CCCsf
   D 74042QAL1      LT Csf    Affirmed     Csf

InCapS Funding I.
Ltd./Corp.

   B-1 453247AC2    LT BBsf   Affirmed     BBsf
   B-2 453247AD0    LT BBsf   Affirmed     BBsf
   C 453247AE8      LT CCCsf  Affirmed     CCCsf

Preferred Term
Securities XXV,
Ltd./Inc.
  
   A-1 74042FAA9    LT AAsf   Upgrade     A+sf
   A-2 74042FAB7    LT BBB+sf Affirmed    BBB+sf
   B-1 74042FAC5    LT BB+sf  Affirmed    BB+sf
   B-2 74042FAE1    LT BB+sf  Affirmed    BB+sf
   C-1 74042FAG6    LT CCsf   Affirmed    CCsf
   C-2 74042FAJ0    LT CCsf   Affirmed    CCsf
   D 74042FAL5      LT Csf    Affirmed    Csf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The CDOs are collateralized primarily by trust preferred securities
issued by banks and insurance companies.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The class A-1 notes were upgraded due to the 16% of paydowns of
their last review note balance. The magnitude of the deleveraging
for each CDO is reported in the accompanying rating action report.

For two transactions, the credit quality of the collateral
portfolios, as measured by a combination of Fitch's bank scores and
public ratings, deteriorated, one transaction exhibited positive
credit migration and the remaining transaction's credit quality
remained stable. No new cures, deferrals or defaults have been
reported since last review.

The ratings for the class B-1 and B-2 (together, the class B) notes
in InCapS Funding I, Ltd./Corp. (InCaps I) are two notches lower
than their model-implied ratings (MIR) and the class C notes are
three notches lower than its MIR due to the concentrated nature of
the portfolio, the deterioration in the portfolio credit quality
and the sensitivity of modelling results to the direction of
interest rates, particularly given the outstanding swap.

Since last review, one asset fully redeemed from the portfolio
which caused the weighted average number of performing and
deferring issuers to step down to 7. Furthermore, the optimal
principal distribution amount was paid in full on the December 2022
payment date so the class B notes are expected to receive lower
levels of deleveraging from excess spread.

The ratings for the class A-2, B-1 and B-2 notes in Preferred Term
Securities XXIV, Ltd./Inc. (PreTSL XXIV) and the class A-2 notes in
Preferred Term Securities XXV, Ltd./Inc. (PreTSL XXV) are one notch
lower than their MIR given the modest cushions at their respective
MIRs.

The ratings for the class C-1 and C-2 notes in Preferred Term
Securities XXVI, Ltd./Inc. (PreTSL XXVI) are one notch higher than
their MIRs, which were driven by the outcome of the sector-wide
migration sensitivity analysis.

The Stable Outlooks on 14 tranches in this review reflect Fitch's
expectation that the classes have sufficient levels of credit
protection to withstand potential deterioration in the credit
quality of the portfolios in stress scenarios commensurate with the
classes' ratings.

Fitch considered the rating of the issuer account bank in the
ratings for the class A-1 notes in PreTSL XXIV, PreTSL XXV and
PreTSL XXVI due to the transaction documents not conforming to
Fitch's "Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating
Criteria." These transactions are allowed to hold cash, and their
transaction account bank (TAB) does not collateralize cash.
Therefore, these classes of notes are capped at the same rating as
that of its TAB, which is one notch below the notes' MIRs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades to the rated notes may occur if a significant share of
the portfolio issuers default and/or experience negative credit
migration, which would cause a deterioration in rating default
rates.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Future upgrades to the rated notes may occur if a transaction
experiences improvement in credit enhancement through deleveraging
from collateral redemptions and/or interest proceeds being used for
principal repayment.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $255MM of US RMBS Deals Issued 2003-2007
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of nine bonds
from six US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed
by Alt-A and subprime mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3Jxi0ij

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2010
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-WL3

Cl. I-A, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 6, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-3

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Cl. 2-A3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Cl. 2-A4, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WF1

Cl. A-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp 2003-BC2

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2007-WF1

Cl. A1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A6, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $258.2MM of US RMBS Issued 2006-2007
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 10 bonds from
eight US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
subprime mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3FleC7t

The complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: C-BASS Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-CB2

Cl. AV, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 11, 2021 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC1

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2019 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC4

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2018 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

Cl. A-2D, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 29, 2018 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-20

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2018 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-21

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 20, 2018 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2006-22

Cl. 2-A-4, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on May 20, 2019 Upgraded
to B3 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-3

Cl. 1-A, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2018 Upgraded
to B2 (sf)

Issuer: CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-9

Cl. 2A4, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 22, 2016 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $36MM of US RMBS Issued 2004-2006
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight bonds
from four US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS),
backed by scratch and dent mortgages issued by multiple issuers.

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3Ji8wWP

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2004-D

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Dec 6, 2018 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-C

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: Bayview Financial Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-A

Cl. B-1, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2022 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Cl. B-2, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2022 Upgraded
to Caa3 (sf)

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2022 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

Cl. M-4, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jun 2, 2022 Upgraded to
Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Truman Capital Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. A, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2022 Upgraded to
Aa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] Moody's Upgrades $57MM of US RMBS Deals Issued 2004-2007
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 13 bonds from
six US residential mortgage-backed transactions (RMBS), backed by
Alt-A, option ARM, and subprime mortgages issued by multiple
issuers.  

A list of Affected Credit Ratings is available at
https://bit.ly/3Tptjfz

Complete rating actions are as follows:

Issuer: Chevy Chase Funding LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates,
Series 2005-3

Cl. A-1, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19,
2022 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-1I, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19,
2022 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-2I, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. A-NA, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19,
2022 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: Ambac Assurance Corporation (Segregated
Account - Unrated)

Issuer: Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-1

Cl. I-A-1, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: J.P. Morgan Alternative Loan Trust 2007-S1

Cl. A-2, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2020 Upgraded
to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Nomura Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-FM1

Cl. M-3, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 21, 2019 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: RASC Series 2005-EMX2 Trust

Cl. M-5, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Cl. M-6, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022 Upgraded
to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Structured Asset Securities Corp Trust 2004-11XS

Cl. 1-A5A, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Cl. 1-A5B, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19, 2022
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May 19,
2022 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Stable on June 22,2022)

Cl. 1-A6, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 23, 2018
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Underlying Rating: Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on May 23,
2018 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Financial Guarantor: MBIA Insurance Corporation (Affirmed at Caa1,
Outlook Stable on June 22,2022)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the recent performance as well as
Moody's updated loss expectations on the underlying pools. The
rating upgrades are a result of the improving performance of the
related pools, and/or an increase in credit enhancement available
to the bonds.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "US RMBS
Surveillance Methodology" published in July 2022.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Up

Levels of credit protection that are higher than necessary to
protect investors against current expectations of loss could drive
the ratings of the subordinate bonds up. Losses could decline from
Moody's original expectations as a result of a lower number of
obligor defaults or appreciation in the value of the mortgaged
property securing an obligor's promise of payment. Transaction
performance also depends greatly on the US macro economy and
housing market.

Down

Levels of credit protection that are insufficient to protect
investors against current expectations of loss could drive the
ratings down. Losses could rise above Moody's expectations as a
result of a higher number of obligor defaults or deterioration in
the value of the mortgaged property securing an obligor's promise
of payment. Transaction performance also depends greatly on the US
macro economy and housing market. Other reasons for
worse-than-expected performance include poor servicing, error on
the part of transaction parties, inadequate transaction governance
and fraud.

Finally, performance of RMBS continues to remain highly dependent
on servicer procedures. Any change resulting from servicing
transfers or other policy or regulatory change can impact the
performance of these transactions. In addition, improvements in
reporting formats and data availability across deals and trustees
may provide better insight into certain performance metrics such as
the level of collateral modifications.


[*] S&P Places Various Ratings on Tax-Secured Debt on Watch Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed some long-term and underlying ratings on
the local governments and public utility issuers (of tax-secured
debt) on CreditWatch with negative implications. These ratings have
been placed on CreditWatch because S&P has yet to receive fiscal
2021 financial statements from these issuers.

S&P said, "We consider the financial statements necessary to
maintain and assess our ratings on these issuers. Accordingly,
these ratings are now at risk of being withdrawn, preceded by any
change to the rating we consider appropriate given available
information, if we do not receive fiscal 2021 financial statements
within 30 days.

"For debt structures where there are multiple revenue streams, we
have placed the entire structure on CreditWatch where we lack
timely information for a key rating component of the structure. In
addition, for state program ratings dependent on state aid
coverage, we have placed ratings on CreditWatch where we lack
information to confirm program eligibility. For issuers that also
have bond anticipation notes, those ratings could also be affected
by the withdrawal of the long-term rating.

"If issuers provide us with 2021 financial statements within 30
days, we will conduct a full review and take a rating action within
90 days of the CreditWatch placement."

Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative As Of March 13, 2023

  ISSUER                                          STATE   CURRENT
                                                           RATING

  Adams County School Dist No. 158                  WA       A

  Albany Cnty Sch Dist #1                           WY       A+

  Aledo                                             TX       AA

  Andrews County                                    TX       AA-

  Apache Cnty                                       AZ       A+

  Apalachin Fire District                           NY       A+

  Atmore                                            AL       A

  Barry Cnty R-VI Sch Dist (Exeter) (Program)       MO       AA+

  Bellefontaine Neighbors                           MO       BBB-

  Blendon Twp                                       OH       AA-

  Boardman                                          OR       A+

  Borough of Lodi                                   NJ       AA

  Brackenridge Boro                                 PA       BBB

  Broadview Vill                                    IL       A+

  Bug Tussel 1, LLC                                 WI       A+

  Camden Cnty                                       MO       AA

  Castleton-on-Hudson Vill                          NY       A+

  Catasauqua Boro                                   PA       BB+

  Centralia                                         WA       AA-

  Centralia (Power)                                 WA       A+

  City of Wilmer                                    TX       BBB+

  Coeymans Hollow Fire Dist                         NY       A

  Coleman Cnty                                      TX       A

  Coolspring Jackson Lake Latonka Jt Auth           PA       A

  Dallas Area Mun Auth                              PA       A

  Danbury                                           CT       AA+

  Danville                                          KY       AA-

  Deadwood                                          SD       AA-

  Decatur                                           IL       A

  Dellwood                                          MO       A

  Dickinson                                         TX       AA

  Dixfield Twn                                      ME       AA-

  Dorchester Cnty                                   MD       AA-

  Dublin Sch Dist (Program)                         GA       AA+

  Durand                                            WI       AA-

  East Point                                        GA       AA-

  East Point (Appropriation)                        GA       A+

  East Providence                                   RI       AA

  Ekalaka Elementary School Dist No. 15 Carter County  MT    A

  Elba                                              AL       A

  Elizabeth Twp                                     PA       A+

  Excelsior Springs                                 MO       A+

  Excelsior Springs (Appropriation)                 MO       A

  Fairview (City of)                                OR       AA-

  Ferris                                            TX       AA-

  Ford Cnty                                         KS       A+

  Fort Mill Twn                                     SC       AA

  Gallia Cnty                                       OH       A+

  Great Neck Vill                                   NY       AAA

  Greendale                                         MO       A+

  Hallsville                                        TX       AA

  Henry Cnty                                        MO       A+

  Henry Cnty (Appropriation)                        MO       A

  Hereford                                          TX       BBB+

  Herkimer Vill                                     NY       A

  Hidalgo Cnty                                      TX       AA-

  Imperial Cnty                                     CA       A-

  Irvington Twp                                     NJ       BBB

  Jefferson Cnty                                    MO       AA

  Jefferson Cnty (Appropriation)                    MO       AA-

  Jefferson Cnty Library Dist                       MO       AA

  Jefferson Cnty Library Dist (Appropriation)       MO       AA-

  Jefferson Davis Parish Rd Sales Tax Dist #1       LA       A-

  Jersey City                                       NJ       AA-

  Kennebunk Twn                                     ME       AAA

  King Cnty Wtr Dist #111                           WA       AA-

  La Salle County                                   TX       A

  Lakeland                                          MN       A

  Little Egg Harbor Twp                             NJ       AA-

  Lodi Boro                                         NJ       AA

  Mandan Public School District No. 1               ND       AA-

  Manheim Twp                                       PA       AAA

  Manteca (Sewer)                                   CA       AA

  Maple Vy                                          WA       AA+

  Marion                                            OH       BBB

  Marion                                            AR       A+

  Martin Cnty                                       MN       AA

  Massena Twn                                       NY       A+

  McLeod Cnty                                       MN       AA

  Mercer Cnty                                       NJ       AA+

  Meridian                                          MS       A+

  Meridian (Water and Sewer)                        MS       A-

  Meridian                                          MS       A+

  Monroe Twp (Middlesex Cnty)                       NJ       AA+

  Morrisonville Fire Dist                           NY       A

  Mount Laurel Twp Fire Dist #1                     NJ       AA

  Mountlake Terrace                                 WA       AA-

  New Boston                                        TX       A+

  New Boston (Water and Sewer)                      TX       A-

  New Fairview                                      TX       A+

  Newell-Fonda Community School District            IA       A+

  Old Colony Regl Voc Tech High Sch Dist            MA       AA

  Olney (Water and Sewer)                           TX       A-

  Pekin Pk Dist                                     IL       A-

  Phenix City                                       AL       AA-

  Phenix City (Appropriation)                       AL       A+

  Polk Cnty                                         MN       AA

  Port Arthur                                       TX       A+

  Randolph Cnty                                     MO       A+

  Randolph Cnty (Appropriation)                     MO       A

  Renton, SeaTac, Auburn, Burien, Tukwila
    & Des Moines (MRS)                              WA       AA+

  Rice Lake                                         WI       AA-

  Rifton Fire Dist                                  NY       A

  Santa Fe                                          NM       AA

  Santa Fe (Gross Receipt Tax 2nd Lien)             NM       AA

  Santa Fe (Gross Receipt Tax)                      NM       AA+

  Santa Fe (Wastewater)                             NM       AA+

  Santa Fe (Water)                                  NM       AAA

  Sardis City Wtr Wrks and Swr Brd                  AL       A

  Scranton                                          PA       BB+

  Sewickley Boro                                    PA       AA-

  Sheffield                                         AL       A+

  Siskiyou Union High School District               CA       A+

  Southern Berkshire Regl Sch Dist                  MA       AA

  Spokane Pub Fac Dist                              WA       BBB+

  Spokane Pub Fac Dist (MRS)                        WA       AA+

  Springdale                                        AR       A+

  St Charles Cnty Indl Dev Auth                     MO       BB+

  St Marys                                          PA       A+

  Stutsman Cnty                                     ND       AA

  Talladega                                         AL       AA-

  Turlock                                           CA       AA-

  Tuscumbia City Brd of Ed                          AL       A+

  Upper Darby Twp                                   PA       A

  Upper Providence Twp                              PA       AA-

  Venus                                             TX       A+

  Vernon Cnty                                       MO       A+

  Vernon Cnty (Appropriation)                       MO       A

  Volney                                            NY       A+

  Wallkill Twn                                      NY       AA

  Warren Cnty (Appropriation)                       MO       A+

  Watab Township                                    MN       A+

  Watford City                                      ND       BBB+

  Webb Twn                                          NY       AA

  Wilkes Cnty School Dist (Program)                 GA       AA+

  Wilkes Cnty School Dist                           GA       A

  Woodbury                                          NJ       AA



[*] S&P Takes Various Actions on 28 Classes From 12 U.S. RMBS Deals
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings completed a review of its ratings on 28 classes
from 12 U.S. RMBS transactions issued between 2002 and 2007. The
review yielded 10 upgrades, four downgrades, and 14 affirmations.

A list of Affected Ratings can be viewed at:

          https://bit.ly/3YPVVjs

Analytical Considerations

S&P incorporates various considerations into its decisions to
raise, lower, or affirm ratings when reviewing the indicative
ratings suggested by our projected cash flows. These considerations
are based on transaction-specific performance and/or structural
characteristics, and their potential effects on certain classes.
These considerations may include:

-- Collateral performance or delinquency trends,

-- Available subordination and/or overcollateralization,

-- Erosion of or increases in credit support,

-- Historical and/or outstanding missed interest payments or
interest shortfalls, and

-- Assessment of reduced interest payments due to loan
modifications and other credit-related events.

Rating Actions

S&P said, "The rating actions reflect our view regarding the
associated transaction-specific collateral performance and/or
structural characteristics, as well as the application of specific
criteria applicable to these classes. See the ratings list for the
specific rationale associated with each of the classes with rating
transitions.

"The upgrades primarily reflect the classes increased credit
support. Most of these transactions have failed their cumulative
loss triggers, which resulted in a permanent sequential principal
payment mechanism. This prevents credit support from eroding and
limits the affected classes' exposure to losses. As a result, the
upgrades reflect the classes' ability to withstand a higher level
of projected losses than we'd previously anticipated.

"We downgraded three ratings from Ameriquest Mortgage Securities
Inc. series 2004-R1 due to the erosion of credit support resulting
from the payment allocation trigger passing, which allows principal
payments to be made to more subordinate classes, thus eroding the
projected credit support for the downgraded classes.

"We lowered our rating on class M1 from Asset Backed Securities
Corporation Home Equity Loan Trust series OOMC 2006-HE5 after
assessing the impact of missed interest payments on this class.
This downgrade is based on our cash flow projections used in
determining the likelihood that the missed interest payments would
be reimbursed under various scenarios because this class received
additional compensation for outstanding missed interest payments.

"The affirmations reflect our view that our projected credit
support, collateral performance, and credit-related reductions in
interest on the affected classes have remained relatively
consistent with our prior projections."



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than $3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

On Thursdays, the TCR delivers a list of recently filed
Chapter 11 cases involving less than $1,000,000 in assets and
liabilities delivered to nation's bankruptcy courts.  The list
includes links to freely downloadable images of these small-dollar
petitions in Acrobat PDF format.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/books/to order any title today.

Monthly Operating Reports are summarized in every Saturday edition
of the TCR.

The Sunday TCR delivers securitization rating news from the week
then-ending.

TCR subscribers have free access to our on-line news archive.
Point your Web browser to http://TCRresources.bankrupt.com/and use
the e-mail address to which your TCR is delivered to login.

                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter is a daily newsletter co-published
by Bankruptcy Creditors Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., USA.
Randy Antoni, Jhonas Dampog, Marites Claro, Joy Agravante,
Rousel Elaine Tumanda, Joel Anthony G. Lopez, Psyche A. Castillon,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Carlo Fernandez, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9474.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.  Information contained
herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is
not guaranteed.

The TCR subscription rate is $975 for 6 months delivered via
e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each.  For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***